Lincoln Diaz-Balart

Mr. DIAZ-BALART

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. Smith], a distinguished and effective freshman Member of this Congress.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay], the majority whip.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of Congress who has never played golf nor has any intention to, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].

Mr. DIAZ-BALART

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, please submit for the Record the following article brought to my attention by Frank Calzon of Freedom House. Last year, many apologists for the Castro dictatorship argued the Cuba's economy was rebounding and that the dictator had survived his latest economic crisis. The following analysis by University of Pittsburgh economist and Cuba specialist Carmelo Mesa-Lago clearly illustrates the fallacy of these optimistic predictions. The truth is that with each passing day, Cuba's economy worsens and Castro's brutal oppression of the Cuban people inreases. Cuba's Economic Recovery, How Good Are Those 1995 Predictions? (By Carmelo Mesa-Lago) Judging from Fidel Castro's pronouncements and recent CNN coverage, Havana's recovery is already on its way. ``Trust but verify'' is the old Russian proverb; and to assess the situation Freedom House sent its Latin American specialist, Douglas Payne to Cuba in late April. His appraisal appears here, together with an article by the dean of Cuban economic analysts, Professor Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Dr. Mesa-Lago advises caution. ``Statistical series were halted in 1989.'' he says. Adding: ``. . . an economy that has declined by one-half in five years could eventually bottom out and show signs of improvement, but unless a vigorous growth rate occurs it will take decades to recover to the previous economic level.'' According to him, ``even a modest growth rate of two percent (one percent per capita) will be difficult to achieve in 1995.'' His article follows. Most Cuban and foreign economists agree that the island's national product declined by one half in 1990-1993, but there is no consensus on whether the economic deterioration was halted in 1994 and a recovery will occur in 1995. Carlos Lage, vice president of the State Council, declared to Granma January 25 that the economy had bottomed out in mid-1994. Three days later (at an international economic forum held in Switzerland) he reported to a group of potential foreign investors that the growth rate in 1994 was 0.7 percent. Furthermore, Alfonso Casanova, director of the Center of Economic Research at the University of Havana, predicted last February a two percent rate of growth for 1995. Optimistic, but ultimately erroneous forecasts of Cuba's economic recovery have been common in recent years. For instance, early in 1993, Andrew Zimbalist (Smith College) and Pedro Monreal (CEA-Havana) predicted a growth rate of 0.4 percent that year; later in 1993 Zimbalist changes his estimate to a decline of 10 to 15 percent, while Monreal postponed the elusive recovery to 1994 or thereafter. Jose Luis Rodriguez, Cuba's minister of finance, and Raul Talarid, the vice-minister of foreign investment, assured at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 that the economy had bottomed out in 1993 and that some ``signs'' of recovery were present in 1994. Even more cautious were Osvaldo Martinez, the minister of Economics and Planning, and Julio Carranza, the deputy director of CEA, who, respectively, foresaw either stagnation or slowdown in the rate of decline in 1994 and ``modest possibilities'' of recovery in 1995. The growth forecasts have been based on the following arguments: the end of the recession in 18 out of 21 industries; cuts in the monetary hangover, state subsidies and the fiscal deficit; higher prices for sugar and nickel in the world market; greater foreign investment, and a growing number of tourists and hard-currency revenue in that industry. And yet some of the forecasters have candidly pinpointed persisting problems and obstacles to the recovery, such as: 1) inability to increase sugar and agricultural output. 2) a significant labor surplus maintained through huge state subsidies to two-thirds of non-profitable enterprises. 3) insufficient export revenue which precluded buying imports needs to expand both domestic production and exports. 4) not enough foreign investment in spite of the acceleration reported in 1993-94. Members of the Cuban Association of Independent Economists, located in Havana, have argued that continuous stagnation or decline is due to the slow and piece-meal implementation of timid market-oriented reforms; according to them, the reduction in the monetary hangover has not generated an increase in output. Three notes of caution are important in the assessment of the previous forecasts of growth. First, today it is extremely difficult to measure Cuba's national product, because the state sector is shrinking while the informal-private sector is expanding and the value of goods and service generated by the latter is unknown. (For instance, only 170,000 self-employed workers have registered, thus the value of their output can be measured, but possible 500,000 or more are working without registration and the government does not have any idea of the value of their output.) Second, statistical series were halted in 1989 and subsequent data collection has been harmed by the virtual demise of central planning. If official growth rates were difficult to check before the crisis, the situation is worse now. Third, an economy that has declined by one-half in five years could eventually bottom out and show signs of improvement, but unless a vigorous growth rate occurs it will take decades to recover the previous economic level. In my opinion, even a modest growth rate of two percent (one percent per capita) will be difficult to achieve in 1995 for several reasons. The 1995 sugar harvest is officially expected at best to reach 3.5 million tons. A compensatory factor could be the increasing world market price of sugar in 1994 and early 1995, largely boosted by the sharp decline in Cuban exports since 1993; but such prices are leveling off as other sugar producing nations have increased their exports. A more difficult problem is the 500,000 tons of the 1995 sugar harvest that Cuba has mortgaged to finance last year's imports of Russian oil. In addition, Cuba was 500,000 tons of sugar short in committed exports to China in 1994, vital for the import of rice, bicycles and other Chinese products. This will cut availability of sugar for new exports. The actual availability of sugar for export in 1995 should be from 2 to 2.5 million tons. Minister of Agriculture Alfredo Jordan has acknowledged that the new cooperatives (UBPC) that replaced most state farms in 1993-94 are not efficient and have failed to increase both sugar and non-sugar agricultural output. He has reported a decline of 36 percent in the production of grains, fruits, vegetables and tubers in 1992-94. Tobacco leaf production decreased 57 percent in 1989-93 and torrential rains harmed the 1995 crop in Pinar del Rio province. Jordan announced an increase of cattle heads to 4.5 million in 1994, but this actually was an eight percent decline in relation to the 4.9 million head officially reported in 1989. Nickel output reached a peak of 46,000 tons in 1989 and declined to 33,349 in 1991 due to the obsolete technology of the Soviet-made plant in Punta Gorda, problems in the old U.S.-made plants, and lack of world demand. In spite of Canadian investment, nickel output in 1994 declined, although Cuba is hoping for improvement this year. (See Cubanews, April 1995) In 1994, the number of tourists reached a record of 630,000 and generated $850 million in revenue, but actual profit was only $255 million because of the high costs of imports required to cater to tourists. Even as the number of tourists increase in 1995 at the previous pace, the target of 1.5 million tourists will not be met and profits will not exceed $300 million. Cumulative foreign investment reached $1.5 billion in 1990- 94, an annual average of $300 million, equal to 5-6 percent of the $5-6 billion in annual Soviet aid received by Cuba in the 1980s. These negative factors will affect foreign investment: 1) the Mexican crisis, which has led to the cancellation or suspension of some Mexican investment projects. 2) the withdrawal of Total, the pioneer French corporation, after two years of unsuccessful oil exploration. 3) the ranking of Cuba as the worst among 167 countries in terms of risk for foreign investment by Euromoney in 1994. 4) the potential enactment of a Republican-endorsed bill to penalize foreign investors in U.S. property confiscated by Cuba in 1959-60. The value of Cuban exports declined from $6 billion in 1985 to $1.8 billion in 1994. Carranza and Monreal forecasted in 1993 exports for $4-5 billion for 1995, while the government prediction was even higher. But Casanova's estimate for 1995 exports is $1.5 billion and Talarid acknowledged that ``only $4 billion'' more were needed to finance the necessary imports. The 1995 combined hard-currency revenue from exports, tourism and investment can be estimated at $2.5 billion, 78 percent less than the corresponding figure for 1989. All the evidence summarized above suggests that the Cuban economy will either stagnate or continue its deterioration in 1995, although at a lower rate of decline. Cuban figures showing a growth rate for 1995 will have to be backed by hard data in order to be credible.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 204 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, tireless fighter for human rights and an inspiration for freedom fighters throughout the world.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I think it is important, No. 1 to concentrate on legislation before us today. I want to be specific with regard to the last section of the bill which reads: Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorizing for deployment of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia for any purpose, including training, support or delivery of military equipment. Now, that is important to realize that is in this bill. The gentleman brings up other possibilities in the future.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. They are not authorized at this point.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], a tireless fighter for human rights throughout the world and a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations and one of the great leaders of this Congress who continuously proves precisely that it is the American people who are the moral leaders of the world. (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Rules. (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 204 is a structured rule providing for the consideration of S. 21, a bill to terminate the U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995. In addition to the 1 hour for debate on this rule, the rule provides for 3 hours of general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. It also makes in order an amendment in the nature of a substitute, if offered, by the minority leader or his designee, which would be debatable for 1 hour, equally divided between the proponent and an opponent. If the minority chooses not to offer a substitute, the additional hour allocated for a substitute may be added to the general debate time by mutual agreement. House Resolution 204 also provides, Mr. Speaker, for one motion to recommit which, if including instructions, may only be offered by the minority leader or a designee. I believe that the time allocated for the discussion of S. 21 is sufficient and it was arrived at in a fair and judicious manner. The Committee on Rules originally considered providing 1 hour on the rule, 2 hours for general debate, and 1 hour on a substitute, but at my suggestion, and I would like to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the chairman, and all of the distinguished members of the Committee on Rules for their gracious consideration, the committee increased the general debate time by an additional hour to provide for further discussion of this critical issue. Mr. Speaker, the House has already spoken on the issue of lifting the arms embargo during consideration of H.R. 1561, the Overseas Investment Act. On June 8 of this year, the House voted overwhelmingly, 318 to 99 in favor of an amendment to require the President to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia upon receiving a request for assistance from that government. Mr. Speaker, the issue can wait no longer. That is why we need to act this week on an amendable bill that has already passed the Senate so that it can go straight to the President without the need for a conference. At this time I would like to thank the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, as well as the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], and other colleagues who have worked tirelessly to bring an end to what I believe is the ethically unjustifiable arms embargo on Bosnia. Mr. Speaker, the arms embargo on Bosnia, as the Speaker knows, was morally questionable from the very beginning and I believe that legally it was questionable from the very beginning as well. It was the Yugoslav regime, the regime in Belgrade, over 3 years ago when that country was already in an obvious process of disintegration that asked the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on what at that time was Yugoslavia. What happened consequently was that months afterward, when Yugoslavia broke up and the independent states of the former Yugoslavia achieved independence, and in fact Bosnia was recognized as a member nation of the United Nations, the arms embargo that had been applied to Yugoslavia was consequently applied to the independent states of the former Yugoslavia. Now, the objective of the aggressors in Belgrade, I believe, Mr. Speaker, was clear from the beginning. Inheriting the great overwhelming majority of the resources, of the equipment of the former army of Yugoslavia, the armed forces of Yugoslavia and having in mind the goal of the so-called greater Serbia, a Serbian empire, Mr. Speaker, which would include great portions of what is now the independent and sovereign and recognized by the international community state of Bosnia, the goal was, in effect, to have a situation imposed by the international community where the hands of the new State of Bosnia would be tied, where they would be in effect not capable of arming themselves against overwhelming superiority by the aggressor, by the army controlled by Belgrade, by the resources that came from the former Communist Yugoslavia. So what we have seen is really a very profound injustice, Mr. Speaker, that has been perpetrated upon a new, sovereign, independent nation that is recognized by the international community, that is a member of the United Nations, and yet, in violation and contravention directly of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it has not been allowed that most fundamental of the rights of any state, which is the right of self-defense. Mr. Speaker, NATO and the United Nations have failed completely to enforce the Security Council resolutions which authorized the use of force to defend the so-called safe havens and to get humanitarian assistance through to the people who need it in Bosnia. As Margaret Thatcher stated in a letter just last week to Senator Dole, the proponent of this very important measure in the Senate, ``The safe havens,'' Margaret Thatcher wrote, ``were never safe. Now they are actually falling to Serb assault. Murder, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and torture are the legacy of the policy of the last 3 years to the people of Bosnia. It has failed utterly.'' Mr. Speaker, we owe it to the victims, we owe it to the victims of Serb aggression at the very least to have them obtain at least the possibility of arming themselves, to defend themselves against what is without any doubt one of the most brutal forms of aggression that the Western World has witnessed since the Holocaust. If the international community is not willing to defend the Bosnian people, at the very least we should not prohibit them from defending themselves. That is the essence of the argument, of the extremely important argument, that the Congress will be debating today. Despite the fact that we have so many important measures that we have to discuss and debate and vote upon this week, despite the fact that this is probably the busiest week since we have been in Congress since January, we are setting aside 5 hours today to debate this issue which very possibly, Mr. Speaker, may be the most critical issue that Members of this body will have an opportunity to vote on during this session of Congress. If I may very briefly address three arguments that are used pretty consistently against the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. We will hear the argument, Mr. Speaker, that by lifting the arms embargo, we would be abandoning, in effect, the people of Bosnia because the United Nations and NATO have said that they oppose the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States. I think the key there is to ask the elected Government of Bosnia what they think. Ask the elected Government of Bosnia, the democratic Government of Bosnia if they think that by the United States unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, they would feel abandoned, or whether they feel abandoned today, when the U.N. Protections Forces are there either as spectators or as hostages, Mr. Speaker. What kind of protection is a force that is actually taken hostage by the thugs and the aggressors from Belgrade and their allies within the Bosnian state? A second argument that we hear often is that we will be fragmenting, that we will be hurting the unity of NATO and of the U.N. Protection Force. I think the key there, Mr. Speaker, is the question that follows: How can you pursue peacekeeping, which is what specifically and officially the mission of the United Nations in Bosnia is, peacekeeping, how can you pursue peacekeeping when there is no peace? I think the answer to that question is self-evident. The mission of NATO is not possible as it is conceived, there is no peacekeeping and even the safe havens that were offered to the Bosnian people, here are six safe havens, give up your heavy arms and you will be safe even though safe havens now are being attacked by the Serbs and two of them have already fallen, Mr. Speaker. The policy of the United Nations and of NATO in effect, the promise to the people of Bosnia, has been but a farce and it is time that we admit it today. Third, the argument is, if we let the Bosnians arm themselves, that will prolong the war. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that it is inherently immoral to say that. That contemplates that the war will inevitably be won by the aggressors, that the Serbs will soon overrun all of Bosnia, kill all of the refugees and destroy all the targets that they are seeking to destroy beforehand, and that by letting the Bosnians arm themselves, we will be prolonging the war. That argument, I maintain, is inherently immoral. So I go back to the essential. What is the Government of Bosnia asking the United States to do? The Government of Bosnia is asking us to pass this bill today and when we pass this bill today, there will be no need for conference, it will go straight to the President and it will, I think, strengthen his hand when he deals with the Europeans that have imposed the policy of appeasement, have imposed the policy that makes Neville Chamberlain look like Rambo, Mr. Speaker, upon the disarmed and defenseless people of Bosnia. I submit that this is an extraordinarily important vote that we are going to take today. This is a fair rule, and I would ask that all of the Members not only realize the importance of the vote today but favorably consider and vote for the resolution. Mr. Speaker, I believe that House Resolution 204 is a correctly and fairly structured rule to provide for the thorough consideration of S. 21, and I would urge its adoption. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following data from the Committee on Rules for inclusion at this point in the Record:

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for purposes of debate only. (Mr. DIAZ-BALART asked and was given permission to include extraneous material in the Record.)

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. King].

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher], a distinguished member of the Committee on International Relations, who is a genuine freedom fighter for the best causes throughout the world and has been throughout his political career.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If the gentleman will yield, the gentleman brings up some possibilities with regard to the future and points to this vote being an easy vote. I do not think it is an easy vote to say that the world community, in fact, has acted immorally for over 3 years. That is not an easy vote. There is a lot of speculation that we can engage in with regard to the future. But what is true is the world has acted immorally, and we are solving that problem with this vote.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I would tell the gentleman, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Today, Mr. Chairman, is an interesting day, the 26th of July, the anniversary of Castro's movement in Cuba, big celebration day for him, the day he got his so-called revolution going, and the revolution culminated with the oppression that has been on the Cuban people for 36 years. It is also interesting that just last week the Christian Science Monitor pointed out the vast new campaign of repression that Castro is engaging in against the--all signs of budding, free, independent press within Cuba. Our colleagues who are proposing this amendment, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], the gentleman from California [Mr. Miller], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Serrano], in their Dear Colleague they say Television Marti uses tax dollars to produce and broadcast programs to Cuba, but Cubans cannot see them because the signals are jammed by the Cuban Government, so, they continue to say, while we support USIA's efforts to provide biased news, we are convinced it makes no sense to continue with the program. In other words, the essence of their argument is, because Castro engages in jamming of TV Marti, that we should give up. In other words, during the heat of the cold war, when the Soviet Union was most engaging in jamming of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and was very successful, at some point jamming up to 90 or 95 percent of the transmissions of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, if we were going to engage in the philosophy, accept the philosophy of the proponents of this amendment of the kill TV Marti, we would simply say, ``Oh, they won. They are jamming 80 percent, they are jamming 85-90 percent, so we have to give up.'' Mr. Chairman, that is not the American way. When we have a burden to overcome, when we have a situation where Castro was spending tons and tons of oil to jam, attempt to jam, the signal, we overcome the jamming, and we are doing that. We are engaging in the conversion of the UHF which the technicians tell us is going to markedly increase the receptivity of TV Marti, and, if we have to, we will use a C-130. We will get the transmission through. That is the American way, not throw in the towel, not give up, not give Castro a victory on the 26th of July. Reject this effort by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, I would tell the gentleman, I have no amendments.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, it is interesting, we heard prior speakers on the amendment on TV Marti say, ``Oh, no, we like Radio Marti,'' and now we just heard a bunch of some minutes' criticism, systematic criticism of Radio Marti, Radio Marti; they just want to get rid of an advisory board that costs the taxpayers about $100,000-something a year. Of course, though, we just heard that is something that even though I think at the end we heard their support for Radio Marti, we just heard a bunch of time and criticism of Radio Marti, not TV Marti, Radio Marti. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen].