Norm Dicks

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution being presented by the gentleman from Alaska. This resolution is necessary because of an unfortunate and unacceptable situation that took place 2 weeks ago, when certain Canadian fishermen took the law into their own hands through an act of aggression aimed at the United States commercial fishing industry, allegedly in retaliation and frustration over the lack of progress in the renegotiation of the United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty. Specifically, 2 weeks ago in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, more than 150 Canadian fishing vessels surrounded the Alaskan ferry Malaspina, forming a blockade and would not let the ferry leave port for 3 days, stranding 300 innocent passengers, and disrupting a key transportation link on the Alaska Marine Highway. The fishermen conducting the illegal blockade of the ferry claimed that they were conducting the disruptive act of aggression to bring attention to their government because of their frustrations and claims that Alaska is overharvesting sockeye salmon headed for spawning waters in the Fraser River. As outrageous as this act was by the Canadian fishermen, equally unacceptable was the slow response by the Canadian Government to enforce its own laws. Canada allowed this situation to go on for 3 days. Even after a Canadian Federal judge ordered the blockade ended, Royal Canadian Mounted Police took no immediate action to enforce the order and end the blockade. Canada is our neighbor and valued ally. We respect her sovereignty, and we support a free trade relationship that benefits the long-term stability and growth of both our nations' economies. This is why I have been a strong supporter of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. My State borders Canada, and my State benefits from open access to Canadian markets. My State also has a significant fishing industry as a component of its economy, and this industry has been hard hit by a variety of unfortunate factors such as endangered species listings and El Nino conditions that have closed and reduced access to key fisheries. Many fishermen have gone out of business and the survivors are struggling. Our fishermen recognize that the migratory patterns of salmon means that Canada, Alaska, and the Pacific Northwest States have a shared responsibility for the conservation and management of salmon populations moving through adjacent waters. Progress and completion of a new United States-Canada Treaty is the best insurance possible to provide stability for the commercial fishing industry on both sides of the border. Our fishermen are frustrated as well. They want progress and they want results. But they have respected the rule of law, and have communicated their concerns through the administration and their elected officials. Canadian fishermen are going to have to do the same, and the Canadian Government is going to have to discourage future illegality by moving swiftly to enforce its own laws. We encourage the President to join us in condemning the actions taken by Canadian fishermen 2 weeks ago, and urge the Canadian Government to condemn such acts as well. I believe that Canada should be justifiably criticized for the deterioration of the present situation regarding progress on treaty negotiations. It was Canada that walked out on negotiations this past June, when the United States side was making significant moves toward a resolution. The only way that this situation is going to be resolved is if everyone stays at the table. Our side is working to make progress and I urge the Canadians to work to do the same. Regarding the southern issues involved in the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the last United States proposal on coho, built on detailed scientific analysis, would have provided for sound conservation and rebuilding of the depleted coho stocks by reducing the harvest rate by approximately 50 percent. It would also have provided a west coast Vancouver Island coho troll fishery approximately three times as large as the United States fishery, and would have enabled Canada to intercept approximately 30 percent more United States-origin coho than U.S. fishers take in Washington and Oregon. In contrast, State Department negotiators indicate that the proposal that Canada put on the table failed to meet even the minimum requirements necessary to conserve coho. Regarding sockeye, the last proposal put on the table by the United States would have assured Canada received more than 80 percent of the Fraser River sockeye harvest. To accomplish this, the United States negotiators proposed a major restructuring of the sockeye fleet to reduce the nontreaty commercial fishery by 40 percent. This would have led to significant sacrifice on the United States side, but Canada would not recognize this and accept the proposal, and instead pushed for an even greater reduction. The point is that our side has been trying and is continuing to push for an overall renegotiation of the treaty that benefits both nations. I believe that Mary Beth West, the lead U.S. negotiator on the treaty, is working in good faith to reach an expeditious resolution to the major sticking points in the negotiations. Recently, she appointed former EPA Director and Washington resident William Ruckelshaus, to serve as a mediator to help get the negotiations back on track. We all want to see progress and a long-term resolution to problems associated with the extension of the United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty. However, illegal acts and attempts at blackmail are not the way to make the situation better and to move us forward. The negotiations are complex, the underlying issues have enormous economic implications for the commercial and recreational fishing industry on both sides of the border. But we must deal with these matters and resolve tensions through good faith negotiations. The Canadian fishermen were wrong to blockade the Alaskan ferry Malaspina, and the Canadian Government was wrong not to act to enforce laws against that illegal action. I support this resolution condemning these events and urge Canada to return to good faith negotiations on the Pacific Salmon Treaty.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my friend from Minnesota for yielding me this time, and I want to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Metcalf] for their outstanding effort on this resolution which I rise in strong support of. I am pleased, Mr. Speaker, to be able to tell the House that there may have been a breakthrough today between the parties. We were very concerned, my colleagues and I from Washington State, about what would happen if the European Commission turned down the Boeing, McDonnell- Douglas merger. We are hopeful now that, after further negotiating between the Boeing Company and the European Commission, that there may be a prospect for a favorable outcome. I think all of us have learned a lesson here, and that is I think both sides have to be careful in reviewing agreements, especially when we have two U.S. corporations that have no manufacturing facilities at all in Europe. The idea that the European Commission can exert jurisdiction and say that these two companies cannot merge, especially after this has been approved by the Department of Defense, it has been approved by the Federal Trade Commission, and under our process here in the United States, is wrong. The Federal Trade Commission does not go out and look and see what the impact is going to be on Airbus. It goes out and looks at the airlines and says will this merger, in fact, have an anti-competitive impact. What they found was that it would not; that, in fact, McDonnell-Douglas today is declining in terms of its ability to produce and manufacture commercial aircraft. They just do not have the orders. The real competition out there is between Boeing and Airbus, and it is a healthy competition that will continue into the future. This is what the airlines in Europe should be concerned about; this is what the airlines in the United States should be concerned about. So what we have here is a situation in which the European Commission used this opportunity to leverage Boeing, to try to realign the competitive field to the benefit of Airbus, not to look at this in terms of anti-competitive behavior but to try to get things from Boeing to help Airbus in its ongoing competition. I think that is wrong. I am saddened to hear that there may have had to have been some compromise reached. I am always for compromise, but I think in this case forcing Boeing to give up on what we call exclusive, although it is not really exclusive, but exclusion agreements with American, Delta and Continental, after they were competed for, after Airbus and Boeing competed and Boeing won, and now in this process they are making Boeing give those exclusives back, I do not think that is fair. I think that goes beyond what this process should be about. I hope American companies in the future will be a little more cautious about agreeing in the first instance that the European Commission should have a right to review these mergers, especially when there are no facilities in Europe. As someone who has served on defense appropriations for 19 years, I would also like to point out that another area of attack came on the question of whether there is indirect subsidy because Boeing or McDonnell-Douglas have contracts with the Defense Department. Well, we have these aerospace companies go out and they bid and compete to do the C-17, the F-18, the F-22, the Joint Strike fighter. And, yes, they may learn some things from that about how to build better airplanes and, in fact, they may even bring their commercial experience to the defense arena and help bring down the cost of our defense products. But to assert that there is somehow an indirect subsidy here is really almost laughable. So, I think that area of concern is one also that should have been dismissed. I think we have shown that there is no indirect subsidy. Of course, the companies over there, the four companies that comprise Airbus, also receive defense contracts from their various countries, and there has been a record, a historic record of subsidy up to 1992 for Airbus. So I am glad that the House and my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Metcalf], have worked together on this. We have taken the floor and made our speeches. I think because of that and because of the good work of this administration, and I want to compliment President Clinton, Stuart Eizenstat, Dan Turallo, the people in the administration who have been working on this for the last several weeks. They stayed with it, they talked to the top officials in the governments of the various countries. And I am glad to see today in the newspaper, in the press accounts, that Reuters says that the British now see this would have been a mistake and the Germans see that this would have been a mistake. The bottom line is that they recognize, and I am just pleased that the administration said that there will be a major trade problem controversy with the United States if we do not reach agreement, and that has, I think, helped us break the ice here. So it has been a good combination of congressional support and support from the administration, and again I want to thank the chairman for bringing this out promptly and giving us his help and support, and my colleagues on the Democratic side for cooperating on this. This means a lot. It is not just in Washington State. If this had gone down, the jobs that would have been lost first are in Long Beach, CA. Fifteen thousand jobs at McDonnell-Douglas in Long Beach, CA would have been on the line. So it is not just Washington State and St. Louis, it is California that have a real stake in this decision.

Mr. DICKS. And a few other States, too.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from California for his statement. He recognizes, as I recognize, that the problem we have here is that this merger is absolutely essential for the commercial part of the McDonnell-Douglas Company which exists down in the gentleman's district, and to protect those jobs there is absolutely crucial. That would be the first casualty if somehow this agreement could not go forward. I think the gentleman from Washington pointed out one of the things I did not realize, that the European Commission claims it could fine Boeing $4.5 billion if they went ahead with this merger, if the EC turned it down. So this takes on very serious implications. Also, that they can seize Boeing aircraft in Europe and demand payment from the various airlines in Europe. So, hopefully, we can avoid this. And I appreciate the gentleman's comments regarding the administration, because we have been working with them. We have been talking to Stuart Eizenstat at the State Department and Dan Turallo at the White House and with the President and his immediate staff. They have been there working hard on this, and I think quietly and diplomatically, and we have taken a little higher profile up here in the Congress. But I think together it has worked effectively, and I appreciate the gentleman's comments.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the gentleman is absolutely correct. Let us hope now, maybe, that they are coming to an agreement and then, after that, the two companies can come together, and the stockholders can meet and approve this merger here in the United States.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call my colleagues' attention to the economic disaster that is waiting to happen in Brussels. At this time the European Commission Merger Task Force is meeting to discuss the impact of the merger between two American companies, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. The taskforce has as its purview the judgment of whether the merger poses any adverse impacts on competitiveness in the world aircraft market. But what is happening, Mr. Speaker, is that the European members representing governments who have directly subsidized the European aircraft consortium Airbus are using these discussions to extort trade concessions from Boeing in order to increase the market position of Airbus. This is truly an improper and unfair manipulation of the process. Now that our own Federal Trade Commission has determined that there are no anticompetitiveness problems with the merger, it is time for the United States to stand firm against the European Community and demand a halt to this travesty. Until 2-days ago, Mr. Speaker, the real intention of the Europeans was thinly veiled by their expression of deep concern over competitiveness. But on July 15, the EC's Minister of Competitiveness, Karel Van Miert, betrayed what I believe is the true motivation of the EC negotiators, to extract concessions out of Boeing through these merger talks that would directly assist Airbus. Two days ago, on the Belgian radio, Mr. Van Miert made this statement following the breakdown of the negotiations with Boeing: ``We cannot give our consent unless Boeing makes very serious commitments in order to, let's say, also further guarantee the chances of Airbus in this market in the future.'' That, Mr. Speaker, is what this charade is all about, guaranteeing market opportunities for Airbus. We cannot, as a free trading Nation, allow this to stand. Certainly in light of this outrageous statement, I believe that the President, the State Department, and our Trade Representative must clearly and unequivocally express the dissatisfaction of the United States with the progress of these negotiations, in addition to our intention of taking retaliatory action if the EC proceeds in this wrongheaded direction. To make things worse, today Commissioner Van Miert noted with satisfaction the fact that the advisory committee grouping the experts of Member States unanimously shares the European Commission's analysis whereby the proposals made by Boeing are not of a kind to dispel the serious doubts expressed by the Commission regarding the risk that will weigh upon competition because of the proposed merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. . .. The commission showed it remained serene, and Mr. Van Miert hopes to firmly recall that the Boeing-McDonnell issue was treated strictly within the framework of the Regulation on mergers and that the Commission analysis was based on tangible facts and figures and not just on a political motive of some kind. I think Mr. Van Miert should go back and listen to his radio tape in Belgium. The spokesman then explained that the Commission will take its final decision on 23 July. . . in order to leave the relevant services time to proceed to authentication of the documents comprising this issue. I want to point out to my colleagues that Mr. Van Miert says that the . . . European Commission decision in concentration matters is legally binding for the parties concerned and means, when it is a matter of veto, that the merged identity is illegal in law. The EC regulation on mergers moreover give the Commission instruments that are apt to dissuade those who do not respect such a decision. In particular, it has the power to impose fines up to 10 percent of the cumulated turnover of the parties, or daily penalties, as long as the infringement lasts. So I want to point out to my colleagues, this is a very serious matter, one that could result in fines of up to $4.5 billion against the Boeing Co. and the seizure of Boeing aircraft overseas. I say to the President and Vice President, members of this administration, we in the Congress want to support you in whatever actions are necessary in order to explain to the Europeans that if they do this, the United States will retaliate, must retaliate, in order to make certain that this merger goes forward and that we not be blackmailed by the European Commission and Mr. Van Miert. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record an article on the current status of EC negotiations. The article referred to is as follows: Current Status of EC Negotiations Discussions between Boeing and the European Commission Merger Task Force have reached an impasse. Boeing has offered significant remedies (see Attachment A) to allay the Commission's concerns regarding the merger, but the Commission continues to demand more. A team of Boeing executives and lawyers met around the clock with the Merger Task Force from July 11th through July 15th. On July 15th, Boeing appeared to have a potential agreement with the Merger Task Force, only to have the Merger Task Force retreat later that day on the issue of Boeing's contracts with American, Delta, and Continental. Following the Advisory Committee's meeting on July 16th, Boeing was advised that the Commission was reopening the divestiture issue. Boeing is concerned that it will be unable to reach a successful conclusion to the merger review. Every time it appears that Boeing is near an agreement with the Commission, the Commission escalates its demands. At the present, the two open issues appear to be divestiture of Douglas Aircraft Company and modification of Boeing's existing contracts with American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Continental Airlines. Boeing has repeatedly stated to the Commission that it will not consider divesting Douglas Aircraft Company. Divestiture of Douglas Aircraft Company will mean its certain death and the loss of over 14,000 jobs. The Commission's true objective on Boeing's airline contracts was revealed when, on July 15th, following the breakdown of negotiations, Karel Van Miert stated on Belgian radio: ``. . . we cannot give our consent unless Boeing makes very serious commitments in order to, let's say, also further guarantee the chances of Airbus in this market in the future.'' As reported in the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal and the International Herald Tribune of July 17th, 1997, Mr. Chirac said on July 16th: ``We strongly support the Commission on its position on Boeing-McDonnell. It could be extremely dangerous for Europeans.'' Similarly, Mr. Rexrodt, Germany's economics minister is reported to have said that concessions offered by Boeing were ``clearly not enough''. Boeing is now faced with the proverbial Hobson's choice of agreeing to divestiture and, effectively, kill Douglas Aircraft, capitulating to the Commission's demands that Boeing abandon its airline contracts or simply walking away from a merger which has received the unqualified endorsement of the Federal Trade Commission. boeing's remedies proposals Douglas Aircraft Company The Commission has repeatedly asserted that Boeing's share of the commercial aircraft market would jump from 60% to 84% upon the acquisition of Douglas Aircraft Company and that Boeing's position as a ``dominant'' player in the commercial aircraft market would be enhanced. Once again the Commission is manipulating facts to fit a predetermined result. To achieve the 84% market share figure, the Commission included all of Douglas Aircraft Company's installed base. This includes aircraft delivered up to 30-50 years ago! Douglas Aircraft Company's share of the commercial aircraft market in 1996 was 3.8%. Since the merger announcement in December, 1996, Douglas Aircraft Company has booked orders for a total of 7 aircraft, all of which were announced before the merger announcement and 5 of which are leased freighters. The Commission has argued that Boeing may be able to leverage the Douglas Aircraft installed base into additional sales of Boeing aircraft. The Commission has not put forward any evidence to suggest that this would be the case and in fact, evidence suggests the contrary. If the Douglas installed base were so valuable, why is Douglas failing? If the Fokker installed base were valuable, why did one of the Airbus partners (Daimler Benz) sell Fokker's spares business and why didn't another airframe manufacturer surface as a potential buyer? The Federal Trade Commission has thoroughly investigated the viability of McDonnell Douglas's commercial aircraft business and has concluded that it is not viable and that any attempt to divest the commercial aircraft business would further damage the business and not promote competition. Nevertheless, the Merger Task Force proposed that Boeing attempt to divest Douglas Aircraft Company. The Merger Task Force further proposed that if no buyer could be found for Douglas Aircraft Company Boeing would be required to shut down the commercial aircraft production lines of Douglas Aircraft and sell the spares business. So great is the Commission's zeal to deny Boeing any access to Douglas Aircraft Company, it is overlooking potential enormous harm to the owners and operators of Douglas aircraft worldwide. Expert analysis submitted to the Merger Task Force shows that even an attempt at divestiture of Douglas Aircraft Company or its spares business could result in the loss of value of Douglas aircraft in service worldwide of 7-14 billion dollars. Evidence has also shown that the cost of customer support increases when such support is provided by someone other than an airframe manufacturer, and the quality of such support decreases. Not only is the Commission ignoring the potential adverse impact of a divestiture on airlines, but it is ignoring EU precedent and jurisdiction and comity considerations as well. An order by the Merger Task Force requiring divestiture of United States assets in the context of a merger between two U.S. companies would be unprecedented in the history of EC antitrust review and would violate principles of jurisdiction and comity. Boeing has repeatedly stated to the Merger Task Force that it would not attempt to divest any portion of the McDonnell Douglas commercial aircraft business because of the potential harm to world's airlines and the adverse impact such an attempt would have on the over 14,000 employees of Douglas Aircraft Company. Boeing has instead offered significant structural and procedural remedies (see Attachment A) that address the Commission's particular concerns regarding ``leveraging'' without having a devastating impact on Douglas Aircraft Company's customers, suppliers and employees. Exclusive Agreements From almost the very beginning of the Commission's merger review, the Airbus Member States and Karel Van Miert have asserted that the merger could not be approved unless Boeing terminated its ``exclusive'' agreements with American, Delta and Continental. The agreements are between a United States airplane manufacturer and United States airlines and are unrelated to the merger. The three ``exclusive'' agreements essentially provide the customers significant price protection and order flexibility over a 20 year period in exchange for a sole supplier relationship with Boeing. Were the exclusivity clauses not present, Boeing would have required much larger firm orders from the airlines to compensate Boeing for its risk. The airlines are therefore receiving the benefits of very large orders without the financial risk. The Federal Trade Commission has thoroughly reviewed the existing ``exclusive'' agreements and has found no basis to challenge them under U.S. law. While the Federal Trade Commission's July 1, 1997 decision evidences concerns regarding such agreements, the concerns relate only to the degree of foreclosure of the market that may result from future additional ``exclusive'' agreements. The Commission does not have jurisdiction over the ``exclusive'' agreements in a merger review. It can acquire jurisdiction only if it attacks the agreements under the competition rules of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. However, because of its desire to obtain concessions from Boeing regarding these agreements, the Commission has manufactured jurisdiction based upon unsubstantiated allegations by Jean Pierson of Airbus that the agreements were the result of a conspiracy between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to use the merger and Boeing's resulting ``dominant'' position and access to McDonnell Douglas customers to force airlines to enter into such agreements. Thus, the Commission is seeking ``voluntary'' concessions as the price of merger approval instead of running the risk of losing a competition case under traditional antitrust rules. Although Boeing's agreements with its three U.S. customers are not properly included in the Commission's merger review and are legal under U.S. law, Boeing is willing to make significant concessions to the European Commission regarding, such agreements in order to resolve the issue and obtain merger clearance. As seen in Attachment A hereto, Boeing has offered a 10- year moratorium on such ``exclusive'' agreements except for those campaigns in which another aircraft manufacturer offers one first. Boeing has never gone one step further and offered to modify its existing agreements to shorten the duration of the ``exclusivity'' period to 13 years (the term of Air Bus' ``exclusive'' deal with US Airways) and to allow American, Delta and Continental to become launch customers for the A3XX. What the Commission asks Boeing to do instead is give up all of its contract rights and allow the airlines to keep all of theirs. Spillover Notwithstanding the existence of the 1992 Bilateral Agreement between the DU and U.S. relating to commercial aircraft subsidies, the Commission has repeatedly tried to extract concessions from Boeing in the area of government- funded research and development contracts. It has also insisted on extracting concessions from Boeing that would impair its ability to deal with its suppliers. The Commission's articulated concern is as follows: by acquiring McDonnell Douglas, Boeing will become bigger and therefore more ``dominant''. In addition, the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would increase Boeing's resources in the area of Dodd and NASA research and development contracts. The Commission has demanded that Boeing hold its commercial and defense businesses separate. This would, of course, deprive the U.S. Government of the benefits of the application of commercial technology to defense programs. The Commission has also demanded that Boeing license its patents to Air Bus. Boeing has attempted to address the Commission's concerns by offering certain remedies in the area of suppliers, reporting of government research and development contracts and patents, as set forth in Attachment A. To offer any further remedies would interfere with the 1992 Bilateral and would seriously impair Boeing's ability to conduct its business.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman was not here, and the only point I would want to make is that, first of all, the first Istook amendment that did what the gentleman wanted to do was struck down on a point of order, so now he has this secondary amendment. Under this amendment, remember now, the Secretary of the Interior must approve this. I would say to the gentleman, if it was ever done in this kind of a threatening way, we will drive you out of business, that application I think would be turned down summarily by the Secretary of the Interior.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I call for a vote on the amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I yield to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kolbe].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I have been assured that the Secretary of the Interior has written a letter in support of this. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Nevada.

Mr. DICKS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, could the gentleman explain to us what the amendment is about?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, yes, I have on the Olympic Peninsula, and it is in the Olympic National Park.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield, I think it was Olympic National Park. We have an active advisory group that nominated it to be part of this.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in the situation where there is not local unanimity that we, as a local representative, have a responsibility either to try to help create it or to tell the department we should not go forward with this. If we do not have the unanimity locally, I do not think we should do it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would not say that. What I would say is, let us work with the people in the executive branch who are involved in this and insist that there be local involvement. That is something we all can agree on. None of us on this side of the aisle that I know of are objecting to the local people being involved in how this is structured and the nomination process, et cetera. But to cut off the money when we have really no example of anything damaging being done is just not fair.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to just get a few facts out here on the table. I think this is important. Under the World Heritage Convention, each nation nominates its own most important natural and cultural sites and pledges to take the necessary steps to preserve and protect them under its own legal system. The treaty implementing legislation and program regulations mandate a process that is orderly, predictable, and exacting, requiring a minimum of more than 2 years between the proposal of a site for study and its consideration by the World Heritage Committee. The U.S. nomination process is clearly delineated in law and regulation, title IV of the Historic Preservation Act of 1980 and 36 CFR 73, the World Heritage Convention. Under the regulation, the National Park Service staffs the Interagency Panel on World Heritage, which is advisory to and chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. The panel meets in public sessions to consider proposed nominations and to review completed studies. Proposals to nominate have originated from private organizations and citizens and local governments as well as from park superintendents. Every proposed nomination has a strictly defined boundary. The criteria and documentation requirements for nominations are highly selective. Many proposed properties have been turned down or deferred for cause. Relevant committees of the House and Senate are notified of all pending proposals and again informed when the department has decided to nominate a property. Over the years when Members have commented, they have commonly supported proposed nominations in their respective States. This whole thing started under the Nixon administration. Since 1979, when Yellowstone and Mesa Verde were placed on the World Heritage list, 18 other U.S. sites have been added, for a total of 20. A handful of others have been nominated but not listed. No new proposed nominations are being actively considered. The World Heritage Committee, composed of representatives-elect from 21 member countries, review all national nominations. At present 506 properties have been listed. The committee also places properties on the list of World Heritage in Danger. Only the committee can place properties on either list. Neither listing action imposes any legal requirement for U.S. sites beyond those already contained in U.S. law.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I share the concern of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Regula] about letting this go on beyond 1 year. The Park Service has, in fact, written a letter of concern about this. But under the circumstances, if they have not torn down the structures, the gentleman I think makes a persuasive case that for 1 year, at least, we ought to go along with this. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing we have heard is that Health and Human Services is concerned that the proposed amendment could infringe on the right of tribal governments to participate in self- determination contracting and compacting, which is their right pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act. We understand that GAO will be asked to study the complexities of this situation. It would be prudent to delay action on this matter until the results of this analysis are completed and reviewed by the tribal governments, Congress, and the administration. And this language comes up, this statement comes up with the blessing of OMB and the Indian Health Service. I am not going to object to the amendment. I think we can check with the administration during conference and make certain that we are on solid ground here. The gentleman has offered the amendment for the gentleman from Alaska [Mr. Young], and I have no objection to it, but I wanted to put this in the RECORD at this point.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I will join the gentleman in going to the FBI, if that is accurate.