Norm Dicks

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. I will just tell the gentleman that when we look at the highwater mark and take it back down, it is a significant reduction.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I will support the Conyers amendment when the gentleman from Michigan offers that amendment. I think the American people have a right to know. One of the reasons I want it out there is because the number that is being bandied around here today is inaccurate. It is inaccurate. I would like to have the American people know what the truth is. I would like to also have them know, frankly, what the CIA percentage of that is, because it is a lot different than what we have heard today on the floor. Again to my colleagues, please come up to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and get the real facts. I think it is embarrassing to have these numbers bandied around on this floor that are simply inaccurate.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, absent a clear national security interest, information should not be classified. In fact, Executive Order 12,958, which governs classification, prohibits classifying information unless to do so is required to protect national security. I do not think anybody can stand up here tonight and say that disclosing the number, disclosing this number, is going to do anything to harm national security. I do not believe a case can be made that the aggregate budget figure for intelligence meets that standard. The arguments that are made in favor of keeping the budget secret have little to do with the number in question and more to do with the potential damage that could occur if more information were released. Some people are afraid that public release of the intelligence budget will lead to drastic cuts in intelligence spending. Not only is that an improper reason for classification, but I firmly believe we can defend the overall amount, as we just did, we spent on intelligence as well as we will defend the overall amount we spend on defense. Releasing the aggregate budget total changes business as usual, and some people are understandably uncomfortable with changing the practices of 50 years. But this is not a radical proposition. It is an idea that has been endorsed by two panels of experienced and knowledgeable experts serving on the Aspen Brown Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. The overall intelligence budget figure is a significant piece of information by which the American people can judge the operations of their Government. I believe we should tell the American people about how we are spending their hard-earned money. We tell them what the overall number for defense is; I do not see how we can then argue that we cannot tell them what the overall number for intelligence is, and frankly I think it would do a lot to clear up much of the confusion that we have heard today on the floor about what this number is because, as I said earlier, the number that we have heard is inaccurate, significantly inaccurate. So I rise in strong support of the Conyers amendment. I remember our colleague, Congressman Glickman, who was chairman when we were in the majority, was the first chairman of this committee to strongly endorse this. I think it is time to do it, and I hope we can do it today on a bipartisan basis.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend from California, Mr. Lewis, and my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hyde, who has served on this committee with great distinction, I still go back to Executive Order 12958 which governs classification. It prohibits classifying information unless to do so is required to protect national security. Now I do not see how anybody can make a case that this number has anything to do with national security. It is the amount of money we spend on intelligence, but by disclosing it I do not see how we in any way endanger national security, and therefore we cannot classify it. It is almost an open and shut case, and that is why I think the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] is correct in calling for this to be disclosed.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if they had used chemical and biological weapons on the 500,000 American troops sitting out there in that desert, they could have done devastating damage. We could have taken huge casualties. It was lucky for us that those Scuds were not accurate. We cannot expect that to happen in the future. With the improvements in intelligence, we are going to be able to target those Scud launchers which we had such a difficult time finding in the past, using Link 16 and other developments that come from our national technical means that will be fused into the cockpit of our advanced aircraft. One of the things we have worked on for the last 20 years is to take advantage of these investments in intelligence to give our military people a significant advantage against any enemy. My hope and prayer is that this will lead to deterrence, that we will be able to prevent future wars because when they go up against the United States, they are going to know we have a very capable force and, No. 2, that that force has the best possible intelligence. That will save money and save American lives and prevent future wars. Military strength and intelligence strength will help prevent conflict in the future.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the Sanders amendment. First of all, I would say to my colleagues, I think Mr. Goss is right. What we read in the newspapers is not necessarily correct. The number that has been bandied around here today is not necessarily correct. Second, I think it is important to realize that the Central Intelligence Agency receives only a small fraction of the money that is spent on the intelligence effort. The overwhelming part of the intelligence budget is spent at the Department of Defense on defense- related activities. I would point out to my colleagues that if they go back and look at World War I, look at World War II, look at Desert Storm/Desert Shield, intelligence played a major role in our victory in those wars. The second lesson I think it is important to remember is that after World War II, we cut back our military spending. We cut back on intelligence. Then we wound up in Korea and we wound up in a military mess. After the Vietnam war, we cut back on defense. We cut back on intelligence. What happened? We wound up weakening our military and we had to come back and restore it and spend a tremendous amount of effort, and when we did do that, we wound up having a very successful effort in Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Again, in my judgment, the amount of money we are spending with 15 Members of the Congress that have reviewed this very carefully, going through it on a line item by line-item basis, I think is about right. I oppose this amendment. I will also say as a senior member of the defense appropriations subcommittee that we are going to be within our 602(b) allocation when the appropriation bill comes to the floor. So I want to assure everyone that defense will be within our 602(b) allocation. Now, let us get down to the specifics as much as we can. I urge everyone who has spoken today with all the passion, all the concern, please come up to the Intelligence Committee. We will see that you are briefed. We will see that you have an opportunity to look at these numbers and to see why we think that the authorization that is presented here is about right. Having had some experience in the defense area, I want to tell my colleagues, I believe intelligence is a force multiplier. We have cut defense overall, and the intelligence budget is part of that, by over $100 billion between 1985 and 1995. Intelligence has not been cut as much as defense. But I will tell my colleagues this: It has been cut significantly, maybe not enough for some, but it has been cut significantly. For Members to stand up here and say intelligence has not been cut is simply inaccurate. It has been cut very significantly. I will just tell my colleagues, I believe that the information that we get, if Members go back to Desert Storm/Desert Shield, we were able to do things there because of the intelligence-gathering success that we had that gave our soldiers a critical advantage. We were able to end that war rapidly, using a combination of air power and intelligence, and we did it rapidly and saved American lives. I want to point out to my colleagues, this is serious business. This is serious business. I agree with my colleague who said if you can take this amendment from 10 to 5 percent in one afternoon, one has to question just how seriously it has been thought out. So I would argue that the intelligence that we get, especially for the military, is absolutely crucial. As we get better and better at this, through our national technical means, we are going to solve some of the problems we had in the gulf war. One was broad area search. General Schwarzkopf wanted to have a better idea of what the enemy was doing. With a combination of our satellites and our UAV's, we are going to be able in the future to let commanders know really what is going on behind enemy lines. That will be an enormous advantage. One of the problems we had there was finding the Scud launchers, and they could have devastated the 500,000 troops we had there if they used chemical and biological weapons.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. That is my point. I agree with that. I think it is multifaceted; I completely concur with that. (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the thing that bothers me the most about this is going back to what we said originally, and that is we should have been doing this 6 years ago. The war has been over for 6 years. Now, 6 years have gone by, and we were kind of lulled into a sense of complacency for the first few years, and so now, when we have to do all of this research, it may take us 2 or 3 additional years to really get the answers. So I hope what we can do is remember these lessons the next time we deploy American forces into a situation like this, so that we do not have to have this big gap in time before we get down to serious work.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentlewoman on her very good statement. This is the same situation we had with Dr. Nicholson out in California. When these people came in, he found that they possessed an infectious mycoplasma. He then ordered massive doses of antibiotics and was able, with many of them, to cure them of the symptoms. Now, if this was a chemical weapon, obviously, antibiotics would not have worked, so there had to be something else that these soldiers were exposed to. The thing that is worrisome about infectious disease is it is something you can give to your family or wife and others. So, again, many doctors, all over the country, have found that by using antibiotics they were able to cure these veterans of their symptoms. But the problem is, when they go in, unless you have a doctor who is creative, he has basically been told that this is not a possibility. So I think it has really slowed down the treatment of the soldiers, which is what I worry about most here. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman yielding, and compliment her on her very fine statement.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I wanted to commend the gentleman for his leadership. He will certainly have bipartisan support. My colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Metcalf], has been a leader on this issue. We will give us as much help from our side of the aisle.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums amendment to eliminate further production of the B-2 bomber. I believe this is the most important defense procurement vote of the decade. The B-2 with smart conventional weapons gives us the potential for a conventional deterrent. The B-2 when fully equipped with smart conventional weapons will be able to devastate a country and an advancing army at the same time. This bomber will give us a war-stopping capability. The war-stopping or preventing capability will save American lives. The B-2 can give us a huge technological advantage over potential enemies. Twenty-one B-2 bombers is not enough. We need to keep the production line open to build nine additional B-2's. Every independent study indicates that additional B-2's are needed. The Dellums amendment stops the production line, which is in California. We would need to spend billions to re-open this line once it is closed. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush, has written a devastating report on the lack of a bomber policy on the part of this administration. Let me quote from General Scowcroft's report: The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere on the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well-suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected challenges. The need for such a capability is basic to the national 2 Military Regional Conflict [MRC] strategy. The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long range, stealthy, precision strike force over the long term is to continue production of the B-2. The B-2 is therefore a critical national asset, which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the ultimate responsibility to fund and govern the military. Under article I, section 8, the Congress shall have power ``To raise and support Armies * * * To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.'' In closing, I again want to quote from General Scowcroft's report: Additional B-2s are fully affordable within planned budgets. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately 50 percent by 2001. Those funds should be allocated to and spent on the most cost-effective systems, such as additional B-2's. The situation is similar to that of the F-117 in the 1980's. The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many American and allied lives in the gulf war. Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain production of the B-2. Help us today and defeat the Dellums amendment.

Mr. DICKS. If we could stop him before he gets there, we could save billions of dollars and save many, many lives.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] says stealth does not matter. Stealth helped us win the gulf war. But this was after Saddam had already grabbed Kuwait. We then blew him out of the ground, in essence, with the F-117. What we are saying is with the B-2, we can stop him from getting Kuwait. That is the big difference.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California mentioned something else called lockout. What if the enemy uses chemical and biological weapons on those tactical airfields so we cannot get the airlift in to set up the TAC air? Then we bought the wrong weapon system. We need something that can come from outside the theatre, assuredly, to be able to protect and stop the enemy before he gets there. I think the possibility of lockout is something that we need to study, that the National Defense Policy Panel needs to study, because that is a very real potential. By the way, in the deep attacks weapons mix study, in every scenario in which there was lockout or very little warning, the B-2 was better than any other conventional weapon. And we lost some of the wars because we did not have enough B-2's. So let us, at least, buy the nine additional we are talking about here. It will save lives and save money. I support the chairman in this. We need to keep this money in the budget. We need to keep this option alive. Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record: Congressman Duncan Hunter, Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee, House National Security Committee. Dear Mr. Chairman: You requested that my colleagues and I provide your committee with an independent look at the adequacy of the nation's heavy bomber force. This is an important issue as we move into the new security era and we greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer our counsel to you and your committee. In our review, we first examined the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the potential offered by the B-2. We then examined the sources of Pentagon opposition to additional B-2 production and the recent series of studies the Department of Defense has sent to the Congress regarding the bomber force. We reached two fundamental conclusions. First, long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that the planned force of 21 B-2s will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. Second, Pentagon opposition to further B-2 production is shortsighted and parochial. It reflects a consensus across the services that long-range air power can be safely abandoned in the long-run--a view with which we strongly disagree. Based on these conclusions we offer a set of legislative recommendations regarding the bomber force. The following contains an executive summary and the overall report. Sincerely, Brent Scowcroft. Independent Bomber Force Review i. introduction Whether the United States should retain enough modern, heavy bombers to support U.S. national security strategy is, foremost, a strategic choice. We believe strongly that the future of America's long-range bomber force should be decided fundamentally on the basis of what best serves the national defense. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) has made this strategic choice on a de facto basis in light of short-term funding and force structure preferences. If this decision is allowed to stand, the end result will be a force structure that relies almost entirely on short-range air power. Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range air power raises a puzzling contradiction. The long-range bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security environment and national military strategy. We also have a weapon system--the B-2--which is now in production and if produced in substantial quantities, could revitalize and sustain that force. Yet the DoD has consistently opposed continued B-2 production. Our analysis addresses this contradiction to help the Congress make a vital decision over the future of the bomber force. We first examine the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the revolutionary potential offered by the B-2. We then examine the sources of Pentagon opposition and how this opposition has manifested itself in the recent series of studies the DoD has put forth to the Congress. We then offer a set of recommendations regarding legislation. ii. the future of the bomber force To put the matter simply, under current plans the bomber has no future. A de facto strategic choice has been made to rest the future of American air power on short-range fighters. Unless immediate corrective action is taken, the long-range heavy bomber will gradually disappear as a meaningful element of America's armed forces. The clearest evidence of the bomber fleet's condition is its size and age. Since the late 1950s, the general trend has been for U.S. force structure to shrink, with capability sustained or improved with advancing technology. But in recent years, bombers have been reduced more than any other major force element (such as army divisions, aircraft carriers, and USAF fighters). There were 360 active bombers in 1980. The force dropped to about 300 in 1990. Under current plans, the operational bomber force in the year 2001 will consist of 130 aircraft: 44 B-52s, 70 B-1Bs, and 16 B- 2s. Unlike the fighter force, bomber force shrinkage is not being offset by substantial deployments of new planes and new models. So as the fighter force is improved, bomber force capabilities will inevitably decline over the long-term. The average bomber is already roughly twice the age of the average fighter, and current USAF plans are to maintain the remaining B-52s in service until they are at least 60 years old, and possibly as old as 100. We may soon be in the extraordinary circumstance where America's bombers will be older than America's oldest aircraft carriers. The bomber's loss has been the fighter's gain. Although in Congressional testimony the distribution of Air Force procurement is frequently portrayed as a cycling among transports, bombers, and fighters, in reality fighters have consistently maintained a plurality of the budget, and will overwhelmingly dominate the budget over the next two decades.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, and 50 former generals of the Strategic Air Command also wrote the President saying, keep this capability alive, keep this line open. And they talk about building stealth bombers like it is just a piece of cake. I want my colleagues to know something. That is not true. I went to my friends at Boeing and they said it is very difficult, putting stealth into an aircraft is enormously difficult. When we shut this down, we would have shut down the ability to build these kind of bombers, which is worth saving. This is something we need. What if a crisis occurs over the next 10 years? Then we have to come back to this. It will cost us $40 billion to pay for the R&D to do a B-3. So get the right number while the production line is open and it will save us money in terms of avoiding taxpayer cost. So we save money that way, we save American lives, and we do the right thing. This is the most important conventional weapon that has ever been developed by any country anywhere, and it gives America an enormous advantage. What we are going to do is not get the right number. The studies that were done by Rand, the studies that were done by Gen. Jasper Welch, say that the right number is significantly more than 21. We are here saying let us do at least three squadrons, three squadrons so that we could have 20 for the first major regional contingency and 10 for the second. This a very reasonable proposal. And the gentleman mentions the numbers. The contractor says we can do it for about $9 billion. The Defense Department I think says $12 billion. And I think over a period of years, that is affordable. Any plane we buy has to have life cycle cost. And we may take out some of the older planes to offset and make room for it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from California. I think it was a very thoughtful statement. I think all the statements this evening have been very well thought out. I happen to agree with his statement. Let me also make another point. In the gulf war, for the first time we used the F-117. The Air Force wanted 27. Congress said no. We think you should buy more. You need 54. We are going to make you buy two squadrons. The Chairman tonight was one of the leading figures in that decision, and we went out and we bought 54. In the first 14 days of the gulf war, they represented 2 percent of the assets, but because they were stealthy, because, as the gentleman pointed out, they could go into the target and come back out without that large package of aircraft, they destroyed 40 percent of the targets and all the most difficult ones. It proved that stealth works. And what the B-2 gives us is a plane that goes five times as far, carries eight times as many weapons, and weapons, by the way, that are $13,000 apiece. JDAM's are $13,000. Sixteen of them are $208,000. That is one-sixth the cost of a cruise missile. What the gentleman from California suggests is that we rely on the old bombers that are not stealthy. That means we have to use these very expensive weapons. But what would it allow us to do? Saddam stopped himself. He gave us the time to build up our forces and then we destroyed him with air power. They came out and surrendered to a Marine Corps RPV. What the B-2 does is allow us to hit those same tanks, that same army that Saddam had from 41,000 feet, day and night, no matter what circumstances, no matter what the weather is. This is a revolutionary military capability. We can destroy a country, and we can destroy the army that it sends in the field by air power. We have never been able to do this before. What that does, to make this point, what that does is to allow us to save American lives. To my friends on the Democratic side, what I believe this gives us is the potential of having a conventional deterrent. Think if we had had the B-2, which we did not have in the gulf war, and the President could have deployed it to the Gulf and said, Saddam, if you come south, I will destroy your division before you get into Kuwait; and we now have the military capability with centrifuged weapons to do just that. We could have not had to fight the war. We would not have had to send 500,000 kids to the Gulf. We could have saved $10 billion it cost us to move them out there and $60 billion to fight the war. The B-2 gives us the potential, a revolutionary conventional potential, to have a deterrent; and that is a capability worth having. Yes, it is expensive. But it is not as expensive as losing American lives. I would guarantee my colleagues today that at some future date, if the proponents win this amendment tonight, there will be a circumstance in which we will not have the capability that we needed, and that will mean that we will lose more lives than had to be lost and that would be a tragedy. The gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] is right; let us send them in our best. Stealth means survival. Stealth means survival. And I will just tell my colleagues this. I have studied this issue. I was there when Harold Brown, a Democrat, came up. By the way, there is a letter here signed by Mel Laird, Jim Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney saying, keep the B-2 program going. That is seven Secretaries of Defense, not one. This is an important issue that demands the attention of this House.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask to withdraw my request for a recorded vote.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the ordering of a recorded vote.