Norm Dicks

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. I think we knew. We certainly understood that he possessed chemical and biological weapons, and this is another problem, by the way. As my colleague knows, people say all this was a great victory. I have heard people get up and say it showed the great might of the U.S. military forces. I would point out we had 500,000 troops out there who were, if Saddam had had accurate Scud launchers and missiles, that he could have devastated us because we did not possess adequate theater missile defense. So when we talk about these issues and talk about deployment of troops in the future, as my colleagues know, we could be faced by someone who would use chemical and biological weapons. That is why I also worry about the potential of lockout, of not being able to get our reinforcements in in a timely way, because an enemy could use chemical or biological weapons on our airfields and therefore stop us from bringing troops and tactical aircraft into the region. So this is an area where we need a lot of work. We also need to make sure we have adequate gear and equipment for our soldiers when we are deploying them. We are pretty good on chemical again, and somewhat weak again on biological. So there are a lot of things that need to be done here, but I have never been as frustrated on any issue except maybe for one, in trying to get the Pentagon to listen as I have been on this one. And recently I want to compliment Dr. Berger out at Walter Reed. He is one of the few officials who had an open mind about this who convened a panel, brought in experts, and we had him review Dr. Nicholson's work, and the funny part of it is the people who were in the Government all said, well, we are skeptical, but all the people from around the country who had open minds from the top universities said, yes, there is enough here, we should investigate it. And so now they are doing a protocol, they are looking into it. But that was only because as a senior member of the defense appropriations committee I personally intervened, went to the meeting 2 days before Christmas, got Dr. Berger to come back from New York. I mean we had to go to those lengths to try to get them to pay attention to this and to realize that we in the Congress were simply not going to let them get away with not doing this job and not looking at these possibilities in order to take care of these veterans. I still worry that these kids are coming into VA hospitals where they still think there really is not a problem and it is all psychosomatic and not really giving them the kind of treatment that Dr. Nicholson and other skilled practitioners out there are giving them, giving these soldiers, in order to get them over the various symptoms that they have had from the Gulf War. So again I rise in strong support of this. We cannot let this happen again, and I think that is the intent of the gentleman's amendment, and I appreciate the ranking Democratic Member, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding me this time.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. DICKS. Reclaiming my time, the other problem that I found out is that we do not have the best technology, I believe, for the detection of when an enemy uses chemical or biological weapons. This is not something that we are very skilled at. We are pretty good in chemicals, but certainly weak in the biological area, so there are some other areas that the Congress needs to look at so that when we deploy forces we have a better idea of what they may be exposed to, and we also need to be careful about the shots that are given. There are some indications that there may have been some problems with that. And so there are problems in the detection area. There also is something that has plagued soldiers from time eternal, and that is when we take somebody and put them into a new area, there may be background infectious agents or parasites, another problem that could have affected our troops. And so I concur very strongly with my colleague's point that we should look at this as a multifaceted problem and not look at it as just one issue, and I think that is where we got off track. We were not willing to have a pragmatic, open mind about this and to look at all these possibilities, and I think also I worry on the intelligence side did we give advanced warning to our commanders in the field about the possibilities that when they destroyed at Khamisiyah, when they destroyed those weapons, who knew exactly what was there? Was it just chemical weapons? Could there have been some low-grade biological weapons or other infectious disease? As my colleagues know, Saddam made a number of speeches in which he said, ``If you come after me, I'm going to do things that will affect you, your families, your wives,'' da-da-da-da. So it is a strong indication that he may have used something that we still do not have full knowledge of.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. DICKS. I certainly appreciate the courtesy of the gentleman from California. I want to rise in strong support of this amendment. This has been one of the most difficult issues that all of us have faced. I serve on the Subcommittee on National Security and on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as the ranking Democrat, and we have asked for an investigation of this: What did we know, and when did we know it, and was there an attempt at the Pentagon not to really come clean with the American people on this issue? I have worried about the veterans that are out there, many of which came from my State, my district, who served in the gulf war, who were told that, well, there was no exposure to chemical weapons; they are also told that they may be suffering from a post war mental syndrome. Well, I do not think that is accurate, and I think the studies that have been done and the work that has been done by doctors all over the country who have treated Gulf War veterans proves conclusively that there are some other problems than the ones that have been suggested by the Defense Department. Out in California, for example, Dr. Garth Nicholson has treated many patients who have had infectious microplasmas, and this would mean that somehow they were exposed to an infectious agent while they were in the gulf and brought it back. In fact, some have given it to their children, their wives and even their pets, and again the Pentagon has been very slow to acknowledge this possibility. Now they are doing a study of this; they are looking into Dr. Nicholson's research, and I have talked, in trying to help Dr. Nicholson I have talked, to doctors all over the country who are treating gulf war veterans at the various veteran's hospitals, and they are incredulous by the way that Washington, DC, has treated this. Now in recent months, the last several months, the administration I think has, and I do not blame the President for this, but people over at the Defense Department have finally gotten the message that the American people want to see every one of these possible causes for gulf war diseases to be investigated, and this Congress has given them the money to do that, the Committee on Appropriations has given them the resources to do that, and still there has been resistance over there, saying we have to study, and we have to do this. I am all for professional studies, I am all for peer review, but I do not want it to be a way of saying we can only afford to do this much. If there is other good, credible, possible answers out there, I want the Pentagon to come and ask for the resources necessary to do the investigation.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to commend the gentleman for his leadership on this issue. I rise in very strong support of his amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman on this. I think that this is something that the Congress needs to deal with, but the gentleman from Arizona, chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, I think makes a very valid point. We want to do this carefully and properly. I urge him to keep up his good work and look forward to voting in favor of his amendment when it comes to the floor.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, today the House will be taking up a very important issue, the B-2 bomber, and I want to read a letter that was just sent to the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] from General Brent Scowcroft, who has just done an independent bomber force review: You requested my colleagues and I provide your committee with an independent look at the adequacy of the Nation's heavy bomber force. This is an important issue as we move into the new security era and we greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer our counsel to you and your committee. In our review, we first examined the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the potential offered by the B-2's. We then examined the sources of Pentagon opposition to additional B-2's production and the recent series of studies the Department of Defense has sent to Congress regarding the bomber force. We reached two fundamental conclusions. First, long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that the planned force of 21 B-2's will satisfy foreseeable U.S. national security requirements. Second, Pentagon opposition to further B-2's production is shortsighted and parochial. It reflects a consensus across the services that long-range air power can be safely abandoned in the long run--a view with which we strongly disagree. Based on these conclusions, we offer a set of legislative recommendations regarding the bomber force. The following contains an executive summary and overall report. And I would like to just read a few paragraphs from this executive summary. If this decision (on the B-2's) is allowed to stand, the end result will be a shift to a force structure that relies almost entirely on short-range air power. Yet current plans will perpetuate a bomber force which will not contain enough modern survivable bombers to support our national interests around the globe. The need for the prompt, global reach of heavy bombers was starkly demonstrated in the 1994 and 1996 Iraq crisis, both of which surprised our military planners and exposed the continuing weakness of our bomber-deficient forces to fast-breaking conflicts located great distances away. Investing in the revolutionary B-2's offers the potential for a radical change in the way in which we think about and employ military power--a change which opens the door to a much more affordable and effective military posture. We believe that being able to strike the enemy promptly and accurately from a distance is the preferable choice, particularly since it appears the long-range option is cheaper over the long term. This is not the way to conduct rational national security decisionmaking. By allowing organizational politics and short-term affordability concerns to dominate the B-2's debate, we will turn our backs on the future. Moreover, we will needlessly risk U.S. national security interests and the lives of thousands of young Americans. Additional B-2's are affordable. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately 50 percent by 2001 and those funds should be spent on the most cost- effective systems, such as additional B-2's. So, Mr. Speaker, I would just say again today, I think this vote this afternoon is critically important. General Scowcroft is a person who I have enormous respect for, who was national security adviser to President Ford and to President Bush. His group also with General Burpee and others have come forward with a devastating criticism of this administration's long-range bomber policy. I would say of all the weapons we are buying today, none has more conventional military potential than the B-2's. When combined with smart conventional weapons, like JDAM's at $13,000 per weapon, it gives us an ability to attack an enemy who is invading, stop the invasion, destroy his army in the field, and also attack his national security leadership, and his operational and tactical targets as well. It gives the opportunity for simultaneous warfare with a plane that can operate autonomously without a huge package of supporting conventional aircraft. I think this is a crucial issue. I think this administration has made a terrible, tragic mistake in not recommending to the Congress to keep this program going, especially now with the line open out there in Palmdale, CA. We can get these bombers today at the cheapest price possible because the line is still open. I believe that buying an additional nine B-2's over 6 years is the right thing to do for the security of the country. It will give us a force of 30 bombers, three squadrons of 10, and I think it will markedly improve our national defense capability.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, in fact I think Secretary Longuemare makes a good point in support of what the gentleman just said: Delaying the backfit of 4 SSBNs with D-5 missiles sends the wrong message to Russia. It removes Russia's incentive to ratify START II in a timely manner and begin START III negotiations as agreed in Helsinki. I have to agree. I think this would send the wrong message. If we are going to bring down the strategic forces, we want to bring them down on both sides. I also would take some umbrage about the status of the Russian Navy. As the ranking Democrat on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and someone who has served 19 years on defense appropriations, this is one area in the submarine area where the Russians are still making significant investments. I would not characterize their submarine capabilities as defective or weak. They have very capable submarines, particularly in the attack area.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time, and I rise in opposition to the Luther amendment and in support of the committee's position on this. One of the problems here is that we have a missile on these older Tridents. The Pacific Tridents were built first. And the older missile, the C-4 missile, has a lifetime up to about 2004. Then, if we do not build the D-5 and replace the C-4's with the D-5's, we are going to have to go out and spend billions of dollars to fix up the C-4 missile. In fact, I have been told that that course is more expensive than buying the newer, more capable missiles. So why would we not want to retrofit? The other problem is, if we have two missiles, then we have to have two infrastructures for the missiles, the D-5's. And if we can go to an all D-5 force, than we can have one missile, one set of repair parts, and it is actually, in terms of ownership, less expensive. I would agree with my friend from California [Mr. Hunter] that until we see what happens in the START talks, we would, in my judgment, be premature to go even from 18 to 14 in terms of the number of submarines that we have. And the D-5 program is in place. We should buy these missiles now while the line is open. We need to keep this open until we see whether, in fact, we are going to get an arms control agreement. To cut it off now would be premature and we would have a situation where the submarines in the Atlantic have D-5's and none of the submarines in the Pacific would. The D-5 is a more capable missile, and we need to have that capability, in my judgment, in both oceans. So I understand the intent here to try to save some money. We all want to save money. But there is a lot more to this, and it goes right to the security of the country. The D-5 and the Trident submarine are the most survivable part of our triad. I think until we get these arms control agreements in place we should stay with this program, support the administration, who strongly is committed to keeping the D-5 program going.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment the gentleman. He has got this exactly right. This is one of those ironies. If we kill the D-5, we are going to spend more on the existing missile which is less capable. It is less capable. And then we got 2 systems, we are going to have the duplication in repair, spare parts and everything else. So let us stay with the program. At some point in the future, as my colleagues know, we may get down to 14, but that is going to be when we have agreed to it, when there is a negotiated agreement between the 2 sides. To do it unilaterally I think would be a very serious mistake, and I urge a no vote on the Luther Ramstad amendment.

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from California [Mr. Doolittle] would agree that what happened here is we had a 500-year flood, a catastrophic event, that caused all this damage. It was certainly not the Endangered Species Act. How can my colleague possibly blame it on protection of habitat and species?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a vote on the amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, as I remember, there were a lot of people offering amendments to cut out funding for the Corps of Engineers and also money for the Endangered Species Act that could have been utilized for these purposes. I think if the gentleman goes back and looks at the record, he will see that some of those amendments are a part of the reason why he did not get more of a response on these issues.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, one of the realities here, too, is when people are talking about protecting flood control projects, that is one thing. But then there is going to be a higher burden on the farmers, on the miners, on the other industries, because we are going to have to do this protection at some point.