Norm Dicks

Mr. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am willing to accept my amendment, as amended by the chairman.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last work. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the gentleman I will be glad to accept his amendment. I want to say I have no problem at all with the additional language proposed by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. In fact, I hope DOD would respond even before the conference on this bill. I want to stress that nothing in this amendment inhibits DOD in any way from recommending again that a replacement air vehicle be made a high priority in the coming fiscal year. Report language already accompanying the bill, as I noted previously, serves notice the committee will continue to examine this program's need carefully prior to conference.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has a perfecting amendment to my amendment. My amendment would authorize an additional $22 million for the endurance unmanned aerial vehicle known as Darkstar. This funding is needed to recover from the loss of the first vehicle during flight testing, which took place just before we marked up this bill in committee. At that time, we did not have good information from the Department of Defense on the impact of the crash, so the report accompanying the bill includes language which reserved the committee's right to revisit this issue as better information became available. While the accident investigation is still not quite completed, DOD has been able to provide a good estimate of what the cost impact is likely to be. DOD has determined that there will be a delay in getting the second aircraft ready for flight, and in carrying out the necessary set of flight tests once testing is resumed. During this period, a substantial engineering team must be sustained and the amendment will provide the funds necessary to do that. I urge the adoption of this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. amendment offered by mr. combest to the amendment offered by mr. dicks

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to compliment the chairman and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. I believe that all of our laws should be properly enforced, and in that spirit we will accept the amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], a very valued member of our committee.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation now before the House. I want to begin by commending Chairman Combest for the manner in which he has presided over the committee's activities this year. He has been solicitous of the views of the Democratic members and has sought to address our concerns when he felt it possible to do so. We do not agree on every issue, although we do agree on many, but I have always felt that he was willing to give us the opportunity to make our case, particularly on matters concerning the intelligence budget. We are, of course, waiting to have a couple of additional hearings, Mr. Chairman, on some of the issues that we discussed in our markup. At a time when most programs are feeling the effects of a constrained budget environment, H.R. 3259 provides a significant increase--nearly 5 percent over the amount authorized for the current fiscal year and about 6.5 percent over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1996. While some of this increase is the result of the substantially higher defense budget approved by the House, a major portion reflects decisions by the committee that a number of intelligence systems need to be modernized to respond to future requirements. These improvements to highly complex systems are expensive, but they are necessary if the United States is to retain the world's preeminent intelligence capability--a capability that will be of increasing importance as a source of early warning to policymakers and military commanders in the years ahead. I urge the House not to adopt amendments which would make across-the-board reductions in the authorization level in this bill. While I understand the sincerity of the views which motivate those amendments, I believe they would substantially impair the ability of the intelligence community to make investments in several systems that will be of great value in the future. In spite of the positive aspects of this bill, committee Democrats have, as we did last year, several fundamental disagreements with the majority over programs administered by the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. The bill would terminate or delay a number of programs designed either to address intelligence shortcomings noted in the Persian Gulf war or in other ways to improve the provision of timely support to intelligence customers, particularly the battlefield commander. Military operations, and the sophisticated weapons systems which are used in them, place an increasingly high premium on accurate intelligence. On March 6 of this year, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Senator Warren Rudman appeared before the committee in open session to report on the work of a commission they led, and on which I served, to examine the roles and capabilities of U.S. intelligence. At the March 6 hearing, Secretary Brown noted that ``if it were not for the existence of the Department of Defense, the intelligence budget would, in my judgment, be maybe 10 percent of what it is.'' I agree with Secretary Brown about the priority of military requirements within those assigned to the intelligence community. I further believe that we should proceed very carefully when we decide to alter a satellite architecture which Defense Department officials, both civilian and uniformed, have indicated is essential to ensuring that future military operations can be conducted successfully without unnecessarily endangering American personnel. Regrettably, the committee has embarked on a course, with respect to NRO programs, which will leave important military intelligence requirements unmet. That is not a good result in a bill which establishes authorization levels that in the aggregate can only be justified on national security grounds. Before we finally endorse decisions which may place at risk the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its mission, we need to clearly understand what capabilities we are being asked to forgo and the consequences of those actions. To his credit, Chairman Combest has promised that, before we get to conference on this legislation, hearings will be held on these matters. I hope those sessions will provide a firmer basis than we now have for making judgments in these critical areas. Mr. Chairman, despite the reservations just expressed, I believe the bill before us is, in balance, a sound one and should be approved. I look forward to working with Mr. Combest to improve it in conference, but I urge its adoption today. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], a distinguished member of our committee. (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman was not on the floor, I think, when we talked about this a little earlier. As she knows, when we buy a weapons system at the Pentagon, sometimes there are billions of dollars of unobligated funds that are spend over a period of time. In the intelligence area, we incrementally fund. It was the opinion of George Mahon and some of the senior members of the Committee on Appropriations many years ago that we could not risk a situation where Congress has not passed its budget by the start of the fiscal year. They believed it was necessary to have a certain amount of flexibility in carryforward funds to keep these programs going, if the Congress did not get the Defense budget passed. There was a kind of agreement among the players to do this. What I object to, and I know the gentlewoman from Colorado objects to, is that this account, and each one of these were for different national technical means, different satellite programs, is that these accounts grew too large in the aggregate. None of the money was misspent. I think the fault was that Congress was not kept appropriately advised about the magnitude. I can tell the Members, I am very pleased that it was the staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and particularly the minority staff, that went to the NRO, found this out, made it known to the other key committees in the Congress, and last year we dramatically reduced the amount of money in those accounts. We used it for Bosnia, we use it for other defense priorities, so that the money was not wasted. The American people did not get ripped off.

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado, an outstanding member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, have we reduced the money for defense? Yes. We have cut the Defense budget by about $100 billion a year between 1985 and 1995. We have also cut back on the amount of money for the intelligence agencies. We have cut back on the number of personnel. I am talking about across the board cuts in the Defense Department, the CIA, and all of these agencies, we have reduced the size. Yet, today, America is in more countries around the world with military forces that require accurate intelligence for their security and support. Mr. Chairman, I just urge my colleagues to remember that fact. Yes, we can always beat up on an agency, but I am always reminded of the fact that this agency is composed of American citizens who serve our Government faithfully, who have done an extraordinary job. I just urge us to put this into some perspective. If they had failed in building these national technical means, then we would be here criticizing them. They certainly failed to keep Congress appropriately informed of the size of the carryover funds. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of that money was improperly spent. So let us try to keep this in perspective. Sometimes, with all the criticism, the harsh rhetoric, we forget that these are men and women who have done a fantastic job for this Nation, and who really do deserve our support.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate a couple of concerns I have about this bill. As I have stated, I am going to support it, but we need to remember that the money we are spending for intelligence today, in my mind, is a tremendous force multiplier for our military. When we consider the fact that we can now literally fuse into the cockpits of our aircraft intelligence gathered in space to give the locations of enemy weapons systems in almost real time, so they can be properly targeted, I think all of a sudden we recognize the revolutionary improvements that are being made in our overall military capability. To my friends on the Democratic side, I believe strongly that such capabilities will allow us in the future to deter military conflicts. I would urge my colleagues, to support the Conyers amendment, of which I am a sponsor. I think we can disclose the aggregate number, but I want everyone to remember that this is still a part of the Defense Department. It is a portion of the defense budget that is used not only to gather intelligence for our national leadership, but also to be used effectively to protect the people that we are sending in harm's way every single day all around the world and to convince our adversaries that picking a fight with the United States just simply does not make sense. I had a chance just a few weeks ago to go to our combined air operation in Vincenza and to see a real fusion center where intelligence from all of our collection platforms is gathered. This intelligence is used by our military to find problems in Bosnia that are then communicated to the military commanders, and thus they are able to avoid possible conflicts that could occur; because of the ability to find enemy radars and things of that nature. This is truly a revolutionary change in intelligence capabilities, so as we sometimes get harsh with the NRO, I would say that John Deutch took effective steps. He named a new chief financial officer. He named a new head of the NRO, a very fine public servant. The two people that were removed are people who have given distinguished service to our country. Unfortunately, the financial people at the NRO did not do their job properly, and Congress was not properly informed about the size of these carryforward funds. Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate, there is no evidence that any of that money was spent on items not authorized by Congress. One of my colleagues talked today about the very famous NRO building. Our committee, a bipartisan basis, put out a report that said that we knew about this building. In fact, we had good oversight over the building. We pointed out that in the other body there were amendments offered by members of the Intelligence Committee to accelerate and possibly to expand the size of the NRO building. So when they then turned around at a later date and said they knew nothing about it, many of us in this body had serious reservations about how they in fact could say that. Sometimes in a rush we do not keep the facts in sight, and we sometimes do not know the history. The point I am trying to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the NRO has been one of the stellar institutions in our Government. One of the reasons we won the cold war was because we had the finest intelligence. We have the finest intelligence community of any nation on earth. Those intelligence community assets are used to enhance our military capability in order to protect American lives and to deter future wars. That is why I have always strongly supported our intelligence community. Can we reduce the money? Yes. Have we reduced the money? Yes. We have reduced it significantly.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, section 504 of the National Security Act requires that funds may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence- related activity only if those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for use for such activities. The Combest amendment will provide the necessary authorization for funds appropriated earlier this year in the Bosnia supplemental. I support the amendment and we are prepared to accept it on our side.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from Texas clarifies that the DCI may transfer the funds authorized by section 303 of the bill to the agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program for the automatic declassification of records over 25 years old. The community management staff has pointed out that this transfer authority is necessary to move the money the bill provides in the community management account back to the various agency programs. I have no problem with this technical correction. The gentleman's amendment also states that the DCI is to make these transfers consistent with his duty to protect sources and methods. This particular language is superfluous because the DCI is already required by current law to protect sources and methods in everything he does. Because I am certain the gentleman does not mean to imply by the inclusion of this redundant language that the DCI has any intention of violating the requirements of current law in transferring money we authorize in this area, I am prepared to accept the amendment for this side.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, the amendment makes clear that what we were trying to do in the bill was ensure CIA makes only one payment and not two, to the civil service retirement and disability fund for those agency employees who take an early retirement or resign and receive separation incentives in fiscal year 1998 and 1999. The CIA was required to make these payments under both amendments to the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act enacted last year and the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994. It was never intended that the CIA would have to pay 24 percent for employees leaving the agency under its separation incentive program. The amendment clarifies that the required 15-percent payment to the fund under the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act is in lieu of the 9- percent payment required under the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act. Thus we would be happy to accept it on our side and urge the committee to pass it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. The amendment would amend section 403 of the bill, giving CIA the authority to enter into multiyear leases to require that the CIA have an appropriation for the total amount of the lease in advance. I understand the concern of the Congressional Budget Office and the Budget Committee that section 401 as it appears in the bill would allow CIA to enter into long-term leases without being subject to appropriations action. This was not the intent of the committee. However, I do have some concerns about the language of the amendment. Since these leases could easily run into many millions of dollars, it is not clear to me that there would ever be an authorization or appropriation for these leases in advance. It is also not clear how funds could be made available for the entire term of a 15- or 20-year lease. Nevertheless, because I believe it should be possible to find mutually acceptable language in conference, I am prepared to accept this amendment for our side.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and speak in favor of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the Conyers amendment as a cosponsor of it. The amendment will require the disclosure of the aggregate budget figure only, not the budgets of any intelligence agency, nor the budget for any program or activity. There is no threat to national security from the disclosure of only the aggregate figure. No potential adversary of the United States has the ability to thwart any intelligence collection activity as a result of knowing just the aggregate budget figure. The executive order on classification permits information to be classified only if its disclosure would be expected to cause damage to the national security. Classification of the aggregate intelligence budget figure does not meet that test. The Constitution requires a public statement and account of the expenditure of public funds. Disclosure of the aggregate budget figure is more consistent with that constitutional requirement than the current practice. I might just add I had the pleasure of serving on the Aspin-Brown Commission. The Commission endorsed disclosing the aggregate number. The current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. John Deutch, has also come out in favor of it, as has the President. I think it would be totally appropriate for the Congress to take this step. That is why I was delighted to join with my colleague, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], in presenting this amendment today. I urge my colleagues to vote for it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. We accept the amendment. I commend the gentleman. I think he has made the right decision here. He is moving the ball forward, and we are just as concerned as he is about making sure that U.S. intelligence is secured properly. I think by accepting the Combest amendment we can make progress because of his initiative. I urge support for the amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of the Combest substitute and urge its adoption.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise I opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, the Brownback amendment places new, unworkable restrictions on the United States sharing information with the United Nations--even when it is in the national interest to do so. It would make it extremely difficult to provide intelligence support to those U.N. activities which are supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals. The administration is opposed to the Brownback amendment. This amendment is identical to language contained in the conference report on H.R. 1561, the Overseas Interests Act, which was vetoed by the President. As the President noted in his veto message, this amendment would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's power to conduct diplomatic relations and limit Presidential control over the use of state secrets. The DCI has already established guidelines to protect intelligence sources and methods, when it is determined to be in the interest of the United States to provide information derived from U.S. intelligence to the United Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations is working with a senior delegation of State, Defense, and CIA officials to implement a number of improvements to its internal security procedures. The DCI's guidelines ensure that information is carefully reviewed and sanitized so that the least sensitive intelligence that satisfies a U.N. requirement is provided. Even if information that is provided to the United Nations fell into the wrong hands, it will have been sanitized so that it will not compromise U.S. intelligence sources and methods. The Brownback amendment would impede the ability of the United States to maintain a flexible and efficient information sharing arrangement with the United Nations, and may adversely impact the ability of the United States to achieve foreign policy successes. The waiver provided in the amendment is too burdensome to be effective. It requires the President to issue a waiver for each instance that information derived from intelligence is provided to the United Nations, or for each document that is provided. Furthermore, the President may not delegate this authority. The amendment also requires the President to personally report, at least quarterly, to Congress on the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided, and report to Congress within 15 days of any unauthorized disclosure. The President ought to be able to delegate this authority to the DCI. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee of this Chamber with the greatest concern over the protection of sources and methods, considered legislation similar to the Brownback amendment at the beginning of the 104th Congress and rejected it on a bipartisan basis. The committee found several instances where the current intelligence sharing arrangement with the United Nations has yielded specific foreign policy successes. Information was shared with Security Council members on Iraqi troop build-ups, in support of a multilateral effort to prevent a repeat of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has also assisted United Nations Special Commission in Iraq [UNSCOM] inspectors in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the magnitude and direction or refugee flows within and from Rwanda. Timely intelligence sharing has also helped save the lives of the United States Protection Force [UNPROFOR] peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. While I do not believe it is necessary to legislate in this area to restrict the President's ability to share intelligence information to promote U.S. foreign policy, a compromise amendment worked out by the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees adopted by the Senate last year would be clearly preferable. I urge a no vote on the Brownback amendment.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend from Ohio, he has offered a similar amendment in years past, with the goal of ensuring that the intelligence community maximizes its purchase of American-made products. As the gentleman knows, we are the leader in stealth technology. This is a goal I support. We have worked with the gentleman from Ohio on other occasions to preserve the spirit of his amendment in conference, even though the committee is aware that the record of the intelligence community on the procurement of U.S. products is exemplary. We will do so again this year, and we are pleased, at least I am pleased for the minority, to accept the amendment. I yield to the chairman.