John Dingell

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, listen to the language of the amendment. This is what it says: Takings prohibited. In implementing the provisions of this section, the commission shall not restrict the activities of COMSAT in a manner which would create a liability for the United States under the fifth amendment to the Constitution. That is all it says. It does not say the commission is supposed to allow monopolies. It simply says, we are not going to subject the taxpayers of the United States to a $6 billion or $7 billion liability by taking property from COMSAT. If there is no taking under this amendment, I say to my friends who oppose it, there is nothing for them to fear. If there is a taking, by God, my colleagues better pray that this is in the bill, because if it is not, my colleagues are going to be trying to defend through our Constitution why they dissipated $6 billion or $7 billion of your constituents' and your taxpayers' money. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask a question to my colleagues on the other side. They said there is no taking here, and so we need to have no fear on that. The gentlewoman from Maryland offers an amendment which says there can be no taking. Well, if they do not intend to do a taking, if the amendment says there is no taking, if in fact there is no taking, what is wrong with the amendment? I would think those who say there is going to be no taking here would accept this amendment with vast enthusiasm and would be speaking for it, not against it. I am curious. What is it that they are trying to tell us; that there is a taking and so they do not want the amendment, or that there is not a taking so the amendment is not needed? I do not know. But I do know one thing. If there is a possibility of the taking, we better doggone well see to it that we adopt the amendment so that we do not impose upon our constituents $6 or $7 billion of liability because of the unwise action in this Chamber today.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, the amendment gets to the nub of the question. It says this, and I can understand why the opponents of the amendment are so distressed about it, because it says, In implementing the provisions of this section, the Commission shall not restrict the activities of COMSAT in a manner which would create a liability for the United States under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. What is wrong with that amendment? All it says is that the Commission has to respect the Constitution and cannot create a liability on the taxpayers because we have engaged in an unconstitutional taking or because we have violated the provisions of the Tucker Act. I want my colleagues to listen to what the Washington Legal Foundation said. By the way, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley) is a major contributor to that agency and has sent them a wonderful letter in which he told them how he wanted to support the good work of that foundation. Here it is. This is what they had to say: In response to your written request for counsel, the Washington Legal Foundation has undertaken a legal analysis of H.R. 1872. After the consideration of H.R. 1872, WLF has concluded that H.R. 1872 would indeed effect a compensable taking of private property belonging to COMSAT, as well as a material breach of the terms of the compact between the United States and COMSAT. WLF's conclusion should not be construed as endorsement or opposition to H.R. 1872. They are giving you a clear warning. The amendment says that the Commission cannot subject your constituents and mine to that kind of liability. I would want to observe something else. What this bill does is to impair contract rights of COMSAT and to impair the value, the good will and the corporate assets of that corporation. The Supreme Court has been very clear on this point. They have said that the most significant factor in determining whether economic regulation constitutes a taking is the extent to which, and I quote now from the Supreme Court, ``the regulation has interfered with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.'' That is from the Penn Central case, Penn Central Transportation Company v. The City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, dated 1978. They went on to say some other things which I think are important. They went on to say, ``The simple words,'' and I am now interpolating, the Supreme Court said ``that Congress may at any time alter, amend and repeal this act * * * cannot be used to take away property already acquired * * * or to deprive'' a private ``corporation of the fruits already reduced to possession of contracts lawfully made.'' We are here with considerable diligence in this legislation interfering in the contract rights of COMSAT. COMSAT's officers are, at the proper responsibility and under the insistence of their shareholders, most assuredly going to file suit under the Tucker Act. I can offer my colleagues firm assurances that the judgment that will be awarded to COMSAT will be most generous and it will be done at the expense of your constituents unless this body has the wisdom to adopt the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Maryland. It should be observed, this does not do anything, the amendment, except to assure that there will be no liability imposed on our constituents because of an unconstitutional taking by this body. I urge my colleagues to keep that thought in mind. You have a responsibility to pass legislation in this body which observes the Constitution, but which also does not subject our taxpayers to a liability for wrongful acts taken by this Congress. I would urge my colleagues to keep carefully in mind that the sums here are not piddling. They amount to billions of dollars. My question to my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, is, do you want the responsibility on your soul and on your conscience of having dissipated this enormous sum of money and subjected your taxpayers to that kind of liability?

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I simply want to commend the gentleman from Colorado for what it is he has done. This treaty violates the INTELSAT agreement and the basic telecom agreement of the World Trade Organization. It also would have the practical effect of insisting on specific results and would impose sanctions on INTELSAT in violation of that treaty if those results are not achieved. The sanctions would violate that treaty further by expelling INTELSAT from the U.S. market in violation of that treaty agreement. In addition to that, it would violate the Inmarsat agreement by preventing COMSAT and Inmarsat from providing certain specifically required, economically viable service to U.S. consumers. It also punishes COMSAT in the event foreign participants do not meet the privatization criteria and time schedule, something which is, again, in violation of that treaty. Now, in addition to that, COMSAT would be barred from providing many services to American and foreign participants under the treaties requiring those actions, to which this Nation is a signatory. It also imposes requirements for spin-offs which do not, I believe, comply with the requirements of the treaty. It also violates the WTO basic telecom agreements' open market requirements because, in point of fact, it tends to close rather than to open markets and reduce rather than increase competition. It would, in fact, imperil the entire future of the WTO agreement entered into with 68 other countries. The comments of the gentleman from Colorado were appropriate and should be considered as my colleagues prepare to vote against this outrageous bill. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mrs. Morella

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call my colleagues' attention to the extraordinary discrepancies between the black-letter law of the statutory text and the contents of the Committee Report. If any of my colleagues would like to know why the judiciary pays little attention to the legislative history when attempting to interpret the statutes we write, the Report to accompany this bill provides a magnificent example. The Committee Report on H.R. 1872 is as accurate a reflection of intentions of the Committee when it considered H.R. 1872 as was yesterday's Washington Post, although I think that the Post made better reading. While this is unfortunate, and will contribute to the decline in the importance of committee reports as legislative history, I am particularly concerned about the way in which the Report treats the Committee's work with respect to proposed Section 641, and in particular those dealing with ``Direct Access.'' During the Telecommunications Subcommittee's consideration of H.R. 1872, I offered an amendment to proposed Section 641 which made significant revisions in the ``Direct Access'' provisions. After I offered and explained my amendment, it was accepted by the Chairman of the Committee and approved without dissent. The provisions in the Committee Report do not reflect the plain text of my amendment, nor my intentions as its author. Legislative History of Section 641 Section 641 is entitled ``Direct Access; Treatment of COMSAT at Nondominant Carrier.'' This Section requires the Commission to take those actions that may be necessary to permit providers and users of telecommunications services to obtain direct access to INTELSAT and Inmarsat telecommunication services. Section 641 also requires the Commission to act on Comsat's petition to be treated as a non-dominant carrier, and to eliminate any of its regulations on the availability of direct access to INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or to any successor entities, after a pro-competitive privatization of this intergovernmental treaty organizations (``IGOs'') is achieved consistent with this statute. Subsection 641(1) addresses direct access to INTELSAT telecommunications service through either purchases of space segment capacity in accordance with subsection 641(1)(A) or through investment in INTELSAT in accordance with subsection 641(1)(B). Specifically, Subsection 641(1)(A) provides that providers or users of telecommunications service may purchase space segment capacity from INTELSAT, as of January 1, 2000, if the Commission determines that (i) INTELSAT has adopted a usage charge mechanism that ensures fair compensation to INTELSAT signatories for support costs that such signatories would not otherwise be able to avoid under a direct access regime (for example, costs for insurance, administrative, and other operations and maintenance expenditures); (ii) the Commission's regulations ensure that no foreign signatory, nor any affiliate of a foreign signatory, is permitted to order space segment directly from INTELSAT in order to provide any service subject to the Commission's jurisdiction; and (iii) the Commission has in place a means to ensure that carriers will be required to pass through to end-users savings that result from the exercise of such authority. Subsection 641(1)(B) requires that providers or users of telecommunications service may obtain direct access to INTELSAT telecommunications services through investment in INTELSAT as of January 1, 2002, if the Commission finds that such investment will be attained under procedures that assure fair compensation to INTELSAT signatories for the market value of their investments. Subsection 641(2) addresses direct access to Inmarsat telecommunications services through either purchases of space segment capacity in accordance with subsection 641(2)(A), or through investment in Inmarsat in accordance with subsection 641(2)(B). Specifically, subsection 641(2)(A) provides that providers or users of telecommunciations service may purchase space segment capacity from Inmarsat, as of January 1, 2000, if the Commission determines that (i) Inmarsat has adopted a usage charge mechanism that ensures fair compensation to Inmarsat signatories for support costs that such signatories would not otherwise be able to avoid under a direct access regime (for example, costs for insurance, administrative, and other operations and maintenance expenditures); (ii) the Commission's regulations ensure that no foreign signatory, nor its affiliate, is permitted to order space segment directly from Inmarsat in order to provide any service subject to the Commission's jurisdiction; and (iii) the Commission has in place a means to ensure that carriers will be required to pass through to end-users savings that result from the exercise of such authority. Subsection 641(2)(B) requires that providers or users of telecommunications service may obtain direct access to Inmarsat telecommunications services through investment in Inmarsat as of January 1, 2001, if the Commission finds that such investment will be attained under procedures that assure fair compensation to Inmarsat signatories for the market value of their investments. Subsection 641(3) requires the Commission to act on Comsat's petition to be treated as a non-dominant carrier for the purposes of the Commission's regulations according to the provisions of section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. Sec. 160). Subsection 641(4) requires the Commission to eliminate any regulation on the availability of direct access to INTELSAT or Inmarsat or to any successor entities after a pro- competitive privatization of those intergovernmental satellite organizations is achieved. Critique of Legislative History The language contained in the Committee Report is replete with instances in which the report is substantially more punitive to Comsat than the text of the legislation adopted by the Committee. As discussed below, the portion of the Report describing Section 641 is filled with inconsistencies and descriptions of provisions that neither appear in the text nor were discussed by the Committee. Not only are there numerous internal inconsistencies, but when the description in the Report is compared with the actual text of H.R. 1872, the factual misrepresentations become apparent. The first sentence of this portion of the Report says that: ``New sections 641(1) and 641(2) require the Commission to permit competitors to offer services through direct access to the INTELSAT and Inmarsat systems.'' The legislation requires the Commission to permit providers and users of telecommunications services to obtain telecommunications services directly for INTELSAT and Inmarsat. The Report also states that if ``the Inmarsat Operating Agreement is terminated, former signatories, including COMSAT for the provision of services in the United States, should not be the exclusive distributors of Inmarsat services.'' The Report continues: ``the U.S. Administration and the Commission should, in the public interest, ensure that any Inmarsat privatization plan includes direct access until full privatization is fully implemented.'' Neither of these provisions are contained in the text of the bill, nor were they discussed when my amendment was accepted. In its description of sections 641(1)(A)(i) through (iii), the Report again misrepresents the requirements of the statute. First, the Report states that these sections ``describe the circumstances which the Commission should determine are present when the Commission implements direct access through purchases of space segment capacity from INTELSAT.'' First, the provisions of the bill do not require the Commission to implement direct access. Rather, the bill requires the Commission to ensure that it is possible for carriers and users to obtain direct access. Additionally, this statement suggests that the Commission's analysis will be conducted simultaneously with the occurrence of direct access, when in fact the plain language of the legislative text requires that the Commission determine if the conditions set forth in sections 641(1)(A)(i) through (iii) are met prior to permitting direct access. The Report's description of the conditions for ensuring direct access is possible is also inaccurate. In particular, sections 641(1)(A)(ii) and (2)(A)(ii) require that no foreign signatory or its affiliate are permitted to provide INTELSAT or Inmarsat services from the United States. The text of the Report incorrectly limits this condition to foreign signatories. Moreover, the Report claims that sections 641(1)(A)(iii) and (2)(A)(iii) require the Commission to ensure that carriers pass savings through to end-users. The statute, however, requires only that the Commission have ``in place a means to ensure'' that carriers will be required to pass savings through to end-users. The description of sections 641(1)(A)(i) and (2)(A)(i) also diverges from the text of the bill. In particular, the text of H.R. 1872 does not contain the limitations on ``unavoided costs'' that the Report suggests. For example, the Report provides that ``the only costs covered by this section are those unavoidable signatory expenses in excess of all payments to signatories from the IGOs.'' This limitation is not present in the legislative text. Rather, the text of H.R. 1872 only refers to ``support costs that such signatories would not otherwise be able to avoid . . .'' Moreover, the Report states that: ``If such costs are in excess of or not covered by the IUC or by other payments to INTELSAT or Inmarsat, then this section shall be satisfied if INTELSAT or Inmarsat has in place or create a mechanism or other methodology or legal regime which permits (or does not preclude) parties . . . to adopt means to ensure that such unavoidable, excess signatory costs are covered by payments from other direct access providers or otherwise covered or fairly compensated.'' Again, there is no such provision in the statute. The Report contains a requirement that the Commission implement new subsections 641(1)(a)(ii) and 2(a)(ii) in a manner consistent with U.S. obligations in World Trade Organization (``WTO'') and to consult with Executive Branch agencies in this regard. Again, the text of the statute contains no such provision. Moreover, direct access itself appears to be inconsistent with the United States' Schedule of Specific Commitments agreed to in the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement. In particular, the U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments limits, inter alia, direct access to INTELSAT and Inmarsat to Comsat, the U.S. Signatory to those IGOs, for the provision of basic telecommunications services. As the Commission noted in implementing the WTO, this Schedule makes no distinction with respect to international service and U.S. domestic services. Rather, it maintains access to INTELSAT and Inmarsat satellites through Comsat for the provision of any service, domestic or international. Thus, any action by the U.S. Government permitting carriers to have direct access to space segment from INTELSAT will conflict with this Schedule of Specific Commitments because it will permit carriers to circumvent Comsat. In describing subsections 641(1)(A)(iii) and (2)(A)(iii), the Report states that: ``The Committee does not intend for the Commission to implement any form of carrier regulation or reporting requirement that would reinstate or be tantamount to dominant carrier regulation on carriers found to be non- dominant before the Committee's consideration of H.R. 1872 . . . [however] [t]he foregoing sentence does not apply to COMSAT . . .'' This provision penalizes Comsat by name even in those markets where the Commission has determined it is non-dominant. Needless to say, there is no basis for the provision contained in the Committee Report, either in the text of the legislation or in the Committee debate when the provision was adopted. In its description of subsections 641(1)(A)(iii) and (2)(A)(iii), the Report states that the requirement that the Commission has in place a means to ensure that carriers will be required to pass through to end-users savings that result from the exercise of direct access authority will be met ``if the Commission finds that competition resulting from direct access will result in savings to consumers over what they might pay in the absence of direct access.'' Thus, if one were to rely on the description in the Report one would assume that the Commission has an affirmative obligation to undertake an analysis of whether competition will result in savings to consumers. By contrast, the text of the legislation requires only that the Commission have a means in place to ensure that cost savings are passed on to end users. Once again, the text of the bill contradicts the description of that provision in the Report. Finally, the Report describes subsection 641(4) as requiring ``the Commission to sunset any regulation providing for direct access to INTELSAT or Inmarsat when these organizations fully privatize . . . ``It is unclear how the Commission would ``sunset'' a regulation. Actually, the statute requires the Commission to ``eliminate'' any regulation on the availability of direct access. Moreover, the Report limits the scope of this provision to INTELSAT and Inmarsat and neglects the fact that ``any successor entities'' of INTELSAT and Inmarsat are included in the statute. The legislative history contained in this Committee Report constitutes a monument to those who would dismiss committee reports as legitimate expressions of Congressional intent. This legislative history is fraught with factual inconsistencies and would lead even the staunchest defender of statutory construction to cringe. It is a blatant attempt to rewrite a bill through its legislative history. As a member of Congress, I am, quite frankly, offended by this, although I cannot say that I am surprised by it. We should aspire to have as our legacy statutes of major importance that speak to the public in plain and ordinary terms. As an integral part of those statutes, the legislative history should enhance, not attempt to redefine, the fruits of our efforts. As the Supreme Court has held: ``In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.'' See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592, 64 L.Ed. 2d 525, 100 S. Ct. 1889 (1980).

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time on the understanding the gentleman from Virginia is going to close. I have made such good speeches, I am sure they will benefit the gentleman in his closing remarks.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, could the Chair tell us how much time is remaining?

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 7 minutes. Mr. Chairman, this is a most remarkable piece of legislation. It is a wonderful solution. It is a wonderful solution seeking most actively for a problem. As a matter of fact, it is rushing wildly from point to point to find some problem that it can solve. In the process, it is knocking over the crockery and going to create enormous damage for the people of this country, for American industry, and for American telecommunications industries. It also is going to create enormous problems for the taxpayers of this Nation by subjecting them to enormous liability for an unconstitutional taking under the Tucker Act. The allegation is made that COMSAT is a monopoly. The simple fact of the matter is that within the last week, on April 24, as a matter of fact, the FCC declared that the COMSAT Corporation is a nondominant telecommunications carrier. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, FCC has found that COMSAT does not wield market power in 130 countries where it offers telephone services, 54 countries where it transfers occasional use of video, and in all countries where it offers long-term video needs. COMSAT has better than 20 major competitors. It is the major competitors of COMSAT who are around here whining for relief. Who are these unfortunate, penniless, downtrodden competitors of COMSAT? They are PanAmSat, and this bill has been described as a PanAmSat relief bill by Wall Street. PanAmSat just merged with Hughes and expects, if we pass this legislation, that they are going to cut a fat hog which will be paid for by the taxpayers, because we are expropriating, by the enactment of this legislation, property which belongs to COMSAT, Loral and AT&T which just merged, poor downtrodden, barefoot telecommunications giants; and Orion and Columbia, plus a wide array of others. There is no real problem with monopoly here. Indeed, the market share of COMSAT has been declining. Another interesting thought, COMSAT is spinning off now its satellite services in which it invested its shareholders' money. Those are going into competition. Talk about INTELSAT. INTELSAT is not a monopoly. It has a number of other competitors who are up there providing telecommunications services. This curious piece of legislation, I want to observe, is going to have virtually no consequences in terms of real increase in competition because, first of all, the competition that we are supposed to be trying to enforce is not being imposed on U.S. companies, but rather, we are trying to impose it on other companies in other countries around the world. A most remarkable set of circumstances, to assert the long reach of the arms of the United States Congress, to impose on other countries and on their industries' deregulation, a most curious practice. But the last thing to which I want my colleagues to devote their attention is the simple fact that under the Tucker Act, the United States Congress is here engaging in an unlawful, unconstitutional, and improper and wrongful taking of assets belonging, not to the government, and not to a wrongdoer, but simply to a U.S. corporation, COMSAT, and also an interference in the contract rights of companies which are subscribers and purchasers of service from COMSAT. This action alone will subject the United States to billions of dollars in lawsuits and probably billions of dollars in compensation that we will have to pay, because we have interfered with the contract rights, not just of COMSAT, but in the contract rights of people who do business with COMSAT. We have interfered in a way which diminishes the value of the stock of the stockholders and the assets of COMSAT. Apart from the fact that this is wrong, it is also something which is protected by the Constitution. Some of my friends have said, well, the Congress reserved to itself the right to amend the statute. We always do that. But we cannot, under the Constitution, reserve to ourselves the right to take the property of an American corporation. The Congress did this a while back. Not many of my colleagues remember the time that we passed the Penn Central reorganization. But because we took property from Penn Central, the American taxpayers wound up having to pay $6.5 billion. Penn Central is no longer a railroad. They are a holding company. They are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. They are making fine earnings on the basis of investments that they made with the money by which the Congress mistakenly enriched them because they did an unlawful taking; and under the Tucker Act, they are able to sue. Let us just look at some of the liabilities that we are absorbing. I asked the staff to inquire to find out what it is that we will be looking at in terms of additional liability for the taxpayers. I remind my colleagues, these are American taxpayers who are going to have to pay. I would tell my colleagues that over $3 billion is the potential liability for INTELSAT's business. That includes revenue from restriction on additional services, direct access, and ``fresh look,'' $623 million for restriction on replacement satellites carrying noncore services and a number of other items. In addition to that, there will be over $4 billion in liabilities potential to Inmarsat from business losses there, over $157 million from restriction on additional services, $327 million from the ``fresh look'' provisions of the legislation, and other liabilities that this Congress is assuming on behalf of a bunch of fat cats who, I reiterate, are seeking to cut a fat hog at the expense not just of COMSAT, but at the expense of the American taxpayers. When, in a few years, my colleagues observe that a lawsuit has been filed, get a hold of our wallet and be prepared to defend what we have done today, because we will have dissipated billions of dollars of the taxpayers' assets, and we will have imposed upon the United States an extortionate, unsatisfactory, and outrageous liability for serious constitutional misbehavior and for improper taking of property belonging to American citizens. We are not playing games. We are not playing with foreigners. We are beating American citizens for the benefit of just a few fat cats who are doing splendidly and who, in terms of their earnings and their market share, are growing at an extraordinary rate. Ask yourself, my colleagues, is this the way that this Congress should spend the budget surplus? Do we want to dissipate money because we have done something egregiously stupid today? Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Green). (Mr. GREEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Wynn).

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6\1/2\ minutes. Mr. Chairman, I want to express affection and respect for my good friend, the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley) and I also want to express the same good feelings towards my friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). They are fine Members, and the fact we have a difference here does in no way diminish my respect or affection for either of these fine gentleman. The simple fact of the matter, however, is this is a bad piece of legislation. It is unfair, it subjects the taxpayers of the United States to large liability under the Tucker Act, and I am talking about billions of dollars. This Congress has learned before that this is a risk, but it appears that we have to relearn the unfortunate lessons that we learned when we wrote the legislation on Conrail and when we did away with the unfortunate New York Central Railroad, and the bankruptcy and the reorganization by statute. We subjected the taxpayers to about $6\1/2\ billion in liabilities because we interfered with the contracts, we interfered with the business, and we interfered with the goodwill and the going value of the corporation, and it cost the taxpayers dearly. This is not a mistake which we should repeat today. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1872 has laudable goals. Unfortunately this legislation is going to fail. It is anticompetitive, it is anticonsumer and, worse, it is unconstitutional. The bill would impose draconian measures which would limit not only INTELSAT or Inmarsat, but it would also limit their U.S. customers. The bill unilaterally dictates complete privatization by legislative edict. If it were that simple, these treaty organizations could have long since been privatized. I would point out these are treaty organizations. The United States cannot unilaterally impose its will on better than 141 sovereign nations who are party to these treaties. The bill disregards the cold hard fact that the United States has but one vote in the governance of INTELSAT and Inmarsat. Congress cannot change that unfortunate international reality. It should be clear to anyone that this approach has no chance of success. If any foreign country wants to scuttle privatization efforts, this train will be immediately derailed and vital American interests will suffer. The interesting thing is that foreign countries cannot only hurt Inmarsat and INTELSAT in this process, but, very frankly, they can hurt American corporations and American competitiveness and American business going well beyond these two entities. I for one cannot support a bill that holds American interests hostage to the whims of 141 countries and that makes American carriers, innocent of wrongdoing, who have been held to be nondominant carriers just recently by the FCC, be at the mercy of foreign competitors. When service restrictions contained in this bill kick in, hundreds of millions of dollars in American investments in satellite equipment will be made obsolete overnight. If this were not bad enough, COMSAT, which is a private corporation publicly traded on the U.S. stock markets, will be ruined financially. Congress made a policy decision to fund these international satellite systems by putting private capital at risk instead of taxpayers' money, and when those private taxpayers' moneys and those stockholders' moneys are lost, the Federal Government will have a liability under the Tucker Act. It should be noted that the United States Government encouraged and in many instances required COMSAT to invest in these systems in exchange for the responsibility and the opportunity to earn a reasonable return. That would be taken away from COMSAT. And the practical result of this is again liability on the part of American taxpayers because of an unconstitutional action and an unconstitutional taking by this Congress of property belonging to private American citizens, which subjects this government immediately to redress under the Tucker Act. For the government to breach this bargain, obliterating the value of this investment, then serious constitutional concerns are raised under the takings clause of the fifth amendment. The report can tell my colleagues until the committee is blue in the face that this is not going to be the fact, but be assured that it will be, and my colleagues are playing fast and loose with the taxpayers' money if they vote for this legislation. This provision alone will subject American taxpayers to claims for damages running to billions of dollars. It should also be noted that this claim will fail. There is no reason to believe this, given the clear Supreme Court's precedents on these matters. And I would note that American users, as well as Inmarsat and INTELSAT, will suffer and will face the severe adverse impact that will flow from an unwise, unconstitutional, and unnecessary governmental action. In any event, this Congress should not be willing to throw away billions of taxpayers' dollars on a litigation strategy that at best is no more than a crap shoot. In sum, H.R. 1872 is a bad bill. It is in desperate need of radical surgery. It contains more constitutional law problems than a first year law school exam. I urge my colleagues to join in defeating what is here, an ill- conceived budget-breaking bill that is going to waste taxpayers' moneys without any benefit to the taxpayers or to the country; and it will subject, I reiterate, our constituents to claims for billions of dollars in damages, with no hope or expectation of gain for the country, for competitiveness, or anything else. Mr. Chairman, I urge the rejection of the bill, and I urge the adoption of the amendment which will shortly be offered by my good friend from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin). Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, it is my honor and privilege today to commemorate the career of a remarkable public servant. Bill McLucas, the Director of Enforcement at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, will soon be leaving his important post after twenty-two years of distinguished service to his country with eight of those years as this country's chief securities enforcer. The Enforcement Division protects the nation's investors by uncovering and prosecuting fraud in our financial markets. Under Bill's leadership, the SEC's Enforcement Division has secured its place as one of the crown jewels in the country's ongoing efforts to combat white collar crime. Tens of millions of investors have benefited from Bill's fierce commitment to fighting fraud. In 1995, Bill gave a speech in San Diego warning the municipal market that the SEC was planning to ``tack a few hides to the shed door''--a remark for which he was teased and criticized for years afterwards. However, I come to the House Floor to praise him. His remarks were dead on the mark. Pensioners, retirees, widows with insurance proceeds, parents trying to help their kid pay for college, couples saving for their first home--these are the people Bill McLucas thinks about and works for every day. And, Bill has done the right thing for the right reasons for a very long time. His remarkable record of accomplishment includes: the unprecedented resolution of the Prudential limited partnership scandal; the vigorous prosecution of insider traders on Wall Street who abused their positions of trust; the complex actions against major firms that helped rig auctions for government securities; and the discovery of abuses on NASDAQ that for many years harmed investors in the over-the-counter market. Though his Division seems always to have had limited resources, Bill seems always to have found a way to bring small scale frauds to justice as well. Although he is moving on, Bill has left an indelible mark on the SEC and the Enforcement Division that should last for generations. His integrity, decency, commitment to fair play, and inherent sense of justice have made an extraordinary contribution to the success of our markets--success that can't be measured on a profit and loss statement or a balance sheet. We owe him our profound thanks.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, what happened to the regular order around here? What is the reason for bypassing the committee? What is the reason we are putting this bill on the floor without ever having it considered by the Committee on Commerce? This is an authorization bill. It is put on the floor by the Committee on Rules. No consultation with the Committee on Commerce, which has jurisdiction over these matters. I do not intend to talk about the substance. I intend to talk about outrageous procedure. Without any consideration of the views of the Committee on Commerce, all of a sudden this legislation is on the floor; introduced and moved here with blinding speed. A majority which is incapable of moving ordinary legislation at even ordinary speed is not capable of withholding from themselves the opportunity to move with blinding haste on a piece of legislation which is unnecessary. The Secretary has already said we are not going to have needle exchanges. If we are going to have a debate on it, let us have an intelligent debate. Let us let the committees work on these matters, as they properly should. Woodrow Wilson, over a half a century ago, observed that the Congress works in its committees. Let the committees function. Let this body work its will in an ordinary and intelligent way. There is no reason for this unseemly haste. If the House needs to work its will on this and if we should pass this legislation, let us do it, but in the ordinary, intelligent way, after allowing the committees to do their work. There are public health experts who have strong feelings on this. They know vastly more about the public health aspects of this than do we. Let us hear from them. If there are theologians or experts on crime or narcotics use or control of narcotics, let us hear from them. Let us not have this matter laid upon our lap by the Committee on Rules without the slightest consideration of public interest questions that should be considered in the ordinary fashion. Vote this matter down. Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, April 28, 1998. Hon. Gerald B.H. Solomon, Committee on Rules, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Solomon: We are writing to object to the highly irregular and unfortunate effort to force House consideration of H.R. 3717, a bill to prohibit Federal funding of needle exchange programs, without any consideration by the Commerce Committee, the committee of jurisdiction. H.R. 3717 has been referred to the Commerce Committee. Its members are fully entitled to an opportunity to review, amend, and state their views on the legislation through hearings, markup, and committee reports. Allowing H.R. 3717 or any comparable legislation to reach the House floor without adequate research and reflection is inconsistent with the best interests of the House. In past Congresses, needle exchange programs have been the subject of deliberations by the Commerce Committee and the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. In the 105th Congress, neither H.R. 3717 nor comparable legislation has been subject to any such review. Consequently, we urge you to ensure that the regular order is observed and an opportunity for appropriate scrutiny of the legislation is made available to the Commerce Committee. Sincerely, John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Commerce. Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Health and Environment. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2691, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Reauthorization Act 1998. The bill authorizes $87.4 million over the next three years so that NHTSA can continue promoting highway safety and reducing death and injuries from vehicular accidents. At the outset I would like to thank and commend the chairman of both the committee and the subcommittee for the rare and welcome bipartisan way in which they have handled consideration of this legislation. Issues of concern raised by the Members on this side of the aisle have been addressed and the bill was reported by the committee by voice vote. Concern was raised during the hearings that the bill's restrictions on lobbying were too tough and would prohibit NHTSA from providing important advice to State and local governments. As a result, provisions in this bill relating to lobbying have been modified so that NHTSA is now subject to the same restrictions at the State and local levels as it is at the Federal level. The legislation also contains important provisions that allow foreign manufacturers to account more fully for U.S. content of parts used to produce automobiles sold in the United States. Under the bill, suppliers can report U.S. content to the nearest 5 percent rather than getting no credit if the part has less than 70 percent U.S. content. This provision was carefully crafted so as not to interfere with the accounting of U.S. auto parts under the U.S.-Japan auto agreement. The bill also requires NHTSA to disclose to the public the risks and benefits of the equipment and design features required to be installed on motor vehicles pursuant to NHTSA regulations. It also authorizes NHTSA to promote adoption of U.S. safety standards by auto producers in other countries. It also allows NHTSA to design occupant protection standards to protect unbelted occupants only if such standards do not result in a substantial increase in the risk of injury to the properly restrained occupant. Mr. Speaker, again I want to thank the managers of the bill for their cooperation and fairness. I want to express my appreciation to the majority for their kindness in this matter. I believe this a good bill, it deserves the support of our colleagues, and I urge my colleagues to vote for the legislation.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce the Democratic Caucus' proposal to protect consumers in managed care, the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998. Ten years ago, only one in seven of us would have been enrolled in managed care. Today, after huge and wrenching changes in our health care system, more than three in four Americans is now in managed care. No matter how prosperous or healthy our lives, all of us at some point become patients and find ourselves at the tender mercies of our health care system. When that happens, we are entitled to minimal rights and measures that will protect our health and dignity. That's what the legislation we're introducing today is all about. We have all heard the horror stories. Heart attack victims forced to drive miles to an approved emergency room. A woman vacationing in Hawaii forced to fly to her plan's participating Emergency Room in Chicago to get care for an emergency situation. Cardiac center's selected on the basis of price, not quality. Denials of treatment resulting in worse problems. A woman testified before our committee late last year about a boy who lost his leg to cancer because the managed care organization would not approve the necessary treatment in time to stop its progression. The legislation we propose is straightforward. It's the product of exhaustive and exhausting discussions involving the full range of views and opinions within the Democratic Party--perhaps the most diverse and contentious political organization ever assembled under one umbrella. First, our legislation says that you should get the care you need when you are sick. If you need to see a specialist, you can see one. If you have an emergency, you can go to the nearest emergency room for treatment. You'll be able to become part of a clinical trial if there is no other treatment available, and you'll be able to get non- formulary drugs if there is cause for exceptions. Second, you'll be able to get the information you need about your plan. You'll know what is covered, what is not, how and where to get care, who to talk to in order to get a complaint or grievance resolved, what providers are in the plan and how the plan measures up in term of providing quality care to members. Third, if you've got a problem with your care, you'll know where and how to straighten it out. If your plan denies a treatment and you're harmed, you'll be able to hold the plan responsible. Finally, our legislation requires plans to have a program to look at the quality of care they provide to the people they serve. Ours is real, enforceable legislation. It doesn't give health care providers a right to bill. It gives patients a bill of rights. We've worked with a range of organizations on this legislation. I'm proud to welcome representatives of both the American Medical Association and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in support of our efforts. That these two institutions are represented in support of our bill should tell you that this is a well-thought-out piece of legislation. We don't believe that managed care is inherently evil. Managed care has controlled costs, and improved care for its patients in many instances. But the excesses that spawned managed care have in turn produced their own excesses. The Patients' Bill of Rights Act is supported by the following groups and organizations. American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) [March 31, 1998 Letter]; American Cancer Society [March 13, 1998 Letter]; American College of Emergency Physicians [March 31, 1998 News Release]; American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations [March 31, 1998 News Release]; American Medical Association [March 31, 1998 Statement]; American Psychological Association [March 12, 1998 Letter]; Consumers Union [March 31, 1998 Letter]; Families USA Foundation [March 31, 1998 Letter]; HIP Health Plans [March 31, 1998 Letter]; Kaiser Permanente [March 31, 1998 Letter]; National Alliance for the Mentally Ill [March 31, 1998 Statement]; National Association of Children's Hospitals [March 31, 1998 News Release]; and National Mental Health Association [March 13, 1998 Letter]. As the baseball season begins across the country, I hope that my Republican colleagues--many of whom have joined in cosponsoring similar legislation--will join in working with me and my fellow Democrats so that we can put a bill on the President's desk by the time that the baseball season draws to a close this September.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, one of the problems of this bill has been put together by two categories of people. First of all, a bunch of people out there in the business world think they are going to cut a fat hog free from exemptions and free from responsibilities and free from good sense controls to ensure that there would be fair behavior and proper behavior in the marketplace. The other is a group of people who do not understand what is going on in the financial world. Financial world people think it runs on money. It does not. It runs on public confidence. And as long as we remember that and craft our laws in the proper fashion, we will have the confidence of the public and we will have the most successful financial operation in the whole world. I rise not in anger but really in sorrow. And I want to say that I have tried to work with my Republican colleagues to cut a deal to preserve certain essential protections for American investors, for American consumers, and for the American financial community and industry. Regrettably, I did not do that. I was not successful. But in any event, we are now confronted with whether or not this rule should be granted. It is with regret I suggest to my colleagues that the rule ought not be granted and, rather, that we ought to proceed to go back to the drawing board and come up with a better piece of legislation, which protects consumers, which protects investors, and which protects the confidence of the American people in what is the most extraordinarily successful financial community, financial undertaking in the history of the world. Let us look at some of the defects in this. One of the most noteworthy is that the bill, under the rule, we would find would preempt State insurance commissioners from regulating the solvency of insurance companies. I have an amendment that would have corrected this problem. The rule does not permit me to offer it. Certainly to attack the solvency of the insurance world and the insurance industry is not the way to enhance confidence or, indeed, to ensure the safety of American investing public. It was only about 10 years ago that lax regulation allowed the savings and loan industry to become insolvent, and that cost the American taxpayer more than $150 billion. I wonder if we are prepared, then, to gamble with the taxpayers' money once again, this time on insurance. If Members vote for this rule, that is what is going to be moving forward in the financial community. Does it surprise anyone that the managers amendment would also preempt State securities administrators from enforcing antifraud statutes to protect investors? I have an amendment that would have fixed this problem, but the rule does not allow me to offer it. Last Congress we enacted legislation that confirmed State responsibility for enforcement of security antifraud statutes, simply because they do a good job. Many of these issues are local in character, and because we do not have enough money to put into Federal responsibilities. Are we going to allow that authority to be taken away from the States? I suggest not. My counsel to my colleagues is, let us not vote for a bad rule; let us reject the rule and go on.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, in one of the most outrageous, cynical, and arrogant displays I have seen in my long service in the Congress the Republican leadership put the bill H.R. 3485, the Campaign Reform Election Integrity Act, on the floor today under suspension of the rules. This procedure allows no amendments, and only forty minutes of debate. This is one of the most important issues in the Nation today. Americans are being alienated by the deluge of money entering our political system and being alienated from their government and our political system by practices they believe are corrupting our entire political system. I cannot and will not vote for bad legislation protected by a gag rule and outrageous procedure, without opportunity for either debate or amendment.

Mr. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I an introducing legislation today which will require the Administration to monitor Asian countries that receive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or from the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund, to ensure that these countries comply with commitments they have made to the IMF, that they fully implement market opening commitments they have made under bi-lateral and multilateral trade agreements, and that our IMF partners, especially Japan and the European Union, open their markets so that increased Asian exports are not dumped in the U.S. market, robbing American workers of their jobs and American firms of hard won market share. In addition, the legislation directs the Commerce Department to determine the appropriate application of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws in light of currency devaluations in Asia, in order to prevent the dumping of subsidized and price-devalued Asian exports in our market. I am happy to have my Colleagues, Congressman John Murtha and Congressman Ralph Regula, joining me in the introduction of this legislation as original cosponsors. Mr. Speaker, the House may soon consider legislation that would appropriate $18 billion for the IMF, which has recently entered into assistance agreements with the troubled Asian economies of Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. The Appropriations Committee has already conditioned the obligation of this funding on compliance by these Asian nations with their trade agreement obligations, and on the elimination of Government directed lending. This is an important step in the right direction, but more is needed. Without the kind of careful monitoring required by the legislation I am introducing, we cannot be certain that the American taxpayers' contribution to Asian stability will be used to tear down already existing market restrictions and industrial policies in these countries, as well as subsidies, the irrational allocation of resources and other non-market decisions that caused this economic collapse in the first place. We must also make sure that our major IMF partners, particularly Japan and the European Union, do their part both to support the IMF effort and to open their markets to Asian exports. Under the agreements that have been negotiated, the IMF is requiring these Asian countries to terminate national industrial policies and to undertake a number of other economic and financial reforms that should strengthen their economies. True economic stability can only be achieved in Korea and the other troubled Asian countries allow free markets to direct their national investment and resource decisions. Competitiveness is the key to stability in Asia, and investing in industries that are already producing far in excess of demand will not contribute to the long-term competitiveness of Asian industries. Despite this fact, Korea has continued to invest heavily in automobile production, despite worldwide excess capacity in the production of motor vehicles. The IMF must be careful, therefore, that its funding is not misused by those in Korea who may be inclined to pursue the failed policies of the past in which the Korean government tightly restricted foreign motor vehicle imports (the foreign share of the Korean auto market is only 0.6%) and heavily promoted investment in Korean auto production. Not only would significant new investment in Korean auto production provide a very unstable basis for that country's future economic growth, but a sharp rise in Korean auto exports to the U.S. could also severely threaten the health of U.S. and other foreign auto manufacturers and the workers they employ. This is not a remote concern. Based largely on the impact of currency devaluations in the last few months of last year, Korean automobile exports to the U.S. increased 8% in 1997 over their 1996 level. Clearly, there is a need to carefully monitor Korea's automobile exports to the U.S. and to other IMF partners, so that future IMF funding decisions can promote stable commercial and trade, as well as financial relations among nations. It is not just Korean motor vehicle exports to the U.S. that have risen sharply in recent months, either. Although the U.S. had been running a healthy trade surplus with Korea, that surplus turned into a substantial deficit during the last three months of 1997, as the U.S. market began to be flooded with price-devalued imports from Korea. It was reported recently in the Financial Times that in the first 20 days of February, Korea's exports to the U.S. jumped 35%. During that same period, Korean exports to Japan increased by only 8.3%. If a disproportionate share of Korea's exports are directed at the U.S. market, American workers and American firms will pay the price with lost jobs and lost market share. It is critically important, therefore, that Japan, the European Union, and other IMF partners share the burden of the new flood of exports coming out of Asia, by promoting consumption and opening their markets to exports from Korea and the other East Asian economies. In this regard, I find it extremely unwise and unfortunate that the government of Japan announced last month that it would increase its duties from zero to 3 percent on 78 import items from Korea, including steel, textiles, and petrochemical products. This move is both harmful to the ultimate success of the IMF's efforts to build Asian economic stability and a direct threat to industries, like steel, in the U.S. and other countries where markets are open. The U.S. market must not become the world's dumping ground for price-devalued imports from Korea. Steel is a good example of why I believe legislation needs to hold our other major IMF partners accountable for taking their fair share of Korean exports. Although trade agreements have eliminated many of the tariffs, quotas, and other formal government barriers to steel imports, steel producers in Japan, the European Union, and many other countries have entered into private, ``mill-to-mill'' agreements under which steel exports are tightly restricted. For example, Japanese steel producers have an agreement with the largest steel producer in Korea, POSCO, that limits Korea's exports of carbon steel products to Japan to a little over 2 million metric tons per year. Korea's POSCO has a similiar agreement with the European Union, the so-called London Agreement or the East of Burma Agreement. Under that agreement, POSCO has agreed to ship no more than 200,000 tons of steel to the European Union in 1995, and steel producers in the European Union have agreed to ship no more than 200,000 tons of steel to Korea. That same agreement also limits the European Union's steel producers' exports to about 150,000 tons per year for Japan and to about 200,000 tons per year for the other Asian markets east of Burma. Trade statistics for 1997 show how these agreements have severely restricted Korean steel exports to the European Union and have forced those exports into the U.S. market. For 1997, the U.S. was the only, I repeat, the only, significant non-Asian importer of Korean steel. On the other hand, the European Union imported only 0.6% of all the Korean steel sold on the world market during 1997. For the U.S., the implication of these unfair and harmful export agreements is clear. The U.S., not Japan or the European Union, is most likely to become the dumping ground for price-devalued steel exports from Korea that, in turn, will rob American workers of their jobs and American firms of hard-won market share. The only way to prevent this from happening is for Japan and the European Union to open, not close, their markets to steel and other imports from Korea. Clearly, Japan's recent tariff hike on Korean steel goes in exactly the opposite direction of what needs to occur. Failure to open markets elsewhere to exports from Korea and the other East Asian economies would only force the U.S. to take action under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty statutes to prevent the dumping of subsidized and price-devalued Asian exports in our market. Mr. Speaker, it is essential that IMF funding legislation also provide for careful monitoring by the Administration and Congress of how IMF assistance is used by Korean and the other troubled Asian economies, as well as the extent to which our IMF partners open their markets to exports from these countries. Without such information, the U.S. cannot know whether IMF assistance is contributing to stable financial and commercial relations among nations, or whether future IMF assistance should be denied. The legislation I am introducing would give this monitoring responsibility principally to the U.S. Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce. The legislation would require these officials to consult regularly with key industry groups to share and confirm information that is pertinent to the monitoring effort. The monitoring results should be submitted bi-monthly to the Congress for as long as IMF-assistance is being provided to Korea and the other East Asian economies. To prevent undermining the effectiveness of U.S. trade remedy laws that limit the dumping of imports and that offset the anti-competitive impact of subsidized imports, the legislation also requires the Commerce Department to take steps to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to the currency devaluations and the extension of government subsidized loans to manufacturers in those Asian countries receiving IMF assistance. Mr. Speaker, I know my Colleagues share my concern that the generosity and willingness of the American taxpayer to provide assistance for the IMF's efforts to build economic stability in Asia not undermine the strength and competitiveness of U.S. products in both our own domestic market and the world market. American workers and American firms have fought hard and long for the success they have earned. Let us not take away their hard-won gains.