Christopher Dodd

Mr. DODD

Mr. DODD. Reserving the right to object, I want to be clear so my colleague will understand this. I had a sheet of paper in front of me-- I do not have it in front of me now--with the order of those who sought time. I want to be careful, as my colleague from Pennsylvania will understand. We are going to vote at 2 o'clock. I want to be sure I can accommodate my colleagues.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, before my friend, the chairman of the Budget Committee, leaves, let me thank him immensely for his analysis of this issue. He has it, as we saw as well, exactly right. In fact, it is not only repaying 100 percent but with interest. There is an interest requirement, that if we borrow from the taxpayers in order to wind down substantially risky firms, then not only do you get paid back, but the interest on the cost of that money is also part of the deal. So it is 100 percent-plus coming back to the Treasury. But his analysis and that of his committee--and there is no one who has been more disciplined or guarded about the budgetary process over the years we have served together, and so I appreciate the Senator's analysis of this particular point on the long-term deficit. I commend the Senator for including the provisions he has and trying to build some discipline into the process of how we expend taxpayer moneys, collect taxes in the first place to pay for the needed expenditures of our government. So I thank the Senator for that. I thank him for his comments as well about the bill and his support and also the substantive contributions the Senator from North Dakota has made, because one of the things we tried to be very careful about-- Jon Tester of Montana, who sits on the committee with me, has been very careful and been tremendously active in seeing to it that rural America is going to be well served by this legislation. And there are differences. It is not all Wall Street, New York, and major financial centers. The importance of the availability of credit in rural communities is critical, as my colleague from North Dakota has informed me over the years we have served together. That ability of a local farmer to borrow that money in the spring, to be able to pay back in the fall, at harvest time, has been essential, and knowing how difficult it has been throughout the country to have access to credit is essential. So his contributions to the legislation make sure that what we do here is going to enhance the capability of rural America to not only come out of this crisis we are in but to prosper in the years ahead with this legislation. So beyond the budgetary considerations and the points of order before us, I thank him for his contributions to the substance of the bill, which has made it a far better bill to begin with. I see my colleague from Oregon is here. I yield the floor.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I said so yesterday, and I will say it again: I thank Senator Merkley. I guess there are four new Members of the Senate serving on the Banking Committee. Senator Merkley, Senator Warner, Senator Tester, and Senator Bennet are all new Members of the Senate from their respective States of Oregon, Virginia, Montana, and Colorado. To be thrown into what has been the largest undertaking of the Banking Committee, certainly in my three decades here--and many have argued going back almost 100 years--was certainly an awful lot to ask. I have already pointed out the contribution Senator Warner has made to this bill. But I must say as well that Senator Bennet of Colorado has been invaluable in his contributions. I just mentioned Senator Tester a moment ago for his contribution on talking about rural America and the importance of those issues. And Senator Merkley, as a member of the committee, on matters we included here dealing particularly with the mortgage reforms, the underwriting standards, the protections people have to go through, and credit cards as well--we passed the credit card bill--again, it was Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon who played a critical role in that whole debate not to mention, of course, working with Carl Levin, one of the more senior Members here, having served for many years in the Senate. But the Merkley-Levin, Levin- Merkley provisions in this bill have added substantial contributions to this effort. So I thank him for his contribution. I see my colleague from North Dakota is here. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided among both sides.

Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, we listened to Senator Conrad, the chairman of the Budget Committee, address the budget point of order. I urge my colleagues to waive the point of order. We came up with an alternative offset in the conference committee, much at the insistence--and I thanked him for that--of Senator Brown of Massachusetts, looking for a better offset than the ones which were originally in the conference report. I know my colleague from Maine as well had reservations about what we originally included. The offset here ends TARP, which I presume most people would welcome with open arms, saving us $11 billion by terminating it early, as well as then complying with the request by the chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Sheila Bair, to provide for additional assessments to meet the obligations of the FDIC and the insurance fund. Both of those items provide the necessary offsets to the cost of this bill. The long-term deficit point of order is caused by the orderly liquidation authority for systemically significant financial institutions. Let me note that this critically important aspect of the legislation was developed in very close cooperation with Senator Shelby in the Shelby-Dodd amendment. It also reflects the bipartisan cooperation of Senators Corker and Warner. The Shelby-Dodd amendment passed this body overwhelmingly with over 90 votes. Even though the liquidation authority is the source of long-term budget costs, it is still 100 percent paid for. The Shelby-Dodd amendment and the Boxer amendment made sure that this would be the case. Let me repeat, the liquidation authority, which is the dominant source of the budget cost in the bill, is 100 percent paid for over time. The only reason that the liquidation authority scores at all is because of timing. The FDIC may initially have to borrow funds from the Treasury in order to wind down the failed company and put it out of business. Because it will take time to liquidate a large, interconnected financial company, there is a lag between when the funds are borrowed and when they are repaid by the sale of the failed companies' assets, its creditors and assessments on the industry if necessary. One more important point on budget scoring and the liquidation authority. CBO cannot factor in the costs to our nation of a failure to address the possibility of future bailouts. We have lived through that nightmare and it has cost our country dearly. Now I would like to discuss the way in which we address the budget consequences of the legislation. In particular, I would like to respond to some comments that have been made about the provisions increasing the long-term minimum target for the FDIC and thereby strengthening the Deposit Insurance Fund, a goal that no one can credibly argue with in light of the recent crisis. In fact, this provision is supported by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, and she has sent us a letter expressing her support. I will submit that for the Record at the end of this statement. Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have claimed that the use of the FDIC in this way is unprecedented and questioned how this could count as budget savings or offsets and at the same time preserve the funds for bank failures. Let us clear up the misinformation. First, no FDIC funds are being spent on, or transferred to, other programs. Premiums paid by banks remain, as they have for over 75 years, in the FDIC fund solely to protect insured deposits. And counting FDIC premiums as budget savings in legislation absolutely does have precedent. We have to look no further than relatively recent actions of Republican Congresses to find them. Budget reconciliation legislation enacted in February 2006 and sponsored by my colleague from New Hampshire, who was then the Chairman of the Budget Committee, included FDIC reforms authored by my colleague from Alabama, who was then Chairman of the Banking Committee. Those provisions resulted in higher FDIC premiums, which CBO said yielded almost $2 billion in budget savings over 10 years. So, my colleagues from New Hampshire and Alabama in fact relied on reforms to the Deposit Insurance Fund to obtain savings that CBO favorably scored. And 10 years earlier, Congress attached to an omnibus spending bill enacted in September 1996 a provision calling for a special premium on thrifts to capitalize the FDIC's thrift insurance fund. The appropriators in that earlier Republican Congress justified higher discretionary spending based partly on the budget savings scored by CBO for the FDIC assessment. I would also like to respond to some comments that have been made about the treatment of TARP in this legislation. We end TARP in the conference report. With the comprehensive financial reform put in place under this bill, we think it is the right time to bring TARP to a close, ending it earlier than had been planned. I think that is something everyone should be happy about. And ending TARP saves the government money. That is not just my conclusion. It is the conclusion of the Congressional Budget Office, $11 billion in savings. It is true that the original TARP legislation passed as an emergency, its costs were declared an emergency when it passed, so rescinding those funds or ending the program now is ending spending that is considered ``emergency'' spending. But the savings are no less real because of that. Interestingly, my Republican colleague who has raised the point of order offered an amendment in conference that would have rescinded stimulus funding to pay for this bill. Why is that relevant? Because the stimulus money was also designated as an emergency, so it would have received the same accounting treatment here in the Senate as TARP. Both were emergencies. Both ending TARP early and rescinding stimulus funding would reduce the deficit, but the burden of cuts in stimulus funding would fall disproportionately on families and small businesses who have been victims of the economic fallout from the Wall Street crisis. Cutting such spending would be exactly the wrong thing to do as we try to get the economy back on track and people back to work. The fact is that overall this bill does not do damage to our budgetary outlook. It does make vital changes to make our financial system stronger and more stable and should be passed as soon as possible. So I urge my colleagues to support a motion to waive the long-term deficit point of order. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, DC, June 29, 2010. Hon. Chris Dodd, Chairman, Committee on Banking, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Hon. Richard Shelby, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Banking, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Spencer Bachus, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Chairmen Dodd and Frank and Ranking Members Shelby and Bachus: Thank you for your interest in our views regarding increasing the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) ratio to 1.35. Federal deposit insurance promotes public confidence in our nation's banking system by providing a safe place for consumers' funds. Deposit insurance has provided much needed stability throughout this crisis. Moreover, insured deposits provide banks with a stable and cost-effective source of funds for lending in their communities. Importantly, the DIF is funded by the insured banking industry. A key measure of the strength of the insurance fund is the reserve ratio, which is the amount in the DIF as a percentage of the industry's estimated insured deposits. Current law requires us to maintain a reserve ratio of at least 1.15 percent. One of the lessons learned from the current crisis is that a minimum reserve ratio of 1.15 is insufficient to avoid the need for pro-cyclical assessments in times of stress. One of my first priorities when I assumed the Chairmanship of the FDIC in June of 2006 was to begin building our reserves. Regrettably, there was insufficient time before the crisis hit. Indeed, we started this crisis with a DIF reserve ratio of 1.22 percent (as of December 31, 2007). Beginning in mid-2008, as bank failures increased and the insurance fund incurred losses, the Fund balance and reserve ratio dropped precipitously. The reserve ratio became negative in the third quarter of 2009 and hit a low of negative 0.39 percent as of December 31, 2009. To date, we have collected more than $65 billion in assessments, and are projected to collect another $80 billion by 2016 to restore the fund. Given this experience, we believe it is clear that as the economy strengthens and the banking system heals, the reserve ratio needs to be increased. In fact, our Board has acted through regulation to target the reserve ratio at 1.25 percent, and a further increase to 1.35 percent is consistent with our view that the Fund should build up in good economic times and be allowed to fall in poor economic times, while maintaining relatively steady premiums throughout the economic cycle, thereby reducing the procyclicality of the assessment system. Please let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss further. Sincerely, Sheila C. Bair. I again urge my colleagues to vote to waive the budget point of order, and, of course, I urge them as well to support the legislation when that vote occurs. intent behind sections 691-621

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator, and I strongly concur with the intentions and interpretations set forth by the principal authors of these provisions, Senators Merkley and Levin, as reflecting the legislative intent of the conference committee. I thank Senators Merkley and Levin for their leadership, which was so essential in achieving the conference report provisions governing proprietary trading and prohibiting conflicts of interest. Assessing Individual Entities

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator. As the Senator knows, his amendment received strong bipartisan support on the Senate floor and passed by a vote of 80 to 18. It was therefore a Senate priority to retain his provision in our negotiations with the House of Representatives.

Mr. DODD. Yes, that is correct. The language is not intended to reduce such charitable and educational activities that are legally required for tax-exempt, not-for-profit organizations that are so important to communities across the country. I thank the Senator for his continued help on these efforts. section 603 trust companies

Mr. DODD. I would be glad to clarify the nature of trust companies subject to the moratorium under section 603(a). The moratorium applies to an institution that is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a commercial firm that functions solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity and is exempt from the definition of a bank in the Bank Holding Company Act. It does not apply to a nondepository trust company that does not have FDIC insurance and that does not offer demand deposit accounts or other deposits that may be withdrawn by check or similar means for payment to third parties.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. The council must consider a number of factors, including, for example, the extent of leverage, the extent and nature of off-balance-sheet exposures, and the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the company's activities. Where a company is engaged only in traditional insurance activities, the council should also take into account the matters you raised.

Mr. DODD. Yes. The size of a financial company should not by itself be determinative.

Mr. DODD. Yes, I do not believe that the council should decide to designate an insurer simply based on whether the insurer would meet bank capital requirements. Preemption Standard

Mr. DODD

Mr. DODD. Have the yeas and nays been ordered on adoption of the conference report?

Mr. DODD. The Senator from Massachusetts is correct. Size and involvement in providing credit or liquidity alone should not be determining factors. The Banking Committee intends that only a limited number of high-risk, nonbank financial companies would join large bank holding companies in being regulated and supervised by the Federal Reserve. Capital Requirements

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I agree completely with Senator Lincoln's analysis and with the need to address this issue to ensure that uninsured U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks are treated the same as insured depository institutions under the provisions of section 716, including the safe harbor language. End Users

Mr. DODD. I agree with the Chairman's assessment. There is no authority to set margin on end users, only major swap participants and swap dealers. It is also the intent of this bill to distinguish between commercial end users hedging their risk and larger, riskier market participants. Regulators should distinguish between these types of companies when implementing new regulatory requirements.

Mr. DODD. The gentleman is correct in his description of the language. Event Contracts

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator. Pursuant to negotiations during the conference committee, it was my desire that the SEC write rules to exempt certain family offices already in operation from the definition of investment adviser, regardless of whether they had previously received an SEC exemptive order. It was my intent that the rule would: exempt family offices, provided that they operated in a manner consistent with the previous exemptive policy of the Commission as reflected in exemptive orders for family offices in effect on the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act; reflect a recognition of the range of organizational, management and employment structures and arrangements employed by family offices; and not exclude any person who was not registered or required to be registered under the Advisers Act from the definition of the term ``family office'' solely because such person provides investment advice to natural persons who, at the time of their applicable investment, are officers, directors or employees of the family office who have previously invested with the family office and are accredited investors, any company owned exclusively by such officers, directors or employees or their successors-in-interest and controlled by the family office, or any other natural persons who identify investment opportunities to the family office and invest in such transactions on substantially the same terms as the family office invests, but do not invest in other funds advised by the family office, and whose assets to which the family office provides investment advice represent, in the aggregate, not more than 5 percent of the total assets as to which the family office provides investment advice.

Mr. DODD. I agree that this position should be raised in a corrections bill and I look forward to working with the Senator towards this goal on this point.

Mr. DODD. I do agree and thank my colleague for raising another important point of clarification. I believe the bill is clear that an end user does not become a swap dealer by virtue of using an affiliate to hedge its own commercial risk. Senator Collins has been a champion for end users and it is a pleasure working with her.

Mr. DODD. Briefly, I thank my colleague from North Dakota. He has been an outspoken advocate on behalf of working families in the time we have served together. The concerns he has expressed consistently in this process are ones I appreciate very much. We did have a couple of disagreements over how to proceed, but that is the normal process of doing business. It was done with civility during the debate and consideration of the legislation. But I am deeply grateful to him for his contributions and those of his staff. He made some good suggestions, and I thank my friend.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would like to clarify the intent behind one of the provisions in the conference report to accompany the financial reform bill, H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Section 204(d) contemplates that the FDIC, as receiver, may take a lien on assets of a covered financial company or a covered subsidiary. With respect to assets of a covered subsidiary that is an insurance company or a direct or indirect subsidiary of an insurance company, I believe that the FDIC should exercise such authority cautiously to avoid weakening the insurance company and thereby undermining policyholder protection. Indeed, any lien taken on the assets of a covered subsidiary that is an insurance company or a direct or indirect subsidiary of an insurance company must avoid weakening or undermining policyholder protection. As a result, the FDIC should normally not take a lien on the assets of such a covered subsidiary except where the FDIC sells the covered subsidiary to a third party, provides financing in connection with the sale, and takes a lien on the assets of the covered subsidiary to secure the third party's repayment obligation to the FDIC. I understand that the FDIC intends to promulgate regulations consistent with this view. Mr. President, I would also like to clarify the intent behind another of the provisions in the conference report to accompany the financial reform bill, H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Section 1075 of the bill amends the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to create a new section 920 regarding interchange fees. This is a very complicated subject involving many different stakeholders, including payment networks, issuing banks, acquiring banks, merchants, and, of course, consumers. Section 1075 therefore is also complicated, and I would like to make a clarification with regard to that section. Since interchange revenues are a major source of paying for the administrative costs of prepaid cards used in connection with health care and employee benefits programs such as FSAs, HSAs, HRAs, and qualified transportation accounts--programs which are widely used by both public and private sector employers and which are more expensive to operate given substantiation and other regulatory requirements--we do not wish to interfere with those arrangements in a way that could lead to higher fees being imposed by administrators to make up for lost revenue. That could directly raise health care costs, which would hurt consumers and which, of course, is not at all what we wish to do. Hence, we intend that prepaid cards associated with these types of programs would be exempted within the language of section 920(a)(7)(A)(ii)(II) as well as from the prohibition on use of exclusive networks under section 920(b)(1)(A). Mr. President, I want to clarify a provision of the conference report of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173. Section 1012 sets forth the executive and administrative powers of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, and section 1012(c)(1)--Coordination with the Board of Governors--provides that ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law applicable to the supervision or examination of persons with respect to Federal consumer financial laws, the Board of Governors may delegate to the Bureau the authorities to examine persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors for compliance with the Federal consumer financial laws.'' This provision is not intended to override section 1026, which will continue to define the Bureau's examination and enforcement authority over insured depository institutions and insured credit unions with assets of less than $10 billion. The conferees expect that the board will not delegate to the Bureau its authority to examine insured depository institutions with assets of less than $10 billion. Throughout the development of and debate on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, I have insisted that the legislation meet three requirements--independent rule writing, independent examination and enforcement authority, and independent funding for the CFPB. The CFPB, as established by the conference report, meets each of those requirements. I want to speak for a moment about section 1017, which establishes the independent funding mechanism for the CFPB. The conference report requires the Federal Reserve System to automatically fund the CFPB based on the total operating expenses of the system, using 2009 as the baseline. This will ensure that the CFPB has the resources it needs to perform its functions without subjecting it to annual congressional appropriations. The failure of the Congress to provide the Office of Federal Housing Enterprises Oversight, OFHEO, with a steady stream of independent funding outside the appropriations process led to repeated interference with the operations of that regulator. Even when there was not explicit interference, the threat of congressional interference could very well have served to circumscribe the actions OFHEO was willing to take. We did not want to repeat that mistake in this legislation. In addition, because many of the employees of the CFPB will come from existing financial regulators, the conferees take the view that it is important that the new entity have the resources to keep these high quality staff and to attract new equally qualified staff, and to provide them with the support that they need to operate effectively. To that end, the conferees adopted the employment cost index for total compensation of State and Federal employees, ECI, as the index by which the funding baseline will be adjusted in the future. This index has generally risen faster than the CPI, which was the index used in the Senate bill. However, the ECI has typically risen at a more gradual rate than the average operating costs of the banking regulators, which was the index proposed by the House conferees. In the end, the conferees agreed to use the ECI and provide for a contingent authorization of appropriations of $200 million per year through fiscal year 2014. In order to trigger this authorization, the CFPB Director would have to report to the Appropriations Committees that the CFPB's formula funding is not sufficient. Section 1085 of the legislation adds the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, to the list of agencies authorized to enforce the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, ECOA--15 U.S.C. Sec. 1691c(a)(9). The legislation also amends section 706(g)--15 U.S.C. Sec. 1691e(g)--to require the CFPB to refer a matter to the Attorney General whenever the CFPB has reason to believe that 1 or more creditors has engaged in a ``pattern or practice of discouraging or denying applications for credit'' in violation of section 701, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1691(a). The general grant of civil litigation authority to the CFPB, in section 1054(a), should not be construed to override, in any way, the CFPB's referral obligations under the ECOA. The requirement in section 706(g) of the ECOA that the CFPB refer a matter involving a pattern-or-practice violation of section 701, rather than first filing its own pattern-or-practice action, furthers the legislation's purpose of reducing fragmentation in consumer protection and fair lending enforcement under the ECOA. The Attorney General, who currently has authority under section 706(g) to file those pattern-or- practice ECOA actions in court on behalf of the government, receives such pattern-or-practice referrals from other agencies with ECOA enforcement responsibilities and will continue to do so under the legislation. By subjecting the CFPB to the same referral requirement, the legislation intends to avoid creating fragmentation in this enforcement system under the ECOA where none currently exists. Title XIV creates a strong, new set of underwriting requirements for residential mortgage loans. An important part of this new regime is the creation of a safe harbor for certain loans made according to the standards set out in the bill, and which will be detailed further in forthcoming regulations. Loans that meet this standard, called ``qualified mortgages,'' will have the benefit of a presumption that they are affordable to the borrowers. Section 1411 explains the basis on which the regulator must establish the standards lenders will use to determine the ability of borrowers to repay their mortgages. Section 1412 provides that lenders that make loans according to these standards would enjoy the rebuttable presumption of the safe harbor for qualified mortgages established by this section. These standards include the need to document a borrower's income, among others. However, certain refinance loans, such as VA- guaranteed mortgages refinanced under the VA Interest Rate Reduction Loan Program or the FHA streamlined refinance program, which are rate- term refinance loans and are not cash-out refinances, may be made without fully reunderwriting the borrower, subject to certain protections laid out in the legislation, while still remaining qualified mortgages. It is the conferees' intent that the Federal Reserve Board and the CFPB use their rulemaking authority under the enumerated consumer statutes and this legislation to extend this same benefit for conventional streamlined refinance programs where the party making the new loan already owns the credit risk. This will enable current homeowners to take advantage of current low interest rates to refinance their mortgages. There are a number of provisions in title XIV for which there is not a specified effective date other than what is provided in section 1400(c). It is the intention of the conferees that provisions in title XIV that do not require regulations become effective no later than 18 months after the designated transfer date for the CFPB, as required by section 1400(c). However, the conferees encourage the Federal Reserve Board and the CFPB to act as expeditiously as possible to promulgate regulations so that the provisions of title XIV are put into effect sooner. I would like to clarify that the conferees consider any program or initiative that was announced before June 25 to have been initiated for the purposes of section 1302 of the conference report. I also want to make clear that the conferees do not intend for section 1302 to prevent the Treasury Department from adjusting available resources that remain after the adoption of the conference report among such existing programs, based on effectiveness. Mr. President, I also wish to explain some of the securities-related changes that emerged from the conference committee in the conference report. The report amends section 408 to eliminate the blanket exemption for private equity funds and replace it with an exemption for private fund advisers with less than $150 million under management. The amendment also requires the SEC in its rulemaking to impose registration and examination procedures for such funds that reflect the level of systemic risk posed by midsized private funds. Section 913 has been amended to combine the principle of conducting a study on the standard of care to investors in the Senate bill with a grant of additional authority to the SEC to act, such as is contained in the House-passed bill. The section requires the SEC to conduct a study prior to taking action or conducting rulemaking in this area. The study will include a review of the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care and whether there are regulatory gaps, shortcomings or overlaps in legal or regulatory standards. Even if there is an overlap or a gap, the Commission should not act unless eliminating the overlap or filling a gap would improve investor protection and is in the public interest. The study would require a review of the effectiveness, frequency, and duration of the regulatory examinations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. In this review, the paramount issue is effectiveness. If regulatory examinations are frequent or lengthy but fail to identify significant misconduct--for example, examinations of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC--they waste resources and create an illusion of effective regulatory oversight that misleads the public. The SEC, in studying potential impacts that would result from changes to the regulation or standard of care, should seek to preserve consumer access to products and services, including access for persons in rural locations. In assessing the potential costs and benefits, the SEC should take into account the net costs or the difference between additional costs and additional benefits. For example, it should consider not only higher transaction or advisory charges or fees but also the return on investment if an investor receives better recommendations that result in higher profits through paying higher fees. After reporting to Congress, the SEC is required to consider the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of its study. New section 914 requires the SEC to study the need for enhanced examination and enforcement ``resources.'' The study of resources should not be limited to financial resources but should consider human resources also. Human resources involves whether there is a need for enhanced expertise, competence, and motivation to conduct examinations that satisfactorily identify problems or misconduct in the regulated entity. For example, if examinations fail to identify misconduct due to insufficient staff expertise, competence, or motivation, the study should conclude that there is a need for more effective staff or better management rather than merely more financial resources devoted to hiring additional staff of the same caliber. New section 919D creates the SEC Ombudsman under the Office of the Investor Advocate. The Ombudsman can act as a liaison between the Commission and any retail investor in resolving problems that retail investors may have with the Commission or with self-regulatory organizations and to review and make recommendations regarding policies and procedures to encourage persons to present questions to the Investor Advocate regarding compliance with the securities laws. This list of duties in subsection (8)(B) is not intended to be an exhaustive list. For example, if the Investor Advocate assigns the Ombudsman duties to act as a liaison with persons who have problems in dealing with the Commission resulting from the regulatory activities of the Commission, this would not be prohibited by this legislation. Title IX, subtitle B creates many new powers for the SEC. The SEC is expected to use these powers responsibly to better protect investors. Section 922 has been amended to eliminate the right of a whistleblower to appeal the amount of an award. While the whistleblower cannot appeal the SEC's monetary award determination, this provision is intended to limit the SEC's administrative burden and not to encourage making small awards. The Congress intends that the SEC make awards that are sufficiently robust to motivate potential whistleblowers to share their information and to overcome the fear of risk of the loss of their positions. Unless the whistleblowers come forward, the Federal Government will not know about the frauds and misconduct. In section 939B, the Report eliminated an exception so that credit rating agencies will be subject to regulation FD. Under this change, issuers would be required to disclose financial information to the public when they give it to rating agencies. In section 939F, the report requires the SEC to study the credit rating process for structured finance products and the conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models; the feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or a self-regulatory organization assigns nationally recognized statistical rating organizations to determine the credit ratings of structured finance products. The report directs the SEC to implement the system for assigning credit ratings that was in the base text unless it determines that an alternative system would better serve the public interest and the protection of investors. The report limits the exemption from risk retention requirements for qualified residential mortgages, by specifying that the definition of ``qualified residential mortgage'' may be no broader than the definition of ``qualified mortgage'' contained in section 1412 of the report, which amends section 129C of the Truth in Lending Act. The report contains the following technical errors: the reference to ``section 129C(c)(2)'' in subsection (e)(4)(C) of the new section 15G of the Securities and Exchange Act, created by section 941 of the report should read ``section 129C(b)(2).'' In addition, the references to ``subsection'' in paragraphs (e)(4)(A) and (e)(5) of the newly created section 15G should read ``section.'' We intend to correct these in future legislation. The report amended the say on pay provision in section 951 by adding a shareholder vote on how frequently the compare should give shareholders a ``say on pay'' vote. The shareholders will vote to have it every 1, 2, or 3 years, and the issuer must allow them to have this choice at least every 6 years. Also in section 951, the report required issuers to give shareholders an advisory vote on any agreements, or golden parachutes, that they make with their executive officers regarding compensation the executives would receive upon completion of an acquisition, merger, or sale of the company. The report required Federal financial regulators to jointly write rules requiring financial institutions such as banks, investment advisers, and broker-dealers to disclose the structures of their incentive-based compensation arrangements, to determine whether such structures provide excessive compensation or could lead to material losses at the financial institution and prohibiting types of incentive- based payment arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks. In section 952, the report exempted controlled companies, limited partnerships, and certain other entities from requirements for an independent compensation committee. Section 962 provides for triennial reports on personnel management. One item to be studied involves Commission actions regarding employees who have failed to perform their duties, an issue that members raised during the Banking Committee's hearing entitled ``Oversight of the SEC's Failure to Identify the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How to Improve SEC Performance,'' as well as circumstances under which the Commission has issued to employees a notice of termination. The GAO is directed to study how the Commission deals with employees who fail to perform their duties as well as its fairness when they issue a notice of termination. In the latter situation, they should consider specific cases and circumstances, while preserving employee privacy. The SEC is expected to cooperate in making data available to the GAO to perform its studies. In section 967, the report directs the SEC to hire an independent consultant with expertise in organizational restructuring and the capital markets to examine the SEC's internal operations, structure, funding, relationship with self-regulatory organizations and other entities and make recommendations. During the conference, some conferees expressed concern about objectivity of a study undertaken by the SEC itself. We are confident that the SEC will allow the ``independent consultant'' to work without censorship or inappropriate influence and the final product will be objective and accurate. The report also added section 968 which directs the GAO to study the ``revolving door'' at the SEC. The GAO will review the number of employees who leave the SEC to work for financial institutions and conflicts related to this situation. The report removed the Senate provision on majority voting in subtitle G which required a nominee for director who does not receive the majority of shareholder votes in uncontested elections to resign unless the remaining directors unanimously voted that it was in the best interest of the company and shareholders not to accept the resignation. The report added the authority for the SEC to exempt an issuer or class of issuers from proxy access rules written under section 971 after taking into account the burden on small issuers. In section 975, the report added a requirement that the MSRB rules require municipal advisors to observe a fiduciary duty to the municipal entities they advise. In section 975, the report changed the requirement that a majority of the board ``are not associated with any broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, or municipal advisor'' to a requirement that the majority be ``independent of any municipal securities broker, municipal securities dealer, or municipal advisor.'' In section 978, the report authorized the SEC to set up a system to fund the Government Accounting Standards Board, the body which establishes standards of State and local government accounting and financial reporting. The report added section 989F, a GAO Study of Person to Person Lending, to recommend how this activity should be regulated. The report added section 989G to exempt issuers with less than $75 million market capitalization from section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which regulates companies' internal financial controls. This section also adds an SEC study to determine how the Commission could reduce the burden of complying with section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxle Act of 2002 for companies whose market capitalization is between $75 million and $250 million for the relevant reporting period while maintaining investor protections for such companies. Section 989I adds a follow-up GAO study on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley section 404(b) exemption in section 989G of this bill involving the frequency of accounting restatements, cost of capital, investor confidence in the integrity of financial statements and other matters, so we can understand its effect. The report added section 989J, which provides that fixed-index annuities be regulated as insurance products, not as securities. This provision clarifies a disagreement on the legal status of these products. In section 991, the report changed the method of funding for the SEC so that it remains under the congressional appropriations process while giving the SEC much more control over the amount of its funding. The report also doubled the SEC authorization between 2010 and 2015, going from $1.1 billion to $2.25 billion, which will provide tremendous increase in SEC financial resources. These resources can be used to improve technology and attract needed securities and managerial expertise. However, the inspector general of the SEC and others have reported on situations where SEC financial or human resources have not been used effectively or with appropriate prior cost-benefit analysis. While the SEC is receiving more resources, we expect that it will use resources efficiently. Mr. President, Senator Dorgan wishes to be heard, which pretty much will end the debate. I will take a minute or so to conclude, and then the votes will occur around 2 o'clock. I ask unanimous consent that even though time may be expired, at least 10 minutes be reserved for the minority to be heard.

Mr. DODD. How much more time would my colleague require?

Mr. DODD. I think it follows more naturally that way.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me again say to my great friend, we have served here a long time together, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan and I. He does a remarkable job as chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Governmental Oversight Committee, which he also handles as well. I am not sure my colleague was here, but I pointed out yesterday that the hearings the Senator held just prior--I am sure people think we orchestrate all these things; we look more organized than we usually are around here, but the fact is, the Senator from Michigan went off and had planned the hearings for months. The amount of work he and his staff did for months in preparation for those hearings threw a tremendous amount of light and great clarity on the subject so that the average citizen in this country could actually see--not just read something but see--a moment occurring during those 2 days when the exposure of what had occurred was so vivid and so clear. Then, frankly, it was a matter of days after that when we were on the floor considering the legislation. As I said, I would love to tell people that was a highly organized set of events. It was purely coincidental the way it occurred. Again, those hearings that occurred publicly involved weeks and months of preparation before they were actually conducted. So I say to my friend from Michigan, I thank him immensely for his work, for his contribution to this bill as well, not for just the set of hearings but then working to include the provisions that are a part of this legislation. The Senator has made a very valuable contribution and has highlighted a very important point. It was fascinating to me, by the way, as to the number of former chief executive officers from major financial firms in the country who strongly endorsed what the Senator was doing. This was not merely a suggestion coming from consumer groups or labor organizations or others that one might associate with the Senator's idea. But people who literally had spent their careers in the financial services sector were strongly recommending the contributions the Senator made to the bill. I do not think that was said often enough, that this was a significant contribution endorsed by those who understood, had worked, had earned livelihoods in this industry, who had watched an industry change dramatically over the years which subjected this country to the exposure that we are suffering from today. So I thank my friend from Michigan.