Member of Congress

Charles Dent

Role
Former Representative
State
PA
Party
Republican

Speeches

CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 20092009-11-06

Mr. DENT

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished cosponsor of this amendment, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Olson).

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Upton).

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, in closing, I just want to say once again, I think extending these CFATS regulations until 2012 is a reasonable approach. The Department of Homeland Security is doing a good job with these regulations. We need to give them more time to implement the existing regulations that will require security assessments. As we said, 2,000 of the 6,000 required have been completed. So let's give them some time. The Department of Homeland Security has not spoken in support of this legislation in its entirety. Again, this bill is a solution in search of a problem. Please accept the Dent-Olson amendment that is a reasonable approach, accepting the regulations that we just approved as part of the Homeland Security appropriations bill. So let's do that. It is the right way to go. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I rise for the purpose of offering an amendment.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out, too, for the record, the American Chemistry Council, just referenced a moment ago by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), in a letter dated October 20, the ACC basically said that the IST provisions which authorize DHS to order the mandatory implementation of IST have proven the most difficult issue on which to find common ground and the primary reason ACC is unable to endorse this bill. They do not support the bill. To be very clear about that, they do not support this legislation. Now, with respect to the Dent-Austria amendment that we are talking about now, this amendment would strike the IST provisions in the bill. IST is inherently subjective and without a widely accepted definition. When the Department of Homeland Security's subject matter expert on IST was specifically asked what IST was, she responded, ``There's enough debate in industry and academia that I can't take a position on that very topic.'' The Deputy Under Secretary responsible for overseeing the program stated unequivocally that the Department had no staff--no staff--capable of conducting an IST assessment. Under direct questioning, Deputy Under Secretary Reitinger made it very clear that neither the fiscal year 2009 nor the fiscal year 2010 budget included any funding to hire the necessary expertise to review IST assessments and recommend alternative methods for complex engineering processes. Again, under direct questioning, most of the witnesses considered IST unnecessary, with the Department's witness adding that the facilities can and are already doing IST. Clearly, no one at DHS is in a position to dictate to a wide range of facilities what engineering process or chemicals should be used to make plastics, prescription drugs, or computer chips. Despite its fancy labeling, and its inclusion in a security bill, IST is not about security and may simply shift the security risk. A decision to keep fewer chemicals on site will likely require more frequent shipments of chemicals. This increases the risk of an attack on the transportation of the chemicals or an accident releasing the substances of concern into neighborhoods outside the security perimeters. It would be foolish to mandate IST in this bill when there is so much uncertainty and lack of expertise in the Department. Finally, and most importantly, IST will cost American jobs. Let me say that again: IST will cost American jobs. With the national unemployment rate at 10.2 percent, and rising, can we really afford unnecessary congressional mandates that provide little security? Conducting an IST assessment will be costly, too costly for many small businesses to afford. Experts estimate that a simple one- ingredient substitution would take two persons 2 weeks to complete and cost between $10,000 and $40,000, and that is on the low end. A pharmaceutical pilot plant with about 12 products would take three to six persons up to 10 weeks to complete an assessment at a cost of $100,000 to a half million dollars. Larger facilities with particularly hazardous chemicals already regulated by OSHA would require 8 to 10 people 6 months or more to complete, and cost over $1 million for the assessment. Fifty-nine percent of the facilities regulated under current CFATS regulations that would be required to conduct these costs assessments employ 50 or fewer employees. Mandating IST will be devastating for small businesses. According to a California fertilizer manufacturer, eliminating the use of anhydrous ammonia and substituting it with urea can cost a 1,000 acre farm up to $15,000 per application. This would be a recurring cost passed to the consumer. As we heard earlier, in the current state of our economy, small businesses relying on chemicals simply may not survive. Today, the Department of Labor announced that unemployment has reached 10.2 percent. Does anybody in this Chamber expect that unemployment figure to go down any time soon? We hope it does, but this is not going to help. ``If I were to build a 20-foot high, 20-foot thick concrete barricade that surrounded my facility on all sides, utilized the most state-of- the-art intrusion detection systems and was better protected than the White House, this legislation would still require me to conduct an IST assessment and potentially implement the findings of that assessment.'' Let me close by quoting subcommittee chairman and chief sponsor, Mr. Markey, who stated at the Energy and Commerce Committee on the markup on October 21 of the proposed legislation, ``The safer technology requirement is not about bolstering security.'' If it's not about security, why is IST in the bill? Why are we asking the smallest of small businesses to pay for it? Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DENT. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DENT. This is a very different bill than the one from last session. This bill has citizen suits in it and all kinds of--it's a very different bill.

Mr. DENT. At this time, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Austria).

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.

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CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 20092009-11-05

Mr. DENT

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Moran).

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Orleans, Mr. Scalise.

Mr. DENT. I yield the gentleman an additional 20 seconds.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this legislation. Our side of the aisle is going to focus on the impact on jobs. This legislation is devastating to jobs in this country, and we will get into that in just a moment. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Houston, Texas (Mr. Culberson).

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion to this discussion, I must restate my reasons for opposition to this bill. There is not one person in the Department of Homeland Security who has any expertise in inherently safer technology. They are not prepared to deal with this mandate. I am concerned that much of this bill is, in fact, not focusing on security at all but is, rather, focusing on Federal mandates that may force our small businesses and farms to shed American jobs, further harming our vulnerable economy. I have a letter here from 27 different organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Farm Bureau and the Fertilizer Institute, which oppose the underlying legislation. They said: ``We continue to oppose the bill due to the detrimental impact it will have on national security and economic stability.'' A lot has been said about chemical facilities, but this bill is not so much about chemical facilities as it is about facilities with chemicals, and those facilities include hospitals, colleges and universities, and 3,630 employers with fewer than 50 employees. These are the people who are going to be impacted, and jobs will be lost. With unemployment approaching 10 percent, I don't think now is the time to impose this kind of a mandate, which will not have any real security benefit to the American people. So, with that, I would like to submit this letter for the Record from the various organizations in opposition to this legislation. Let's let the current regulations be implemented. Let's extend them for that 1 year and beyond. November 3, 2009. Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. John Boehner, Republican Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Speaker Pelosi and Republican Leader Boehner: We write to you today to express our opposition to H.R. 2868, the ``Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009'' (CFATS). Despite the changes made to this legislation in the Energy and Commerce and Homeland Security Committees, we continue to oppose the bill due to the detrimental impact it will have on national security and economic stability. Specifically, we strongly object to the Inherently Safer Technology (IST) provisions of this legislation that would allow the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to mandate that businesses employ specific product substitutions and processes. These provisions would be significantly detrimental to the progress of existing chemical facility security regulations (the ``CFATS'' program) and should not be included in this legislation. DHS should not be making engineering or business decisions for chemical facilities around the country when it should be focused instead on making our country more secure and protecting it from terrorist threats. Decisions on chemical substitutions or changes in processes should be made by qualified professionals whose job it is to ensure safety at our facilities. Furthermore, forced chemical substitutions could simply transfer risk to other points along the supply chain, failing to reduce risk at all. Because chemical facilities are custom-designed and constructed, such mandates would also impose significant financial hardship on facilities struggling during the current economic recession. Some of these forced changes are estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars per facility. Ultimately, many facilities would not be able to bear this expense. Thank you for taking our concerns into account as the Committee continues to consider the ``Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Act of 2009.'' We stand ready to work with the Committee and Congress towards the implementation of a responsible chemical facility security program. Sincerely, Agricultural Retailers Association; American Farm Bureau Federation; American Forest & Paper Association; American Petroleum Institute; American Trucking Associations; Chemical Producers and Distributors Association; Consumer Specialty Products Association; The Fertilizer Institute; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses; International Liquid Terminals Association; International Warehouse Logistics Association; National Agricultural Aviation Association; National Association of Chemical Distributors; National Association of Manufacturers; National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry; National Mining Association; National Oilseed Processors Association; National Pest Management Association; National Petrochemical and Refiners Association; National Propane Gas Association; North American Millers' Association; Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Association; U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DENT. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the ranking member of the Committee on Agriculture, the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Lucas). (Mr. LUCAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have remaining.

Mr. DENT. Reclaiming my time, the ones that are currently in place. The regulations that we just extended for 1 year. About a month ago, when we passed the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, we extended the current regulations for 1 year. I think we should extend them for another 2 years. Let those regulations take effect. Let's implement them. We have agreement. There was a great deal of opposition to this legislation by farmers, manufacturers and others who are going to be saddled with these costs. I have to point this out: Inherently safer technology deals with workplace safety issues and how you develop the product or the process. It doesn't deal with securing the plant--you know, hiring more guards or building fortifications to secure a plant. That deals with safety as opposed to security. I want to make that distinction because we all agree--you and I agree--that we need to make sure that these plants are secure, but inherently safer technology is really not about plant security, and I think we have to be clear about that. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DENT. I am suggesting that we, as a country, maintain the regulations.

Mr. DENT. No

Mr. DENT. I will yield briefly.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to address this legislation, and I want to thank Ranking Member King for rubbing it in on the Phillies. I know you're very pleased about the Yankees, but at least the Phillies beat the Mets. That's all I have to say today about that. So with that, congratulations to the Yankees. Again, this is a very important piece of legislation, as we all know. I have very serious concerns about it for a number of reasons, but it should be remembered that in 2006, we, Congress, enacted a law that gave the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate chemical facilities. You're hearing a lot of talk today about inherently safer technologies, and I would like to get into that in just a moment and what it means. I should also point out as well that the State of New Jersey does require IST assessments, but not implementation of IST, which is quite different. We are going much further than the State of New Jersey in this legislation. It's important to point out, too, that I certainly support the Department's efforts to secure chemical facilities, but unfortunately, I think this legislation is riddled with costly provisions that go beyond the underlying security purpose of the bill. Currently, there are vulnerability assessments that the Department must do under the current regulations. There are about 6,000 vulnerability assessments that must be done. So far, 2,000 have been completed, leaving about 4,000 vulnerability assessments that remain. Adding these IST assessments will be enormously costly. I should also point out that the Department of Homeland Security has no one on staff who is an expert in these inherently safer technologies, so I wanted to point that out for the record. We've had a lot of testimony, too, and I want to say something about inherently safer technologies. Testimony was referenced. There was a statement from a Scott Berger, who is a director for the Center for Chemical Process Safety. Mr. Berger is an expert in inherently safer technology and inherently safer design. And as the organization that developed the most widely used reference addressing inherently safer design, inherently safer processes, and lifecycle approach, they are the leaders. That was in his testimony. And he said, What is inherently safer design, from his testimony back in June of 2006. He said, Inherently safer design is a concept related to the design and operation of chemical plants, and the philosophy is generally applicable to any technology. Inherently safer design is not a specific technology or set of tools and activities at this point in its development. It continues to evolve, and specific tools and techniques for application of inherently safer design are in the early stages of development. And he goes on. But essentially what he's saying is inherently safer technology is a conceptual framework. It's not a technology; it's an engineering process. Unfortunately, it seems that too many in Congress are trying to act as chief engineers. We are essentially trying to tell people how to produce certain types of chemicals and what chemicals to use. These are very technical issues. It will be very costly to implement. It will affect jobs in this country, and with unemployment rates approaching 10 percent nationally, I am very concerned about the impact on this. I happen to represent a district, the 15th District of Pennsylvania. I have a company called Air Products and Chemicals. About 4,000 people work there. They spend their time designing and building chemical plants in this country and throughout the world. They know a bit about this. And I am extremely concerned that those types of jobs will be put at risk because these chemical plants will be built, but they will not be built here. They will be built elsewhere to produce the chemicals that we need every day in our lives. So that is something that I just feel we have to talk about.

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PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2868, CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI- TERRORISM ACT OF 20092009-11-05

Mr. DENT

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, just very briefly, I want to thank the chairlady of the subcommittee for commenting on the amendments that were adopted in the Homeland Security Committee on a bipartisan basis. Those amendments were stripped out of the bill that we are considering today. They are not in. So even though we had amendments in the bill that came out of the Homeland Security Committee, they are not here in this bill today.

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