Member of Congress
J. Exon
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- NE
- Party
- Democrat
Speeches
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-26
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-26
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Washington.
Mr. EXON. I yield 2 more minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. EXON. I thank my colleague. I was just trying to divide the time to go back and forth. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. EXON. I yield 1 more minute.
Mr. EXON. I ask the Senator from Oregon as to how much time he feels he will need.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there is obviously some serious misunderstanding here, because Senator Kyl has not correctly stated the existing law by suggesting that any other nuclear state could conduct a nuclear test after September 30, and before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is entered into, but the United States could not. This is simply not true. If any nation tests after September 30, the law stipulates that all restrictions on U.S. testing are limited. It is a basic tenet of the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon law. The only effect of the law is that the United States will not be the first nation to test after September 30. Would Senator Kyl agree with this correction? I ask him to do it on his time because I am almost out of time. Senator Kyl has also said that his amendment would allow for a resumption of testing for ``safety and reliability'' reasons only. I say to my friend from Arizona, if he can show me where in his amendment it states the testing would have to be done for ``safety and reliability'' only. I have looked and I cannot find it. The way I read his amendment, a resumption of U.S. testing could be for any reason whatever. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. EXON. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Hatfield.
Mr. EXON. I yield myself that time, and then the Senator from Oregon will be in to offer the tabling motion. I want to take just a moment and thank my dear friend and colleague from Oregon, Senator Hatfield, for all of the staunch support and leadership that he has given. We have worked on this matter because we have a total joint understanding of just how critical the end to nuclear testing can be for mankind. It is absolutely essential that the United States continue to provide leadership in this area. Thanks once again to my friend from Oregon. Both the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Nebraska will conclude our careers in the U.S. Senate this year. Somebody else will have to take up from there if we are to continue. If we have not reached a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that is still a must. I simply say, Mr. President, that the U.S. President says the act is not needed now; the National Security Council, I have entered a letter to that effect; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says it is not necessary; the Secretary of Energy says it is not necessary; not only is it not necessary, but it could not come up at a worse time. I just hope that we will put this matter over by the tabling motion that is going to be offered. I would simply advise the Senate that, if for any reason the tabling motion does not prevail, there is going to be long and extended debate on this particular amendment. With that, Mr. President, I simply say put this off, keep mankind informed, do something about it next year and not now. It has no adverse effect whatsoever on the national security interests of the United States, or the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. I thank the Chair. I yield back any time I have remaining.
SECURITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE1996-06-26
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. EXON. I would like to say a few things complimenting my friend from Virginia on the remarks he made.
Mr. EXON. While the Senator from Virginia and I have not always agreed on all subjects, we have agreed on more than we have disagreed on. I could not help but ask for a moment, if I might, to congratulate the Senator from Virginia for his very thoughtful remarks with regard to the security of the White House. I voted against the resolution when it came up because I thought it was ill-advised. I believe it is safe to say that what happened, the tragedy that happened to our people serving the United States overseas with the terrorist attack yesterday, if it can happen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, it can happen even more easily at an open Pennsylvania Avenue, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. I thank the Senator for his thoughtful comments and remarks.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-20
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. I inquire of the Chair, what is the pending business before the Senate?
Mr. EXON. And the underlying amendment is a Kyl amendment?
Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Arkansas.
VOTE ON THE NOMINATION OF ALICE RIVLIN1996-06-20
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, before I make a comment with regard to the Kyl amendment, which I have talked about previously and will be talking about again at some length, if necessary, I would just like to make a comment that I was rather disappointed in the votes we just had. We just had two controversial nominations: One, Mr. Greenspan and one, Ms. Rivlin. I was very pleased to see, although the Greenspan nomination was controversial, it had a strong bipartisan flavor of support on a vote of 91 to 7. Frankly, I was quite disappointed at the lack of similar consideration for the other nomination that some people thought was controversial with regard to Ms. Rivlin. We all know Alice Rivlin and have known her for a very, very long time. Frankly, I was discouraged that the bipartisan spirit that has to be part of the Federal Reserve Board was not accepted nearly as handily as was the Greenspan nomination. Ms. Rivlin was confirmed by a vote of 57 for and 41 against. I thank those few Members on the Republican side of the aisle who at least, in this instance, showed the same bipartisan support that those of us on this side of the aisle showed for Mr. Greenspan. Frankly, I was quite disappointed and, I think, this is a point in the Senate that should be raised. There must be sometime when we can lay partisanship aside and recognize and realize that we have a two-party system that still is designed to function here.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-20
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, on the matter at hand with regard to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I indicated in my remarks of yesterday that the administration, and others, who have a firsthand say, had a firsthand look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are all opposed to the Kyl amendment. I would like to read briefly at this time the letters that I have received from some of the agencies. First, a letter I received from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from Mr. John D. Holum. Dear Senator Exon: Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, William C. Danvers, has provided you the Administration's reason for opposing the Kyl-Reid amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill. As I represent the lead agency in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in Geneva, I want to emphasize our belief that this amendment could undermine our efforts to negotiate a Treaty that would end nuclear testing for all time by suggesting a possible U.S. interest in resuming testing before the CTBT enters into force, that does not, in fact, exist. Since the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, the United States has pursued a CTBT as the long-term goal. Now, when such a treaty is in hand, we urge the members of the Senate to oppose this amendment and to reaffirm our country's longstanding bipartisan efforts to achieve a CTBT. A second memorandum from the Secretary of Energy: The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant contribution to the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts. During the duration of the moratorium, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at this time. The Department of Energy, with the full support of the Department of Defense, has embarked on an ambitious stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the safety and reliability of the stockpile is maintained into the foreseeable future, without nuclear testing. One of the elements of stockpile stewardship is maintaining the readiness of the Nevada Test Site to resume testing if it is in the supreme national interest of the United States to do so. DOE is committed to maintaining this readiness, consistent with Presidential direction. DOE has confidence in the stockpile stewardship program and does not need the authority that this amendment would provide. President Clinton has already outlined his commitment to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile under the existing moratorium and under a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is premature to make any statutory changes to the existing moratorium legislation. Any changes should be made only in the context of a negotiated and signed comprehensive test ban treaty. Any changes in the current statutory prohibition on underground nuclear weapons testing at this time certainly does not help the negotiation process, and could very well set it back. Achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty is a key to reducing the global nuclear danger including proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear terrorism. Last, Mr. President, a letter from the National Security Council. These are of the same date. Dear Senator Exon: You have requested the Administration's views on the amendment offered by Senators Kyl and Reid concerning nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Administration is strongly opposed to this amendment. We believe that the amendment could not come at a worse time. The states that are negotiating in the CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva have set a deadline of June 28--next Friday--to complete this historic treaty. The amendment could be interpreted by some CD states as signaling a possible U.S. intent to conduct a round of nuclear testing after the CTBT is completed but before it enters into force. The Administration has no such plans or intentions, nor has it requested funding for any such tests. Moreover, the amendment would relax the existing legislative moratorium on U.S. testing just at the time the only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China, has announced that it will joint the global moratorium in September. As you know, we are confident that our Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship will ensure that we can meet the challenge of maintaining the reliability and safety of our nuclear inventory absent nuclear testing. Nonetheless, because he considers this to be a supreme national interest of the United States, the President has pledged that after the CTBT enters into force, he would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty in the event, however unlikely, that he was informed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified. There is concern on the part of the amendment's co-sponsors that if such a problem arose after September 30 but before the CTBT entered into force, current law would prohibit remedial testing. If that were to occur, it is important to recognize that one or more years would be required to prepare for any resumption of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. During this time, we would be able to obtain the necessary funding and legislative relief to carry out the necessary tests. In short, the Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid Amendment is not only not necessary, but it also entails a genuine risk of delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations just as we may well be poised to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing. Signed by the Special Assistant to the President on Legislative Affairs. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these three letters be printed in the Record.
Mr. EXON. I thank my colleague from Arkansas.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-19
Mr. EXON
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I inquire of the Senator from Minnesota, about how much time does he wish? There has been some talk about moving ahead on this matter. I prefer to move ahead on this matter, and I simply inquire, before I withdraw my right to object, about how much time the Senator from Minnesota feels he needs, and on what subject, before we set aside the pending business of the Senate.
Mr. EXON. With that understanding, I withdraw my objection. Is the Senator intending to propose an amendment?
Mr. EXON. Then, Mr. President, I object on the grounds that I am prepared to move ahead on the amendment before us. Certainly, I would like to accommodate the concerns of the Senator from Minnesota and his sense-of-the-Senate amendment. But I suggest that in order to try and move ahead on this matter, it would probably be best at this time to proceed with debate on the amendment that is before us rather than offering another amendment at this juncture. With that caveat, I object.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I say to my friend from South Carolina, the chairman of the committee, which I have observed now for 18 years, and also my colleague from Georgia, the ranking member of the committee, that I understand the difficult position they find themselves in with regard to trying to move this bill along. I certainly am not here to cause any problems in that effort because, certainly, the defense authorization bill, which I voted for as it came out of the Armed Services Committee, is an important piece of legislation, and I think that we should move expeditiously ahead. Certainly, any Senator has a right under the rules of the Senate to offer any amendment. But I would simply say that I intend to make some remarks at this time in strong opposition to the Kyl amendment, and then would plead to the managers of the bill--since the Kyl amendment nor nothing like it was included in the authorization bill that came out of the committee-- that it would probably be best, in the interest of moving ahead with this bill, that the Kyl amendment be withdrawn and probably and possibly considered at some later more appropriate date. Mr. President, there could not possibly be a worse time, a more inopportune time, if you will, to consider the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona. Here we are, Mr. President, 9 days away from the self-imposed June 28 deadline by the multination negotiators now delicately moving toward hopefully an agreement for a comprehensive test ban treaty. And the deadline is June 28. That is 9 days from now. To be specific, that is a week from this coming Friday. These are extremely delicate negotiations. I have talked on numerous occasions to our Ambassador who is involved in those detailed negotiations. I have been in close touch with the Secretary that has responsibility in this area, the Secretary of Energy. I have been in close touch with the White House, and the National Security Council. They all agree with myself, Senator Mark Hatfield, and many others who will speak in opposition to this amendment, that there could not possibly be a worse time for the U.S. Senate to begin meddling in matters of this delicate nature 9 days ahead of the June 28 self- imposed date by the negotiators to try to come up with a comprehensive test ban treaty that in the opinion of this Senator, and in the opinion of most people who understand the procedure, would be to the greatest benefit of mankind for as far as we can see into the future. What we are talking about here is whether or not we are going to have less reliance on nuclear weapons in the future. Since the end of the cold war we all have been working, and quite well, I might say, with Russia and the former states of the former Soviet Union to the point where we do not have nuclear warheads pointed at each other. Behind all of this is the attempted emergence of new nations to nuclear power. If we can put in place and keep in place the nuclear test ban treaty that is now being delicately renegotiated in Geneva it would be the greatest boon to mankind and the safety of mankind that one could imagine. No. I suspect that none of us can see into future time when we will have not have nuclear weapons. But certainly we should be able to recognize and realize that the United States of America which is far ahead on the ability to test, which is far ahead on the ability to make tests with computers, which is far ahead in inventory of any other part of the world, it would seem evident to me that it would be not only in the national security interests of the United States of America but also the right thing to do to recognize that we should continue to be a leader in trying to end for all time, if we can, nations testing nuclear devices. So, Mr. President, I speak now not only for myself but other Members of the U.S. Senate on both sides of the aisle in strong opposition to the Kyl-Reid amendment. It is being sold here just to give the President a little flexibility, and so forth and so on. If the U.S. Senate would pass the Kyl-Reid amendment, which I think it will not--I think I have been here long enough to have a pretty good understanding of the Senate and its rules--I say to the managers of the amendment, and I say to the managers of the bill that there could be long and delayed debate on this amendment. I think it has little chance of surviving the opposition that we will mount against it. I want to unmask, if I can, Mr. President, the feeling that this is a harmless amendment; that it is not going to hurt anything at all. I would simply say that regardless of what the intentions of the authors of the amendment are for the U.S. Senate to be even debating such a proposition 9 days ahead of the final deadline, whether we pass it or not, only gives the opposition around the world, wherever it is and for whatever reason, more chances of disrupting and eliminating any chance of a comprehensive test ban treaty based on negotiations--very delicate negotiations, I might say, Mr. President--in Geneva today. Why is it that 9 days ahead of the deadline we have some Senators coming on the floor of the U.S. Senate trying to make changes in what we are going to do in the future with regard to nuclear tests? No one knows at this juncture.
Mr. EXON. I have not interrupted the Senator from Arizona. I will not yield. He will have ample time to make his points at a later time. I simply say that this amendment is ill-timed. It is ill-advised. At least the authors should recognize and realize, if they are so certain that this amendment is all-important, that it would be more in line with reality and reason to at least wait until follow-on bills after the 28th day of June, a week from Friday, when we will know by that time whether or not the hard work and the delicate balance to try to reach an international comprehensive test ban treaty is successful. I do not know what their motives are. It may well be that the authors of this amendment are totally in support, as I hope they would be in being behind our negotiators and our administration who fully recognize and realize the dangers that we are working with here; that the authors of this amendment would simply say, yes, this is probably not the best time and this amendment should not be offered. Mr. President, this amendment, or something like it, was discussed by members of the Armed Services Committee before our markup and before our hearings in the Armed Services Committee on the defense authorization bill. It was agreed unanimously that this is a matter that should not have been taken up at this time. And for that reason, and principally for that reason, there was no move inside the Armed Services Committee to make any such suggested changes. And I believe that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee knows and understands that full well. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee has every right to support this amendment, if he wants to, on the floor of the U.S. Senate. That was not the reasoning of his committee during those deliberations. Mr. President, later on today I will insert into the Record statements by the White House, statements by the Secretary of Energy, and others in strong unqualified opposition to this amendment principally along the lines that I have outlined. I cannot imagine anything I would oppose more than the Kyl-Reid amendment authorizing the resumption of nuclear testing beginning on October 1 this year under certain conditions. While proponents of the amendment contend that this change to the 1992 Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law closes some sort of a loophole in the American nuclear testing policy and should have no impact on the comprehensive test ban negotiations now underway in Geneva, this simply is not--I emphasize, Mr. President, is not--the case. The Kyl-Reid amendment is the proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing, an innocent appearance cloaking a more sinister inner nature. Whether intended or not, passage of this meddlesome amendment would send a chilling ripple around the world that the Senate has pulled the rug out from under our Nation's treaty negotiators on the very eve of finalizing a landmark treaty designed to halt the global spread of nuclear weapons. After decades of failed efforts and ineffectual agreements, the world's nuclear powers have finally made some progress in not only curbing the increase in the number of nuclear weapons States but also reducing the number of nuclear weapons systems targeted on population centers around the world. The INF Treaty, START I Treaty, and now START II are historic mileposts in the history of arms control in that they compel for the first time the destruction of nuclear delivery systems while still maintaining the geopolitical balance and the ability to deter an attack by a potential aggressor. Defense and foreign policy experts agree that the most significant security challenge facing the United States and the rest of the world is curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, most dangerous of which is a nuclear warhead. Closing Pandora's box, as I have referred to these nonproliferation efforts in the past, is a formidable undertaking, but I believe history will judge the leaders of our era in great measure on how successful we are in meeting this challenge. While the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar program has made remarkable progress in addressing the secure transportation, storage, and destruction of thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons, another threat reduction effort designed to enhance our national security is close to agreement. That is the agreement I talked about that is hopefully scheduled to be agreed to in 9 days. What in the world, whatever are their intentions, is the reasonableness of Members of the Senate coming in 9 days ahead of that formidable undertaking with an amendment that could only cause great mischief and possibly lead to further division of the nations that are having enough trouble already in coming to agreement in Geneva on the nuclear test ban treaty a week from this Friday--9 days away. I cannot imagine any Member of the Senate, Mr. President, I cannot imagine any Member of the Senate believing it would be wise, if they understood the possible consequences, for any Member of the Senate to endorse this amendment for the reasons that I have stated and very likely for other reasons as well. For the past 3 years, the 37-member nation conference on disarmament has been meeting in Geneva to negotiate a verifiable comprehensive test ban or CTB Treaty. A CTB Treaty is an important linchpin in our efforts to prevent new nations from developing a nuclear weapons capability by depriving them of the ability to test and verify the performance and capability of the new weapons. In effect, the CTB Treaty, if realized, would go a long way in cutting off membership to the nuclear weapons club, depriving autocratic rulers and Third World rogue nations of the means to develop such weapons with confidence in the future. After 40 years of effort, the world community is now 10 days away, hopefully, 10 days away, Mr. President, from its self-imposed negotiating deadline of June 28--that is this June 28--to finalize a CTB agreement. Not only are we in the last hours of the negotiations end game in the context of the historical debate on the test ban concept, we are in the final minute of this long and difficult endeavor. For this reason, it is no surprise that some opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and advocates of continued nuclear testing would look for ways to undermine an agreement. I am not saying that the authors of this amendment necessarily fall into that category. I hope they do not. It might well be that some people pushing this amendment were not here in 1992 when Senator Mitchell, Senator Exon and Senator Hatfield came about with a bipartisan agreement, stepped aside from political considerations and worked out an agreement that passed the Senate and has been the framework ever since and has been endorsed by the President of the United States and indirectly endorsed by other nations of the world and has resulted in the ongoing negotiations at Geneva. In large part, the bipartisan Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law of 1992 jump started American interest in joining the world's other nuclear powers in pushing for a comprehensive test ban treaty. By requiring that future U.S. nuclear weapons testing be linked to the correction of prospective safety and reliability problems, the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell provision confirms what most scientists, military leaders, and policymakers understood: The United States has the safest, the most reliable nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. Furthermore, after conducting over 1,000 nuclear tests, with the data resulting therefrom, at our test facility in Nevada, we have developed more advanced simulation technology than any other power in the world. The time was ripe for phasing out our testing program over 3 years and start seriously negotiating a comprehensive test ban agreement. Basically, Mitchell-Exon-Hatfield played a key role in that development. And I am astonished at this amendment because, however well intended, it is ill-advised as I have outlined. Now, 4 years later, when we are on the verge of possibly reaching a comprehensive test ban agreement, a mere 9 days away from lowering the lid on the nuclear Pandora's box, it is in this context that the Kyl- Reid amendment should be judged. The Kyl-Reid amendment would authorize the President to seek authorization to resume nuclear testing after October 1 up until the time when a comprehensive test ban treaty is ratified by the Senate. Unlike the existing requirements of Hatfield- Exon-Mitchell, these tests could be for any reason, not necessarily to correct any safety or reliability problem. I should reiterate, there is no known safety or reliability problem with our nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that even if the President did seek to resume testing it would take approximately 2 years--let me repeat that, Mr. President-- even if suddenly, today, the President of the United States should find that we have a serious problem with our nuclear deterrent, it would take approximately 2 years to reready the nuclear test site to conduct tests to verify if there is a problem and to help identify what would be necessary to correct it. If that should happen, I believe there is no question but the U.S. Senate would join in, would recognize and realize the serious threat, and take action as the President has outlined. But that is not the case, and we should not be using or relying on that type of scare tactic to justify this ill-conceived and ill-timed amendment here on this date, late in June 1996, 9 days away from the final deadline in Geneva. According to the Department of Energy's best estimate, we would have to take 2 years, if we needed it, to reready the test site in Nevada. In that context, the amendment before us is meaningless. This reality raises the question of what is the true value of the Kyl-Reid amendment if it professes to give the President the means by which to resume testing up to a point of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratifications? The President of the United States is firmly against this. He does not need any additional authority at this time. The Secretary of Energy, who has prime responsibility under the President of the United States, and the National Security Council, are firmly opposed to this amendment, primarily for the reasons I have outlined. Even if there was a reason to test, and there is not, we would have to wait 2 years at least before detonation could take place and tests could be conducted even underground at the Nevada test site, far more time than the anticipated delay between signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its subsequent ratification by the U.S. Senate. In light of this, and the fact that there is no known safety or reliability reason to test, the question that needs to be asked is, Why is this amendment being proposed now, and what would the consequences be if the amendment was agreed to? As I have stated, I am very fearful that they would be devastating. The prospects of a comprehensive test ban agreement by June 28 were greatly enhanced just recently when China agreed to join the rest of the world's declared nuclear weapons states in adhering to a testing moratorium and forsaking the right to test, ending all testing once an agreement is reached, which might be in the immediate future. For the first time in history, all five permanent members of the Security Council are in agreement to adhere to a true zero yield test ban treaty. The Chinese decision clears the most difficult and significant hurdle in reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty text. What is more, the world's nonnuclear states, the potential new admissions to the nuclear club, are poised to sign on to a treaty relinquishing their right to develop or obtain these highly lethal and destabilizing weapons of mass destruction. If the United States were to approve the Kyl-Reid amendment on the eve of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreement, changing U.S. policy so as to authorize tests for any reason--for any reason, I emphasize, Mr. President, up until the time of Senate treaty ratification--the effect on our Nation's nonproliferation efforts in Geneva I am afraid would be devastating. I am afraid, Mr. President, that under those circumstances the United States would become the pariah of the international arms control community and the reactions of condemnation from around the world would undoubtedly be swift, not unlike what occurred following the French and the Chinese weapons tests earlier this year. My suggestion to Senator Kyl and Senator Reid is that this issue be withdrawn and reconsidered at some later date this year or maybe next year, or sometime after that when we will know whether or not the comprehensive test-ban negotiations were successful. While we have learned a great deal about all of these problems, with regard to reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons arsenal, and we have a lot to learn in the future, but there is no justifiable reason to resume testing now or in the foreseeable future. There is, however, a compelling reason to push hard in the final days of the comprehensive test-ban negotiations in Geneva, without having to bother with the uproar that is sure to follow if the Kyl-Reid amendment, regardless of how well intended, would be passed by the U.S. Senate or even considered and defeated under the rules that we have at our disposal in the U.S. Senate. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to stay the course and work in a positive way to halt the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will do just that. Mr. President, the Kyl-Reid amendment regrettably would work to the contrary. Approval of this amendment by the Senate would be self-defeating and could very well snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, scuttling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at a time 9 days--9 days away from possible success. Such a happening would undermine our own collective security and that of our allies by allowing nonnuclear states to potentially join what has been, up to now, an exclusive group of nations capable of killing millions with the push of a button. Rejection or withdrawal of the Kyl amendment would give us a chance-- and I underline the word chance--of success at Geneva. I fear history will not judge this Senate kindly if our actions, whether intended or not, are instrumental in killing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it is prepared, hopefully, to be enacted and to join other landmark arms control agreements which have brought greater peace to all Americans and all people in the world, as we look not only just at today, but at tomorrow as well. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject the Kyl-Reid amendment. I will do everything that I can, within the powers that I and others have in the U.S. Senate, to see that this amendment does not prevail. There will be many other speakers who will follow me in opposition to the Kyl-Reid amendment. I emphasize only, again, in closing that, while this amendment may be well-intentioned, it is ill-conceived and the timing could not be worse. Those are the essential elements that the White House and the Secretary of Energy joined me on and, in my conversations with them, asked me to relate along with their strong opposition to this amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor. Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.