Russell Feingold

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to call for the immediate release of Wei Jingsheng, China's most prominent political prisoner. Wei Jingsheng is no stranger to harsh unjust treatment. He has spent all but 6 months of the last 18 years in prisons or in labor camps, often in solitary confinement. Now serving his second sentence of 14 years for the crime of peacefully advocating democracy and human rights, Wei Jingsheng is terribly ill. His expected release date is 12 years from now--the year 2009--and that is assuming he lives that long. At 46 years of age, Wei suffers from life-threatening heart disease, he cannot lift his head, and he complains of severe back pain. His requests for medical attention have gone unfulfilled and all indications are that he has not seen a doctor in more than a year. A former electrician at the Beijing Zoo, Wei has been one of the strongest voices of China's democratic movement. In recognition of his efforts, Wei was named the 1994 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award laureate and, every year since 1995, Members of Congress have nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. While in prison serving his first sentence, Wei was allowed to write letters on certain topics to his family, prison authorities, and China's leaders. Because most of these letters urged democratic reforms, they were seized by authorities and never sent. Wei was later able to retrieve them and release them publicly, and they have now been translated and published as a book. Today, May 13, is the publication date of this book, ``The Courage To Stand Alone: Letters From Prison and Other Writings.'' This book states what is obvious to Wei and should be clear to Americans: China needs democratic freedoms. Unfortunately, China's leaders continue to show a flagrant disregard for human rights. In 1994, over the strenuous objections of those of us concerned over China's atrocious and repeated violations of international standards of human rights, the administration delinked granting of most-favored- nation trade status to China to improvements in its human rights record. The administration argued then that through constructive engagement on economic matters, and dialog on other issues, including human rights, the United States could better influence Chinese behavior. That was a mistake. Let those who support constructive engagement visit the terribly ill Wei Jingsheng in his prison cell, and ask him if developing markets for toothpaste or breakfast cereal will help him win his freedom or save his life. I do not see how closer economic ties alone will somehow transform China's authoritarian system into a more democratic one. Unless we press the case for improvement in China's human rights record, using the leverage afforded us by the Chinese Government's desire to expand its economy and increase trade with us, I do not see how conditions will get much better. In fact, the harsh prison conditions and lack of medical attention provided to Mr. Wei demonstrate that, after nearly 4 years, dialog and constructive engagement have made no impact on Chinese behavior. We should make it clear that human rights are of real--as opposed to rhetorical--concern to this country. Until Wei Jingsheng and others committed to reform in China are allowed to speak their voices freely and work for change, American-Chinese relations should not be based on a business-as-usual basis. I hope the administration will do everything possible to demand the immediate release of Wei Jingsheng and urge Chinese authorities to provide him with access to medical care that he urgently requires.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the remainder of my time and I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Not only do I agree, but I ask the Senator and I make sure we reach out to Members of both parties in this body who are cosponsors, and others who I think are very interested in reform and have not yet chosen to cosponsor it, to do just that. There are myths about the legislation and about the effort that have been perpetuated in an effort to make the public ignore the issue, thinking it cannot be resolved. But the facts speak differently. There have been newspaper articles indicating that we have fewer cosponsors than last year. That is just false. We have 30 Members of the U.S. Senate as cosponsors of this bill. I guess if we do not come out here on the floor and start to indicate these facts, it is very hard for the average citizen to relate to it. One of the reasons it is hard for them to relate to it is, when they start hearing about $100,000, $200,000 contributions, it is pretty hard for them to feel invited into the process. It is pretty hard for them to believe that anything will ever change. They are so used to believing that this system and this town is dominated by interests and powers that they cannot control, that the people of the country, when they are asked in a poll, may not say that campaign finance reform is the No. 1 issue. I think, if you ask them whether they think we ought to do the job and whether it is important, of course they would say yes. Many would support almost every aspect of the legislation we are proposing. But, for the average citizen, if you asked them what is their No. 1 concern, what are they going to say? They are going to say, ``We are concerned about our kids' education, we are concerned about crime in our neighborhood.'' Those are the things that people should identify, should feel free to identify, and they should not have to worry about a system that has gone out of control so far away in Washington. That is not the stuff of the daily lives of people in this country. That is not what it takes to make ends meet. But the fact is, until we clean up this system here, the ability of this Government to assist those families in getting through and making ends meet will be seriously compromised. When we reach the point that Members of this body get on the floor and say that what the problem is is that we do not have enough money in politics, and then we do not pass a piece of legislation, and then we have an election--we find out the result. More money was spent in these last elections than in any other election and we had the lowest voter turnout in 72 years. That is not just a fluke. It is because more and more people are feeling that they are no longer part of a system that is supposedly premised on the notion of one person one vote. So, today begins the effort to speak here on the floor on a regular basis--not just about the McCain-Feingold bill, but about the fact that we are not going to allow this year to pass without an effort to bring this issue back to the floor. Again, my lead author on this bill, the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain--I always have to apologize for his being right and my being wrong last year when he said it would probably take a scandal to get this passed. I said, please, don't say that. I want to get it passed this year. But he was right. It took something like the abuses of the 1996 election to get people in this body, to get people across the country, to realize that this just is not a quantitative change in what has been happening in elections since 1974. What happened was a qualitative change, a major change in the way in which elections are conducted. Basically, the current election system is falling apart through the use of loopholes and abuses and how much money people are willing to raise through soft money and their own campaigns. So our goal here is to make sure everyone knows this issue is not ``not there.'' It will become one of the dominant issues, not just in the media and the newspapers, as it has been, but it will become one of the dominant issues here in the floor in the not too distant future. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me just read the last paragraph of this. The editorial basically talks about the way in which Members of Congress are very skilled about talking around the edges of this thing: Foreign contributions are the problem, or the problem is what the White House did, or what we need is an investigation, or what we need is an independent counsel, or we need investigations--all so you can talk about everything but the need to actually pass reform. This is what they identified, and I thought the last paragraph was effective. As it says: But the churning about the lurid particulars of how that money was raised last year ought not to be allowed to take the public eye off the broader questions: What do you do about the solicitation system generally? How do you keep electoral outcomes, and the policy outcomes to which they lead, from being bought? The politicians--both parties--are conducting a kind of mock debate about the lesser issues as a diversion and an alternative to dealing with the central one. That's the ultimate scandal, and they should not be allowed to get away with it. Mr. President, I think that is exactly what the Senator from Minnesota is referring to, talking around the edges, using the committee process to avoid talking about what is really going on, the need to change this big money system, and to talk about it on the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I think we have to do this on the floor, in part because of the witness list. We went through this last year, where the committee hearings were used for a great deal of time and you did not get the feeling that the goal was to find a solution or to pass a bill. The goal was to sort of talk it to death. The floor is a superb place to do this. In fact, I would say to my friend from Minnesota, I think one of the best editorials that has been written on this subject, that I think we can sort of elaborate on on the floor in the coming weeks, is something from the Washington Post of April 21, 1997, entitled, ``Skirting the Real Scandal.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this editorial be printed in the Record.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I do really thank the Senator from Minnesota. In fact, I would very much like to join with him in coming out here each week, assuming we are permitted the time. This is the time to start this effort in the Chamber. We had great help from the President of the United States in endorsing the legislation and getting us off to the right start at the beginning of the year when there was a great deal of attention paid to this issue. Obviously, there are other priorities; the whole issue of balancing the budget has taken much of center stage for the last few weeks and obviously is now on a track, whether one likes it or not, that is moving in a direction that will be resolved one way or another. That is why I think this is the time, as the Senator from Minnesota is suggesting, to have an awful lot of the conversation here on the floor between now and the day we pass campaign finance reform be about this issue. We have to talk to the American people this way and in every other way about what the real facts are about this issue because it has been often distorted. For example, the point of the Senator from Minnesota about whether or not this is really a Republican-Democrat issue. It is not. The Public Citizen report, for example, points out there is not a lot of difference between the parties in terms of this issue: 54 percent of the Democrats who ran for the Senate in the last three election cycles exceeded the limits; 59 percent of the Republicans exceeded it. It is not a vast kind of difference, and the Members here really know that. The problem is somehow encouraging Members, incumbents here to realize that their lives and their jobs would be better and the opportunities for others who want to run for office would be better if we do this. But I think we do need to be out here talking about this, if not on a daily basis at least on a weekly basis, to let people know this is a serious effort and that we do intend to succeed.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I rise today, with my friend and colleague, Senator Wellstone, and others to start up the conversation again about the need to clean up our election system and pass meaningful, bipartisan campaign finance reform. I am pleased to announce that as of yesterday the so-called McCain-Feingold legislation now has reached a milestone of having 30 cosponsors in the Senate, with the addition of the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia, Senator Robert Byrd, as a cosponsor. The senior Senator from Minnesota, of course, was a leader on this issue long before I got here and continues to be, not only in our legislation but on other aspects and ideas about how we can clean up this system. One of the things that really highlights the importance of this issue is the type of work that was recently done by Public Citizen in releasing a report that lays out the fact that the McCain-Feingold bill, and I am sure other alternatives as well, really would make a difference, that had we done the job last July the elections of 1996 would have looked very different. They have analyzed three components of the legislation. One is the voluntary limits on overall spending that candidates would agree to in order to get the benefits of the bill. They analyzed the fact that the McCain-Feingold bill would ban soft money completely, as any good reform proposal must do. And Public Citizen analyzed the requirement in the bill that if you want the benefits of the bill, you cannot get more than 20 percent of your total campaign contributions from political action committees. Very briefly, since I want to obviously hear from the Senator from Minnesota, I just want to report what the figures were. Over the last three election cycles, had these provisions been in the law and had all candidates for the U.S. Senate in 1992 and 1994 and 1996 abided by the limits, $700 million less would have been spent on these campaigns-- $700 million. That is just for Senate races in three cycles; in other words, just one whole series of Senate races for 100 seats--$700 million of less spending. It would have been $259 million in less spending overall by candidates because they would have agreed to an overall limit for their State; $50 million less in political action committee receipts and $450 million less in soft money. I wish to indicate, since some get in the Chamber and say this is a proincumbent bill, the Public Citizen report shows it is just the opposite, absolutely the opposite of a proincumbent bill. This is a prochallenger bill. Ninety percent of the Senate incumbents over the last three election cycles exceeded the limits for the McCain-Feingold bill--90 percent of the incumbents. Only 24 percent of the challengers exceeded these limits. So the challengers in most cases would have been the ones who would have been more likely to get the benefits of the bill; 81 percent of the incumbents exceeded the 20 percent PAC limit and only 13 percent of the challengers exceeded the 20 percent PAC limit. So there are many arguments that are posed against the bill, most of which do not hold water, including the notion that the bill is unconstitutional. We will address that on another occasion, but today I thought I would just use a few minutes of this time to indicate that this notion that this bill is protection for incumbents is false and just the opposite is the case as is indicated by Public Citizen. At this point I would like to----

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am an original cosponsor of amendment No. 76, offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] which requires the Department of Agriculture to collect and disseminate, on a weekly basis, statistically reliable information on bulk cheese prices throughout the Nation. Secretary Glickman has already initiated this price survey with the voluntary cooperation of cheese manufacturers using existing administrative authorities of the Department. The amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Senator Specter] requires the Secretary to continue doing so until April 5, 1999. However, because the Secretary has already implemented this cheese price reporting initiative using existing authorities, I wanted to clarify that he can continue to collect and report this cheese price information after April 5, 1999 using the same authorities he is using currently. Does the chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, Mr. Lugar, concur that the sunset provision in section (d) of amendment No. 76 in no way affects or diminishes the Secretary's existing authority to continue the voluntary collecting and reporting of cheese price information from cheese manufacturers after April 5, 1999?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to take this opportunity to respond to remarks in opposition to Senator Hutchison's amendment by the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Delaware. Let me, first of all, reiterate a couple of points about my attitude and the attitude of most Senators about this amendment and its purpose. First of all, no one can even begin to criticize what a wonderful job our troops and our military have done in Bosnia. In fact, all we can do is offer praise and gratitude. I feel that way, in particular, about the wonderful job some of our folks from Wisconsin, whom I have had a chance to speak with about this, have done. Second, I want to reiterate that I believe this mission has accomplished some very, very positive things. It certainly has not accomplished all that would have been hoped. But to suggest somehow that this mission has not accomplished anything in terms of saving lives and in terms of trying to resolve the situation would be wrong, and I do not suggest that. I also want to acknowledge that the two Senators who spoke in opposition to the amendment, the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Delaware, are two of the great leaders on this issue, two of the most compassionate Senators when it comes to being concerned about the tragedy in Bosnia, and I learned that fast when I came here to the United States Senate. I wish that we could be in agreement on this particular issue about how long this mission should continue, because we have been allies on many aspects of the Bosnia operation in the past. In fact, Mr. President, I just remind my colleagues that when I arrived here in 1993, the first resolution I ever submitted, was to simply lift the arms embargo that was being enforced against all the areas in the region, all the people in the region, but, in particular, the Bosnian Muslims. The reason I came to that position was because of the inspiration of the Senator from Delaware who had taken the lead in developing the concept of lifting the arms embargo prior to my arrival in the Senate. When I got here, I joined with other Senators, in fact, I think I was the first one in that Congress to introduce a resolution to lift the arms embargo. The Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Delaware and I and others all got up and talked about the important right of self-defense, the importance of people being able to defend themselves. We thought that they should be given arms to defend themselves, the right that they have, I believe, under unalienable human rights and under article 51 of the U.N. Charter to defend themselves. That is where many of us wanted to go. As the Senator from Connecticut indicated, we tried very hard. We won a vote on the Senate floor on a bipartisan basis, although, regrettably, it was not carried all the way through. I still believe that was the best answer to this situation. But, we did not get that done in a timely manner and, as a result, I think we were essentially forced into the Dayton accord. I think some of our European allies made sure, in effect, that we would be forced into sending troops into the region. So when many of us spoke about the importance of lifting the arms embargo, we discussed that it was the right thing for the Bosnians. But it was a way to prevent us from becoming ensnared in a military operation that we would not be able to get out of, where American men and women would be forced into a situation where an end-game or departure justification would be difficult to find. That is how we got to where we are today, unfortunately. That is why I have offered this amendment, and I believe it is one of the reasons the Senator from Texas has offered her second-degree amendment. When the Senator from Connecticut--and I say this with all respect, because I simply know no one who is more concerned about the situation, and I know at a very personal level as well, as a Senator, that he cares as deeply, perhaps more deeply than any other Senator about what is going on in Bosnia--but when he says it is inconceivable that we would try to do this on this bill in this way, let me suggest what I consider to be inconceivable. It is inconceivable to me that we would not have a clear debate on this issue when the initial understanding that was given to the American people about this is that it would cost $2 billion and be over within 1 year. I took every opportunity I could in the Foreign Relations Committee and in every other meeting that I had on this subject to ask the question: Is it truly the intent to be out of there in 1 year? And the answer was always yes. Even when it was just a few months before the December 1996 deadline, I asked many leading military and State Department officials about this. I said, ``Is it going to be over in a year?'' And they said, ``Well, yes, give or take a few weeks.'' The American people and the Congress were led over and over to believe that this was a 1-year operation. Then, really quite quietly, it was extended. It was extended by 18 months beyond that deadline, to a minimum of June of 1998. And even then, when I asked whether or not that is the end of the line for this operation, the remark has been simply, ``We hope so, we think so, we think it's possible.'' What is also inconceivable to me is that we add another $1.5 billion in this supplemental bill and then tell the American people what we are on track to do is to spend not just $2 billion--in fact, we are already in for $3 billion--but that the minimum estimate now is $6.5 billion through the middle of 1998. To me it is somewhat inconceivable that we would simply move in that direction without a full and thorough debate with regard to these numbers. Where is the public accountability on this? Where is the congressional accountability with regard to the expenditure of those kinds of funds and with regard to the duration of an operation that was promised to be over within 1 year? Others have suggested today that somehow this is an unprecedented kind of amendment, but all I can do is refer my colleagues to what we did when it came to the Somalia operation. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia offered an amendment, which we voted on on October 15, 1993, that provided for a cutoff date for the expenditure of funds with regard to Somalia. No one knows better the power of the purse of the Congress than the Senator from West Virginia, and he knows that that is the heart and the soul of congressional power when it comes to military operations. Both the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Delaware voted for the amendment that Senator Byrd offered that would cut off the funds for Somalia by a date certain. We signaled what we were going to do in that situation --we signaled it clearly--because we knew that it was time for us to get out. You know what is sad about that one. In the Somalia case, we waited until something bad happened. We waited until a tragedy occurred. We waited until we had essentially no choice but to extricate ourselves from a situation that became a mess. I am very pleased to be able to say today that we are not in that situation yet in Bosnia. I hope we never will be. But to wait for that moment to signal clearly when we intend to get out is the worst thing we can do in terms of our credibility in the world. To wait for a moment like that and then just run out of Bosnia because the public support may evaporate is the worst thing we can do in terms of our credibility. I do not think any of us regard what happened in Somalia as one of the finest hours in our diplomatic, military or foreign policy moments. So, Mr. President, let me simply say that this is a situation where we all have to decide whether we are just going to let this $1.5 billion go forward without asking serious questions. The Senators who are opposed to me and Senator Hutchison on this said we have not had proper hearings on our amendment. They have indicated they want to have a real debate on this matter. That is the whole point. We have not had real hearings on this. We have not had a real debate on whether we should spend $6.5 billion on Bosnia by the middle of 1998 or on the possibility of even more. We have not had a real national discussion about whether we should go forward with this. I think the American people and the Congress should be engaged in that kind of discussion. So let me conclude by saying that I think this amendment is appropriate. It does not go too far. It does not hamstring our military. There are opportunities for providing more funds later, if needed, for extending the operation, if needed. All this does is signal that neither this body nor this country is going to simply let this continue without any real consideration and public debate of where we are heading--especially since the operation is already costing $6.5 billion and has already more than doubled the duration that was originally promised. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from Texas for her leadership regarding the issue of troop deployment in Bosnia, and will support her second-degree amendment. The language drafted by the Senator from Texas changes the date of the funding prohibitions in my amendment, as she indicated, from September 30, 1997, which is the end of the current fiscal year, to June 30, 1998, which is the date the administration is now using as its target end date for this mission. Of course, Mr. President, I would have preferred the earlier date, the September 30, 1997 deadline, which would effectively require the administration to begin plans to withdraw at least some of our troops starting tomorrow. That would be the quickest way for the United States to get out of a situation that, I think, is getting worse the longer we stay there. But I, of course, recognize there are concerns from a number of Senators that trying to dismantle an operation the size of the United States troop deployment in Bosnia within a 5-month timeframe would be difficult to accomplish. I also recognize that there is more support in this body for the later date that the Senator from Texas has suggested. There are many Members who are willing to allow the mission to continue through June of next year if, in exchange for that, they get a solid, firm, and irrevocable commitment to an end date. So I am prepared to support the end date of June 30, 1998. A point I want to emphasize is that if Congress does not establish an end date to our involvement in Bosnia, this mission will continue to drag on and on and on. Therefore, I am willing to accept the second- degree amendment of the Senator from Texas. I congratulate her for her efforts in this area. I have joined as a cosponsor of a freestanding bill that she is introducing to also help us accomplish this goal. Regardless of the result of today's debate, she and I will continue to press for an end date to this deployment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam President. This editorial, in one of our State's leading newspapers, notes as follows: By leaving the United States mission in Bosnia open-ended, [President] Clinton gives the Serbs every reason to continue thumbing their nose at the Dayton agreement and our European allies less reason to take ownership of a peace-keeping mission that should be their primary concern. By this analysis, the presence of U.S. troops may actually serve to harden rather than soften the ethnic tensions in the area. The longer the Moslem refugees are prevented from returning to their homes, the more determined they are of the right to do so. At the same time, the Serbs are thwarting resettlement efforts and ignoring indictments from the War Crimes Tribunal against their own leadership. As this newspaper editorial reminds us, the ``U.S. commanders [in Bosnia] describe the situation on the ground not as `peace' but rather as the `absence of war.' '' Madam President, I believe that the open-endedness of this mission may actually be helping to keep the warring parties from truly fulfilling their commitments under the Dayton accord. Madam President, let me turn to my second major concern. And it is really the crux of this amendment. That relates to the bill that the United States taxpayer is bearing with regard to the Bosnia operation. Congress and the American people were originally told that the Bosnia mission would cost the United States taxpayer some $2 billion; a lot of money. Then sometime in 1996 that estimate was revised up to $3 billion. But subsequent to the President's announcement extending the deadline for troop withdrawal, we learned that cost estimates have been revised again, and now, according to statements by the Department of Defense on this matter, the figure is estimated to be at a minimum, by the middle of 1998, $6.5 billion for this Bosnia operation. Madam President, that represents a more than threefold increase from the administration's original estimate. To put this in perspective, the United States over the course of 30 months in Bosnia--in Bosnia alone--expects to have spent an amount equivalent to just over half of what our country spends in the entire world in our foreign operations budget for the current fiscal year. What we have here with United States involvement in the Bosnia operation is not just mission creep, it has become dollars creep for the United States Congress and the American people. And this is all happening at the very moment, at the very key moment when we are straining hard to eliminate the Federal deficit. We need to plug up the hole in the Treasury through which funds continue to pour into the Bosnia operation. In the supplemental request before us today, the administration is asking the Congress now to sign off on an additional $1.5 billion for the Bosnia operation. This request represents only a portion of the threefold increase in the estimate. So it is clear to me--and I think it is clear to everyone--that this request will not be the last. It is just another installment on this $6.5 billion cost that we already know the Bosnia operation is going to involve. Madam President, what my amendment would do is retain the Bosnia- related funding in the supplemental, but it would prohibit the use of those funds after the end of the current fiscal year. This amendment would then effectively establish an end date for the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia. This is the only hope we have to plug up that hole in the Treasury. By establishing an end date for the funding of the deployment of U.S. troops, I would like to think that my amendment serves a dual purpose. First, it prevents mission creep, and, second, I think it would put an end to the dollars creep that is beginning to become very troubling with regard to the Bosnia operation. At this point, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act that would effectively set an end date for deployment of ground troops in Bosnia. The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1997 provides an additional $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1997 funds for the ongoing Bosnia operation. But what my amendment will do, Madam President, is seek to set a date certain for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from participation in the NATO-led Stabilization Force, or SFOR. Specifically, it prohibits the use of funding provided for under the Supplemental Act for United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina after September 30, 1997, the end of our current fiscal year. Madam President, I recognize very sincerely that the Dayton Accord and the deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force, IFOR, to enforce it, has not been without some real benefit. People are no longer dying en masse in Bosnia. And U.S. troops, in conjunction with troops from other countries, should be warmly applauded for having largely succeeded in enforcing the military aspects of the agreement. We should also be very thankful that there have been virtually no casualties. I think a special note should be made to commend the courage and the dedication of the U.S. military personnel in the region. These men and women continue to work tirelessly in an environment which has been challenging and very complex. Service men and women from across the United States have served in this mission with distinction and there should be no confusion between the honor and the admiration which they have earned and, Madam President, the need to terminate this operation. The issue of whether the United States should continue to deploy ground troops in Bosnia is a separate question from the outstanding performance of our military forces. Madam President, I have had strong reservations about United States troop deployment in Bosnia ever since it was initially announced in 1995. As some in this Chamber may recall, I was one of only a few Members of Congress, and the only Democrat in the Senate, to vote against the deployment of U.S. men and women to support the Dayton Accord. I said then that I doubted the value of a heavy U.S. investment in the region. I felt then that administration promises to have American men and women out of the region within a year's time were unrealistic and would not be kept. And I questioned then whether or not the Dayton plan would level the playing field between the Serbs and Moslems such that peace would reign in the region. So where are we today, Madam President? United States troops have now been on the ground not just for a year in Bosnia, but for nearly 18 months. And the concerns that I had then remain with us today. My concerns, Madam President, are twofold. One has to do with a mandate for a military operation that continues to grow, yet has increasingly less value. The other relates to the ever-spiraling cost of United States involvement in Bosnia. Let me first take up the question of the mandate under which our troops are operating. Madam President, when, in late 1995, the President first announced he would be sending United States forces to Europe to participate in the IFOR mission, he and many others promised the Congress and the American people that the IFOR mission would be over within 1 year. And this promise was reiterated by the President on several occasions and continually backed up by senior American military and diplomatic officials in public statements and in testimony before Congress, including in response to my own questions in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There were repeated assurances that this would be over within 1 year. We all understood that that promise meant that our military men and women would be withdrawn from the region by December 1996, or at least very shortly thereafter. But, Madam President, in November 1996, the President announced that he would extend the U.S. mission for an additional 18 months. A mission that was promised to be only 1 year was just suddenly and very quietly extended by 18 months beyond that year through June 1998, for participation in the NATO force now known as the Stabilization Force, or SFOR. Despite the baptism of a new mission, Madam President, we all know that SFOR, although a bit more limited in scope, in reality represents just an extension of the original IFOR mandate that was supposed to expire within 1 year. The President's announcement of an extended deadline signaled that the United States would continue to be drawn deeper into a situation from which it has become harder and harder to extricate itself. Madam President, the war in Vietnam was called a quagmire. We referred to continued United States troop deployment in Somalia as ``mission creep.'' I fear that the Bosnia operation is presenting the same dilemma. With indicted war criminals still at large, refugees still unable to return to their homes, and the timing for upcoming local elections still in doubt, there will obviously continue to be many reasons to call for an ongoing U.S. military presence on the ground without any clear end in sight. In the meantime, in the heart of the conflict is the fact that the strategic political goals of the warring factions remain unchanged. Madam President, I have a copy of a November 26, 1996, editorial from the Wisconsin State Journal. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I call up my amendment No. 83 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Reid amendment be temporarily laid aside.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, what is the pending business?

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in the fall of 1940, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was attempting something audacious, unprecendented in American history--running for a third term as President. His opponent, Wendell Wilke of Indiana, a man with whom he would attempt to forge an alliance 4 years later, was gaining momentum. Roosevelt had waited until October to begin his formal campaign, but when he hit the trail, he did with characteristic gusto. ``I am an old campaigner,'' he told cheering audiences, ``and I love a good fight.'' Mr. President, it was the love of the fight, not in the sense of carrying a chip on one's shoulder, but more in the manner of relishing a challenge to one's ideas and abilities, that marked Franklin Roosevelt's character. That spirit motivated him in his fight against polio, sustained him during many a dark hour in the White House during the Depression and the Second World War and infused itself into his concept of a government that shrugged off old models of action--or inaction --and engaged in bold, persistent experimentation, seeking the best solutions for the pressing problems of the Nation. His administration did many things considered audacious in Washington, including the creation of then-radical programs like Social Security. It is well-documented that one of the sources for some of Roosevelt's bold experimentation was the Progressive tradition in Wisconsin, which pioneered unemployment insurance and workers' compensation. Mr. President, Franklin Roosevelt sometimes succeeded gloriously. Sometimes he failed. Sometimes he was helped by a fortuitous turn of events; other times, events frustrated his purposes. Through it all, however, he kept trying, kept experimenting, fueled by a restless intellect, guided by the constitutional responsibility of government to promote the general welfare of the people, and supported by a bedrock conviction that an honest attempt would, at the very least, yield a useful lesson and might well solve the problem. Mr. President, last week we dedicated the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, a celebration of his memory, his accomplishments and, perhaps most importantly, his spirit. He was a man of enormous complexity and energy who embraced life and encouraged others to follow his example. His philosophy of encouraging boldness and creativity in the service of the common good and his insistence on an inclusive, not exclusive politics will serve us well in any time.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my senior colleague, Senator Kohl of Wisconsin, I rise today to submit a resolution calling for the restoration of fiscal responsibility to the Department of Defense's plan to modernize and upgrade our tactical fighter force. The resolution I am submitting today, focuses on the Pentagon's current acquisition strategy for three new tactical fighter programs; the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, the Navy's F/A-18 E/F SuperHornet, and the multi-service joint strike fighter. Numerous experts, including the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office, have concluded that given our current fiscal constraint and likely spending parameters, the current acquisition strategy is unrealistic, unwise, and untenable. The administration's fiscal year 1998 proposal for defense spending provides $250 billion in budget authority. According to projections provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the overall DOD budget is expected to rise after fiscal year 1998 until reaching a plateau of $277.5 billion. That is pretty amazing. Amazingly, while all other areas of Government are cutting back, the Pentagon is anticipating a $27 billion peacetime increase over the next 5 years. The overall defense budget is comprised of several individual budgets, including, among others, those for military personnel, operations and maintenance, military construction, and, of course, procurement, which relates to the purchasing of new aircraft, weapons systems, and technology. It is the procurement budget that I would like to focus on for a moment. The Pentagon's current procurement funding level for new weapons systems, ships, and aircraft in fiscal year 1997 is just over $44 billion. But under the Defense Department's current acquisition plan, in order to achieve the projected purchasing levels of new aircraft and ships, procurement funding will have to rise 55 percent, 55 percent Mr. President, over the next five years, until it reaches a level of $68.3 billion. Every other title within the Pentagon's budget request--whether we are talking about quality of life issues for service personnel or spending on research and development--every other title remains relatively stagnant over the next 5 years. No other program within the Pentagon's budget is receiving the sort of dramatic increase the procurement budget is slated to receive. The need for additional procurement dollars--24 billion of them--is the result of the Pentagon's planned purchase of some 4,440 new tactical fighter airplanes at a total price tag of at least $350 billion according to the Congressional Budget Office. The Defense Department argues that our fighter force is in need of modernization and that as a percentage of the overall defense budget, procurement spending is within historical norms. It is true, Mr. President, that the Pentagon's projections place our level of aircraft acquisition at or slightly below where we were in the 1980's, in terms of as a percentage of the overall defense budget. But this omits the fact that the defense budget was an entirely different creature in the 1980's than it is today. Thus, when the Pentagon argues that the piece of the pie they are asking for today in terms of procurement spending is roughly the same as it was in the 1980's, we must recognize that the size of the whole pie was profoundly greater than it is today. The procurement budget itself is comprised of a number of weapons systems and technology programs, but the Pentagon's acquisition strategy is dominated by the three tactical fighter aircraft proposals currently on the table. This strategy includes three separate programs, all very expensive, all the subject of questions raised by budgetary and aviation experts, and all scheduled to move forward at unrealistic procurement levels. We begin with the Navy's F/A-18 E/F SuperHornet program. This aircraft is the followup to the F/A-18 C/D, currently employed by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. The F/A-18 is an all-weather, multi-mission strike fighter, and the Navy currently has about 580 in its inventory. Although the C/D performed remarkably well in the gulf war and has the capability of achieving most of the Navy's requirements with some retrofitting, the Pentagon is currently asking for 1,000 of the expensive E/F airplanes, at a projected cost of about $42 million per airplane. The F/A-18 E/F program has a cumulative cost of at least $67 billion and up to $89 billion according to the General Accounting Office. The second program belongs to the Air Force. It is the F-22 Raptor, a stealthy fighter intended to provide air superiority but at a extraordinary cost. This aircraft, which one Navy official referred to as ``gold-plated,'' will cost at least $71 million per airplane, with some estimates reaching over $100 million per aircraft. In all, the F- 22 program, slated to provide some 440 airplanes to the Air Force, will cost at least $70 billion. The final program is one which is truly still in infancy. The joint strike fighter, formally the Joint Advanced Strike Technology [JAST] Program, is actually still on the drawing board with two major contractors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, dueling for what is expected to be at least a $219 billion contract--$219 billion, Mr. President. That is some contract. And given the Pentagon's porous record keeping its aviation programs on schedule and on target, the costs of this program will likely surpass the initial $219 billion figure. The JSF is intended to be a joint-service, multipurpose aircraft tailored to each of the service's individual needs. The Navy variant will have carrier landing and takeoff capabilities. The Marine Corps variant will have short takeoff and vertical-landing capability. In all, the Pentagon expects to purchase 3,000 joint strike fighters over a 25-year period from 2005 through 2030. The Air Force would purchase about two-thirds of these planes, the Marine Corps about 640, and the Navy the remaining 300. The JSF program has thus far received mixed reviews. On one hand is the Pentagon's contention that these aircraft will be affordable because of commonality of components and high-volume production of an airplane capable of meeting each of the three services' differing operational requirements. On the other hand is the Pentagon's track record and the countless aviation programs that have promised so much in terms of cost savings and have delivered so little. In fact, the General Accounting Office estimates that the Pentagon's projections with respect to aircraft procurement typically have cost overruns of 20 to 40 percent. This, Mr. President, provides an overview of the Pentagon's current acquisition strategy with respect to tactical fighter aircraft. And although the resolution I am submitting today focuses on tactical fighters, it is important to mention a few of the other programs on the Defense Department's wish list, as these programs will also be drawing on a limited procurement budget over the next few years. There is the V-22 Osprey--a tilt-rotor aircraft to be used for troop and cargo transport, amphibious assault, and special operations--being built primarily for the Marine Corps and Navy. This is a $46.6 billion program expected to produce some 523 aircraft. There is the Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter for the Army. The Pentagon expects to purchase close to 1,300 of these helicopters at a total price tag of $25 billion. And the Air Force is asking for 80 C-17 cargo and transport airplanes, at a procurement cost of over $18 billion. That Mr. President, is just the portion of the procurement budget related to aviation spending. The Navy, for example, is looking to increase the procurement of their surface ships, starting with another aircraft carrier, CVN-77, and 17 of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers, as well as four new attack submarines. And in fiscal year 1999 the Navy would like to begin procurement of the new San Antonio-class amphibious landing ships for our Marine expeditionary forces. Mr. President, in recent months a number of respected experts on military spending have warned the Department of Defense of an impending fiscal disaster. The Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle--even high-ranking Pentagon officials--have all forewarned that the Defense Department will not receive the procurement funding level it has projected and will not be able to sustain these tactical fighter purchases at their planned acquisition levels. Unless we take a step back right now, in 1997, we will undoubtably have what some have dubbed a train wreck, or maybe more appropriately, a shipwreck, in the next few years. I understand that many of my colleagues are either strong proponents or opponents of one or more of these individual fighter programs. The resolution I am submitting today does not target any one program for termination--it does not even suggest that one of the programs should be discontinued. The language in this resolution merely states that we do not have now, nor will we have, the necessary available funding to move forward with the purchasing of the number of fighter planes the Pentagon currently has scheduled and given that, the Pentagon should present to the Congress a more realistic acquisition strategy to take us into the next century. In just 2 weeks or so, on May 15, the Pentagon is scheduled to deliver a reassessment of our strategic blueprint for our Armed Forces, known as the quadrennial defense review, or the QDR. This is the first such reassessment since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and represents a collaborative effort on the part of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual services to conduct a comprehensive review of our inventories and projected needs. The upcoming QDR presents the Pentagon a timely opportunity to reexamine its spending priorities and make a reasoned determination about what our tactical fighter force will realistically look like over the next 20 years. I am hopeful that the Pentagon will use this opportunity to present an acquisition strategy to the Congress that is affordable, tenable, and consistent with the goal of Congress to achieve a balanced Federal budget in the coming years. If not, I intend to offer the resolution I am submitting today, or a variant of it, as an amendment to the budget resolution or other legislation as part of an effort to force the Defense Department to understand the gravity of this situation. I hope such a step proves to be unnecessary.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business for 20 minutes.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to commemorate the 82d anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Today we remember the Armenians who died during the years 1915 to 1923 at the hands of the Ottoman Empire. From 1915 to 1923, the Ottoman Turkish government systematically murdered 1.5 million Armenians and drove half a million into exile. On the eve of the first World War, 2.5 million Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire. Following the brutal Ottoman Turkish campaign, less than 100,000 remained. These Armenians were victims of a policy explicitly intended to isolate, exile, and even extinguish the Armenian population. As we look at world events today--in Bosnia, in Rwanda, and elsewhere--we see a repetition of what happened in Armenia. In commemorating this day, we remember those who died, and condemn violations of human rights at anytime in the past or the future. We all know that, in the context of world politics, human rights violations are far too common and the response to those violations is often tame at best. As we meet here today, it is likely that somewhere, a political prisoner is being beaten by the police or armed forces, or by some paramilitary group whose members might include police officers or soldiers. It is likely that a union organizer is being detained or harassed by authorities, that a woman is being raped by government thugs, that a newspaper is being shut down, or that a prisoner has ``disappeared.'' It is equally likely that the people responsible for such outrages will never be held accountable. As Americans we must keep a vigilant watch on our world so that the horrors that occurred in Armenia 82 years ago might not be repeated again, and again, and again. History means nothing if we do not learn from it. On a day like today, we must remember what we stand for, and ensure that the U.S. continues to be a beacon of strength and hope for the heroes that stand up and survive such atrocities. These deaths should not be in vain. I am proud to commemorate this important occasion today.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased to re-introduce a measure designed to limit consideration of non-emergency matters in emergency legislation. This bill, S. 647, the Emergency Spending Control Act of 1997, passed the Senate during the last Congress as part of the Senate's version of the line-item veto act, though it was later dropped in conference. Identical language passed the other body during the 103d Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, first as a substitute amendment by a vote of 322 to 99, and then, as amended, by a vote of 406 to 6. Mr. President, the support this measure has received in both Houses is a reflection of the keen awareness Members have of the abuses of the emergency appropriations process that have taken place. This measure helps address one aspect of that abuse by limiting emergency spending bills solely to emergencies by establishing a new point of order against nonemergency matters, other than rescissions of budget authority or reductions in direct spending, in any bill that contains an emergency measure, or an amendment to an emergency measure, or a conference report that contains an emergency measure. As an additional enforcement mechanism, the legislation adds further protection by prohibiting the Office of Management and Budget from adjusting the caps on discretionary spending, or from adjusting the sequester process for direct spending and receipts measures, for any emergency appropriations bill if the bill includes extraneous items other than rescissions of budget authority or reductions in direct spending. Mr. President, though this proposal relates to shoring up our budget rules, I want to stress that the rules themselves do not solve the deficit problem. No rule can--whether it is a procedural rule of the Senate, a statute, or a constitutional amendment. The only way we will balance the budget is through specific spending cuts and exercising fiscal restraint. However, we have made some progress over the past 4 years, and that progress, as well as the continued work we need to do, can be sustained through the budget rules we impose on ourselves by ensuring the sacrifices that have been made, and that we will ask in the future, will not be hollow or futile. The rules that have been developed over the past twenty years have proven useful in this regard, though it bears repeating that the deficit has begun to come down only as a result of our willingness to vote for tough measures. In general, the rules require that new spending, whether through direct spending, tax expenditures, or discretionary programs, be offset with spending cuts or revenue increases. However, the rules provide for exceptions in the event of true emergencies. The deliberate review through the federal budget process, weighing one priority against another, may not permit a timely response to an international crisis, a natural disaster, or some other emergency. We do not ask that earthquake victims find a funding source before we send them aid. But that should not, even in dire circumstances, be read to imply we must not find ways to pay for emergencies, rather than simply add their costs to the deficit. But, Mr. President, the emergency exception to our budget rules, designed to expedite a response to an urgent need, has become a loophole, abused by those trying to circumvent the scrutiny of the budget process, in particular, by adding non-emergency matters to emergency legislation that is receiving special, accelerated consideration. Mr. President, the measure I introduce today targets that abuse by helping to keep emergency measures clean of extraneous matters on which there is no emergency designation. When the appropriations bill to provide relief for the Los Angeles earthquake was introduced in the 103rd Congress, it initially did four things: provided $7.8 billion for the Los Angeles quake, $1.2 billion for the Department of Defense peacekeeping operations; $436 million for Midwest flood relief, and $315 million more for the 1989 California earthquake. But, Mr. President, by the time the Los Angeles earthquake bill became law, it also provided $1.4 million to fight potato fungus, $2.3 million for FDA pay raises, $14.4 million for the National Park Service, $12.4 million for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, $10 million for a new Amtrak station in New York, $40 million for the space shuttle, $20 million for a fingerprint lab, $500,000 for United States Trade Representative travel office, and $5.2 million for the Bureau of Public Debt. Though non-emergency matters attached to emergency bills are still subject to the spending caps established in the concurrent budget resolution, as long as total spending remains under those caps, these unrelated spending matters are not required to be offset with spending cuts. In the case of the LA earthquake bill, because the caps had been reached the new spending was offset by rescissions, but those rescissions might otherwise have been used for deficit reduction. Moreover, by using emergency appropriations bills as a vehicle, these extraneous proposals avoid the examination through which legislative proposals must go to justify Federal spending. If there is truly a need to shift funds to these programs, an alternative vehicle--a regular supplemental appropriations bill, not an emergency spending bill -- should be used. The measure I am introducing today will restrict that kind of misuse of the emergency appropriations process. Adding non-emergency, extraneous matters to emergency appropriations not only is an attempt to avoid the legitimate scrutiny of our normal budget process, it can also jeopardize our ability to provide relief to those who are suffering from the disaster to which we are responding. Just as importantly, adding superfluous material to emergency appropriations bills degrades those budget rules on which we rely to impose fiscal discipline, and that only encourages further erosion of our efforts to reduce the deficit. Mr. President, as I noted earlier, this legislation has passed both Houses in recent years--in the Senate during the 104th Congress as the amendment I offered to the Line Item Veto Act, and in the other body, during the 103rd Congress, by a vote of 406 to 6. I urge my colleagues to join in this effort to pass this measure through both Houses during this Congress, and help end this abusive practice. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I am pleased that--more than 3 years after the administration sent this treaty to the Senate--the CWC is finally before us on the floor of this Chamber. In these three years, Mr. President, three Senate committees have held numerous hearings--nearly 20 of them--on the efficacy of this treaty. As a Member of both the Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees, I have been privileged to participate in several of these hearings and to hear numerous perspectives during this debate. More recently, several Senators and Administration officials have spent a considerable amount of time negotiating the terms under which this treaty would come to the floor. And so I think we should all thank the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Helms] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], the ranking member of that committee, for the time they both have spent on this issue. I would also like to recognize the efforts of the White House Working Group and the Lott Task Force to come to a consensus on the aspects of this treaty on which we can agree. I know that the Members and Administration officials involved in these negotiations have spent hours reviewing countless technical details. It is because of these efforts that the resolution of ratification before us today contains 28 agreed-upon conditions. These conditions were carefully crafted by our colleagues to respond to Members' specific concerns. I am myself comfortable with these conditions, which, for the most part, duly exercise the Senate's prerogatives with respect to treaty ratification, and instruct the administration to undertake certain commitments. They also require greater reporting requirements which will help the Senate to monitor U.S. participation in the Convention in the future. I am pleased that our colleagues have come to agreement on these points, because throughout the deliberations over this convention, I have made two observations: No. 1 the CWC is not a perfect document, and No. 2 notwithstanding that, the CWC is the best avenue available today for beginning to control the spread of chemical weapons, and leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such weapons. Like any document arrived at through consensus, the Chemical Weapons Convention can not claim to address every party's concerns. But, it is my view that the 28 agreed-upon conditions in the resolution before us today serve to strengthen what we do have. Let me speak first on my initial point--that the CWC is not a perfect document. There are real flaws that we all recognize, and that experts both pro and con acknowledge, related to the verifiability of the CWC. There may well be cheating, evasions, and attempts to disobey the spirit, as well as the letter, of the treaty. Some of this cheating may escape detection--although not enough, I believe, to pose a legitimate threat to the security of the United States. Nevertheless, I think we gain more by establishing an international regime that prohibits such behavior than we do by refusing to exercise U.S. leadership in that regime. My second, and more important, point is this: The CWC is the best avenue available today for beginning to control the spread of chemical weapons, and leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such weapons. Those countries that do ratify the treaty--and this group represents most of the responsible players on the international stage--recognize that through the CWC, the world firmly rejects the existence and use of chemical weapons. The treaty puts in place mechanisms to enforce its precepts and monitor its progress, and signatories are committed to complying with these mechanisms. What of the handful of nations who flout international will, and will not sign on to this treaty? First, defense experts at the very top of our military command structure are satisfied that the use of chemical weapons by these so- called rogue states does not pose a significant threat to our national security. In March 1996, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry told the Foreign Relations Committee that he was ``damm sure'' that the United States could respond massively and effectively to any chemical weapons challenge. Moreover, the CWC will make it easier for the international community to track the chemical ingredients necessary for weapons production and to inhibit the flow of these materials to rogue or non-signatory states. The Convention will impose trade sanctions on non-signatory countries whether or not they are known to posses chemical weapons. This provision was devised by the Bush administration specifically to make it expensive for countries not to join this Convention. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, ``These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them.'' Those states that we are most concerned about currently are unwilling to accept the norms that the treaty would establish. That is why they have thus far chosen not to ratify. But it is just as clear these states will never accept the treaty if the United States refuses to ratify. This is why I plan to vote in favor of striking the so-called killer amendments that would tie the deposit of our instrument of ratification to the actions of these nations. If the linkage were to remain in the resolution, the Senate would become responsible for painting the United States into a very uncomfortable corner, a corner from which we would be unable to exit. Such conditions would force the United States, which led the negotiations of this treaty, to engage in a game of chicken with other countries. It should instead join our allies in ratifying this treaty. Mr. President, this treaty provides a solid start to limiting the flow of chemical weapons. It urges the destruction of all chemical weapons. It will provide more information about the prevalence of chemical weapons than we have ever had before. And it will make the dissemination of such weapons-- and the materials used to make them--more actionable than they have ever been before. Mr. President, do I think the treaty could be improved? Of course. So I am pleased that the CWC has the provision for amendment after it comes into force. But now is not the time to debate amendments to the treaty. One hundred sixty-one nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and 74 of them have ratified it. I think we can all assume that--just as we played a leading role in negotiating the existing treaty--the United States will again be at the forefront of efforts to make the treaty more effective after a period to test its utility. We have the technological means and the economic weight to do so. But only if we ratify this treaty prior to its entry into force on April 29. Only by that deadline--now less than a week away--will the United States be a full participant in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], the governing body that will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for the implementation of the CWC. Would I like to see the enforcement provisions of the CWC written in a less ambiguous manner? Certainly. Could sanctions against violators be spelled out more clearly? Absolutely. But the CWC was laboriously crafted throughout three decades to meet the security and economic interests of States' Parties. The United States led this effort, and the treaty which we are voting on reflects our needs. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty has ``Made in the USA'' written all over it. That is why the CWC has the blessing and enthusiastic support of our defense and business communities. Mr. President, I would like to address an issue that is of particular importance to me, and that is the potential constitutional implications of this treaty. In particular, the argument has been made, incorrectly in my opinion, that adoption of the CWC would subvert, in some way, the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment which--as Americans--we all enjoy. Let me say at the outset that preserving the fourth amendment is a responsibility that I take very seriously and very personally. My concern about preserving the protections of the fourth amendment does not end at the corners of this treaty. I have opposed in this Congress proposals to weaken the fourth amendment's protections, for example, in the area of wire taps. In fact, I am pleased to see that throughout the debate over this treaty, many of my colleagues have taken an active interest in promoting the rights bestowed upon us by the fourth amendment. Indeed, I welcome the opportunity to work with these members on future initiatives related to this vital provision of our Constitution. With respect to the claim that ratification of this treaty risks constitutional protections for Americans, I think three points need to be stressed. First, this treaty, and in particular the inspection language therein, is the product of bipartisan efforts spanning many years. In fact, it was the Bush administration which rejected efforts to adopt overly broad, and undoubtedly unconstitutional inspection proceedings in favor of those in the treaty today. Second, although the treaty itself acknowledges the supremacy of the constitutions of its signatories, this would be the case even without specific language. The Senate cannot, be it through signing a treaty or passing a law, subvert any of the protections guaranteed by our Constitution. That is the very essence of our Constitution: it is the bedrock of our freedoms and cannot be abrogated short of amendment to the Constitution itself. Mr. President, during a Judiciary Committee hearing last September, I questioned Professor Barry Kellman of the DePaul Law School on various aspects of the constitutionality of this treaty and on each of the points I have raised here today. On each point, Professor Kellman was in agreement with me. In fact, Professor Kellman, who has dedicated many years, and much time and energy to reviewing the constitutional implications of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, testified that, ``every serious scholar'' who has looked into the issue has found this treaty to be constitutional. Finally, to the extent there are concerns to be addressed, and there may be, the proper context for airing those concerns is during what I expect to be a lively discussion over the implementing legislation, which we will have a chance to debate in the next several weeks. It is in the implementing legislation--not the treaty itself--where these issues should be addressed and resolved. I look forward to working with concerned colleagues as we consider implementation of the treaty, so I am pleased that the unanimous consent agreement arrived at regarding the resolution of ratification before us today included the intent to debate and vote on the implementing legislation prior to the Memorial Day recess. As the debate over the implementing language continues, I will work with my colleagues to ensure that the language we ultimately adopt fully and properly reflects the protections embodied in the United States Constitution. In the interim, however, we should not become side-tracked by arguments that this treaty is unconstitutional or subverts the fourth amendment. The inspections conducted pursuant to this treaty will be conducted pursuant to the Constitution of this nation. Nothing in this treaty can, nor does it even attempt to, alter that simple, but fundamental fact. Mr. President, I support the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention which I believe is in the best interests of the United States. And if the Senate is to lend its support to this treaty, we must vote to strike each one of the five conditions before us. Four of these would pronounce the treaty dead on arrival by linking the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification to conditions that are simply impossible to achieve--by April 29, or at any time in the near future. The other condition would establish a precedent for the selection of inspectors that would greatly undermine the entire inspection process. Mr. President, it is imperative that those of us who support this treaty help strike the language that would undermine U.S. participation in the Convention in this manner. And, after doing so, Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will join me in voting for final passage of the resolution of ratification.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased to re-introduce a measure designed to limit consideration of non-emergency matters in emergency legislation. This bill, S. 647, the Emergency Spending Control Act of 1997, passed the Senate during the last Congress as part of the Senate's version of the line-item veto act, though it was later dropped in conference. Identical language passed the other body during the 103d Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, first as a substitute amendment by a vote of 322 to 99, and then, as amended, by a vote of 406 to 6. Mr. President, the support this measure has received in both Houses is a reflection of the keen awareness Members have of the abuses of the emergency appropriations process that have taken place. This measure helps address one aspect of that abuse by limiting emergency spending bills solely to emergencies by establishing a new point of order against nonemergency matters, other than rescissions of budget authority or reductions in direct spending, in any bill that contains an emergency measure, or an amendment to an emergency measure, or a conference report that contains an emergency measure. As an additional enforcement mechanism, the legislation adds further protection by prohibiting the Office of Management and Budget from adjusting the caps on discretionary spending, or from adjusting the sequester process for direct spending and receipts measures, for any emergency appropriations bill if the bill includes extraneous items other than rescissions of budget authority or reductions in direct spending. Mr. President, though this proposal relates to shoring up our budget rules, I want to stress that the rules themselves do not solve the deficit problem. No rule can--whether it is a procedural rule of the Senate, a statute, or a constitutional amendment. The only way we will balance the budget is through specific spending cuts and exercising fiscal restraint. However, we have made some progress over the past 4 years, and that progress, as well as the continued work we need to do, can be sustained through the budget rules we impose on ourselves by ensuring the sacrifices that have been made, and that we will ask in the future, will not be hollow or futile. The rules that have been developed over the past twenty years have proven useful in this regard, though it bears repeating that the deficit has begun to come down only as a result of our willingness to vote for tough measures. In general, the rules require that new spending, whether through direct spending, tax expenditures, or discretionary programs, be offset with spending cuts or revenue increases. However, the rules provide for exceptions in the event of true emergencies. The deliberate review through the federal budget process, weighing one priority against another, may not permit a timely response to an international crisis, a natural disaster, or some other emergency. We do not ask that earthquake victims find a funding source before we send them aid. But that should not, even in dire circumstances, be read to imply we must not find ways to pay for emergencies, rather than simply add their costs to the deficit. But, Mr. President, the emergency exception to our budget rules, designed to expedite a response to an urgent need, has become a loophole, abused by those trying to circumvent the scrutiny of the budget process, in particular, by adding non-emergency matters to emergency legislation that is receiving special, accelerated consideration. Mr. President, the measure I introduce today targets that abuse by helping to keep emergency measures clean of extraneous matters on which there is no emergency designation. When the appropriations bill to provide relief for the Los Angeles earthquake was introduced in the 103rd Congress, it initially did four things: provided $7.8 billion for the Los Angeles quake, $1.2 billion for the Department of Defense peacekeeping operations; $436 million for Midwest flood relief, and $315 million more for the 1989 California earthquake. But, Mr. President, by the time the Los Angeles earthquake bill became law, it also provided $1.4 million to fight potato fungus, $2.3 million for FDA pay raises, $14.4 million for the National Park Service, $12.4 million for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, $10 million for a new Amtrak station in New York, $40 million for the space shuttle, $20 million for a fingerprint lab, $500,000 for United States Trade Representative travel office, and $5.2 million for the Bureau of Public Debt. Though non-emergency matters attached to emergency bills are still subject to the spending caps established in the concurrent budget resolution, as long as total spending remains under those caps, these unrelated spending matters are not required to be offset with spending cuts. In the case of the LA earthquake bill, because the caps had been reached the new spending was offset by rescissions, but those rescissions might otherwise have been used for deficit reduction. Moreover, by using emergency appropriations bills as a vehicle, these extraneous proposals avoid the examination through which legislative proposals must go to justify Federal spending. If there is truly a need to shift funds to these programs, an alternative vehicle--a regular supplemental appropriations bill, not an emergency spending bill -- should be used. The measure I am introducing today will restrict that kind of misuse of the emergency appropriations process. Adding non-emergency, extraneous matters to emergency appropriations not only is an attempt to avoid the legitimate scrutiny of our normal budget process, it can also jeopardize our ability to provide relief to those who are suffering from the disaster to which we are responding. Just as importantly, adding superfluous material to emergency appropriations bills degrades those budget rules on which we rely to impose fiscal discipline, and that only encourages further erosion of our efforts to reduce the deficit. Mr. President, as I noted earlier, this legislation has passed both Houses in recent years--in the Senate during the 104th Congress as the amendment I offered to the Line Item Veto Act, and in the other body, during the 103rd Congress, by a vote of 406 to 6. I urge my colleagues to join in this effort to pass this measure through both Houses during this Congress, and help end this abusive practice. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I was pleased to see the Senate consider the President's nomination of Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson to be the United States Ambassador to Socialist Republic of Vietnam late last week. I supported this nomination in the Foreign Relations Committee. But I did so after careful consideration of the symbolism of this vote and of the signal it sends to Americans. Mr. President, the appointment of an ambassador is a normal consequence of having full diplomatic relations with a given country. And we have had diplomatic relations with Vietnam since July 1995 when the President signed an executive order establishing such ties. So, technically, the Senate's view on this nominee does not represent a statement of policy. It simply represents the normal procedure by which the Senate provides its advice and consent to a Presidential nomination. There has never been any serious question raised regarding the President's selection of Mr. Peterson to fill this position. Mr. Peterson is an outstanding citizen and public servant. He spent nearly 30 years in the U.S. Air Force, including 6\1/2\ years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, and has received numerous awards for his valiant service. As a three-term Member of Congress from the second district in Florida, Mr. Peterson also has devoted significant energies to working with both the Bush administration and the Clinton Administration to bolster the U.S. search program for POW/MIA's. There are few people who have as deep of an understanding of the uniqueness of America's relationship with Vietnam, so I fully support the President's choice. This does not mean that there do not remain myriad outstanding questions and issues in our bilateral relations with Vietnam. One issue that is of particular concern to me is the human rights record of the Vietnamese Government which remains poor. According to the most recent State Department Report on Human Rights Practices, the Government of Vietnam continues to restrict basic freedoms; of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of privacy, and of religion. Citizens can be arbitrarily arrested or detained for trying to express political or religious objections to government policies. And although the Vietnamese Constitution provides for the right to privacy, according to the State Department, the Vietnamese Government continues to operate a ``nationwide system of surveillance and control through * * * block wardens who use informants to keep track of individuals' activities.'' The Vietnamese Government also has in place a policy of forced family planning. Mr. President, this is not a country that shares with the United States the principle that government should exist to promote the general welfare of its people. Nor is it one that has respect for the rule of law. But, as I said in 1995 when the President first announced his decision to restore diplomatic relations with Vietnam, I believe that diplomatic relations actually enhance our ability to advocate for issues such as human rights and political freedoms. Through a permanent, high-level presence in the country, I believe the United States can intensify the dialog on human rights, work more closely with Vietnamese reformers, and more effectively monitor developments in the human rights situation. Now I have listened carefully to the veterans in Wisconsin and to the national veterans' organizations. I recognize that the veterans themselves have differing opinions on the issue of diplomatic relations, in general, and of Senate confirmation of this nomination, in particular. The concerns are two-fold: Does having an ambassador on the ground in Vietnam actually help advance the accounting of POW and MIA cases? Or does the dispatching of a President's representative with ambassadorial rank imply that the United States no longer thinks we have reason to withhold a special privilege for Vietnam? Mr. President, it is my view that having an ambassador resident in Hanoi can serve to better advance U.S. interests, in human rights, as I said earlier, and on issues related to the continued accounting of our POW's and MIA's. I salute the efforts of all those who have tirelessly sought details about missing U.S. service men and women, and, from most of their testimony, I am inclined to believe that we will enhance our ability to collect more information about the remaining POW and MIA cases through fulfilling the President's commitment to full diplomatic relations. On the other hand, I think it is equally important to acknowledge that sending a Presidential representative of ambassadorial rank does indicate a symbolic change in our relationship with Vietnam that I know some observers still are hesitant to send. It is my view, however, that the United States can serve two purposes by that change: Better advance our interests as described above, and better indicate our concerns about Vietnam or its government through other actions. For example, that is why I voted against lifting the trade embargo against Vietnam and why I have supported congressional efforts to limit United States assistance to Vietnam. However, I believe that in an era of global engagement and integration, it usually makes little sense to refuse diplomatic relations with a country in the international community. Vietnam is a large presence in a fast-growing region where the United States has ever-increasing interests. We can no longer hope to isolate it, nor will isolation serve to advance any of our goals. To reiterate, Mr. President, I support the President's choice of Pete Peterson to be Ambassador to Vietnam because I believe that the United States best serves its citizens by having a Presidential representative of the highest order resident in the country. Nevertheless, I remain concerned about other aspects of our bilateral relations in that country and I will continue to scrutinize carefully the President's policies in that regard.