Russell Feingold

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Protect America Act we passed last year was sold repeatedly as a way to allow the Government to collect foreign-to-foreign communications without needing the approval of the FISA Court. Last week, the Vice President defended the Protect America Act by talking about the need to wiretap without a court order ``one foreign citizen abroad making a telephone call to another foreign citizen abroad about terrorism.'' Now, this is something all of us support, every one of us. But what the Vice President did not mention--and what rarely gets discussed--is the Protect America Act actually went much further. It authorized new sweeping intrusions into the privacy of countless Americans. The bill the Senate is considering to replace the PAA does not do nearly enough to safeguard against Government abuse. So this amendment--the Feingold- Webb-Tester amendment--would provide those safeguards, while also ensuring that the Government obtains the information it needs to fight the terrorists who threaten us. I am, of course, extremely pleased to have the support and cosponsorship of Senators Webb and Tester, as well as Senators Biden, Sanders, Kennedy, Menendez, Akaka, Dodd, and Obama. We have worked closely together to develop a workable solution to a difficult problem--a solution I hope the Senate can support. Now, this is not about whether we will be effective in combating terrorism. This amendment in no way hampers our fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates. This is about whether Americans at home deserve more privacy protections than foreigners overseas. This is about whether anyone outside the executive branch will have a role in overseeing what the Government is doing with all the communications of Americans it collects inside the United States. We all know the stakes are very high. I want my colleagues to understand the impact the Intelligence Committee bill being considered on the Senate floor could have on the privacy of Americans, because that is exactly what our amendment addresses. This bill does not just authorize the unfettered surveillance of people outside the United States communicating with each other; it also permits the Government to acquire those foreigners' communications with Americans inside the United States, regardless of whether anyone involved in the communication is under suspicion of any kind of wrongdoing at all. There is no requirement the foreign targets of this surveillance be terrorists, spies, other types of criminals or even agents of a foreign power. The only requirements are that the foreigners are outside the country and that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain ``foreign intelligence information,'' a term that has an extremely broad definition covering anything involving the foreign affairs of the United States. The key, of course, is that no court reviews these targets individually. Only the executive branch decides who fits these criteria. So the result is many law-abiding Americans who communicate with completely innocent people overseas will be swept up in this new form of surveillance, with virtually no judicial involvement and virtually no judicial oversight. That is astounding, isn't it? Yet there has been very little discussion of it. The administration has told us over and over this law is needed to capture foreign-to-foreign, terrorism-related communications. In the State of the Union last week, President Bush defended this law by saying: To protect America, we need to know who the terrorists are talking to, what they are saying, and what they are planning. Even the administration's illegal warrantless wiretapping program, as described when it was publicly confirmed in 2005, at least focused on particular al-Qaida terrorists. But what we are talking about now is different. This is the authority to conduct a huge dragnet that will sweep up innocent Americans at home, combined with an utter lack of oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse. These incredibly broad authorities are particularly troubling because we live in a world in which international communications are increasingly commonplace. Thirty years ago, it was very expensive and not very common for most Americans to make an overseas call. Now, though, particularly with e-mail, such communications are commonplace. Millions of ordinary and innocent Americans communicate with people overseas for entirely legitimate personal and business reasons. Technological advancements, combined with the ever more connected world economy, have led to an explosion of international contacts. Americans call family members overseas; students e-mail friends they met while they were studying abroad; businesspeople communicate with colleagues or clients overseas. In fact, recently released declassified responses to congressional oversight questions highlight how broad these authorities are. The executive branch was asked whether it could acquire all the calls and e-mails between employees of a U.S. company and a foreign company the U.S. Government is targeting, with no requirement to get a warrant and no requirement that there be some link to terrorism or a specific threat against the United States. The administration did not deny this would be entirely legal under the PAA. So any American who works at a company that does business overseas should think about that. Americans should also think about the testimony of the DNI himself, in which he said the PAA would authorize the collection of all communications between the United States and overseas. In other words, the Government has the authority to collect all international calls and e-mails into and out of the United States--every last one. We often hear from those who want to give the Government new powers that we just have to bring FISA up to date with new technology. But changes in technology should also cause us to look closely at the need for greater protection of the privacy of our citizens. If we are going to give the Government broad new powers that will lead to the collection of much more information on innocent Americans, we in the Senate have a duty to provide the necessary safeguards against abuse. That, of course, is what the Feingold-Webb-Tester amendment would do. It allows the Government to acquire all the communications of foreign targets communicating with other foreigners overseas. It also allows the Government to acquire all the communications of overseas terrorists, but it sets up additional safeguards--additional checks and balances--for communications of foreign targets the Government ultimately determines involves someone in the United States. The amendment has several components. But let me reiterate that the amendment would permit the Government to freely acquire and share all foreign-to-foreign communications without any court oversight. This is, in fact, an enormous change from the pre-PAA law, and this amendment leaves those new authorities intact. Let me quickly describe how the amendment would work. First, when the Government knows in advance that a foreign target is communicating with someone in the United States, it permits the Government to acquire, without a court order, those communications involving terrorism or suspected terrorists or if someone's safety is at stake. It permits the Government to acquire any other communications into the United States with a court order. The FISA Court would review and approve procedures for making these determinations. As I said, the Government could continue to acquire and use any communications its foreign targets have with other foreigners overseas. That surveillance would continue, again, without any court oversight. Our amendment permits that. The second part of this proposal recognizes it is frequently not possible for the Government, in advance, to determine whether a particular communication is a purely foreign communication or involves one end in the United States. Thus, the amendment specifies that when the Government does not know in advance with whom a foreign target is communicating, it can acquire all the target's communications without an individualized court order--all of them. But at some point--and this is one of the keys to our amendment--the Government may realize it has acquired a communication with one end in the United States based on procedures that are developed by the executive branch and reviewed and approved by the FISA Court. Under our amendment, it must then tag or segregate the U.S.-end communication in a separate database. Now, we know this tagging process is feasible because the Government recently declassified the fact that it does something similar with information obtained under the PAA. The Government can then access, analyze, and disseminate any of these tagged U.S. communications if they involve terrorism or a suspected terrorist or if someone's safety is at stake. All they have to do is this: They have to simply notify the FISA Court after the fact and provide a brief certification that one of these circumstances apply. There is no requirement that these communications be destroyed, in case they include information that may later prove to be useful. The other tagged communications can also be accessed, analyzed, and disseminated if the Government obtains a court order. The amendment also ensures there is independent oversight of this process. If the FISA Court has any concerns that the terrorism or emergency certifications are being abused, it has authority to ask for additional information, and to limit future access to certain communications if it ultimately determines the Government's certifications to the court are clearly erroneous. Now, I do understand this amendment imposes a new framework that may take some time to implement. That is why the amendment would not require the Government to implement this new system for up to a year after enactment. I think that is plenty of time to work out any problems and get these procedures up and running. The amendment also contains a critical oversight provision. It directs the inspectors general of the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense to audit the implementation of compliance with this amendment. These IGs as well as the FISA Court will have access to the American communications that the Government has acquired to make sure the authorities are not being abused. Taken together, these provisions ensure that we know when Americans' communications are being collected so there is some baseline information available to the FISA Court, Congress, inspectors general, and other independent monitors for tracking impact of the legislation on Americans' privacy. Tracking this type of information is also good for national security. We have heard the President tell us repeatedly in defense of his so- called terrorist surveillance program that if there are people inside our country who are talking with al-Qaida, we want to know about that. This amendment takes him at his word, and it requires him to set up procedures for identifying those communications in the United States where it is reasonably practical. We have been hearing for years now that the U.S. Government needs authority to wiretap foreign terrorists outside the United States without individual court orders. This amendment permits that. To take one example, if the U.S. Government has targeted a member of al-Qaida overseas, under this amendment it can acquire all of that target's communications--all of them. If it determines the particular communication is with someone in the United States, the Government would tag it and it could access and disseminate it as long as the FISA Court is simply notified after the fact with a brief certification. That kind of focused, terrorism-related surveillance--the type of surveillance we most want our Government to be engaging in--would continue absolutely unabated. On the other hand, the amendment provides safeguards in case the Government is, in fact, conducting massive dragnet surveillance of communications with people in the United States. In that situation, yes, this amendment would then impose the oversight that is desperately needed. It will make sure that in situations not involving terrorism or personal safety, the FISA Court will play its important role in overseeing the Government's use of communications involving Americans. In other words, it will make sure these authorities are not abused. We have heard a lot today about minimization procedures, which are supposed to protect against unnecessary disclosure of information about Americans' communications the Government collects, and the importance of giving the FISA Court power to enforce compliance with them. I strongly support that effort. I tried to initiate this issue in the Intelligence Committee. It has been very effectively taken up in the Judiciary Committee by the Senator from Rhode Island as well as the Senator from New York, and it is extremely important that we prevail in that amendment to get those protections. But the supporters of the Intelligence Committee bill claim that minimization procedures are enough to protect Americans' privacy. In fact, the minimization requirements in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act are quite weak. They permit the widespread disseminations throughout the U.S. Government of information about U.S. persons if it is deemed foreign intelligence information which, again, is very broadly defined, and they permit dissemination of the identities of these U.S. persons if ``necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance''--also a very loose standard. Now, we know from our experience in the nomination hearing of John Bolton to be United Nations Ambassador how easy it is for Government officials to obtain access to those identities. And when the FBI receives reports referring to a U.S. person, according to recently declassified Government documents, it will ``likely request that person's identity'' and will ``likely be'' the requirements for obtaining it. There are other minimization requirements and Government regulations, the details of which are classified. We know in any event that those can be changed at any time. Minimization is simply inadequate in the context of these broad new authorities. More is needed. The amendment I have developed with Senator Webb, Senator Tester, and others is an extremely balanced and reasonable approach to addressing one of the most serious problems with this legislation. It gives the Government full access to foreign-to-foreign communications without any court oversight. And it provides access to communications between a foreigner and an American, if there is a terrorism link or if someone's safety is at stake, without the requirement of a court order. In other words, this amendment gives the administration what it asked for when it demanded these massive new powers. So when the Vice President says we need to pass legislation that permits warrantless wiretapping of ``one foreign citizen abroad making a telephone call to another foreign citizen abroad about terrorism,'' this amendment totally permits that. When the minority leader says the Government needs to be able to ``freely monitor new terrorist targets overseas,'' this amendment totally permits that as well. But this amendment also provides safeguards to make sure that Americans' basic rights are being protected. Too many communications of innocent Americans are going to end up in Government databases under the PAA and under the Intelligence bill for us to ignore this very serious problem. Any Senator who believes that Americans here at home deserve more privacy protections than foreigners overseas should support this amendment, and any Senator who believes the executive branch should not be granted far-reaching surveillance authorities involving Americans without independent oversight should support this amendment as well. At this time I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Montana, Senator Tester, be recognized to speak on this amendment, and after he has concluded his remarks, that the Senator from Virginia be recognized. Both of these presentations would be allocated from the time I control on this amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me say how grateful I am to the Presiding Officer, Senator Webb, and the next speaker, Senator Tester, new Members of the Senate who have delved into this very difficult subject and who have tried to achieve the right balance. I don't know of any Senators who are more concerned about protecting the lives of Americans from terrorists, but they also want to make sure that we get this right while protecting the privacy of Americans. So I thank both of them. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, responding to the comments just made, the Senator from Missouri, in responding to the Feingold-Webb-Tester amendment, tried to indicate that this will prevent us from going after spies and others from foreign states. First, under our amendment, of course the FISA Court can grant permission to wiretap spies. And, if it is a foreign state that is involved in terrorism, there would be no permission required under our amendment to wiretap the officials involved. It would not affect that. It was also suggested this would somehow be very cumbersome. That suggests we are requiring permission for all foreign communications, but that is not true. Our amendment only affects, and only in a minimal way, communications from a foreign place to someone in the United States. That is not cumbersome. Third, the Senator from Missouri suggests we will have to make the Government sift through all kinds of e-mails to figure out whether they can get at individual communications. That is the opposite of the way this works. This amendment creates an assumption in favor of collection. In other words, if the Government does not know for sure if a communication is foreign or domestic, the assumption is it is foreign until there is some indication that it is domestic. It is only then that the limited oversight provided by this amendment kicks in. The final example the Senator from Missouri used shows how questionable these arguments are. If you can believe it, the Senator argued that if Osama bin Laden called someone in the United States, somehow our amendment would affect that. That is obviously false. Our amendment specifically allows an exception for any conversation by anyone in the United States with a terrorist overseas, without any special FISA Court permission. That argument shows the weakness of the opposition. The idea that the Senators from Virginia and Montana and I would suggest an amendment to not allow us to listen in on Osama bin Laden gives you a little clue that the arguments against this amendment are not based on the amendment we offered. I thank the Senator from Vermont very much for understanding. I wanted to quickly respond to those arguments. I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Maryland for his leadership on the sunset issue. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3915.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, in response to the Senator from West Virginia, it is true that the use limits in my amendment would apply to any information about U.S. persons gathered under unlawful procedures, other than information indicating a threat of bodily harm. That is why the amendment provides significantly more flexibility to the Government than the use limits for emergency surveillance. The FISA Court can allow the Government to use even information about U.S. persons as long as the Government corrects the defective procedures. That is a huge exception that is not present in the emergency use limits provision.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is a provision that was part of the Judiciary Committee bill. It was included in a larger substitute amendment adopted in that committee that was sponsored by Senator Leahy and cosponsored by Senator Feinstein, Senator Schumer, and others. This amendment puts no additional limits on the Government's ability to target people overseas under this legislation or to collect information about those people. All it does is help ensure that the Government's procedures follow the requirements that are laid out in the bill. It fixes an enormous problem in the Intelligence Committee bill: the complete lack of any incentive for the Government to do what the bill tells it to do, namely, target people overseas rather than people in America. There are many aspects of this bill that have generated strong disagreement, but one thing on which everyone in this Chamber should agree is that the Government should not be using these authorities to target the conversations of innocent Americans in their homes and offices in the United States. For that, the Government should have to get an individualized court order, as it always has. The bill requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that only people outside the United States are targeted. The bill also requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to adopt minimization procedures to govern the retention and dissemination of information about Americans that is captured in the course of the surveillance. All of this sounds good. The targeting procedures, in particular, are one of the few safeguards built into this legislation. Yet, remarkably, the Intelligence Committee bill does nothing to ensure the Government will follow them. They are basically non-binding. The FISA Court does not have to approve the procedures before they are implemented. If the Government develops procedures that target Americans in this country, in violation of the law, the FISA Court can reject those procedures and require them to develop new ones but only after those procedures have already been in effect. The bill does nothing to stop the Government from continuing to use and share the information it collected under those illegal procedures. Think about that. The Government develops and implements procedures the FISA Court later finds out are not reasonably designed to target people who are outside the United States, meaning the procedures likely permit the targeting of Americans here at home--something we all agree should not be permitted under this bill. Yet if the Government has been using those unlawful procedures while the FISA Court reviews them, it can keep and freely share any communications it gathered. In theory, the Government could play this game indefinitely, periodically revising its procedures and all the while using and disseminating information that has been illegally collected under prior procedures rejected by the court. My amendment would solve this problem, at least in part, by allowing the FISA Court to put limits on the use of information about Americans the Government has gathered using procedures the court later finds do not comply with the requirements of this legislation. These types of use limitations are not a new concept. Indeed, they are borrowed from another part of FISA. Under current law, if the Government in an emergency starts surveillance of an American without a court order and the court later determines the surveillance was not lawful, FISA places limits on how the Government can use that unlawfully gathered information. It is simple common sense: If the Government wasn't supposed to obtain this information under the law, then the Government shouldn't be permitted to use this information except in a true emergency. Otherwise, the limit on obtaining the information in the first place isn't worth the paper it is printed on-- it's just there for show. This amendment adopts the same basic idea, but with significantly more leeway for the Government. Under the amendment, if the Government collects information using unlawful procedures, the default is that the Government may only use the information regarding U.S. persons--namely, the information the Government was never supposed to collect in the first place--in an emergency involving a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. But the Government can continue to freely use information collected on foreign persons. The amendment also provides significant additional flexibility. It gives the FISA Court discretion to allow the Government to use even information about U.S. persons--information collected illegally--as long as the Government ultimately fixes the defective procedures. That is a very broad exception to the use limitation, but importantly, it is an exception that is overseen and applied by the FISA Court. This is the bare minimum we could possibly do to encourage the Government to adopt and adhere to lawful targeting and minimization procedures in the first place. The practical effect of this amendment is simply to give the FISA Court the option of prohibiting the use of information about U.S. persons obtained illegally--in violation of the very act we are debating. Given the FISA Court's history of overwhelming deference to the executive branch, it is quite clear the court will exercise this option, if ever, only in the most egregious cases of Government excess or abuse. And as I said before, the Government will always have the ability to use information about foreign persons and any information that indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Just to be clear, no one is talking about holding the Government to a standard of perfection. The bill we are debating does not require the Government to develop procedures that ensure that in every instance, only people overseas are targeted. Instead, it requires the Government to develop procedures that are reasonably designed to target people who are reasonably believed to be outside the United States. So the use limitation I am proposing would come into play only if several things happen: First, the Government failed to get court clearance for its procedures before implementing them; second, the procedures were not even reasonably designed to meet the modest goal of targeting people reasonably believed to be overseas; third, the Government failed to correct the problem when given a chance to do so, or the FISA Court decides not to allow the use of the illegally collected information despite the procedures being fixed; fourth, the information involves a U.S. person; and fifth, the information does not indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm. All these things have to be true in order for there to be any limitation here at all. This is an extremely modest safeguard against unlawful procedures and one that gives the Government ample leeway to develop sound targeting procedures while simultaneously getting and using the information it needs. It comes down to a very simple question: Do we mean what we say when we declare that Americans in this country should not be targeted under the powers we are giving the Government in this legislation? If we do mean what we say, we should have no problem saying that the use of information obtained through procedures that target Americans can be blocked by the FISA Court, since that information should never have been obtained in the first place. If we don't say that, then the targeting and minimization requirements are really just suggestions, and the supporters of the bill are not serious when they say they only want to go after foreigners overseas. This amendment is based on a commonsense provision that already exists in FISA, with significant additional flexibility for the Government. It gives the Government a modest incentive to comply with the law, without taking away any of the legitimate tools it needs to respond to foreign threats. And it was already adopted by the Judiciary Committee. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment, and I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, let me agree with the Chair that it is important to clarify what these amendments do and do not do, not only for purposes of voting on the amendment, but for any court consideration of this issue. The arguments of the chairman and ranking member do not relate, in many cases, to the amendment that has been put forward. The Senator from Missouri just made the argument that my amendment differs from the use limit provisions for emergency surveillance because my amendment would limit the use of information about foreign targets. But that is not true. That is not the amendment I offered. My amendment only puts limits on information about U.S. persons. The Government can always use information about foreign persons. With regard to the comments of the Chair of the committee, the supposed burden of identifying which communications involved U.S. persons only comes up if the Government starts its targeting procedures before it gets court approval, and then fails to keep track of what it is collecting during that time. And it only comes up if the Government procedures are targeting Americans in the United States, in which case I think there are overwhelming policy and constitutional reasons why this information needs to be retrieved and its use limited. Moreover, if the intelligence community is concerned about this potential burden, it can do what it says it already does with information gathered using the PAA, and that is to label it. Then it shouldn't have any problem finding it later on; it shouldn't be cumbersome. The arguments of the chairman and ranking member would yield the following result: We set up rules for the Government, the Government doesn't follow the rules, and there is simply no consequence at all. The law has no teeth. There is no incentive for the Government to follow the rules. Again, under my amendment, the Government can use information even about U.S. persons if it indicates a threat of death and serious bodily harm, and the FISA Court can allow the Government to use any information if the Government fixes the defective procedures. On that point, I am very troubled by the arguments of the Senator from Missouri. He says that my amendment will not even allow the Government to fix the problem with its procedures. That is absolutely false. I specifically stated that the Government is given an opportunity to fix the problem. If it fixes the problem, the FISA Court can allow it to use the information. If the Government gets a complete free pass and faces no consequence whatsoever for adopting and implementing unlawful procedures, then the law's requirements for targeting and minimization procedures and the FISA Court's oversight of these procedures have no meaning. The Government would be allowed to intrude on the private conversations of Americans with no consequences. This amendment contains a very modest series of provisions. It gives the court and the Government tremendous flexibility. If the Government makes even a reasonable effort to address the concerns of the FISA Court, there will be no disruption of the information the Government needs--and, of course, none is intended. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. The Senate should not be having a cloture vote on this legislation today. What we should be doing is considering and voting on the amendments that I and my colleagues tried to bring up last week, and other amendments that have been proposed to improve this badly flawed bill. But the minority does not think we should have the right to actually legislate here. They expect this body to rubberstamp that bill. I am afraid I have to say the conduct of the minority has been very disturbing on this. They insisted for weeks that it is absolutely critical to finish the FISA legislation by February 1, even going so far as to object repeatedly to efforts by the majority leader to extend for only 1 month the Protect America Act--a law they rammed through this Chamber in August--and they still don't want to give us another month so the Senate can carefully consider changes to it. So the majority leader brought to the floor the Intelligence Committee bill, the legislation that the minority wanted to consider and urged the Senate to stay in session through the weekend to complete work on it. I criticized the majority leader for bringing the Intelligence Committee bill to the floor because I thought the Senate should be working from the much better bill reported by the Judiciary Committee, on which I also serve, but I would have thought the minority would be pleased by the majority leader's decision. So what have they done in response? They have obstructed all efforts to actually work on this bill. They will not allow me to get a vote on the one amendment I have offered--an amendment cosponsored by Senator Hagel--and they will not allow me or anyone else to offer any other amendments. They filed for cloture the day this Senate began working on the bill, after allowing only a single amendment to be called up. They have effectively halted Senate consideration of this bill, despite the fact they are the ones--they are the ones--who are arguing that the February deadline is so critical. They seem to think that scare tactics peddled by administration officials, such as the Vice President, will be enough to pressure the Senate into letting them have their way. I certainly hope they are wrong. Mr. President, as you well know, this legislation is in serious need of fixing. It authorizes widespread surveillance involving Americans at home and abroad. Yes, it does. Despite what the Senator from Missouri said, it certainly does do that. I have a number of amendments I want to offer, both to ensure that the FISA Court has more authority to oversee these authorities, and to guarantee Americans their fourth amendment rights. But I cannot even get a vote on the one, simple, straightforward, and extremely modest amendment I offered last week. This demonstrates how brazen these tactics are. This bipartisan amendment would merely require that the Government provide copies of important FISA Court orders and pleadings for review to the committees of jurisdiction in a classified setting, so that Members of Congress can understand how FISA has been interpreted and is being applied. You would think this amendment would be, as they say, a no-brainer, and yet the minority will not even consent to a vote on that. But at least that one amendment is pending, and we will get a vote eventually. If the Republicans succeed in cutting off debate on this legislation, the Senate will not be able to vote on any other amendments, including the amendment Senator Dodd and I wish to offer to deny retroactive immunity to telecom companies that allegedly cooperated with the administration's illegal wiretapping program. It is unconscionable to think that the Senate should have to make a final decision on this legislation without even having an opportunity to debate and vote on whether to grant retroactive immunity to companies that allegedly cooperated with an illegal program. And why are we in this situation? Because the minority and the administration think they are entitled to ram the deeply flawed Intelligence Committee bill through the Senate without any changes. It seems they are worried the Senate might actually pass some of the very reasonable amendments I and others would like to offer if they give us a chance to do so or perhaps they are trying to sabotage the bill and then figure out a way to blame that outcome on Democrats. No Senator--no Senator--should go along with these cynical, strong- arm tactics. We have to stand up to the administration and stand up for our rights. I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose cloture. Invoking cloture on this bill would be an abdication of our responsibility to consider legislation that will have a huge impact on the American people for years to come. I hope even those who support the Intelligence Committee bill will think twice before voting to make this body a rubberstamp. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, just over 1 month ago, in the days before the December 27 president election, I noted that it had become the closest political contest in that country's history and that the two leading candidates were running robust, active campaigns. Although I also acknowledged the persistence of a deeply entrenched culture of corruption, I was encouraged by the growing engagement of Kenyan citizens and civil society organizations during the relatively peaceful, well-run, and competitive campaign season. I joined many others in hoping that the presidential and parliamentary elections held on that day would confirm Kenya's place among the world's most promising emerging economies and young democracies. Instead, that hope turned to dismay as we watched a blatant disregard for democratic principles and processes by the ruling party and an extraordinary disrespect for rule of law and human rights by both leading candidates' parties. The serious allegations of vote rigging, the rushed declaration of a presidential winner, and the destructive violence that have ensued are not only hurting the Kenyan people--they are jeopardizing Kenya's previous democratic progress. With Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda as neighbors in the volatile Horn of Africa, Kenya has long been regarded as a stable country making slow but persistent progress towards democracy. Kenya's press and courts seemed to be asserting their independence from the president-dominated government, and the mere fact that all pre-election opinion polls put the incumbent president neck-and-neck with his challenger from the main opposition party seemed to be an encouraging sign of a vibrant democracy. But on December 27 and in the days that followed, this progress came to a grinding halt. The Kenyan election suffered a fate all too common in Africa, with the votes tallied behind closed doors and the results finally announced by Kenya's Electoral Commission suggesting significant rigging. The resulting frustration and deadlock have sparked violence, looting, destruction of property, and disruption of normal activity, creating an economic and humanitarian emergency on top of the current political crisis. Hundreds have been killed--some of them because of disproportionate use of force by Kenyan police as they seek to quell protests--and tens of thousands have fled their homes. Trust in the government, law enforcement, and even in one's neighbor has been seriously undermined. The rival political leaders--incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and leader of the Orange Democratic Movement opposition party, Raila Odinga--can work to end this violence and destruction by refraining from using, inciting or condoning violent tactics. In recent days, Mr. Odinga and his supporters have demonstrated noteworthy restraint and it is essential that both parties respect the importance of a peaceful resolution as they begin to participate in an internationally brokered dialogue, led by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. It is early days yet, and it remains unclear how committed these leading candidates are to seeing the negotiation through to the finish line. Although he has agreed to participate in an internationally brokered meeting with Mr. Odinga, Mr. Kibaki has been less than cooperative by rushing to appoint his own cronies to top cabinet positions and declaring he will follow the recommendations only of the Kenyan courts, which are also packed with his supporters. A political settlement is a key element in working through this electoral crisis but it must be part of a greater initiative that includes institutional reform. The road ahead is long, and I remain concerned that while both leading candidates have come to the table for negotiations, they could still decide to abandon the effort. The past few weeks have shown how superficial Kenya's democratic gains may really have been. Now the international community--and the United States in particular--must live up to its rhetoric in favor of free and fair elections and institutional building. Many of the other countries that have suffered botched elections had a long history of such fraud but if this relatively stable and prosperous country is allowed to abandon its democratic experiment, the appeal of democracy will inevitably dim around the world. The citizens of Kenya as well as those from around the world had higher expectations for Kenya. Resolving Kenya's current political, humanitarian, and economic crisis will require a coordinated international effort to engage all players in identifying and addressing the deeper problems that allowed the election fraud to occur and to ignite such a wave of outrage. Although a power-sharing agreement will likely be part of the solution, serious underlying problems need to be addressed. The challenges facing Kenya include an over-concentration of power in the office of the president, insufficient independence of the judiciary and electoral institutions, the need for professionalization of police and armed forces, and a persistent lack of transparency and inclusiveness throughout the political system. Only by addressing these root causes of the recent conflict will Kenya be able to truly restore stability and emerge from this crisis a stronger and more prosperous nation. Such a task will not be quick, easy, or cheap, but the alternative--not seizing this chance to bring about essential political reform--would be enduring, complex, and costly. Last week, along with my ranking member on the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator Sununu, and Senators Cardin and Kerry, I introduced a resolution to encourage the United States and the wider international community to resist the temptation for a quick fix in Kenya and to instead pursue a more intensive, encompassing plan for political transition and transformation. I hope the Senate will pass this resolution shortly. The administration has played an active role-- sending Assistant Secretary Frazer to Nairobi shortly after the elections to meet with both leading candidates--and I know Ambassador Ranneberger has been actively engaged in-country. But we need to see greater collaboration from all donors--with one consistent message that helps move Kenya to the next stage. I hope that Members of Congress from both parties will come together to support this initiative and the diplomatic and humanitarian efforts in Kenya that must follow in the coming weeks and months. The U.S.-Kenya partnership is a longstanding and important one, but I can-not condone a continued relationship with a government that has apparently stolen an election and uses tactics of fear and intimidation to address dissent. This is not the Kenya I have come to know, and I am sure, not the Kenya its citizens want to know. We must close this devastating chapter by addressing the reasons for the electoral crisis and ensuing violence. Without such vital work, our historic partnership will deteriorate. There is a window of opportunity to ensure this does not happen, and I encourage all key actors to seize upon this opening. Above all, I want to see violence end and hope restored in Kenya.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Augustine Ripa, a legal intern in my Judiciary Committee office, be granted floor privileges for the remainder of the Senate's consideration of the pending FISA legislation.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my remarks, the Senator from Florida, Mr. Nelson, be recognized for his remarks.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Leahy in his effort to replace the Senate Intelligence Committee bill with the version passed by the Judiciary Committee. I am a member of both of these committees. As a member of both committees, I have been deeply involved in the process of having looked at those two products. Having been involved in helping shape them, I urge my colleagues to support the Judiciary Committee version of this legislation. Indeed, I had hoped very much that the Senate would take up that bill to begin with rather than the flawed Intelligence Committee bill. In December, I along with 13 other Senators, urged the majority leader to make the Judiciary Committee bill the base bill on the Senate floor. Unfortunately, our request was denied. So it is very disappointing that we are now forced to fight an uphill battle of offering the Judiciary bill as an amendment. I would like to lay out the reasons the Senate should support the Judiciary Committee bill rather than the Intelligence Committee bill. One obvious reason is the Judiciary Committee bill, unlike the Intelligence Committee bill, does not contain unjustified retroactive immunity for companies alleged to have participated in an illegal wiretapping program. I do not want to spend a lot of time on this today because there will be an opportunity to debate this issue as the Senate's consideration of this legislation moves forward. But I will say that having spent the last year and a half studying what happened at the NSA from 2001 to 2006, I strongly oppose immunity. Under current law, telecom companies already get immunity as long as they follow certain requirements that are clearly spelled out in the law. I see no reason for Congress to change the rules this late in the game. Today, I would like to focus on the other significant parts of these bills, the part contained in title I of each bill that contains sweeping new changes to the FISA law for years to come. Let me start off by pointing out that there are a number of similarities between title I of the Intelligence Committee bill and title I of the Judiciary Committee bill. Their basic structure is the same. Title I of both bills authorize the Government to conduct surveillance of individuals reasonably believed to be overseas without court approval for individualized warrants. Both bills authorize the Government to develop and implement procedures to govern that type of surveillance and provide the procedures to the FISA Court for review after they have gone into effect. Now, let's be clear. These are extraordinary powers that both bills give to the executive branch. And there is no difference between these two bills in terms of the intelligence they permit the Government to acquire. No difference between the bills as regards to the effort to go after those who may be trying to do us harm in this respect. Rather, the differences between these two bills comes in the form of critically important checks and balances on those powers. The Judiciary bill contains a number of important changes to improve court oversight of these broad new executive branch authorities and to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans--the privacy of law- abiding Americans. The Intelligence Committee bill, on the other hand, leaves it up to the executive branch to police itself, an approach that has all too often proven to be a bad idea throughout American history. I would say particularly under this administration. Let me state as clearly as I can the differences between these two bills have nothing--nothing--to do with our ability to combat terrorism. They have everything to do with ensuring that the executive branch follows the rule of law and does not unnecessarily listen in on the private communications of Americans who are doing absolutely nothing wrong. This debate is about whether the court should have an independent oversight role and what protections should apply to the communications of Americans that somehow get swept up in these broad new surveillance powers. If you believe the courts should have a meaningful oversight role with regard to Government surveillance, then you should support the Judiciary bill. If you believe that Congress should safeguard the communications of Americans at home that could be swept up in a broad new surveillance program that is supposed to be focused on foreigners overseas, then you should support the Judiciary bill. It is as simple as that. That said, the Judiciary Committee bill is not perfect. More still needs to be done to protect the privacy of Americans. That is why it should be an easy decision to support the Judiciary Committee bill as our starting point on the floor of the Senate as we work on this legislation. Let me also remind my colleagues that the process by which the Judiciary Committee considered, drafted, and amended and reported out its bill was an open one, allowing outside experts and the public at large the opportunity to review and comment. With regard to legislation so directly connected to the constitutional rights of Americans, the result of this open process should be accorded great weight, especially in light of the Judiciary Committee's unique role and expertise in protecting those rights. I also point out that several of the administration's criticisms of the Judiciary Committee bill have been based on technical drafting concerns. But in the version that Chairman Leahy has brought to the Senate floor, he has made the changes necessary to address those technical concerns. So I hope we do not hear any arguments in this floor debate about these issues that have already been addressed. Exactly what are the differences between these two bills? First, the Judiciary bill gives the secret FISA Court more authority to operate as an independent check to the executive branch. For example, one provision in the Judiciary bill fixes an enormous problem with the Intelligence Committee bill; that is, the complete lack of incentives for the Government to target people overseas rather than to target people in the United States. The Judiciary bill solves this problem by giving the FISA Court the discretion to limit the use of information concerning Americans when that information is obtained through procedures that the FISA Court ultimately finds are not--are not--reasonably designed to target persons overseas. Another provision of the Judiciary bill ensures that the FISA Court has the authority to oversee compliance with what are called minimization procedures. Minimization procedures have been held up as the primary protection in the Intelligence Committee bill for the privacy of Americans whose communications get swept up in this new surveillance authority. Now, I do not think current minimization procedures are strong enough to do the job. But to the extent that minimization can help protect Americans' privacy, its implementation surely needs to be overseen by the court. So that means giving the court the authority to review whether the Government is complying with the minimization rules and to ask for the information it needs to make that assessment. Now, without this provision from the Judiciary bill, the Government's dissemination and use of information on innocent law-abiding Americans will occur without any checks and balances whatsoever, no checks and balances at all. Once again, ``trust us'' will have to do. Now, I believe in this case, as in so many others, ``trust us'' is not enough. The Judiciary bill offers other types of oversight, as well. For one thing, it requires relevant inspectors general to conduct a complete review of the President's illegal wiretapping program, which, frankly, is long overdue. It improves congressional access to FISA Court orders. The Intelligence Committee bill required the Congress to be provided with orders, decisions, and opinions of the FISA Court--that includes significant interpretations of the law--within 45 days after they are issued. Now, that is good as far as it goes. But the Judiciary Committee bill adds that Congress should be provided with the pleadings, the pleadings filed with the court associated with the opinions that contain significant interpretations of law. At times, the court's opinions merely reference and approve arguments made in the Government's pleadings. In that case, the pleadings may be critical to understanding the reasoning behind any particular decision. It is not enough just to have the cursory court opinion. It also requires that significant interpretations of law not previously provided to Congress over the past 5 years be provided. Congress needs to have the full story of how the law has been interpreted in the past in order to make the right decisions on what changes in the law should be made in the future. The Judiciary bill also does a better job of protecting Americans from widespread warrantless wiretapping. First, it provides real protection against what is called reverse targeting. It ensures that if the Government is wiretapping a foreigner overseas in order to collect the communications of the American with whom that foreign target is communicating, it gets a court order on the American. Specifically, the Judiciary Committee bill says the Government needs an individualized court order when a significant purpose of its surveillance is, in fact, listening to an American at home. The Director of National Intelligence himself said reverse targeting violates the fourth amendment. All this provision that I am raising does is simply codify that principle. The administration continues to oppose this provision. I have a simple question: Why? Why is it opposed to a provision that prohibits a practice that its own Director of National Intelligence says is unconstitutional? The Judiciary Committee bill also prohibits something called bulk collection. Now, that is this sweeping up of all communications between the United States and overseas. The DNI said in public testimony that this type of massive bulk collection would be--would be--permitted by the Protect America Act that is currently in effect. But he has also said that what the Government is seeking to do with these authorities is something very different. It is, he said: Surgical. A telephone number is surgical. So, if you know that number, you can select it out. So if the DNI has said he does not need broader authorities, there should be no objection to this modest provision which, again, simply holds the DNI to his word. The prohibition against bulk collection ensures that the Government has some--some--foreign intelligence interest in the communications that it is collecting and not just vacuuming up every last communication between Americans and their friends and business colleagues overseas. Targets do not need to be known or named individuals; they can be phone numbers, which is how the DNI has described how the Government collects. And the Government does not have to identify or explain its interest in the targets to the FISA Court. It merely has to make a general certification that individual targets exist. As was already alluded to on the Senate floor, the Judiciary Committee bill also has a sunset of 4 years rather than 6 years, ensuring that Congress will reevaluate this law at least once before the end of the next Presidential term. And, critically, it contains a strong statement that Congress intends for FISA to be the exclusive means by which foreign intelligence surveillance is conducted. It also closes purported statutory loopholes that the Justice Department relied on to make its torture arguments that the congressional authorization for the use of force in Afghanistan authorized the President's illegal wiretapping program. The Judiciary bill makes clear, once and for all, that the President must follow the law. For all of these reasons, the Senate should support the Judiciary Committee's product. Let me repeat what I said at the outset. The differences between these two bills have nothing to do with our ability to combat terrorism. Nothing. They have everything to do with ensuring that the executive branch adheres to the rule of law and does not necessarily listen in on the private communications of Americans. The fact that the administration is so strongly resisting these commonsense protections really says a lot. It ought to give pause to those who are considering opposing it. It is time for Congress to stop being an enabler when it comes to this administration's indifference to the rule of law and, instead, start being a protector of the rights and freedoms of our citizens. I urge my colleagues to support the Judiciary Committee bill. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3909.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Not only is it assumed, but I just stated specifically on the floor a few minutes ago that it would exist.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Correct.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and I call up amendment----

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dodd be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is a straightforward reporting requirement that is critical if Congress is to understand how the foreign intelligence surveillance laws it passes, including this one, are being interpreted and applied. The issue is very simple. If the FISA Court makes a significant interpretation of the law, I think Congress should know about it. Congress can't conduct oversight of intelligence unless it knows what the court is and is not permitting the administration to do. Congress can't pass new legislation without knowing how the court has interpreted current law. This issue is absolutely fundamental to our constitutional system. Congress has a responsibility to understand the impact of the laws it is passing. The courts should have the assurance that when they interpret the law, those interpretations will be communicated to the legislature. This isn't some unusual idea; this is how our system of government has operated from its inception. Specifically, this amendment does two things. First, it requires that when the court issues an opinion that includes a significant legal interpretation, the Government must provide the Government's pleadings associated with that decision to Congress. Now, these pleadings are often critical to understanding the legal interpretations of the court. This is in part because at times the court's opinions merely reference and approve the Government's arguments made in those pleadings. So it is really necessary to be able to review the pleadings themselves if you are going to understand the court's decision. They are also necessary to understand how the Government interprets and seeks to implement the law. Neither Congress's oversight of the intelligence community nor any responsible legislating in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance can be effective without these documents. Yet, even today, as Congress considers this FISA legislation, the administration continues to refuse to provide Congress with important FISA Court pleadings. The other reason is this: The amendment requires that the Government provide Congress with FISA Court orders that include significant interpretations of law over the last 5 years. Now, this is necessary because there was an enormous loophole in previous statutory reporting requirements that would be closed for the first time by this Intelligence Committee bill. The Government didn't previously have to provide Congress with significant interpretations of law if they were included in court orders rather than court decisions or opinions. But we know from the administration's public announcement in January about the President's wiretapping program that such legal interpretations are, in fact, found in orders. For Congress to have any sense of how the court has interpreted the FISA statute, therefore, it is critical to understand recent jurisprudence. Congress needs to have access to FISA Court orders not just going forward but for the past 5 years as well. This is not theoretical. The administration has refused to provide to Congress orders containing significant interpretations of law, and that is just what we know of. Without this amendment, we might never know what other important legal interpretations are out there. To be clear, I first offered an amendment to require that FISA Court orders and other documents be provided to Congress through the intelligence authorization bill. It was approved on a bipartisan basis. It was later removed from the authorization bill, and only a watered- down version was included in the Intelligence Committee FISA bill. What my amendment today does is merely put the language back that has already been given the support of a bipartisan majority of the Intelligence Committee. The most appropriate arrangement for Congress to obtain information related to the FISA Court would be for the court to provide it directly, without the involvement of the executive branch. So granting the executive branch any role in an exchange between the two other branches of Government, which is what my amendment actually allows, is, in fact, already a compromise. But this amendment is a direct response to the administration's assertion that it can withhold FISA Court opinions and documents that include significant interpretations of law from Congress--not letting us read these things. Imagine if the administration tried to keep Supreme Court decisions from Congress. Even worse, imagine if the administration tried to keep from Congress a decision like Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which rejected the administration's military commissions, just as Congress was considering the Military Commissions Act. Congress wouldn't stand for it. Yet that is exactly what is happening in the world of intelligence. There are really no serious, substantive reasons to oppose this amendment. Orders and pleadings will be provided to the Intelligence Committee in a classified and, if necessary, redacted manner, just as FISA Court decisions are now. This is the furthest thing from an onerous reporting requirement. If there are FISA Court orders that include significant interpretations of law, Government lawyers certainly know what they are and where to find them. It is sometimes said that intelligence in technical terms ``belongs'' to the executive branch. I disagree. But in any case, such an argument simply doesn't apply here. This amendment relates to the documents of an article III court. Just last month, that court confirmed in a rare public opinion that it has ``inherent power'' over its own records--in other words, they do not belong to the executive branch. Finally, let me stress the scope of the information Congress needs before it can conduct effective oversight and legislative responsibility. While the public is understandably focused on the FISA Court's involvement with regard to the President's warrantless wiretapping program, the FISA Court is actually responsible for interpreting all of the FISA statutes. Now, that includes the electronic surveillance issues we are considering here today but also physical searches of Americans' homes and the collection of sensitive business records, including library and medical records. Just as Congress should know how the Protect America Act and this FISA bill will be interpreted, it should have similar information with regard to the FISA provisions related to the PATRIOT Act and any other legislation that governs surveillance and affects the rights of Americans. This simple reporting requirement is critical to congressional oversight, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the second-degree amendment. This is a classic example of people hiding behind a tragedy in this country to make arguments that have no merit. This argument, that the provision of pleadings, legal arguments by the Government, will somehow compromise sources and methods and bring down the intelligence system, has no merit. When the Senator from Arizona asked me specifically whether my amendment allows for certain sensitive information to be redacted, my answer was yes, and he didn't respond. In fact, I had already stated that in my opening statement. Everything the Senator from Missouri referred to--confidential information, sensitive information about individuals we are going after, critical intelligence--all of that can be redacted. What the Senator wants to help the administration do is prevent Members of Congress--and by the way, these are kept classified; it is only people who have certain clearances who can see them--from seeing the pleadings provided to an article III court. That is the basis for their arguments. As I pointed out in my statement, a lot of times the court just refers to the pleadings in its orders. So if we don't have the pleadings, we have no idea what the order is about. Listen very carefully because this kind of argument is going to be used with regard to every aspect of this bill. Everything is a red line. I want to tell you something, Mr. President, it is not a red line for the duly elected representatives of the people of this country in a classified setting to be able to review documents from a court proceeding. That is a ridiculous notion and disrespectful to the United States Congress that has an oversight role. I was involved in the debate, as the Senator from Missouri knows, in the Intelligence Committee. We won fair and square on this vote by a majority bipartisan vote when it was first offered to the Intelligence Authorization bill. Because of various issues and pressures relating to other matters, we later had to compromise, and ultimately they said, why don't you do it on the FISA bill, which is exactly what I am doing. But the idea that somehow this endangers America to allow certain Members of Congress and a few staff members who have been cleared to look at the pleadings of the Government in a court proceeding takes this way too far. There are no substantive arguments against doing this, and I urge Senators to reject the second-degree amendment and adopt the underlying amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I am pleased to support the Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2007. This bill is long overdue, and I hope that we in the Senate can ensure this bill's quick passage. There are significant unmet needs in Indian Country throughout this Nation, and addressing the unmet health care needs ranks as one of the most significant issues that we must address. The Federal Government has a well-established trust responsibility with regard to American Indian affairs, and this trust responsibility extends to providing good health care to communities throughout Indian Country. I am impressed with the bipartisan work that Senator Dorgan and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee have put into moving this bill forward, and I commend the committee for its dedication to significant consultation with Indian Country in drafting and negotiating this bill. Because of the strong consultation with individual tribes and collective organizations like the National Tribal Steering Committee and the National Indian Health Board, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee has put together a comprehensive reform bill that will help improve the health care services available to American Indians around the country. This bill has the support of tribal governments throughout the Nation, including the 11 federally recognized tribes in my State of Wisconsin. I have heard from a number of constituents in Wisconsin about the need to pass this important piece of legislation and the improvements that the legislation will make to various Indian Health Service programs including clinical programs, on the various reservations throughout the State and the urban Indian program in the city of Milwaukee. Health care is consistently the No. 1 issue that I hear about all over my home State of Wisconsin. When I hold my annual townhall meetings across the State, many people come to tell me about problems with our overall health care system, and data shows us that these problems are often most acutely felt in Indian Country. Lack of access to good health care is a problem that disproportionately affects American Indians throughout the United States. According to the Indian Health Service, American Indians and Alaska Natives are 200 percent more likely to die from diabetes, more than 500 percent more likely to die from alcoholism, and approximately 500 percent more likely to die from tuberculosis. I was disappointed to hear one of my colleagues say yesterday on the floor that American lives do not depend on whether we pass the Indian health care bill by the end of the month. The staggering health statistics I cited earlier show just how imperative it is that we pass this legislation, which is long overdue. These statistics also help illustrate the vast amount of work that needs to be done to improve the quality of health care in American Indian communities. This piece of legislation takes an important first step toward addressing these health care disparities through the many reforms it makes to Indian health care programs. Contrary to what my colleague asserted yesterday, American lives do depend on this legislation. Modernizing Indian Health Services programs through this legislation will help to address the diabetes and suicide crises that exist on reservations-- just two examples of the many health care issues that impact the daily lives of American Indians across the country. Reauthorization of this bill will help encourage health care providers to practice at facilities in Indian Country and encourage American Indians to enter the health care profession and serve their communities. Recruiting talented and dedicated professionals to serve in IHS facilities, whether urban or rural, is a key challenge facing many tribal communities in Wisconsin and around the country. I hope these provisions will help bring additional dedicated doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals to our tribal populations. This bill also reauthorizes programs that assist urban Indian organizations with providing health care to American Indians living in urban centers around the country. The Urban Indian Health Program represents a tiny fraction of the Indian Health Services budget, but the small amount of resources given to the urban programs provide critical health services to those Indians living in urban areas. Contrary to what some people may think, the majority of American Indians now live in urban areas around the country, including two urban areas in my State--Milwaukee and Green Bay. Throughout our Nation's history, some American Indians came to urban centers voluntarily, but many were forcibly sent to urban areas as a result of wrongheaded Federal Indian policy in the 1950s and 1960s and have since stayed in urban areas and planted roots in these communities. As a result of this movement to urban centers, Congress created the urban Indian program in the late 1970s to address the growing urban Indian population around the country. The Federal Government's responsibility to American Indians does not end simply because some American Indians left their ancestral lands and moved to urban locations--particularly when some of them had little choice in the matter. While this legislation takes important steps toward improving urban Indian health care programs, we need to do much more to support these urban programs, including fighting for increased appropriations. I have been disappointed that the President has proposed zeroing out the urban Indian program in past budgets, and I fear that this year's upcoming budget will be no different. As in years past, I will join with my colleagues in efforts to restore funding for urban Indian programs to the Federal budget, and I hope this year we can also provide a much needed boost in funding for the urban Indian programs. While this bill is a good first step towards reforming and improving access to health care in Indian Country, I also look forward to working with my colleagues to examine better ways to address the disparities that exist in the funding allocated to various IHS regions, including the Bemidji region, which covers Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. According to the latest available data compiled by the Great Lakes Inter-Tribal Epidemiology Center, the Bemidji Indian Health service area has lower funding rates than other Indian Health Service areas around the country. Even though the Bemidji region's funding rates are lower than other areas, the region has higher rates of heart disease and cancer than other regions and has the second worst diabetes rate in the IHS system. Not only do we need to provide more funding for all IHS regions, we also need to better address disparities that exist within the system, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in the coming months to address those disparities. This bill is a solid first step toward improving access to health care in Indian Country. Unfortunately, the Senate was not able to finish work on this important bill before we had to move to debate another matter. I understand the majority leader has made a commitment to return to the Indian health care bill after we finish that other debate, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to pass the American Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2007 in the near future. We need to move forward on this critical bill, and I urge all my colleagues, whether Republican or Democrat, to work together quickly to ensure its swift passage. Indian Country has made many compromises in order to move this bill forward, and passage of this bill is long overdue. This bill takes important steps toward addressing some of the health care needs facing American Indian communities around the country, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to build on this legislation in the coming months and years. I also hope that we can continue to work together in a bipartisan way to pass the reauthorization of the Native American Housing and Self-Determination Act, work on legislation to address the education needs of American Indian youth, and address other legislative areas in order to help ensure stronger futures for American Indians throughout the country.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I wish to honor our distinguished Secretary of the Majority, Martin Paone, who announced recently his plans to leave the Senate after almost 30 years of exemplary service. During his career in the Senate, Marty has helped to guide this body as it has addressed some of the most pressing issues, and faced some of the most difficult challenges, in our Nation's history. Marty began his career in the Congress, working in the House Post Office and the Senate Parking Office. From there, he quickly rose through the ranks to become an assistant in the Democratic cloakroom in 1979. After demonstrating his keen understanding of floor procedures, he became a member of the floor staff for the Democratic Policy Committee and later assistant secretary of the majority. In 1995, he was elected as secretary of the minority, and continued to serve in that role, and later as the secretary of the majority, for the Democratic caucus. As we all know, the procedures of the Senate are complicated, and at times perplexing. Indeed, Americans watching us from home may wonder how we are able get our important legislative work done. Well, one of the principal reasons is that Republican and Democratic Senators alike have been able to rely on Marty's counsel when it comes to questions about the rules of the Senate. Marty possesses a vast and detailed knowledge of the history and procedures of the Senate that is possibly second only to that of our distinguished President Pro Tempore, Senator Robert C. Byrd. And he has a well-deserved reputation as a straight shooter. Whenever I have approached Marty with a question during my time as a Senator, I have always been able to count on him for a straight answer--even when my position may have run counter to that of my leadership. Throughout his tenure in the Senate, Marty has also served as a steady hand, helping this Chamber through changes in our country's leadership and critical events in our Nation's history. Marty's career has been marked by five different Presidents, five Republican Senate leaders and four Democratic Senate leaders. Marty has also served during several key historic moments, from the end of the Cold War to the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It was after September 11 that Marty's extensive experience and understanding became especially important as he helped guide this body during an extremely difficult and uncertain time. That service to the Senate, and to the country, was invaluable, and I will always remember it. I wish Marty, his wife Ruby, and their three children, Alexander, Stephanie, and T.J., all the best as Marty begins this new chapter in his life. He will be greatly missed, but he leaves behind a lasting impact that will help guide this body for years to come.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I oppose the fiscal year 2008 Defense authorization bill because it authorizes $189.5 billion for the war in Iraq but does nothing to end the President's misguided, open-ended Iraq policy. That policy has overburdened our military, weakened our national security, diminished our international credibility, and cost the lives of thousands of brave American soldiers. There are certain provisions of the bill that I support strongly, including a pay raise for military personnel, Senator Webb's amendment creating a Commission on Wartime Contracting to examine waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Senator Lautenberg's amendment to create a Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. But on balance, I cannot vote to support a bill that defies the will of so many Wisconsinites--and so many Americans--by allowing the President to continue one of the worst foreign policy mistakes in the history of our Nation.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, they often say that the third time is the charm, and now the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater knows why. After UW-Whitewater's football team came so close to winning the NCAA Division III National Football Championship 2 years in a row, this year they triumphed, winning the big game and becoming Division III's reigning champions. Their fantastic season marked the first Division III football championship in UW-Whitewater's history. The hard work of the Warhawk football team culminated in a 31-21 victory over two-time defending champion Mount Union College in the Amos Alonzo Stagg Bowl on December 15, 2007, in Salem, VA. The Warhawks bolted to an early 17-0 lead and beat back the comeback attempt of Mount Union, which had come into the game having won 37 contests in a row. I commend Coach Lance Liepold for his dedication and hard work throughout his rookie season as head coach. I also congratulate Justin Beaver on being named the championship game's Most Outstanding Player, and the winner of the Gagliardi Trophy as the best player in Division III. The continuing success of University of Wisconsin-Whitewater football has made the people of Wisconsin, and alumni throughout the country, very proud.