Russell Feingold

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in 1906, Wisconsin sent a new Senator to Washington, and this body and this Government have never been the same since. From the moment he arrived, delivering powerful orations on the floor of this Chamber and taking on the most powerful interests in this country and all around the world, he became the stuff of legend. Of course, I am talking here about Robert M. La Follette, Sr., who was destined to become one of the greatest Senators in the history of this distinguished body. It is fitting that his portrait now hangs in the Senate reception room outside of this Chamber, along with just four other legendary Senators: Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Robert Taft. When he came to this body, La Follette was already known as an insurgent, and his arrival made more than a few of his colleagues nervous, including, of course, the Senate's leadership. At the time, because this was prior to the ratification of the 17th amendment in 1913, Senators were still appointed by State legislatures, and La Follette himself had been appointed to fill the office after he served as Governor of Wisconsin for 5 years. By and large, however, the Senate of the early 1900s was dominated by the powerful economic interests of the day: the railroads, the steel companies, and the oil companies, and others. Senator La Follette did not disappoint those in his State and across the country who looked to him to champion the interests of consumers, taxpayers, and citizens against those entrenched economic forces. The Senate in those days, if you can imagine this, had an unwritten rule that freshman Senators were not supposed to make floor speeches. La Follette broke that rule in April of 1906. He gave a speech that lasted several days and covered 148 pages of the Congressional Record. Speaking on the most important legislation of the year, the Hepburn Act regulating railroads, La Follette discussed the power of the railroad monopolies and declared: At no time in the history of any nation has it been so difficult to withstand those forces as it is right here in America today. Their power is acknowledged in every community and manifest in every lawmaking body. So La Follette offered amendments to try to make railroad regulation more responsive to consumer interests. His amendments lost, of course, but that was part of the plan. That summer he went on a speaking tour across the country. He described his efforts to change the Hepburn Act. And then he did something extraordinary and unprecedented: He read the rollcall on his amendments name by name. This ``calling of the roll'' became a trademark of La Follette's speeches. Its effect on audiences was powerful. You see, at the time Senators' actual votes on legislation were not as well known publicly as they are today. And then when Americans found out that their Senators were voting against their interests, they were shocked and they were angry. The New York Times reported the following: The devastation created by La Follette last summer and in the early fall was much greater than had been supposed. He carried senatorial discourtesy so far that he has actually imperiled the reelection of some of the gentlemen who hazed him last winter. La Follette's calling of the roll was part of an effort to expose corporate and political corruption. His view was that powerful economic interests controlled the Senate, preventing it from acting in the public interest. Then, in 1907, just a year after La Follette had come to the Senate, the Congress finally acted on legislation that had been under consideration since an investigation a few years earlier of insurance industry contributions to the political parties. That legislation, the Tillman Act, banned corporations from making political contributions in connection with Federal elections. Today, over 90 years later, obviously much has changed in the Senate and in the country. For one thing, the votes of Senators are available almost instantly on the Internet and published regularly in the newspapers. Come election time, political ads remind voters regularly about our voting records. La Follette's idea that the public should know how its representatives have voted and it should hold those representatives accountable for their votes is well accepted in our modern political life. The power of corporate and other interests in the Senate is still too strong. The nearly century-old prohibition on corporate political contributions is now a mere fig leaf made meaningless by the growth of soft money. Today, corporations, unions and wealthy individuals give unlimited--I repeat, unlimited--contributions of soft money to the political parties. While, technically, corporations still do not contribute directly to individual campaigns, they might as well be. Individual Members of Congress get on the phone and raise soft money for their parties, and that money is in turn targeted at congressional races. Some Members have set up so-called leadership PACs to accept soft money for use in their own political endeavors. Soft money has, once again, given corporations the kind of influence over this Congress that La Follette railed against on this very floor. Since I have come to the Senate, I have noticed that we talk about the money that funds our campaigns and the influence on policy only a few times a year. That is when we are debating actual campaign finance legislation. It is almost as if the influence of campaign money on our business here is an abstract proposition, relevant only when we debate changing the way campaigns are financed. But we all know that the power of money in this body is much more pervasive and, I would say, insidious than that. We know, if we are honest with ourselves, that campaign contributions are involved in virtually everything that this body does. Campaign money is the 800-pound gorilla in this Chamber every day that nobody talks about but that cannot be ignored. All around us and all across the country, people notice the gorilla. Studies come out on a weekly basis from a variety of research organizations and groups that lobby for campaign finance reform that show what we all know: The agenda of the Congress seems to be influenced by campaign money. But in our debates here, we are silent about that influence, and how it corrodes our system of government. Mr. President, we can allow that silence no longer. In the tradition of my illustrious predecessor Senator La Follette, I am inaugurating a modern version of the Calling of the Roll. I will call it the ``Calling of the Bankroll.'' I don't expect to be listing votes or specific contributions to specific Senators, but I will be providing vital information, both to my colleagues and the public, as to how much money special interests are donating overall to candidates and political parties. I'll be providing a context for evaluating our debates on legislation, and I'll be doing it right here on this floor, and in the Congressional Record, for the convenience of the public and my colleagues. I plan to Call the Bankroll from time to time here on the floor of this Senate as we debate significant legislation and at least until this body passes a campaign finance reform bill. This body can no longer ignore the 800 pound gorilla. I'm going to point him out sometimes when I speak on a bill, because I think we in the Senate need to face this issue head on. We cannot just pull our head out of the sand to discuss the influence of money on the legislative process once a year when we take up a campaign finance bill. I am sure my colleagues are familiar with the old adage that is attributed to Otto von Bismark: ``If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being made.'' Well, we might not like to admit that campaign contributions are an ingredient of our legislation, but we know that they are. And the public knows too, although they might not know the details. But it's those details which help the public see the big--and disturbing--picture of the influence of wealthy interests on our legislation. It's time to illustrate clearly how our flawed campaign finance system, which corrupts our democracy, also affects our daily lives. The public has a right to this information--it has a right to know how the special interests have worked to influence legislation, and how that influence has had an impact on everything from defense spending to the Y2K problem, and just about everything in between. I think this information should be part of our public debate on important legislation, and that's why I will Call the Bankroll from this floor. In fact I've already started to do this over the past few weeks on several occasions. For example, when we considered the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill, which included a rider to delay the implementation of new mining regulations, I called attention to the more than $29 million the mining industry contributed to congressional campaigns during the last three election cycles, and the $10.6 million the industry made in soft money contributions during the same period. During our debate over the Juvenile Justice bill, I noted the $1.6 million the NRA gave in PAC money in the last election cycle, and the $146,000 in PAC money Handgun Control gave during the same period. Just last month, when I argued for my amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill concerning the Super Hornet, I included information about the more than $10 million in PAC and soft money contributions the defense industry made in the last cycle. I also pointed out during the debate on Y2K legislation that the computer and electronics industry gave close to $6 million in PAC and soft money in 1997 and 1998, while the Association of Trial Lawyers of America gave $2.8 million. We have many difficult and important bills to work on this year, Mr. President: bankruptcy reform, financial modernization when it comes back from conference, a patients' bill of rights, and all of our spending bills. It won't be difficult, indeed it will be easy, to find examples in each of those areas of huge campaign contributions coming from industries and groups that are affected by our work. The bankruptcy reform bill itself is a prime example: The members of the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition--an industry lobbying group made up of the major credit card companies, and associations representing the nation's big banks and retailers--gave nearly $4.5 million in contributions to parties and candidates in the last election cycle. The public deserves to know about this, Mr. President. It deserves to know about the campaign contributions these interests are giving us and our political parties at fundraisers--fundraisers that sometimes take place the night before or the night after we vote on bills that affect them. Now Mr. President, I do not have any pride of authorship here, nor do I plan to lay out the whole picture of campaign contributions that might be relevant to our discussion of a bill. To the contrary, I encourage my colleagues to join this debate. And in particular I want to recognize the effort of my friend the Senator from South Carolina, who on Tuesday came to this floor during the closing debate on the Y2K bill, calling his own roll of the high tech companies that have made campaign contributions to this Congress. If any of my colleagues feel that the contributions of a different industry or interest group should be highlighted, I encourage them to add that information to their remarks in this chamber. I will also welcome any corrections or additions that my colleagues might wish to provide. Nor do I believe that organizations that may have supported me should be exempt from the Calling of the Bankroll. Providing information about the contributions of any group or interest is welcome, and, more than that, it is critical to the purpose of this effort. This information should be in the Record, and all Senators should be aware that these facts are in the Record as they decide how to cast their votes. It is time that the 800-pound gorilla of campaign money be made a part of our debate on legislation. I look forward to the day when the Calling of the Bankroll will no longer be necessary; when this body has adopted bipartisan campaign finance reform legislation to ban soft money and to restore the vitality of the law banning corporate contributions to federal elections that was enacted in 1907, the year after Robert La Follette of Wisconsin came to the Senate. Let me close with another quote from Senator La Follette's inaugural speech on the floor of the Senate. He was responding to the argument that public sentiment had been whipped into an unreasonable hysteria over the question of whether the railroads controlled the Congress. His words seem quite apt to me as a response to those who argue on this floor that we really have no campaign finance problem in this country-- and that the media and the groups that support reform exaggerate the impact of money on the legislative process. He said: [I]t does not lie in the power of any or all of the magazines of the country or of the press, great as it is, to destroy, without justification, the confidence of the people in the American Congress. . . . It rests solely with the United States Senate to fix and maintain its own reputation for fidelity to public trust. It will be judged by the record. It can not repose in security upon its exalted position and the glorious heritage of its traditions. It is worse than folly to feel, or to profess to feel, indifferent with respect to public judgment. If public confidence is wanting in Congress, it is not of hasty growth, it is not the product of `jaundiced journalism.' It is the result of years of disappointment and defeat. Mr. President, the Senate must respect the public judgment and fix its reputation for fidelity to the public trust. It must let the solid bipartisan majority of this body that supports reform, work its will and pass a campaign finance reform bill this year. Until it does, Mr. President, I plan to Call the Bankroll. I'm going to acknowledge the 800 pound gorilla in this chamber, and I'm going to ask my colleagues to do the same. And then I'm going to see if we can't agree that it's time to show him the door. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I appreciate all the hard work that has been done on this legislation by my colleagues. I know they are sincere in their concern about the effect of Y2K computer failures and in their desire to do something to encourage solutions to those problems in advance of the end of the year. But this bill is ill-considered and ill-advised. As the Justice Department has noted with respect to original version of this bill, and I think the judgment remains accurate: this bill would be ``by far the most sweeping litigation reform measure ever enacted if it were approved in its current form. The bill makes extraordinarily dramatic changes in both federal procedural and substantive law and in state procedural and substantive law.'' For all the heated rhetoric we have heard on this floor over the past few days, I have not seen evidence that legislation is needed to create incentives for businesses to correct Y2K problems. More importantly, I do not agree that this bill actually creates those incentives. Indeed, I think that in many ways it does just the opposite. It rewards the worst actors with its damages caps and its prohibition of recovery for economic loss, and it may even give incentives to delay corrective action with the cooling off period and the changes in class action rules. A major concern that I have about this bill is the breathtakingly broad and unprecedented preemption of state law that it contains. I simply do not agree that we should overrule the judgment of state legislatures and judges who have defined the law in their states for traditional contract and tort cases. This bill benefits one class of businesses, those who sell products that may cause Y2K problems, over another class of business, those who buy such products, and individual consumers. It completely disregards whether state lawmakers and judges would reach the same conclusions. I see no reason why Congress should dictate tort and contract law to the states. Protections for injured parties that have been developed through decades of experience are being summarily wiped out by the Congress, on the basis of a very thin record. Mr. President, that is not right. Another serious problem with this bill has to do with the elimination of joint and several liability in the vast majority of Y2K cases. Mr. Chairman, we all have heard many times the horror story of a poor deep pocket defendant found to be only 1% liable who ends up on the hook for the entire judgment in a tort case. Frankly, I am aware of few actual examples of this phenomenon, but I know it is theoretically possible. A far more frequent occurrence, however, is a case where two or three defendants are found equally liable, but one or more of them is financially insolvent. The real question raised by joint and several versus proportionate liability is who should bear the risk that the full share of damages cannot be collected from one defendant. Who should have the responsibility to identify all potentially liable parties and bring them into the suit? Who should bear the risk that one of the defendants has gone bankrupt? Should it be the innocent plaintiff who the law is supposed to make whole, or a culpable defendant? Mr. President, to me that question is easy to answer. Someone who has done wrong should bear that risk. But states have reached different balances on this question, based on their own experience of decades and decades of tort cases. How is it that we in the Congress all of the sudden became experts on this issue? Where do we get off overriding the judgment of state legislatures on this crucial question of public policy? Now I recognize that changes to the bill obtained by Senator Dodd would limit the effect of the abrogation of joint and several liability in a narrow set of cases involving egregious conduct by defendants or particularly poor plaintiffs. But I don't think this change goes far enough in protecting innocent victims from the harsh reality that sometimes the worst offenders have the least money. Section 6 of this bill eliminates joint and several liability in virtually every Y2K case, and that is wrong. Let me quote one of the bill's stated purposes from Section 2(b) of the bill--``to establish uniform legal standards that give all businesses and users of technology reasonable incentives to solve Y2K computer date-change problems before they develop.'' But Mr. President, this bill doesn't establish uniform standards. It preempts state law only in one direction--always in favor of defendants and against the interests of the injured party. As I stated before, I don't agree that uniform standards are needed. I think our state legislatures and judges are due more respect than this bill gives them. But if there is truly a compelling interest in uniformity, then I do not understand why this bill preempts state laws that offer more protection to injured plaintiffs but not those state laws that are less generous to the injured party. Yesterday, we even adopted, without debate, an amendment offered by Senator Allard that says specifically that any state law that provides more protection for defendants in Y2K cases than this bill does is not preempted. So preemption is a one-way street here. If you're in a state where the law is moving in the same direction as this bill and cutting back on the damages that can be recovered in a Y2K suit, you're fine, but if your state is going in the wrong direction, you get run over. Mr. President, that is not fair. And it certainly is not consistent with the bill's stated purpose of providing uniform national standards. Let me give you one example. About 30 states have no caps on punitive damages. Three other states have caps that are more generous than the caps in this bill. In Y2K cases involving defendants who are small businesses as defined in this bill, those state laws would be preempted. About a dozen states have higher caps on some kind of cases and lower caps on others. This bill would partially preempt those state laws, overriding the balance that the duly elected state legislatures in question decided was fair and just. Six states do not allow punitive damages in tort cases, and one has caps that are lower than those permitted under this bill. Those states would be allowed to continue to apply the judgments of their legislatures and courts in Y2K cases. My state of Wisconsin has generally rejected imposing arbitrary caps on punitive damages, instead trusting judges and juries to determine an appropriate punishment for defendants who act in a particularly harmful and intentional or malicious way. The state of Washington, to take an example, has eliminated punitive damages. Why should the policy decisions of the state of Washington be respected by this Congress more than the policy decisions of Wisconsin--or Pennsylvania, or Arizona, or New York, or the majority of states. The one-sided tilt of this bill is very troubling. Punitive damages caps of any kind are bad ideas I believe. Remember that in every state punitive damages can be awarded only in cases of intentional or outrageous misconduct. So the protection offered by these caps goes to the very worst Y2K offenders--those who have acted intentionally or maliciously to avoid fixing their Y2K problems. Where is the justice and balance in that? Mr. President, because I think it's important for the Senate to take every aspect of legislation into account in our debate here on the floor, I have a few more facts I'd like to add--facts about how much money has been donated to the political parties and to candidates by a couple of powerful groups that have a huge stake in this bill. Now the dollar figures I'm about to cite, keep in mind, are only for the last election cycle, 1997 to 1998. First there's the computer and electronics industry, which gave close to $6 million in PAC and soft money during the last election cycle--$5,772,146 to be exact. And there's also the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, which gave $2,836,350 in PAC and soft money contributions to parties and candidates in 1997 and 1998. As I said, I cite these figures so that as my colleagues weigh the pros and cons of this bill, they, and the public, are aware of the financial interests that have been brought to bear on the legislation. The lobbying efforts, as we know, have been significant, and so have the campaign contributions. And the public can be excused if it wonders if those contributions have distorted the process by which this bill was crafted. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Administration has indicated it will veto this bill in its current form. I will support that veto as well as voting against the bill. We need to encourage problem solving and remediation to avoid a disaster on January 1 in the Year 2000. But we don't need to enact this bill. Indeed, while trying to address a supposed litigation explosion, we may well have created an explosion of unfairness to people and businesses who are injured by the negligent or reckless behavior of those who sell non-Y2K compliant products.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, June is a very special month for this nation's dairy industry. It is the month farmers and consumers join together to commemorate the contributions and history of our great dairy industry by celebrating National Dairy Month. Even before the 1937 inception of National Dairy Month, Wisconsin led the nation in milk and cheese production. Even today, Wisconsin leads the nation in cheese volume, processing nearly 90 percent of the more than 22 billion pounds of milk produced into cheese. More than 350 varieties of cheese are produced in the state, including, Cheddar, American, Muenster, Brick, Blue and Italian, not to mention the famous Limburger cheese variety, which is only produced in Wisconsin. Also, Wisconsin buttermakers produce nearly 25 percent of the America's butter supply. National Dairy Month is the American consumer's oldest and largest celebration of dairy products and the people who have made the industry the success it is today. During June, Wisconsinities will hold nearly 100 dairy celebrations across our state, including dairy breakfasts, ice cream socials, cooking demonstrations, festivals and other events. These events all highlight the quality, variety and great taste of Wisconsin dairy products and honor the producers who make it all possible. June Dairy Month is a time to celebrate America's dairy industry and Wisconsin dairy's proud tradition and heritage of quality. It provides Wisconsin's dairy farmers a special time to reflect on their accomplishments and those of their ancestors, and to look forward to continued success in the future. Wisconsin was nicknamed America's Dairyland in the 1930s, but it became a leader in the industry soon after the first dairy cow came to Wisconsin in the 1800's. Dairy history and the state's history have been intertwined from the beginning. Why, before Wisconsin was even declared a state, Wisconsin's first cheese ``factory'' established when one clever Wisconsinite combined milk from her cows with milk from her neighbor's cows and made it into cheese. Other Wisconsin dairy firsts include: the development of Colby cheese in 1874, the creation of brick cheese in 1875, the first dairy school in America--established in 1891 at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the first statewide dairy show in the U.S. in 1928, and the creation of the world-record holding 40,060 pound, Grade-A Cheddar cheese in 1988. And Wisconsin also can claim one of the best-tasting inventions in the history of dairy industry: the creation of the first ice cream sundae in 1881. Also unique to Wisconsin's dairy industry is the crowing of ``Alice in Dairyland.'' This lucky young woman serves as the state's dairy ambassador all over the country, and often in other parts of the world. Last year's Alice, Jennifer Hasler of Monroe, represented Wisconsin well as she promoted Wisconsin's agriculture in California, Arizona, Minnesota and even Japan. She generated millions of dollars in unpaid advertising for hard working Wisconsin farmers. I congratulate her on her achievements and her hard work and wish the new Alice good luck in her year serving Wisconsin agriculture. I am proud to honor this great American tradition--proud to honor the dairy producers not only in Wisconsin, but also those across this great nation.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to support a joint resolution disapproving the extension of normal-trade-relations status to China. This is the fourth time that I have joined with other Senators to support such a resolution because I believe that trade policy is an effective tool that the United States can and should use with respect to the policies of the Chinese Government. I am pleased to join Senator Smith in supporting his resolution. On June 3, President Clinton announced his intention to extend the normal-trade-relations trading status to China. As I understand it, without actually affecting the practical application of tariff treatment, legislation last year replaced the term ``most-favored- nation'' in seven specific statutes with the new phrase ``normal trade relations.'' Regardless of which phrase you use, I find this policy unacceptable. Although we have expected the President to make such a decision, I can only say that under the current circumstances I am once again disappointed in the President's decision. In fact, I have objected to the President's policy since 1994, when he first de-linked the issue of human rights from our trading policy. The argument made then was that trade privileges and human rights are not interrelated. At the same time, it was said, through ``constructive engagement'' on economic matters, and dialogue on other issues, including human rights, the United States could better influence the behavior of the Chinese Government. Clearly events of the last few months have shown the fallacy of that assumption. I have yet to see persuasive evidence that closer economic ties alone are going to transform China's authoritarian system into a democracy. Unless we continue to press the case for improvement in China's human rights record, using the leverage of the Chinese Government's desires to expand its economy and increase trade with us, I do not see how U.S. policy can help conditions in China get much better. De-linking trade and human rights has resulted only in the continued despair of millions of Chinese people, and there is no evidence that NTR or MFN or whatever you want to call it, has significantly influenced Beijing to improve its human rights policies. Basic freedoms--of expression, of religion, of association--are routinely denied. The rule of law, at least as we understand it, does not exist for dissenters in China. Virtually every review of the behavior of China's Government demonstrates that not only has there been little improvement in the human rights situation in China, but in many cases, it has worsened-- particularly in the weeks preceding the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. In fact, China has resumed its crackdown on dissidents who might have attempted to commemorate the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Human rights groups have documented the detention of more than 50 dissidents since May 13, with a number still in custody. These have included two detained for helping to organize a petition calling on the government to overturn its verdict on Tianamen. The detainees include former student leaders at Tiananmen, a member of the fledgling Democracy Party, intellectuals, and journalists. Those not detained have reportedly been under constant surveillance amid calls by China's top prosecutor for a clampdown on ``all criminal activities that endanger state security,'' including such activities as signature gathering and peaceful protest. More generally, five years after the President's decision to de-link MFN from human rights, the State Department's most recent Human Rights Report on China still describes an abysmal situation. According to the report. ``The Government continued to commit widespread and well- documented human rights abuses. * * * Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process.'' This list does not even touch on restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and religion or the continuing abusive family planning practices. In my view, it is impossible to come to any other conclusion except that ``constructive engagement'' has failed to make any change in Beijing's human rights behavior. I would say that the evidence justifies the exact opposite conclusion: human rights have deteriorated and the regime continues to act recklessly in other areas vital to U.S. national interest. We have so few levers that we can use against China. And if China is accepted by the international community as a superpower without regard to the current conditions there, it will believe it can continue to abuse human rights with impunity. The more we ignore the signals and allow trade to dictate our policy, the worse we can expect the human rights situation to become. This year--1999--is likely to be the most important year since 1989 with respect to our relations with China. We face many thorny issues with China, including the accidental embassy bombing, faltering negotiations regarding accession to the World Trade Organizations and the recent release of the Cox report on Chinese espionage. But even with all that is going on, the United States and others in the international community yet again failed to pass a resolution regarding China at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva earlier this spring, largely because China lobbied hard to prevent it. Despite China's efforts to avert a resolution, the United States must also shoulder some of the blame for the failure to achieve passage--our early equivocation on whether we would sponsor a resolution and our late start in garnering support for it no doubt also contributed to the lack of accomplishment in Geneva. While we would certainly prefer multilateral condemnation of China's human rights practices, the failure to achieve that at the UN Commission on Human Rights proves that it is even more important for the United States to use the levers that we do have to pressure China's leaders. We can not betray the sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in Tiananmen Square by tacitly condoning through our silence the continuing abuses. We know that putting pressure on the Chinese Government can have some impact. China released dissident Harry Wu from prison when his case threatened to disrupt the First Lady's trip to Beijing for the U.N. Conference on Women, and its similarly released both Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan around the same time that China was pushing to have the 2000 Olympic Games in Beijing. After losing that bid, and once the spotlight was off, the Chinese government rearrested both Wei and Wang. These examples only affirm my belief that the United States should make it clear that human rights are of real--as opposed to rhetorical--concern to this country. If moral outrage at blatant abuse of human rights is not reason enough for a tough stance with China--and I believe it is and that the American people do as well--then let us do so on grounds of real political and economic self-interest. We must not forget that we currently have a substantial trade deficit with China. Over the past few years, the U.S. trade deficit with China has surged. It has risen from $6.2 billion in 1989 to nearly $57 billion in 1998. Political considerations aside, a deficit of that size represents a formidable obstacle to ``normal'' trading relations with China at any point in the near future. Other strictly commercial U.S. concerns have included China's failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights, the broad and pervasive use of trade and investment barriers to restrict imports, illegal textile transshipments to the United States, the use of prison labor for the manufacture of products exported to the United States, as well as questionable economic and political policies toward Hong Kong. This does not present a picture of a nation with whom we should have normal trade relations. Or, if the Administration accepts these practices as ``normal'', perhaps we need to redefine what normal trade relations are. These are certainly not practices that I wish to accept as normal. My main objective today is to push for the United States to once again make the link between human rights and trading relations with respect to our policy in China. As I have said before, I believe that trade--embodied by the peculiar exercise of NTR renewal--is one of the most powerful levers we have, and that it was a mistake for the President to de-link this exercise from human rights considerations. So, for those who care about human rights, about freedom of religion, and about America's moral leadership in the world, I urge support for S.J. Res 27 disapproving the President's decision to renew normal-trade-relations status for China.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my strong opposition to the fiscal year 2000 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. Mr. President, it is almost painful to witness the way in which this Senate is abdicating its responsibility to scrutinize the Department of Defense. During debate on the fiscal year 2000 DoD authorization bill, we had exactly two amendments that called a multi-billion dollars weapons system into question. On this appropriations bill, we had exactly two amendments worthy of extensive debate. Two amendments, Mr. President. Here we have a defense policy that perpetuates a Cold War mentality into the 21st century, and the Senate has no questions. Mr. President, on the heels of an authorization bill that exemplifies the Pentagon's utter failure to adapt its priorities to the post-Cold War era, the American taxpayer is left holding the bag paying for the mess. There are a number of theories that attempt to explain the difficulties faced by the armed services. There is a dearth of thoughtful solutions. The general consensus is that if we pour enough money into the Defense Department, the problems will go away. Unfortunately, effective problem-solving doesn't work that way. The DoD has a weapons modernization strategy that makes it impossible to buy enough new weapons to replace all the old weapons on a timely basis, even though forces are much smaller than they were during the Cold War and modernization budgets are projected to return to Cold War levels. Consequently, the ratio of old weapons to new weapons in our active inventories will grow to unprecedented levels over the next decade. Subsequently, that modernization strategy is driving up the operating budgets needed to maintain adequate readiness, even though the size of our forces is now smaller than it was during the Cold War. Each new generation of high complexity weapons costs much more to operate than its predecessor, and the low rate of replacement forces the longer retention and use of older weapons. Thus, as weapons get older, they become more expensive to operate, maintain, and supply. Couple this with an accounting system that has failed each and every GAO audit since enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, and you have a poorly managed, misguided strategy inviting disaster. Instead of thoughtfully addressing these shortcomings, Mr. President, we proceed to spend the American taxpayers' money as we have in the past. No change. We continue to promote bigger and more expensive weapons systems at the expense of our men and women in uniform. No matter how much money we throw at this problem, we won't find a solution if we stay on this track. For the past year, Mr. President, we've heard the call to address our military's readiness crisis from virtually all quarters. We were told that foremost among the readiness shortfalls were operations and maintenance as well as pay and allowances accounts. Just last year, there was a virtual consensus that the armed services were facing a readiness crisis. Last September, the Joint Chiefs testified that there was a dangerous readiness shortfall. General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, claimed that ``without relief, we will see a continuation of the downward trends in readiness . . . and shortfalls in critical skills.'' Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer stated that the military faces a ``hollow force'' without increased readiness spending. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson asserted that the Navy has a $6 billion readiness deficit. So it went for all the services. To address the readiness shortfall, Mr. President, the Congress passed an emergency supplemental appropriations bill. The bill was well-intentioned in its support for the efforts of our men and women in uniform. Unfortunately, something happened on the way to the front lines. The bill spent close to $9 billion, but just $1 billion of it went to address the readiness shortfall. We added $1 billion for ballistic missile defense. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization still hasn't spent all that money, yet we've added another $3.5 billion for the BMDO in this bill. Last year's supplemental also added billions to what has become an expected emergency, that being our operations in Bosnia. That other unexpected emergency, the year 2000, received a billion dollars. And so it went. What happened to readiness? One provision in this bill casts a pall over the readiness needs of our service members and highlights, in microcosm, the Defense Department's misguided priorities. This appropriations bill will spend upwards of $40 million in the next fiscal year, and perhaps as much as half a billion dollars over the next ten years on luxury jets for four- star generals. Am I missing something or is this absurd? We actually have more than 11,000 troops that qualify for food stamps and DoD can justify spending tens of millions of dollars next year for luxury jets. How can this be? Mr. President, one concern goes to the heart of the entire debate on our national defense. The underlying question is this: Why should the Pentagon receive billions dollars more in funding when it has failed utterly to manage its budget? Throwing good money after bad isn't tolerated at other departments and agencies. Why is it tolerated with DoD? Defense Week reported just yesterday that the Navy has lost track of almost $1 billion worth of ammunition, arms and explosives. Additionally, DoD has yet to pass an audit. A 1998 GAO audit couldn't match more than $22 billion in DoD expenditures with obligations; it could not find over $9 billion in inventory; and it documented millions in overpayments to contractors. GAO concluded that ``no major part of DoD has been able to pass the test of an independent audit.'' Mr. President, this bill also has some painful implications for other federal programs. Essentially, we are spending tax dollars on a wasteful and misguided defense strategy while domestic programs face steep spending cuts in the upcoming fiscal year. The bill exceeds the Pentagon's request by $1.4 billion. It spends $1.4 billion more than the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe is sufficient to meet our national defense needs. And that additional money is coming out of vital domestic programs that were already facing spending cuts. Mr. President, I cannot vote to increase the defense budget by tens of billions of dollars, including tens of millions for corporate jets, while the budgets for veterans health care, education, agriculture and other programs are facing deep cuts. Supporting the Defense Department's misguided spending priorities is not synonymous with supporting the military. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to stand in strong support for this amendment. This straightforward amendment to strike tens of million of dollars for luxury aircraft for military commanders, brought to the floor by Senators Boxer and Harkin is about our men and women in uniform. It is about the men and women that we have heard so much about over the past years, the central players in the services' readiness crisis. It is about the men and women whose lives are on the line in operations around the world. There is no question, Mr. President, that we must provide them with the necessary resources to defend themselves and the United States. Just last year, there was a virtual consensus that the armed services were facing a readiness crisis. Last September, the Joint Chiefs testified that there was a dangerous readiness shortfall. General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, claimed that ``without relief, we will see a continuation of the downward trends in readiness . . . and shortfalls in critical skills.'' Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer stated that the military faces a ``hollow force'' without increased readiness spending. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson asserted that the Navy has a $6 billion readiness deficit. So it went for all the services. To address the readiness shortfall, the Congress passed on emergency supplemental appropriations bill. The bill was well-intentioned in its support for the efforts of our men and women in uniform. Unfortunately, something happened on the way to the front lines. The bill spent close to $9 billion, but just $1 billion of it went to address the readiness shortfall. We added $1 billion for ballistic missile defense. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization still has not spent all that money, yet we have added another $3.5 billion for the BMDO in this bill. Last year's supplemental also added billions to what has become an expected emergency, that being our operations in Bosnia. That other unexpected emergency, the year 2000, received a billion dollars. And so it went. What happened to readiness? It is with wonderment that the appropriations bill before us today would spend upwards of $40 million in the next fiscal year, and perhaps as much as half a billion dollars over the next ten years on luxury jets for four-star generals. Am I missing something or is this absurd? We actually have troops that qualify for food stamps and DOD can justify spending tens of millions of dollars next year for luxury jets. This bill will allow the Air Force to lease executive business Gulfstream V jets for the military's unified and regional commanders in chief. This bill also spends $27 million for five UC-35 corporate aircraft that the Pentagon did not even ask for this year. How can this be? According to John Hamre, the assistant secretary of defense, DOD has an inventory of almost 500 operational support airlift, or OSA, aircraft, including 70 Learjets. The Army owns 160 OSA aircraft, the Air Force 111 OSA aircraft, the Navy 89 OSA aircraft; and the Marines 24. The General Accounting Office found that DOD's operational support fleet ``far exceeded any possible wartime requirement.'' Yet, the Air Force and certain members of Congress believe this to be a high military priority. Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to close their eyes for a few minutes while I describe the jet that has become such a military priority. I take this directly from Gulfstream's website: From the 100 percent fresh air control system, to the comfortably maintained 6,000 foot cabin altitude at 51,000 feet, to cabin size--a generous 1,669-cubic-feet and the longest in the industry--the Gulfstream V provides an interior environment unmatched in transoceanic business travel. The jet also offers a substantial outfitting allowance of 6,700 pounds--more than 12 percent greater than any other business aircraft current or planned--which affords owners and operators the freedom to select furnishings and equipment with minimum tradeoffs. Space-age titanium mufflers and vibration isolators eliminate hydraulic system noise. Plentiful insulation in the side panels reduces sound further, and we've even reengineered Gulfstream's trademark expansive, oval windows to lessen noise levels. The total effect is library-like science conducive to a productive trip. Now I ask my colleagues to open their eyes and face reality. Supporting the Defense Department's misguided spending priorities is not synonymous with supporting the military. I urge my colleagues to look themselves in the mirror and credibly ask themselves if they can support corporate jets for generals while front-line troops muddle by on food stamps. Which is the higher priority? I cannot vote to increase the defense budget by tens of billions of dollars, including tens of millions for corporate jets, which the budgets for veterans' health care, education, agriculture and other programs are facing deep cuts. Throwing good money after bad is not tolerated at other Departments and agencies. Why is it tolerated with DOD? Defense Week reported just yesterday that the Navy has lost track of almost 1 billion dollars' worth of ammunition, arms and explosives. Additionally, DOD has yet to pass an audit. A 1998 GAO audit couldn't match more than $22 billion in DOD expenditures with obligations; it could not find over $9 billion in inventory; and it documented millions in overpayments to contractors. GAO concluded that ``no major part of DOD has been able to pass the test of an independent audit.'' Mr. President, we need some accountability in the Defense Department. Voting for the Boxer-Harkin amendment shows that the Senate supports our men and women in uniform. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. I am sorry, I can't hear the Senator.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, first with regard to the second amendment, the one before us now having to do with the question of performance parameters, there have been some concerns raised by the Senators from Virginia and Michigan about reference to the role of the GAO in this amendment. At this time I ask unanimous consent that portion of the amendment be deleted to address their concerns.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Navy would like to rely on flight test data from the single seat E version of the Super Hornet to claim that the aircraft procured under the Navy's F/A-18E/F program will perform up to specifications. Here is the problem. Fifty-six percent of the planes the Navy intends to buy will be the lower performing two- seat F models. My amendment to address this sleight of hand is simple and sensible. It would require that the majority of aircraft ordered under the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program meet the key performance parameters in the Operational Requirements Document before going into full-rate production and before the Navy enters into a multi-year procurement contract. Mr. President, my colleagues are well aware of my concerns about the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft program. Over the past three years, I've delved into the program's flaws in agonizing detail. Earlier, I was on the floor to offer an amendment that institutes a cost cap on the E/F program. At the time, I took this body through a wide-ranging review of facts and figures from the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the General Accounting Office, on the Super Hornet's shortcomings. So I won't subject my colleagues to more of the same facts showing how the Super Hornet program fails to improve on the existing Hornet program more than marginally, or in a cost-effective manner. Mr. President, I'm sure many of my colleagues wonder why I continue on this lonesome crusade. I continue this effort pilots' lives will be placed at risk in the F/A-18E/F for the next 25 to 30 years. On top of that, taxpayers are being asked to pay more than $45 billion for this program. Mr. President, the amendment I offer simply requires the Super Hornet to meet existing performance specifications before going into full-rate production. It is simply a common sense measure. To briefly summarize the contracting process, in 1992, the Secretary of the Navy and the aircraft's primary contractor, Boeing, entered into a contract for the development, testing, and production of the Super Hornet. Within a follow-up Operational Requirements Document, or ORD, which was signed off by the Navy in April, 1997, are a number of key performance parameters. Essentially, Mr. President, the contract states explicitly what the Navy wants the plane to be able to do. Mr. President, the Navy wanted, and I assume still wants, a plane with increased range, increased payload, greater bringback capability, improved survivability, and increased growth space over the existing F/ A-18C Hornet aircraft. The Navy calls these improvements the pillars of the Super Hornet program. As I stated earlier, premier among the Navy's justifications for the purchase of the Super Hornet is that it fly significantly farther than the Hornet. As recently as this past January, the Navy claimed the E/F would be able to fly up to 50 percent farther than the Hornet. Mr. President, again, these improvements have yet to be proven in reality. And in the realm of reality, initial Super Hornet range predictions have declined as actual flight data has been gathered and incorporated into further prediction models. If the anticipated, but yet to be demonstrated range improvements are not included in the estimates, the Super Hornet range in the interdiction role amounts to a mere 8 percent improvement over the Hornet. According to GAO, this is not a significant improvement. Mr. President, not only does the Super Hornet fall short in its range, but also in its payload capacity, and growth space improvements. On top of that, the Super Hornet is worse than the Hornet is turning, acceleration, and ability to climb. Again, this plane will cost far more, perhaps twice as much as the current model. As I mentioned earlier, the General Accounting Office testified recently before Congress that the Super Hornet is not meeting all of its performance requirements, is behind schedule, and above cost, regardless of Navy boasts to the contrary. The agency offered evidence of shortcomings in each and every area of the Navy declared as justifications for the aircraft. GAO also states that some of the Navy's assumed improvements to the aircraft have yet to be demonstrated. Mr. President, the Navy's statements on performance reflect the single-seat E model of the aircraft, not the less-capable two-seat F model. This is troubling because the model of the aircraft, not the less-capable two seat F model. This is troubling because the F model comprises 56 percent of the Pentagon's purchasing plan for the Super Hornet. Again, Mr. President, the Navy's statements on performing are based on projections, not actual performance. According to GAO, which has been reviewing the program for more than three years, the aircraft continues to offer only marginal improvements over the Hornet, the same finding GAO made in 1996. After three years of development and testing, Mr. President, we still stand to gain only marginal improvements that don't outweight the cost. Again, Mr. President, I have stood on the floor of the United States for three years now discussing the inadequacies of the Super Hornet program. And for three years, a majority of my colleagues have turned a deaf ear to the facts. I hold out hope that this body will use some measure of common sense in procuring this aircraft. Mr. President, this amendment merely enforces what should be blatantly obvious. Before moving to full-rate production, or entering into a multi-year procurement contract, of the Super Hornet, the contract between the Navy and its contractor should be enforced. The Navy signed a contract to receive a plane that can do certain things. I agree with the Navy. The plane ought to do certain things. We shouldn't go forward until we know that it really does those things. This amendment simply requires that the Navy receive the plane it expects. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays, I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, it is pretty obvious at this point that any effort to question any weapons system is considered an effort to somehow undercut the military strength of our country. The fact is that we have a responsibility to do some oversight on our own. We should not just take the word of Government bureaucrats, whether they are in one Department or the other--the Defense Department or Department of Agriculture. We should not just take their word for it. We have some responsibility to look at the questions that have been raised by independent bodies such as the General Accounting Office that say there are real problems. There has been a great effort here to distort my amendment. It takes the Navy's figure of $8.8 billion and uses that for the cost cap. That is what it does. We have done this before on this particular airplane. My amendment to do this in another phase of the program a couple of years ago was accepted, and it worked just fine. On the engineering and manufacturing development portion of it, it was not a radical attack. This simply takes the Navy's own numbers and holds them to it. We all know what happens with the incredible cost increases that occur with these planes. Where is the role of oversight of the Senate? There is a attitude of ``don't confuse me with the facts'' when it comes to such a complicated, expensive program. It is a $45 billion program, and we are whitewashing the whole thing, even though the General Accounting Office--not me, but the GAO--has identified problems on each of the five pillars of the program. There was essentially no substantive response to any of the points the GAO made that I laid out. They just repeated the facts of the original claims without saying one thing about what has been determined about problems with survivability, and with the additional space. It simply is not as good as originally claimed. So what we are left with is a blank check. This is the only challenge to any weapons system on the floor of the Senate on this entire bill. Where have we come to, that we scrutinize and cut so many other areas of Government? I have worked hard on that and have a good record on it. But why doesn't the Defense Department, and why don't these weapons systems have to share in the scrutiny of everything else? There are problems with this plane. My amendment doesn't terminate the plane; it says we ought to hold them to a dollar amount that the Navy itself has identified. Regarding the Senator's point, that technology improvement language he thinks would help is a giant loophole that will allow anything to get through to add to the cost. In fact, you could fly a Super Hornet through that loophole. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in the last 10 years, the defense industry gave almost $40 million to the two national political parties. For that kind of money, these interests could have gotten their own Hornet. Unfortunately, they would have needed another $36 million to get themselves a Super Hornet. Boeing, the Super Hornet's primary contractor, gave more than $3 million in PAC money and more than $1.5 million in soft money during that same period. There were no PACs in Eisenhower's day, but this is what he warned us about, only with higher stakes than he may have imagined. I have stood on the floor of the Senate for 3 years now discussing the inadequacy of the Super Hornet program. And for 3 years, Congress has turned a deaf ear to the facts. I harbor no illusions that the Super Hornet will be terminated. I do hold out hope that this body will use some common sense in procuring the aircraft. My amendment does nothing more than set a cost cap using the exact dollar amount put forward by the Navy--nothing more, nothing less. We owe it to our naval aviators to give them a product worthy of their courage and dedication. And we owe it to the American taxpayers to ensure that we are using their money to modernize our Armed Forces wisely. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is a straightforward, common sense measure that establishes greater accountability in the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program. The Navy and Boeing say they need $8.8 billion over the next five years to procure the Super Hornet. Specifically, they say the $8.8 billion would procure the airframe, contractor furnished equipment, and engines. My amendment simply sets a cost cap that holds them to that amount. My amendment doesn't terminate the funding; it doesn't hold that money up; it doesn't even restrict use of the money. My amendment just holds them to the amount that they say they need. I would like to discuss the spectacular medicocrity of the Navy's F/ A-18E/F, or Super Hornet, aircraft program, and to raise concerns about the poor decisions that have been made with regard to this breathtakingly expensive program. President Eisenhower warned us four decades ago about the inexorable momentum of the military-industrial complex. Today we face the military-industrial-congressional complex that plods forward with a relentlessness that Ike, for all his foresight, could not have imagined. I have long feared that the Super Hornet is not the future of naval aviation, but rather a step backward. The Super Hornet just isn't worth the cost. It's as simple as that. The Pentagon wants to spend 45 billion of our tax dollars to buy the Super Hornet for the Navy. But the plane isn't as good, in some respects, as the one they currently use, and may have design problems that could cost billions more to fix. ``Super'' is not the way to describe this plane--``superfluous'' really is. For very limited gain, the American taxpayers are getting hit with a 100 percent premium on the sticker price. At this point in the program's development and testing, my colleagues may be asking why I continue to tilt at this windmill. I continue this effort in part because pilots' lives may be placed at risk in the E/F for the next 25 to 30 years. I come to the floor today to point out not just the failings of the Super Hornet but the failed decision-making process that has brought us to this point--a point where both the Pentagon and Congress continue to approach a 21st century reality with a Cold War mentality. Exhibit A for this failed decisionmaking process is the Defense Department's current strategy for its aviation programs. The Super Hornet is just one overpriced piece of this strategy, which carries an almost $350 billion price tag. Here is the real kicker: The strategy will not even adequately replace our existing tactical aviation fleet. This strategy has been roundly criticized. It has been criticized by the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, members of the congressional Armed Services Committees, the Cato Institute, and defense experts such as President Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense, Lawrence Korb. The Navy's Super Hornet is just the crown jewel in this misguided tactical aviation acquisition strategy. The story of the Super Hornet is one of huge sums of money spent with really very disappointing returns. The plane's failings have been expensive and alarming. These problems do not just empty our pocketbook; they could endanger our pilots. I want to discuss what the Navy has described as the ``pillars'' of the Super Hornet program. These are the performance parameters that the Navy touts as justifications for this expensive program. But these pillars have become problems. First and foremost is the plane's range. The Navy argues that the Super Hornet will fly significantly farther than the Hornet. But these improvements have yet to be proven in reality. What is worse, initial Super Hornet range predictions have actually declined as flight data has been gathered. By continuing to base range predictions on actual flight test data, the Super Hornet range in the interdiction role amounts to an 8-percent improvement over the Hornet, and this is not particularly impressive. Adding to the range shortcoming is the wing-drop problem. When the Super Hornet is in air-to-air combat, when it most needs to maintain its precise ability to position itself, the plane can lose wing lift, a problem beyond the pilot's control that essentially causes the plane to roll out of position. We have been wrestling with the wing problem for a couple of years now, and it still is not resolved. Potential fixes for the wing-drop problem will decrease range, but since we do not know which solution the Navy will employ, the actual decrease is not yet known. Also affecting the range, believe it or not, is the potential of bombs colliding with each other or with the aircraft. The Navy's solution increases drag, thus resulting in a deficiency that would preclude the aircraft from carrying external fuel tanks. If the aircraft does not carry the two 480-gallon tanks, it will not be able to meet its required range specification. The Navy and its contractor now have little choice but to redesign the wing pylons. A second pillar of the program is survivability. Since the inception of the Super Hornet program, the Navy has asserted that the aircraft will be more survivable than the current Hornet. Based on operational tests, however, survivability issues now comprise the majority of the program's deficiencies, as identified by the Procurement Executive Office for Tactical Aircraft. A chief survivability problem is that the plane's exhaust will actually burn through its decoy tow line. The towed decoy is designed to attract enemy missiles away from the aircraft. Obviously, losing a decoy will not increase survivability. A third pillar put forth is growth space, or space availability to accommodate new systems. When the Navy was pitching the Super Hornet to Congress, they said the Hornet just did not provide enough space to accommodate additional new systems without removing existing capability. We were told that the Super Hornet would have a 21 cubic feet of growth space versus less than a few feet in the Hornet. But now, GAO actually reports that the Super Hornet has only 5.46 cubic feet of usable growth space. The Navy's F/A- 18 upgrade roadmap shows that most of the upgrades planned for the Super Hornet are already planned to be installed on the Hornet as well. The remaining pillars are that of payload and bringback. The Navy claims that the Super Hornet would provide greater payload and bringback than the Hornet. Increased payload should mean the Super Hornet is able to carry more weapons and fuel, and increased bringback should mean that the Super Hornet should return from its mission carrying more of its unused weapons than the Hornet, so pilots do not have to lessen their load for the trip home by dropping missiles unnecessarily. That is what payload and bringback should mean, but with the Super Hornet, the reality falls short of expectation. Flight tests have revealed additional wing stations that allow for increased payload may cause noise and vibration that could damage missiles. In response to this glitch, the Navy is determining whether the missiles need to be redesigned. The Navy also plans to restrict what can be carried on inner wing pylons during Operational Test and Evaluation because of the excessive loads on them. These restrictions would prohibit the Super Hornet from carrying 2,000-pound bombs on these pylons, which reduces the payload capacity for the interdiction mission. GAO also reports that the pylon load problems could negatively affect bringback. What all this technical talk is about, simply stated, is that the pillars supporting the Super Hornet program are crumbling. But don't take my word for it. Just look at the troubling evidence amassed by the GAO which makes the best case yet against the Super Hornet program. According to GAO, the aircraft's performance is less than stellar. In fact, GAO reports that the aircraft offers only marginal improvements over the Hornet, the same finding it made in 1996. Over the last 3 years, GAO has offered evidence of shortcomings in each and every area the Navy declared as justifications for the Super Hornet. In addition, the Super Hornet is actually worse than the Hornet in turning, accelerating, and climbing--actually worse than the plane we are using now that is less expensive. GAO testified recently before Congress that the Super Hornet is not meeting all of its performance requirements. It is behind schedule, and it is above cost, regardless of Navy boasts to the contrary. The Navy's statements on performance actually reflect the single-seat E model of the aircraft, and it does not factor in the performance of the less capable two-seat F model. This is troubling because the F model actually comprises 56 percent of the Pentagon's purchasing plan for the overall Super Hornet program. Not only that, the Navy's assertions about performance are based on projections, not on actual performance. GAO's work has made crystal clear the setbacks the Super Hornet has already faced and the serious problems that lie ahead. There is really a mountain of evidence against the Super Hornet. The Navy's response to that mountain of evidence has been simply to tell you: It's a molehill; don't worry about it. To close the cost gap between the Super Hornet and Hornet aircraft, Boeing is shutting down production lines for the Hornet. Those lines may be prohibitively expensive to reopen if we ever face the facts and decide that the Super Hornet is not worth the cost and risk. The Navy's response to the Super Hornet's troubles has been to play games, to divert attention from the plane's failings, to keep the Navy from relying on the more reliable Hornet, and, most of all, they are playing games with Federal tax dollars. These games have to stop. For the sake of our pilots and American taxpayers, the Navy must be forthright with us. By any reasonable assessment, the Super Hornet program has problems that have to be corrected before we commit our pilots and our taxpayers to a long-term obligation. But that is what is so disturbing here, Mr. President. At the very moment we should be pausing to reassess this program, in our oversight role, the Navy and the Pentagon are pushing for a multiyear procurement contract. This is despite the fact that the Navy has identified 29 major unresolved deficiencies in the aircraft. The Program Risk Advisory Board, which is made up of Navy and contractor personnel, states that there is a medium risk--a medium risk--that the operational test and evaluation might find the Super Hornet is not operationally effective and/or suitable, even if all performance requirements are met. In other words, even if they fix all the problems plaguing the plane, the Super Hornet still might not cut the mustard. How can we sign off on a 5-year $9 billion contract before an aircraft is certified operationally effective? I am very puzzled by that. Instead of signing off on this leap of faith, I suggest the Navy complete OPEVAL and then reassess the prudence of a multiyear procurement contract. The Super Hornet's OPEVAL will allow the Navy and its contractor to stress the aircraft as it would be stressed in the fleet. A multiyear procurement decision prior to OPEVAL defeats the purpose of the test. It is not unreasonable to ask that all deficiency corrections be incorporated into the aircraft design and successfully tested prior to a 5-year, $9 billion procurement commitment. Not only is it not unreasonable, it is consistent with existing Navy criteria. What concerns me most here is the conduct of the Navy and the Pentagon as they have tried to ensure that the Super Hornet has a place in its aviation program. At every turn, they have pushed this plane, despite all logic to the contrary. They have even resisted answering simple, straightforward questions about the plane's performance. My own experiences trying to extract information from the Pentagon about the Super Hornet's performance have been fraught with difficulties. Last November, I sent a straightforward letter to the Secretary of Defense that asked some simple questions about the status of the E/F. At the time, Congress had just appropriated more than $2 billion for the third lot of production. After that letter, I wrote four additional times urging DOD to answer very specific, clear questions regarding the performance of the aircraft in its latest flight test. Three months later, I received a memorandum stating that it ``addresses some'' of my ``concerns.'' This was unfortunate because I was assured by Pentagon officials familiar with the report that my questions could be easily answered in full. I can assure everyone who is listening that I will not stop asking until I get answers. I would like to conclude my initial remarks by telling my favorite story about this profoundly flawed program. This past January, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition commissioned an independent study to address my questions. I had been asking for a study for some time, so I was heartened and relieved and looking forward to the results. Unfortunately, the person chosen to lead the inquiry is a well known Washington defense lobbyist who had a longstanding business relationship with Boeing, the Super Hornet's primary contractor. During the meeting with my staff, the lobbyist did not disclose his firm's association with Boeing. Later my staff telephoned him, and he described his firm's association with Boeing in response to direct questions from my staff. Then he went on to say that he had terminated his relationship with Boeing ``a few days'' after Mr. Buchanan asked him to perform the independent review--``a few days.'' No one will be shocked to hear that the report was very favorable to the Super Hornet. This latest episode with the Super Hornet highlights a pervasive Pentagon mindset that sometimes sacrifices the interests of our men and women in uniform to the assumption that bigger and more expensive programs are always better. It puts in stark relief the power of the defense industry which gave more than $10 million in PAC money and soft money to parties and candidates in the last election cycle. In the last 10 years, the defense industry gave almost $40 million to the two national political parties. You know, for that much money, they could buy their own Hornet.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I voice my strong opposition to the fiscal year 2000 Department of Defense Authorization Act. It is with disgust and sorrow that we are forced to bear witness to a defense bill that fails, once again, to understand the 21st century reality of national defense. So we set the foundation for our national defense in the new millennium to serve the needs of the Cold War era. Mr. President, this bill exemplifies the Pentagon's utter failure to adapt its priorities to the post-Cold War era. It promotes a pervasive Pentagon mind set that sacrifices the interests of our men and women in uniform to the assumption that bigger and more expensive weapons systems are always better. And even then, the prohibitive cost of the new weapons systems necessary means that we can't replace, on a one-to- one basis, old weapons for newer replacements. No matter how much money we throw at this problem, we won't find a solution. Short of a true shift in the paradigm at the heart of our national defense strategy, this problem will continue unabated. Mr. President, I start with a perennial culprit of misguided defense strategy; that is the continued spending of billions of dollars on wasteful and unnecessary programs. But this year, it's been taken a step further. For the past year, Mr. President, we've heard the call to address our military's readiness crisis from virtually all quarters. We were told that foremost among the readiness shortfalls were operations and maintenance as well as pay and allowances accounts. This 288.8 billion dollar bill would have us increase O&M by all of $1.1 billion, with $1.8 billion for a pay raise and a retirement benefit change. That works out to about 1 percent. I'm sure that our men and women in uniform are not impressed. Mr. President, even the pay raise and retirement change is fraught with uncertainty and was addressed in a less than proper manner. In February, this body passed the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's, and Marines' Bill of Rights. We did so without benefit of hearings, prior to the budget resolution, and prior to the issuance of three reports on whether such changes would improve recruitment and retention in our armed forces. Then, this month, we paid for the entire $1.8 billion price tag for the pay raise and benefit reform in the emergency supplemental bill. Yet we still await reports from the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Department of Defense on the efficacy of that action. Earlier this year, GAO offered preliminary data on a study showing that money has been overstated as a factor affecting decisions to stay in or leave the military. Instead, GAO found that issues like a lack of spare parts; concerns with the health care system; increased deployments; and dissatisfaction with military leaders have at least as much effect on retention, if not more, then pay issues. These are the same concerns that I have heard from the men and women out on the front lines. Mr. President, there's no question that certain services have a recruiting and retention problem. For a variety of reasons, officers and enlisted members are leaving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and these services are having problems bringing enough new people on board. Serious questions remain unresolved about the cause of this problem, or its best solution, yet we will authorize and appropriate the entire $1.8 billion in an extraordinary and inappropriate manner. This is a quick fix that fails to address the recruitment and retention problem in a comprehensive and thoughtful manner. I agree that many service members need a raise. These men and women have chosen to represent our country. They deserve to be paid adequately. Meanwhile, in this bill, Mr. President, programs that didn't even warrant DoD's request will receive $3.3 billion. Additionally, weapons procurement is up $2.9 billion beyond DoD's request. Missile defense programs, that paragon of efficiency and effectiveness, is up $509 million. These and other provisions raise the question, just how important does the Pentagon think our men and women in uniform are? Mr. President, the bill authorizes 2.9 billion dollars for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program. It also authorizes the Navy to enter into a five-year $9 billion multi-year procurement contract for the Super Hornet. It's no secret that I have numerous concerns about the program, but I am also troubled by the manner in which the Pentagon and the Navy have moved the Super Hornet forward. And my concerns are not addressed in the least by this bill. In fact, this bill makes them worse. The Super Hornet program hasn't even begun its Operational Test and Evaluation, yet we're ready to authorize a five-year, $9 billion procurement contract. The program has 29 unresolved, major deficiencies, yet we're ready to authorize a five-year, $9 billion procurement contract. The program still fails significantly to improve on the existing F/A-18C aircraft, yet we're poised to blindly authorize a five-year, $9 billion procurement contract. Mr. President, the logic is baffling. The current Hornet program has been proven reliable and cost- effective. Why do we want to replace the Hornet with a bloated, cost- prohibitive aircraft that offers marginal benefits over a reliable fighter? Mr. President, this bill has some remarkable budgetary issues. Essentially, we can't pay for what this bill authorizes, and remain under the budget caps. The bill meets the fiscal year 2000 Budget Resolution target for budget authority, but current estimates state that the bill exceeds the outlay target in the Budget Resolution by $2 to $3 billion. Even by Washington standards, that is real money. Mr. President, one concern goes to the heart of the entire debate on our national defense. The underlying question is this: Why should the Pentagon receive billions dollars more in funding when it has failed utterly to manage its budget? In a 1998 audit of the Department of Defense, GAO, the official auditors for the U.S. Congress, could not match more than $22 billion in DoD expenditures with obligations; it could not find over $9 billion in inventory; and it documented millions in overpayments to contracts. GAO concluded that ``no major part of DoD has been able to pass the test of an independent audit.'' Throwing good money after bad without accountability is not the answer. Instead, Mr. President, we will sharply increase defense spending. The fiscal year 1999 DoD authorization bill assumed a budget of $250.6 billion. Since that time, the Congress has added $17 billion in emergency spending for defense. That spending boost is not offset and takes money directly from the Social Security Trust Fund. Mr. President, we have done a tremendous job of eliminating our budget deficit. We're staring a huge budget surplus in the face, but we can't seem to handle the temptation to spend it. To spend it before we address Social Security and Medicare is irresponsible, Mr. President. Mr. President, a large part of that success has been due to the willingness of both the Congress and the President to do more with less, to trim excessive spending wherever possible and maintain important services with fewer resources. We have begun to succeed in many areas of government--education, health care, veterans' care, welfare benefits, environmental programs--but not in defense spending, where we continue to build destroyers the Navy does not ask for and continue to build bombers the Air Force does not want. This bill continues this sad tradition. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I send the modification to the desk.

Mr. FEINGOLD. My understanding is the various Senators have negotiated agreement on this, and it is acceptable on both sides. As modified, the Senate is prepared to accept it. Amendment No. 444, As Modified

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is a straightforward, commonsense measure that establishes accountability in the Super Hornet program. It holds the Navy to the $8.8 billion over the next 5 years to procure the Super Hornet. My amendment simply sets a cost cap at that level and holds them to that amount. Again, this amendment holds the Navy to the $8.8 billion, its own figure. It doesn't terminate the funding, it doesn't hold the money up, it doesn't even restrict the use of the money, it just holds them to the amount they say they need. I hope the body will use common sense in procuring this aircraft. The amendment does nothing more than set a cost cap using the exact dollar amount put forward by the Navy; nothing more, nothing less. We owe it to our naval aviators and to the taxpayers to make sure we provide a modernized plane that does what it is supposed to do within the parameters the Navy has set forth itself. Mr. SANTORUM addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a resolution designating June 5, 1999, as ``Safe Night USA.'' Safe Night USA is an exciting program that is helping reduce youth violence, as well as drug and alcohol abuse, in my home state of Wisconsin and around the nation. Safe Night is a low cost, high-profile way to focus national attention on the importance of providing young people with safe alternative activities and tools for conflict resolution, anger management and mediation. I am proud to report Mr. President that Safe Night first began in 1994 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and in 1999 all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands will participate in this exciting program. Mr. President, Olusegun Sijuwade, a Milwaukee Health Department educator and former police officer, developed Safe Night in response to more than 300% increase in violent death and injury in Milwaukee between 1983 and 1993. The Safe Night program in Wisconsin began with 4,000 youth in Milwaukee and by 1996 involved more than 10,000 participants in over 100 sites spread across the state. And now, on June 5, 1999, a million kids are expected to participate in Safe Night programs in 1,200 sites across the country. Mr. President, as you know, last week Congress debated and voted on the Juvenile Justice bill. The resolution I am introducing today is indeed timely and an appropriate response to the juvenile crime statistics we were reminded of last week. These include the over 220,000 juveniles arrested last year for drug abuse and the over 1,000,000 juvenile victims of a violent crime. I believe community- based violence prevention models, like Safe Night USA, are extremely important to stem the rise in juvenile crime. By educating youth, community leaders and parents, Safe Night promotes secure environments for kids and families while reducing the alienation that so often leads to violent crime and substance abuse. Very simply, Mr. President, Safe Night brings community partners together to provide a place for youth to have fun during high-risk evening hours, with three ground rules; no guns, no drugs and no fighting allowed. A typical Safe Night consists of a party, planned by kids and adults in the community, including police officials, church leaders, doctors, teachers, parents, and other volunteers. Held at a school, a church, or a community center, a Safe Night event could have a dance with a disc jockey, an athletic event, or a large dinner, usually interspersed with targeted violence-reduction activities. These activities include role playing, trust-building games, and other methods of teaching kids stress management and alternatives to violence. Safe Night USA 1999 will occur in both rural and urban areas. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and the Black Entertainment Television (BET) Network will broadcast the events nationally. The following community partners have joined with Safe Night USA: the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, National Civics League, 100 Black Men of America, the Resolving Conflict Creatively Center and Educators for Social Responsibility, American Academy of Pediatrics, Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America and the National 4-H Youth Council. Mr. President, it is critical that both families and communities understand that we are not powerless to help prevent destructive behaviors, such as drug abuse, in our children. Safe Night USA helps develop a strong, committed partnership between schools, community and families to foster a drug-free and violence-free environment for our youth. I believe Mr. President that Safe Night USA is a wise investment up front--it is a simple idea that works--and I am proud that it originated in my home state of Wisconsin. I thank my colleagues for their cooperation in passing this resolution and I wish the 10,000 local Safe Night USA events great success on June 5, 1999, as they join in one nationwide effort to combat youth violence and substance abuse. I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arkansas again for his leadership on this critical issue. S. Res. 103 marks the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, when a still unknown number of Chinese--some say hundreds, others, thousands--died at the hands of the People's Liberation Army. Despite the significance of this tragedy, China's leaders remain unwilling to re-examine the events of June 4, 1989. Indeed, they would like nothing more than to have Tiananmen fade from the world's memory. But today, the memory of Tiananmen remains vivid in our minds. In particular, we remember one man who defined the spirit of the day as he stood, with only freedom at his side, and faced down an army tank. We saw him then, and as we think of Tiananmen Square today, we see him still. The memory of Tiananmen refuses to fade because the human rights situation in China remains abysmal. According to Amnesty International more than 200 individuals may remain in Beijing prisons for their role in the 1989 demonstrations. And hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals continue to be detained or imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs. We face many issues with China--the recent embassy bombing, accession to the WTO, charges of espionage--but we can not let these issues silence our voices on the subject of human rights. China's human rights practices continue to be abhorrent, and we should not allow recent events to diminish our continued vigilance on such practices. It is noteworthy that the recent demonstrations in China against the United States are perhaps the largest since the Tiananmen Square protests exactly 10 years ago. It is ironic that public protest is OK when it serves the government's interest, and not OK when it threatens the government's hold on power. In fact, since the end of the bombing-related anti-U.S. demonstrations, China has resumed its crackdown on dissidents who could attempt to commemorate the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The failure to adopt a resolution condemning China's human rights practices at last month's UN Commission on Human Rights makes it all the more urgent that we continue to demand improvements in China's policies. We cannot betray the sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in Tiananmen Square by tacitly condoning through our silence the abuses that continue to this day. This resolution reminds the leaders in Beijing that we will not forget what was done 10 years ago and will not look the other way when they again deny the Chinese people their rights. Until we see genuine progress on human rights, the memory of Tiananmen Square will continue to haunt us. We must not forget. And we must never let the rulers in Beijing forget.