Russell Feingold

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am merely responding to arguments made in response to my arguments. When that ceases, I will cease. I was asked to come down here and offer two amendments this morning. This is the first. If it is in the interests of the Senate that I defer the second to next week, I will be happy to do that, as long as I am assured my opportunity to present it at that time. I have nothing further to say on this amendment, unless somebody wants to debate it further.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, it is fairly easy to try to make the words ``not substantially justified'' sound like a reasonable standard. But what really is going on here is an intrusion into the attorney- client relationship that is very dangerous. I practiced law for several years before running for the Wisconsin State Senate, and I remember always when looking at a client's argument--first of all, I obviously didn't think I could file any argument that was frivolous. That was prohibited both under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure. But there would be a number of occasions where we would have two or three possible arguments to make. One we might think was our strongest argument, and then another might be our sort of middle argument, and then there might be a third legal argument where it was a long shot but we thought the facts were strong. Any good lawyer would bring all three of those arguments, in most cases, because if a judge found any one of the three to be persuasive, that could be the basis. I like to think I would have had the courage as a young attorney to go forward with that third argument, even with this provision. But I didn't have any money, and if I thought that bringing that third argument could cause me to be assessed with attorney's fees that would make it impossible for me to pay my mortgage--I am human. I wonder if I would have done what is right, which is to counsel that client: This one is about a 25-percent possibility, but under the right facts, and I think you might have the right facts here, sir, you ought to bring it. Lawyers should not be put in a position where they believe, except for cases where there is a frivolous claim, that bringing an argument will cause them to have personal harm come to them. That destroys the whole notion of zealous advocacy. This is a serious problem for the relationship between attorney and client, and I really do think to suggest that the ``not substantially justified'' standard is simply a reasonable restraint does not show an understanding of what really goes on in a situation where a lawyer and client sit down and try to come up with the best argument possible. So I reject that suggestion and again urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I enjoy and appreciate working with the Senator from Iowa on many issues, and I have enjoyed all of his remarks except for the suggestion that somehow this is going to be a bad-faith attempt to try to improve the bill, or somehow attempt to benefit attorneys. I feel like I identified some very specific arguments that are real and that are important to the legal system; and, that, although I share the concerns of the Senator about the general system, in fact I think there are abuses in chapter 7. There is no question about that. But what I tried to do is craft an amendment that creates a fair balance. I am not trying to prevent punishment of an attorney who does something wrong. But let me just quickly review the arguments about why this is a reasonable amendment and I don't think was responded to. First of all, I heard nothing about my argument that this creates a conflict of interest. A lawyer has a responsibility under the rules of professional conduct to zealously advocate on behalf of their client. Therefore, it is very rare that our legal system would function well and that attorneys would zealously advocate for their clients if they are afraid that their family and their house could possibly be taken away because they might be assessed with the entire cost of litigation. That is the conflict of interest that this creates. The Senator suggested in an attempt to suggest that we are going to leave no opportunity to punish a wrongdoing lawyer that there is nothing left. That isn't true. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the Bankruptcy Code there are rules about filing frivolous claims. In fact, I remember when I was a young attorney. The first thing I learned when I came into the office as a young associate was you had better not file a pleading that is frivolous or you might be personally assessed for having done so. That is applicable to these situations and would be effective. There is no truth to the suggestion by the Senator from Iowa that the attorney can go off scot-free, if he brings up a ridiculous claim. Furthermore, in fairness to the Senator from Iowa, he did make a point about whether a trustee would be protected in getting his fees in a situation where the case is dismissed. We sent a modified version of this to the desk which addresses that issue. We understood the point of the Senator from Iowa. We listened to him and modified our amendment from committee, because it was pointed out in that there was a conversion from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13; that in that case the trustee would be protected, but not if the chapter proceeding was actually dismissed. That is a fair point. We changed it. It applies to both the dismissal as well as the conversion. I hope it is clear from the Record that the Senator's comments about that provision relates to the amendment we originally proposed, but not the amendment that was sent to the desk. Finally, Mr. President, let's talk for just one second about the real effect of this. The provisions that are in the bill relate only to ``counsel''--an attorney, a licensed attorney. If this goes through and attorneys feel a fear of being assessed these fees in a case where they can't bring a case that they know is airtight, and they don't represent the client, who do they go to? They go to these petition preparers. These petition preparers are the very people who are most likely to do a sloppy job and not care if they bring a frivolous proceeding. But guess what, Mr. President? The petition preparer isn't responsible. The petition preparer would not be under this standard. So what you are doing is pushing these debtors from legitimately licensed attorneys, who know what they are doing, hopefully, to people who are basically in many cases scamming people, and they would have no responsibility at all. That is bad for the debtor. It is bad for the creditor. That is bad for the legal system. That is bad for the congestion in the courts as a result of the bankruptcy system. For all of these reasons, we have a frivolous standard. We make sure that the trustee is protected, whether it is a dismissal, or a conversion. And we try to address the inherent conflict of interest that exists when an attorney has to wonder if their own personal finances are going to be affected because they think they have addressed the best interests in arguments on behalf of a client but they are not certain. This goes too far, and I really hope in good faith that the Senator takes a look at these arguments and the modifications we have made, and considers that this really is a reasonable balance in the context of the larger bill. I yield the floor. Mr. SESSIONS addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, section 102(A)(3) of S. 1301, the section of the bill that would make a debtor's attorney responsible for the costs and the fees of the trustee if the attorney loses a 707(b) motion and the chapter 7 filing if it is found not to be ``substantially justified'' is a very troubling provision. As we know, a 707(b) motion does allow the court to dismiss or convert a bankruptcy petition. This is an important safeguard that protects the bankruptcy system from having abusive chapter 7 filings. There certainly is some abuse by some debtors' attorneys. However, this provision does not punish the attorneys. It actually punishes their clients. This provision, Mr. President, in effect, will deny debtors their right to be represented by counsel. What it will do is deny debtors any meaningful access to chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. Therefore, ultimately, this provision will have the effect of denying debtors equal access to justice. This bill makes the debtor's attorney responsible for the costs and fees of the trustee--not if the bankruptcy filing was brought in bad faith, not if the bankruptcy was frivolous, but only if the motion was ``not substantially justified.'' I believe this is unprecedented in American law. Parties--not their lawyers--are sometimes assessed fees under fee shifting statutes that are designed to level the playing field or encourage certain types of suits. However, unlike section 102(A)(3), every other provision in which lawyers are assessed fees requires affirmative wrongdoing by the lawyer. In every other case the lawyer has to be found to, in effect, have been guilty of affirmative wrongdoing. As we all know, the standard of ``not substantially justified'' is a significantly lesser standard than a ``frivolous'' standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Pierce v. Underwood that ``not substantially justified'' is a standard ``greater than general reasonableness,'' but a standard which ``falls short of that necessary to issue sanctions for frivolousness.'' Given the vaguely defined contours of this standard, it is likely that cases would be dismissed in which there was a good-faith argument that the chapter 7 filing was proper. Indeed, in other contexts, courts have interpreted that the ``not substantially justified'' standard is widely varying. The impact in this provision will be, in effect, to eliminate the filing of chapter 7 cases by debtors' attorneys except in the most clear-cut cases, regardless of whether a chapter 7 filing would actually be in the best interest of the client. Obviously, very few, if any, debtors' attorneys are likely to put their own finances and welfare on the line for such a filing. Or if a few debtors' attorneys do continue to handle such cases, they will likely raise their fees to account for this tremendous risk, thereby pricing themselves out of the market except for the most wealthy of debtors. It is an oxymoron to talk about the wealthiest of debtors. In the end, the result of this attorney's fees provision is that many debtors will be denied the benefit of counsel if they wish to file for chapter 7. In other words, many chapter 7 debtors will be forced to proceed pro se. As we have recently seen in the well-publicized abuses by Sears and others, many pro se debtors, due to their lack of knowledge about the system, suffer abuse under existing bankruptcy law. The bill, as a whole, supplies potentially unprincipled creditors with many new tools to take advantage of pro se debtors. The bill would allow an unscrupulous creditor to make threats of 707(b) motions, threats of discharge ability complaints, and threats of repossessing household goods, which may ultimately result in debtors signing ill- advised reaffirmation agreements. In addition, the attorney's fees provision, because it will compel many debtors now to file pro se, will likely result in a number of debtors having their petitions dismissed for even trivial or procedural mistakes. As you know, pro se cases are frequently dismissed because debtors file papers incorrectly and cannot correct them quickly enough. And, of course, this bill, by forcing more and more debtors to go with pro se representation, simply exacerbates this problem. Mr. President, Section 303 of the bill creates a presumption of bad faith when a case is dismissed for failure to file the required papers in the proper form. This provision, coupled with the fact that significantly more debtors will be forced to file pro se, will mean that many people who filed in good faith will have their petitions dismissed and, thus, will never receive their rightful bankruptcy relief. Moreover, in this the bill's current attorney's fees provision is maintained; it will have the perverse effect of increasing abuses in this area. As previously noted, this provision will cause attorney fees to increase; therefore, more people will be unable to pay attorneys. In addition to catalyzing the pro se problems that I have already discussed, the provision will also cause nonattorney petition preparers to proliferate and they--much more so than debtors' attorneys--have, unfortunately, historically been the No. 1 source of the abusive bankruptcy filings, which this entire bill is so focused upon. Indeed the nonattorney petition preparers have always been most prevalent where bankruptcy attorney's fees are the highest, notably in southern California and, to a lesser extent, in cities like New York. Very few pro se debtors actually prepare their own papers. Most have to seek help from these petition preparers who sometimes do a terrible job for them, give faulty legal advice, and file cases that often prejudice the debtor as well as landlords, mortgage companies, and other creditors. Mr. President, in the end, on an issue like this, we have to be honest with ourselves. These attorney fees provisions are designed to intimidate lawyers into counseling against a chapter 7, plain and simple; that is the goal. This is inherently troubling, but such a provision, Mr. President, creates a blatant conflict of interest between the debtor's attorney and his or her client. What if the client has a valid chapter 7 case and would be better served by a chapter 7? Under this new rule, if we don't change it with this amendment, the attorney will have the perverse incentive to counsel his or her client to enter into chapter 13 in order to protect the attorney's financial interests. This issue was actually raised at one of the hearings called by the Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley. A powerful and troubling example was offered to illustrate the dilemmas that bankruptcy lawyers will potentially face under this bill. The scenario presented was that of a client who supports an elderly relative. Since a lawyer could not be sure if supporting an elderly relative would be considered a ``reasonable living expense,'' the lawyer would be taking a risk, a personal risk, by filing for chapter 7 and zealously arguing--as the attorney is required to do--her or his client's case. Indeed, rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit a lawyer from handling a case ``if representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's * * * own interests.'' Mr. President, this bill would institute a scenario in which a debtor's attorney would arguably violate this rule whenever chapter 7 is at issue. The amendment I am offering aims to prevent the inevitable conflicts of interest, perverse incentives, and harm to vulnerable good-faith debtors that this provision would create. My amendment would simply make all reasonable costs of prosecuting a 707(b) motion incurred by a trustee an administrative expense. Characterization of trustees' fees as an administrative expense would then ensure that the trustee receive reimbursement if the debtor's case is dismissed or converted; but what it would do, also, is prevent the conflict of interest specifically prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct that I just mentioned. Senator Specter and I offered in committee an amendment that would have amended the bill to provide that the debtor's attorney would only be liable if his or her chapter 7 filing was frivolous. This amendment would have simply placed debtors' attorneys in the same position as all other attorneys. That is, they would only be held personally liable if they engaged in some kind of affirmative wrongdoing. This proposed amendment was, however, defeated in committee, but it was defeated by a 9-9 vote. Those Senators who voted no on our amendment claimed they were doing so because they wanted to maintain the financial incentive for panel trustees to challenge allegedly abusive chapter 7 filings. We have carefully, and in response to that, recrafted our amendment to retain this financial incentive. Under this amendment, the panel trustee who successfully challenges a chapter 7 filing will be rewarded for their efforts. In addition, if the debtor's attorney does file a frivolous chapter 7, that attorney will be punished. Just as every other attorney can be sanctioned for frivolous filings, the bankruptcy code already provides for sanctions to be assessed against an attorney who has actually acted in bad faith. So, Mr. President, in sum, my amendment seeks to equitably reimburse the panel trustee if he or she is forced to prosecute a party who inappropriately filed for chapter 7; but it also tries to strike the right balance by striving to protect a debtor's right to counsel. Nothing is more fundamental to our legal system than the right of every American to be represented by a qualified and zealous attorney. We should not risk compromising this right, particularly for vulnerable parties who often seek protection under the bankruptcy system. I strongly urge my colleagues to make this change, which I think would be in the spirit of improving this piece of legislation that both the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Illinois have worked so diligently on. I yield the floor. Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to offer this amendment for myself and Senator Specter, and I send the amendment to the desk.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to offer another amendment for myself and Senator Specter.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I will vote to sustain the President's veto of HR 1122, the so-called partial birth abortion bill, that seeks to outlaw a particular abortion procedure, which is most closely analogous to the intact dilation and extraction procedure, sometimes called Intact D&E. I do support a ban on post-viability abortions, if the ban is subject to important exceptions to protect a woman's life and prevent grievous injury to her physical health. I am disappointed that the proponents of HR 1122 have steadfastly refused to accept any amendment, no matter how tightly crafted, which would include provisions to protect a woman's physical health in extreme circumstances. I have said repeatedly here on the floor of the Senate, during hearings in the Judiciary Committee, and at listening sessions held across the state of Wisconsin that I believe post-viability abortions should be banned, with two exceptions. The first is an exception to save the life of the woman, which is an important and necessary provision. I hope we can agree on that point. The second is to protect a woman from grievous injury to her physical health. I hope we can also agree on that point. I am sensitive to the fears of the bill's proponents that any health exception might serve as a major loophole, and I agree that the definition of a threat to physical health should be narrow. But it should be there. Let me remind my colleagues that the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that, although states have the right to restrict post-viability abortions, exceptions must always be made to protect the life and health of the mother. Twenty-eight states, including my own home state of Wisconsin, have passed so-called partial birth abortion bans, and the statutes in ten states are substantially identical to HR 1122. Wisconsin's experience in the wake of the passage of its partial birth abortion ban should give all of us, as we consider whether to override the President's veto of HR 1122, some additional pause. For nearly two weeks following the passage of the state bill, physicians struggled to determine which procedures, if any, were allowed under the bill; prosecutors proclaimed that they couldn't enforce the new law in their communities until it was clarified by a court. Last year, I voted for the bipartisan alternative amendment to HR 1122 introduced by Senator Daschle and others. I voted for that amendment because it took a comprehensive approach to banning abortions on viable fetuses, rather than merely banning a single procedure. I did so, Mr. President, because I was concerned that the language contained in HR 1122 was imprecise. I looked closely at the bill to see how it addressed the significant concerns raised by my constituents based upon accounts and descriptions of the ``procedure'' they had heard. The text of HR 1122 does not specify a gestational age, such as ``late term;'' it does not mention any specific part of the fetus, such as the head; and it does not mention any specific medical instruments, medical situations or circumstances. I believe that the Daschle amendment provides that needed clarity while being sufficiently narrow to satisfy most reasonable people's concerns about healthy women with normal pregnancies who might seek to terminate those pregnancies in the third trimester. It would have required a physician to certify that continuation of the pregnancy would threaten the woman's life or risk grievous injury to her physicial health. Grievous injury was define in the amendment as ``a severely debilitating disease or impairment specifically caused by the pregnancy, or any inability to provide necessary treatment for a life threatening condition.'' The other side claims that abortion is never necessary to protect a woman's health. But Mr. President, I have met women whose doctors believed differently. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the Society of Physicians for Reproductive Health supports them. ACOG has stated that although Intact D & E may not be the only option to save a woman's life or preserve her health, it sometimes may be the best or most appropriate procedure, depending on the woman's particular circumstances. Precisely because I am not a doctor. I think it is important for us to uphold the President's veto. The point is, Mr. President, that there is a dispute within the medical community about the necessity for and the risk associated with Intact D & E. And that is where it should be resolved. It should be women and their doctors, not politicians, who decide which medical procedure is appropriate within the confines of the Daschle amendment. The Daschle alternative amendment struck the right balance between protecting women's constitutional right to choose abortion and the right of the state to protect future life. It would have protected a woman's physical health throughout her pregnancy, while ensuring that only grievous, medically diagnosable physicial conditions could justify ending a viable pregnancy. Within the terms of that amendment, both fetal viability and women's health would have been determined by the physician's best medical judgement, as they should be. I hope, as we vote today, we do so in full knowledge of the strong feelings about this issue on all sides. We should respect these differences, avoid efforts to confuse or distort each others views before the public, and maintain a level of debate that reflects the importance of relying on the facts about this issue and finding a response that is sensitive and constitutionally sound.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the amendment offered by the Senator from New York (Mr. D'Amato). This amendment is about simple fairness. Mr. President, banks, credit unions, and the other owners of automatic teller machines are entitled to be compensated for the service they offer. But consumers are also entitled to be treated fairly. The D'Amato amendment strikes that balance. This amendment does not fix prices. It does not limit what ATM owners may charge for using their machines. It simply prohibits charging consumers twice for the same service. Mr. President, consumers become subject to ATM charges when they obtain an ATM card through their bank or credit union. While the consumer's bank or credit union often has its own ATM machines at which account holders can bank, increasingly, banks and credit unions join a network of ATMs to give their account holders greater access. Mr. President, when your bank or credit union joins an ATM network, it pays what is called an interchange fee to the network, and your bank or credit union may pass the cost of that interchange fee directly to you, or it may just add it into their overall cost of doing business--a cost that account holders help to bear. But, Mr. President, consumers are now being forced to pay an additional fee, a surcharge, for using a network ATM. When that happens, the consumer is being billed twice for the same transaction--once by their own bank, and once by the ATM owner. Mr. President, consumers who are already charged by their own banks or credit unions for using an ATM feel that once is more than enough. When consumers are charged twice for the privilege of accessing our own hard-earned money through an ATM, it's time for this body to take some action. Mr. President, not only are consumers now being asked to pay twice for the privilege of accessing their own money, the second fee, or surcharge, often represents a big portion of the cash they want to withdraw. The Senator from New York noted consumers may be hit with a surcharge of $3 or more just to take $20 out of their account. This is especially a problem for consumers in under-served areas. Because they lack ready access to their bank or credit union, those consumers are much more dependent on ATMs for every day financial services. Mr. President, let me note here that not all ATM networks subject consumers to this double billing. I understand there have been efforts, especially by community banks, to form networks that explicitly do not charge consumers twice. While I applaud those efforts, they may not be enough. Mr. President, in addition to the fundamental unfairness of these double charges to consumers, I am troubled that this fee structure may also put smaller banks and credit unions at a competitive disadvantage. Customers seeking to avoid these double charges may move their accounts to larger banks that own these broad-based ATM networks, and as we've seen recently, these big banks are now merging with each other, which will only make matters worse for their smaller competitors. Indeed, Mr. President, in this regard there have been some troubling developments in the past few weeks. In particular, I was disturbed to hear reports that the Department of Justice is investigating whether or not some of the large ATM networks are engaging in illegal restraint of trade by seeking to prevent smaller banks from forming those very alliances that promise not to double charge consumers. Mr. President, this amendment will end double-billing at ATMs. It will ensure fairness for consumers, and it will put a stop to efforts that undermine the ability of our smaller community financial institutions to retain their customer base. Mr. President, it's time to demand fairness for ATM users. Paying additional fees at the ATM is something consumers can afford to live without.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to S. 1981, the so-called ``Truth in Employment Act'' and urge my colleagues to do so as well. Mr. President, this legislation is an affront to the American worker. It opens the door to abuse of good workers and unfair job termination. This measure would undermine a worker's right to organize, to seek better working conditions, to work to reduce racial tension, and to seek higher wages and better benefits. This measure seeks to undermine and penalize most every action an employee might take to improve the lot of workers. In a unanimous 1995 decision, NLRB versus Town and Country, the United Sattes Supreme Court held that a ``union organizer is an employee, with all the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), if acting as a union organizer does not involve abandonment of his or her service to the employer.'' This legislation makes a mockery of the Court's decision by requiring that workers be, what it calls, ``bona fide'' job applicants and by subjecting workers to an outrageous test of motivation as a condition of enjoying the protection of the NLRA rights. This bill provides a legal shield to employers who refuse to hire applicants who are union members or who have worked for an organized employers. Mr. President, its not my intention to stand here telling the business community of this country that they do not have the right to terminate union employees for cause or that they must hire only applicants who claim a union affiliation. In my eyes, anyone who does not produce quality work product or who consistently ignores the rules of the workplace should face the threat of termination. Along those lines, any applicant who does not have the skills or experience to perform a job well should not be hired and the law today does not require that any unqualified person even be considered for a job. Mr. President, that's just common sense--that's just fair. This bill, the deceivingly named ``Truth in Employment Act,'' is not fair. Mr. President, since being elected to the Congress, the Senate majority has used every possible opportunity to attack worker rights. They have used a variety of vehicles, ranging from their anti-overtime bills, to repeated efforts to water down OSHA requirements, to their opposition to an increase in the minimum wage or any expansion of the Family Medical Leave Act. This latest measure is just the latest in a long history of anti-worker legislation presented to us by the majority party. This bill is blatantly anti-union, anti-worker and anti-American. I urge my colleagues to stand up for the ordinary American workers in their state. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this harmful measure.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. I say to the leader, you have been enormously courteous. I want to make one more remark.

Mr. FEINGOLD. That is what I just indicated. When we sat down, we made it work. I suggest and make my plea to you: Let's sit down and try to work out something so that we can accomplish something in this regard to make the year 2000 elections look something better and different than the mess in 1996. That is my plea.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I think it is essential for the country that this process--and I realize it is a difficult one--be completed this year because of the danger of what will happen in the year 2000 election. We cannot let another 2-year cycle begin with the corruption that already existed in the 1996 elections and the problems with this year's elections to not finish the job in whatever form it is, however we can reach a consensus. You and I know we reached a consensus on the gift ban. We sat down in a room, and we worked it out.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I say to the leader, I would be happy to try that process. We tried the poison pill, and it didn't work.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I say to the leader, that is what the amendment process is for. Your amendment came up and, quite frankly, didn't prevail. Our amendment came up and did prevail, and there were many other amendments and we just stopped. I recognize there may be another version of the Paycheck Protection Act that may prevail. My problem is that it stopped at that point, and that is not the normal procedure. That is what I am asking for, that everybody do their amendments, and at the end of the day, I know, unless you change your mind--and I recognize you don't need to--that we still need 60 votes, but to have the amendments, to have everybody's ideas presented and voted on, is what we are asking for here.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Which we debated.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I appreciate the comment. Let me indicate, as I indicated before, if the process of debating campaign finance reform would ever be permitted to involve the normal amending process, without even insisting on giving up the right to filibuster, that that is the critical element, because without that, we are not in a position here to do what was done in the House where there was a lot of debate over many months, but they were able to offer amendments. Here, as soon as we won on the Snowe-Jeffords amendment, it was over, there were no more amendments. This has happened three times now.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Precious little. I can yield the Senator 2 minutes of our remaining 8 minutes.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask that it be equally divided.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Will the current amendment, the Feingold amendment, be the pending business?

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to the Senator from Arizona for his willingness to continue this important fight. I understand that we may well be moving now to another piece of legislation, but I want to indicate that we will continue to move this amendment, to try to adopt this amendment. As I understand it, it will be the pending business on the Interior bill when it comes back, and we will certainly proceed accordingly. Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.