Member of Congress

Russell Feingold

Role
Former Senator
State
WI
Party
Democrat

Speeches

NEW WISCONSIN SAGE SCHOOLS1998-09-03

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, as children around the country head back to school this week, I come to the floor to speak about 44 Wisconsin schools with an extra reason to be excited on their first day of school this year. The students, teachers and parents at these 44 schools are excited because they are now participants in Wisconsin's successful pilot program, the Student Achievement Guarantee in Education, known as the SAGE program. These 44 schools deserve congratulations and I want to recognize some of them here today on the Senate floor. New SAGE participants include Giese Elementary School in Racine, McKinley Elementary School in Kenosha, Allen-Field Elementary School in Milwaukee, Chegwin Elementary School in Fond du Lac and many, many, more. The new SAGE schools are spread throughout Wisconsin from LaCrosse in the east, to Sheboygan in the west, Ashland in the north and Madison in the south. They include schools in Wisconsin's most populous areas, such as, Milwaukee, Madison, Racine and Waukesha, and also, the rural communities of Winter, Kickapoo and Baraboo. Mr. President, Wisconsin's SAGE program is a model for the nation in how to implement successful education reforms in our public schools, most importantly, reducing public school class size. I congratulate those in Wisconsin that have made the SAGE program possible for these additional twenty schools and take this opportunity to again alert my Senate colleagues to Wisconsin's innovative SAGE program. Mr. President, for many years now, I have been a strong advocate of federal support for states that are trying to reduce class size in their schools. I have witnessed first-hand, how reducing class size enhanced the overall quality of education in Wisconsin's SAGE classes. Those participating in SAGE, teachers, parents, students and school administrators, report that student academic performance, student behavior and teacher morale all improved. In addition, comprehensive evaluations of Wisconsin's SAGE program have confirmed that small class size promotes effective teaching and learning. Leading scientific studies of the impact of small class size, including Tennessee's STAR study and its follow-up, the Lasting Benefit study, found that students in small classes in their early years earned higher scores on basic skills tests in all four years and in all types of schools. Follow-up studies have shown that these achievement gains were sustained in later years, even if students go on to larger classes. Along with important factors in quality education like teacher quality, high expectations, and parental involvement, the significance of small class size should not be underestimated and cannot be ignored. When asked about her experience as a kindergarten teacher at Webster Stanley Elementary School in Oshkosh, a new SAGE school, Lauren Flanagan said she noticed that she could visit with each table more frequently and the children listened and learned more readily. In addition, she said about the SAGE program, quote, ``It just makes such a difference. I had a chance to visit schools around the state participating in the SAGE program, and what I observed is that they were much further along in their curriculum. The students were much more advanced.'' end quote. Mr. President, I have been so impressed with the success of the SAGE program that I introduced the National SAGE Act, legislation to offer grants to qualifying states to assist them in reducing public school class size in the earliest grades. The National SAGE Act authorizes $75 million over five years to fund a limited number of demonstration grants to states that create innovative programs to reduce public school class size and improve educational performance, as Wisconsin has done. The Secretary of Education would choose the states to receive funding based on several factors, including a state's need to reduce class size, the ability of a state education agency to fund half the program, and the degree to which parents, teachers, administrators, and teacher organizations are consulted in designing the program. The National SAGE Act is fully offset by cuts in a wasteful and unnecessary federal subsidy that benefits research and development for the world's largest aircraft manufacturer. We can fund this important SAGE program, while simultaneously reducing the federal budget deficit by more than $2.1 billion over five years. My legislation also includes a comprehensive research and evaluation component that would document the benefits of smaller class size in the earliest grades, and support efforts to reduce class size in schools all over the country. I think we all can agree that there are no easy solutions to the problems in our public schools. I believe, however, that targeting federal funds, matched on a 50-50 basis with state funding, to assist school districts moving toward smaller class size, is an effective use of federal dollars. The federal government, in cooperation with local school boards and state governments, has a responsibility to take positive steps toward helping school districts reduce class size as a part of an overall effort to improve student learning. As we near the end of the 105th Congress, I hope my Senate colleagues will embrace SAGE as a serious and exciting reform effort and act to assist states trying to reduce public school class size. Again, congratulations to the twenty new Wisconsin SAGE schools--you are off to a great start for a successful school year.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS1998-09-02

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, with my distinguished colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998. While alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration can serve a useful purpose in resolving disputes between parties, I am extremely concerned with the increasing trend of stronger parties to a contract forcing weaker parties to waive their rights and to arbitrate disputes. Earlier this Congress, I introduced S. 63, the Civil Rights Procedures Act, to amend certain civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to claims that arise from unlawful employment discrimination and sexual harassment. It has come to my attention that the automobile and truck manufacturers, which present dealers with ``take it or leave it'' contracts, are increasingly including mandatory, binding arbitration clauses as a condition of entering into or keeping an auto or truck franchise. This practice forces dealers to submit their disputes with manufacturers to involuntary arbitration. As a result, dealers are required to waive access to judicial or administrative forums, substantive contract rights, and statutorily provided protection. In short, this practice clearly violates the dealers fundamental due process rights and runs directly counter to basic principles of fairness. Historically and currently, franchise agreements for auto and truck dealerships are nonnegotiable with the manufacturer; the dealer accepts the terms offered by the manufacturer or they lose the dealership; plain and simple. Dealers, therefore, have been forced to rely on the states to pass laws designed to minimize the manufacturers' greater bargaining power and to safeguard their rights. The first such state automobile statute was enacted in my home state of Wisconsin in 1937. Since then all states, except Alaska, have enacted substantive law to balance the enormous bargaining power enjoyed by manufacturers over dealers and to safeguard small business dealers from unfair automobile and truck manufacturer practices. In addition, the majority of states have created their own alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and forums which specialize in auto and truck industry disputes. These administrative forums are inexpensive, efficient, and unbiased. For example, in Wisconsin mandatory mediation is required before the start of an administrative hearing or court action. Arbitration is also optional if both parties agree. These state dispute resolution forums, with years of experience and precedent, are greatly responsible for the small number of manufacturer/dealer lawsuits. Unfortunately, when mandatory binding arbitration is included in dealer agreements, state laws and forums established to resolve auto dealer and manufacturer disputes are essentially null and void. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) arbitrators are not required to apply federal or state law. The stronger party--in this case the auto or truck manufacturer--can, therefore, use mandatory arbitration to circumvent the state laws which were specifically enacted to regulate the dealer/manufacturer relationship. Not only is the circumvention of these laws inequitable, it also eliminates the deterrent to prohibited acts that these state laws provide. Besides losing the protection of state law and the ability to use state forums, there are other numerous reasons why a dealer may not want to agree to binding arbitration. Arbitration lacks some of the important safeguards and due process offered by administrative procedures and the judicial system. For example: (1) arbitration lacks the formal court supervised discovery process oftentimes necessary to learn facts and gain documents; (2) an arbitrator need not follow the rules of evidence; (3) arbitrators generally have no obligation to provide factual or legal discussion of their decision in a written opinion; and (4) arbitration often does not allow for judicial review. The most troubling problem with this sort of mandatory, binding arbitration may be the absence of judicial review. Take for instance a dispute over a dealership termination. To that dealer--that small business person--this decision is of paramount importance. Even under this scenario, the dealer would not have recourse to substantive judicial review of the arbitrators' ruling. Let me be very clear on this point; in most circumstances a dealer cannot appeal an arbitration award even if the arbitration panel disregarded state law which likely would have produced a different result. This problem is growing. The use of mandatory binding arbitration is increasing in many industries, but nowhere is it growing more steadily than the auto/truck industry. Currently 11 auto and truck manufacturers require some form of such arbitration in their dealer franchise contracts. In recognition of this problem, many states enacted laws to prohibit the inclusion of mandatory, binding arbitration clauses in certain agreements. The Supreme Court, however, held in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984), that the FAA by implication preempts these state laws. The Southland Corp. decision has, in effect, nullified many state arbitration laws that were designed to protect weaker parties in unequal bargaining positions from involuntarily acquiescing--often without other meaningful options--to these mandatory, binding arbitration clauses. The legislative history indicates that Congress never intended that the FAA be a tool that the stronger party to a contract could use to force the weaker party into binding arbitration. Congress certainly did not intend the FAA to be a weapon used to coerce parties into relinquishing important protections and rights that would have been afforded them by the judicial system. Unfortunately, this is precisely the current situation. Although contract law is generally the province of the states, the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. has in effect made any state action on this issue moot. I, therefore, along with Senator Grassley, am introducing this bill today to ensure that auto and truck dealers are not coerced into waiving their rights. Our bill, the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998 would simply allow each party to an auto or truck franchise contract to voluntarily agree to arbitration; mandatory, binding arbitration would be prohibited. The bill would not proscribe arbitration, however. On the contrary, our measure would encourage arbitration by making it a fair choice that both parties to such a franchise contract willing and knowingly select. In short, this bill would ensure that the decision to arbitrate is voluntary and that the rights and remedies provided for by our judicial system are not mandatorily waived. Today if a small business person wants to obtain or keep her or his auto or truck franchise, she or he may only be able to do so by relinquishing her or his statutory rights and foreclosing the opportunity to use the courts or administrative forums. Mr. President, I cannot not say this more strongly--this is unacceptable; this is wrong. I, therefore, urge my colleagues to join with Senator Grassley and me to put an end to the invidious practice.

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-09-02

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to comment on one provision of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill that does not appear in this year's bill, for fiscal year 1999, and that is the provision that would impose certain restrictions for security assistance to Indonesia. As many of my colleagues may know, since 1992, the Congress has imposed restrictions on the provision of International Military Education and Training, known as IMET, to Indonesia, in response to the despicable treatment by the Indonesian military in East Timor the previous year, when more than 100 civilians were brutally massacred. In the Foreign Operations bill that year, for FY 1993, the Congress cut off all IMET assistance for Indonesia. A few years later, in the Foreign Operations Appropriation bill for fiscal year 1996, Congress authorized a limited form of IMET, known as ``expanded IMET,'' meaning military training courses focused on the management of defense resources, improvement in domestic systems of military justice in accordance with internationally recognized human rights, and the principle of civilian control of the military. This was the result of a compromise between those of my colleagues who support close ties between the United States military and Indonesia, and those of us, myself included, who remained skeptical and opposed because of continuing human rights abuses in Indonesia. In 1997, Indonesia withdrew completely from the program because it recognized the continuing opposition from some of us in Congress to these relations. President Suharto wanted to avoid what he knew would be criticism over his military's treatment of East Timor, and he decided that IMET, ultimately, was not worth it to him. This year, the Appropriations Committee has decided to remove the limitations on IMET for Indonesia. I welcome the Committee's report language urging the Defense Security Assistance Agency to consult with Congress regarding its plans for IMET training in Indonesia, particularly given past human rights concerns. However, since such consultation is not mandated, I would hope the DSAA will follow this proscription, and consult early and fully with the relevant appropriations and authorizing committees of both Houses of Congress. Nevertheless, it is my strong view that 1998 is not the year to change our policy with respect to IMET in Indonesia. Congress wisely restricted IMET at a time when the Indonesian military was clearly involved in myriad abuses. This year, Indonesia has certainly undergone tremendous changes. We have seen the country suffer through a quickly downsliding economy. We have seen student demonstrations not thought possible in that country's restrictive political environment. And then, amazingly, we have seen the resignation of long-time authoritarian leader Suharto. The country's new leader, President B.J. Habibie, has certainly taken some steps that are encouraging. He has released some political prisoners, and allowed workers to form unions. He has pledged to hold parliamentary elections by May and presidential election by December 1999. And, he has even broached the sensitive subject of East Timor, agreeing to hold talks on the region's status, and announcing a drawdown of some troops. But, in my view, these actions should still be considered mere preliminary steps. They are promising, but do not yet warrant a policy change with respect to our military training. Notably, Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, and other reliable sources in Dili, the capital of East Timor, believe the situation in East Timor remains substantially unchanged. Asked if he saw any concrete results after the UN action, the bishop said firmly, ``Not yet.'' In early August, Belo stated, ``There is still intimidation and terror.'' In late July, there was a widely publicized announcement of Indonesian troop withdrawal from East Timor, with about 100 foreign journalists brought there for the occasion. The problem is that there is every indication that the drawdown may not actually have taken place. Bishop Belo stated on August 20 that the troops were actually shifted to the western side of the island and later brought back to East Timor in trucks. ``We must denounce this,'' Bishop Belo said at the time. Other sources note that the army in East Timor's rural areas does not seem to act in the same spirit of reform that the leadership in Jakarta is professing. With all the political changes taking place in Indonesia, generally, it remains critical that the country's government make strong efforts to demilitarize East Timor as quickly as possible, and establish a United Nations or other international presence to protect human rights. Until such measures are in place, any claims of progress can have little credibility. There is a strong need to monitor closely conditions on the ground. Given this unsure environment, and particularly the unclear role of the military in the transition process, I believe restrictions on IMET training continue to be appropriate. As a result, I am disappointed that this year's bill does not include the restrictions that were first included in the Foreign Operations bill for fiscal year 1996, and continued every year since then. I believe removing these restrictions represents a radical step that I fear will send the wrong signal to the Indonesian Government. It is, however, my understanding that the House version of this bill, which is still in committee, is likely to include these restrictions. If this is the case, it is my sincere hope that the Senate conferees will agree to accept the House version of these provisions.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Committee on Appropriations for including language in its report on S. 2334, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY 1999, related to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. In its discussion of funding for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Committee notes its support for that organization's efforts to implement this important Convention. The United States was instrumental in negotiation of this treaty, and has signed it, but the Senate has yet to exercise its advice and consent responsibilities on it. Mr. President, desertification is a serious problem with which many of my colleagues may not be familiar. I fear the Convention may be overlooked because of this ignorance, but at great cost and with little reason. The Problem of Desertification Desertification is the severe land degradation of arid and semi-arid regions, rendering such drylands unable to sustain crops or other vegetation. It is not the spread of existing deserts, but rather the destruction of fertile soils, largely through human activity. In the past, drylands recovered easily following long droughts and dry periods. Under modern conditions, however, they tend to lose their biological and economic productivity quickly unless they are sustainably managed. Today drylands on every continent are being degraded by over-cultivation, deforestation and poor irrigation practices. Excessive population pressure and unwise economic policies also exacerbate the problem. Over one-quarter of the Earth's land surface is endangered by desertification, threatening the livelihoods of one billion people. In Africa, 73 percent of drylands are moderately or severely desertified, and the proportion of drylands affected by desertification is comparable. In addition, 40 percent of the land surface of the United States, covering most of 17 western states, qualifies as affected dryland areas. The direct worldwide economic loss from desertification, mainly from decreased agricultural productivity, is estimated at $42 billion per year, while the cost of actions needed to combat it is estimated at between $10-22 billion annually. The loss of annual income in areas immediately affected by desertification in the United States is an estimated $5 billion. It is clear that it is far more cost- effective to prevent desertification than to deal with its devastating consequences. To most Americans, the Dust Bowl of the 1930's is the most familiar example of desertification and its consequences--massive hunger, poverty, and migration. Mr. President, desertification is far more than an environmental problem. It is connected to famine, malnutrition, starvation, epidemics, poverty, economic and social instability and mass migration. Desertification contributes to water scarcity. In many countries, inadequate water resources leads to increased political tension, often rendering desertification a security issue. Around the world, desertification and water shortages lead to reduced crop production, hunger and mass migration which can spark turmoil and armed conflict over scarce food resources. These upheavals can result in heavy costs to the U.S. taxpayer in the form of extended humanitarian assistance or large immigration programs. The Convention to Combat Desertification was called for at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, when the severity of the problem was recognized. At that time, several African nations argued that the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions did not address their major environmental concern--desertification. The United States has since been an active participant during the negotiation and drafting process. The Convention entered into force in 1996 and has been ratified by more than 120 countries. The President submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent in August of 1996, but no action has yet taken place. It is crucial that we consider this treaty as soon as possible, prior to the Conference of the Parties, due to take place in November. Mr. President, this treaty is unlike the other environmental conventions brought before the Senate in recent years. It advocates a unique method that I believe will have efficient, effective outcomes. Not only is this the first international treaty to address directly the issue of poverty and land degradation in rural areas, but it also calls for the participation of resource users in the development of solutions. This is one of the most important facets of the convention; by stressing the need for concerted, cooperative action at all levels, strategies to attack this problem becomes an amalgamation of expertise and experience. First-hand knowledge of the problem and an awareness of the particularities means that programs will be specifically designed to meet the needs of a certain area. This method will also empower the residents of countries--mostly developing countries--where desertification is a particular problem, helping people to help themselves. The Convention calls upon affected countries to establish national action plans to combat the problem at local and regional levels, and calls upon developed countries to channel existing bilateral and multilateral funds to support these programs. These national action plans mean that countries will be active participants that will accept responsibility without imposing some kind of universal solution on countries that may have different needs. Thus, the Convention aims to ensure that funding programs are better coordinated, that funding is based on the needs of affected countries, that donor countries can be sure their funds are well spent, and that recipients obtain the maximum benefit from the sums available. No new funding is required. Instead, the treaty establishes a Global Mechanism which can serve to mobilize and coordinate donor resources to combat the problem of desertification. The United States has a long history of managing its drylands. Desertification affected hundreds of thousands of Americans during the Dustbowl years of the 1930s, when impoverished farmers had to abandon their exhausted land. Today, desertification in the United States has been associated with Western grazing and water management practices. Aspects of the desertification process, such as soil erosion, present a serious threat to agricultural productivity. As a result of these decades of experience, we have created a variety of programs and institutions to combat drought. The United States is considered to have the premier technology and expertise in this area, and so our participation in the Convention to Combat Desertification can really determine its success. It is of course important to consider the implications of the treaty for the United States. The Convention to Combat Desertification does not require any land-use restrictions, legislation or regulations for U.S. implementation. The President has asserted that if the U.S. was to ratify the treaty its obligations would be met by current law and on- going programs. Most importantly, the Convention does not call for increased funding from the United States. This treaty operates on existing levels of aid. Mr. President, around the world desertification and water shortages lead to reduced crop production, hunger, and mass migration which can spark turmoil and armed conflict over scarce food resources. The Convention to Combat Desertification could lead to powerful preventive action that reduces dependence on U.S. foreign aid. Mr. President, there are many reasons why it is in the U.S. national interest to ratify the Convention to Combat Desertification. First, expectations are high among the CCD nations that private sector business and NGOs will play a key role in coordinating and implementing the provisions of the treaty. The U.S. agricultural industry, our excellent university system, and strong network of NGOs have much to offer their counterparts in developing countries in combating desertification. The treaty provides opportunities for U.S. agribusiness to build positive relationships with developing country governments and to improve the policy environment for bilateral trade in their emerging markets. By providing the necessary institutional mechanisms, the CCD will facilitate the transfer of technology and information from U.S. business firms to the world's huge and expanding drylands. It is clear that ratifying the CCD creates a number of opportunities for the U.S. private sector, including the export of American technical assistance and expertise in erosion control. Failure to ratify will place American agribusiness at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis similar businesses in the 128 countries that have already ratified the CCD. Second, being part of the CCD is critical to U.S. leadership in promoting democracy and sound stewardship of natural resources around the world. If the Senate ratifies the Convention prior to adjournment this year, the U.S. could play a major role in decisions affecting the treaty's implementation this November. Third, helping fight desertification abroad, and the poverty that goes with it, benefits American exports and the U.S. trade balance. Rising incomes in the agricultural sector of developing countries generate a higher demand for U.S. exports of seeds, fertilizer, agro- chemicals, farm and irrigation equipment as well as other U.S. produced goods and services. By helping build markets in developing countries, we gain greater access to them in the long run. As desertification deepens poverty worldwide, it undercuts economic growth and triggers social instability in developing countries. This results in more frequent and costly U.S. food programs, increased immigration to the U.S. from land-degraded countries like Mexico, and reduced foreign markets for American businesses. The CCD has the potential to alleviate these problems, with no additional American foreign aid. It also stimulates business and leads to better trade environments. Mr. President, this Convention is important to the leaders of many African nations. In fact, it was presented as a priority of the African Diplomatic Corps prior to President Clinton's trip to Africa earlier this year. As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I have had the opportunity to see first hand how valuable the provisions of this Convention will be to the people of Africa. It is a mechanism by which the people of Africa will be assisted in preserving and protecting their land, which is a vital element in Africa's fight to become self-sufficient. This convention is innovative because it requires participation from all segments of the population, from the farmers and herders who work the land, to local governments and environmental organizations, to those who affect environmental and agricultural policy at the national and regional levels. It works from the bottom-up, incorporating the knowledge of those directly involved for a more effective approach. The consideration of this Convention will also refocus the Senate's attention on the plight of the African people. It is the perfect opportunity for the Senate to go on record in support of programs that are both vital to the African continent and consistent with United States foreign, economic, and environmental policy. The Convention also furthers the Administration's stated policy to build a new partnership with Africa. Mr. President, there has been virtually no formal opposition to the Convention to Combat Desertification. The same arguments used against U.S. participation in the United Nations or in other international organizations or against other environmental treaties--views I do not share, but which nevertheless are argued here in this body--simply do not apply to the CCD. There are no possible constraints on U.S. sovereignty or policies, but just the sort of benefits that I have described. This should be a non-controversial issue, and it is in our best interest to deal with it as soon as possible. Swift ratification ensures U.S. leadership and potential profit. I hope that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, of which I am an active member, will act on this treaty in a timely manner. peace corps

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of development assistance for Africa, which is included in the fiscal year 1999 Foreign Operations appropriations bill. For fiscal year 1999, the total funding for development assistance has gone down once again. At the same time, there are still earmarks for many programs in all regions in this bill. Given that there will be necessary cuts throughout all of these accounts, Africa should not suffer any more than other accounts simply because it lacks the earmarks that have been given to other regions of the world. Development assistance for Africa used to be provided through a separate account called the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), which was created in the fiscal year 1988 appropriations bill to meet a broad range of objectives specifically aimed at Africa, including rural and sustainable development, private sector development, maternal and child health needs, and educational improvement, particularly in the primary grades. For a variety of reasons, the DFA has been dropped as a separate funding account. Nevertheless, the goals and programs embodied in the DFA continue to be important in terms of our Africa program. For many years, these goals were championed by our former colleagues and former Chairmen of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senators Nancy Kassebaum-Baker and Paul Simon. As the current Ranking Member of that subcommittee, I share their commitment to these goals. I have seen how the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly becoming even more relevant to United States interests, and our economic, political, humanitarian, and security concerns. Long-term development assistance to African nations--whether through bilateral or multilateral channels--directly complements U.S. foreign policy goals and national security interests. There are several examples of this complementary relationship. First, we have an interest in a safe and healthy environment. The rapid spread of the Ebola virus demonstrated some of the areas of vulnerability on the African continent. Now, unfortunately, the rates of HIV and AIDS infections in Africa are the highest in the world, and they are continuing to rise rapidly. As we have seen, viruses do not need visas. Second, we have an interest in expanding trade and investment ties with the African continent. U.S. exports to Africa expanded by 22.7 percent in 1995--this is nearly twice the growth rate of total U.S. exports worldwide. Already U.S. exports to Africa equal 54 percent more than our exports to the former Soviet Union. We export more to South Africa alone than to all of Eastern Europe combined. Third, we have an interest in democracy. More than half of African nations now can be considered democratic or have made substantial progress toward democracy. Many of these nations also are moving toward free-market economies. Fourth, we have an interest in human resource development. Sub- Saharan Africa has the fastest growing and poorest population in the world. A substantial percentage of Africa's population is under 18 years of age. These children will soon grow to adulthood and I hope there will be opportunities for them to lead productive and dignified lives, in which their basic human needs are met. At the same time, Africa's infant and child mortality rates are 2 to 3 times higher than those in Latin America or Asia. Finally, we have an interest in security. It is unfortunate, but Africa also is home to terrorist activity and to drug and arms trafficking. As the recent bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombing of a crowded restaurant in South Africa have painfully demonstrated, Africa is not immune to the scourge of terrorism. Mr. President, a stable African continent serves American interests. The Development Fund for Africa was created to ensure a steady source of long-term development funds for Africa. Over the past decade, the DFA has contributed to substantial gains in health care, education, small business development, democracy, and stability. A sustained assistance program for Africa helps African nations to invest in development and not in crises. The types of challenges we face in Africa today are very complex and require long-term solutions. And this requires long-term investment. As a result of DFA assistance, African farmers are growing more food, more children are attending primary school, and more informal sector entrepreneurs have access to credit than was possible 10 years ago. And the United States has played a key role in helping several African countries experience dramatic drops in fertility through effective family planning and health care programs. In sum, Mr. President, our assistance program represents a sound investment in our relationship with the continent of Africa that signals our continued interest in remaining engaged with Africa. I hope that during consideration of this bill in the Senate, in the House, and in conference, as well as during the United States Agency for International Development budgeting process, that we can maintain a similar proportion of the total development assistance appropriations as that requested by the President in the congressional presentation documents for foreign assistance.

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UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST--H.R. 21831998-09-02

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the leader for his statements and for his leadership on this issue. I was enthusiastic about coming back to work on this issue again after I have had conversations with people like the Senator from Michigan. I was very enthusiastic when I had a chance to meet with the senior Senator from Arizona. We decided definitely yesterday to move, and move soon, on this issue. I am even more excited and enthusiastic that we can finish the job. The excuses are over. The whole thing is down to eight Senators. It is time to do the job. I thank the leader very much.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this is precisely the reason the senior Senator from Arizona and I announced yesterday that we will be forcing the issue if your proposal is not agreed to, to bring this up, because we do believe that there will be Members on the other side of the aisle here who will support us. In fact, we are down, now, to only eight people. The fact is that originally people said, ``You only have several cosponsors. You only have two Republicans. It will never get through the House.'' That is just a series of what I regard as excuses. Mr. President, now it is very simple. The President has said he is ready to sign the bill. A majority of this body has indicated on the record they are for the bill and a majority of the other House is dramatically in favor of the bill. I just wonder if the leader would comment for a minute on the significance if we don't get this done this year. Unfortunately, we can't pass a bill that will affect this election, the one that will happen in 60-some days. That was an agreement we had. We worked hard and we would have loved to avoid the abuses that are going on right now as we speak. But there is another election coming up in the year 2000. I wonder if the leader would talk for a minute about what it means if we don't get the job done now.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, before I ask a question, let me thank the minority leader for his tremendous leadership on this issue and for maintaining the support of the entire Democratic caucus for reform-- whether it be the McCain-Feingold bill or the Shays-Meehan bill, which is very similar. One of the criticisms made of this bill consistently, which I obviously have never found very valid, is that it is a partisan bill. The fact is that seven Republicans have supported this bill out here on the floor, and the number in the House was overwhelming. I wonder if the minority leader is aware that a quarter of all the members of the Republican Party in the House supported this legislation.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Will the Senator yield?

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Introductory Statement on S. 24341998-09-02

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, with my distinguished colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998. While alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration can serve a useful purpose in resolving disputes between parties, I am extremely concerned with the increasing trend of stronger parties to a contract forcing weaker parties to waive their rights and to arbitrate disputes. Earlier this Congress, I introduced S. 63, the Civil Rights Procedures Act, to amend certain civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to claims that arise from unlawful employment discrimination and sexual harassment. It has come to my attention that the automobile and truck manufacturers, which present dealers with ``take it or leave it'' contracts, are increasingly including mandatory, binding arbitration clauses as a condition of entering into or keeping an auto or truck franchise. This practice forces dealers to submit their disputes with manufacturers to involuntary arbitration. As a result, dealers are required to waive access to judicial or administrative forums, substantive contract rights, and statutorily provided protection. In short, this practice clearly violates the dealers fundamental due process rights and runs directly counter to basic principles of fairness. Historically and currently, franchise agreements for auto and truck dealerships are nonnegotiable with the manufacturer; the dealer accepts the terms offered by the manufacturer or they lose the dealership; plain and simple. Dealers, therefore, have been forced to rely on the states to pass laws designed to minimize the manufacturers' greater bargaining power and to safeguard their rights. The first such state automobile statute was enacted in my home state of Wisconsin in 1937. Since then all states, except Alaska, have enacted substantive law to balance the enormous bargaining power enjoyed by manufacturers over dealers and to safeguard small business dealers from unfair automobile and truck manufacturer practices. In addition, the majority of states have created their own alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and forums which specialize in auto and truck industry disputes. These administrative forums are inexpensive, efficient, and unbiased. For example, in Wisconsin mandatory mediation is required before the start of an administrative hearing or court action. Arbitration is also optional if both parties agree. These state dispute resolution forums, with years of experience and precedent, are greatly responsible for the small number of manufacturer/dealer lawsuits. Unfortunately, when mandatory binding arbitration is included in dealer agreements, state laws and forums established to resolve auto dealer and manufacturer disputes are essentially null and void. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) arbitrators are not required to apply federal or state law. The stronger party--in this case the auto or truck manufacturer--can, therefore, use mandatory arbitration to circumvent the state laws which were specifically enacted to regulate the dealer/manufacturer relationship. Not only is the circumvention of these laws inequitable, it also eliminates the deterrent to prohibited acts that these state laws provide. Besides losing the protection of state law and the ability to use state forums, there are other numerous reasons why a dealer may not want to agree to binding arbitration. Arbitration lacks some of the important safeguards and due process offered by administrative procedures and the judicial system. For example: (1) arbitration lacks the formal court supervised discovery process oftentimes necessary to learn facts and gain documents; (2) an arbitrator need not follow the rules of evidence; (3) arbitrators generally have no obligation to provide factual or legal discussion of their decision in a written opinion; and (4) arbitration often does not allow for judicial review. The most troubling problem with this sort of mandatory, binding arbitration may be the absence of judicial review. Take for instance a dispute over a dealership termination. To that dealer--that small business person--this decision is of paramount importance. Even under this scenario, the dealer would not have recourse to substantive judicial review of the arbitrators' ruling. Let me be very clear on this point; in most circumstances a dealer cannot appeal an arbitration award even if the arbitration panel disregarded state law which likely would have produced a different result. This problem is growing. The use of mandatory binding arbitration is increasing in many industries, but nowhere is it growing more steadily than the auto/truck industry. Currently 11 auto and truck manufacturers require some form of such arbitration in their dealer franchise contracts. In recognition of this problem, many states enacted laws to prohibit the inclusion of mandatory, binding arbitration clauses in certain agreements. The Supreme Court, however, held in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984), that the FAA by implication preempts these state laws. The Southland Corp. decision has, in effect, nullified many state arbitration laws that were designed to protect weaker parties in unequal bargaining positions from involuntarily acquiescing--often without other meaningful options--to these mandatory, binding arbitration clauses. The legislative history indicates that Congress never intended that the FAA be a tool that the stronger party to a contract could use to force the weaker party into binding arbitration. Congress certainly did not intend the FAA to be a weapon used to coerce parties into relinquishing important protections and rights that would have been afforded them by the judicial system. Unfortunately, this is precisely the current situation. Although contract law is generally the province of the states, the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. has in effect made any state action on this issue moot. I, therefore, along with Senator Grassley, am introducing this bill today to ensure that auto and truck dealers are not coerced into waiving their rights. Our bill, the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998 would simply allow each party to an auto or truck franchise contract to voluntarily agree to arbitration; mandatory, binding arbitration would be prohibited. The bill would not proscribe arbitration, however. On the contrary, our measure would encourage arbitration by making it a fair choice that both parties to such a franchise contract willing and knowingly select. In short, this bill would ensure that the decision to arbitrate is voluntary and that the rights and remedies provided for by our judicial system are not mandatorily waived. Today if a small business person wants to obtain or keep her or his auto or truck franchise, she or he may only be able to do so by relinquishing her or his statutory rights and foreclosing the opportunity to use the courts or administrative forums. Mr. President, I cannot not say this more strongly--this is unacceptable; this is wrong. I, therefore, urge my colleagues to join with Senator Grassley and me to put an end to the invidious practice.

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-09-01

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased that the managers of the foreign operations appropriations bill have agreed to accept my amendment regarding development assistance to Nigeria. My amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that the assistance program in Nigeria has not been sufficient and should be expanded, and that the recent political upheaval in the country requires a new strategy for development assistance. The amendment specifies that no direct aid shall be provided to the government ``unless and until that country successfully completes a transition to civilian, democratic rule.'' It also encourages the development of a more robust presence in Nigeria, including placing development personnel outside of Lagos, the capital. Finally, it requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the new strategy. This amendment reiterates part of the basic policy expressed in a bill I introduced earlier this year, S. 2102, the Nigeria Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act of 1998. That bill declares that the United States should encourage the political, economic and legal reforms necessary to ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights in Nigeria and should aggressively support a timely and effective transition to democratic, civilian government for the people of Nigeria. The bill codifies many existing sanctions, authorizes the President to impose new sanctions if conditions sour in Nigeria, and would provide for $37 million in development assistance over three years to support democracy and governance programs and the activities of the U.S. Information Agency. My amendment would pick up on the development assistance provisions of S. 2102 without specifying an amount. Like S. 2102, this amendment authorizes no new money. All spending in Nigeria would come out of existing USAID appropriations. The United States Agency for International Development has already, correctly, noted that its program in Nigeria needs considerable re- thinking. It recently submitted a notification to certain congressional committees for some $5 million to support an immediate and effective transition to democracy. But activities under this notification were not fully defined, and approval would have granted USAID broad leeway in its budgeting for this project, so the Congress has asked USAID to provide additional details. My amendment would require the administration to submit a report with a more defined strategy for its Nigeria program within 90 days of enactment of the Foreign Operations bill. I would hope that the preparation of this report will help the administration focus its development efforts in Nigeria, so that we do not receive such vague notifications in the future. With the replacement of longtime ruler General Abacha by the current military leader, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, there has been reason to be optimistic about Nigeria's future. Although General Abubakar has not yet moved to repeal the repressive decrees that place severe restrictions on the basic freedoms of Nigerians, he has taken some positive steps, including the release of several prominent political prisoners, and has indicated a willingness to move his country once and for all in the direction of democracy. But he had yet to deal with some of the more vexing issues related to such a transition, which were further complicated by the untimely death last May of Chief Moshood Abiola, the presumed winner of the 1993 elections. These are not easy times in Nigeria, nor for U.S.-Nigeria relations. As the Ranking Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, and as someone who has watched Nigeria over the past several years, I look forward to working with the administration on the development of a coherent Nigeria policy, beginning with a more robust development assistance presence.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to explain an amendment related to U.S. development assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC) that the managers of this bill have agreed to accept. As the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Africa, I am pleased to have been joined in this effort with the Chairman of that Subcommittee, my colleague from Missouri [Mr. Ashcroft] as well as the junior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Faircloth]. This amendment revises Section 574 of the foreign operations appropriations bill for fiscal year 1999 to define restrictions on aid to DROC. It mandates that no aid may be granted to the Democratic Republic of the Congo until the President certifies that the DROC government is investigating and prosecuting those responsible for human rights violations or atrocities and is taking specific steps to implement a credible democratic transition program. When I originally began thinking about an amendment of this nature, I was concerned about the inability of the DROC government to follow up on what were really gross abuses of human rights committed during the takeover of the former Zaire by the rebel movement that became known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL). During the takeover, which took place from late 1996 through the Spring of 1997, thousands of civilians, mostly Hutu refugees, were slaughtered reportedly by rebel troops, some of them possibly Rwandan or under Rwandan command. The facts have never been clear on these massacres, but credible information from human rights groups clearly indicate that massacres were carried out throughout the country--in Mbandaka, in the west; in Kisangani, in the middle of the country, and in the Kivu region in the east--leading even a casual observer to surmise it was a well planned military operation. In July 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan named an investigative team to investigate gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Congo since March 1993. Not only was the team mandated to look into the general question of the massacres themselves, but also to establish responsibility for the massacres. Unfortunately, the government of Laurent Kabila continually obstructed the work of the U.N. team--imposing various conditions, delaying meetings, harassing potential witnesses, refusing permission to deploy to certain sites, and apparently organizing demonstrations against the U.N. teams, to name a few. Eventually, in April 1998, Mr. Annan felt compelled to withdraw his teams since it became impossible for the team to conduct its work. Nevertheless, it remains important that these atrocities be fully investigated and that those responsible be brought to justice. Our amendment calls for the investigation and prosecution of these abuses. This could mean that the government conduct its own transparent and credible investigation. It could mean that the DROC government cooperates with a future UN mission, if the UN decides to launch a new commission of inquiry. Or it could mean that the government cooperates fully with an appropriate judicial body, possibly an international tribunal, which would be charged with investigating the massacres. We have left the desired method intentionally vague so that all options might be considered. The amendment also calls for the implementation of a credible democratic transition program, which includes the establishment of an independent electrical commission, the release of individuals detained or imprisoned for their political views, the establishment of an environment conducive to the free exchange of political views, and free and fair elections. The discussion of both the investigation of past abuses and of the implementation of political reform may seem academic at a moment when we are watching Congo disintegrate into civil war for the second time in less than two years. A slightly different rebel movement is trying to recreate the ``success'' of the AFDL in 1996 by taking control of large portions of Eastern and Central Congo. However, the latest events only underscore the critical need for U.S. policy to focus on the protection of human rights, an end to impunity for gross abuses, and democratization in DROC. It has been precisely the lack of attention to these issues that fueled the conflicts throughout central Africa, and which now threaten the entire region. Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to say unequivocally that I condemn actions by all the governments and other movements in the region to become involved in violent conflict in DROC. I am sorely disappointed that despite repeated efforts to discourage them, the governments of both Rwanda and Uganda sought early on to support the rebel movement. Now, the involvement of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on the other side is no less constructive. In fact, we are now seeing an almost total regionalization of this conflict that risks bringing more and more African countries into it. Clearly, this is no way to further the African ``renaissance'' that we had reason to believe was underway. I hope the parties will quickly move to declare a cease-fire, and to try to negotiate an end to this terrible situation. In the meantime, I thank the managers for the consideration of this amendment. amendment no. 3511 (Purpose: To prohibit assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation) At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-09-01

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise in support of an amendment to the fiscal year 1999 Foreign Operations appropriations bill offered by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin]. The amendment requires a report to the Congress from the Inspectors General of the Departments of Defense and State detailing the type and purpose of military training provided to foreign military personnel within the United States during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. I am pleased the Senate has adopted this amendment. I have long been opposed to the continued operation of the United States Army's School of the Americas (SOA), located at Fort Benning, Georgia. This amendment will ensure that the Congress receives a full accounting of the duration, cost, purpose and nature of the foreign military training at all sites within the United States, including the School of the Americas. The report required by this amendment will also include a list of the number and country of origin of foreign military officers trained and the units in which these officers serve. Further, the report must include an analysis of whether or not the training these officers receive conflicts with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. While the Senator's amendment includes all foreign military training that is conducted in the United States, this is an especially appropriate time to talk about the training at the School of the Americas in particular. All across our country, millions of children are beginning a new school year. Most students this year will study math, science, history, and English, and perhaps foreign languages, art and music. And they will learn the basic values of our society--honesty, integrity, and how to get along with each other. There is one school in our country, however, that has not subscribed to these basic American values. It is called the School of the Americas--a name which evokes the idea of a shared system of values among the United States and our democratic neighbors in the Americas. This school was created in 1946 with the best of intentions--to train Latin American military officers in combat and conterinsurgency skills, with the goal of professionalizing Latin American armies and strengthening the new democracies in our hemisphere. Its curriculum has included some history and math and science and foreign languages, to be sure. But this school has replaced the traditional three Rs with the three As--arrest, abduction, and assassination. Because many of its graduates have excelled at the three As, the school has earned the nickname the ``School of the Assassins.'' Others call it the ``School of Dictators.'' In 1991, following an internal investigation, the Pentagon removed certain SOA training manuals from circulation. On September 22, 1996, the Pentagon released the full text of those training manuals and acknowledged that some of those manuals provided instruction in techniques that, in the Pentagon's words, were ``clearly objectionable and possibly illegal.'' The techniques in question included torture, extortion, false arrest, and execution. And the students have learned these lessons very well. The school's alumni directory reads like a who's who of international criminals. Among its graduates are Manuel Noriega, at least 19 Salvadorean officers implicated by El Salvador's Truth Commission in the murder of six Jesuit priests, and officers who participated in the coup against former Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Since I first came to the Senate in 1993, I have been contacted by hundreds of Wisconsin residents, including religious and school groups, who see the closure of this school as a moral imperative. The importance of removing the imprimatur of the United States from this school has been driven home many times during the listening sessions I hold in each of Wisconsin's 72 counties every year. I share my constituents' shock and disappointment that our government continues to operate a school with the miserable record of the School of the Americas. As a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I am committed to promoting human rights throughout the world. We cannot do that by continuing to operate this school. I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of S. 980, legislation introduced by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] to close this school. The movement to close the School of the Americas is not a new one. Over the past several years, there have been a number of votes on this issue in the House of Representatives. Many of our colleagues in the other body share my concern about this school. Last year, an amendment to close SOA was defeated by the narrowest of margins. It is clear that the momentum behind the bipartisan effort to close this school is growing, and I believe that SOA's days are numbered. While it may be appropriate under certain circumstances for the United States military to offer training to military forces from friendly nations, it is a mistake to conduct this training at the School of the Americas. I have no objection to training military officers from Latin America, but to continue to do so at this school places all future training under a sinister shadow of doubt. This school's reputation has been irrevocably tainted by the blood of the victims of its graduates. In order to remove any suggestion of responsibility for the deaths of these innocent people from the United States, and in order to lift the cloud of suspicion over American military training, we must separate the legitimate training exercises conducted by the United States military from the sordid acts most notorious graduates of SOA. The only way to do that is to close the School of the Americas once and for all.

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EXECUTIVE SESSION1998-07-31

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and am pleased that the Senate is poised to ratify it today. This convention seeks to establish worldwide standards for the criminalization of the bribery of foreign officials to influence or retain business. That this treaty has overwhelming bipartisan support is not surprising. But that we have this treaty to consider at all is a rather exceptional event. For it was just over 20 years ago that the Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA. This landmark legislation, which I am proud to say was sponsored by one of Wisconsin's most respected elected officials, Senator William Proxmire, was enacted after it was discovered that some American companies were keeping slush funds for making questionable and/or illegal payments to foreign officials to help land business deals. For these 20 years, the FCPA has succeeded at curbing U.S. corporate bribery of foreign officials by establishing extensive bookkeeping requirements to ensure transparency and by criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials. These very important principles do not simply reflect an American sense of morality and fair play in business. They also strengthen America's trade policy, foster faith in American democracy, and protect our interests in requiring an open environment for U.S. investment. Certainly, these are principles and guidelines in everyone's best interest, and as such, well worth promoting worldwide. Yet there has been a price for taking the ethical high road. U.S. companies that are trying to pursue opportunities in the global marketplace are forced to compete with firms from countries whose national laws take a more--shall we say--``laissez-faire'' approach to this issue, and turn a blind eye to the corruption and graft evident in many business transactions. Some countries--Germany is the most-often cited example--even allow companies to take a tax deduction for bribes paid to foreign officials as a business expense. I call such practices corporate welfare of the worst kind! These laws and practices by our closest trading partners clearly put our businesses at a disadvantage. I have heard from more than one Wisconsin company about international contracts lost as a result of some non-American company paying a bribe to a foreign official. These lost contracts represent lost employment and revenue opportunities for my state, and I am sure for many other states. A 1997 report by the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee estimates that in a single year, U.S. firms lost at least 50 international commercial contracts--valued at more than $15 billion--as a result of bribes by competitors. But with the signing of the OECD Convention last December, the rest of the industrialized world, along with several key lesser developed countries, is finally beginning to follow America's lead. What this convention does is initiate several significant steps to raise the standards of our major trading partners to the level established by the FCPA. Specifically, the convention obligates the parties to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in all branches of government. Individuals who bribe public officials will be subject to ``effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties,'' and the parties agree to cooperate in investigations and proceedings related to such crimes. I have been keenly interested in anti-corruption efforts for many years. In 1994, I authored a provision to close a loophole in defense contracting by outlawing kickback payments in the conduct of offsets-- an issue brought to my attention by a major Wisconsin corporation. I have raised the potential problem of corruption in taxpayer-supported export promotion programs to a Wisconsin State trade promotion commission, the Lucey Commission. In 1995, I introduced legislation that would have specifically barred the extension of U.S. export financing and trade promotion to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations which have not adopted and enforced a company-wide anti-bribery code. I also introduced a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that bribery is indeed a morally reprehensible business practice and has destabilizing consequences for the international trade environment. Finally, I offered an amendment to the 1996 State Department authorization bill requiring an inter-agency study on bribery and corruption and the impact it has on American businesses. I believe the Administration's actions with respect to negotiation of this convention have been consistent with my intent in all of these efforts, as well as the intent of the authors of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA. I commend all the individuals involved for their efforts. In addition, I commend the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for moving the Committee quickly to recommend ratification of this convention. I will highlight for my colleagues several provisions in the resolution of ratification. Section (c)(1) requires the President to submit to Congress an annual report that sets out various details regarding ratification, relevant domestic legislation of the parties, and enforcement. It also requires a description of the future work of the parties to expand the definition of ``foreign public official.'' In particular, the President will need to report on the steps taken by the Parties to specifically make illegal the bribery of foreign political parties or party officials and candidates for public office. This provision reflects the strong views of the Committee on Foreign Relations that the pernicious practice of bribery also pervades the political world, and it too must be stopped. Finally, Section (c)(1)(F) requires the President to provide a description of U.S. efforts to encourage other non-OECD members to sign, ratify, implement, and enforce the treaty. This provision, which I encouraged the Committee to include, is important because it recognizes that while most major international companies are based in OECD members states--the major industrialized nations of the world--it is vitally important to include less developed countries in an undertaking of this nature. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted at the December 1997 signing ceremony for the Convention, ``supplier nations have a special responsibility to stop this destructive practice. * * * At the same time, * * * it is vital that nations in the developing world meet their responsibility to act.'' As noted in the Committee report, we expect the Executive to work through bilateral and multilateral fora to encourage other non-OECD members to join this effort by ratifying the treaty and implementing its provisions. I think those of us that are members of the Foreign Relations Committee can help in this effort. For example, at the most recent hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa to consider ambassadorial nominations, I asked a panel of seven nominees to provide their views on the effectiveness of the efforts of their respective, prospective host countries' governments to combat corruption, and asked them to comment on how they might work individually with these governments to become more active in dealing with this issue at a multilateral level. These nominees provided quite thoughtful responses, and I certainly encourage all of our ambassadors to pursue similar goals in their respective countries. Mr. President, in sum, I believe this is a vitally important treaty, and I am thrilled that the Senate has moved so quickly to ratify it. As a direct descendent of Senator Proxmire's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it represents the best of a long Wisconsin tradition of good government and ethics, and I am proud to have been a part of the Senate's ratification of this effort.

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BIOMATERIALS ACCESS ASSURANCE ACT OF 19971998-07-30

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Senator McCain, I thank the Senator for addressing my concerns.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Finally, I am concerned that in a case where the manufacturer has gone bankrupt, the claimant will be unable to recover from the liable party. Does your bill address this issue?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Second, I am concerned that there would not be a sufficient introduction of evidence demonstrating the liability of the supplier in the underlying suit against the manufacturer for the court to make an independent determination that the supplier was an actual and proximate cause of the harm for purposes of the impleader motion as required in Sections 7(1)(A) and 7(2)(A) of the bill.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to express my concern regarding three provisions of the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998. Although I have broader concerns with the bill including federalism issues, consumer protection issues, and evidentiary issues, I would like clarification from one of the sponsors of the bill, Senator McCain, on three specific points. First, Section 7(a) the language reads that only ``after entry of a final judgment in an action by the claimant against a manufacturer'' can a claimant attempt to implead a biomaterials supplier. I am concerned that this could be interpreted to mean that the manufacturer must lose the underlying suit before the claimant may implead the supplier. Is this correct?

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-07-30

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to voice my opposition to the fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense appropriations bill. Once again, we have loaded up this bill with unnecessary, extravagant, and flat-out wasteful items. In a time when we are cutting programs and fighting for a true balanced budget, we cannot afford to insulate any department from scrutiny as we seek to reduce the Federal debt. Unfortunately, the DoD budget remains immune to any and all attempts at responsible spending. Mr. President, I offered an amendment to this bill that aimed to invest fully in the best bargain in the Defense Department. According to a National Guard study, the average cost to train and equip an active duty soldier is $73,000 per year, while it costs $17,000 per year to train and equip a National Guard soldier. The cost of maintaining Army National Guard units is just 23 percent of the cost of maintaining Active Army units. It failed, however, but that should not come as a surprise. DoD and a complicit Congress have never been known as a frugal or practical when it comes to defense spending. From $436 hammers to $640 toilet seats to $2 billion bombers that don't work and the department doesn't seem to want to use, we have a storied history of wasting our tax dollars. I presented an opportunity to spend defense dollars on something that works and is worthwhile, but the lobby for the wasteful and unnecessary Super Hornet prevailed. Speaking of which, the bill appropriates $2.9 billion for the procurement of 30 Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. The current Hornet program has been proven reliable and cost- effective. Why do we want to replace the Hornet with a bloated, cost- prohibitive aircraft that offers marginal benefits over a reliable fighter? This bill also contradicts the House's overwhelming recommendation on Super Hornet procurement. Twice, once in their authorization bill and again in their appropriations bill, the House, by margins of nearly 300 members, voted to procure 27 Super Hornets in fiscal year 1999. The House correctly notes that the Navy asks for an inexplicable procurement increase from fiscal year 1998; that the Navy's low rate initial production schedule is not consistent with its procurement objective of 548 aircraft; and that the wing drop problem has not been resolved. Mr. President, it seems we have thrown rationality out the window when it comes to this plane. Judging by the Super Hornet's past performance, I'm sure we'll be hearing more about it soon. Finally, Mr. President, authors of the bill have again loaded it up with projects and hundreds of millions of dollars the Pentagon didn't even ask for. Just to give my colleagues a taste of these extravagant morsels, the bill adds: $78.5 million for 8 additional UH-60 helicopters; $30.0 million for JAVELIN anti-tank missiles; $208.3 million for Marine Corps procurement priorities; $50 million for advance procurement of the LHD-8 amphibious ship, which is a program DoD didn't even want to fund next year; $65.7 million for Humvee vehicles; $90 million for C-135 aircraft; and $40 million for F-15 Eagles. Further, there is $1.8 billion in additional funds for the deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia that are designated as ``emergency'' funds. The Bosnia mission is no longer an emergency. It is a long-term commitment for the United States military, and we should pay for it on budget. Mr. President, this is shameful. We have a duty to act responsibly with our constituents tax dollars. Instead of looking after our constituents, we continue to pick their pockets. We have to make smart choices, Mr. President. A truly balanced federal budget is in sight for the first time in three decades. But we are not going to be able to maintain a balanced budget, let alone start bringing down the federal debt, so long as we continue to commit to programs and force structures that are so blatantly unaffordable. We must continue to fight for further spending reductions until we achieve the most effective and cost efficient military which serves our national security interests. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor. Prostate Cancer Research

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-07-30

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is supported by 25 State adjutants general. I hope my colleagues contact their State adjutants generals to get their opinion before casting their vote. I urge colleagues to support the National Guard and to vote against tabling this amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is about the National Guard. This amendment is about priorities in our Armed Forces, not about the merits of any aircraft proposed to be added to the Navy's aviation fleet. This amendment fills in almost all of the dangerous $225 million shortfall in the National Guard's O&M account. As an offset, we use the House's recommendation on Super Hornet procurement for the coming fiscal year.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the Hutchison amendment, No. 3413, to the DOD appropriations bill concerning Bosnia. I want to very sincerely commend the Senator from Texas for all the hard work she continues to devote to this important issue and for trying to craft a compromise that would be acceptable to a majority of our colleagues regarding the United States' ongoing presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As my friend from Texas has already explained, this amendment mandates a withdrawal of U.S. forces participating in the NATO Stabilization Force, or S-FOR, requiring that that force, or any future multi-national successor force, shall not exceed 6,500 troops by February 2, 1999, and 5,000 troops by October 1, 1999. The amendment enforces these levels by tying any appropriated funds for the Bosnia mission to this troop reduction. This amendment represents something less than a funding cut-off for the mission, although that is a policy I have pursued in the past. Rather, it suggests a slow and careful drawdown of U.S. forces in the region. In fact, it allows for troops to stay there past October of next year! Mr. President, this is July 30. This is exactly 1 month after the date that we were supposed to be out of Bosnia in the first place. That isn't even accurate, because really we were supposed to be out of Bosnia in the first place, according to the promises that were made by both parties, by December 30, 1996. So we are way beyond that date. Our troops have been there since 1995--much longer than the original 1-year mandate, and already longer than the expanded 18-month mandate for S-FOR--and I do not think anyone has a good idea how many more years we will be there. More significantly, the cost of our involvement in Bosnia has increased dramatically--easily more than quadrupling the original $2 billion estimate to over $9 billion. The estimate is that it is now well over $9 billion for this commitment that has already been spent or obligated. Mr. President, I regret that the managers of this bill earlier today agreed to a provision that would allow $1.8 billion in additional funds for the Bosnia mission to be added to this bill with an emergency designation. Mr. President, the mission in Bosnia has clearly ceased to be an emergency, and this amendment even recognizes that fact. The fact that the emergency designation was inserted into the bill this morning unfortunately highlights the fact that we in Congress continue to be lax in establishing some kind of accountability for our continued operation in Bosnia, and particularly for the taxpayer dollars that are needed to support that operation, soon to approach the astounding figure of $10 billion. I recognize that my continued opposition to the mission in Bosnia is not shared by everyone in Congress. But I think all of us would agree that the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to provide a check on the manner in which the executive branch spends money. This is the way the President spends an annual budget request to the Congress with his plans for the following year's spending. From time to time there are emergencies that can not be foreseen, and we deal with those accordingly as emergencies. But let me repeat again, U.S. involvement in Bosnia has ceased to be an emergency. Rather, our presence in Bosnia has clearly become a substantial, long-term commitment. It is something the United States has, for better or worse, decided to do for the long-term. And we need to evaluate this operation on its merits accordingly, and not pretend that it is an appropriate occasion for an emergency designation. The amendment by the Senator from Texas can at least put some real pressure on the administration to develop plans for a reduction in troop levels in Bosnia. The amendment also would have a positive budgetary impact, because we would need fewer resources to support a smaller troop presence. Mr. President, with or without this amendment, I think we all recognize that there will be troops in Bosnia next year. So, this is not an emergency, and I think the Congress has a responsibility to face that fact and deal with it accordingly. I hope, therefore, that those of my colleagues who do support the mission in Bosnia will cease to resort to maneuvers regarding the funding of this mission that seek to avoid our budget spending caps! This has been going on far too long, and has eaten up too many of our resources--human, financial and otherwise. We cannot continue with this budgetary game. Mr. President, I am pleased once again to join the junior Senator from Texas in trying to assert some kind of accountability for this mission. I urge my colleagues to support her amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19991998-07-30

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me first of all say that the two Senators who have spoken in opposition to this amendment are not only very sincere in their support of the National Guard but they have demonstrated in committee a serious concern about increasing funding. And their efforts have gone a long way to make sure that we have less of a shortfall than was originally occurring. That is encouraging. However, as was admitted by those opposed to this amendment, we still have a $225 million shortfall in the O&M account at the National Guard. This is a serious shortfall. I am not suggesting that we remove this funding from vital areas, but this is about priorities within the defense budget. I think it is a pretty easy call. Although I would prefer that we not move forward with the Super Hornet airplane, what I am suggesting here is not a dramatic reduction in those planes. I am simply suggesting we take what has already been passed in the House; that is, instead of having 30 of the Super Hornets, we procure 27--3 fewer. For three fewer of these planes, we could fully fund the National Guard O&M account. This is not an attempt, as the Senator from Alaska, suggested, to seriously disrupt the production of the Super Hornet. Very candidly, Mr. President, I would prefer to do that, because the General Accounting Office has pointed out that the Super Hornet is not substantially better than the current plane. It is going to cost $17 billion more than the current plane. That is a huge amount of money. But that is not what this amendment does. All this amendment does is say let's adopt what the House did, which is have 27 Super Hornets instead of 30, and use the money that is saved to fully fund the National Guard, or virtually fully fund the National Guard O&M account. Mr. President, these shortfalls for the National Guard are serious. I have had the opportunity to visit armories in Oak Creek, WI, and Appleton, WI, and spend a fair amount of time speaking to the officers and the guardsmen and guardswomen who are trying so hard to do the job that they are expected to do, constituting 34 percent of our entire Army's sources and resources. They are having morale problems. Otherwise, why would 26 adjutant generals in this country write in support of this amendment? They are very concerned. Mr. President, my amendment is simply about priorities. It is a modest reduction in the number of these Super Hornets that are going to be procured, and in return for something that is far more vital at this point. And that is fully funding the O&M account for the National Guard. Mr. President, in light of the fact there will be a motion to table at some point, I strongly urge my colleagues to put these modest resources in the National Guard, which supports our Army and which exists in our communities in every one of our States, rather than three more airplanes that, frankly, have not been proven to be substantially better than the current plane that has done a good job in the Gulf war and other situations. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to quote the chairman of the House Military Procurement Subcommittee, Duncan Hunter. Speaking of the National Security Committee's Super Hornet procurement decision, Representative Hunter said, ``We think it's a rational, responsible reduction, a balanced reduction.'' Mr. President, it is time we prioritized this Nation's defense needs. The National Guard provides a wide range of services, from combat in foreign lands to support in local weather emergencies, all at a fraction of the cost of the Active Army. The National Guard needs and deserves our full support. And it is for that reason that I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Missouri states that my amendment is a ``reckless assault'' on the Navy's Super Hornet program. This could not be further from the truth. My amendment to increase funding for the National Guard is simply that; an amendment to correct most of a dangerous shortfall in funding for the National Guard's operations and maintenance account. To raise as little controversy as possible in finding an offset to the funding increase, I chose a provision already agreed to by the other chamber. Not only did the House agree to funding procurement of 27 Super Hornets in FY99, the body authorized funding for the identical amount. In speaking to the reduction, Chairman of the House Military Procurement subcommittee, Duncan Hunter said, ``We think it's a rational, responsible reduction, a balanced reduction.'' Does this mean Chairman Hunter is recklessly assaulting the Super Hornet program? Is Chairman Hunter diminishing the value of the Navy's aviation fleet? Is Chairman Hunter questioning the value of the Super Hornet? I don't think Chairman Hunter was, or ever will be, accused of any of those things. That's why, Mr. President, it boggles my mind why I now stand accused of all those things. It's a plain mischaracterization of my amendment. This amendment is not about gutting the Super Hornet program. This amendment is not about pitting one service against another. This amendment is not about diminishing the Navy's aviation fleet. This amendment does not question the value of the Super Hornet. Mr. President, this amendment is about an adequate level of funding for the National Guard and priorities in our armed forces. This amendment is about giving priority to the National Guard's readiness levels, capabilities, force structure, and end strength. This amendment is about bringing the Guard's personnel, schools, training, full-time support, and retention and recruitment to adequate levels. This amendment, is about ending a slide in the morale of our citizen- soldiers. Finally, my friend from Missouri states that the National Guard Association of the United States does not support this amendment. I'm sure he made his case very forcefully to them. I counter by saying that the association does not oppose this amendment either. In fact, a majority of State Adjutants General, 26 of them so far, have contacted my office to add their names in support for my amendment. I hope my colleagues will draw their own conclusions from that figure. Indeed, I urge my colleagues to contact their State Adjutant General and ask them for their opinion of my amendment. I urge my colleagues to support the National Guard, as I do. I urge my colleagues to vote against tabling my amendment. Amendment No. 3124 (Purpose: Relating to human rights in the People's Republic of China)

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