Russell Feingold

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Will the Senator from Arizona yield?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send this amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and the distinguished Senator from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] and the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain]. This amendment is the product of negotiations of a number of Senators and provides that none of the funds appropriated in this bill for the Animas-La Plata project can be expended for construction until the Secretary of Interior submits a report on a new scaled-down project design and the new project is actually authorized by Congress at a date subsequent to the date of the enactment of this bill. Mr. President, what this amendment means is that we will stop and evaluate what should be done before we spend more Federal dollars on this project. As colleagues may recall from my statement last year on this matter, the currently authorized Animas-La Plata project is a taxpayer-funded water development project planned for southwest Colorado and northwest New Mexico. The project is designed to supply 191,230 feet of water. The Animas-La Plata project consists of two major reservoirs, 7 pumping plants and 20 miles of canals and pipes and will pump water over 1,000 feet uphill, consuming enough power to run a city of 60,000 people to supply municipal, industrial and irrigation interests. Last Tuesday, Mr. President, prior to the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee markup of the legislation that is before this body, those who support the construction of the Animas-La Plata project announced that they have developed what they believe to be a cheaper and scaled-down alternative. The announcement of an alternative sends a clear signal to this body. After 30 years and $71 million in appropriations to date, the project costs of Animas-La Plata are too great and there are too many lingering substantive questions to proceed with the original design. As I indicated during the discussion over the fiscal year 1997 energy and water appropriations legislation, I do support the search for an alternative to Animas-La Plata. In fact, legislation that I introduced on March 13, 1997, cosponsored also by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] and also by the Presiding Officer, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Gregg] and sponsored in the other body by my colleague from Wisconsin [Mr. Petri] and the Congressman from New York [Mr. DeFazio], deauthorizes the current Animas-La Plata reclamation project and directs the Secretary of the Interior to work with the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute tribes to find an alternative to satisfy their water rights needs. However, the taxpayers should not continue to be asked to sock money away in Bureau of Reclamation construction accounts as a placeholder for an option that has not yet fully been analyzed and authorized. This new alternative by the proponents has not had a full cost evaluation by the Department of Interior and, of greater concern to me, requires statutory changes to be implemented that I think should be reviewed by the authorizing committee in question. It is the jurisdiction of this body's Energy Committee to determine the benefits of a reclamation project, and it is the responsibility of the Interior Department to make certain that the Federal Government's legal responsibilities to the Ute tribes under any sort of an agreement are met. This revised project, which would be evaluated by the Department of Interior under our amendment, at a minimum may require major changes to several relevant laws and agreements. The 1986 Ute Settlement Agreement may have to be renegotiated to reflect changes in water allocations among parties to the agreement, particularly the reduced quantity of water, changes in contract and repayment requirements and obligations and changes in cost-sharing requirements. The 1988 Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act may also need changes to conform to a new agreement and new requirements. Finally, the Water Supply Act of 1958 would need to be changed to modify or waive current requirements that the beneficiaries of municipal and industrial water repay the Federal Government for construction costs with interest and pay for the Bureau of Reclamation operations and maintenance costs that are attributable to the amount of water they receive. Let me make it clear, Mr. President, because we will be reauthorizing this project at some date in the future, the language in this amendment allows the Secretary to explore and recommend any appropriate alternative, including nonstructural alternatives, in developing a revised plan for submission to Congress. These issues will all be assessed under the amendment we are offering before any funds can be expended in the construction of a new project. I think this is a responsible way to proceed, and I am pleased that so many Members of the Senate have worked together toward this amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, last week, the Senate expressed in very clear terms its view that the United States' mission in Bosnia should be terminated by next June, which is the administration's stated deadline. This was not a position that was taken without public debate. In fact, the Senate debate regarding the Bosnia operation began last Thursday evening and continued well into Friday morning. A number of Senators were involved in the debate at various times during the consideration of the DOD bill. Quite frankly, Mr. President, as we well know, there were some Senators--including the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner]--who did express their disagreement with having a date certain for termination of U.S. ground troop deployment. Mr. President, they were clearly in the minority on this issue. The Senate took this action regarding an end date as part of one of the most important pieces of defense related legislation--the Department of Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998. Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues what we did this past Friday. Indeed, one of the reasons that I pressed so hard to have a Bosnia-related provision added to that bill was because of the importance of having this debate on the DOD authorization itself. Now, today, we have begun consideration of the other key defense bill--the Department of Defense appropriations bill. As in the authorization bill, I do not think we can let the fact that we currently have 8,000 of our troops in Bosnia go unnoticed during a debate on the Department of Defense appropriations. Just 3 days ago, we passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill that clearly states the Senate's desire to have United States troops out of Bosnia no later than June 30, 1998. The resolution we passed was a modification of an amendment I had introduced that would have imposed a hard, statutory requirement that the administration stick to its announced pullout date of June 30, 1998. My original amendment was virtually identical to the one that passed the other body, the House, on a vote of 278-148 that literally cut off funding for the Bosnia mission after that June 30 date. The message of the action, Mr. President, in both the House and the Senate is crystal clear: It is the overwhelming desire of the Congress that the administration pull our brave men and women out of Bosnia by June 30, 1998. In light of these strong messages, Mr. President, I was somewhat disappointed in what I read in the papers over the weekend. Only 1 day after the Senate passed its resolution, President Clinton publicly stated what I am afraid the administration has been thinking all along--the possibility that the deployment of United States troops in Bosnia may well continue after the present mission expires. Let's not forget, this is already a major extension from the original date when it was supposed to terminate, which was approximately the end of December 1996. The President said, ``I believe the present operation will have run its course by then''--referring to the June deadline--``and we'll have to discuss what, if any, involvement the United States should have there.'' Meanwhile, the White House said that an international presence will be necessary in Bosnia for perhaps a considerable time past June 1998. Now, Mr. President, I fear these statements send the wrong message. By making these remarks, the administration is hinting that the United States might be willing to sign on to a new mission once the mandate of the NATO-led stabilization force, or SFOR, has run out. Mr. President, I think it frighteningly opens the door for additional U.S. troop involvement after that time. Now, this is contrary to what Congress has said, that the U.S. troops should be on the way home next June, not starting a new mission. There should be no maybes about the continued involvement of U.S. ground troops past the clear deadline that has been set by the administration and endorsed by both Houses of Congress. Mr. President, in 1995, President Clinton asked Congress to approve the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia, with an understanding. The understanding was that our military personnel would remain there for just 1 year. Well, as we all know, after the 1 year the original implementation force was turned into a stabilization force and renamed from IFOR to SFOR. It just kept on going. And as a result, the United States has kept 8,000 of our troops in the region under the premise that SFOR was somehow a completely new mission. But it obviously is not. I also do not need to remind everyone, I hope, of the ballooning costs of the Bosnia mission. This is really quite startling to me. Despite original estimates in the $2 billion range, we are now committed to pay at least, Mr. President, $7.7 billion, and it is going up. When I first raised this issue this year on the supplemental bill, the figure I brought to the floor was $6.5 billion. Now it is already up to $7.7 billion a few short weeks later. Every time there is an assessment of the cost of this mission, the figure goes up another $1 billion or $2 billion. After this weekend, I have a new fear that when the June deadline rolls around this mission will undergo another name change. Maybe the ``stabilization'' force will become the ``coordination'' force, or CFOR. Maybe it will become the ``maintenance'' force, or MFOR. Whatever the new acronym is, Mr. President, I am afraid the results will be the same--our ground troops will be asked to remain in Bosnia past June under the pretense of a new mission. Now, I don't doubt for a minute, Mr. President, that United States goals in Bosnia are to maintain the peace and to help the three sides rebuild a united government. While our mission has succeeded in stopping the fighting, we are far behind in preparing for the day when Bosnians will once again have to rule themselves without the benefit of NATO troops. In a May study of the Bosnia mission, the GAO noted there has been little progress in creating a united police force, or on building a functioning parliament, or even setting up offices for a new Bosnian cabinet. Mr. President, the best way to ensure that something never gets done is to constantly extend the deadline. If a teacher were to give his or her students a term paper assignment and tell them, ``try to get it done by this year and, if that's not possible, maybe next year,'' you can bet that the students will not be rushing off to the library to get the work done. In a way, that is a little like what we are doing in Bosnia. We are saying, ``try to comply with the Dayton accords by June, but if you can't, we'll stick around anyway.'' It is no wonder the various parties in Bosnia are not making much headway in rebuilding their civilian institutions, given that NATO and the United States seem committed, it appears, to policing this country indefinitely. Similarly, I do not think that our European allies will take seriously their own responsibilities to the region unless they clearly understand American intentions. I think that's why the compromise resolution the Senate passed last week actually included language that the President should inform our partners in Europe in this exercise of the expression of this Congress--tell them that we are planning to leave by June 30, 1998. I think this is a very important part of the Senate's position on this issue. The administration, our friends in Europe, and the parties to this conflict must all understand that this Congress does consider the June deadline a firm one. That is not to say that at the end of next June there will be no more American involvement in the region. That is not my position. I don't think that is the position of most Senators. As the Senate resolution indicates, Congress would be open to considering a different kind of supporting role in Bosnia. This could include activities such as airlift, logistics, intelligence, or equipment, for example. As long as such activities do not include the use of ground forces, and as long as the Congress is appropriately consulted, I too am open to considering the United States having such a supportive role for our allies. That is not inconsistent with the notion of making sure ground troops come home. Mr. President, there are many who feel uncomfortable with Congress actually using its literal ``power of the purse'' to command a withdrawal of U.S. troops from a military deployment. During the debate last week, some Members who firmly support termination of the Bosnia deployment by the June target date did express concern about the mechanism--a hard funding cutoff--that I had originally proposed. However, I want to point out that the reason Members of Congress turn to these drastic remedies, the reason I proposed it in the first place, and the reason the House passed such a hard date overwhelmingly is precisely because not only the administration but also some leaders in Congress seem oblivious to the calls by other Members of Congress for ending the mission by the target date. Given the statements we heard this weekend, Mr. President, it is even more imperative than ever that the conferees employ the strongest possible language regarding the June 30 pullout date when we get to the final version of the Defense authorization bill. I originally believed that a hard mandate--nearly 1 year in advance of that date--would give the administration more than enough time to prepare for and to implement an orderly withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. Unlike the President's remarks, the message from the Congress has to leave no room for interpretation or ambiguity. We should not just say that our ground troops should be back home next year, if possible. I think we have to say, as we have done in both Houses--and we have to say this in the conference report--that our men and women should be out of Bosnia by June 30, 1998, period. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Amendment No. 846

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that Susanne Martinez, Andy Kutler, and Linda Rotblatt of my staff be granted privileges of the floor during further consideration of S. 936.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, thank you. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the proponents of the modified Bosnia amendment have managed to work out a compromise, and I think, in fact, the changes that were made on the modification strengthened the second-degree amendment, made it stronger and tough, which, I think, is very appropriate here. While my original amendment would have prohibited the use of funds for the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia, I was willing to accept the sense-of-the-Congress language because I think it is vitally important that the Congress send a signal about our views on this mission during consideration of this bill, the Department of Defense authorization bill. I introduced this amendment in the first place because I felt it was critical that we debate this issue at this time. Frankly, I think it would have been somewhat irresponsible not to have any debate about the Bosnian involvement in the context of the Department of Defense authorization bill. As I indicate by my underlying amendment, I would greatly prefer a hard statutory requirement that the administration stick to its stated end date of June 30, 1998. That is, in fact, what the other body did. That is what the House has already done. The House voted 278 to 148 to limit the use of funds after that date. The House version and the modification to my amendment speak to the same goal. The Congress wants to see this mission end. Our main differences lay in the mechanism to achieve that goal. But when these two versions get to conference later this year, the conferees will have to resolve these differences. Mr. President, it is my hope that the conference will include the strongest possible language with regard to this issue. We have taken an important step today toward terminating the Bosnian mission and bringing home our men and women. I am delighted to have the support from so many Members on both sides of the aisle for my efforts in this area. I want to especially thank the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island for their work, and the strong and consistent support of the Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, who has been working with me on this important matter all along. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor. Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam President. This amendment asks that the Defense Department, within 60 days, issues a report to tell us which of the three planned jet fighters should be terminated because of the obvious problem that we don't have enough money in the procurement budget to have all three of these--the F-22 of the Air Force, the F-18E/F of the Navy, or the joint strike fighter that is being planned as a commonality plane for three branches of our armed services. The GAO, CBO, many military experts, and others agree that it is not possible for us to afford all three of these, and it is also not an answer, as the QDR suggests, to simply reduce each of the three, because the problem is that the unit cost of each plane is so high that at the lower number of planes that are produced, you don't get the savings. This is what happened with the B-2 bomber. We are facing a train wreck with regard to this, and we need some guidance from the Defense Department about which of the three should go, if that is what we have to do in order to continue to balance the budget. Thank you, Madam President.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the remainder of my time and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Has all time expired except for that 30 seconds?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am just a little puzzled as to how the term ``draconian'' can be applied to my amendment. What does my amendment actually call for? The Defense Department, on this issue--or at least the advocates--seem so nervous about talking about this problem that we can't afford these three airplanes that they are referring to an amendment as ``draconian,'' which only asks the Defense Department to give us their opinion, tell us what they think. If you had to give up one of these three airplanes, which one would it be and how would you proceed? I would understand if this was a ridiculous question and why ask it of them. But it isn't. The GAO has said that the E/F is a good airplane, but it is not that much better than the C/D, and it is going to cost $17 billion more. There are others who are really questioning whether this is a good idea. How can it possibly be termed ``draconian'' to simply ask the Defense Department to give us their opinion? It doesn't require a decision. If the crisis that the Senator from Indiana and I both agree may be coming has to be dealt with later, this is the kind of information that would be useful for us to have. We are not required to act on it. The Defense Department is not required to change their mind. How can this be described as draconian? What troubles me about that characterization is, what are we afraid of here as Members of Congress? Openly discussing the fact that there are some questions about whether we can afford this and whether we really need all three of these planes? This is really a business-as-usual attitude. The Defense Department will be better off and this country will be better off if it starts to join in the fiscal responsibility that all of us have been calling for. So I am very concerned that the Members of the Senate, who will vote on this soon, know that all this does is ask for a report within 60 days. It is asking for an advisory opinion from the Defense Department: If we had to cut one of these three planes, which one would it be? What possible harm would that be? I ask my colleagues to support this and help us solve what we all agree is an impending problem with regard to fiscal spending. How much time do I have?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have no additional speakers.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me again remind the body that this does not require the termination of any one of the three jet fighters. It asks for a recommendation from the Department of Defense within 60 days as to which of the three should be terminated, if that became fiscally necessary. Second, it is simply not the view of everyone who knows a lot about this subject that this would jeopardize our national security or the defense capability of our Armed Forces. Take a look at the GAO reports, the CBO reports, the analysis of a number of military experts--that is just not the case. I hope the folks who have urged me to look at the hearing testimony which I and my staff have looked at with regard to the merits of these airplanes, would give the same kind of attention to the analysis, fiscal analysis and other analysis of others who we often rely on to give us advice about the effectiveness and cost efficiency of various programs, including the GAO and the CBO, as well as military experts. Look, I don't think anyone thinks these are not good planes. These are great planes that are being proposed. I went down and spent part of a morning seeing the wonderful E/F planes, but what we see here is a credit card mentality that somehow we can just have it all. There is no real plan here to make sure that we don't end up trying to have all of these things and, as a result, not end up being able to truly pay for the ones we most need. One of the arguments that came out of the QDR that was cited by the Senator from Indiana is that there are ideas about bringing down the cost of each of these by reducing the number of E/F's, reducing the number of F-22's, and reducing the number of joint strike fighters. It is suggested significant savings can be achieved by reducing the size and scope of the fighter programs. I certainly do not question the motives of those who say that. But the idea we can maintain all three of these fighter programs is simply inconsistent with balancing the Federal budgets. Two months ago, the Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from CBO with respect to proposals to merely reduce, as has been suggested by QDR, rather than cancel these tactical fighter programs. In that testimony, CBO explained how the Air Force had proposed last year to buy 124 F-22's over the 1998 to 2003 period. This year, the Air Force has revised that estimate and proposed purchasing just 70 F-22's during the 5-year period. That is a reduction in terms of numbers of over 40 percent of the number of airplanes. But despite buying 54 fewer airplanes and reducing the buy by over 40 percent, CBO noted this, and I think it is very significant, that the funding level for this buy remained almost the same, at about $20.4 billion now compared with $21.5 billion in last year's estimate. Why? Unit cost. If you don't build more airplanes up to a high level, then you don't get the benefit of the reduced cost. You end up paying almost the same for much fewer airplanes. CBO pointed out that is a savings of about $1.1 billion, despite buying 54 fewer planes. In other words, we reduced the F-22 buy by over 42 fewer airplanes, but saved only about 5 percent of the funding. I ask my colleagues to consider the Pentagon's track record and the countless aviation programs that have promised so much in terms of cost savings and have delivered so little in terms of cost savings. In fact, the GAO estimates that the Pentagon's projections with respect to aircraft procurement typically have cost overruns of 20 to 40 percent. Clearly, that is not enough--and this may even exacerbate our budget problems--to simply propose reducing any one of these three planes without eliminating one. Time and time again, the Pentagon has promised an aviation program, promising large quantities of new aircraft at a given price, only to continually scale back the size of such program until we are receiving small quantities of aircraft but paying huge sums of money for those. The B-2 is a tremendous example. In 1986, the Reagan administration told us we were going to get 132 B-2's at a cost of $441 million per airplane. In 1990, the Bush administration revised this number and said, let's only have 75 B-2's, but at a cost of $864 million per airplane. Of course, by late 1996, we were on track to buy 20 B-2's at a cost of roughly $2.3 billion per copy. This isn't saving money. Over the course of a decade, Mr. President, we received less than one-sixth of the number of airplanes originally proposed, and we paid more than five times the original price quoted per airplane. Of the three tactical fighter programs identified in my amendment, the two programs currently under production, the F-22 and E/F, have already experienced this sort of program instability. In 1986, the Air Force originally proposed we buy 750 F-22's. That number was reduced to 648 in 1991, 440 in 1996, and now, in 1997, the QDR proposes purchasing just 339 of these aircraft. Likewise, the Pentagon claims that the Navy and Marine Corps originally intended to purchase 1,300 Super Hornets. In 1992, with the Marine Corps dropout, this figure went to 1,000, and now the QDR is recommending this number be dropped to as low as 548 of these airplanes. Again, we are buying fewer and fewer of these airplanes and we are paying more and more for them. That is precisely, Mr. President, why merely reducing the quantities of the tactical fighters, just reducing the numbers, will not avert the fiscal train wreck that is certain to occur if we continue to fund all three of these programs. That is why GAO has called this ``business as usual,'' and that is what it is. It completely shirks responsibility for how we are possibly going to afford all three of these programs 5 years from now. I hope my colleagues will not follow this road to fiscal irresponsibility and instead will support my amendment that simply says: Have the Pentagon tell us, within 60 days, which of these planes you can most do without, how they would go forward without one of these planes, and give us guidance on this so we can make the best decision here. Mr. President, we cannot afford these three fighters, and we have to make a decision at some point in the future about it. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, not that I know of. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment instructing the Pentagon to recommend the cancellation of one of the three aviation programs currently under development to modernize our tactical fighter force. Canceling one of these three programs would save American taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, and by all accounts still provide our Armed Forces with an effective yet affordable state-of-the-art tactical fighter fleet. This amendment which I am offering on behalf of myself and the senior Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Kohl, focuses on the Pentagon's current acquisition strategy for three new tactical fighter programs: The Air Force's F-22, the Navy's F/A-18E/F, and the multiservice joint strike fighter. DOD is currently planning on purchasing some 4,400 new fighters from these three programs at a total cost of at least $350 billion according to the Congressional Budget Office. Numerous experts, including the CBO and the General Accounting Office have concluded that given our current fiscal constraints and likely future spending parameters, the current acquisition strategy is just plain unrealistic and unwise and untenable. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review, a collaborative effort by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual services to reassess our strategic blueprints for our Armed Forces, as well as to review our inventories and projected needs, has recommended sharp reductions in two of these three jet fighter programs already, the F/A-18E/F and the F-22. The QDR proposed recommendations are a promising step in the right direction. But the problem is that the QDR still clings to the assumption that somehow we can adequately control a program's cost by simply scaling it back, just having fewer of each of the three kinds of planes rather than taking the tough and more wise step of simply terminating one of them. Mr. President, to understand just how serious this budget shortfall will be, we have to take a look back for a minute and look at the entire defense procurement budget comprised of a number of weapons systems and technology programs. But it is currently dominated by these three separate fighter programs. First, the Navy's F/A-18E/F program. All though the current C/D model of this airplane performed extraordinarily well--very well in the gulf war--and has the capability of achieving most of the Navy's requirements with some retrofitting, the Pentagon is currently still asking for 1,000 of these expensive E/F airplanes, with a cumulative program cost of about $89 billion, according to the GAO. The second program is the Air Force's F-22, a stealthy fighter intended to provide air superiority but at an extraordinary cost. This aircraft, which one Navy official has referred to as gold-plated, will cost as much as $161 million per airplane making it the most expensive plane in our history. In all, the F-22 program, slated to provide 440 airplanes to the Air Force, will cost at least $70 billion. The final one of the three fighters is truly still in its infancy. The joint strike fighter, expected to provide common, affordable 21st century strike aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, is actually still on the drawing boards with two major contractors dueling for what is expected to be at least--at least--Mr. President, a $219 billion contract for close to 3,000 airplanes. Although the amendment I am offering today focuses on tactical fighters, I think to put this in context we should mention a few of the other programs on the Defense Department's wish list. We have focused on these because these programs will also have to draw on a limited procurement budget over the next few years. And it just seems impossible that all of these programs can go forward without some changes. In fact, it is likely that many of these nontactical fighter programs will receive reduced funding in the coming years as a result of the drain on our limited procurement dollars, particularly due to going forward with all three of these jet fighters. These programs include the $47 billion V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft being built primarily for the Marine Corps and Navy. There is the $25 billion Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter program for the Army. There is the Air Force's $18 billion request for 80 more C-17 cargo and transport airplanes. Mr. President, in addition to these new aviation programs, we must also factor into account the costs of the necessary replacement of other aging aircraft, such as the KC-135 refueller, the C-5A, the F- 117, and the Navy's EA-6B aircraft. These are all important air assets that must be replaced in the next few years, Mr. President. That, Mr. President, is just the portion of the procurement budget related to aviation spending. The Navy, for example, is looking to increase the procurement of their surface ships, starting with another aircraft carrier, CVN-77, and 17 of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers, as well as four new attack submarines. In fiscal year 1999, the Navy would like to begin procurement of the new San Antonio-class amphibious landing ships for our Marine expeditionary forces. Unless, Mr. President, we take immediate action to avert this train wreck, with respect to tactical fighter spending, there simply will not be enough procurement dollars to fund all of these additional aviation and shipping programs. And a number of experts, Mr. President, in recent months, experts on military spending, have tried to warn the Department of Defense of this impending fiscal disaster. CBO, GAO, Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle--even high- ranking Pentagon officials--have all forewarned the Defense Department that they will not receive the procurement funding level it has projected and will not be able to sustain these tactical fighter purchases at their planned acquisition levels. Here, for example, is what the GAO says: DOD's aircraft investment strategy is a business as usual approach that is wasteful--adding billions of dollars to defense acquisition costs and delaying delivery of weapon systems to the operational forces. GAO goes on to say: We found the DOD's aircraft procurement plans will reach unsustainable levels of the procurement budget if the procurement and the total DOD budgets do not increase. The aircraft procurement plans, if implemented as planned, will require drastic reprioritization of the procurement budget that will require significantly reducing the amount spent on other types of procurement (ships, tracked and wheeled vehicles, missiles, etc.) Mr. President, I understand that many of my colleagues are either strong proponents or opponents of one or more of these individual fighter programs. That is why, Mr. President, my amendment is careful not to target any one specific program for termination. The language in this amendment merely states the obvious, that the Pentagon's procurement budget over the next several years will not be able to support three costly tactical fighter programs and that the Pentagon must start the process of making the tough decisions. Let me read exactly what my amendment does. It says: Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the Secretary's recommendation on which one of the three new tactical fighter programs should be terminated if only two of such programs were to be funded. The report shall also contain an analysis of how the two remaining new tactical fighter programs (not including the tactical fighter aircraft program recommended for termination), together with the current tactical aircraft assets of the Armed Forces, will provide the Armed Forces with an effective, affordable, tactical fighter force structure that is capable of meeting projected threats well into the 21st century. That's it, Mr. President. My amendment merely requires the Pentagon to send us a report within 60 days with a recommendation for canceling one of these programs. It also requires the Pentagon to provide an analysis of how our current tactical fighter assets, including the F- 15, the F-117, the F/A-18C/D and others might be utilized to continue to provide us with air superiority should one of the costly programs be canceled. My amendment does not single out any one program. That is the Pentagon's responsibility. It does not cancel funding for one single fighter aircraft. It merely calls for a recommendation. Once that recommendation is made, it will be up to Congress to determine if we are going to follow through on that recommendation. It does not lock in the Congress. That is what my amendment is about, Mr. President, making some tough decisions. We must have an acquisition strategy for tactical aviation that is affordable and tenable and consistent with the goal of Congress to achieve a Federal balanced budget in the coming years. My amendment is an attempt to force the Defense Department to understand the gravity of this situation. I hope we can get back to the path of fiscal responsibility in this area, as well, as we have sought so hard to do in so many other areas. I reserve the balance of my time, and I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I now call up amendment No. 677, and ask unanimous consent that Senator Kohl, the senior Senator from Wisconsin, be added as an original cosponsor.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. amendment No. 677 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to select one of the three new tactical fighter aircraft programs to recommend for termination)

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, no, it is not. The agreement is 20 minutes on my side and 10 minutes on the other side.

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I was disappointed to read language in the committee report accompanying the fiscal year 1998 Defense authorization bill which called upon the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences [USUHS] to propose the construction of an additional building on the USUHS campus. While I fully appreciate such language is not binding, the provision is a clear invitation to the controversial school to expand the physical plant of a program which many already consider to be costly. More particularly, the provision is inconsistent with the view of a number of Members of Senate and the other body that USUHS not only should not be expanded, but instead should be terminated. That view is shared by others as well. The Department of Defense has proposed phasing out this school, and proposals to close the school have also been offered by the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], the Grace Commission, and the National Performance Review. Mr. President, USUHS is the most expensive source of physicians for our military, according to CBO costing 4 to 10 times as much as other sources and supplying only a tiny fraction of the needs of the Pentagon for new physicians--less than 12 percent in 1994. Expanding the physical plant of a program that is already 4 to 10 times as expensive as alternative sources of physicians for our military makes no sense, and is inconsistent with both the increasing pressure on the Defense Department's budget and our efforts to balance the budget. Mr. President, I urge the Department of Defense to carefully review the non-binding language included in the report accompanying the fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense authorization legislation before it moves to expand a school that cannot justify its current cost to taxpayers. Land Conveyance Provisions

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Correct.