Member of Congress

Russell Feingold

Role
Former Senator
State
WI
Party
Democrat

Speeches

UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA ACT2001-10-11

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank my friend for his kind words. Madam President, in response to the points he made, first, let me respond that I accept the premise of this basic provision in terms of updating the ability to get at computer hackers. That is an update. We did not know what this was a few years ago. We did not know what risks it posed. Nobody opposes that very important part of this bill. But what the Senator claims is that the phrase ``contractual relationship'' somehow makes sure that people are protected from being subject to this who really should not be subject to this; but it does it. I can think of at least three categories of people who do not come within the category of ``contractual relationship.'' One is in the context employment. It is nice if you have a contract, but a lot of employees do not. They do not fall within the protection of a contractual relationship. The same goes for people who would go and use a computer at a library. They do not have a contractual relationship to protect them in this situation. And finally, as the Senator conceded here, in his last example, that certainly students, students at all our universities across the country, are not protected by that language. And that is all we want to do, to make it clear that this amendment is related to the problem of computer hackers, not moms who might be buying Christmas presents on a computer at work, even though they are not supposed to, or students who maybe are gambling on a university computer. Of course they should not do that, but should that subject them to extraordinary, unprecedented intrusion by Government law enforcement authority? Of course not. The Senator attempts to suggest that the provision in here having to do with our desire to have the language say ``contractual'' or ``other'' relationship would somehow allow a hacker to claim that he is protected. The notion that a hacker would be considered as somebody who has a relationship with the company under this amendment is an absurd interpretation of the amendment's intent, so that clearly is not what this amendment would do. And finally, let me get back to the students, the example the Senator from Utah mentioned. It is simply an unprecedented intrusion into individual rights for a university to be able to allow--because of a minor use that is not within university rules--that person to be completely subject to this kind of intrusion.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Yes.

Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct. And that even troubles me for the length of time that it is allowed--but it is far better than an infinite position. Law Enforcement should be required to seek a warrant as soon as possible, within reason, given the fact that what the amendment tries to get at is emergency situations involving hackers. As soon as possible, they should have to meet the standards that are normally met. But, yes, the amendment does permit that, in my view, rather extraordinary period of time before the requirement would have to be made.

Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Correct.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I want to clarify a couple points, then I will be prepared to yield the remaining time. These were helpful exchanges on a couple of points. First of all, it became very clear from Senator Specter's excellent questioning that, of course, there is no guarantee, under the way this language is set up, under the words ``contractual relationship,'' that the provision would not apply to students or to people who would use a computer at a library. I can't understand why, if that is the intent of the administration, the intent of the legislation, why they don't just agree to language that would say so. That is all we asked for yesterday. It could have resolved the problem. For some reason, they won't agree to it. Second, is this notion that a hacker could somehow get in under our language. There is no way that a hacker has a relationship with the computer owner that permits the use of the computer. The hacker is, obviously, the antithesis, the opposite of an individual with a relationship that permits use of the computer. Finally, I am amazed at this notion that this amendment, even under our version of it, would allow only 96 hours for surveillance when under the example of the Senator from Utah, an ongoing hacker attack is occurring. Is it the Senator's contention that at the end of 96 hours, the FBI would not have probable cause to get a warrant, when all it has been dealing with for 4 days is this hacking of the computer? Of course, it would. It would be the easiest thing in the world. Section 217 is a very dramatic exception to the usual rule as derived under our system, and expressed in the fourth amendment. Normally, you have to come up with probable cause and a warrant. There are exceptions because we have difficult problems sometimes. But 96 hours? At the end of that time, with clear evidence of a hacking attempt, a warrant could easily be obtained. Obviously, our amendment takes care of the need for emergency authorization. In fact, I think it is too generous. I am trying to put some kind of a time limit on this so we can have some semblance of the normal rules that protect our citizens. If the other side yields their time, I will yield my remaining time as well.

Mr. FEINGOLD. It is my understanding the opponents have yielded all time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota. He said it exactly right. Each of us who spoke on these amendments tonight cares just as much as everybody in this room about the fight against terrorism and stopping it. We just want to make sure we do not go beyond that goal with unnecessary language that intrudes on our civil liberties. That is it. That is all we are trying to do. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment has to do with section 215 in the bill. It allows the Government, under FISA, to compel businesses to turn over records to assist in an investigation of terrorism or espionage. The provision makes two significant changes from current law. Under current law, the FBI can seek records from only a limited set of businesses--from public accommodations, such as hotels and motels, car rental companies, storage facilities, and travel records, such as those from airlines. Current law also requires the FBI to demonstrate to the FISA court that the records pertain to an agent of a foreign power. The FBI cannot go on a fishing expedition of records of citizens of this country who might have had incidental contact with a target of an investigation. But under section 215 of this bill, all business records can be compelled to be produced, including those containing sensitive personal information such as medical records from hospitals or doctors, or educational records, or records of what books someone has taken out of the library. This is an enormous expansion of authority, compounded by the elimination of the requirement that the records have to pertain to an agent of a foreign power. Under this provision, the Government can apparently go on a fishing expedition and collect information on anyone--perhaps someone who has worked with, or lived next door to, or has been seen in the company of, or went to school with, or whose phone number was called by the target of an investigation. So we are not talking here only about the targets of the investigation; we are talking about people who have simply had some incidental contact with the target. All the FBI has to do is to allege in order to get the order that the information is sought for an investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence gathering. That is all they have to do, assert that--not to just get at the targets, but at people who have had any contact whatsoever with them. On that minimal showing in an ex parte application in a secret court, the Government can lawfully compel a doctor or a hospital to release medical records or a library to release circulation records. This is truly a breathtaking expansion of the police power, one that I do not think is warranted. My amendment does not completely strike the provision. There are elements of it that I think have legitimacy. First, my amendment maintains the requirement that the records pertain to a target alleged to be an agent of a foreign power. This provides some protection for American citizens who might otherwise become the subject of investigations for having some innocent contact with a suspected terrorist. Second, while the amendment maintains the expansion of the FISA authority to all business records, it also requires the FBI to comply with State and Federal laws that contain a higher standard for the disclosure of certain private information. The amendment makes it clear that existing Federal and State statutory protections for the privacy of certain information are not diminished or superseded by section 215. There are certain categories of records, such as medical records or educational records, that Congress and State legislatures have deemed worthy of a higher level of privacy protection. Let me quickly give you a couple of examples. In California, there is a very detailed statutory provision governing disclosure of medical information to law enforcement authorities. Generally, the law requires either patient consent, or a court order, or a subpoena. Before issuing an order for the records to be produced, the court must, among other things, find good cause based on a determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the records in question will disclose material information or evidence of substantial value in connection with the investigation or prosecution. Montana is another State with strong statutory, and indeed constitutional, protections for medical records. It provides that medical records can only be obtained with an investigative subpoena signed by a judge, and that subpoena may be issued only when it appears upon the affidavit of the prosecutor that a compelling State interest requires it to be issued. In order to establish a compelling State interest, the prosecutor must state facts and circumstances sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the information relative to the commission of that offense is in the possession of the person or institution to whom the subpoena is directed. My State of Wisconsin, along with many other States, has very strong library confidentiality laws which requires a court order for disclosure of public library system records. Texas, for example, permits disclosure of library records ``to a law enforcement agency or prosecutor under a court order or subpoena obtained after a showing to a court that: (A) disclosure of the record is necessary to protect the public safety; (B) the record is evidence of an offense or constitutes evidence that a particular person committed an offense.'' Missouri and Nevada library records confidentiality laws both require that a court find ``that the disclosure of such record is necessary to protect the public safety or to prosecute a crime.'' South Carolina's library records confidentiality law permits disclosure ``in accordance with a proper judicial order upon finding that disclosure of the records is necessary to protect public safety, to prosecute a crime, or upon showing of good cause before a presiding judge in a civil matter.'' In short, our States have made policy judgments about the protection to which certain kinds of records are justified. We have Federal laws that express similar judgments--Federal Educational Records Privacy Act. Indeed, as I will mention, this bill provides new standards for the production of educational records in connection with terrorism investigations. So my fear is that what section 215 does is effectively trump any and all of these State and Federal privacy protections. I think that is a result that most of our citizens and their State representatives would not countenance. So my amendment simply provides that this new authority to compel the production of business records through an order of a FISA court does not apply if another State or Federal law governs the law enforcement or intelligence access to the records. To the extent that the records sought have no such statutory protection, the only effect this amendment would have is to ensure that the records actually pertain to the target. But I strongly believe that merely alleging that the records are needed for an intelligence investigation should not override other protections provided by State and Federal law. I will quickly highlight the problem by referring to section 508 of this bill. That section, I think, would be rendered meaningless if section 215 is not amended as I propose. The original version of section 508 proposed by the administration would have given the Attorney General the right to obtain the educational records of virtually any student without a court order. I and many other Senators had serious problems with that provision, and it was significantly changed before S. 1510 was introduced. Section 508 now does require a court order and does provide a specific showing that the Attorney General must make to obtain the order to get at these educational records. But if section 215 is enacted without my amendment a university could be ordered to turn over such records as ``tangible things'' on a much lower showing. The administration asserts that it is too great a burden for the Government to abide by existing privacy protections and seek court orders to obtain certain sensitive information specifically identified by Congress and State legislators. I remind my colleagues that the protections I seek to preserve were carefully drafted and debated and enacted at a time when legislators could thoughtfully consider the full weight of granting such protections. We are now asked to set these protections aside with scant discussion of either the merits or the consequences of such a proposal, during a time of incredible strain on our democratic principles, and for an indeterminate length of time. If my amendment is adopted, law enforcement will still have access to all of the information it seeks. But my amendment simply maintains the integrity of protections enacted by Congress and State legislatures for certain kinds of sensitive information to ensure that access to this information is given only where it is necessary. It makes sure that this provision does not become the platform or an excuse for a fishing expedition for damaging information on American citizens who are not the subjects of FISA surveillance. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. FEINGOLD. If the majority leader is going to speak, I would like to respond. If not, I will simply yield back the remainder of my time.

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UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT--S. 1447 AND S. 15102001-10-10

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, reserving the right to object--I do not intend to object--I thank the leader and the leadership for working with me to make it possible to take up some amendments on the floor. These amendments directly address issues that were brought up at the only hearing on this issue in the Senate Judiciary Committee, a hearing held in the Constitution Subcommittee which I chair. I think it is good for the body, and the bill, that we consider the issues that were raised in the hearing. We should have the debate, have the votes, and resolve these issues in public. I thank you.

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PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR2001-10-10

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Eric Baker, a legal intern on the Judiciary Committee staff, be granted floor privileges for the remainder of the session of the Senate.

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HONORING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, FIREFIGHTERS, EMERGENCY RESCUE PERSONNEL AND HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS2001-10-09

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I rise today in support of this resolution honoring the efforts and sacrifices of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency rescue personnel, and health care professionals in responding to the horrific attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. In New York and Washington, D.C., emergency calls went out on the morning of September 11 just after those attacks occurred. Those alarms were heard by first-responders throughout the country. Law enforcement, firefighters, emergency rescue personnel, and health care professionals answered the call with the same selfless courage and determination that has long distinguished our emergency response community. While the world looked on in stunned disbelief, these workers, always prepared and ever vigilant, instinctively donned their uniforms and raced to the scene. At ground zero, as many as 400 of these brave men and women sacrificed their very lives in service to their communities that morning. Since that time hundreds more have labored tirelessly in efforts to save and recover their fellow rescuers and other victims. Although we react with awe and commend them for working above and beyond the call of duty, these courageous souls expect no less from themselves and carry on despite the heavy emotional and physical burdens of their mission. This instinct to respond has shown in the efforts of emergency response personnel nationwide. On seeing the events of September 11 unfold, volunteers from all parts of the country, including firefighters and other workers from the State of Wisconsin, travelled across the country to the impact zones to assist in whatever means necessary. From home, firefighters and other rescue workers have organized fund-raising and supply drives to support rescue and recovery efforts and the families of their fallen brethren. In Madison, WI, local firefighters have raised over $200,000 for families of their New York counterparts who died at the World Trade Center. Other community fire departments throughout Wisconsin have responded in kind. I am proud to recognize the contribution of our Wisconsin emergency response community. More than three-quarters of our fire and rescue workers in Wisconsin are volunteers, individuals who balance this substantial public service commitment while working full-time jobs throughout our communities. These workers know, like no other, the sacrifices that were made at the World Trade Center on September 11, and our prayers go out to them as they grieve for their comrades-in- arms. As we prepare to respond to this vicious attack on our Nation, we must not forget the integral part that emergency response workers will play in this campaign. The threat of terrorism knows no boundaries, as we were so painfully reminded, and these first-responders will be on the front lines of our defense. These workers have been quietly preparing for years for this mission, but they will need our continued support to remain at-the-ready. It will be these workers who will ensure that America ``gets back to work,'' because their efforts give us security in our streets, our public facilities, and our homes. I would like to say to all of our emergency response workers thank you for your service to our communities. Your work has never been so needed, never so appreciated.

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RECESS2001-10-09

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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AVIATION SECURITY ACT2001-10-09

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST--S. 15102001-10-09

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I understand and certainly appreciate the urgency of this bill. It is very important we give the Department of Justice and our intelligence agencies the tools they need to combat and prevent terrorism, but it is also crucial that civil liberties in this country be preserved. Otherwise, I am afraid the terrorists win this battle without firing another shot. It is our constitutional duty in this body to preserve and protect the Constitution of the United States. Our freedoms in part are what the terrorists hate about us. We cannot be expected to limit those freedoms without careful study and debate, and I do know--and the majority leader, of course, is right--how hard the leaders, the chairman, and the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee have been working on this measure, and I appreciate all they have done. But there has not been an open process in the Judiciary Committee, much less the full Senate, for Senators to have an opportunity to raise concerns about how far this bill goes in giving powers to law enforcement to wiretap or investigate law-abiding U.S. citizens. As of the end of last week, we were told the bill would probably come up on Thursday of this week. Today the request is made to bring it up immediately under extremely restrictive terms for debate that would not allow any opportunity for amendments other than the one the majority leader mentioned. Senators must have the opportunity to read and debate this 200-plus page bill and offer amendments. It does not have to take weeks or even days, but it cannot be done before most Senators have even had a chance to read and understand the far-reaching changes this bill makes on our laws. Madam President, I reserve the right to object. I do not wish to object, but in order to give due attention to the serious constitutional issues before us, and in the interest of moving forward on this important legislation, I ask unanimous consent that the leader's request be modified to allow this Senator to offer four relevant amendments with each to be debated for an hour equally divided.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I will not be able to do it this evening, but I will be able to do it tomorrow.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, reserving the right to object.

Mr. FEINGOLD. We can certainly continue these discussions, but I want to say it is certainly not the case that I have not shared the concerns I have, I would say, concerning the amendments we have talked about, the actual areas, and shared them with the leadership. We certainly could have the text of all of these amendments by 10 tomorrow morning. In other words, the language would be available before the bill even comes up. That strikes me as sufficient notice usually in the Senate. I do not think it is a fair complaint to say we cannot agree to these reasonable requests simply because of the extra language written out at this point. Madam President, at this point, unless other Members wish to address this issue, I will object.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002--Continued2001-10-02

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, under normal circumstances, it is likely that I would have opposed this bill. Under normal circumstances, I may have offered amendments to realign the Pentagon's lingering cold war mentality with the realities of the post-cold war world. Under normal circumstances, there would have been a more comprehensive debate on the proposed national missile defense system. But as we all know, these are not normal times. The tragedies that began to unfold in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania on September 11, and the bold strike against terrorism that this country and our men and women in uniform are about to launch, demand a unified Congress and a unified nation. For those reasons, I will vote in favor of this bill. The events of the past three weeks have crystalized support for our Armed Forces and have made it very clear that we should ensure that they have the resources necessary for the daunting task that lies ahead. But this strong sense of unity does not require Congress to abdicate its responsibility to review closely the funding requests of the President, and it does not prohibit discussions about the direction of federal spending, including defense spending. Each year that I have been a member of this body, I have expressed my concern about the priorities of the Pentagon and about the process by which we consider the Department of Defense authorization and appropriations bills. I am troubled that the Department of Defense does not receive the same scrutiny as other parts of our Federal budget. This time of unprecedented national crisis underscores the need for the Congress and the administration to take a hard look at the Pentagon's budget to ensure that scarce taxpayer dollars are targeted to those programs that are necessary to defend our country in the post-cold war world and to ensure that our Armed Forces have the resources they need for the battles ahead. I look forward to reviewing carefully the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review, a document which I believe should have been submitted in conjunction with the fiscal year 2002 defense budget request. At a time when the Department of Defense has rightly undertaken a comprehensive review of our military and its missions, it is troubling that we will pass yet another defense bill that is largely rooted in the long-ended cold war. I commend the Secretary of Defense for acknowledging the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on our future defense strategy, and urge him to continue to analyze of the role of our Armed Forces in combating terrorism and other challenges of the post-cold war world. This bill is not perfect. To be sure, there are some good things in it. I am pleased that the committee has reduced the President's procurement request for the troubled V-22 Osprey from 12 aircraft to nine. I remain concerned, however, that those nine aircraft, and the Ospreys that have already been built and are currently being built, will require costly and extensive retrofitting following the ongoing review of the program. Since it remains unclear whether many of the problems with this aircraft can be fixed, and since the Department of Defense's decision on whether to move forward with this program remains a long way off, I am pleased that the committee has included language in its report requiring the Department of Defense to study alternatives to this aircraft. We owe it to our men and women in uniform to provide them with safe, effective equipment. Their safety should be the principle that guides the important decision as to whether to proceed with this program. We should not move forward until we know for certain that this aircraft is safe and that the design flaws addressed in numerous reports have been corrected. We also owe it to our military personnel and their families to provide them with decent facilities and housing. For that reason, I strongly support the provision of this bill that authorizes another round of base closures. We should continue to reassess our base structure to ensure that we are maximizing the use of our defense facilities. By closing bases that are no longer needed, we can help to ensure that our military personnel and their families are not being forced to live and work in hazardous conditions. The decision to move forward with another round of base closures is an example of the hard decisions that this body will have to make as we face the realities of the Federal budget. I am also concerned that this bill again focuses on procurement of costly weapons systems at a time when we should be redirecting more funding to readiness and to quality of life programs for our men and women in uniform and their families. I regret that this bill authorizes the conversion of four Trident I submarines to carry conventional weapons when the Defense Department requested the conversion of two submarines and the retirement of two submarines. I also regret that we continue to procure cold war-era weapons such as the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile and that we continue to operate the Navy's Extremely Low Frequency communications system. This is a time for the administration, the Congress, and the country to stand together in the face of the horrific attacks on September 11. We must do everything we can to support our military personnel as they prepare to combat the forces of evil who perpetrated these vicious crimes and those who offer them financing, shelter, and support. While this bill is far from perfect, I will vote in favor of it.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the amendments introduced by Senators Helms and Craig relating to the proposed International Criminal Court. Regardless of how one feels about the court, this amendment could have the unintended but devastating effect of alienating our allies and undermining the global coalition against terrorism. By imposing sweeping limitations on the President's capacity to cooperate with other countries on security and intelligence matters, and by taking a unilateral approach to an important global issue, this amendment weakens the United States hand in pursuing the most urgent foreign policy priority before us--building an strong and lasting coalition to fight terrorism. I recognize and share many of the concerns with the proposed International Criminal Court, but this bill would not accomplish its primary objective of protecting American service members. It could in fact have the opposite effect, particularly as it stands to jeopardize our country's ongoing diplomatic efforts to build a broad coalition in opposition to terrorism. I urge you to oppose the amendment at this extraordinary moment in our national history. Let me just highlight a few of the ways in which this amendment could tie the hands of our President and our diplomats as they move forward in building a coalition to combat terrorism. The amendment, if fully enacted, would limit the ability of our President to enter into global security alliances at a time when such alliances may be more important to our national interest than ever before. The amendment could also limit our ability to share essential security information with some of our closest allies in the war against terrorism. This limitation is particularly offensive, as it comes at a time when we are asking those same allies to share their intelligence information with us as we track the global terrorist networks that may have been involved in the devastating attacks of September 11. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a much noted provision in the Helms bill would allow the President ``to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release'' of certain U.S. citizens detained by, or at the request of, the International Criminal Court. As such, the bill has been labeled the ``Hague Invasion Act'' by some opponents, a point that serves to highlight how provocative the measure may appear to even our closest allies. Of course, our first priority must be to protect our service members. But this amendment would not accomplish that goal, and we simply cannot afford to create a rift in our growing global alliance against terrorist networks by adopting such a troubled amendment. This is the wrong amendment. And this amendment is offered at the wrong time; it is offered just as we are beginning to realize important diplomatic successes in building a global coalition against terrorism. I would urge all of my colleagues to oppose it.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002--Resumed2001-09-26

Mr. FEINGOLD

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have two amendments regarding the V-22 Osprey program. I understand that these amendments have been accepted, and I thank the managers, the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee, for their cooperation on these important amendments. The Osprey program has a troubled history and an uncertain future. Serious allegations and serious questions continue to cloud this program. Thirty Marines have died in Osprey crashes since 1991. Many questions regarding the accuracy of maintenance records and the safety and viability of this aircraft remain unanswered. We should proceed with caution, and we should have all the facts on this program. I share the Armed Services Committee's concern about ``how the Marine Corps and the Air Force are going to meet the requirements established for the V-22 program,'' and I commend the Committee for including language in the underlying bill that directs the Department of Defense to conduct a review of potential alternatives to this troubled aircraft. One of my amendments will require the Defense Department to submit a report to Congress regarding the status of the Osprey program. This report will be submitted to the Congress no later than 30 days before a decision to resume test flights of the Osprey. The report will include a description of how the Department is implementing or plans to implement the recommendations of the Panel to Review the V-22 Program. This Panel, which was formed by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen following the December 2000 Osprey crash that killed four Marines, has recommended that the program be restructured and enter a new ``Development Maturity Phase'' during which the Panel's design and testing recommendations would be implemented. In addition, the Department will be required to provide a full analysis of the deficiencies in the V-22's hydraulic system components and flight control software and the steps that have been taken to correct these deficiencies. There are many questions about specific components of this experimental tilt-rotor aircraft, including the hydraulic system and the flight control software. Extensive problems with the Osprey's hydraulic system components is one of the principal concerns that has been cited in numerous reports, including the report of the Panel to Review the V-22 Program; the report of the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation into the December 2000 Osprey crash; reports by the General Accounting Office and the Defense Science Board; and the November 2000 report of the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation. Further, the Panel recommended that no further test flights of the Osprey take place until the flight control software has been redesigned. The hydraulic system and the flight control software have been blamed for the December 2000 crash. In addition, there are a number of concerns regarding the aeromechanics of the Osprey, including the so-called ``vortex ring state'' phenomenon that caused the April 2000 crash that killed 19 Marines. The Navy commissioned the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, to conduct a study of the tilt-rotor aeromechanics, including the vortex ring state and autorotation. The Department also will be required to include in its report to Congress an assessment of NASA's recommendations on tilt-rotor aeromechanics. My second amendment would require the Department of Defense to provide notification to Congress thirty days before the resumption of V-22 test flights of all waivers of any item, capability, or other requirement specified in the Joint Operational Requirements Document, JORD, for the V-22, including the justification for such waivers. As has been noted in reports including the final report of the Panel to Review the V-22, the November 2000 report of the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, and the Armed Services Committee report accompanying this bill, there are a number of concerns regarding the items that were waived during operational testing of the V-22. These include: the aircraft flight envelope and clearance for air combat maneuvering; defensive weapons systems; flight testing in bad weather conditions such as icing; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pressure protection; and the cargo handling system. The November 2000 report of the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation states that ``several of these waived capabilities impact the operational effectiveness and suitability of the MV-22.'' My amendment will help to provide Congress with a more complete picture of the V-22 testing program by requiring the Department of Defense to provide a notification of all waivers and the justification for these waivers prior to a resumption of V-22 test flights. Again, I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for accepting these amendments.

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