Dianne Feinstein

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to let me know when 7 minutes have expired so I can defer to my cosponsor, Senator Kennedy.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, before the chairman of the committee speaks, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Stabenow be listed as a cosponsor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am happy to yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask the minority whip how much time I have.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. The Senator was not in the Chamber. But the chart I used was of a predicted radioactive fallout from a B61-11, the 300-kiloton explosion in west Pyongyang, North Korea, using historical weather data for the month of May. It is a similar chart to what the Senator has shown, but it gives the 48-hour dose of radiation contamination. The possible effects of radioactive fallout should a nuclear weapon be used include, possible radiation burns; change in blood chemistry, hemorrhaging, as well as deaths in weeks or months--it is a terrible chart to have to look at. Of course, this is an extraordinarily large device, so we are not talking about a bunker buster. That is 300 kilotons. But that is the chart that we happen to have. I think the thing that bothers me most about this program is that nobody really knows what is going to be produced with all this money. It always happens kind of under the shelf. Then the economics of it become so important that there needs to be a continuation of it. I really suspect that is why we ended up with 40,000 nuclear bombs-- because once you get into it, it just keeps going and keeps rolling; there are constant demands. I think that is indicated by the fact that we have already appropriated $2.3 billion for this plutonium pit facility at Los Alamos and reportedly this pit facility, if it is able to be built correctly, can take care of all of the needs for the foreseeable future. But this is another $4 billion program--that is over 10 years--of which an amount is authorized in this bill that we are trying to strike because there is no need for it. I think we have tried to lay out the arguments here. This is not an easy issue. I really believe we will probably never have more of an issue of conscience in this session than we do in this vote. I think the House of Representatives have given their consciences a test and measured up by eliminating the funds. They said clearly we are not ready to spend these funds in the report language that I read and put in the Record. And the balance really rests with the Senate. I suspect we may be defeated. It will be a conferenceable item, and all of those who want this new generation of nuclear weapons will end up prevailing. But I can tell you I don't want my fingerprint on it. I don't want to have to say what I have done to my children. Every bit of information I have ever received indicates that with the most superior conventional weapons forces in the world, and an amount of money spent that is more than that spent by all of the nations put together, a huge nuclear arsenal, and the ability to dial up or down the kilotonnage of our nuclear bombs--my hope is we will continue our commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; that we will not be hypocritical; that we will live by our words, our statements; if we want other nations not to proliferate; that we will see that we do not develop the mechanisms by which proliferation is incentivized or carried out. So I think this is a very big vote. I really hope the Members of this esteemed body will vote yes to strike the money from this bill.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Madam President, I very much thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for his remarks. I appreciate very much his leadership and support on this issue. I want to make some comments in response to the chairman's comments. The first is, on July 16, the House published their report. I would like to read excerpts from the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act into the Record because I think it sets some things straight: Before any of the existing program goals have been successfully demonstrated, the Administration is now proposing to spend millions on enhanced test readiness while maintaining the moratorium on nuclear testing, aggressively pursue a multi-billion dollar Modern Pit Facility before the first production pit has even been successfully certified for use in the stockpile, develop a robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon and begin additional advanced concepts research on new nuclear weapons. It appears to the Committee the Department is proposing to rebuild, restart and redo and otherwise exercise every capability that was used over the past forty years of the Cold War and at the same time prepare for a future with an expanded mission for nuclear weapons. Nothing in the past performance of the NNSA convinces this Committee that the successful implementation of Stockpile Stewardship Program is a foregone conclusion, which makes the pursuit of a broad range of new initiatives premature. Until the NNSA has demonstrated to the Congress that it can successfully meet its primary mission of maintaining the safety, security, and viability of the existing stockpile by executing the Stockpile Life Extension Program and Science- based Stewardship activities on time and within budget, this Committee will not support redirecting the management resources and attention to a series of new initiatives. What they are saying is, shouldn't we certify before starting this program? Shouldn't we certify to its safety? There are just a few reasons to do that. I am going to bring up the Rocky Flats plant northwest of Denver. Fourteen years ago, this plant, which had produced pultonium pits, sank permanently into a multibillion-dollar cesspool of contamination, criminality, and managerial incompetence. I am quoting from an article in the bulletin of Atomic Scientists: Not to worry says, the Department of Energy, Rocky Flats II will have all the necessary equipment for suppressing plutonium fires that regrettably cannot be totally eliminated, but whose frequency and severity can be reduced, and even planned for, in the structural and process designs. This keeps getting mixed up. We already have $2.3 billion appropriated for a pit facility at Los Alamos, and that facility will begin producing 20 pits per year in 2007 and can be equipped to produce as many as 80 pits per year and can be further enlarged to produce 150 pits per year. At what are we throwing this money? How big does this thing have to get? That is what is going on in this. It may be that Los Alamos is having trouble with it. I don't know. But I do know this: Throwing money at it is not the solution. It might be useful to put the entire report language in the Record. I ask unanimous consent to print the report language in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I would. But I know Senator Kennedy has come to speak on this amendment. At an appropriate time--I have made some notes--I would like to respond to him. But I do not want to delay everybody else.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that this administration is reopening the nuclear door. They are doing this to develop essentially a new generation of nuclear weapons. They call them low yield. It is contained in words such as ``advanced concepts.'' Essentially, they are battlefield tactical nuclear weapons. This latest Defense authorization bill reversed the Spratt-Furse amendment which had existed for 10 years and had prohibited the development of low-yield nuclear weapons. So for 10 years there was a prohibition on this reopening of the nuclear door. With this year's Defense authorization bill, that went down the tubes. Now we see in this Energy appropriations bill money to move along in the development and the research of these weapons. What is interesting to me is when you ask these questions in committee, as I did of Secretary Rumsfeld--and I will get to that--what we hear is: Oh, it is just a study. In fact, last year, $14 million was appropriated for the study. It is more than just the study. It is the study and development. I rise today to send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy; the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed; the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg; the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Wyden; and the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, by prior unanimous consent agreement, it is now the opportunity for Senator Byrd to address the body for 1 hour. I know Senator Lincoln had one brief statement she wanted to make. If there is no objection, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Lincoln be permitted to make her remarks at this time, and perhaps the clerk could notify Senator Byrd that his time has arrived.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in addition, the nuclear posture review said we need to develop new types of weapons so we can use them in a wider variety of circumstances and against a wider range of targets, such as hard and deeply buried targets, or to defeat chemical and biological weapons. Even the New York Times suggests we would even consider a first strike against a nonnuclear country if that country possessed biological or chemical weapons. It seems clear that this administration is no longer focused solely on the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence. Rather, the new triad proposed by the administration has grouped nuclear and conventional weapons together on a continuum, believing each has an equal role on the battlefield. During the cold war, the nuclear triad consisted of air, land, and sea nuclear forces--bombers, ALBMs, ICBMs and SLBMs. The new triad consists of offensive strike forces, missile defense--which has yet, incidentally, been shown to work--and a responsive infrastructure to support the forces. Strategic nuclear forces are combined dangerously, in my view, with conventional strike capabilities in the offensive leg of the new triad. This new triad represents a radical departure from the idea that our strategic nuclear forces are primarily intended for deterrence, not for offense as the new triad proposes. In a few months, after issuing the Nuclear Posture Review, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 17 indicating the United States might use nuclear weapons to respond to a chemical or biological attack. I find the Nuclear Posture Review and NSPD-17 deeply disturbing. Some have maintained we don't need to concern ourselves too much with these documents because they are merely intellectual exercises. In fact, at a hearing of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in May, I asked Secretary Rumsfeld about where the administration was going on these issues. He responded, in essence, that there was nothing to be concerned about because current research to develop nuclear weapons is just a study. But the fact is, the administration has begun to take concrete steps toward developing new classes of nuclear weapons. In fact, the administration's statement of policy for the fiscal year 2004 Defense authorization bill may well have been more honest than intended. This is the statement of administration policy: The administration appreciates the Senate Armed Services Committee's continued support of our national defense and support for critical research and development for low-yield nuclear weapons. As Fred Celec, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Nuclear Matters, stated: If a hydrogen bomb can be successfully designed to survive a crash through hard rock or concrete and still explode, ``it will ultimately get fielded.'' That is his statement: If a hydrogen bomb can be successfully designed to survive a crash through hard rock or concrete and still explode, ``it will ultimately get fielded.'' That is where we are going, Mr. President. I believe it is in this context that we must view the funding requests in this bill. This is not an esoteric funding request. I don't believe it is just a study. I believe it is the second step in the study and in the development of these so-called advanced nuclear concepts of moving up test readiness, of building a huge modern pit facility. The legislation before us today contains funding to start that process of developing this next generation of nuclear weapons, clear and simple. I strongly support a robust military, and our safety interests and our security interests should be protected, but I believe we are going to make our Nation and our allies less secure, not more, if the United States opens the door to the development, testing, and deployment of new tactical and low-yield nuclear weapons. I think there are several things wrong with the logic which suggests that using these weapons is acceptable. First, using nuclear weapons, even small ones, will cross a line that has been in place for 60 years. I don't want to be a Member of the Senate who crosses that line and has to explain to my five grandchildren why I voted to sanction a new generation of nuclear weapons, whether it is a robust earth penetrator or whether it is a tactical battlefield weapon, because you cannot protect from the radiation. What grandmother or mother wants to send their son or daughter on to a battlefield with tactical nuclear weapons? Sixty years of history is in the process of being reversed. It was the Secretary of State, GEN Colin Powell, who wrote in his autobiography about possibly using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to thwart a Soviet invasion. Let me read what he said. He wrote: No matter how small these nuclear payloads were, we would be crossing a threshold. Using nukes would mark one of the most significant political and military decisions since Hiroshima. That is what we are doing, I say to my colleagues--one of the most significant decisions since Hiroshima--and his statement in his book is just as true today. Second, I wish to speak for a moment about the fact that there is no such thing as a clean or usable nuclear bomb. According to Stanford University physicist, Dr. Sidney Drell, the effects of a small bomb would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet underground--1 kiloton detonated 20 to 50 feet underground--would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero and eject a million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air. This chart shows 1 kiloton at 30 feet and it will eject a million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air. A low-yield weapon would have very little utility in trying to destroy a deeply buried underground bunker. Given the insurmountable physics problems associated with burrowing a warhead deep into the earth, destroying a target hidden beneath a thousand feet of rock will require a nuclear weapon of almost 100 kilotons. That is 10 times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. As this chart shows, if a bunker buster were able to burrow into the earth to reach its maximum feasible depth--that is about 35 feet--it still would not be deep enough to contain a bomb with an explosive yield of only .2 kilotons, 75 times smaller than the bomb that exploded over Hiroshima, let alone a 100-kiloton bomb. Let me make the point. To destroy a typical bunker or another underground target, such as a chemical or biological weapons facility, you would need to burrow down at least 800 feet, which is not physically possible, or detonate a 100-kiloton weapon whose fallout and destruction belie the idea that an antiseptic nuclear weapon can be developed. Anything short of that would not contain the fallout. A fireball would break through the surface, scattering enormous amounts of radioactive debris--1.5 million tons for a 100-kiloton bomb--into the atmosphere. As this map of the Korean peninsula shows, just the path fallout, with travel in typical weather, would place both South Korea and Japan in severe danger while placing millions of innocent people at risk if a nuclear bunker buster were to be used in North Korea. We can see it used at this point. We can see the path of fallout. It is devastating. Ultimately, the depth of penetration of the robust nuclear earth penetrator is limited by the strength of the missile casing. The deepest our current earth penetrators can burrow is 20 feet of dry earth. Casing made of even the stronger material cannot withstand the physical forces of burrowing through 100 feet of granite, much less 800 feet. I believe it is deeply flawed to argue, as some robust nuclear earth penetrator proponents do, that because it would penetrate the earth before detonating, it would be a clean weapon. It will not be. In fact, far more than the added explosive power a nuclear weapon provides, the most important factor in destroying a deeply buried target is knowing exactly where it is. Someone is not going to drop a bomb such as a robust nuclear earth penetrator unless they know exactly where the target is. If they know exactly where the target is, there are other things that can be done. It can be destroyed with conventional weapons. Access to it can be prevented by destroying entrances, cutting off electricity, cutting off air ducts. Cutting off a bunker in this way renders it useless just as effectively as destroying it with a nuclear blast. The fact is that our intelligence is weak. So I very much doubt we are going to be throwing around bunker busters of 100 kilotons that are nuclear with this fallout spread when we really do not know, among the tens of thousands of holes the North Koreans have in the ground, exactly what is what. Thirdly, the development of new low-yield nuclear weapons could lead--and this is where we are going--to the resumption of underground nuclear testing in order to test the new weapons. This would overturn the 10-year moratorium on nuclear testing. So we are changing 60 years of history. We are overturning a 10-year moratorium. This could lead other countries to resume or start testing, actions that would fundamentally alter future nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts. The March 2003 Arms Control Today points out an interesting thing: In 1995, many of the world's nonnuclear states made it clear their continued adherence to the NPT was contingent on the cessation of all nuclear-yield testing. . . . A decision to resume testing to build low-yield nuclear weapons could deal the regime a fatal blow while providing the United States a capability of questionable military value. This is where we are going with this bill. We are moving up test readiness from 24 to 30 months to 18 months. So inherent in this bill is the beginning of expedited testing, overturning 60 years, going against the nonproliferation treaty, which will then encourage other nations to do the same, and beginning testing once again. According to the 2003 Report to Congress on Nuclear Test Readiness, 18 months is the minimum time necessary to prepare a test once a problem is identified. Yet even during the cold war when tests were ongoing on a regular basis, the Nuclear National Security Agency found that it required 18 to 24 months to design and field a test with full diagnostics. As purely a technical matter, 18 months is also an extremely short timeframe for test readiness. So why are we doing it? Why are we doing it now with no pressing need? Why is the administration pushing so hard for the absolute minimum time necessary to conduct a test? This tells me exactly where this administration is going. Even putting aside the concern I have about the message that the United States moving ahead with test readiness sends to the rest of the world, this short time period may well not be technologically feasible. In an op-ed in the Washington Post on July 21, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham said this: We are not planning to resume testing; nor are we improving test readiness in order to develop new nuclear weapons. In fact, we are not planning to develop any new nuclear weapons at all. Then what are we doing this for? Fourteen million dollars last year, $50 million this year, a $4 billion modern pit facility program over 10 years. What are we doing it for? I think what the Secretary did by these comments is really an injustice in terms of casting a web over these moves that is not credible. I can only deduce that despite all the ``this is just a study'' rhetoric, there is an intention to test, and this administration is reopening the nuclear door to develop a new generation of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, and I do not want to be a part of it. In fact, in a September 3 interview, Fred Celec stated: If you say, I've got to go to design a new nuclear weapon . . . you probably will have to have a nuclear test. Likewise, I have serious concerns about the intentions behind the funds included in this bill for work on the modern pit facility. As I have said, the modern pit facility is the administration's proposed $4 billion plan where new plutonium pits for nuclear weapons will be fabricated. This facility, when completed, would be able to produce 250 to 900 plutonium pits per year. To put this in perspective, if the proposed modern pit facility operated at half of its capacity, it could equal or exceed China's entire new nuclear arsenal in 1 year. This production would be in excess of our current inventory of 15,000 plutonium pits. What does this say to other nations? What does this say to China? What does it say to Iraq? What does it say to Iran, Pakistan, India, or any other nation? What does it say to North Korea? At a time when we should be lessening our reliance on nuclear weapons and lessening the amount of fissile material available which might fall into the hands of terrorists, encouraging other countries in the world to do likewise by following our example, why do we need this new production capability? The Department of Energy has already begun a separate $2.3 billion pit fabrication and plutonium chemistry complex at Los Alamos, which will begin producing 20 pits per year in 2007 and can be equipped and enlarged to produce as many as 150 pits per year. So what do we need this for? No one has answered that question. With the current age of our stockpile pits averaging 19 years, and the Department of Energy estimating a pit minimum lifetime to be 45 to 60 years, with no ``life-limiting factors'' being identified, why put our Nation $4 billion further into debt by creating additional capacity for plutonium pits we don't need? We can't find anything that indicates why we need these additional plutonium pits. As I said, we already have a $2.3 billion program to produce 20 pits that can go up to 150 pits. Are we going into some kind of enormous program that we don't know about? The House report language in their version of the energy and water bill put it this way: It appears to the Committee that the Department is proposing to rebuild, restart, and redo and otherwise exercise every capability that was used over the past 40 years of the cold war, and at the same time prepare for a future with an expanded mission for nuclear weapons. Nothing in the past performance of NNSA convinces this Committee that the successful implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is a foregone conclusion, which makes the pursuit of a broad range of new initiatives premature. This was just written. This was considered by the House of Representatives, and the House of Representatives had the guts to take it out of the bill. So this amendment would put in place a 1-year stay. It is a little different from the House bill. It would put in place a 1-year stay on site selection for the modern pit facility. If the administration can come forward with a convincing rationale and plans in a year, we can revisit this issue. But until then, we should not be supporting this new initiative. Today, America's current conventional and nuclear forces vastly overpower those of any other nation. So for me, it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile building a multibillion-dollar nuclear bomb factory, which is what this is, as we preach the importance of limiting proliferation and preventing other nations from developing weapons of mass destruction. And, if I may say so, it is hypocritical. It is hypocritical; we say one thing to others and we do an entirely different thing ourselves. If that is not hypocrisy, I don't know what is. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapon states are committed to halting so-called vertical proliferation. That means they are prohibited from increasing their nuclear stockpiles. They are prohibited. The purpose is to encourage other nations to halt horizontal proliferation, whereby more and more nations become nuclear capable. That is what the NPT is trying to do. They are trying to stop it, and we are doing exactly the opposite. If our country goes down the road of developing and bringing the modern pit facility on line, we will effectively undermine the nonproliferation treaty. I know the Bush administration doesn't like it. I know they don't attend meetings. I know we are now on a big unilateral binge, where we know better than anybody else. But this is for our children and our grandchildren. Perhaps more than any other this represents the country we try to be and the country we are going to be. I think with this legislation, and by going down this path, we undermine the nonproliferation treaty. Maybe that is what they want to happen. And by our example we create an incentive and we present a challenge to others with nuclear aspirations to develop them. I don't know whether that is the intention. We know ballistic missile defense does the same thing. I think we are seeing, in Iraq, where unilateralism is not working. We have before us an $87 billion supplemental which will bring the cost of the war to about $166 billion so far. Yet we are starting a whole new nuclear program. I guess why I don't like it, most of all, is it is all done under the guise of study, of development. The facts are never really put on the table. It just kind of happens. Then some get kind of ``suckered'' into it, if I can use that word, because of the economics of doing it in this State or that State or competing for it. We need to begin to think what we are competing for. I don't want us to compete for something that is going to encourage China to begin nuclear weapons production or begin testing. I don't want to encourage something that is going to say to Pakistan and India: We developed tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. Look at our example. That is what we are doing and we don't see it. Finally, to those who argue that the United States needs new weapons for new missions, I should point out that the United States already has a usable nuclear bunker buster, the B61-11, which has a dial-to-yield feature, allowing its yield to range from less than a kiloton to several hundred kilotons. When configured to have a 10-kiloton yield and detonated 4 feet underground, the B61-11 can produce a shock wave sufficient to crush a bunker buried beneath 350 feet of layered rock. If, indeed--I don't think there is--but if there is a legitimate military mission for these kinds of weapons, the experts tell us we already have one. We don't need new nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the U.S. military, the strongest and most capable military force the world has ever seen, has plenty of effective conventional options designed to penetrate deeply into the earth and destroy underground bunkers and storage facilities. These range in size from 500 pounds to 5,000 pounds, and most are equipped with either a laser or a GPS guidance system. The 5,000-pound bunker buster, like the guided bomb unit 28/B, is capable of penetrating up to 20 feet of reinforced concrete, or 100 feet of earth. The GBU-28 was used with much success in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Other conventional bunker busters were used to take out Saddam Hussein's underground lairs in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, the U.S. military possesses a conventional bunker buster--the GBU-37--which is thought to be capable of taking out a silo-based ICBM. I only wish that instead of beginning the research and development of a new generation of weapons, this administration would lead efforts to prevent nuclear development and prevent the spread and delegitimize the use and utility of nuclear weapons. Oh, how I wish they would. Instead, with these appropriations a new nuclear arms race will begin. Let there be no doubt. I know it as sure as I am standing here now. I know it from the judgment of past history. I know how difficult it has been. I know just how difficult it was to reach agreements with the Soviet Union to begin to ratchet down the nuclear arsenal of both of our countries. We will be dealing with governments far more difficult to deal with than the Soviet Union, like those typified by North Korea. If we appropriate these dollars, we can expect that other nations will follow, that a new nuclear race will begin to develop, and the chance that one day, somehow, some way they will be used against us. Those chances are clear. Let there be no doubt. As the Economist concluded in its May 17 issue: In their determination to leave no weapons avenue unexplored [the administration] is proposing to lead America along a dangerous path. This is why our amendment seeks to strike the funding in this bill for the development of the robust nuclear earth penetrator and the other so-called advanced concepts--I hate calling nuclear weapons ``advanced concepts''--including low-yield weapons, and to limit the funding for enhanced test readiness and the modern pit facility. Right now our country is spending well over $400 billion on defense. Next year we will spend more on our military than all of the other 191 nations on the planet combined. If we can't protect ourselves without thinking about nuclear weapons, who can? Who can? We spend more than 191 nations combined--all of the other nations on Earth. Yet the proposal is that we reopen the nuclear door and begin a new generation of nuclear weapons. I think once again we will see rogue states basically conclude that they will be safe from the United States only if they develop their own nuclear weapons quickly. I think that is exactly what is happening in North Korea, which has responded to the Bush administration's aggressive posture by claiming that only a ``tremendous military deterrent'' will protect it from the United States. Now Iran is following suit. Will we encourage India and Pakistan to develop tactical nuclear weapons as well? Indeed, by seeking to develop new nuclear weapons ourselves, we send a message that nuclear weapons have a future battlefield role and utility. This is the wrong message. It takes us in the wrong direction. In my view, it will cause Americans to be placed in greater jeopardy in the future. We are telling others not to develop nuclear weapons and not to sell fissile materials, but we continue to study and design new nuclear weapons ourselves. Again, ``hypocrisy.'' I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. The House has totally eliminated the money. We don't do exactly that. We eliminate some and we fence others. We delay the pit facility for 1 year. We don't use the money for water projects, and we don't use it for deficit reduction. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I urge them to realize that we are at a historic turning point. It may well be that people do not remember the Enola Gay, they don't remember Hiroshima, they don't remember Nagasaki, and they don't remember that 220,000 people were killed instantly in both of those strikes. They don't remember Chernobyl and what radioactive fallout does to people. I see this as a very historic vote. The way is carved for us by the House of Representatives. They have eliminated funding. They have done what is right. I hope we follow suit. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 [From the New York Times, March 10, 2002] U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons (By Michael R. Gordon) Outlining a broad overhaul of American nuclear policy, a secret Pentagon report calls for developing new nuclear weapons that would be better suited for striking targets in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. The Nuclear Posture Review, as the Pentagon report is known, is a comprehensive blueprint for developing and deploying nuclear weapons. While some of the report is unclassified, key portions are secret. In campaigning for office President Bush stressed that he wanted to slash the number of nuclear weapons and develop a military that would be suited for the post-cold war world. The new Pentagon report, in fact, finds that non-nuclear conventional weapons are becoming an increasingly important element of the Pentagon arsenal. But the report also indicates that the Pentagon views nuclear weapons as an important element of military planning. It stresses a need to develop earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy heavily fortified underground bunkers, including those that may be used to store chemical and biological weapons. It calls for improving the intelligence and targeting systems needed for nuclear strikes and argues that the United States may need to resume nuclear testing. The New York Times obtained a copy of the 56-page report. Elements of the report were reported today by the Los Angeles Times. One of the most sensitive portions of the report is a secret discussion of contingencies in which the United States might need to use its ``nuclear strike capabilities'' against a foe. During the cold war, the United States used nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. But now, the Pentagon report says, the nation faces new contingencies in which nuclear weapons might be employed, including ``an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, or a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.'' Another theme in the report is the possible use of nuclear weapons to destroy enemy stocks of biological weapons, chemical arms and other arms of mass destruction. Pentagon and White House officials turned down repeated requests for interviews on the report. The Pentagon issued a statement this evening noting that the purpose of the review was to analyze nuclear weapons requirements, not to specify targets. ``It does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning,'' the Pentagon statement said. ``The Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies. We do so in order to deter such attacks in the first place.'' ``This administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction,'' the Pentagon statement continued. ``That is why the administration is pursuing advanced conventional forces and improved intelligence capabilities. A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.'' Critics responded to the report by complaining that the Bush administration was not only pushing for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, but broadening the circumstances in which they might be used. ``Despite their pronouncements of wanting to slash nuclear arms, the Bush administration is reinvigorating the nuclear weapons forces and the vast research and industrial complex that support it,'' said Robert S. Norris, a senior research associated at the Natural Resources Defense Council and an expert on nuclear weapons programs. ``In addition the Bush administration seems to see a new role for nuclear weapons against the `axis of evil' and other problem states.'' Classified versions of the report were provided to Congress in January but the disclosure now could become a public relations problem for vice President Dick Cheney, who is scheduled to leave on Sunday for a 10-day trip to Britain and Middle Eastern countries. The disclosure of the administration's ambitious nuclear plans is likely to spark criticism from European groups that have long supported more traditional approaches to arms control. Middle Eastern leaders may be alarmed to learn that the Pentagon sees Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya as potential nuclear battlegrounds. One of the most sensitive portions of the report is its discussion of countries that do not have nuclear arms. Recalling the Cuban missile crisis, the report noted that the United States might be caught by surprise if an adversary suddenly displayed a new ability involving weapons of mass destruction or it a nuclear arsenal changes hands as a result of a coup in a foreign land. ``In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared,'' the Pentagon report states. ``Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected.'' ``North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies,'' it added. ``All have long- standing hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns.'' It said, ``All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active'' programs to create weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Among Iraq, Iran, Syria or Libya none has nuclear weapons, though Iraq and Iran are making a serious effort to acquire them, according to American intelligence. American intelligence officials believe that North Korea may have enough fissile material for one or two nuclear weapons, but there is considerable debate as to whether it has actually produced one. Significantly, all of those countries have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Washington has promised that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty unless those countries attack the United States or its allies ``in alliance with a nuclear weapon state.'' The policy was intended to discourage outsider nations from seeking to develop nuclear weapons. But conservatives argue that Washington should be able to threaten the use of nuclear weapons as a way to deter one state from attacking the United States with chemical or biological weapons. Earlier this month, Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman, repeated the policy but then added that ``if a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of response.'' His qualified statement along with the Pentagon report raises the question of whether the Bush administration still plans to abide by the longstanding policy. One former senior American officials said that the development of new weapons to attack non-nuclear states would not in itself contradict American policy since it would be no more than a contingency. But using them would contradict the policy, he said, unless the nations violated their commitments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by developing nuclear weapons. ``I would not say that developing a bunker-busting nuclear weapon for use against these countries would by itself violate that pledge,'' the former American official said. ``But using nuclear against them would unless they violated their assurance by acquiring nuclear weapons.'' The Pentagon report discussed other contingencies as well. The report stated that China is also a potential adversary and is modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces. While Russia has the most formidable nuclear force, the report took the view that relations with Moscow have vastly improved. ``As a result, a contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected,'' the report states. Still, the report said that the United States cannot be sure that relations with Russia will always be smooth and thus must be prepared to ``revise its nuclear force levels and posture.'' In addition to surveying the potential situations in which nuclear weapons might be employed, the report discussed the sort of force that might be needed. The Bush administration has said that it plans to reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, a big reduction from the 6,000 or so nuclear weapons that the United States has now. Critics of the Bush administration say the cuts are roughly the same as those foreseen by the Clinton administration, which agreed that future strategic arms treaty should reduce nuclear weapons to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads. While the reductions projected by the Bush administration seem deeper, the Pentagon has changed the rules for counting nuclear weapons and no longer counts bombers or nuclear missile submarines that are in the process of being overhauled. Adding new detail to previous briefings, the Pentagon says that its future force structure will have the following components. By 2012, the United States will have 14 Trident submarines with two in overhaul at one time. They will be part of a triad that will include hundreds of Minuteman III land-based missiles and about 100 B-52 H and B-2 bombers. ``This will provide an operationally deployed force of 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads and a wide range of options for a responsive force to meet potential contingencies,'' the report says. But the Pentagon report said that nuclear planning is not merely a question of numbers. The Pentagon also wants to improve existing nuclear weapons and possibly develop new ones. The report cites the need to improve ``earth-penetrating weapons'' that could be used to destroy underground installations and hardened bunkers. According to a secret portion of the Pentagon study, more than 70 nations now use underground installations. It notes that the only earth- penetrating weapon that exists is that B61 Mod 11 bomb and that it has only a limited ``ground-penetration capability.'' The report argues that better earth-penetrating nuclear weapons with lower nuclear yields would be useful since they could achieve equal damage with less nuclear fallout. New earth-penetrating warheads with larger yield would be needed to attack targets that are buried deep underground. The report said it is very hard to identify such underground targets but that American Special Operations Forces could be used for the mission. Another capability which interests the Pentagon are radiological or chemical weapons that would be employed to destroy stockpiles of chemical or biological agents. Such ``Agent Defeat Weapons'' are being studied. The report also argues that Washington needs to compress the time it takes to identify new targets and attack them with nuclear weapons, a concept it calls ``adaptive planning.'' In general, the Pentagon report stresses the need for nuclear weapons that would be more easy to use against enemy weapons of mass destruction because they would be of variable or low yield, be highly accurate and could be quickly targeted. Pentagon officials say this gives the United States another tool to knock out enemy chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. But critics say that the Bush administration is, in effect, lowering the nuclear threshold by calling for the development of nuclear weapons that would be easier to use. The need to maintain the capability to rapidly expand the American nuclear arsenal in a crisis, such as ``reversal of Russia's present course,'' is also a theme of the report. The Pentagon calls this hedge ``the responsive force.'' The notion that the United States is reserving the right to rapidly increase its nuclear forces has been an important concern for Moscow, which has pressed Washington to agree to binding limits and even destroy some of its warheads. The Responsive Force, the Pentagon report says, ``retains the option for the leadership to increase the number of operationally deployed forces in proportion to the severity of an evolving crisis,'' the Pentagon report said. As part of this concept, bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or weeks. Other efforts to augment the force could take as long as a year. To maintain the nuclear infrastructure a number of steps are planned. The Pentagon says that an ``active'' stock of warheads should be maintained which would incorporate the latest modifications and have the key parts. The report says that the United States needs a new capability to produce plutonium ``pits,'' a hollow sphere made out of plutonium around which explosives are fastened. When the explosives go off they squeeze the plutonium together into a critical mass, which allows a nuclear explosion. The Pentagon said the production of Tritium for nuclear warheads will resume during the fiscal 2003 year. Another sensitive political point involves the report's discussion of the United States moratorium on nuclear testing. The Bush administration has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, but says it has no plans yet to resume nuclear testing. But the report suggests that it might be necessary to resume testing to make new nuclear weapons and ensure the reliability of existing ones. ``While the United States is making every effort to maintain the nuclear stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible in the indefinite future,'' it said.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Madam President, it may be useful to think for a moment--the chairman started me thinking. He asked the question: Why did we need 40,000 nuclear weapons? The answer is we didn't. Now 40 years later, we are left with enormous problems: 40,000 nuclear weapons which this country entered into the study, the research, the design, and the development of. We could blow up this Earth time and time and time again, obliterate it from existence. Does anyone think that makes sense--40,000? No, because what happens is the economic urge, the parochial nature of States--all of this takes over and subliminally, under the radar, huge weapons systems become developed which need to be maintained, secured, activated, and deactivated. It is a crazy system, and we all pat ourselves on the back and think we are good Americans. Does anybody believe the United States of America needed 40,000 nuclear weapons? But we built them. That is what is happening here again. That is exactly what is happening here again. We are appropriating money for a $4 billion bomb factory in addition to the $2.3 billion bomb factory we already appropriated. If they can't do it for $2.3 billion--and I am talking about Los Alamos run by the University of California--if they can't do it, let's take a good look at the reasons. Other nations know what we are doing. The Finnish Foreign Minister, just a week ago, commenting on our failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the move sent completely the wrong message to the international community. That is exactly what I have been saying. That is exactly what we are doing. We are sending a message we are doing it and, believe me, others will follow suit. Then he went on and said: We should be concerned about the development of weapons of mass destruction even in the case of low-yield weapons, the foreign minister said in an interview to be published in the Austrian daily Die Press on Friday. Muhammad el-Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, accused the United States last week of effectively breaking a ban on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through its research on so-called mini-nukes. The chairman says there is no research going on regarding mininukes. Then why did we repeal the Spratt-Furse language that for 10 years prevented the development of mininukes? Why did we do it if we were not going to build it? This is the deception. This is the covert nature of these programs. I do not doubt that we are building them. To say this is not happening really bothers me. If my colleagues do not believe it is happening, reread the Nuclear Posture Review. Every Member has access to the classified version of the Nuclear Posture Review which came out in January of 2000. They can read the unclassified version. For these purposes, I am going to quote from the New York Times of March 10. This is about the Nuclear Posture Review. It stresses a need to develop earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy heavily fortified underground bunkers, including those that may be used to store chemical and biological weapons. Now I am quoting from parts of the article. There is a quote again from the Pentagon: This administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction. That is why we are pursuing advanced conventional forces and improved intelligence capabilities. A combination of offensive and defensive and nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century. In my mind, what that means is the smaller nuclear weapons will be built below 5 kiloton. The difference is kind of blurred between conventional and nuclear weapons and it makes it easier to use the nuclear weapon on the battlefield. That is what I believe is going on. Another place states: Adding new detail to previous briefings, the Pentagon says that its future force structure will have the following components. By 2012: 14 Trident submarines with two in overhead at one time. They will be part of a triad that will include hundreds of Minuteman III land-based missiles, 100 B-52, H and B-2 bombers. That is an operationally deployed force of about 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. The Pentagon said that nuclear planning is not merely a question of numbers. The Pentagon also wants to improve existing nuclear weapons and possibly develop new ones. The report cites the need to approve earth-penetrating weapons. In general, the Pentagon report stresses the need for nuclear weapons that would be more easy to use against enemy weapons because they would be of variable or low yield, be highly accurate, could be quickly targeted. It is going on. No matter how one wants to cloak advanced weapons concept designs, it means new nuclear weapons, and that is what we are doing. We are breaking a 60-year tradition. We are going to move up testing. Testing does not need to be moved up. Why do they want to move up testing to the basic minimum time possible when the experts say it is not possible to do it in 18 months? Now, you can believe that we can be fairly assured by the fact that we spend $400 billion a year on our defense, more than every other nation on Earth combined; that maybe ought to give us an element of security; but I think to open this door, to walk through a nuclear door, to propose that we are going to begin to develop low-yield nuclear weapons and nuclear bunker busters sets an example for the world. They read the Nuclear Posture Review. They read the Washington Post. They read the French press. They read the speeches. They know what is happening. So we are setting an example for other nations. We say all the time that we do not want to proliferate, and we are encouraging proliferation by our own actions. Forty thousand nuclear weapons, I guess 45 years ago or 40 years later--I bet there is no one in the United States who can say we need 40,000 nuclear weapons, but we develop them. They are there. A lot of them have been disarmed. We are going to begin now this next generation. It is wrong. It is morally wrong. It is wrong for our children. It is wrong for our soldiers who have to go on the battlefield. Take another look at Hiroshima. Both Senator Kennedy and I spelled out the number of deaths. If we add them all up within a year, I think between Hiroshima and Nagasaki it totals 220,000 dead. That is a combination of a 15-kiloton bomb--what was it, a 21-kiloton bomb at Nagasaki--and we are talking about a 100-kiloton nuclear bunker buster. Look at this devastation. This is one bomb. I will never forget as a 12-year-old what we grew up with. Children today have different fears, but what we grew up with was the fear of an atomic bomb. That is why the daisy spot that was used in the Goldwater campaign had such an impact because there was a whole generation of young children who were impacted by it. I was one of them. Senator Kennedy is the same generation. He was one of them. When we were young, we said: We are never going to let this happen again. But in the Senate we are letting it happen again. If this Senate does not do what the House of Representatives does, I think there is a moral degradation spread over this whole body because we will then become the ones who launched the new generation of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am very concerned that through a policy of unilateralism and preemption, combined with the creation of new nuclear weapons, we may very well be encouraging the very nuclear proliferation we seek to prevent. It seems to me that pursuing the development of new tactical battlefield nuclear weapons not only lowers the threshold for possible use but also blurs the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. The amendment I have just sent to the desk essentially in many ways mirrors what the House of Representatives has done. Much to the credit of Chairman Hobson, the House of Representatives has deleted this funding. I believe very strongly the Senate should follow. The amendment I proposed would strike $15 million for the study of the development of the robust nuclear earth penetrator and $6 million in funding for advanced nuclear weapons concepts, including the study for development of low-yield weapons--these are battlefield tactical nuclear weapons--and it would prohibit spending--this is where it is a little different in the Senate version than in the House version--in the 2004 year to increase the Nevada Test Site's time to test readiness posture from the current 24 to 36 months to 18 months. The House actually cut the 24 $8 million. We fence it for this year. Secondly, it would implement site selection for the modern pit facility. The House cut $12 million. We would delay it for 1 year. The House also redirected the savings from this bill for water projects. We essentially use the money for deficit reduction. By seeking to develop a new generation of 5-kiloton, or below, tactical nuclear weapons, which produce smaller explosions, the administration is suggesting we can make nuclear weapons less deadly. It is suggesting we can make them more acceptable to use. Neither is true. By seeking to develop a robust nuclear earth penetrator, the administration seems to be moving toward a military posture in which nuclear weapons are considered just like other weapons--like a tank, a fighter aircraft, or a cruise missile. By seeking to speed up the time to test requirement for the Nevada Test Site, the administration is taking us down a road that may well lead to the resumption of underground nuclear testing, overturning a 10-year moratorium. By seeking to move forward with the modern pit facility, the administration appears to be seeking to develop a facility that will, in 1 year, allow the United States to produce a number of plutonium pits that exceeds the entire current arsenal of China. Given that the United States has a robust pit stockpile and plans for a facility that will be able to produce an adequate number of replacement pits in the coming years, questions must be asked as to why a facility like the modern pit facility is necessary, and why now? What sort of message is the United States sending to the rest of the world, at a time when we are trying to discourage others from developing their own nuclear arsenal, by our taking this action? We say to North Korea, you cannot do this. We say to Iran, you cannot do this. Yet we set a precedent whereby countries such as Pakistan and India--each with their own indigenous nuclear capability, each diehard enemies--may well take the example and say: If they can do it, we can do it. We should start our own advanced concepts program. I deeply believe the combined impact of studies or development of new nuclear weapons enhancing the posture of our test sites and developing a new plutonium pit facility could well have the result of leading these other nuclear powers and nuclear aspirants to resume or start testing and to seek to enlarge their own nuclear forces--action that would fundamentally alter future nonproliferation efforts and undermine our own security. Instead of increasing it, it will undermine it. The House of Representatives had the foresight to realize that going down this path was not in the best interest of the United States national security. I truly hope this Senate will respond and do the same. I cannot say enough good things about Chairman Hobson. I have had the privilege of working with him on MilCon, and I think he has shown dramatic courage, spunk, individualism, good thinking, and solid common sense. Nearly 60 years ago, our world was introduced to nuclear weapons. I was 12 years old when the Enola Gay left our shores. I saw a 15-kiloton bomb destroy Hiroshima. It killed up to 140,000 people--just that bomb killed 140,000 people. A 21-kiloton bomb then destroyed Nagasaki, killing 80,000 people. Two bombs, 220,000 people dead, and the largest pattern of destruction the world has ever seen--just look at it on this photo. For the decades that followed, we saw a standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union with armadas of nuclear weapons, many of which remain today. They are targeted at each other's cities even right this very minute. We have seen other nations become nuclear powers--the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan. And others--like I said, Iran and North Korea clearly have nuclear aspirations. But after decades of steady progress, our efforts against nuclear proliferation have also produced a number of dividends. Nuclear-capable states, like South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have either forgone developing nuclear weapons or, like the States of the former Soviet Union, given up the weapons they possessed. China has recently signaled it might be willing, finally, to sign onto the comprehensive test ban treaty. When U.S. policy can urge others to act responsibly, the world is a far safer place and the United States is safer as well. As we continue to prosecute the war on terror, it should be a central tenet of the U.S. policy to do everything at our disposal to make nuclear weapons less desirable, less available, and less likely to be used. This does just the opposite. This administration appears to be looking for new ways to use our nuclear advantage, to restructure our force so nuclear weapons are more ``usable.'' That sends a very troubling message to others who might also aspire to obtain or use nuclear weapons. Let me just quote a Pentagon spokesperson in saying this: This administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction. That is why the administration is pursuing advanced conventional forces and improved intelligence capabilities. A combination of offensive and defensive and nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century. I profoundly disagree. If the most potent conventional military on Earth cannot meet the challenges without new nuclear weapons, it is a tragedy indeed. The administration's own nuclear posture review, released in January of 2002, did not focus solely on the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence. It stressed the importance of actually being prepared to use nuclear weapons. In fact, the review noted we must now plan to possibly use them against a wider range of countries. To that end, I would like to put into the record a New York Times article by Michael R. Gordon, dated March 9. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my comments.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Through the Chair, respectfully, to the Senator from Massachusetts, I think no one can give an unequivocal statement that our nuclear supplies, plants, et cetera, are unequivocally safe. I think a lot of steps have been taken. As to whether they are adequate to meet any challenge, I have never heard anyone say they were not.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Mr. President, I come to the floor to add my words to those of my colleagues as we take time to remember those who died and who were injured 2 years ago on this very day and at this very time. America will never be the same again. The changes are visceral and they are real. So many innocents were killed by a vicious and evil act. We still can't really comprehend how people could do this kind of thing. It has truly been a living nightmare for so many children, wives, mothers, fathers, and loved ones. There have been so many candles, so many shattered dreams. September 11, 2001 was a true day of infamy. But the rebuilding has begun and the page is turned. I cannot imagine what the survivors and family members and friends of those killed have endured. My sorrow, my sympathy, and my condolences go to those who lost so very much. I hope they understand that they still have the love and respect of a sympathetic nation. Here in the Capitol, in the wake of 9/11, we have come to see that many loopholes exist in the security of this great and free Nation. Some of these are the very result of what we have treasured as part of our freedom, our openness, our democratic way of life. And while acknowledging this fact, we in the Senate have participated in plugging a number of these loopholes in ways we hope are designed to protect our country from another catastrophic terrorist attack. First, we passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which is legislation that aims to make it easier for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to monitor terror suspects and investigate their financial and personal records, to improve the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies, and to bring Federal law up to date with recent advances in communication technology. It is still amazing to me to realize that 19 terrorists were able to come into this country--most of them on legal visas--and launch an attack that killed thousands of our people. But we should also be very much aware that the 9/11 attacks were no anomaly. In fact, there are thousands of other terrorists, just like those 19 hijackers, who are poised to strike at the United States and our interests. The CIA Counterterrorism Center estimates that 70,000 to 120,000 individuals trained in Afghanistan terrorist training camps between 1979 and 2001. Think of that. The Center also says that between 15,000 and 20,000 are believed to have been trained by Osama bin Laden. These people are now spread all over the world and in many areas of this country now. The number of terrorist cells in this country is classified. I cannot share this on the floor of the Senate, but if I did, many people would be both shocked and surprised. So there is no question that the danger is real and, unless we find out who the enemy is and stop them before they try to kill us, only suffering and death can result. The USA PATRIOT Act was aimed at helping solve some of the problems that led to missed opportunities before 9/11. This legislation was spurred by the fact that key agencies in our Government had bits of information that, when viewed together, may have revealed details about the hijackers and their plans and prevented 9/11. Unfortunately, these bits of information were often held by different law enforcement and intelligence agencies and not widely shared--or, in some cases, not shared at all. Given the urgency of the war on terror and the inevitability of future attacks against our country and our interests, I believe there is a compelling need for our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to be able to gather intelligence to prevent attacks. But the challenge is, how can we do this without violating cherished civil rights and liberties? Now, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the knowledge that it had been drafted and negotiated quickly. Mr. President, you yourself serve on the same committee I do--Judiciary--and I think it was about 6 weeks from start to finish that we held hearings, debated the bill, and then finally enacted it. Congress needs to exercise vigorous oversight to prevent abuse and to solve unintended problems with the legislation. That is one of the reasons some of these sections in the PATRIOT Act are scheduled to sunset in 5 years. The USA PATRIOT Act was also passed with the expectation that the executive branch would limit its new powers to the intended purpose of fighting terrorism. Indeed, the breadth and depth of these new powers in the act demand careful application and close oversight. And the jury is still out as we evaluate the actions taken under this new law. Secondly, after September 11, I learned at a hearing on the Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee of Judiciary that the security controls for anthrax, smallpox, ebola, and 33 other deadly pathogens were too lax. The FBI and the CDC could not tell us at that time how many people were working with these deadly agents, how much they possessed, where these agents were, or where they were being used or stored. Moreover, labs conducted no background screening of workers who handled these dangerous agents. As a result, Senator Kyl and I introduced legislation to heighten security and restrict possession of these pathogens. Ultimately, Congress incorporated many of these provisions into the comprehensive bioterrorism bill that was passed in June of last year. Thirdly, Senator Kyl and I also coauthored the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, which seeks to plug loopholes in our border security. We have seen over the years that our borders are like swiss cheese. This legislation enhances border security by, among other things, putting more Federal officers on the border to try to stop possible terrorists from entering our country. Last month, for example, two Pakistani nationals at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport paid cash for one-way tickets to John F. Kennedy International Airport. The customer agent at the desk checked a terrorism-related ``no fly'' list and found both men's names on it. Local police then detained the two men and handed them over to the FBI. The new border security law requires the Federal Government to take concrete steps to restore integrity to the immigration and visa process. It requires that all visas, passports, and other travel documents to be fraud- and tamper-resistant and contain biometric data by October 26, 2004. Word has reached me that the administration may be requesting a delay in this deadline. I hope they will not. I hope that, instead of taking the easy course and saying let's delay that deadline, they take the more constructive and important course and say let's find out what we can do to comply with the law. It is critical and important that they do this. This law also requires all foreign nationals be fingerprinted and, when appropriate, to submit other biometric data to the State Department when applying for a visa. These provisions should help eliminate fraud, as well as identify potential threats to the country before foreign nationals gain access to the United States. That is why that October 26, 2004, deadline is so important. Now, when we put deadlines into the border security bill, we actually considered the need to come up with the new technology and the time it might take. We believed that the 2004 date was one that could be met. I, for one, think we should meet it. Finally, this law tightened up two programs that were highly unregulated and ripe for abuse and have been abused by terrorists: the Visa Waiver Program and the Foreign Student Visa Program. Much other work remains to be done. We know all of our ports, all 361 one of them, are the soft underbelly of homeland security. To emphasize this point, ``ABC News Primetime'' tonight will have a segment announcing the results of an investigation that shows just how porous our borders are. As a test, they shipped a suitcase with 15 pounds of depleted uranium from Jakarta to Singapore to Hong Kong to mainland China, and finally to the port of Los Angeles--all without being detected. The suitcase was in a 20-foot container filled with teak furniture. This investigation demonstrates how easily a terrorist could put a dirty bomb on a container, ship that container to a port in the United States, then place the container on a train unopened, and move it out anywhere into the heartland of our country. To help solve this sort of problem, earlier this year, Senator Kyl and I introduced the Antiterrorism and Port Security Act of 2003. This bill is still pending. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Schumer, is a cosponsor, and we are grateful for his support. This legislation would close loopholes in our criminal laws that would allow terrorists to strike against our ports to escape appropriate punishment. Many criminal laws don't deal appropriately with port security and were never even contemplated as deterring and punishing a terrorist attack on a port, so there are enormous loopholes in them. The bill would also help safeguard ports by strengthening security standards and requirements and ensuring greater coordination, and it would better focus our limited cargo inspection resources by improving the existing shipment profiling system and substantially bolstering container security. The ``ABC News'' show airing tonight will show that our container risk profiling and inspection system is inadequate. Today, the administration is putting a handful of Customs agents in other countries, to try to push the borders out, and using a risk profiling system that includes much less information and intelligence that it could. Moreover, fewer than 2 or 3 percent of the containers that come into our country are searched. I would add that over 40 percent of all imported containers in the U.S. come through two big ports in my State. I would hate to see a dirty bomb come in through the port of Los Angeles, the port of Long Beach, or the port of Oakland and be detonated somewhere in the United States. That is all too easy to do still today. Rather than criticize ABC for this show, we should be grateful to them because, once again, their investigative efforts have shown dramatically a loophole in the homeland security of this great, free society. I have also come to truly believe that we need to look deeply at our entire intelligence structure in this country. I have been privileged to serve on the Select Committee on Intelligence now for a couple of years, and I have seen many indicators that our intelligence structure needs dramatic improvement. Some recommendations for improvement are in the report by the joint inquiry into intelligence community activities before and after the terror attacks of September 11. One of the most important of these recommendations is the creation of a statutory Director of National Intelligence who shall be the President's principal adviser on intelligence and have the full range of management, budgetary, and personnel responsibilities necessary to run the entire United States intelligence community. Our intelligence community is so big--more than a dozen separate departments--and yet the individual who is head of the CIA is also supposed to be the head of this entire community. Yet he does not have budgetary and statutory authority over all of the departments. Consequently, he cannot transfer positions, and he cannot set strategies among the more than a dozen departments. I believe this is a shortcoming. And I have been joined by others in this belief. I am pleased that the joint inquiry report included the creation of a Director of National Intelligence as one of its recommendations. I am also pleased that Senator Graham of Florida makes this one of the provisions in his bill implementing the report's major recommendations. The current structure of our intelligence community was designed for post-cold-war intelligence-gathering agencies in a symmetrical world where two world powers--the Soviet Union, and the United States-- dominated. That structured world is no more. We are now in an asymmetrical world where intelligence-gathering agencies have to move to entirely new and different dimensions. Our current intelligence structure is not set up to allow that to happen. One of the things that has concerned me greatly is that many people have shied away from considering real reform in this area. If I ask questions about restructuring our intelligence community, I am told: Well, now is really not the time. I proposed the Director of National Intelligence bill in June 2002 and have introduced it again in this Congress. Yet we still have not had a hearing on that bill. It still has not moved. When I make inquiries, I am told: Now is really not the time. When is it going to be the time? The Intelligence Committees of both the House and Senate are charged with oversight of the intelligence structure. But I do not believe we are doing our job in that respect with respect to the organization of our intelligence community. One of the things, also, that I have learned is that man is capable of unspeakable violence, and in the case of 9/11, violence was the product of learned hatred--hatred that was conscientiously taught, that was drummed into tens of thousands, maybe millions, of people. Such hatred sows a field of violence and now this violence is all over our world. As The New York Times points out today, in the 2 years since 9/11, the view of the United States as a victim of terrorism deserving the world's sympathy has changed. Remember the Le Monde headline right after 9/11 in France? It was: ``We are all Americans today.'' That view has given way to a widespread vision of America as an imperial power that has defied world opinion through unjustified and unilateral use of force. We must take heed of this and move to remedy it. We must listen more; we must build alliances; we must move multilaterally; and we must recognize that we need the help of others. Yes, we need the help of the United Nations. In a world of asymmetrical warfare and terror, unilateralism is a flawed and unworkable doctrine. I believe the last 2 years have demonstrated that point. I hope we take heed, I hope we listen. And I hope as we commemorate this very solemn day that we will dedicate ourselves to that listening, to working with alliances, to building partnerships, to encouraging the United Nations to work with us, and to dispelling arrogance and becoming the humble nation that we said we were going to be. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask to speak in morning business.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wanted an opportunity as a cosponsor of the amendment to say a few words and to add my support to that of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee. We stand at a very unusual time. Because of the human genome and the advances in molecular biology, it is now possible to develop and target drugs to specific ailments and therefore to break frontiers, to cross barriers and make uncharted progress. What we began exactly 5 years ago under the leadership of the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Iowa was essentially to double the funding of NIH over 5 years, to be able to take advantage of the new horizon in front of us. I serve with President and Mrs. Bush, senior, as vice chairman of the National Dialogue on Cancer. Senator Sam Brownback has just come aboard. And in the Senate Cancer Coalition which Senator Brownback and I co-chair, we have heard miraculous testimony, for example, from Dr. Brian Drucker, the inventor of the drug Gleevec which is used to treat patients with chronic myeloid leukemia. Gleevec is one of a new generation of targeted cancer drugs that just kill bad cancer cells, leaving good cells unaffected. There is much less toxicity with this drug. Individuals do not lose their hair, they are not nauseated, and it has been shown to produce a 90-percent remission rate. That is where we are at this point in time. The sponsors of this amendment want to continue that advance. I say to my colleagues on this side, we all voted for a host of amendments. They all cost money. This is the big one. This is the one that will really make a difference for the health of Americans. If this amount is not added to the budget, the number of new and competing non- biodefense research grants will drop, from 9,902 in fiscal year 2003 to 9,827 in fiscal year 2004. NIH says the optimum number percent of approval for these research grants is about 40 percent. Through the increases we have made over the last 5 years, the grant approval rate is now about 30 percent. All this amendment does is allow us to keep even with that rate. Unfortunately, it takes $1.5 billion to do that. The suffering out there is enormous. Because of advances, we can find new cures and new drugs with better prevention and better rehabilitation. That is what I believe the American people want to spend these dollars on. I have faith in what the chairman of the Appropriations Committee said. Actually, I have never in the 10 years I have been here on a dollar matter heard him make a misstatement. I have no reason not to believe what he is saying. It may be true in absolute terms that this is not an emergency and the original plans were to take this money in a different way. For some reason that changed. The need is there. And the results will be there. I am absolutely convinced of it. Senator Brownback and I, as cochairs of the Senate Cancer Coalition, hold hearings. We hear from people. We hear from scientists. We hear from advocates. Yet more than 575 health, research, and disease advocacy organizations support this amendment. That is no coincidence. It is because people know now that because of the advances in molecular biology, because of the human genome, we are on the brink of new discoveries. We want those discoveries to continue. This is not pie in the sky. This is real. Every dollar spent will yield health dividends for people. I hope we will pass this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wish to inquire of my friend, the distinguished chairman of the Labor, HHS Appropriations Subcommittee, about the nature of funding in this measure for the care and treatment of unaccompanied alien children. As my friend knows, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress transferred responsibility for the care and treatment of unaccompanied alien children from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), effective March 1 of this year. Fiscal year 2004 will be the first full year during which ORR will be responsible for this important function, and it is critical for ORR to have adequate funding to exercise its new responsibilities.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania, the distinguished chairman, for that assurance. He has been an important ally in our efforts to reform the treatment of unaccompanied alien children. I also commend my friend from Iowa for his tireless efforts on behalf of all children throughout his career in the Senate, and I thank him for his support for this effort. I look forward to working closely with both of my colleagues to ensure that adequate funding is appropriated to carry out the mandate that Congress created in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. community access program

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator. It is important to note that in making its initial request for fiscal year 2004, the administration acknowledged that it was a preliminary estimate based on less-than- complete information. Since the administration made its initial budget request last January, it has become evident that ORR will need more funds in order to fulfill its unaccompanied alien child responsibilities. In talking with experts who work with these children as well as with administration officials, it has become evident that this important program will need at least $20 million in additional funding to order to operate effectively in fiscal year 2004. As the Senate knows, I was prepared to offer an amendment to this bill that would appropriate the additional $20 million for these programs, bringing the total appropriation for unaccompanied alien children for fiscal year 2004 to $54,227,000. This anticipated that the additional $20 million being appropriated for these functions would be derived from unused refugee and entrant funds from prior fiscal years. These funds have gone unused because of the unfortunate shortfalls that have occurred in refugee admissions during the last several fiscal years. In the interest of time and in deference to the delicate balance that the committee was forced to achieve in putting together this bill, I will not offer this amendment at this time. However, I ask the chairman for some assurance that he will work with House conferees to secure a minimum of $54.227 million for these functions in conference.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today the Senate will be voting on an amendment that is of vital importance to the working people of California and indeed the Nation. Earlier this year the White House proposed redefining the job descriptions of millions of workers and thus eliminate their right to overtime pay. Left alone, these rules will go into effect early next year. The Bush administration's proposal could wipe out overtime pay protections and increase work hours for at least 8 million workers. Losing overtime pay protections would also result in huge pay cuts for many workers. For more than 65 years we have maintained an appropriate balance between family life and work life by forcing employers to pay certain workers time and a half when those workers were required to work more than 40 hours in a single week. Thanks to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, this requirement has protected the 40-hour workweek which has been a trademark of our economy for more than six decades. And, as a result, our Nation's workers now have greater dignity, better health, and a more appropriate balance between work and family. This is an issue of fairness. Our workers are more productive than ever and yet the Bush administration believes it is necessary to penalize those very individuals who have literally built this Nation. The men and women who will be most hurt by the President's decision will be the hourly workers who maintain our streets, ring up our groceries, and respond to our calls to 911. Those hurt most will be disproportionately women and minority. They will be mostly middle and lower income. They will be struggling to make ends meet and they will be worrying about paying the mortgage. They are, in fact, our neighbors and friends. Given the high unemployment rate and economic uncertainty that is still smoldering in our economy, this is not the time to be making it harder for our hardest workers. Rather, it is a time when we should be helping all workers achieve fairness in the workplace. Fairness in the workplace is good for business. It is well known that by requiring companies to respect the 40-hour workweek, we encourage businesses to hire additional workers. With unemployment above 6 percent, we should continue to encourage companies to maximize employment while respecting the workforce they have. I support Senator Harkin's amendment to stop the Department of Labor from issuing any regulation that disqualifies workers from the overtime protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. I think the amendment is fair and just.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today with Senators Daschle, Dodd, Lieberman, Bingaman, Johnson, Feingold and Lincoln to introduce legislation to require the President to report to Congress on his vision for a democratic, economically viable, and politically stable Iraq, his plan for achieving those goals, and an estimate on how much this is going to cost. After months of dodging questions, giving half-answers, and ignoring Congressional requests, the time has come for this Administration to level with the American people and Congress and spell-out its plan for rebuilding a country torn apart by years of dictatorial rule, ethnic strife, war, and terror. Our legislation requires the President within 60 days of the enactment of this act to report to Congress on: the current economic, political, and military situation in Iraq including the number, type and location of attacks on U.S. and Coalition military and civilian personnel in the previous 60 days; a discussion of the measures taken to protect U.S. troops serving in Iraq; a detailed plan for the establishment of civil, economic and political security in Iraq, including the restoration of basic services such as water and electricity and the construction of schools, roads, and medical clinics in Iraq; the current and projected monetary costs incurred by the United States, by Iraq, and by the international community; actions taken and to be taken by the Administration to secure increased international participation in peacekeeping forces and in the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq; a detailed time-frame and specific steps to be taken for the restoration of self-government to the Iraqi people; cost estimates for achieving those goals; and U.S. and international military personnel requirements for achieving those goals. I am pleased that, as Secretary of State Colin Powell announced last week, the Administration has finally decided to seek an additional United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing increased U.N. participation in multinational peacekeeping forces and the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. Nevertheless, President Bush waited far too long to seek additional help and, as a result, we will face an ever greater challenge in rebuilding Iraq in the months and years ahead. And this past Sunday, President Bush announced his intention to seek an additional $87 billion to fund reconstruction efforts and military and intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we need now is a plan on how to rebuild Iraq, an estimate on how much it is going to cost, what personnel, both military and civilian, U.S. and international, will be needed, and what the end game will look like. Our troops, along with our British and Australian allies, performed brilliantly in executing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their unmatched skill, bravery, and professionalism made us all proud. They overthrew a tyrannical regime in three weeks and, for the first time in over thirty years, brought hope to millions of Iraqis. We owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude. But I believe United States troops assumed too great a burden in terms of manpower and exposure to risk, and will be forced to remain in Iraq longer than expected and at a higher financial cost. Let us look at the facts. Sixty-seven Americans have died in hostile action since the President declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003. In total, 286 U.S. troops have died in Iraq, 146 since May 1. One hundred and thirty-nine thousand U.S. troops are currently serving in Iraq, comprising 85 percent of coalition forces. Four car bombings in the past month have killed 121 people, including the UN's top envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the United States is spending approximately $4 billion a month in Iraq and, given the President's statement Sunday, there is no indication that this figure will go down anytime in the near future. These are enormous commitments, and yet, we do not have a clear indication from the Administration about its intentions in Iraq. And that is why I am introducing this legislation. We have assumed an enormous responsibility in Iraq and we must stay the course. But let us hear from the Administration on how it intends to stay that course and where that course will lead us. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.