Dianne Feinstein

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to state my opposition to the fiscal year 2004 budget conference report. At a time when the United States is engaged in a war and will shortly begin a massive reconstruction effort whose costs are still unknown, at a time of growing deficits and rising debt, and at a time of increasing entitlement spending and increasing interest payments to service that debt, it is highly irresponsible for Congress to engage in such unprecedented maneuvering and gamesmanship to try to force through an overlarge, unstimulative, and unnecessary tax cut. The parliamentary maneuvering is unprecedented. A conference report is supposed to reconcile differences between the two bodies, but this conference report sets up a mechanism by which two different figures for a tax cut can be considered. It is a clear effort to make an end run around the Senate rules and procedures by advocates of large and irresponsible tax cuts to avoid a vote they know that they simply can't win. It makes no sense, and I urge my colleagues to vote against this conference report. When President Bush assumed office in January 2001, the Congressional Budget Office projected a budget surplus of $5.6 trillion for fiscal years 2002 through 2011. But under this budget resolution, there will be a deficit of $1.95 trillion. That is a $7.6 trillion turnaround in 2 years. For fiscal years 2003 and 2004 alone, deficits will reach $347 billion and $385 billion respectively if this budget resolution is adopted, and this does not include the cost of the war or the reconstruction of Iraq. This conference report provides for tax cuts of $1.3 trillion over the period 2003-2013. With interest the full cost of this tax cut is $1.6 trillion. And in an unprecedented move, the amounts of the tax cut that are reconciled are different in the House and Senate. The reconciliation instructions to both the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee say that tax cuts up to $550 billion over 11 years can be reported. A special rule prohibits consideration in the Senate of the reconciliation bill that costs more than $350 billion, but it allows the Senate to consider a reconciliation conference report that costs up to $550 billion. This would establish a precedent that could be used in the future to play all kinds of games with the budget resolution. It is a bad solution to an impasse and should be rejected. There is also an urgent need to fund many priorities which are not dealt with in this budget, and those needs are not likely to disappear over the next decade. Those priorities include, among others: The war in Iraq and the subsequent reconstruction of Iraq, including a 90 billion supplemental appropriations conference report coming to this body shortly; the President's No Child Left Behind education initiative; homeland security; a full prescription drug benefit in Medicare. Many priorities that are important to Californians are either cut or eliminated altogether, most notably funding for the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. If that program is eliminated, the burden of processing and incarcerating criminal aliens will fall entirely on thinly-stretched State law enforcement budgets. When faced with the choice between supporting a bad budget and no budget at all, I must choose the latter. I support a budget which faces our fiscal needs head-on, even when an economic downturn forces us to make tough choices, and which resists the temptation to further increase the debt burden on future generations of taxpayers. This is not that budget. I urge my colleagues to vote against the budget conference report.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I would like to speak for a few minutes on this bill, if I might.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I must say I really think this is unfortunate. When Senator Hutchison and I proposed the AMBER alert in the last session and when Senator Leahy was good enough to see that it passed through the committee very rapidly, the Senate voted on it, the House did not. This year Senator Hatch was good enough, as chairman, to see that it passed through the Judiciary Committee very rapidly. The Senate passed the bill. It went to the House, and it became confused in what is a rather monumental discussion. I want to make a couple of comments on the AMBER alert bill, and then I want to make a few comments on the remainder of the bill. More than any other single law enforcement tool, I deeply believe, as does Senator Hutchison, that the AMBER alert can result in an abducted child being brought home safely. We know it works, and we know it is a program that should be nationwide. To date, in 39 States and 49 local and regional jurisdictions, there is an AMBER alert. This is up from 16 States and 32 local and regional jurisdictions just last August. These alerts have been extremely successful. They have resulted in the return of 53 abducted children across the country. Hallelujah. That is 53 families who did not have to suffer the pain of losing a loved one, 53 families who did not have to live through the trauma of losing a child, and that is why this legislation is so important. That is why I am going to vote for this bill. The first hours after a child is taken are critical. If the child is not found in those first few hours, chances increase dramatically that he or she will disappear forever, and this is the power of the AMBER alert. An alert can be issued within minutes of an abduction and disseminate key information. Since the State of California first adopted the AMBER alert just 9 months ago, 25 AMBER alerts have been issued involving 31 victims. Each of these alerts ended with the child being united with their family. One cannot argue with results like that. The provision included in the conference report has a number of key components. It would authorize $20 million for the Department of Transportation and $5 million to the Department of Justice for the development of AMBER alert systems in States where they do not exist; it would build upon the President's Executive order by authorizing a national coordinator; and it would reduce the number of false alerts. The bill would provide a framework for the Justice Department to establish minimum standards for the regional coordination of AMBER alerts. It is a good bill. We need it. The report also includes several provisions similar to legislation that I sponsored, with Senator Hatch, which would enhance national efforts to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes against children. I really regret that these provisions have become enmeshed with other concerns over the conference report. I heard Senator Kennedy speak in the Judiciary Committee this morning. I have heard him speak on the floor this afternoon. I understand his concerns. I do not believe judges should have to report their sentences on child crime to the Congress of the United States. I think that is a mistake. It should not happen. With respect to Koon v. the United States, I think it is a mistake to let appellate courts change the standard of review. I hope the Judiciary Committee will consider these things in the future. Let me state what is in the report that I agree with. It mandates that sex offenders be supervised for a minimum of 5 years after they are released from prison. I agree. It ensures that the murder of a child committed as part of a pattern of assaulting or torturing a child is considered first-degree murder. I agree. It increases the maximum and minimum penalties for anyone who sexually exploits a child. For first conviction, a maximum penalty is 30 years, increased from 20 years. And the minimum sentence is 15 years, increased from 10 years. I happen to agree. It creates a mandatory minimum penalty for kidnapping of not less than 20 years. Some do not agree with mandatories. I understand that. I respect that. But in the instance of a child, I agree with mandatories. It creates a crime with a maximum penalty of 30 years for a U.S. citizen traveling within or outside the United States to engage in illegal sexual conduct with children. I agree. It requires a person convicted a second time of a Federal sex offense involving children to receive a penalty of life imprisonment unless a death sentence is imposed. Now, if a person is going to be convicted of sexually abusing children twice, the question comes, should there be a third time? I have to say there shouldn't be a third time. I support this provision. It makes it a crime to attempt international parental kidnapping. Currently, only actual parental kidnapping is illegal. The attempt should be illegal, as well. I support that. It removes the statute of limitations for child abduction and sex crimes. I agree with that. It creates a Federal crime with a 2-year maximum penalty for creating a domain name with the intent to deceive a person into viewing obscene material on the Internet. The maximum penalty is 4 years if the intent is to deceive a minor. I agree. It creates a rebuttal presumption against bail for a person accused of raping or kidnapping a victim who was under 18. It expands reporting requirements for missing children from 18 to 21 years. Current law requires a host of Federal agencies to report a case of a child under 18 who is missing to the National Crime Information Center. In this case, the age of a missing child for reporting purposes is increased to 21. It provides more funding for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, increasing funding by $10 million in both fiscal years 2004 and 2005. I wish it did not have to happen this way. I would have felt much better if we had a chance in the Judiciary Committee to hold the requisite decisions and debate this more fully. I am very hopeful those things which are very controversial--and there are a few in this bill-- we will have an opportunity to hear further and amend, if necessary. What is important is to get the AMBER alert established nationally. If we had been at this for a month or two, I would not feel the way I do today. But we passed this bill in this body in the last Congress. Yet here we are today. I wish it could be a clean bill. I wish it could be just AMBER alert, but I am very pleased and will support the passage of this legislation. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Reserving the right to object, if I may.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today North Korea formally withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet while the United States has marshaled its military, diplomatic, and political resources against Iraq over the past 6 months, too little appears to have been done with regard to North Korea, which I believe represents the most imminent, serious, and dangerous threat facing the United States. Over the past few months North Korea has: expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors; moved 8,000 previously canned plutonium rods back to a reprocessing facility; started up its Yongbyon nuclear facility again; scrambled fighter jets to intercept a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan; and, threatened to abandon the armistice that has been in effect since 1953. We must face facts: North Korea, an isolated dictatorship, with a collapsed economy, controlled by its military, and in possession of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, represents a clear and present danger. If the United States does not exercise leadership and seek a pragmatic approach to engaging North Korea--pragmatism that comes not from weakness, but from strength--we run the risk of disrupting strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the most vital political, military, and economic region for the United States in the 21st century, and undermining our international credibility and global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. North Korea is a quasi-Stalinist state which, since its formal creation in 1948, has been run by two men--Kim Il Sung, who died in 1994, and his son, Kim Jong Il. It is still almost entirely closed to the Western World, a stark and isolated country marked by repression and poverty. The North Korean people have no access to outside sources of information, such as television or radio or the Internet. The totalitarian discipline of the North Korean people is dramatically illustrated by the fact that North Korean infiltrators commonly commit suicide rather than allow themselves to be captured. Only in rare cases have they been captured before they killed themselves. That is a measure of fanatical devotion. Second, the North Korean economy is increasingly isolated and stands, in my view, on the brink of collapse. In many ways, North Korea is the ``black hole'' of Northeast Asia. Even before Russia and China curtailed their energy and food support in the 1990s, the North Korean economy was in free-fall. One measure of the dire straits facing the North Korean economy is the famine that has gripped that nation for the past decade. Largely created by gross human negligence, not natural causes, it has killed an estimated 2 million people since the mid-1990s. Although harvests have improved modestly in recent years, food shortages are still a serious problem. In recognition of this problem, just last month Secretary of State Powell announced that the United States would provide 40,000 tons of food aid to the North--a modest level compared to recent years but significant nonetheless. A second measure of the desperate situation facing the North Korean economy is the collapse of its energy sector. North Korea's total electricity consumption in 2000 was only 65 percent of what it had been in 1991. North Korea has resorted to a rationing system for electricity and often experiences extended blackouts and power losses due to an antiquated transmission grid, and the North Korean agricultural sector is severely afflicted by a lack of diesel and power supplies, as well as spare parts and fertilizer. Taken together, North Korea's continuing isolation, famine, and economic collapse constitute a humanitarian crisis, and act as a barrier to improving cooperation and engagement in Northeast Asia on a number of fronts--political, economic, and military. In early October of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that North Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. According to Secretary Kelly, with whom I have discussed this situation on several occasions, North Korea initially denied the allegations, but later confirmed the U.S. claim. In confirming that they had an active nuclear weapons program, they also declared that the 1994 Agreed Framework was essentially null and void. Under the Agreed Framework, signed by North Korea and the United States: North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear program and agree to enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, safeguards; the United States would lead an effort to replace the DPRK's graphite- moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water, LWR, powerplants; the U.S. pledged to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, HFO, annually until the LWRs were completed; both countries would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations; both sides would work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; and both sides would work to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Implementation of the Agreed Framework was never perfect. None of those who negotiated it or worked to implement it were operating under the mistaken belief that North Korea was a ``good actor.'' But the guts of the deal--international safeguards on North Korea's plutonium facilities in exchange for HFO and the construction of the LWRs-- appeared to be intact until October 2002, when North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons that is in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements. With the Agreed Framework now null and void, North Korea may well find in the production of fissile material a new cash crop, ready for export, to support its sagging economy. What makes the North Korean nuclear program of particular concern is that North Korea also possesses advanced missile technology--in fact, it is the only country on earth that continues to sell Missile Technology Control Regime-banned missiles--including missiles that one day may be capable of reaching the United States. North Korea produces a wide range of ballistic missiles, including extended range versions of the Soviet-era Scud missile as well as indigenous medium range No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles. In fact, in 1998, North Korea test fired one of its Taepo Dong missiles over Japan and into the Pacific. In addition, since at least 1987, North Korea has been developing long-range missiles, including the Taepo Dong 2. A two-stage Taepo Dong 2 has a range of approximately 6,000 miles, while a three-stage version has a 9,300 mile range, allowing it to hit almost any point in North America. North Korea has also developed and produced cruise missiles. In fact, the land-to-ship missile fired last month on the eve of Roh Moo-hyun's inauguration as South Korea's new President, was a cruise missile believed to be based on the Chinese Silkworm missile design. Exporting missiles is one of the few sources of hard currency for North Korea, and in addition to the recent Scud sale to Yemen, North Korean leader Kim Jong II has admitted that Pyongyang sells missile technology to other nations, including Syria, Iran, and Libya. Now, I believe the blame for precipitating the current crisis lies squarely with North Korea, which clearly violated the Agreed Framework by undertaking its secret uranium enrichment program. The government of Kim Jong II has clearly placed its focus not on feeding its people but in developing its military, its missiles, and its nuclear capability all in defiance of the treaties it has signed. Yet it also appears that our own handling of events on the Korean peninsula over the past 2 years, as well as our broader foreign policy rhetoric and statements have served, ironically, to fuel North Korea's paranoia and made the situation much more difficult to manage. Part of the problem was our reluctance to endorse former President Kim Dae Jung's ``Sunshine Policy,'' a diplomatic and economic effort by the South Korean Government to ease tensions with the North. President Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for precisely these initiatives. This move was perceived as a major humiliation in South Korea, helped set the stage for the rise of anti-Americanism, and was seen as a sign by the North that the administration was intent on a policy of isolation and confrontation. Next month, when President Roh visits Washington, I would urge the administration to take great care to assure that the United States and South Korea share a common vision, goal, and purpose regarding North Korea. The North Korean situation offers no easy solution. But over the past several months it has gone from bad to worse, and the administration has yet to demonstrate the degree of high-level seriousness and commitment necessary to defuse the crisis. We cannot allow North Korea to produce additional nuclear material. Restarting its production facility will allow North Korea to develop at least a half dozen nuclear weapons within 6 months. It is bad enough that North Korea might acquire a significant nuclear arsenal for its own possible use. But even worse would be North Korea becoming a plutonium factory selling fissile material to the highest bidder. As we were reminded in December when we intercepted a quasi- legal missile shipment to Yemen, this is a regime that will sell anything it develops. In short, the administration's justification for being concerned about Iraq that it is a brutal dictatorship that may threaten instability in the region and may provide WMD to terrorists is quickly becoming a reality with North Korea. A failure to stop North Korea's nuclear program is sending a terrible message to other rogue states and to our friends and allies as well. Every would-be proliferator is measuring our response to North Korea as they consider how to chart their futures. And a nuclear North Korea may lead friends in the region, like Japan and South Korea, to conclude that they have to increase their military capabilities, sparking an arms race in Asia and drawing China, India, and Pakistan into a regionwide cycle of escalation. At the end of the day, I believe that we face the same three basic options today that we did in 1994: We can launch a preemptive strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities; we can pursue a policy of isolation and containment; or, we can seek to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions through negotiations. In reality, a preemptive strike is not a feasible option. First, while we might be able to take out Yongbyon and other well- known sites, we simply don't know where all of North Koreans fissile material, missile, or nuclear facilities are located. There are over 10,000 caves and holes in North Korea. We don't know the location of the uranium facility. Second, launching a preemptive strike is hardly a palatable option given the military realities on the ground at the DMZ. Such a strike would lead to all-out war on the Korean peninsula, and although I believe the U.S. and our allies would emerge victorious, the price would be high. Finally, our South Korean allies strongly reject a preemptive strike, which should give us pause. Likewise, there are major problems with continuing a policy of isolation and containment, as some in the administration have argued for. In essence, isolation and containment appear unlikely to succeed in toppling a regime that has been isolated and contained for so long. And it means that we have acquiesced to North Korea's going nuclear, and to North Korea acquiring serial production capacity for nuclear weapons and fissile material. Furthermore, isolation will not prevent North Korea from exporting fissile material to Iran, al-Qaida, or others. A policy that allows North Korea to build and retain nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States, and to possess excess fissile material and a highly efficient network to sell or transfer fissile material to terrorists or other rouge states, is not in our best interest, which brings us to the third option negotiations. I strongly believe that the United States must signal its willingness to engage in immediate U.S.-North Korean negotiations to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program in return for U.S. security assurances to North Korea, economic assistance and normalized relations. In fact, as some experts have suggested, bilateral negotiations themselves could be premised on a North Korean commitment not to reprocess the Yongbyon reactor fuel rods into plutonium during the discussions. As we seek creative solutions to engage North Korea and go forward with a process of negotiations, it is critical that we do so in harmony with South Korea and Japan, and both China and Russia must also play a major role. The administration is right that this crisis is an international problem that requires the active involvement of the other powers in the region. I am particularly pleased to note that China has, in fact, played a constructive role in helping to convey to North Korea the gravity of its current course. At the same time, I believe that the burden of international leadership falls on the United States, and, as we seek to engage North Korea diplomatically, we must move beyond continuing to argue over the shape of the table or how many chairs should be at it. Continuing to do so is little more than an excuse for those who would prefer to see the crisis escalate instead of seeking to solve it. Although the administration believes, correctly, that bad behavior should not be rewarded, it is also a truism of diplomacy that if you want to get something you must be prepared to give something. And I strongly believe that it is in the United States' best interests to get something from North Korea: That North Korea cease and desist its nuclear activities and stop proliferating missiles. So I believe that it is imperative to think creatively about inducements that can be offered to induce North Korea to relinquish its nuclear ambitions. Implementation of several relatively modest nonnuclear energy sector initiatives--introducing market institutions to the North Korean energy sector; undertaking efforts to repair the existing electric grid; rehabilitating coal supply and transport; eliminating waste; and underwriting small-scale renewable projects-- would provide for a stable energy sector for North Korea in the near and intermediate term. And, as part of a process of larger diplomatic engagement with North Korea, this can contribute significantly to defusing the current crisis. There is no evidence that North Korea has started to reprocess. North Korea may well be determined to go down the nuclear path and a nuclear North Korea may well be an unavoidable consequence of the current crisis. But nothing is yet set in stone, and at a time of increasing uncertainty the world looks to the United States to lead. And there is no better way to underscore our seriousness than through direct negotiations. Such talks are all the more important when dealing with an isolated, tyrannical and bellicose regime, because miscommunication can all too easily lead to miscalculation, with possibly catastrophic consequences.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wish to honor Mr. Stanley Hirsh, a California businessman, and publisher of the widely read Los Angeles Jewish Journal, who dedicated his life to others. Mr. Hirsh lost his battle with brain cancer and passed away on March 22nd. Mr. Hirsh left behind his wife, Anita, four children, and four grandchildren. He was 76. While Mr. Hirsh was a highly successful businessman, he will be remembered, to quote the Jewish Journal, as a ``maverick philanthropist.'' Such a title was earned by Mr. Hirsh's plethora of donations to various charity organizations, his service during World War II in the United States Navy, and his formation of twelve kosher kitchens for Jewish seniors in the Los Angeles area. In addition to his dedication to philanthropy, Mr. Hirsh sought to positively affect Arab-Israeli relations. In the early nineties, Mr. Hirsh and his family formed the Hirsh Family Early Childhood Development Center in Tel Aviv. While no single accomplishment defined Mr. Hirsh, his friends remember him as an altruistic man who was steadfast in his leadership. Friend and Congressman Howard L. Berman recalled Hirsh as ``a real generalist, interested in matters of the greater community.'' Mr. Hirsh's dedication to community service is evidenced by his stint as president at the Jewish Federation, and in the mid 1980s, he chaired the United Jewish Fund General Campaign. Interestingly, Mr. Hirsh was the greatest contributor to the campaign. Mr. Hirsh owned the Cooper Building in downtown Los Angeles and was a former chairman of the Community Redevelopment Agency in the city of Los Angeles. Employees of Mr. Hirsh at the Jewish Journal remember him as being obsessed with fair and balanced reporting. Editor-in-Chief of the periodical, Robert Eshman, said that the paper grew ``significantly'' under Stanley's leadership. People of Stanley Hirsh's caliber do not come very often and while his accomplishments still resonate, and his warmth and kindness honored, Mr. Hirsh will be sorely missed.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the nomination of Judge Cormac Carney for the Central District of California. Judge Carney is a bright, young judge with truly impressive credentials. Judge Carney graduated cum laude from UCLA, where he earned All-American honors as a wide receiver. He attended Harvard Law School, worked as a partner for the prestigious law firm of O'Melveny & Myers, and has served with distinction as a Los Angeles Superior Court judge. I am confident he will prove a valuable addition to the bench in the Southern District of California. Today's vote on Judge Carney marks a milestone event for California's bipartisan Judicial Advisory Committee, which Senator Barbara Boxer and I set up with the White House. Judge Carney is the eighth judge to come out of the advisory committee. Nearly every one of these judges has passed out of the committee by a unanimous vote. With Judge Carney's confirmation, the committee will have filled all the current district court vacancies in California. This if the first time in recent memory that all of California's authorized district court judgeships are filled. I would like to give credit to Jerry Parsky and the White House for working constructively with the California Senate delegation in a bipartisan manner to get these judgeships filled. The results of the committee's efforts speak for themselves. On average, these eight California judges have received Senate confirmation within 114 days of their nomination. In contrast, during the last year of the Clinton administration, district court nominees took an average of 196 days to get confirmed. We have confirmed these nominees efficiently and without rancor. This process has enabled the best and the brightest legal minds of our state to gain admission to the Federal bench. I hope the Senate sees our efforts in California as a model of how the judicial nominations process could work.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I was going to call up an amendment about interoperable communications, but the text of our amendment is being worked out by the chairman of the committee and the ranking member. I believe it is going to be successfully worked out, so I would like to say a few words about what I would like to see happen. This emergency supplemental provides $2 billion through the Office of Domestic Prepareness for State and local governments and first responders for homeland security. It also states in the Conference Report that $30 million of the $2 billion should go to provide ``technical assistance to States for a variety of activities'' and mentions ``assistance with interoperable communications and equipment'' as one such activity. But nowhere is there a specific earmark for interoperable communications, and none of the $30 million mentioned for ``technical asssistance'' will go directly to the people who need it most-- policemen, firefighters, and emergency assistance personnel. And even if some fraction of the $30 million does trickle down to public safety first responders, this is simply not enough to make a dent in the problem. There are, today, about 2.5 million public safety first responders operating in the U.S., located at 18,000 law enforcement agencies, 26,000 fire departments, 6,000 rescue departments, and many other agencies as well. They have historically depended on their own radio systems, even though sometimes these systems are often incompatible with other agencies with whom they work. As a result, law enforcement, firefighters, and emergency medical service (EMS) teams can't talk to each other. For example, while police received a radio message that the World Trade Center was going to collapse on September 11, firefighters never received the message because they use different radios. A report from the University of New Hampshire-based ATLAS Project states: From numerous interviews gathered as part of a fire department inquiry into the events of September 11th, it would appear that non-interoperability was at least partially responsible for the loss of 343 firefighters at the World Trade Center. According to an article in The New York Times on January 30, 2002, the New York Fire Department's most senior commanders report that: they had little reliable radio communications that morning, could not keep track of all of the firefighters who entered the towers and were unable to reach them as the threat of collapse became unmistakeable. . . . So poor were communications that on one side of the trade center complex . . . a city engineer warned officials that the towers were at risk of ``imminent collapse.'' Those he told could not reach the highest-ranking fire chief by radio. A messenger was sent across, dodging flaming debris and falling bodies, to deliver it in person. He arrived with the news less than a minute before the first tower fell. Let me give some other examples. Interoperability was also a problem at both the Littleton, Colorado shooting spree at Columbine High School. During that horrific attack, over 2000 students and teachers were effectively held hostage and 15 were killed and 23 wounded. Forty-six separate agencies responded during the incident. Many of these responders were operating on different emergency radio channels, and in different parts of the radio spectrum. Some operated on VHF frequencies, some on an Ericsson 800 megahertz system, some on an analog 800 megahertz system, and some on a digital 800 megahertz trunked system. According to an internal report by the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office: With such varying systems being used, not only were agencies prevented from communicating directly with each other, but groups with similar functions also could not communicate via radio. Ideally, groups with the same responsibility, such as the various SWAT teams or those officers setting up inner or outer perimeters would have their own channel to use in order to report and obtain vital information about their particular area. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the Federal, State, and local first responder agencies also couldn't talk to each other. Things were so bad that agencies resorted to using ``runners'' to carry messages from one command center to another. To ensure that all agencies were on the same page, these runners often had to run between different agencies repeating the same message. This is the same method of communication used thousands of years ago by the ancient Greeks and Romans. We all know--Senator Byrd especially--the story from 490 B.C. of the man who ran 26 miles from the plains of Marathon to the city of Athens to report victory in the Battle of Marathon and warn the people in the city of impending attack. In some ways, we are no better off today, 2,500 years later. It is outrageous that our emergency communications systems can be reduced to levels that existed 2\1/2\ millennia ago. And even if runners are not needed to transit messages physically from agency to agency, lack of interoperability can still spell disaster. Lack of interoperability always means that precious minutes are lost and lives are put at risk. The bottom line is that Congress has not provided enough money for interoperable communications--and that means we are needlessly jeopardizing the safety of our public safety first responders and the citizens of our country. The fiscal year 2003 appropriations bill only provides $45 million in dedicated money for interoperable communications--only $12 million of which is likely to go directly to first responders. Twenty million dollars was given to the COPS program for interoperability, but $8 million of this amount was earmarked for other purposes--$5 million to the National Institute of Standards to develop minimum standards and $3 million for research and development through the National Institute of Justice's Advanced Generation of Interoperability for Law Enforcement-- AGILE--program. Another $25 million was given to FEMA under the Emergency Management Planning and Assistance account. However, my staff has been told that this money will probably go to State emergency management agencies. There is another $400 million for equipment grants and $750 million for fire grants, but only some of this could be used for interoperable communications. There was only about $50 million set aside specifically for interoperable communications in fiscal year 2002. And I mentioned earlier, that there is $30 million in the supplemental for ``technical assistance'' to the States, some of which could be used for interoperable communications. In my view, providing only $12 million in dedicated money directly for first responders for fiscal year 2003 is simply not enough. We have talked with the International Chiefs of Police. We have talked with all the national firefighting and first responding organizations. They are all strongly in support of increasing this amount. I must tell you, I am delighted that both the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and the ranking member have responded, and I am assured there will be added, in the managers' package, an additional amount which will go directly to first responders. Now, let me make one point. I recently heard from a Los Angeles city councilman, Jack Weiss, about one potential solution. It is a device called ACU-1000, which is also available in a mobile version called the First Responder Vehicle. ACU-1000 is manufactured by JPS Communications, which is owned by Raytheon. Now, here is how the First Responder Vehicle works: They take an SUV, and fill it with software that converts the different frequencies into a compatible network that allows first responders, using different communication devices, to talk to each other. So a local community, such as one of yours, I say to the Presiding Officer, or one of mine, can purchase this vehicle for $150,000 to $200,000 and thus allow first responders to coordinate using diverse, incompatible communications systems. A public safety first responder will drive the SUV to an emergency. Then Federal agency, State agencies, local agencies, the National Guard, police officers and firefighters can all talk to one another. This can be done for as little as $150,000 a unit. While my amendment is for $400 million, I am hopeful that as much as the chairman and the ranking member believe is possible can be appropriated and earmarked for interoperable communications in the supplemental and go directly to these first responding communities. I also ask that the Record reflect that Senator Mikulski, Senator Dodd, Senator Durbin, and Senator Dayton are also very concerned about this issue and that they worked on the amendment with me. I thank them all very much. The bottom line is that it is easy to solve this problem and that solving the problem is going to save lives. If you are going to protect the homeland, you have to enable those who first respond to a major crisis to be able to communicate. Once again, I thank the chairman and the ranking member for working with me to include money for interoperable communications in the supplemental. I look forward to this issue being resolved in the manager's package, but I would like to reserve the right, in the event something goes wrong, to call up the amendment.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose this amendment. I very much respect the distinguished Senator from Nevada. However, I think this amendment is enormously destructive. If America is going to become an arrogant nation, do things only our way, this is a good way to begin. I believe it would be a tragic and a terrible mistake. The amendment is couched in such words that no one would know exactly what it means. It reads: No funds made available in this Act for purposes of reconstruction in Iraq may be provided, to a person who is a citizen of or is organized under the laws of France or Germany, unless such person is a resident of or organized under the laws of the United States. Just to know how this would affect an employee of a given company, an officer of a given company, or anyone else, I think creates a whole miasma of very real problems. I think to use the word ``despicable'' perhaps is hyperbole. I think there is a legitimate point of difference between European nations and the United States with respect to how to handle Iraq. Culturally there are differences. Diplomatically there are differences. But to pass a piece of legislation that puts America's No. 1 allies in a position of being an absolute enemy of this country, I think is a terrible thing to do. I would hope we would vote down this amendment.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to respond. The fact is, there are dozens of countries in this world that disagreed with what the United States is doing. I am one who voted to authorize the President with the use of force. Most of the larger countries in the world disagree. Additionally, the French and the Germans, in many ways in the war against terror, have been helpful to the United States. Those of us who serve on the Intelligence Committee know this. We know that intelligence comes from both of those nations which is instrumental in helping in the war on terror. The unilateral approach of this country is subject to some concern by other countries. That is not necessarily a bad thing. This is the first time in America's history we have unilaterally, with Great Britain, with the help of a couple thousand Australians, and with some tacit support of other countries in different ways, some public, some not public, essentially invaded another sovereign nation. There is a difference of opinion as to whether we should have stayed at the United Nations. I happen to share that view. I believe we should have worked to have made this more multilateral. I believe we should have taken the time to do so. But we chose not to do that. The administration chose not to do it. For the Senate to pass this amendment--you might as well include a whole host of other countries in this--sets us upon a very bad course of action. I would think we would want everyone's help in the rebuilding of Iraq. I would think we would want everyone's help in the establishment of a secure and stable and open and free and, perhaps one day, democratic, new Iraqi government. To place two of America's staunchest allies, France and Germany, that have shown their solidarity with us over the years from the time--certainly the French from the time our country was founded, the Germans certainly subsequent to World War II, and not to understand that there are strong antiwar feelings in both of these countries is shortsighted. What this Senate should try to do is bring people together, bring our allies together, to reduce America's unilateral courses in the world, to work with our friends. This does not help. I hope there will be an overwhelming vote against this amendment.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I would like to make a couple of points on this amendment. I ask the distinguished Senator two questions. The first is, is he aware that Germany has allowed over 60,000 U.S. troops to pass through U.S. Air Force bases in Germany--all troops bound for Iraq? Is he aware that the Germans have helped in many ways? Second, is he aware that there are already contracts out from our Department of Defense with firms that would be nullified under this bill? Also, I would like to ask the question, if he does know, to what extent would those contracts be nullified by this legislation?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. I appreciate that. I was a mayor for 9 years. I required all of the departments to have portable radios. Every Monday we would test their radio systems at 7:30 because, in the event of an earthquake, at that time there was no other way for all the city departments to talk to one another except over a radio system. So I know firsthand the importance of interoperable communications. I appreciate the comments. Thank you very much. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, if I might, I would like to read an editorial that was published in the Los Angeles Times. I think it is pertinent. It was published on the 30th of last month, a few days ago. It is entitled, ``Move Past the Grudges.'' The United States should act to review tattered alliances that will be needed in the fight against terrorism. It goes on to point out: Blair visited Bush at Camp David last week and readily acknowledged the bruises left by the rancorous United Nations debate before the war. When Bush was asked about the many nations that declined to join the Iraq war alliance, he replied only that the United States and Britain had plenty of Western allies that continue to stand with us. Blair, however, frankly conceded that many countries disagree with what we are doing. How that divide is handled now and after the war will affect global relationships for years to come. Mr. President, I could not agree more. I don't know why we have any need to be small, to be rancorous, and to be bitter. Right now, we have our men and women in harm's way, and the battle is turning and it is favoring our side. The hope should be that we can put this conflict to an end, that we can mend the wounds, that we can rebuild the country, that we can show to the entire Muslim/Arab world that America is indeed an open, fair, democratic country, and we care about the Muslim people. I don't believe any purpose is served by this amendment. I don't believe the world is going to be a better place because we pass this amendment. I don't believe we are going to be able to restore or bind any wounds with this amendment. I believe we will drive deeper the scars into the psyche of America with this amendment. I believe we will spread apart our alliances with this kind of amendment. I hope this amendment is not a harbinger of things to come on the floor of the U.S. Senate because I believe it does disrespect to a strong, able, competent, and compassionate United States of America. I urge its defeat.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that would allow private, non-profit medical facilities which service industry-specific clients to be eligible for hazard mitigation and disaster assistance. Under the current law, institutions such as these are limited in their ability to receive the Federal funds needed for both preparedness and response in the case of emergencies. In particular, I speak today of the Motion Picture & Television, MPTF, Hospital, located in the earthquake-prone San Fernando Valley. Set up more than 80 years ago to provide members of the entertainment industry with vital medical care and social services, the MPTF Hospital is the only institution of its kind in the United States. With an acute care hospital, six outpatient facilities staffed with primary care physicians, a children's center, retirement facilities, and programs for the elderly, the MPTF Hospital provides comprehensive care for a significant sector of the population of the greater Los Angeles community. It is the only non-profit institution providing industry-specific health and human services to the entertainment industry and to the general public. This legislation is important because in the aftermath of the Northridge Earthquake of 1994, considered one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history, the MPTF Hospital was unable to receive federal assistance to repair structural and equipment damages suffered from the earthquake. Furthermore, that same year, the California Senate enacted legislation requiring all hospitals to be seismically retrofitted by 2010. The costs of both the reparations and structural upgrades are enormous, and the MPTF Hospital cannot receive federal funds because as an institution serving an industry-specific clientele, it does not qualify under the current definition of a ``private, nonprofit facility'' within the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, Stafford Act. To address this problem, this legislation broadens that definition to include tax-exempt facilities that provide medical services to specific occupational or industry segments of the general public. Under this change, facilities such as the MPTF Hospital would have the opportunity to apply for federal assistance under the Stafford Act, alongside other private, nonprofit institutions. There is no up-front cost stemming from this amendment to the Stafford Act. This bill simply puts the MPTF Hospital on equal footing with other critical care facilities when applying for Federal disaster assistance. This legislation is timely and necessary. Hospitals such as the MPTF deserve an opportunity to apply for Federal funding, and desperately need this financial assistance in order to both meet California's 2010 deadline for seismic retrofitting and respond adequately to future disasters. I call on this body to enact this legislation promptly.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that would allow private, non-profit medical facilities which service industry-specific clients to be eligible for hazard mitigation and disaster assistance. Under the current law, institutions such as these are limited in their ability to receive the Federal funds needed for both preparedness and response in the case of emergencies. In particular, I speak today of the Motion Picture & Television, MPTF, Hospital, located in the earthquake-prone San Fernando Valley. Set up more than 80 years ago to provide members of the entertainment industry with vital medical care and social services, the MPTF Hospital is the only institution of its kind in the United States. With an acute care hospital, six outpatient facilities staffed with primary care physicians, a children's center, retirement facilities, and programs for the elderly, the MPTF Hospital provides comprehensive care for a significant sector of the population of the greater Los Angeles community. It is the only non-profit institution providing industry-specific health and human services to the entertainment industry and to the general public. This legislation is important because in the aftermath of the Northridge Earthquake of 1994, considered one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history, the MPTF Hospital was unable to receive federal assistance to repair structural and equipment damages suffered from the earthquake. Furthermore, that same year, the California Senate enacted legislation requiring all hospitals to be seismically retrofitted by 2010. The costs of both the reparations and structural upgrades are enormous, and the MPTF Hospital cannot receive federal funds because as an institution serving an industry-specific clientele, it does not qualify under the current definition of a ``private, nonprofit facility'' within the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, Stafford Act. To address this problem, this legislation broadens that definition to include tax-exempt facilities that provide medical services to specific occupational or industry segments of the general public. Under this change, facilities such as the MPTF Hospital would have the opportunity to apply for federal assistance under the Stafford Act, alongside other private, nonprofit institutions. There is no up-front cost stemming from this amendment to the Stafford Act. This bill simply puts the MPTF Hospital on equal footing with other critical care facilities when applying for Federal disaster assistance. This legislation is timely and necessary. Hospitals such as the MPTF deserve an opportunity to apply for Federal funding, and desperately need this financial assistance in order to both meet California's 2010 deadline for seismic retrofitting and respond adequately to future disasters. I call on this body to enact this legislation promptly.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay my respects to four more Californians who have died in combat in Iraq, as well as to nine other Americans who were stationed in California and have made the ultimate sacrifice in our efforts to liberate the Iraqi people. Most of these men have left family in California. So far, of the 44 Americans who have died, 10 were from California, while another 9 were stationed there. This accounts for around 45 percent of all those killed in action. But first, I would like to take a moment to remind my colleagues about the two servicemen killed and another wounded late last week in Geresk, Afghanistan, when they were ambushed by Taliban forces while on a reconnaissance patrol. As America focuses almost exclusively on the conflict in Iraq, we must not forget the bravery and sacrifice of men such as SGT Orlando Morales, SSG Jacob Frazier, and others in America's larger, global war on terror. Of the four Californians I would like to recognize today, two of them, members of the 1st Tank Battalion of 29 Palms, were killed when their tank plunged off a bridge near Nasiriyah, during a heavy sandstorm. Both of them were still legal residents. LCpl Patrick T. O'Day: One of these was 20-year-old Patrick O'Day, who was born in Scotland and came to the United States when he was just 3. He learned to read around the same time and quickly impressed his family and surprised his kindergarten teacher. He was captain of the wrestling team at Santa Rosa Middle School and a 2001 graduate of Santa Rosa High School, where he met his future wife Shauna. They were married in October of last year, and they are expecting their first child in September. His younger brother, Thomas, said that Patrick was ``always someone that could make anyone in the room laugh. When he came into a room, everyone knew he was there. He could change the atmosphere very quickly. . . . He was just so much fun to be around.'' PVT Francisco A. Martinez Flores: Francisco Martinez Flores was also in the tank that plunged in the Euphrates River. He was born in Guadalajara, Mexico, and settled in Duarte, CA, when only a little boy. He attended Maxwell Elementary School and graduated from Duarte High School in 2000, where he was a popular and outgoing football player with a passion for fixing up old cars. He had expressed a desire to be ``a great soldier'' ever since he was a young boy. ``[The Marines] returned to me a true man,'' said his mother, Martha, who had gone back to Mexico to bury her father when her son was deployed to the gulf. She never had the opportunity to say goodbye. Francisco Martinez Flores was to become a U.S. citizen in 2 weeks. But the 21-year-old marine was killed before he could take an oath of allegiance to the country he died fighting for. LCpl Jesus Suarez del Solar: Just 20, Cpl Suarez had already served in Afghanistan, and was ready to returning to combat, this time in Iraq. This past December, he had married his longtime girlfriend Sayne. They had a baby boy, Erik. ``I'm very proud of Jesus,'' said his father, Fernando. ``I want Americans to know that immigrants that came to the United States, we did not come to take their jobs. We came here to give them our blood, so they can have freedom and they can have a world free of terrorism. That's why my son died.'' Known as something of a charmer and even a bit of a flirt, he graduated in 2001 from Valley High School, in Escondido, a town about 30 miles north of San Diego. His principal, Janice Boedeker, said that ``Jesus wanted to become a marine from the time I met him, as a junior in high school. He was just a wonderful kid with maturity beyond his years.'' ``He was so excited about being a part of the infantry and the Marine Corps,'' Boedeker said. ``I always ask kids about their goals what they want to do. There was never a question with him. I remember he wrote in big, capital letters: MARINES.'' One of his teachers, Tom Gabriella, remembered how Jesus ``felt he could build a solid life around the Marine Corps. . . .Once, he gave a presentation to a class. He always had a big smile on his face.'' GySgt Joseph Menusa: Born in the Philippines, Joseph Menusa came to the United States when he was 10 and grew up in San Jose. A veteran of the first gulf war, he was killed in battle on Thursday, March 27. He was a graduate of Silver Creek High, Class of '89. He was working his way up the ranks and was in the process of gaining his U.S. citizenship when he received his deployment orders to the gulf. On the eve of his deployment, Sgt Menusa told his wife Stacy why he had to go. ``He said he was in charge of these young kids and he was the only one who had ever seen combat. He needed to be their guide.'' Capt Tuan Pham, who was born in Vietnam and worked with Sgt Menusa as a Marine recruitment officer in San Francisco, had this to say about his friend: ``We are both naturalized Americans and believe in the ideals of what this country represents. He paid the ultimate price for something we all believe in--freedom.'' Of those Americans stationed in California, most were from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force based at Camp Pendleton, in San Diego County. While from all across the country, these men were so much a part of the local community, where the mood is somber, yellow ribbons are everywhere, and the flags at half mast. I would also like to commend the local newspaper, the San Diego Union Tribune, for doing an impressive job of providing much of the information on those stationed at Camp Pendleton. 2Lt Therrel S. Childers, Harrison County, MS: While most youngsters pick a new career more often than they outgrow their sneakers, Lt Therrel Childers, the son of a Navy Seabee, first decided he wanted to be a marine when only 5 years old. He joined the Marines a month after he graduated from high school; they sent him to college and promoted him. 25 years after he first glimpsed his future, Second Lieutenant Childers was fatally injured on a battlefield in Iraq. ``We're proud of him,'' his mother said from her Powell, WY, home. ``He died doing what he believed in.'' He approached his life with a unique intensity that made him successful both in his career and in the classroom. His professors at The Citadel, in Charleston, SC, saw the dedication that made him a good marine. ``When he decided to study French, he wanted to speak French perfectly,'' said one of his professors, Guy Toubiana. ``It really bothered him if he was making a couple of mistakes.'' His intensity sometimes made him the butt of jokes, but somehow he remained a likable guy, perhaps because he maintained his sense of humor. And despite his military surroundings, he still had a sensitive side. ``He was very warm,'' Toubiana said. The 30-year-old spent his limited free time climbing mountains, running road races, and mountain biking. Perhaps he would be most proud that marine friends remember him as someone they could count on. John Bacon, who met Childers at The Citadel, said Childers would always show up to help lift a heavy sofa on moving day. ``He was a type of person that would never let you down,'' Bacon said. ``The world lost a great man.'' Marine Cpt Ryan Anthony Beaupre, St. Anne, IL: Cpt Ryan Beaupre, who was single, abandoned an accounting career to join the Marines in 1996. ``He always wanted to fly, but his parents wanted him to get a college degree first,'' said Bob Themer, a friend of the family's. Beaupre, who was from St. Anne, IL, and graduated from Illinois Wesleyan University, and worked in accounting for a year. ``Then he came home and told them he could do more as a marine,'' Themer said. Beaupre lived in an Encinitas apartment overlooking the sea, where he often surfed, said neighbor Ron Holdsworth. He remembers a comment the marine made after military helicopters flew by their building one day. ``At the time, we were in Afghanistan fighting, and he said, `The thing about being a marine is you know when your brother marines are fighting, you can't sit still. You want to go help them.' '' Navy Hospital Corpsman Michael Vann Johnson, Jr., Little Rock, AR: Navy corpsman Michael Vann Johnson, Jr., was killed Tuesday while tending to a marine wounded in battle in Iraq. He was hit in the head by shrapnel from a grenade and fatally injured, his sister, Janisa Hooks, told the Associated Press in Little Rock, AR, where Johnson was born and raised. Only 25 years old, Johnson was a hospital corpsman who had been assigned to travel with Camp Pendleton-based marines in Iraq. ``He provided medical care right up to the time he was killed,'' said Doug Sayers, spokesman for the San Diego Naval Medical Center, where Johnson had been stationed. Johnson had worked at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot since June 2001, helping oversee the health care of thousands of recruits, Sayers said. ``A big hole has been ripped in the soul of the clinic down there,'' Sayers said. Johnson's mother Jana Norfleet said she had recently received a letter from her son saying that he was going to be all right. She said he wrote that ``God had twisted a guardian angel around him.'' Marine Cpl Brian Matthew Kennedy, Houston, TX: ``He gave his life in an effort to contribute to the freedom of the Iraqi people,'' Mark Kennedy of Houston wrote in a statement about his 25-year-old son, Brian. ``We are so very proud of him and his service to his country.'' But sitting at home, staring at a photograph of his handsome, athletic son in his marine dress uniform, reminiscing about Brian's love of football and lacrosse, patriotism and pride seems overwhelmed by a father's pain. ``We just miss him terribly already,'' the father said. ``He was a wonderful man.'' Sgt Michael V. Lalush, 23, Troutville, VA: Sgt Michael Lalush-- pronounced LAW'-lish--was always busy trying to fix things, said Linda McMillan, a family friend who knew the sergeant from birth. He always had his hands in equipment, tinkering with lawnmowers and cars. As a teenager, he dragged home a pink 1965 Volkswagen Beetle, rebuilt and repainted it, and in no time was driving it around the neighborhood. Lalush moved to Virginia with his family in 1994 from Sunnyvale, CA, settling in a quiet house on a hilltop overlooking farmland about 20 miles north of Roanoke. A tall, gangly boy who eventually sprouted several inches above his parents, Lalush was anything but the stereo typically domineering military man, McMillan said. He was quieter, more sensitive, she said. He loved his sister Danielle and depended on his family. More than anything, Lalush wanted to be a pilot and he wanted to be a marine. After graduating from Lord Botetourt High School, Lalush left for boot camp at Parris Island in South Carolina. He was transferred to Camp Lejeune, NC, and then to Camp Pendleton. SSgt Donald C. May, Jr. Richmond, VA: SSgt Donald May, Jr., followed both parents into the Marine Corps and, just like his dad, became a tank commander. He disappeared in Iraq nearly a week ago and his mother learned Monday he had been killed. May and his crew were in the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, based at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, CA. He joined the Marine Corps the year he graduated from high school and spent 4 years in the military police, serving in the Middle East for the last few months of the first gulf war in 1991. He left for 2 years, serving in the Reserves, then ``got back in as a tank commander, just like his dad,'' his mother said. May's wife Deborah is 7\1/2\ months pregnant with a boy, due May 16. She went into premature labor Friday after learning that her husband was missing, but doctors were able to halt the delivery. Maj Kevin Nave, White Lake Township, MI: A veteran of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Maj Kevin Nave is the first Michigan native reported killed in the war with Iraq. He was from White Lake Township, about 20 miles north of Detroit, where he used to fish in the river behind his house. He and his wife Carrie lived at Camp Pendleton with their son Anthony, 6, and daughter, Maeve, who turned 5 Thursday. Nave graduated in 1985 from Waterford Kettering High School where he was on the school's varsity football and wrestling teams. He was a very positive type personality, a school leader and a good citizen,'' said Ronald Zeeman, dean of students and a math teacher during Nave's years there. ``The whole Waterford Kettering staff was proud of him. To have something like this happen, it really hits home.'' After high school, Nave went to the University of Michigan on a Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship. He graduated in 1989 with a degree in political science and attended marine officer's school immediately after college, said T.J. McCullough, a high school classmate and ex-marine. According to T.J. McCullough, a high school classmate and ex-marine, ``He was motivated, focused and driven, but one of the nicest, most easygoing guys you'd ever want to meet,'' said McCullough. ``I know he followed his dream. He was a career marine.'' Marine LCpl William W. White, NY: A shy and quiet 24-year-old with a sweet and charming smile, Marine LCpl William W. White had grand plans for his return from Iraq. He had tested to become a New York City firefighter, a job that would take him home to his native Brooklyn. White and his wife Mychaele 23, wanted to begin a family when they moved back east. Instead, the Camp Pendleton marine, whose father fought with the Army in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, was killed when his Humvee overturned into a canal and he drowned. Along with his wife, White leaves behind two younger brothers and his parents in Brooklyn. According to his mother-in-law, Debra Gentry, ``He was one of the sweetest, kindest guys. He always put himself last.'' SSgt Kendall Damon Waters-Bey, Baltimore, MD: A specialist in helicopter maintenance, Sgt Kendall Damon Waters-Bey was assigned to the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-268, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Waters-Bey was among four United States Marines and eight British soldiers killed when a CH-46 helicopter crashed Thursday in Kuwait, about 9 miles from the Iraqi border. He grew up in the rowhouse working-class neighborhood of northeast Baltimore, graduating from Northern High School where he excelled in swimming and track. At home, his sisters recalled, he excelled in jokes and cooking. ``He was always making faces, making people laugh,'' said his sister Michelle. The oldest of five children, 29-year-old Waters-Bey had been living in California with his wife of 11 months, Angela, who serves in the Navy. He also leaves behind a 10-year-old son from a previous marriage. Maj Jay Thomas Aubin, Waterville, ME: An 18-year marine veteran, 36- year-old Maj Thomas Aubin was an instructor with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 in Yuma, AZ, before deploying for war with the Camp Pendleton force. Aubin's hometown was Waterville, ME, where he was the first of 30 grandchildren in a family that has been in that State for generations. ``He was a very determined little boy,'' said his aunt, Kim Willette of Winslow, ME. ``He had big dreams. He always wanted to fly planes and knew he was going to, just like his dad--a private pilot. Jay would fall asleep in the back of the Cessna.'' ``There's no way to soften the blow, his aunt said. ``He prepared us for this all the time,'' she said. ``But that doesn't make it any easier.'' He is survived by his wife Rhonda and children Alicia, 10, and Nathan, 7. SSgt James Cawley, Layton, UT: SSgt James Cawley, was a marine reservist and Salt Lake City police detective, was killed in a fire fight in Iraq Saturday. ``He could have been anything but he chose to be a soldier and an officer because of his strong beliefs,'' his family wrote in a prepared statement distributed by the police department Sunday. Cawley leaves behind a wife, Miyuki, an 8-year-old son, Cecil, and a 6-year-old daughter, Keiko. He served for 12 years in the Marines, traveling around the world. He met his wife Miyuki in Okinawa, Japan, while serving there. He also served a proselytizing mission with the Mormon Church in Fukuoka, Japan. ``He knew that his life was not the end and that we will all be together again in a far greater place,'' the letter said. Detective Mark Schuman, Cawley's partner on the Salt Lake City force for 18 months and one of his closest friends, had just received a letter from Cawley a few days ago. At the time of his writing, Cawley was in Kuwait, awaiting further instructions. ``He was a loyal and trusting friend, and he was an outstanding officer,'' Schuman said. ``He was a very patriotic man, and he loved the Marine Corps, and he felt it was his duty to protect us and protect America.'' As our troops move rapidly towards Baghdad, I continue to hope for a quick resolution to this conflict. I hope that the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein will soon collapse and the Iraqi people will be liberated. And I hope all of this can be done with as few casualties as possible, Iraqi, American and allied, civilian and military. To those that have already fallen, we must never forget their sacrifice. They have given their future for that of our Nation--and we as a nation owe them and the others that have fallen our eternal gratitude.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, the amendment I offer today would restore fiscal year 2003 funding for the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, SCAAP, to the level of funding Congress provided in fiscal year 2002. Specifically, my amendment would provide an additional $315 million in supplemental funding to the SCAAP program, to bring the total fiscal year 2003 appropriations to the same amount that was appropriated in fiscal year 2002--$565 million. Most of my colleagues have had to deal with the question of illegal immigration. Just the sheer number of illegal immigrants in our country--estimates range from 9 to 11 million--suggests that Federal strategies to curb illegal immigration have failed. While only a relatively small percentage of the illegal immigrant population have committed crimes, nonetheless, even that small percentage represents a significant burden on State and local governments, which are forced to apprehend, prosecute, and incarcerate those who prey on our communities. Today most States are encountering their largest deficits in more than 60 years. Indeed, the fiscal consequences of illegal immigration have contributed to this challenge. In fiscal year 2002, for instance, States and counties incurred more than $13 billion in incarceration expenses. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to help shoulder the burden that its failures have created. The Federal Government alleviated some of that burden by providing $565 million to the States in fiscal year 2002. Increasingly, States and local counties are relying on SCAAP funding to help supplement their homeland security activities. Clearly, our local governments would spend the $13 billion they have spent incarcerating criminal aliens on other fiscal priorities, such as homeland security. The amendment I offer today would not only provide a more equitable level of funding to help reimburse States for the costs they incur for incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens, it would also help free up funds that State and local governments may need for their first responder activities. Without adequate funding, this fiscal burden will continue to fall on many of our local law enforcement agencies--including sheriffs, police officers on the beat, antigang violence units, and district attorneys offices. At a time when cash-strapped State and local governments are being asked to do even more to protect our homeland, we cannot afford to eliminate vital funding that already falls far short of what local governments spend to incarcerate undocumented criminal aliens. SCAAP payments have never matched the true costs to the States dealing with this problem, but they have nevertheless been critical additions to prison and jail budgets. They have also symbolized the Federal Government's obligation to pay for the results of its failed immigration strategies. Counties and sheriffs offices across the country, and not just those along the border, are very concerned because of the severe cuts in funding this year. I have received letters from county executives and sheriffs from Virginia, Wisconsin, New York, and other States who are facing critical cuts in their law enforcement budgets because of the anticipated shortfall in SCAAP funding. Those amounts will be cut drastically. I ask unanimous consent that I may submit for the record, a chart comparing the amount of SCAAP money States received in fiscal year 2002 to the amount they will receive with the fiscal year 2003 SCAAP allocation of $250 million. Our Nation is facing one of the most challenging periods in our Nation's history. And, we want, to the best extent possible, our constituents to feel secure in their homes and in their communities. At a time when the Nation is focused on enhancing security within our borders, our States, and our local communities, a vital program like SCAAP should not be vulnerable to being underfunded or eliminated altogether. The control of illegal immigration is a Federal obligation and we owe it to our States and local communities to provide them with the critical Federal assistance they need to continue doing their job. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Anti- Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003, comprehensive legislation aimed at preventing and punishing a terrorist attack at or through one of our nation's 361 seaports. I would like to thank Senator Kyl for joining me in sponsoring this bill. Currently, our seaports are the gaping hole in our nation's defense against terrorism. According to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, about 13 million containers, twenty-foot equivalent units, came into United States ports in 2002. However, the U.S. government inspected only about two or three percent of these containers--they rest were simply waved through. In addition, in almost every case, these inspections occurred after the containers arrive in the United States. The problem is that a single container could contain 60,000 pounds of explosives--10 to 15 times the amount in the Ryder truck used to blow up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City--and a single container ship can carry as many as 8,000 containers at one time. Containers could easily be exploited to detonate a bomb that would destroy a bridge, seaport, or other critical infrastructure, causing mass destruction and killing thousands. Worse, a suitcase-sized nuclear device or radiological ``dirty bomb'' could also be installed in a container and shipped to the United States. The odds are that the container would never be inspected. And, even if the container was inspected, it would be too late. The weapon would already be in the United States--most likely near a major population center. In addition, any attack on or through a seaport could have devastating economic consequences. Excluding trade with Mexico and Canada, America's ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Every year U.S. ports handle over 800 million tons of cargo valued at approximately $600 billion. The West Coast labor disruption last year cost the U.S. economy somewhere $1-2 billion a day--a total of $10-20 billion. A terrorist attack would have an ever graver impact. The U.S. would likely shut down all major U.S. ports, bringing thousands of factories to a standstill and leaving retailers with bare shelves within days. And this shut down will have a ripple effect around the globe, raising the cost exponentially. In its December 2002 report, the Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force discussed the implications of a possible terrorist attack at a seaport. Here is what they said: If an explosive device were loaded in a container and set off in a port, it would almost automatically raise concern about the integrity of the 21,000 containers that arrive in U.S. ports each day and the many thousands more that arrive by truck and rail across U.S. land borders. A three-to-four- week closure of U.S. ports would bring the global container industry to its knees. Megaports such as Rotterdam and Singapore would have to close their gates to prevent boxes from piling up on their limited pier space. Trucks, trains, and barges would be stranded outside the terminals with no way to unload their boxes. Boxes bound for the United States would have to be unloaded from their outbound ships. Service contracts would need to be renegotiated. As the system became gridlocked, so would much of global commerce. I am particularly concerned about such an attack because such an enormous proportion of U.S. foreign trade passes through my home state of California. Last year, 6.2 million imported containers--48 percent--passed through California, 5.7 million just through two ports alone: the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach. That means that, if terrorists succeeded in putting a weapon of mass destruction into a container undetected, there is about a one in two chance that this weapon would arrive and/or be detonated in Southern California. And the problem is not just with containers. Nearly one-quarter of all of California's imported crude oil is offloaded in one area. A suicide attack on a tanker at an offloading facility in this area could leave Southern California without refined fuels within a few days. There is no doubt in my mind that terrorists are seeking to exploit vulnerabilities at our seaports right now. Indeed, the Al Qaeda training manual specifically mentions seaports as a point of vulnerability in our security. In addition, we know that Al Qaeda has already tried to attack American interests at and through seaports in the past. Let me mention some examples. In October 2001, Italian authorities found an Egyptian man suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda in a container bound for Canada. He had false identifications, maps of airports, a computer, a satellite phone, cameras, and plenty of cash on hand. In October 2000, Al Qaeda operatives successfully carried out a deadly bombing attack against the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Yemen. In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Evidence suggests that the explosives the terrorists used were shipped to them by sea. And the investigation of the embassy bombings concluded that Bin Laden has close financial ties to various shipping companies. We cannot afford to be complacent. Terrorists can be very patient. We cannot forget the successful attack on the World Trade Center on September 11 took place eight years after a relatively unsuccessful attack on the same target. I introduced legislation in the last Congress to offer a comprehensive solution to the problem of seaport vulnerability. I am pleased that some of its provisions we adopted in some form by recent regulatory changes as well as the Maritime transportation Security Act of 2002 and Trade Act of 2002. For example, one provision in my bill required shippers to provide manifest information to Customs at least 24 hours before departure from a foreign port. Soon after the bill was introduced, Customs published a draft regulation with the same requirement. This requirement is now being enforced. However, Customs is still not getting all relevant information from every important party involved in the shipping process. In addition, I am pleased that, especially in the last six months, Customs has aggressively promoted its Container Security Initiative (CSI). One of the core elements of this initiative involves placing U.S. Customs inspectors at major foreign seaports to pre-screen cargo containers before they were shipped to America. Most of the biggest ports in the world are now participating in CSI. However, Customs has posted relatively few inspectors overseas and I believe that CSI can and should be expanded further. The Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 and Trade Act of 2002 also included a number of security measures. However, in my view, many of these measures do not go nearly far enough, particularly in the areas of criminal penalties, pushing back the border, minimum port and security standards, employee identification cards, research and development, and so on. And even the strongest provisions in these bills are, in some cases, years away from implementation. The bottom line is that, while we have made some modest improvements in seaport security in the last year, much more remains to be done. And, crucially, much remains to be done right now. In fact, I believe that our seaports remain almost as vulnerable today as they were before September 11. That is why I am introducing the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003. This legislation builds on improvements made to our laws in the last year but goes much further than those changes to ensure the security of our seaports. The Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003 does three main things: First, the bill ensure that our criminal laws apply to deter and punish terrorists who choose to strike against our seaports. The bill closes a number of loopholes in our criminal laws to ensure that terrorists are held accountable for any attacks. Let me provide a couple of examples. If a person blows up an airplane, he commits a crime. However, if he blows up a oil tanker, he does not commit a crime--unless he is doing it to injure the person. If a person distributes explosives to a non-U.S. national, he commits a crime. But if the same person sows mines in the San Francisco harbor, he does not commit a crime. Specifically, the bill would: Make it a crime for terrorists to attack a port or a cruise ship or deploy a weapon of mass destruction at or through a seaport. Make it a crime to put devices in U.S. waters that can destroy a ship or cargo or interfere with safe navigation or maritime commerce. Update our federal criminal piracy and privateering laws and increase penalties. Make it a crime to use a dangerous weapon or explosive to try to kill someone on board a passenger vessel. Make it a crime to fail to heave to (that is, to slow or stop) a vessel at the direction of a Coast Guard or other authorized federal law enforcement official seeking to board that vessel or to interfere with boarding by such an officer. Make it a crime to destroy an aid to maritime navigation, such as a buoy or shoal/breakwater light, maintained by the Coast Guard if this would endanger the safe navigation of a vessel. Make it a crime for terrorists or criminals to try to attack U.S. citizens or U.S. marine live by putting poisons in the water off shore. Require the Attorney General to issue regulations making it easier to determine the extent of crime and terrorism at seaports and improve communication between different law enforcement agencies involved at ports. Second, the bill would help improve physical security at seaports by beefing up standards and ensuring greater coordination. Specific provisions would: Designate the Captain-of-the-Port as the primary authority for seaport security at each port. This would enable all parties involved in business at a port to understand who has final say on all security matters. Require minimum federal security standards for ports. These standards include restrictions on private vehicle access, a prohibition on unauthorized guns and explosives, and unauthorized physical access to terminal areas. They would also mandate that terminal areas at ports have a secure perimeter, monitored or locked access points, sufficient lighting, and son on. Mandate that all Customs inspectors have personal radiation detection pagers. Require all port employees and contractors to have biometric smart identification cards. Require Captains-of-the-Port to keep sensitive information on the port secure and protected. Such information would include, but not be limited to maps, blueprints, and information on the Internet. Third, the bill would ensure that we devote our limited cargo inspection resources in the most efficient and effective manner. The bill would improve our shipment profiling system by requiring additional information from more relevant parties to the shipping process, and it would substantially improve container security. Specifically, it would establish a comprehensive risk profiling plan for the Customs Service to focus their limited inspection capabilities on high-risk cargo and containers. Under this plan, all relevant parties in the shipment process would provide electronically relevant and timely information to enable Customs to determine which shipments to inspect. Impose steep monetary sanctions for failure to comply with information filing requirements, including filing incorrect information (the current penalty is only up to a few thousand dollars). The Seaport Commission found that about \1/2\ of the information on ship manifests was inaccurate. Push U.S. security scrutiny beyond our nation's borders and improve our ability to monitor and inspect cargo and containers before they arrive near America's shores. If a weapon of mass destruction arrives in a U.S. port, it is too late. Require the use of high security seals on all containers coming into the U.S. Require that each container to be transported through U.S. ports receive a universal transaction number that could be used to track container movement from origin to destination. Require all empty containers destined for U.S. ports to be secured. Authorize pilot programs to develop high-tech seals and sensors, including those that would provide real-time evidence of container tampering to a monitor at a terminal. Require ports to provide space to Customs so that the agency is able to use non-intrusive inspection technology. In many cases, Customs has to keep this technology outside the port and bring it in every day, which prevents some of the best inspection technology (which is not portable) from being used. Require the Department of Homeland Security to take the relative number of imported containers received at each port into account in exercising its discretion in determining the allocation of funds appropriated for seaport security grants. I believe that the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003 would make a significant contribution to protecting America from terrorist attacks at or through our seaports. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation.; I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Privacy Act of 2003.'' This legislation would establish, for the first time, a comprehensive national system of privacy protection. It would: require companies to gain consumers' written consent prior to selling their most sensitive personal information including personal health information, financial information, Social Security numbers, and drivers' license data; and require companies to provide consumers' notice and an opportunity to refuse to allow their less sensitive personal information to be sold. Simply put, this legislation would give consumers more control over how their personal information is used. The personal information of today's consumer is too vulnerable to abuse. With access to sensitive data so widely available--often just at the touch of a keyboard--it is easy to understand why identity theft has become one of the country's fastest growing crimes. Recent statistics on the growth of identity theft suggest we have no time to waste in protecting personal privacy. Identity theft is the number one consumer complaint reported to the Federal Trade Commission. American consumers filed approximately 163,000 identity theft complaints with the FTC in 2002. Fully 43 percent of all the complaints the FTC receives are about identity theft. An estimated 700,000 cases of identity theft occur each year. The average victim spends an average of 175 hours over a two-year period clearing off an average of $17,000 fraud off their credit reports. My own State, California, has more victims than any other state. The FTC recorded 30,738 identity theft cases last year from California consumers alone. While modern technology has increased the threat to personal security and privacy, the protections for individual privacy have not kept pace. Our country's privacy laws form an incomplete and inconsistent patchwork. For example, Americans enjoy the highest level of privacy protection concerning the names of the movies they rent at a video store. But, at the same time, it is perfectly legal to sell another person's Social Security number over the Internet. The Privacy Act would establish a Federal privacy standard that adjusts the level of privacy protection according to the sensitivity of the information at issue. The legislation provides the highest level of protection for a person's most sensitive data--personal financial data, health data, driver's license information, and Social Security numbers. For this sensitive data, the bill gives the individual ultimate control over whether or not his or her information is shared. If an individual does not actively decide to permit sharing of personal data, the data is not disclosed. Specifically, this legislation tightens the privacy provisions of the Financial Services Modernization Act, commonly known as the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, a bank can share a customer's personal information with other companies so long as it gives consumers notice and the right to opt-out of the data sharing. The problem with opt-out is that most people toss out their privacy notices from banks along with the rest of the unrelenting pile of commercial solicitations they receive. Since the passage of Gramm- Leach-Bliley, banks have sent out over one billion privacy notices. According to available published information, fewer than 5 percent of bank customers have opted out of sharing their personal information, and for many financial institutions, the response rate has been less than one percent. It is not surprising that consumers do not respond overwhelmingly to these notices, since, by some estimates, the average American household received a dozen of these notices. A consumer should not have the burden of constantly monitoring how his or her most sensitive personal information is shared with other companies. Accordingly, the Privacy Act prohibits the sale or disclosure of sensitive personal financial information to third parties unless the consumer affirmatively consents or opts in. This legislation also toughens Federal financial privacy laws for affiliate sharing and joint marketing. An affiliate is a company that is linked by common ownership with another company. Under Federal law, a bank can share with affiliates or joint marketing partners regardless of whether the consumer wants this information shared. The Privacy Act of 2003 would require that banks give consumers the option of opting out of the sharing of their personal financial information with the bank's affiliates or joint partners. Some banks argue that affiliates are just branches of an organization, and a bank should for efficiency purposes be able to share data within the entire organization. In an era where a bank had one or two affiliates, that might be true. But, now, some companies are so big that if a customer has no control over affiliate sharing, then the customer is unable to prevent the disclosure of their data to hundreds of companies. For example, in recent testimony before Congress, U.S. PIRG reported that Citibank has 2,761 affiliates, Key Bank had 871 affiliates, and Bank of America has 1,576 affiliates. Similarly, a customer must be able to restrict a bank's sharing of personal information with its joint venture partners if the customer wants to maintain control over his personal information. I would also like to describe several other key components of the financial privacy section. The bill prohibits banks from denying a customer a financial product or financial service just because the customer chooses to not disclose his personal information to third parties, affiliates, or joint venture partners. However, the bill does allow banks to offer incentives to customers to encourage them to permit the sharing of their personal information. Additionally, the bill permits banks to disclose, but not sell, personal information to third parties for vital public interest purposes such as identifying or locating missing and abducted children, witnesses, criminals and fugitives, parents delinquent in child support payments, organ and bone marrow donors, pension fund beneficiaries, and missing heirs. Just as with financial data, personal health data deserves the most stringent privacy protections. The recently adopted Department of Health and Human Services privacy regulations set a basic opt-in framework for disclosure of health information. But more can be done to protect patient privacy. The regulations only prohibit ``covered entities''--namely health insurers, health providers, and health care clearinghouses--from selling a patient's health information without that patient's prior consent. Meanwhile, non-covered entities such as business associates, health researchers, schools or universities, and life insurers are not subject to this opt-in requirement, except through contractual arrangements. This legislation would preserve the privacy of health information wherever the information is sold. Any business associate, life insurer, school or non-covered entity trying to sell or market protected health information would, like covered entities, have to get the patient's prior consent. Drivers' license data also is given the strongest level of protection under this bill. With its recent amendments, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, DPPA, offers some meaningful protections for drivers privacy. For example, under the DPPA, a State Department of Motor Vehicles must obtain the prior consent, Opt-in, of the driver before ``highly sensitive information''--defined as the driver's photograph, image, Social Security number, medical or disability information--can be disclosed to a third party. However, loopholes remain. Other sensitive information found on a driver's license deserves equal protection. The Privacy Act would expand the definition of ``highly sensitive information'' to include a physical copy of a driver's license, the driver identification number, birth date, information on the driver's physical characteristics and any biometric identifiers, such as a fingerprint, that are found on the driver's license. Thus, this bill would ensure consumers have control over how their motor vehicle records and driver's license data are used. I would like to take a moment to highlight the Social Security number section of the privacy bill, which reflects over four years of negotiation with Senator Hatch, Senator Gregg, Senator Grassley, Senator Baucus, and other Senate colleagues. I have also introduced this section as a stand-alone bill, Senate bill 228. It is crucial to protect Social Security numbers because the numbers are the key to a person's identity. Many identity theft cases start with the theft of a Social Security number. Once a thief has access to a victim's Social Security number, it is only a short step to acquiring credit cards, driver's licenses, or other crucial identification documents. Not surprisingly, members of the public have flooded our Federal agencies with pleas for assistance. Reports to the Social Security Administration of Social Security number misuse have increased from 7,868 in 1997 to 73,000 in 2002--an astonishing increase of over 800%. The Feinstein/Gregg compromise bars the sale or display of Social Security numbers to the public except in a very narrow set of circumstances. Display or sale is permitted if the Social Security number holder consents or if there are compelling public safety needs. Government entities will have to redact Social Security numbers from electronic records that are readily available to the public on the Internet. Moreover, State governments will no longer be permitted to use the Social Security number as the default driver's license number. The legislation, however, recognizes that some industries rely on Social Security numbers to exchange information between databases and complete identification verification necessary for certain transactions. Thus, the bill directs the Attorney General to develop regulations allowing for the sale or purchase of Social Security Numbers to facilitate business-to-business and business-to-government transactions so long as businesses put appropriate safeguards in place and do not permit public access to the number. Recognizing that not all personal information merits the same restrictions, the bill permits businesses to collect and sell nonsensitive personal information, e.g., name, phone number, address, to third parties so long as they give customers notice and the opportunity to opt-out of the sale. The opt-out standard for non-sensitive information means that if a person fills out a warranty card, signs up for a computer service, or submits an entry for a sweepstakes, the business must notify him before it sells his personal information to other businesses or marketers. This framework guarantees basic privacy protections for consumers without unduly impacting commerce. To further minimize the regulatory burden of these privacy rules, the bill sets up a safe harbor so that industries and industry-sponsored seal programs which have already adopted Notice-and-Opt Out information policies, will be exempt from the regulatory requirements of the legislation. To ensure uniformity of the laws across all 50 states, the bill preempts inconsistent state laws regarding the treatment of non- sensitive information. A jumbled patchwork of State privacy laws helps neither businesses nor consumers. Consumers will have confused expectations about what information is protected. Another distinguishing characteristic of the Privacy Act of 2003 is that it protects the privacy of information regardless of the medium through which it is collected. Other privacy proposals have tried to confine privacy legislation to the Internet. These proposals unfairly discriminate against high technology users. Put simply, companies and other entities can misuse personal information from off-line sources just as easily as with on-line sources. For example, telemarketers who besiege consumers with phone calls during the dinner hour do not typically get customer information from the Internet. Much of the identifying information used to make these calls comes from consumers filling out and mailing back warranty and registration cards. Regardless of how information is collected, it should get equal protection. This legislation codifies steps Congress can take to protect citizens from identity thieves and other predators of personal information. It restores to an individual more control over his or her most sensitive personal information such as Social Security numbers, health information, and financial information. It also sets reasonable guidelines for businesses that handle our personal information every day. A byproduct of our information economy--personal information is much more vulnerable to exploitation than ever before. Every American has a fundamental right to privacy, no matter how fast our technology grows or changes. A person should be able to have control over how their most sensitive personal information is used. But our right to privacy only will remain vital, if we take strong action to protect it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact the Privacy Act of 2003.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Privacy Act of 2003.'' This legislation would establish, for the first time, a comprehensive national system of privacy protection. It would: require companies to gain consumers' written consent prior to selling their most sensitive personal information including personal health information, financial information, Social Security numbers, and drivers' license data; and require companies to provide consumers' notice and an opportunity to refuse to allow their less sensitive personal information to be sold. Simply put, this legislation would give consumers more control over how their personal information is used. The personal information of today's consumer is too vulnerable to abuse. With access to sensitive data so widely available--often just at the touch of a keyboard--it is easy to understand why identity theft has become one of the country's fastest growing crimes. Recent statistics on the growth of identity theft suggest we have no time to waste in protecting personal privacy. Identity theft is the number one consumer complaint reported to the Federal Trade Commission. American consumers filed approximately 163,000 identity theft complaints with the FTC in 2002. Fully 43 percent of all the complaints the FTC receives are about identity theft. An estimated 700,000 cases of identity theft occur each year. The average victim spends an average of 175 hours over a two-year period clearing off an average of $17,000 fraud off their credit reports. My own State, California, has more victims than any other state. The FTC recorded 30,738 identity theft cases last year from California consumers alone. While modern technology has increased the threat to personal security and privacy, the protections for individual privacy have not kept pace. Our country's privacy laws form an incomplete and inconsistent patchwork. For example, Americans enjoy the highest level of privacy protection concerning the names of the movies they rent at a video store. But, at the same time, it is perfectly legal to sell another person's Social Security number over the Internet. The Privacy Act would establish a Federal privacy standard that adjusts the level of privacy protection according to the sensitivity of the information at issue. The legislation provides the highest level of protection for a person's most sensitive data--personal financial data, health data, driver's license information, and Social Security numbers. For this sensitive data, the bill gives the individual ultimate control over whether or not his or her information is shared. If an individual does not actively decide to permit sharing of personal data, the data is not disclosed. Specifically, this legislation tightens the privacy provisions of the Financial Services Modernization Act, commonly known as the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, a bank can share a customer's personal information with other companies so long as it gives consumers notice and the right to opt-out of the data sharing. The problem with opt-out is that most people toss out their privacy notices from banks along with the rest of the unrelenting pile of commercial solicitations they receive. Since the passage of Gramm- Leach-Bliley, banks have sent out over one billion privacy notices. According to available published information, fewer than 5 percent of bank customers have opted out of sharing their personal information, and for many financial institutions, the response rate has been less than one percent. It is not surprising that consumers do not respond overwhelmingly to these notices, since, by some estimates, the average American household received a dozen of these notices. A consumer should not have the burden of constantly monitoring how his or her most sensitive personal information is shared with other companies. Accordingly, the Privacy Act prohibits the sale or disclosure of sensitive personal financial information to third parties unless the consumer affirmatively consents or opts in. This legislation also toughens Federal financial privacy laws for affiliate sharing and joint marketing. An affiliate is a company that is linked by common ownership with another company. Under Federal law, a bank can share with affiliates or joint marketing partners regardless of whether the consumer wants this information shared. The Privacy Act of 2003 would require that banks give consumers the option of opting out of the sharing of their personal financial information with the bank's affiliates or joint partners. Some banks argue that affiliates are just branches of an organization, and a bank should for efficiency purposes be able to share data within the entire organization. In an era where a bank had one or two affiliates, that might be true. But, now, some companies are so big that if a customer has no control over affiliate sharing, then the customer is unable to prevent the disclosure of their data to hundreds of companies. For example, in recent testimony before Congress, U.S. PIRG reported that Citibank has 2,761 affiliates, Key Bank had 871 affiliates, and Bank of America has 1,576 affiliates. Similarly, a customer must be able to restrict a bank's sharing of personal information with its joint venture partners if the customer wants to maintain control over his personal information. I would also like to describe several other key components of the financial privacy section. The bill prohibits banks from denying a customer a financial product or financial service just because the customer chooses to not disclose his personal information to third parties, affiliates, or joint venture partners. However, the bill does allow banks to offer incentives to customers to encourage them to permit the sharing of their personal information. Additionally, the bill permits banks to disclose, but not sell, personal information to third parties for vital public interest purposes such as identifying or locating missing and abducted children, witnesses, criminals and fugitives, parents delinquent in child support payments, organ and bone marrow donors, pension fund beneficiaries, and missing heirs. Just as with financial data, personal health data deserves the most stringent privacy protections. The recently adopted Department of Health and Human Services privacy regulations set a basic opt-in framework for disclosure of health information. But more can be done to protect patient privacy. The regulations only prohibit ``covered entities''--namely health insurers, health providers, and health care clearinghouses--from selling a patient's health information without that patient's prior consent. Meanwhile, non-covered entities such as business associates, health researchers, schools or universities, and life insurers are not subject to this opt-in requirement, except through contractual arrangements. This legislation would preserve the privacy of health information wherever the information is sold. Any business associate, life insurer, school or non-covered entity trying to sell or market protected health information would, like covered entities, have to get the patient's prior consent. Drivers' license data also is given the strongest level of protection under this bill. With its recent amendments, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, DPPA, offers some meaningful protections for drivers privacy. For example, under the DPPA, a State Department of Motor Vehicles must obtain the prior consent, Opt-in, of the driver before ``highly sensitive information''--defined as the driver's photograph, image, Social Security number, medical or disability information--can be disclosed to a third party. However, loopholes remain. Other sensitive information found on a driver's license deserves equal protection. The Privacy Act would expand the definition of ``highly sensitive information'' to include a physical copy of a driver's license, the driver identification number, birth date, information on the driver's physical characteristics and any biometric identifiers, such as a fingerprint, that are found on the driver's license. Thus, this bill would ensure consumers have control over how their motor vehicle records and driver's license data are used. I would like to take a moment to highlight the Social Security number section of the privacy bill, which reflects over four years of negotiation with Senator Hatch, Senator Gregg, Senator Grassley, Senator Baucus, and other Senate colleagues. I have also introduced this section as a stand-alone bill, Senate bill 228. It is crucial to protect Social Security numbers because the numbers are the key to a person's identity. Many identity theft cases start with the theft of a Social Security number. Once a thief has access to a victim's Social Security number, it is only a short step to acquiring credit cards, driver's licenses, or other crucial identification documents. Not surprisingly, members of the public have flooded our Federal agencies with pleas for assistance. Reports to the Social Security Administration of Social Security number misuse have increased from 7,868 in 1997 to 73,000 in 2002--an astonishing increase of over 800%. The Feinstein/Gregg compromise bars the sale or display of Social Security numbers to the public except in a very narrow set of circumstances. Display or sale is permitted if the Social Security number holder consents or if there are compelling public safety needs. Government entities will have to redact Social Security numbers from electronic records that are readily available to the public on the Internet. Moreover, State governments will no longer be permitted to use the Social Security number as the default driver's license number. The legislation, however, recognizes that some industries rely on Social Security numbers to exchange information between databases and complete identification verification necessary for certain transactions. Thus, the bill directs the Attorney General to develop regulations allowing for the sale or purchase of Social Security Numbers to facilitate business-to-business and business-to-government transactions so long as businesses put appropriate safeguards in place and do not permit public access to the number. Recognizing that not all personal information merits the same restrictions, the bill permits businesses to collect and sell nonsensitive personal information, e.g., name, phone number, address, to third parties so long as they give customers notice and the opportunity to opt-out of the sale. The opt-out standard for non-sensitive information means that if a person fills out a warranty card, signs up for a computer service, or submits an entry for a sweepstakes, the business must notify him before it sells his personal information to other businesses or marketers. This framework guarantees basic privacy protections for consumers without unduly impacting commerce. To further minimize the regulatory burden of these privacy rules, the bill sets up a safe harbor so that industries and industry-sponsored seal programs which have already adopted Notice-and-Opt Out information policies, will be exempt from the regulatory requirements of the legislation. To ensure uniformity of the laws across all 50 states, the bill preempts inconsistent state laws regarding the treatment of non- sensitive information. A jumbled patchwork of State privacy laws helps neither businesses nor consumers. Consumers will have confused expectations about what information is protected. Another distinguishing characteristic of the Privacy Act of 2003 is that it protects the privacy of information regardless of the medium through which it is collected. Other privacy proposals have tried to confine privacy legislation to the Internet. These proposals unfairly discriminate against high technology users. Put simply, companies and other entities can misuse personal information from off-line sources just as easily as with on-line sources. For example, telemarketers who besiege consumers with phone calls during the dinner hour do not typically get customer information from the Internet. Much of the identifying information used to make these calls comes from consumers filling out and mailing back warranty and registration cards. Regardless of how information is collected, it should get equal protection. This legislation codifies steps Congress can take to protect citizens from identity thieves and other predators of personal information. It restores to an individual more control over his or her most sensitive personal information such as Social Security numbers, health information, and financial information. It also sets reasonable guidelines for businesses that handle our personal information every day. A byproduct of our information economy--personal information is much more vulnerable to exploitation than ever before. Every American has a fundamental right to privacy, no matter how fast our technology grows or changes. A person should be able to have control over how their most sensitive personal information is used. But our right to privacy only will remain vital, if we take strong action to protect it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact the Privacy Act of 2003.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Anti- Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003, comprehensive legislation aimed at preventing and punishing a terrorist attack at or through one of our nation's 361 seaports. I would like to thank Senator Kyl for joining me in sponsoring this bill. Currently, our seaports are the gaping hole in our nation's defense against terrorism. According to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, about 13 million containers, twenty-foot equivalent units, came into United States ports in 2002. However, the U.S. government inspected only about two or three percent of these containers--they rest were simply waved through. In addition, in almost every case, these inspections occurred after the containers arrive in the United States. The problem is that a single container could contain 60,000 pounds of explosives--10 to 15 times the amount in the Ryder truck used to blow up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City--and a single container ship can carry as many as 8,000 containers at one time. Containers could easily be exploited to detonate a bomb that would destroy a bridge, seaport, or other critical infrastructure, causing mass destruction and killing thousands. Worse, a suitcase-sized nuclear device or radiological ``dirty bomb'' could also be installed in a container and shipped to the United States. The odds are that the container would never be inspected. And, even if the container was inspected, it would be too late. The weapon would already be in the United States--most likely near a major population center. In addition, any attack on or through a seaport could have devastating economic consequences. Excluding trade with Mexico and Canada, America's ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Every year U.S. ports handle over 800 million tons of cargo valued at approximately $600 billion. The West Coast labor disruption last year cost the U.S. economy somewhere $1-2 billion a day--a total of $10-20 billion. A terrorist attack would have an ever graver impact. The U.S. would likely shut down all major U.S. ports, bringing thousands of factories to a standstill and leaving retailers with bare shelves within days. And this shut down will have a ripple effect around the globe, raising the cost exponentially. In its December 2002 report, the Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force discussed the implications of a possible terrorist attack at a seaport. Here is what they said: If an explosive device were loaded in a container and set off in a port, it would almost automatically raise concern about the integrity of the 21,000 containers that arrive in U.S. ports each day and the many thousands more that arrive by truck and rail across U.S. land borders. A three-to-four- week closure of U.S. ports would bring the global container industry to its knees. Megaports such as Rotterdam and Singapore would have to close their gates to prevent boxes from piling up on their limited pier space. Trucks, trains, and barges would be stranded outside the terminals with no way to unload their boxes. Boxes bound for the United States would have to be unloaded from their outbound ships. Service contracts would need to be renegotiated. As the system became gridlocked, so would much of global commerce. I am particularly concerned about such an attack because such an enormous proportion of U.S. foreign trade passes through my home state of California. Last year, 6.2 million imported containers--48 percent--passed through California, 5.7 million just through two ports alone: the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach. That means that, if terrorists succeeded in putting a weapon of mass destruction into a container undetected, there is about a one in two chance that this weapon would arrive and/or be detonated in Southern California. And the problem is not just with containers. Nearly one-quarter of all of California's imported crude oil is offloaded in one area. A suicide attack on a tanker at an offloading facility in this area could leave Southern California without refined fuels within a few days. There is no doubt in my mind that terrorists are seeking to exploit vulnerabilities at our seaports right now. Indeed, the Al Qaeda training manual specifically mentions seaports as a point of vulnerability in our security. In addition, we know that Al Qaeda has already tried to attack American interests at and through seaports in the past. Let me mention some examples. In October 2001, Italian authorities found an Egyptian man suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda in a container bound for Canada. He had false identifications, maps of airports, a computer, a satellite phone, cameras, and plenty of cash on hand. In October 2000, Al Qaeda operatives successfully carried out a deadly bombing attack against the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Yemen. In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Evidence suggests that the explosives the terrorists used were shipped to them by sea. And the investigation of the embassy bombings concluded that Bin Laden has close financial ties to various shipping companies. We cannot afford to be complacent. Terrorists can be very patient. We cannot forget the successful attack on the World Trade Center on September 11 took place eight years after a relatively unsuccessful attack on the same target. I introduced legislation in the last Congress to offer a comprehensive solution to the problem of seaport vulnerability. I am pleased that some of its provisions we adopted in some form by recent regulatory changes as well as the Maritime transportation Security Act of 2002 and Trade Act of 2002. For example, one provision in my bill required shippers to provide manifest information to Customs at least 24 hours before departure from a foreign port. Soon after the bill was introduced, Customs published a draft regulation with the same requirement. This requirement is now being enforced. However, Customs is still not getting all relevant information from every important party involved in the shipping process. In addition, I am pleased that, especially in the last six months, Customs has aggressively promoted its Container Security Initiative (CSI). One of the core elements of this initiative involves placing U.S. Customs inspectors at major foreign seaports to pre-screen cargo containers before they were shipped to America. Most of the biggest ports in the world are now participating in CSI. However, Customs has posted relatively few inspectors overseas and I believe that CSI can and should be expanded further. The Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 and Trade Act of 2002 also included a number of security measures. However, in my view, many of these measures do not go nearly far enough, particularly in the areas of criminal penalties, pushing back the border, minimum port and security standards, employee identification cards, research and development, and so on. And even the strongest provisions in these bills are, in some cases, years away from implementation. The bottom line is that, while we have made some modest improvements in seaport security in the last year, much more remains to be done. And, crucially, much remains to be done right now. In fact, I believe that our seaports remain almost as vulnerable today as they were before September 11. That is why I am introducing the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003. This legislation builds on improvements made to our laws in the last year but goes much further than those changes to ensure the security of our seaports. The Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003 does three main things: First, the bill ensure that our criminal laws apply to deter and punish terrorists who choose to strike against our seaports. The bill closes a number of loopholes in our criminal laws to ensure that terrorists are held accountable for any attacks. Let me provide a couple of examples. If a person blows up an airplane, he commits a crime. However, if he blows up a oil tanker, he does not commit a crime--unless he is doing it to injure the person. If a person distributes explosives to a non-U.S. national, he commits a crime. But if the same person sows mines in the San Francisco harbor, he does not commit a crime. Specifically, the bill would: Make it a crime for terrorists to attack a port or a cruise ship or deploy a weapon of mass destruction at or through a seaport. Make it a crime to put devices in U.S. waters that can destroy a ship or cargo or interfere with safe navigation or maritime commerce. Update our federal criminal piracy and privateering laws and increase penalties. Make it a crime to use a dangerous weapon or explosive to try to kill someone on board a passenger vessel. Make it a crime to fail to heave to (that is, to slow or stop) a vessel at the direction of a Coast Guard or other authorized federal law enforcement official seeking to board that vessel or to interfere with boarding by such an officer. Make it a crime to destroy an aid to maritime navigation, such as a buoy or shoal/breakwater light, maintained by the Coast Guard if this would endanger the safe navigation of a vessel. Make it a crime for terrorists or criminals to try to attack U.S. citizens or U.S. marine live by putting poisons in the water off shore. Require the Attorney General to issue regulations making it easier to determine the extent of crime and terrorism at seaports and improve communication between different law enforcement agencies involved at ports. Second, the bill would help improve physical security at seaports by beefing up standards and ensuring greater coordination. Specific provisions would: Designate the Captain-of-the-Port as the primary authority for seaport security at each port. This would enable all parties involved in business at a port to understand who has final say on all security matters. Require minimum federal security standards for ports. These standards include restrictions on private vehicle access, a prohibition on unauthorized guns and explosives, and unauthorized physical access to terminal areas. They would also mandate that terminal areas at ports have a secure perimeter, monitored or locked access points, sufficient lighting, and son on. Mandate that all Customs inspectors have personal radiation detection pagers. Require all port employees and contractors to have biometric smart identification cards. Require Captains-of-the-Port to keep sensitive information on the port secure and protected. Such information would include, but not be limited to maps, blueprints, and information on the Internet. Third, the bill would ensure that we devote our limited cargo inspection resources in the most efficient and effective manner. The bill would improve our shipment profiling system by requiring additional information from more relevant parties to the shipping process, and it would substantially improve container security. Specifically, it would establish a comprehensive risk profiling plan for the Customs Service to focus their limited inspection capabilities on high-risk cargo and containers. Under this plan, all relevant parties in the shipment process would provide electronically relevant and timely information to enable Customs to determine which shipments to inspect. Impose steep monetary sanctions for failure to comply with information filing requirements, including filing incorrect information (the current penalty is only up to a few thousand dollars). The Seaport Commission found that about \1/2\ of the information on ship manifests was inaccurate. Push U.S. security scrutiny beyond our nation's borders and improve our ability to monitor and inspect cargo and containers before they arrive near America's shores. If a weapon of mass destruction arrives in a U.S. port, it is too late. Require the use of high security seals on all containers coming into the U.S. Require that each container to be transported through U.S. ports receive a universal transaction number that could be used to track container movement from origin to destination. Require all empty containers destined for U.S. ports to be secured. Authorize pilot programs to develop high-tech seals and sensors, including those that would provide real-time evidence of container tampering to a monitor at a terminal. Require ports to provide space to Customs so that the agency is able to use non-intrusive inspection technology. In many cases, Customs has to keep this technology outside the port and bring it in every day, which prevents some of the best inspection technology (which is not portable) from being used. Require the Department of Homeland Security to take the relative number of imported containers received at each port into account in exercising its discretion in determining the allocation of funds appropriated for seaport security grants. I believe that the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003 would make a significant contribution to protecting America from terrorist attacks at or through our seaports. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation.; I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act, S. 351. Whether we are at war, as is currently the case, or at peace, members of the armed services should not be treated unfairly by the Tax Code as a result of their decision to serve our county. Inequities in the Tax Code that disadvantage men and women in uniform not only make it harder for them to support their families and themselves, but also threaten our own security by making it harder for the armed services to recruit talented service men and women. We have a responsibility to eliminate any disincentives to serving in the United States military, and this bill does much to fulfill that goal. The two most important provisions in this bill are relaxed rules on the treatment of capital gains on the sale of a home by military personnel, and an above-the-line deduction on travel expenses for members of the National Guard and Reserve. Anyone who has ever served in the military or grown up in a military family knows that frequent travel is a way of life for those in uniform. A U.S. Marine might spend a year or two at Camp Pendleton, in my home State of California, then transfer to Quantico, and finally end up at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Under current law, that Marine might not qualify for the home sale capital gains exclusion available to most homeowners, due to his or her frequent postings to different bases, or to combat duty abroad. This bill corrects that inequity, and makes it easier for all military personnel to sell their home tax free. National Guard and Reserve members would also benefit under the bill from an above-the-line deduction for travel expenses up to $1,500. This puts those who serve on the National Guard and Reserve on equal footing with those who travel on company business and do not pay for those expenses out of after-tax income. No one who chooses to serve in the Guard or Reserve should have to pay for a plane ticket or hotel room out of their after-tax income in order to join their unit when called up for duty. This bill also contains a number of smaller, but no less important, provisions designed to ease the tax burden on military personnel, such as the treatment of service academy appointments as scholarships when personnel apply to tuition programs and Coverdell Education Savings Accounts. I wish we could do more in the Senate to keep our soldiers, pilots, and sailors out of harm's way during the current conflict in Iraq. I wish we could pass a bill that guarantees that each and every one of them returns home safely to their husbands, wives, children, and parents. We cannot do that. But by passing this bill we can improve their financial security and make it easier for them to continue to serve and to protect our country. I urge my colleagues to support the Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the 24 young American men who have died in the conflict in Iraq. I would like to pay particular tribute, however, to the six men from my home State of California, and to talk briefly about each of them. To date, the young men of California account for one-fourth of all the Americans that have made the ultimate sacrifice. To date, nearly 120,000 men and women now stationed in the Middle East, many of them in harm's way, are either from California or were stationed there before being deployed. It is often said that California receives too much from the Federal Government--too much of the appropriations pie. But when you consider our population is 35 million and you remember that, on average, Californians pay more in federal taxes than they receive in Federal programs, this is simply not the case. And Californians are playing a very prominent role in liberating the Iraqi people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Of the six Californians that have died so far, two were not yet citizens, while one was a direct descendant of the second and sixth Presidents of the United States. Together, they embody the depth and breadth of America's armed forces men and women from all walks of life, willing to give their lives to defend our freedoms. The first four I would like to honor--Corporals Jorge Gonzalez, Randal Kent Rosaker, and Jorge Garibay, and SGT Michael Bitz--were killed on March 23, in heavy fighting outside the town of An Nasiriya. Two were fathers with infant children that they never met, a third a son who followed his father into the military. Twenty year-old Cpl Jorge Gonzalez was part of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. He grew up in Rialto, with his parents, Rosa and Mario, and five siblings. He was an avid soccer player, and a graduate of El Monte High School. His last visit home was at Christmas. There, his younger sister Nancy, who was never affectionate with her brother, hugged and kissed him before he left. ``I knew I had to do that,'' she said. He also left behind his wife Jazty and their 3-week-old baby boy, Alonso, who he never knew. He had hoped to retire from the Marines in a year and become a policeman. Before leaving he told his anxious mother,: ``Don't worry, mom. If I die a Marine, I'll die honored.'' Marine Sgt Michael Bitz, a part of the 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, was just 31 years old. He grew up in Port Hueneme. He loved being a Marine so much, he reenlisted last fall. He loved his wife Janina so much that they had just renewed their vows. When he left for the gulf, they were expecting twins, Caleb and Taylor, who are now a month old. They also have a 2-year-old son, Joshua, and a 7 year- old son, Christian, from an earlier marriage. In his last phone call to his mother, Donna, Sargeant Bitz was able to tell her that he loved her--and in his last letter he said that he was her warrior. In classic Marine-style, she always called her ``ma'am.'' Cpl Randal Kent Rosacker was also a member of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. He was a rough-and-tumble athlete who loved the outdoors and ever since he was a boy he knew he wanted to follow his father, Rod, into the military. Cpl Rosacker grew up in San Diego, the son of a Navy man. He played football, baseball and wrestled for the Serra High School Conquistadors. His wrestling coach, Steve Stone, recalled when Randal broke his hand senior year, just before an important game. ``Well, we heard some thudding on the wall in the lockeroom,'' he said. ``We walk in, and Randy had broken off his cast. He said: 'Coach, tape it up. I'm ready to go.''' His former baseball coach, Chris Herrin, said that Rosacker's teammates could always count on him. ``He was the kind of guy who you would want fighting for your country,'' Herrin said. His grandmother, Patricia, said her grandson died doing something he loved--serving America. ``He believed in what he was doing,'' she said. He was just 21 years old. Born in Jalisco, Mexico, Cpl Jorge Garibay played football at Newport Harbor High School, in Costa Mesa. He, too, was just 21 years old. One of his teachers, Janis Toman, described him as a hard worker who frequently returned to the high school campus in full uniform, to encourage students to do their best. Ms. Toman received a letter from Cpl Garibay just a few hours before learning of his death, as she packed him a care package. ``He wrote of simple things that we take for granted but make soldiers happy,'' she said. ``Things like moving from a small tent to a bigger one.'' ``I want to defend the country I plan to become a citizen of,'' he wrote to her. He also left a tape recording before his deployment for his beloved Uncle Urbano, whom he regarded as a surrogate father. In the tape he said: ``I'm being called to represent and serve my country. I don't know if I'll return, and I want you to know that I love you and how much I appreciate the support and love you have given me over the years.'' LCpl Jose Gutierrez was the first American killed in combat. He was struck by enemy fire while fighting alongside fellow Marines near the southern Iraqi port city of Umm al Qasr. He was 22 years old. LCpl Gutierrez arrived in the United States when he was a 16 year old orphan, having left poverty-stricken circumstances in Guatemala City and a country racked by a brutal civil war. He traveled over 2,000 miles by foot, north through Mexico, in search of a better life here in the United States. Like so many immigrants, his past was soon eclipsed by his new life as an American. He was taken in by the Mosquera family, of Lomita, CA. Nora and Max Mosquera had begun helping immigrant foster children when their own children had grown. ``He joined the Marines to pay back a little of what he'd gotten from the U.S.,'' Max Mosquera said. ``For him it was a question of honor.'' A tall and quiet young man who enjoyed soccer and chess, Jose learned English quickly and had plans to study architecture. ``He was such a good kid,'' remembered Robert Nobles, a physical education teacher at North High in Torrance, where Corporal Gutierrez graduated in 2000. I have been told that news of his death has resonated throughout Guatemala. Every major newspaper, radio and TV station carried his story. He has been portrayed as a brave and selfless young man--which he most certainly was. Navy LT Thomas Mullen Adams grew up in comfort, in the suburb of La Mesa, as a member of a family that traces its roots directly to John Adams, one of America's most important Founding Fathers. He graduated from Grossmont High School in 1993 and the United States Naval Academy in 1997. He received flight training in Pensacola, FL, and inherited his love of flying from his father, John, an architect who helped design the aerospace museum in San Diego. Promoted to lieutenant in the year 2000, Adams won two National Defense Service Medals, three sea service deployment ribbons, and other awards. ``He's one of these amazingly clean-cut, all-American kids,'' his aunt, Elizabeth Hansen, told the San Diego Union Tribune Newspaper. ``He's the kind of kid that if you had a very special daughter, you would hope that she would snag him. He was just amazingly bright, funny, and kind.'' In October 2002, Lieutenant Adams was assigned as an exchange officer with the British Royal Navy's 849th Squadron, now on the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. An avid soccer fan who had volunteered to go to Japan with the carrier Kitty Hawk in time for the World Cup finals last summer, he joined a local team near his base in Helston, England. Lieutenant Adams's family said he particularly enjoyed his time with the Royal Navy for two reasons: Every ship had a pub onboard, and he was allowed a weekly 20-minute phone call home. He died with the Royal Navy when the helicopter he was flying collided with another helicopter over the Persian Gulf. He was just 27 years old. Mr. President, we all wish for a quick resolution of this war to limit casualties, military and civilian, American, allied, and Iraqi. We wish that American and coalition forces will be able to liberate the people of Iraq soon, and that our men and women will be able to return home to their families. Until then, however, they remain in our thoughts and our prayers, along with those who have already fallen. All Americans owe an enormous, an almost incalculable debt to these young men who were willing to sacrifice their own futures for the future of this country they so dearly loved so that we, as a people, might be safe and free. Their sacrifices must never be forgotten. I thank the Chair.