Dianne Feinstein

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Kennedy, Brownback, and Kyl in introducing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001. We submit this legislation with 16 sponsors. This legislation represents a consensus, drawing upon the strengths of both the Visa entry Reform Act of 2001, which I introduced with my colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, and the Enhanced border Security Act of 2001, which Senators Kennedy and Brownback introduced. I believe the legislation we are introducing today will garner widespread support from our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. September 11 clearly pointed out the shortcomings of the immigration and visa system. For example: All 19 terrorist hijackers entered the U.S. legally with valid visas. Three of the hijackers had remained in the U.S. after their visas had expired. One entered on a foreign student visa. Another, Mohammed Atta had filed an application to change status to M-1, which was granted in July. However, Mr. Atta sought admission and was admitted to the United States based on his then current B-1 visitor visa. Most people don't realize how many people come into our country; how little we know about them; and whether they leave when required. Consider the following: The Visa Waiver Program: 23 million people from 29 different countries; no visas; little scrutiny; no knowledge where they go in the U.S. or whether they leave once their visas expire. The INS estimates that over 100,000 blank passports have been stolen from government offices in participating countries in recent years. Abuse of the VISA Waiver Program poses threats to U.S. national security and increases illegal immigration. For example, one of the co- conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 deliberately chose to use a fraudulent Swedish passport to attempt entry into the U.S. because of Sweden's participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Foreign Student Visa Program: more than 500,000 foreign nationals entering each year; within the last 10 years, 16,000 came from such terrorist supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Syria. The foreign student visa system is one of the most under-regulated systems we have today. We've seen bribes, bureaucracy, and other problems with this system that leave it wide open to abuse by terrorists and other criminals. For example, in the early 1990s, five officials at four California colleges, were convicted of taking bribes, providing counterfeit education documents, and fraudulently applying for more than 100 foreign student visas. It is unclear what steps the INS took to find and deport the foreign nationals involved in this scheme. Each year, we have 300 million border crossings. For the most part, these individuals are legitimate visitors to our country. We currently have no way of tracking all of these visitors. Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the attack, was admitted as a non-immigrant visitor in July 2001. He traveled freely to and from the U.S. during the past 2 years and was, according to the INS, in ``legal status'' the day of the attack. Other hijackers also traveled with ease throughout the country. It has become all too clear that without an adequate tracking system, our country becomes a sieve, creating ample opportunities for terrorists to enter and establish their operations without detection. I sit as the Chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Last month, we held a hearing on the need for new technologies to assist our government agencies in keeping terrorists out of the United States. The testimony at that hearing was very illuminating. We were given a picture of an immigration system in chaos, and a border control system rife with vulnerabilities. Agency officials don't communicate with each other. Computers are incompatible. And even in instances here technological leaps have been made, like the issuance of more than 4.5 million ``smart'' border crossing cards with biometric data, the technology is not even used. Personally, I am astonished that a person can apply for a visa and granted a visa by the State Department, and that there is no mechanism by which the FBI or CIA can raise a red flag with regard to the individual if he or she is known to have links to terrorist groups or otherwise pose a threat to national security. In the wake of September 11, it is unconscionable that a terrorist might be permitted to enter the U.S. simply because our government agencies don't share information. Indeed, what we have discovered in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks was that the perpetrators of these attacks had a certain confidence that our immigration laws could be circumvented where necessary. The terrorists did not have to steal into the country as stowaways on sea vessels, or a border-jumpers evading federal authorities. Most, if not all, appeared to have come in with temporary visas, which are routinely granted to tourists, students, and other short-term visitors to the U.S. Let me talk about the legislation that I cosponsored with Senators Kennedy, Brownback, and Kyl. First, a key component of this solution is the creation of an interoperable data system that allows the Department of State, the INS, and other relevant Federal agencies to obtain critical information about foreign nationals who seek entry into or who have entered the United States. Right now, our government agencies use different systems, with different information, in different formats. And they often refuse to share that information with other agencies within our own government. This is not acceptable. When a terrorist presents himself at a consular office asking for a visa, or at a border crossing with a passport, we need to make sure that his name and identifying information is checked against an accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive database. Period. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act would require the creation of this interoperable data system, and will require the cooperation of all U.S. government agencies in providing accurate and compatible information to that system. In addition, the interoperable data system would include sophisticated, linguistically-based, name-matching algorithms so that the computers can recognize that ``Muhamad Usam Abdel Raqeeb'' and ``Haj Mohd Othman Abdul Rajeeb,'' are transliterations of the same name. In other words, this provision would require agencies to ensure that names can be matched even when they are stored in different sets of fields in different databases. Incidentally, this legislation also contains strict privacy provisions, limiting access to this database to authorized Federal officials. And the bill contains severe penalties for wrongful access or misuse of information contained in the database. Second, this legislation includes concrete steps to restore integrity to the immigration and visa process. including the following: The legislation would require all foreign nationals to be fingerprinted and, when appropriate, submit other biometric data, to the State Department when applying for visa. This provision should help eliminate fraud, as well as identify potential threats to the country before they gain access. We include reforms of the visa waiver program, so that any country wishing to participate in that program must begin to provide its citizens with tamper-proof, machine-readable passports. The passports must contain biometric data by October 26, 2003, to help verify identity at U.S. ports of entry. Prior to admitting a foreign visitor from a visa waiver country, the INS inspector must first determine that the individual does not appear in any ``lookout'' databases. In addition, the INS would be required to enter stolen passport numbers in the interoperable data system within 72 hours after receiving notification of the loss or theft of a passport. We would establish a robust biometric visa program. By October 26, 2003, newly issued visas must contain biometric data and other identifying information, like more than 4 million already do on the Southwest border, and, just as importantly, our own officials at the border and other ports of entry must have the equipment necessary to read the new biometric cards. We worked closely with the university community in crafting new, strict requirements for the student visa program to crack down on fraud, make sure that students really are attending classes, and give the government the ability to track any foreign national who arrives on a student visa but fails to enroll in school. The legislation prohibits the issuance of a student visa to any citizen of a country identified by the State Department as a terrorist- supporting nation. There is a waiver provision to this prohibition, however, allowing the State Department to allow students even from these countries in special cases. We require that airlines and cruiseliners provide passenger and crew manifests to immigration officials before arrival, so that any potential terrorists or other wrongdoers can be singled out before they arrive in this country and disappear among the general populace. The bill contains a number of other related provisions as well, but the gist of the legislation is this: Where we can provide law enforcement more information about potentially dangerous foreign nationals, we do so. Where we can reform our border-crossing system to weed out or deter terrorists or others who would do us harm, we do so. And where we can update technology to meet the demands of the modern war against terror, we do that as well. As we prepare to modify our immigration system, we must be sure to enact changes that are realistic and feasible. We must also provide the necessary tools to implement them. Our Nation will be no more secure tomorrow if we create new top-of- the line databases and do not see to it that government agencies use them to share and receive critical information. We will be no safer tomorrow if we do not create a workable entry- exit tracking system to ensure that terrorists do not enter the U.S. and blend into our communities without detection. And we will be no safer if we simply authorize new programs and information sharing, but do not provide the resources necessary to put the new technology at the border, train agents appropriately, and require our various government agencies to cooperate in this effort. We have a lot to do but I am confident that we will move swiftly to address these important issues. The legislation Senators Kennedy, Brownback, Kyl, and I introduce today is an important, and strong, first step. But this is only the beginning of a long, difficult process. In closing, I would like to respond to concerns that this bill is ``anti-immigrant.'' We are a nation of immigrants. Indeed, the overwhelming percentage of the people who come to live in this country do so to enjoy the blessings of liberty, equality, and opportunity. The overwhelming percentage of the people who visa this country mean us no harm. But there are several thousand innocent people, including foreign nationals, who were killed on September 11 in part because a network of fanatics determined to wreak death, destruction, and terror exploited weaknesses in our immigration system to come here, to stay here, to study here, and to kill here. We learned at Oklahoma City that not all terrorists are foreign nationals. But the world is a dangerous place, and there are peopled and regimes that would destroy us if they had the chance. We are all casualties of September 11. Our society has necessarily changed as our perception of the threats we face has changed. The scales have fallen from our eyes. It is unfortunate that we need to address the vulnerabilities in our immigration system that September 11 painfully revealed. The changes we need to make in that system will inconvenience people. We can ``thank'' the terrorists for that. Once implemented, however, those changes will make it easier for law- abiding foreign to visit or study here, and for law-abiding immigrants who want to live here. More important, once they are here, their safety, and ours, will be greatly enhanced. We must do everything we can to deter the terrorists, here and abroad, who would do us harm from Oklahoma City to downtown Manhattan, we have learned just how high the stakes are. It would dishonor the innocent victims of September 11 and the brave men and women of our armed forces who are defending our liberty at this very instant, if we flag or fail in this effort. I urge my colleagues to support us on this legislation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Kennedy, Brownback, and Kyl in introducing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001. We submit this legislation with 16 sponsors. This legislation represents a consensus, drawing upon the strengths of both the Visa entry Reform Act of 2001, which I introduced with my colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, and the Enhanced border Security Act of 2001, which Senators Kennedy and Brownback introduced. I believe the legislation we are introducing today will garner widespread support from our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. September 11 clearly pointed out the shortcomings of the immigration and visa system. For example: All 19 terrorist hijackers entered the U.S. legally with valid visas. Three of the hijackers had remained in the U.S. after their visas had expired. One entered on a foreign student visa. Another, Mohammed Atta had filed an application to change status to M-1, which was granted in July. However, Mr. Atta sought admission and was admitted to the United States based on his then current B-1 visitor visa. Most people don't realize how many people come into our country; how little we know about them; and whether they leave when required. Consider the following: The Visa Waiver Program: 23 million people from 29 different countries; no visas; little scrutiny; no knowledge where they go in the U.S. or whether they leave once their visas expire. The INS estimates that over 100,000 blank passports have been stolen from government offices in participating countries in recent years. Abuse of the VISA Waiver Program poses threats to U.S. national security and increases illegal immigration. For example, one of the co- conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 deliberately chose to use a fraudulent Swedish passport to attempt entry into the U.S. because of Sweden's participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Foreign Student Visa Program: more than 500,000 foreign nationals entering each year; within the last 10 years, 16,000 came from such terrorist supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Syria. The foreign student visa system is one of the most under-regulated systems we have today. We've seen bribes, bureaucracy, and other problems with this system that leave it wide open to abuse by terrorists and other criminals. For example, in the early 1990s, five officials at four California colleges, were convicted of taking bribes, providing counterfeit education documents, and fraudulently applying for more than 100 foreign student visas. It is unclear what steps the INS took to find and deport the foreign nationals involved in this scheme. Each year, we have 300 million border crossings. For the most part, these individuals are legitimate visitors to our country. We currently have no way of tracking all of these visitors. Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the attack, was admitted as a non-immigrant visitor in July 2001. He traveled freely to and from the U.S. during the past 2 years and was, according to the INS, in ``legal status'' the day of the attack. Other hijackers also traveled with ease throughout the country. It has become all too clear that without an adequate tracking system, our country becomes a sieve, creating ample opportunities for terrorists to enter and establish their operations without detection. I sit as the Chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Last month, we held a hearing on the need for new technologies to assist our government agencies in keeping terrorists out of the United States. The testimony at that hearing was very illuminating. We were given a picture of an immigration system in chaos, and a border control system rife with vulnerabilities. Agency officials don't communicate with each other. Computers are incompatible. And even in instances here technological leaps have been made, like the issuance of more than 4.5 million ``smart'' border crossing cards with biometric data, the technology is not even used. Personally, I am astonished that a person can apply for a visa and granted a visa by the State Department, and that there is no mechanism by which the FBI or CIA can raise a red flag with regard to the individual if he or she is known to have links to terrorist groups or otherwise pose a threat to national security. In the wake of September 11, it is unconscionable that a terrorist might be permitted to enter the U.S. simply because our government agencies don't share information. Indeed, what we have discovered in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks was that the perpetrators of these attacks had a certain confidence that our immigration laws could be circumvented where necessary. The terrorists did not have to steal into the country as stowaways on sea vessels, or a border-jumpers evading federal authorities. Most, if not all, appeared to have come in with temporary visas, which are routinely granted to tourists, students, and other short-term visitors to the U.S. Let me talk about the legislation that I cosponsored with Senators Kennedy, Brownback, and Kyl. First, a key component of this solution is the creation of an interoperable data system that allows the Department of State, the INS, and other relevant Federal agencies to obtain critical information about foreign nationals who seek entry into or who have entered the United States. Right now, our government agencies use different systems, with different information, in different formats. And they often refuse to share that information with other agencies within our own government. This is not acceptable. When a terrorist presents himself at a consular office asking for a visa, or at a border crossing with a passport, we need to make sure that his name and identifying information is checked against an accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive database. Period. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act would require the creation of this interoperable data system, and will require the cooperation of all U.S. government agencies in providing accurate and compatible information to that system. In addition, the interoperable data system would include sophisticated, linguistically-based, name-matching algorithms so that the computers can recognize that ``Muhamad Usam Abdel Raqeeb'' and ``Haj Mohd Othman Abdul Rajeeb,'' are transliterations of the same name. In other words, this provision would require agencies to ensure that names can be matched even when they are stored in different sets of fields in different databases. Incidentally, this legislation also contains strict privacy provisions, limiting access to this database to authorized Federal officials. And the bill contains severe penalties for wrongful access or misuse of information contained in the database. Second, this legislation includes concrete steps to restore integrity to the immigration and visa process. including the following: The legislation would require all foreign nationals to be fingerprinted and, when appropriate, submit other biometric data, to the State Department when applying for visa. This provision should help eliminate fraud, as well as identify potential threats to the country before they gain access. We include reforms of the visa waiver program, so that any country wishing to participate in that program must begin to provide its citizens with tamper-proof, machine-readable passports. The passports must contain biometric data by October 26, 2003, to help verify identity at U.S. ports of entry. Prior to admitting a foreign visitor from a visa waiver country, the INS inspector must first determine that the individual does not appear in any ``lookout'' databases. In addition, the INS would be required to enter stolen passport numbers in the interoperable data system within 72 hours after receiving notification of the loss or theft of a passport. We would establish a robust biometric visa program. By October 26, 2003, newly issued visas must contain biometric data and other identifying information, like more than 4 million already do on the Southwest border, and, just as importantly, our own officials at the border and other ports of entry must have the equipment necessary to read the new biometric cards. We worked closely with the university community in crafting new, strict requirements for the student visa program to crack down on fraud, make sure that students really are attending classes, and give the government the ability to track any foreign national who arrives on a student visa but fails to enroll in school. The legislation prohibits the issuance of a student visa to any citizen of a country identified by the State Department as a terrorist- supporting nation. There is a waiver provision to this prohibition, however, allowing the State Department to allow students even from these countries in special cases. We require that airlines and cruiseliners provide passenger and crew manifests to immigration officials before arrival, so that any potential terrorists or other wrongdoers can be singled out before they arrive in this country and disappear among the general populace. The bill contains a number of other related provisions as well, but the gist of the legislation is this: Where we can provide law enforcement more information about potentially dangerous foreign nationals, we do so. Where we can reform our border-crossing system to weed out or deter terrorists or others who would do us harm, we do so. And where we can update technology to meet the demands of the modern war against terror, we do that as well. As we prepare to modify our immigration system, we must be sure to enact changes that are realistic and feasible. We must also provide the necessary tools to implement them. Our Nation will be no more secure tomorrow if we create new top-of- the line databases and do not see to it that government agencies use them to share and receive critical information. We will be no safer tomorrow if we do not create a workable entry- exit tracking system to ensure that terrorists do not enter the U.S. and blend into our communities without detection. And we will be no safer if we simply authorize new programs and information sharing, but do not provide the resources necessary to put the new technology at the border, train agents appropriately, and require our various government agencies to cooperate in this effort. We have a lot to do but I am confident that we will move swiftly to address these important issues. The legislation Senators Kennedy, Brownback, Kyl, and I introduce today is an important, and strong, first step. But this is only the beginning of a long, difficult process. In closing, I would like to respond to concerns that this bill is ``anti-immigrant.'' We are a nation of immigrants. Indeed, the overwhelming percentage of the people who come to live in this country do so to enjoy the blessings of liberty, equality, and opportunity. The overwhelming percentage of the people who visa this country mean us no harm. But there are several thousand innocent people, including foreign nationals, who were killed on September 11 in part because a network of fanatics determined to wreak death, destruction, and terror exploited weaknesses in our immigration system to come here, to stay here, to study here, and to kill here. We learned at Oklahoma City that not all terrorists are foreign nationals. But the world is a dangerous place, and there are peopled and regimes that would destroy us if they had the chance. We are all casualties of September 11. Our society has necessarily changed as our perception of the threats we face has changed. The scales have fallen from our eyes. It is unfortunate that we need to address the vulnerabilities in our immigration system that September 11 painfully revealed. The changes we need to make in that system will inconvenience people. We can ``thank'' the terrorists for that. Once implemented, however, those changes will make it easier for law- abiding foreign to visit or study here, and for law-abiding immigrants who want to live here. More important, once they are here, their safety, and ours, will be greatly enhanced. We must do everything we can to deter the terrorists, here and abroad, who would do us harm from Oklahoma City to downtown Manhattan, we have learned just how high the stakes are. It would dishonor the innocent victims of September 11 and the brave men and women of our armed forces who are defending our liberty at this very instant, if we flag or fail in this effort. I urge my colleagues to support us on this legislation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to submit a resolution congratulating Barry Bonds of the San Francisco Giants for his historic achievements during the 2001 baseball season and to thank him for his contributions to baseball and his community. On October 7, 2001 at Pacific Bell Park in San Francisco, Barry Bonds hit his 73rd home run, setting a new record for most home runs in a season, eclipsing the previous mark of 70 set by Mark McGwire of the St. Louis Cardinals in 1998. In addition, during the 2001 campaign Barry Bonds set records for slugging percentage, 16 points above the previous mark, and most walks in a season, surpassing the feats of the immortal Babe Ruth. Barry Bonds' outstanding play on the field added to what was already a Hall of Fame career: 3 Most Valuable Player awards, 567 career home runs, 7th on the all-time list, the only player with more than 400 home runs and 400 stolen bases, 10 All-Star Game appearances, 8 Gold Glove awards, and the Sporting News' Player of the Decade for the 1990s. As a native San Franciscan and life-long San Francisco Giants fan, I could not be prouder of Barry Bonds. His roots in California and the Bay Area run deep. Born in Riverside, he grew up in San Mateo and attended Sierra High School. After attending Arizona State University and beginning his career with the Pittsburgh Pirates, Barry Bonds returned to his hometown team, the Giants, in 1993. No one should be surprised that Barry Bonds has reached the elite level of baseball players. After all, he is the son of former major league star and San Francisco Giant, Bobby Bonds, and the godson of perhaps the greatest living ball player, the great Willie Mays. His exploits in baseball are matched by his dedication to the community off the field. Seven years ago he founded the Barry Bonds Family Foundation, headed by his mother, Pat Bonds. The Foundation supports activities and programs opportunities of African American youth in the Bay Area. Barry Bonds and his Foundation are particularly involved in the United Way's ``Link and Learn'', a program dedicated to raising student achievement through greater parental involvement, access to tutoring and interactive technology. All baseball fans, even those of the Los Angeles Dodgers, can appreciate Barry Bonds' breathtaking skill, record setting performance, and commitment to his community. During a difficult time for our country, he gave us a reason to return to the ballpark and cheer him on the way to a new home run record. All over the country, fans rose from their seats for every at-bat, celebrated each home run, and even booed their own teams when they intentially walked him. At 37 years old, he is in the prime of his baseball career and I am sure he will amaze and dazzle us many more times in the future. Again, I congratulate Barry Bonds for his season and thank him for all that he has done for baseball and his community. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise to introduce legislation, cosponsored by Senator Kyl, to prohibit individuals from possessing anthrax, smallpox, and three dozen other of the most dangerous biological agents and toxins. To date, 17 people have confirmed anthrax infections, four of whom died from inhalation anthrax. This toll, though tragic, could have grown exponentially if the perpetrators had used a more sophisticated delivery system. Despite anthrax's and other agents' potential for weaponization, our government does not keep track of who possesses them. No special certification is required to possess these agents. Nor are background checks conducted on the laboratory personnel who handle or have access to these agents. This situation must change. The legislation I am introducing expands upon the antiterrorism bill Congress passed and the President signed just days ago. That bill prohibited an individual from possessing anthrax or other potential weapons of bioterror unless the individual could show legitimate purpose for holding the substance once caught. This standard of ``legitimate purpose;' is not defined, and will put the burden on courts and law enforcement to determine what a ``legitimate purpose'' is. The fact is that current law still does not adequately prevent individual possession of these dangerous agents. During a hearing in the Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee yesterday, it became clear to those of us on the committee that law enforcement does not know who has anthrax, where it is stored, or what is being done with it. When asked if domestic laboratories were the source of the anthrax sent to Senator Daschle's office, the FBI witness said the FBI didn't know. When asked how many labs in the United States handle anthrax or are capable of developing the highly refined anthrax used in the Daschle letter, the FBI answered again that it did not know. When asked how many labs in the United States handle anthrax or are capable of devlopoing the highly refined anthrax used in the Daschle letter, the FBI answered again that it did not know. And the same goes for more than three dozen other dangerous agents like small pox, ebola virus, and ricin. Under our legislation, no individual could possess any of these dangerous agents, period. Any medical or research lab wishing to possess or use these dangerous agents must first be certified by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Individuals in those labs who handle or who have access to these agents must undergo background checks, and the labs themselves must institute strict safety precautions. And every single research lab, medical office, or other entity wishing to possess any one of these 40 some agents ruled dangerous by the CDC must demonstrate to the Secretary a legitimate purpose for that possession. The purpose of the legislation is to assure that law enforcement and public health officials know much more about who has these agents, where and how they are stored, and what is being done with them. Right now, we do not have this information. Moreover, the bill will make it harder for terrorists to get access to these agents by requiring background checks and assuring that labs possessing these agents have adequately security safeguards. I can think of no legitimate reason why an ordinary person needs to possess his or her personal cache of anthrax, small pox, or ebola virus. According to the calculations of some experts, biological weapons are pound for pound potentially more lethal even than thermonuclear weapons. For instance, a 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that between 130,000 and 3 million deaths could follow the aerosolized release of 100 keg of anthrax spores upwind of the Washington, DC area--lethally matching or exceeding that of a hydrogen bomb. It is time to acknowledge that we live in a world where the government must take responsibility in protecting the public from those who would misuse these materials. No longer can we stand by and let the balance tip towards free possession of dangerous, even deadly, biological agents. I urge my colleagues to support this bill

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of Senator Graham's bill authorizing appropriations for intelligence for fiscal year 2002. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I serve, and which Senator Graham chairs, is a unique expression of the vital role the United States plays in the critical field of national security. Much of our proceedings are, by necessity, secret, and our committee's business is often conducted behind closed doors. That said, I am proud of the fact that in this country the activities of the intelligence services, so important to national security, but potentially so dangerous to our precious civil liberties, are authorized by the people's representatives in Congress. The bill before us today is the result of that process. Under the able leadership of Chairman Graham and Vice Chairman Shelby, the Intelligence Committee has delved deeply into the activities of our intelligence agencies, reviewing their operational efforts, their resource needs, and the legal and regulatory structure within which they operate. This bill was crafted in the light of that inquiry, and I believe represents a well-conceived and workable plan to support the critical intelligence needs of our country. Many have said that, after the tragic events of September 11, ``everything changed.'' That is not completely true, for an effective and well-supervised intelligence structure was essential to our national security before September 11, and remains so after the attacks. What did change, however, is the sense of urgency, and the general understanding of the importance of intelligence, particularly in the area of terrorism. This bill addresses those needs, and I am certain will provide a framework which will allow the intelligence community to work towards protecting our Nation from those who would do it harm, whether rogue nations or sub-national terrorist groups. The bill addresses some of the difficult issues that confronted the committee during the past year with balance and firmness. It contains language that addresses the specific, and systemic, shortcomings which led to the tragedy last spring when a civilian airplane was accidentally shot down in the course of a CIA-sponsored counterdrug operation. It accomplishes this by requiring the President to certify that appropriate safety procedures are in place, adhered to, and that the program, should it continue, is necessary to our national security. The bill contains language directing the Department of Justice to perform a thorough review of current law concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. This will allow the administration to carefully address the pernicious problem of recurring unauthorized disclosures in a measured and thoughtful manner. Should it be necessary for the Congress to revisit this issue, our efforts will be assisted by the results of the Department of Justice review. The bill, and its classified annex, authorizes funding appropriate to the extensive, and often expensive, responsibilities we have asked the intelligence community to carry out. There has been much said publicly about the size and scope of our intelligence budget, and there remains reasonable arguments on both sides as to whether the intelligence budget should remain classified. However, I want to take this opportunity to assure my colleagues, and all Americans, that the intelligence budget is not created in a shadowy vacuum, but in a process that allows the legislative branch meaningful insight into, and final authority on, the intelligence budget. Finally, I look forward to working with my colleagues on the committee in performing the necessary follow-on to passage of this bill--the vigorous oversight of the operational and analytic efforts that will carry out the authorized direction contained in this bill.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise to introduce legislation, cosponsored by Senator Kyl, to prohibit individuals from possessing anthrax, smallpox, and three dozen other of the most dangerous biological agents and toxins. To date, 17 people have confirmed anthrax infections, four of whom died from inhalation anthrax. This toll, though tragic, could have grown exponentially if the perpetrators had used a more sophisticated delivery system. Despite anthrax's and other agents' potential for weaponization, our government does not keep track of who possesses them. No special certification is required to possess these agents. Nor are background checks conducted on the laboratory personnel who handle or have access to these agents. This situation must change. The legislation I am introducing expands upon the antiterrorism bill Congress passed and the President signed just days ago. That bill prohibited an individual from possessing anthrax or other potential weapons of bioterror unless the individual could show legitimate purpose for holding the substance once caught. This standard of ``legitimate purpose;' is not defined, and will put the burden on courts and law enforcement to determine what a ``legitimate purpose'' is. The fact is that current law still does not adequately prevent individual possession of these dangerous agents. During a hearing in the Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee yesterday, it became clear to those of us on the committee that law enforcement does not know who has anthrax, where it is stored, or what is being done with it. When asked if domestic laboratories were the source of the anthrax sent to Senator Daschle's office, the FBI witness said the FBI didn't know. When asked how many labs in the United States handle anthrax or are capable of developing the highly refined anthrax used in the Daschle letter, the FBI answered again that it did not know. When asked how many labs in the United States handle anthrax or are capable of devlopoing the highly refined anthrax used in the Daschle letter, the FBI answered again that it did not know. And the same goes for more than three dozen other dangerous agents like small pox, ebola virus, and ricin. Under our legislation, no individual could possess any of these dangerous agents, period. Any medical or research lab wishing to possess or use these dangerous agents must first be certified by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Individuals in those labs who handle or who have access to these agents must undergo background checks, and the labs themselves must institute strict safety precautions. And every single research lab, medical office, or other entity wishing to possess any one of these 40 some agents ruled dangerous by the CDC must demonstrate to the Secretary a legitimate purpose for that possession. The purpose of the legislation is to assure that law enforcement and public health officials know much more about who has these agents, where and how they are stored, and what is being done with them. Right now, we do not have this information. Moreover, the bill will make it harder for terrorists to get access to these agents by requiring background checks and assuring that labs possessing these agents have adequately security safeguards. I can think of no legitimate reason why an ordinary person needs to possess his or her personal cache of anthrax, small pox, or ebola virus. According to the calculations of some experts, biological weapons are pound for pound potentially more lethal even than thermonuclear weapons. For instance, a 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that between 130,000 and 3 million deaths could follow the aerosolized release of 100 keg of anthrax spores upwind of the Washington, DC area--lethally matching or exceeding that of a hydrogen bomb. It is time to acknowledge that we live in a world where the government must take responsibility in protecting the public from those who would misuse these materials. No longer can we stand by and let the balance tip towards free possession of dangerous, even deadly, biological agents. I urge my colleagues to support this bill

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to join with the distinguished Senator from Arizona, who is my ranking member on the Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee of Judiciary, to introduce a piece of legislation. On October 12, the committee held a hearing on what could be done to technologically improve our visa entry system. It has become very clear, now that we know all 19 of the terrorists essentially had, at some time, valid visas, that our system is such that it really cannot countermand or alert our Government to any possible terrorist entering this country legally through our visa system. We have about 7 million nonimmigrants entering the U.S. a year. About 4 million of them disappear and are unaccounted for. We have 23 million people coming in on visa waivers from 29 different countries. We have an unregulated student visa program. And we also have about 300 million people coming across borders back and forth. We have about 5 million containers a year that come in through the ports of entry, fewer than 2 percent of them searched. The ranking member, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, and I have been very concerned about this. As a product of the hearing, we believed that the most important thing we could do was create a centralized data base, using cutting-edge technology, and also enabling that data base to interface between our intelligence agencies, our law enforcement agencies, and our State Department, to create a kind of lookout data base so that the situation that happened--whereby in Saudi Arabia 15 terrorists came in to the State Department consul's office and got visas, and we were told there was no intelligence to alert the system--would not, in fact, happen in the future. This legislation would create that kind of centralized, integrated data base. Additionally, we provide for a biometric visa smart card. We provide that all Federal identity permit and license documents be fraud- resistant and tamper-resistant. We provide for passenger manifests of all commercial transportation vehicles to go into that data base, again, so that it can alert the proper authorities about who is about to come into the U.S. Law enforcement information, intelligence information all combine to send certain signals. We also provide regulation and school responsibility for the student visa program. I am very pleased to indicate that Senator Kyl and I are joined by Senators Kohl, Snowe, Hatch, Thurmond, and Bond. I would like to now defer to my colleague from Arizona, the ranking member of our Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from Arizona for those comments. He is very hard working, and it has been a great pleasure for me to be able to work with him. He and I hope to sit down with Senators Kennedy and Brownback next week. I think all four of us believe that if it is possible to have one bill, we would like to have one bill. We have taken on the technology aspect of our bill. But bottom line, the Senator from Arizona is correct, our Nation has essentially been laid back when it comes to matters of really scrupulously trying to set up a system that can provide a measure of protection for our national security. It has become very clear now, post September 11, that we must take steps to do so. Otherwise, we are derelict in our duty to protect American citizens. This bill does it. Because the student visa part of it has been somewhat controversial, this morning I was visited by the chancellor of the California State University system. This is the largest system in the United States, with about 380,000 students. He came in to indicate his support for our bill, for the acknowledgment that he knows that schools across America also have to assume more responsibility to see that there is a system where there is some regulation. Right now, a student can apply to a number of schools, get accepted to a number, and show up at none. And there is no reporting. We would change this. The university association will be supportive of these changes. I am very optimistic that we have an opportunity, in meeting with Senators Kennedy and Brownback, to put together one bill that could provide some reform to a porous visa entry system. As I said, I sit as the chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Last month, we held a hearing into the need for new technologies to assist our government agencies in keeping terrorists out of the United States. The testimony at that hearing was very illuminating. We were given a picture of an immigration system in chaos, and a border control system that acts like a sieve. Agencies don't communicate with each other. Computers are incompatible. And even in instances where technological leaps have been made--like the issuance of more than 4.5 million ``smart'' border crossing cards with biometric data--the technology is not even used. Let me give some specific examples of the testimony we heard before our subcommittee: There are 29 countries that now participate in a ``visa waiver'' program that invites 23 million visitors a year to our country. Travelers from these countries do not have to get a visa before entering the United States, so nobody knows when they arrive, and nobody knows whether they leave. Passports don't have to be machine- readable or tamper-proof, and the result is millions of people coming and going with no accountability, and no way to find them if they choose to stay and do mischief. We also heard in our subcommittee that the student visa program is unregulated and subject to abuse and fraud. Schools don't keep track of students, the INS does not find out when the students leave or whether they even show up for classes, and many students overstay their visas by years. Furthermore, students who apply to many schools can receive multiple documents--called ``I-20'' forms--giving them the right to entry. Because they only need one of these forms, the possibility for fraud is enormous. Additional forms are sold, and many enter the country with no real plans to go to school here at all. In our hearing, Mary Ryan, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, said that the lack of information sharing is a ``colossal intelligence failure'' and that the State Department ``had no information on the terrorists from law enforcement.'' Personally, I am amazed that a person can apply for a visa, be granted a visa, and that there is no mechanism by which the FBI or CIA can enter a code into the system to raise a red flag on individuals known to have links to terrorist groups and pose a national threat. In the wake of September 11th, it is hard for me to fathom how a terrorist might be permitted to enter the U.S. because our government agencies aren't sharing information. This was one, sobering hearing. It made it clear to all who were present that our borders act only as a sieve, essentially allowing easy access to all who would do us harm. Something must be done, and something must be done now. When I arrived in the Senate in 1992, I brought with me the concerns of millions of Californians about the porous nature of the Southwest border. When I tried to address the problems there, I met with the same response over and over again--``nothing can be done.'' But something was done, and our Southwest border is now far more difficult to transit. Here, too, I am now told that ``nothing can be done'' to keep terrorists from entering the country on student visas, or through the visa waiver program, or through some other program. I am told that commerce and trade are too important. Or that the technology simply does not exist. Or that the agencies involved are incapable of cooperating in a way that would keep our country safe from those who try to enter. Well, I did not accept those arguments then, and I do not accept them now. There are things we can do to solve some of these problems, and this issue is too important to wait. Let me talk about how this legislation would address these problems. First, the most important piece of this solution is the creation of one, central database containing all the information our government has about foreign nationals who cross the border into the United States. Private industry can help in this effort--in fact, I recently met with Larry Ellison, Chairman of Oracle, who wrote me a letter offering the services of his company, free of charge, in the creation of the necessary software. Right now, our government agencies use different systems, with different information, in different formats. And they often refuse to share that information with other agencies within our own government. This is not acceptable. When a terrorist presents himself at a consular office asking for a visa, or at a border crossing with a passport, we need to make sure that his name and identifying information is checked against an accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive database. Period. My legislation will require the creation of this central database, and will require the cooperation of all U.S. government agencies in providing accurate and compatible information to that system. Incidentally, this legislation also contains strict privacy provisions, limiting access to this database to authorized federal officials. And the bill contains severe penalties for wrongful access or misuse of information contained in the database. Second, the legislation I will introduce will include concrete steps to restore the integrity to the immigration and visa process, including the following: First, the legislation requires all foreign nationals to be fingerprinted, and, when appropriate, submit other biometric data, to the State Department when applying for a visa. This provision should help eliminate fraud, as well as identify potential threats to the country before they gain access. Second, we include reforms of the visa waiver program, so that any country wishing to participate in that program must quickly provide its citizens with tamper-proof, machine-readable passports, eventually with biometric data to help verify identity at ports of entry. Third, we establish a robust ``SmartVisa'' program. Newly issued visas must contain biometric data and other identifying information-- like more than 4 million already do on the Southwest border--and, just as importantly, our own officials at the border and other ports of entry must have the equipment necessary to read those new smart cards. Next, we worked closely with the university community in crafting new, strict requirements for the student visa program, to crack down on fraud, make sure that students really are attending classes, and give the government the ability to track any foreign national who arrives on a student visa but fails to enroll in school. The legislation prohibits the issuance of a student visa to any citizen of a country identified by the State Department as a terrorist- supporting nation. There is a waiver provision to this prohibition, however, allowing the State Department to allow students even from these countries after review and evaluation. We require that airlines, cruiselines, buslines, and other transportation services provide passenger and crew manifests to law enforcement before arrival, so that any potential terrorists or other wrongdoers can be singled out before they arrive in this country and disappear into the general populace. The bill contains a number of other related provisions as well, but the gist of this legislation is this: Where we can provide law enforcement more information about potentially dangerous foreign nationals, we do so; Where we can reform our border-crossing system to weed out or deter terrorists or others who would do us harm, we do so; And where we can update technology to meet the demands of the modern war against terror, we do that as well. As we prepare to modify our immigration system, we must be sure to enact changes that are realistic and feasible. We must also provide the necessary tools to implement them. Our Nation will be no more secure tomorrow if we create new top of the line databases and no not see to it that government agencies share critical information. We will be no safer tomorrow if we do not create a workable entry- exit tracking system to ensure that terrorists do not enter the U.S. and blend into our communities without detection. And we will be no safer if we simply authorize new programs and information sharing, but do not provide the resources necessary to put the new technology at the border, train agents appropriately, and require our various government agencies to cooperate in this effort. We have a lot to do and I am confident that we will move swiftly and with great care to address these important issues. The legislation I introduce today is an important, and strong, first step. But this is only the beginning of a long, difficult process. I urge my colleagues to support us on this legislation. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from Arizona for those comments. He is very hard working, and it has been a great pleasure for me to be able to work with him. He and I hope to sit down with Senators Kennedy and Brownback next week. I think all four of us believe that if it is possible to have one bill, we would like to have one bill. We have taken on the technology aspect of our bill. But bottom line, the Senator from Arizona is correct, our Nation has essentially been laid back when it comes to matters of really scrupulously trying to set up a system that can provide a measure of protection for our national security. It has become very clear now, post September 11, that we must take steps to do so. Otherwise, we are derelict in our duty to protect American citizens. This bill does it. Because the student visa part of it has been somewhat controversial, this morning I was visited by the chancellor of the California State University system. This is the largest system in the United States, with about 380,000 students. He came in to indicate his support for our bill, for the acknowledgment that he knows that schools across America also have to assume more responsibility to see that there is a system where there is some regulation. Right now, a student can apply to a number of schools, get accepted to a number, and show up at none. And there is no reporting. We would change this. The university association will be supportive of these changes. I am very optimistic that we have an opportunity, in meeting with Senators Kennedy and Brownback, to put together one bill that could provide some reform to a porous visa entry system. As I said, I sit as the chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Last month, we held a hearing into the need for new technologies to assist our government agencies in keeping terrorists out of the United States. The testimony at that hearing was very illuminating. We were given a picture of an immigration system in chaos, and a border control system that acts like a sieve. Agencies don't communicate with each other. Computers are incompatible. And even in instances where technological leaps have been made--like the issuance of more than 4.5 million ``smart'' border crossing cards with biometric data--the technology is not even used. Let me give some specific examples of the testimony we heard before our subcommittee: There are 29 countries that now participate in a ``visa waiver'' program that invites 23 million visitors a year to our country. Travelers from these countries do not have to get a visa before entering the United States, so nobody knows when they arrive, and nobody knows whether they leave. Passports don't have to be machine- readable or tamper-proof, and the result is millions of people coming and going with no accountability, and no way to find them if they choose to stay and do mischief. We also heard in our subcommittee that the student visa program is unregulated and subject to abuse and fraud. Schools don't keep track of students, the INS does not find out when the students leave or whether they even show up for classes, and many students overstay their visas by years. Furthermore, students who apply to many schools can receive multiple documents--called ``I-20'' forms--giving them the right to entry. Because they only need one of these forms, the possibility for fraud is enormous. Additional forms are sold, and many enter the country with no real plans to go to school here at all. In our hearing, Mary Ryan, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, said that the lack of information sharing is a ``colossal intelligence failure'' and that the State Department ``had no information on the terrorists from law enforcement.'' Personally, I am amazed that a person can apply for a visa, be granted a visa, and that there is no mechanism by which the FBI or CIA can enter a code into the system to raise a red flag on individuals known to have links to terrorist groups and pose a national threat. In the wake of September 11th, it is hard for me to fathom how a terrorist might be permitted to enter the U.S. because our government agencies aren't sharing information. This was one, sobering hearing. It made it clear to all who were present that our borders act only as a sieve, essentially allowing easy access to all who would do us harm. Something must be done, and something must be done now. When I arrived in the Senate in 1992, I brought with me the concerns of millions of Californians about the porous nature of the Southwest border. When I tried to address the problems there, I met with the same response over and over again--``nothing can be done.'' But something was done, and our Southwest border is now far more difficult to transit. Here, too, I am now told that ``nothing can be done'' to keep terrorists from entering the country on student visas, or through the visa waiver program, or through some other program. I am told that commerce and trade are too important. Or that the technology simply does not exist. Or that the agencies involved are incapable of cooperating in a way that would keep our country safe from those who try to enter. Well, I did not accept those arguments then, and I do not accept them now. There are things we can do to solve some of these problems, and this issue is too important to wait. Let me talk about how this legislation would address these problems. First, the most important piece of this solution is the creation of one, central database containing all the information our government has about foreign nationals who cross the border into the United States. Private industry can help in this effort--in fact, I recently met with Larry Ellison, Chairman of Oracle, who wrote me a letter offering the services of his company, free of charge, in the creation of the necessary software. Right now, our government agencies use different systems, with different information, in different formats. And they often refuse to share that information with other agencies within our own government. This is not acceptable. When a terrorist presents himself at a consular office asking for a visa, or at a border crossing with a passport, we need to make sure that his name and identifying information is checked against an accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive database. Period. My legislation will require the creation of this central database, and will require the cooperation of all U.S. government agencies in providing accurate and compatible information to that system. Incidentally, this legislation also contains strict privacy provisions, limiting access to this database to authorized federal officials. And the bill contains severe penalties for wrongful access or misuse of information contained in the database. Second, the legislation I will introduce will include concrete steps to restore the integrity to the immigration and visa process, including the following: First, the legislation requires all foreign nationals to be fingerprinted, and, when appropriate, submit other biometric data, to the State Department when applying for a visa. This provision should help eliminate fraud, as well as identify potential threats to the country before they gain access. Second, we include reforms of the visa waiver program, so that any country wishing to participate in that program must quickly provide its citizens with tamper-proof, machine-readable passports, eventually with biometric data to help verify identity at ports of entry. Third, we establish a robust ``SmartVisa'' program. Newly issued visas must contain biometric data and other identifying information-- like more than 4 million already do on the Southwest border--and, just as importantly, our own officials at the border and other ports of entry must have the equipment necessary to read those new smart cards. Next, we worked closely with the university community in crafting new, strict requirements for the student visa program, to crack down on fraud, make sure that students really are attending classes, and give the government the ability to track any foreign national who arrives on a student visa but fails to enroll in school. The legislation prohibits the issuance of a student visa to any citizen of a country identified by the State Department as a terrorist- supporting nation. There is a waiver provision to this prohibition, however, allowing the State Department to allow students even from these countries after review and evaluation. We require that airlines, cruiselines, buslines, and other transportation services provide passenger and crew manifests to law enforcement before arrival, so that any potential terrorists or other wrongdoers can be singled out before they arrive in this country and disappear into the general populace. The bill contains a number of other related provisions as well, but the gist of this legislation is this: Where we can provide law enforcement more information about potentially dangerous foreign nationals, we do so; Where we can reform our border-crossing system to weed out or deter terrorists or others who would do us harm, we do so; And where we can update technology to meet the demands of the modern war against terror, we do that as well. As we prepare to modify our immigration system, we must be sure to enact changes that are realistic and feasible. We must also provide the necessary tools to implement them. Our Nation will be no more secure tomorrow if we create new top of the line databases and no not see to it that government agencies share critical information. We will be no safer tomorrow if we do not create a workable entry- exit tracking system to ensure that terrorists do not enter the U.S. and blend into our communities without detection. And we will be no safer if we simply authorize new programs and information sharing, but do not provide the resources necessary to put the new technology at the border, train agents appropriately, and require our various government agencies to cooperate in this effort. We have a lot to do and I am confident that we will move swiftly and with great care to address these important issues. The legislation I introduce today is an important, and strong, first step. But this is only the beginning of a long, difficult process. I urge my colleagues to support us on this legislation. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to join with the distinguished Senator from Arizona, who is my ranking member on the Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee of Judiciary, to introduce a piece of legislation. On October 12, the committee held a hearing on what could be done to technologically improve our visa entry system. It has become very clear, now that we know all 19 of the terrorists essentially had, at some time, valid visas, that our system is such that it really cannot countermand or alert our Government to any possible terrorist entering this country legally through our visa system. We have about 7 million nonimmigrants entering the U.S. a year. About 4 million of them disappear and are unaccounted for. We have 23 million people coming in on visa waivers from 29 different countries. We have an unregulated student visa program. And we also have about 300 million people coming across borders back and forth. We have about 5 million containers a year that come in through the ports of entry, fewer than 2 percent of them searched. The ranking member, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, and I have been very concerned about this. As a product of the hearing, we believed that the most important thing we could do was create a centralized data base, using cutting-edge technology, and also enabling that data base to interface between our intelligence agencies, our law enforcement agencies, and our State Department, to create a kind of lookout data base so that the situation that happened--whereby in Saudi Arabia 15 terrorists came in to the State Department consul's office and got visas, and we were told there was no intelligence to alert the system--would not, in fact, happen in the future. This legislation would create that kind of centralized, integrated data base. Additionally, we provide for a biometric visa smart card. We provide that all Federal identity permit and license documents be fraud- resistant and tamper-resistant. We provide for passenger manifests of all commercial transportation vehicles to go into that data base, again, so that it can alert the proper authorities about who is about to come into the U.S. Law enforcement information, intelligence information all combine to send certain signals. We also provide regulation and school responsibility for the student visa program. I am very pleased to indicate that Senator Kyl and I are joined by Senators Kohl, Snowe, Hatch, Thurmond, and Bond. I would like to now defer to my colleague from Arizona, the ranking member of our Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. That is correct.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I say to Senator Reid, thank you very much. We could probably do it within 5 to 10 minutes.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, Americans tend to be a very open people. Americans, to a great extent, have looked at Government, saying: Just leave me alone. Keep Government out of my life. At least that is the way it was before September 11. What I hear post-September 11 are people saying: What is my Government going to do to protect me? As we look back at that massive, terrible incident on September 11, we try to ascertain whether our Government had the tools necessary to ferret out the intelligence that could have, perhaps, avoided those events. The only answer all of us could come up with, after having briefing after briefing, is we did not have those tools. This bill aims to change that. This bill is a bill whose time has come. This bill is a necessary bill. And I, as a Senator from California, am happy to support it. This legislation brings our criminal and national security laws in line with developing technologies so that terrorists will no longer be able to stay one step ahead of law enforcement. And believe me, they can today. Right now, for example, terrorists can evade Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act wiretaps, which are device-specific, by simply switching cell phones every few hours. This legislation fixes that and allows for roving FISA wiretaps, the same as are currently allowed for suspected criminals under the domestic law enforcement portions of the law known as title III. And because modern communications often travel through countless jurisdictions before reaching their final destination, investigators must now get court orders from every one of those jurisdictions. They can have to get 15, 20 court orders to carry out a wiretap. This bill would change that, allowing for just one court order from the originating jurisdiction. And the bill recognizes that voice mails and e-mails should be treated alike when law enforcement seeks access to them. Technology, as it changes, changes the ability to conduct an intelligence surveillance. This bill attempts to keep a very careful balance between the personal right to privacy and the Government's right to know, in an emergency situation, to be able to protect its citizens. It also increases information sharing between the intelligence community and law enforcement. As a matter of fact, it mandates it. Criminal investigations often result in foreign intelligence. This information, up to this point, is not shared with the intelligence community. After this bill becomes law, it must be shared. And it makes it easier for law enforcement to defeat those who would use the computers of others to do mischief. For example, with the Zombie computer, I invade your computer and, by invading your computer, go into 1,000 other computers and am able to get one of them to open the floodgates of a dam. This bill prevents that. Overall, this bill gives law enforcement and the intelligence community the tools they need to go after what is an increasingly sophisticated terrorist element. I am very pleased this legislation also includes a number of provisions I drafted with Senator Graham well before the events on September 11--title 9 of this bill. These provisions give the Director of the CIA, as head of the intelligence community, a larger role with regard to the analysis and dissemination of foreign intelligence gathered under FISA. These mandate that law enforcement share information with the intelligence community. And title 9 improves the existing Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center which helps locate terrorist assets. It authorizes additional resources to help train local law enforcement to recognize and handle foreign intelligence. We now have these anti-terrorist teams throughout the country. They need to be trained, and they need to learn the tools of the trade and get the security clearances so they can tap into these databases. I agree with the 4-year sunset included for certain surveillance provisions in the bill. In committee I suggested a 5-year sunset. The House had 2 years. It is now 4 years. That is an appropriate time. It gives us the time to review whether there were any outrageous uses of these provisions or whether uses were appropriate under the basic intent of the bill. Let me briefly touch on a related topic of great importance in the war against terrorism. As an outgrowth of the Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information Subcommittee, today Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona and I held a press conference indicating a bill we will shortly introduce to create a new, central database, a database that is a lookout database into which information from intelligence, from law enforcement, from all Federal agencies will go. That database will be for every visa holder, every person who crosses borders coming in and out of this country. The legislation will provide for ``smart visa cards'', reform the visa waiver program, reform the unregulated student program, and improve and beef up identity documents. I passed around at the press conference a pilot's license, easily reproducible, no biometric data, no photograph, perforated around the edges showing that it had been removed from a bigger piece. This is the pilot's license that every 747 pilot carries, every private pilot carries. It is amazing to me that this can be a Federal document and be as sloppy as it is in this time. We intend to see that identity documents are strengthened to provide not only photographs, but biometric data as well (such as fingerprints or facial recognition information). And the data system would be such that it is flexible and scalable so as biometric technology and requirements progress, the database can keep up. Both Senator Kyl and I also met with Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle. Oracle has stated that they are willing to devote some 1,500 engineers to develop a national identity database. What we are proposing is different from that. He said they would devote their software free of charge.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I will take 1 additional minute; 8 minutes. That was meant to be a joke.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I would be happy to yield.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. We are not proposing a national identity card, but we do believe this kind of database could be prepared by a company such as Oracle--they have offered to give it to the Government for free or by NEC, which did a state-of-the-art fingerprint system for San Francisco. We believe this should be under the auspices of the Homeland Security Director, that these decisions need to be made rapidly, and that we need to get cracking to close the loopholes that have made the United States of America one giant sieve. This bill, which I am so happy to support, takes a giant step forward in that direction. I thank both the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for their diligence on this bill. I yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. If I may just have 1 minute to conclude.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise this morning alongside my colleagues Senators Hutchison and Mikulski to voice my support for the Afghan Women and Children's Relief Act of 2001, which I am proud to cosponsor. This bill authorizes the President to provide educational and health care assistance to the women and children living in Afghanistan and as refugees in neighboring countries. This is an important new front in our war against terrorism--and for the people of Afghanistan--and a much overdue one at that. For over twenty years Afghanistan has known little but violence, bloodshed, and civil war. It has seen mass killings, disappearances, land mines, child soldiers, and one of the world's largest refugee outflows and internally displaced populations in history. And, since the Taliban takeover in 1996, Afghanistan has also been witness to a horrifying war against women. Until the accession of the Taliban women in Afghanistan were involved in public life, had access to education, were able to travel freely within their own country, and had access to jobs. Indeed, many were professionals--doctors, nurses, and teachers. But under the Taliban women have been systematically denied access to education and health care. They have been denied access to employment. They have been forced to wear burkas, an all-encompassing garment, if they go out in public--something they can only do if accompanied by a male relative. Indeed, without a male relative to accompany them, many are even denied access to humanitarian aid and food assistance. In short, under the Taliban Afghan women have been systematically denied their basic and fundamental human rights. At the same time Afghanistan has witnessed a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. Two decades of war have destroyed or degraded much of the housing stock in Afghanistan's major cities. Afghan war-widows have been forced to become the primary bread-winners for their families and children, but, under Taliban law, are often prevented from working. As a result, tens of thousands of Afghan children are undernourished or malnourished. Most Afghans do not have access to safe drinking water. It has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. Millions of Afghans have fled to neighboring countries, and millions more are internally displaced within their own country. I first became concerned about the plight of Afghan women five years ago, during the 105th Congress, when, shortly after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, I first started to hear the horror stories of what was transpiring in a country which at that time rarely made the news section of American newspapers. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee I held a public hearing on women's rights in Afghanistan to learn more about what was happening, and I introduced legislation which condemned the Taliban, called on the United States to provide additional humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan, and stated that the U.S. government should not recognize any government of Afghanistan which systematically maltreated women. Alongside a handful of my colleagues--Senators Boxer and Brownback foremost among them--I have continued to try to bring attention to this issue in the years since, addressing it in letters to the President, addressing it every year in statements on International Woman's Day, cosponsoring further legislation in the Senate, and, earlier this year, urging the Administration to consider additional emergency assistance for the people of Afghanistan, with an emphasis on the special needs of women and children. For too many years, however, all too few people listened. But I would argue that how a regime treats its women and children can be seen as an early warning indicator that can alert us to larger systemic problems that demand our attention. Indeed, as I stated before the Foreign Relations Committee in addressing this issue in 1998, ``The conditions of near-anarchy that have resulted from the sectional fighting and civil war have created in Afghanistan an environment well-suited for the training of terrorists and the production and shipment of drugs. It is no coincidence that Osama bin Laden has chosen Afghanistan as a base of operations . . . .'' Today, tragically, we have all become experts on Afghanistan and its tumultuous recent history. The ``Afghan Women and Children's Relief Act of 2001'' is an important statement of the United States commitment to the future of Afghanistan and its people. A commitment to make sure that Afghanistan's women and children, who have borne the brunt of the Taliban's brutality for the past half-decade, will receive the assistance they need, and have the opportunity for a future. As we continue to push forward in our effort to combat international terrorism I can think of few tasks more valuable than making sure that Afghanistan will never again face conditions which have made it an ideal base for terrorist operations, and that the people of Afghanistan will never again face the human suffering that they have been subject to for the past two decades. I urge my colleague to join with Senators Hutchison and Mikulski in support of this important piece of legislation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise this morning alongside my colleagues Senators Hutchison and Mikulski to voice my support for the Afghan Women and Children's Relief Act of 2001, which I am proud to cosponsor. This bill authorizes the President to provide educational and health care assistance to the women and children living in Afghanistan and as refugees in neighboring countries. This is an important new front in our war against terrorism--and for the people of Afghanistan--and a much overdue one at that. For over twenty years Afghanistan has known little but violence, bloodshed, and civil war. It has seen mass killings, disappearances, land mines, child soldiers, and one of the world's largest refugee outflows and internally displaced populations in history. And, since the Taliban takeover in 1996, Afghanistan has also been witness to a horrifying war against women. Until the accession of the Taliban women in Afghanistan were involved in public life, had access to education, were able to travel freely within their own country, and had access to jobs. Indeed, many were professionals--doctors, nurses, and teachers. But under the Taliban women have been systematically denied access to education and health care. They have been denied access to employment. They have been forced to wear burkas, an all-encompassing garment, if they go out in public--something they can only do if accompanied by a male relative. Indeed, without a male relative to accompany them, many are even denied access to humanitarian aid and food assistance. In short, under the Taliban Afghan women have been systematically denied their basic and fundamental human rights. At the same time Afghanistan has witnessed a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. Two decades of war have destroyed or degraded much of the housing stock in Afghanistan's major cities. Afghan war-widows have been forced to become the primary bread-winners for their families and children, but, under Taliban law, are often prevented from working. As a result, tens of thousands of Afghan children are undernourished or malnourished. Most Afghans do not have access to safe drinking water. It has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. Millions of Afghans have fled to neighboring countries, and millions more are internally displaced within their own country. I first became concerned about the plight of Afghan women five years ago, during the 105th Congress, when, shortly after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, I first started to hear the horror stories of what was transpiring in a country which at that time rarely made the news section of American newspapers. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee I held a public hearing on women's rights in Afghanistan to learn more about what was happening, and I introduced legislation which condemned the Taliban, called on the United States to provide additional humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan, and stated that the U.S. government should not recognize any government of Afghanistan which systematically maltreated women. Alongside a handful of my colleagues--Senators Boxer and Brownback foremost among them--I have continued to try to bring attention to this issue in the years since, addressing it in letters to the President, addressing it every year in statements on International Woman's Day, cosponsoring further legislation in the Senate, and, earlier this year, urging the Administration to consider additional emergency assistance for the people of Afghanistan, with an emphasis on the special needs of women and children. For too many years, however, all too few people listened. But I would argue that how a regime treats its women and children can be seen as an early warning indicator that can alert us to larger systemic problems that demand our attention. Indeed, as I stated before the Foreign Relations Committee in addressing this issue in 1998, ``The conditions of near-anarchy that have resulted from the sectional fighting and civil war have created in Afghanistan an environment well-suited for the training of terrorists and the production and shipment of drugs. It is no coincidence that Osama bin Laden has chosen Afghanistan as a base of operations . . . .'' Today, tragically, we have all become experts on Afghanistan and its tumultuous recent history. The ``Afghan Women and Children's Relief Act of 2001'' is an important statement of the United States commitment to the future of Afghanistan and its people. A commitment to make sure that Afghanistan's women and children, who have borne the brunt of the Taliban's brutality for the past half-decade, will receive the assistance they need, and have the opportunity for a future. As we continue to push forward in our effort to combat international terrorism I can think of few tasks more valuable than making sure that Afghanistan will never again face conditions which have made it an ideal base for terrorist operations, and that the people of Afghanistan will never again face the human suffering that they have been subject to for the past two decades. I urge my colleague to join with Senators Hutchison and Mikulski in support of this important piece of legislation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise to offer some comments on the bill before us, the foreign operations appropriations bill. Today we are considering the fiscal year 2002 foreign operations appropriations bill. I ask my fellow Senators to consider this: The total foreign assistance spending in this legislation represents just .79 percent of the entire $1.9 trillion Federal budget. That is less than half of what it was just 15 years ago, and it is barely .1 percent of GDP. An even smaller amount of the bill's funding is for foreign development assistance, less than .6 percent of the budget. Anemic U.S. foreign assistance spending is not new news, but it is part of a very sad legacy of more than two decades of declining foreign assistance spending. But at precisely the time when the events of September 11 have driven home what an integrated and globalized world we live in, a world that requires us, I believe, to reexamine the basic underpinnings of U.S. national security policy, it is baffling that the United States remains on a course to tie a post-World War II low in foreign assistance spending and a 50-year low of overseas assistance as a share of Government spending. I do not mean this as any criticism of the managers of the bill. Given the administration's request and the allocations of the subcommittee, they have done an excellent job of putting together a $15.5 billion bill. But in light of September 11, I strongly believe that the fundamental assumptions regarding how best to safeguard U.S. national security interests over the long term require rethinking and reexamination. As America undertakes a war on terrorism, we must declare war on global poverty as well, and we must do so because our national security demands no less. If we are going to win this war against terrorism, we have to be willing to invest in the lives and livelihoods of the people of the developing world. For it is the poverty and the resulting political instability and institutional weakness of developing countries, many of them failed or near failed states, which provide the ecosystem in which terrorists, terrorist operations, terrorist recruitment, and terrorist organizations are able to flourish. The World Bank estimates that 1.2 billion residents of poor nations live on less than $1 a day. In South Asia alone, more than 550 million people, 40 percent of the total population, live on less than $1 a day. In sub-Saharan Africa it is close to 50 percent of the population. I know the Chair is eminently familiar with this. Close to 50 percent of the population--that is, 291 million people, or more than the entire population of the United States--live in that abject, grinding poverty. All in all, about 2.8 million people, half of the world's population, live in poverty, getting by on $2 a day. That is less than a cappuccino at Starbucks. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations estimates that nearly 800 million people in the developing world are undernourished, 1.2 billion lack access to safe drinking water, 2.9 billion have inadequate access to sanitation, and over 1 billion people are either unemployed or underemployed. For all too many of these people, there is precious little hope in their daily life, and they experience a world in which progress or betterment is virtually impossible. Yet, as a recent Congressional Budget Office study on the role of foreign aid and development reports: ``U.S. spending on foreign aid has fluctuated from year to year but has been on a downward path since the 1960s.'' In 1962, the United States spent more than 3 percent of the budget outlays on foreign assistance. Today, as I noted, it is barely six- tenths of 1 percent. This is unconscionable. Interestingly enough, people do not understand this. I often ask people: How much do you think the foreign operations budget is as a percent of the overall budget? Some will say 5 percent, some will say 10 percent, some will say 15 percent, but nobody says less than 1 percent. Yet that is the fact. The United States spends less than $30 a year for each of its citizens helping those in the developing world, compared with a median per capita contribution of $70 by other industrialized nations. This has not always been the case and, I would argue, it is also not becoming of America's position and role in the world. Between 1950 and 1968, the United States contributed more than half of the official development assistance provided by countries in the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and by 1978 we were contributing less than a third. By 1998, it was less than a sixth, where it languishes today. Some would question why this matters, or they would argue that it is the responsibility of others, not us, to address these development needs. The short answer is that it matters because development assistance is a critical tool for the protection and promotion of U.S. interests around the globe. It matters because poverty leads to financial instability, infectious disease, environmental degradation, illegal immigration, drugs, narcotic trafficking, and it fuels the hatred of ``have-not'' nations for the ``have'' nations, of which the United States heads the list. Although not the sole cause of perceived grievances in an increasingly unequal and increasingly globalized world, poverty is a principal cause of human suffering, and the political instability that results as well. In its worst form, poverty creates the political, social, economic, and institutional instability and chaos that leads to failed states, zones of anarchy, and lawlessness, with semi-legitimate governments, or no real functioning government, which are unable to offer their people a positive vision of the future and instead utilize the United States as a scapegoat for their hopelessness. It matters because into the void of failed states, and lives without hope or the prospect for betterment, step terrorists, fanatics, extremists, and others who take advantage of these situations for their own ends. If a state is unable to educate its young, terrorists and extremists will only be too happy to indoctrinate the young, poisoning their minds. If a country is unable to offer young men or women the prospect of a job and self-respect, terrorists, fanatics, and extremists are more than happy to offer conspiracy theories to explain misfortune and offer alternative employment in their criminal enterprises. And if a government is unable to offer its people a positive prospect for the future, terrorists or fanatics are able to offer their own distorted view of the world and twisted vision of the future. It matters because poverty creates the swamp in which the terrorists find protection and sustenance, and it matters in short because our national security interests and the lives and safety of our citizens depend on us recognizing this. It matters, I strongly believe, because self-interest aside, the United States has a strong moral global obligation, especially in cases such as Afghanistan and now Pakistan, to provide assistance to those who have helped us in the past and who stand with us today in this war on terrorism. Foreign assistance and development assistance are valuable elements in our toolbox to respond to the events of September 11, and in cases where diplomacy or military force cannot be used, they may be the only tools available. When nations who are friends or allies of the United States were subject to terrorist attacks prior to September 11, all too often the U.S. reaction was to bemoan the rough neighborhood in which these nations live and shrug our shoulders as if nothing could be done. But September 11 proved with startling clarity all of the globe is a neighborhood today, our neighborhood, and we must see what can be done; for if we continue to do nothing, it is at our peril. I would not argue that the United States should waste foreign assistance spending on ineffective programs, or on projects where rampant corruption prevents us from assuring that our assistance reaches those in need. But a report last year by the Overseas Development Council suggests that many aid programs have been successful. They have contributed to advances in public health, sanitation, and education. As a first step in this new war on global poverty, then, it is critical that the government, private foundations, and nongovernmental organizations come together to identify areas where increased spending can make a difference, especially in the world's poorest regions. This review must also look at what government and private voluntary donors have learned about how to make delivery of assistance more effective. This evaluation should also extend to the activities of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral development and lending institutions. Where these institutions need to be reformed, and I believe they do, their activities should be redefined today. Once this evaluation is complete, I believe it is critical we reverse the past two decades of a downward trend in U.S. foreign assistance spending and dramatically increase funding, including that channeled through foundations and nongovernmental organizations. According to the U.N. Development Program, some $40 billion a year-- remember, we are at $15 billion--would provide water and sanitation, reproductive health, basic health and nutrition, and basic education for all in need in the developing world. To help meet our share of this need, I believe and propose we triple the foreign assistance budget within 5 years, bringing it back up to what it was before, roughly, and this is still a meager amount, 0.3 percent of gross domestic product. I fully believe such an increase in United States foreign assistance spending would be leveraged by increases in assistance contributions by other potential public and private donors. In addition to traditional economic development programs, our renewed focus on fighting international poverty must also focus on the creation of public goods, democratic institutions, rule of law, functioning and legitimate educational systems which allow public and economic progress and growth to take root and flourish. The image of ``draining the swamp'' of terrorists has become a commonplace metaphor, but the metaphor has its limits. The environmental elements which contribute to the germination and flourishing of terrorists and extremists cannot, in fact, simply be drained away. Indeed, I am worried that if we do not act wisely and address every dimension and level of this war on terrorism we run the risk of fueling a new generation of terrorists. Rather, we must adopt a long-term, carefully crafted strategy to reduce and perhaps even eliminate factors such as global poverty, which underlie and foster terrorism. So I call upon my colleagues to recognize that such long-term efforts are as much a part of the burden of global leadership and the war on terrorism as cruise missiles and aircraft carriers. Meeting this obligation of leadership demands and requires a serious, long-term commitment of the necessary resources by the United States. As one Senator, I am prepared to make that commitment and I hope my colleagues are as well. I yield the floor. Amendment No. 1940

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as I mentioned, this bill took a good deal of good staff work. I am very proud that good staff work has occurred on both sides of the aisle. It is not easy to remedy 170 differences between a House and Senate bill, and yet this happened. I particularly commend the appropriations staff, Christina Evans, B.G. Wright, on the Republican side; Sid Ashworth, John Kem, and also Matt Miller of my staff. They worked long and hard on this bill, and I think that it will get, if not a unanimous vote of this body, certainly a near unanimous vote. It is a job well done, and I am very pleased on behalf of Senator Hutchison and myself to recognize that. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for her comments. Today I am very pleased to bring before the Senate the conference agreement on the fiscal year 2002 military construction appropriations bill. Given the circumstances, this is a particularly timely and time- sensitive conference report. I am very pleased that the Senate has demonstrated a willingness to move quickly on it. The military construction conference agreement provides $10.5 billion of new budget authority. That is a 17.5-percent increase over last year's military construction funding, and it is a 5.3-percent increase over the President's budget request. This statistic alone sends a strong message of support to America's men and women in uniform. This is a good package. It meets the most pressing needs of the military, both in terms of readiness and quality-of-life issues. It is not, of course, a perfect package. The conference report does not include everything the Senate wanted, nor does it include everything the House wanted. It does, however, address the priorities of the Department of Defense, which I think is most important, as well as both Houses of Congress. It is a carefully crafted compromise. It is both balanced and bipartisan. I am particularly pleased to see such quick action on this measure at a time when we as a nation are asking for so much from our men and women in uniform and from their families. The conference agreement provides $4.8 billion for the Active components of the military. That is a 35-percent increase over fiscal year 2001. So the military components are up 35.8 percent. It provides $953 million for the Reserve components. That is a 357-percent increase over last year. For family housing, the conference agreement provides $4.1 billion. That is a 12-percent increase over last year. These are important increases. They signal a commitment to upgrading and rebuilding the infrastructure that is truly the backbone of our Nation's military. The conference report also includes a $100 million increase over the President's budget request for environmental cleanup at military installations that have been closed as part of the base realignment and closure effort. This is most significant. We need to clean up these bases so they can be transitioned into civilian use. This additional funding is necessary. It enables the military to honor its commitments to the people and the communities that have been affected by the economic upheaval caused by base closures. I point out that this is a great deal of money, yet much more is going to be needed before the environmental cleanup of BRAC sites across the Nation is complete. This is certainly something we should consider before we embark on any future rounds of base closings. I believe this most strongly. One other item I want to mention today is the issue of defense access roads. The events of September 11 have made us all the more aware of the potential vulnerability of sensitive civilian and military installations to the threat of terrorist attack, and a number of our colleagues have expressed concern about the need for upgrading access roads serving military installations, particularly around chemical demilitarization facilities. These roads are generally Federal or State highways that provide access to defense installations but are not owned by the Defense Department. Therefore, funding to construct access roads has to go through the Department of Transportation. The military construction bill includes a standing provision authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide funds to the Transportation Department for access roads but only--only--when the Secretary of Defense has certified that these roads are important for national defense. In other words, these are not projects that can easily be added to the MILCON bill if the President does not request them. However, because of the current sensitivity of chemical demilitarization facilities, we included a provision in our conference agreement that will enable the Defense Department to conduct a feasibility study on the requirements for Defense roads at chemical demilitarization sites in the United States to support emergency preparedness requirements. I might also mention the Senate MILCON bill and the House MILCON bill had about a $600 million difference between the two bills. There were about 173 adds from Members. Only 3 of them were the same in both the House and the Senate bills. So truly the Senate staffers on both sides have done a wonderful job in putting together the conference report. I am very pleased to say it was a unanimous vote in the conference committee. So it was a reconciling of interests. I very much thank Chairman Byrd. I thank Senator Stevens and particularly my ranking member on the subcommittee, Senator Hutchison, for their unflagging support and assistance in bringing this conference report to the Senate. Again, I particularly thank the subcommittee staff for their hard work on this measure. I am very pleased the military construction bill will be one of the first appropriations conference agreements sent to the President, and I hope he will sign it without delay. I turn this over to the ranking member for her comments, and I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I would like to speak for a moment about Section 128 of the Interior Appropriations conference report. In its original form, Section 128 repealed language from last year's Omnibus Indian Advancement Act, language that circumvented the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's commonsense protections and regulatory safeguards against the inappropriate siting of Class III, Nevada-style casinos. Late last year, a one-paragraph provision was attached to the Omnibus Indian Advancement Act granting land in trust to a single Indian tribe, the Lytton band, and permitting them to move forward on plans to establish a Nevada-style gaming establishment in San Pablo, CA, on a site that is not part of and is not adjacent to land traditionally held by the Lytton band of Indians. In fact, this site is in a major urban area just outside of San Francisco, neither in nor near the Lytton band's reservation. This was done without regard to Federal laws currently in place to regulate the siting of such a casino. Now, language that would have originally repealed that granting of land in trust merely states that the Lytton band must follow the Code of Federal Regulations for Class III gaming, which they would have had to follow anyway. I have serious reservations about the expansion of Class III gaming in urban areas, and I am particularly against off-reservation gambling. These off-reservation casinos cause counties additional costs in public and local services, often intrude in residential areas, and are increasingly causing local concerns ranging from traffic congestion to additional crime. Currently, California has 109 separate and independent tribal governments, of which 46 have operational casinos. Three more casinos are currently under construction. Additionally, 20 tribes have compacts with the state and are proposing casinos, and 10 more are in negotiations with the Governor for a tribal state compact for Class III gaming. Finally, 54 more tribes are petitioning or involved in congressional acts to be federally recognized to promote a casino. Circumventing the processes for Federal recognition of tribal governments and for granting land into trust presents a variety of serious and critical multi-jurisdictional issues--issues which can negatively affect the lives of ordinary citizens and deprive local government of their political power to protect those whom they govern. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act has provided this Nation with a fair and balanced approach to Indian casinos by facilitating tribal plans for economic recovery without compromising a multitude of factors that should be taken into account when deciding on the siting of such a large, Nevada-style casino. IGRA works. It is a fair process that should be followed.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Security and Fair Enforcement in Arms Trafficking Act of 2001, cosponsored by Senators Leahy and Akaka. Small arms and light weapons, such as assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, and portable launchers of antiaircraft missile systems, are the weapons of choice for terrorists and their friends, and I fully believe that U.S. leadership is needed to stem the global torrent of illicit arms. All too often these arms fall into the hands of terrorists, drug cartels, and violent rebellions. Curbing the proliferation of these weapons must be a vital component of our efforts to combat international terrorism. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in fact, is due in no small part to the ready availability of these weapons in that war torn country, and Afghanistan clearly demonstrates how a country can become a threat to regional and global security if it is flooded with small arms and light weapons. The Taliban and the al Qaeda network were able to gather more than 10 million small arms and light weapons from a variety of sources over the past decade, including AK-47s, hand grenades, and Stinger missiles. Today the United States and its allies are faced with these very weapons as we move forward with Operation Enduring Freedom. The global networks of terrorism are clearly linked to the networks of the illicit arms trade and to the states that harbor terrorists, and terrorists around the globe also utilize the intertwined global networks of the illegal arms trade and the drug trade to generate financial resources for their destructive and threatening activities. As I have previously discussed on the floor, the global proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a staggering problem. An estimated 500 million illicit small arms and light weapons are in circulation around the globe. In the past decade, an estimated 4 million people have been killed in civil war and bloody fighting. Nine out of ten of these deaths are attributed to small arms and light weapons. The sheer volume of available weaponry has been a major factor in the devastation witnessed in recent conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Kosovo, among others, as well as the violence endemic to narco-trafficking. The increased access by terrorists, guerrilla groups, criminals, and others to small arms and light weapons poses a real threat to U.S. forces overseas. For the United States, as we now engage in the war on terrorism, this issue is a very real force protection issue. The conflicts fueled by small arms and light weapons undermine regional stability and endanger the spread of democracy and free markets around the world. Clearly this is a huge problem, with profound implications for U.S. security interests. I strongly believe that the U.S. Government must take the lead in the international community in addressing this issue. It is in the United States national interest to promote responsibility and restraint in the transfer of small arms and light weapons; to combat irresponsible practices in such transfers, to ensure that nations engaged in substandard practices are held accountable; to encourage other members of the international community to meet, as minimum standards U.S. law and practices; take strong action to negotiate and support making the trafficking of small arms traceable; bolster rules governing arms brokers; and eliminate the secrecy that permits millions of these weapons to circulate illicitly around the globe, fueling crime and war. As a matter of fact, as a major supplier country in the legal arms trade, the United States has a special obligation to promote responsible practices in the transfer of these weapons. That is what the Security and Fair Enforcement in Arms Trafficking Act of 2001 aims to do. It: Affirms U.S. policy to maintain the highest standards for the management and transfer of small arms and light weapons exports, and that it is U.S. policy to refrain from exports that could be used in internal repression, human rights abuses and international aggression; enforces the ban in international commercial transfers of military-style assault weapons and, improves end-use monitoring of U.S. arms transfers; urges the administration to enter into negotiations with the European Union and NATO member states, as well as other members of the international community to bring our allies into compliance with U.S. law and standards for the export and transfer of military-style assault weapons as well as on such critical issues as marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, rules governing the conduct of arms brokers, and the enforcement of arms embargoes; calls on the administration to establish a U.S.-EU Coordinating Group on Small Arms, and to work to and implement and advance the Program of Action of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects; improves the transparency of U.S. transfers in small arms and light weapons, and requires the establishment of a registry of all U.S. firearm exports; and, encourages all states that have not done so to ratify the OAS convention on small arms and light weapons. And let me be clear: This legislation does not interfere with legitimate and responsible transfers of small arms or the lawful ownership and use of guns in the United States. The United States needs to push hard to improve the international standards and the application of legally binding agreements to stem the illicit trade in these weapons. Fighting the proliferation of small arms is critical to our efforts to combat terrorism, narco-trafficking, international organized crime, regional and local war. I believe that combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a critical element of the fight against terrorism, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Senate and with the administration to pass the Security and Fair Enforcement in Arms Trafficking Act of 2001.