Dianne Feinstein

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I note that the ranking member is not present on the floor at the moment, Mr. President. I will yield myself 10 minutes.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe it is very much in our national interests to ratify this treaty, after we strike five conditions in the resolution of ratification. Let me first express my respect and appreciation for the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden. He and his staff have really done the heavy lifting in getting this treaty to the floor, including many long hours of negotiations on the package of 28 agreed conditions. I also want to express my respect for the opponents of this treaty, including the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl. I have worked well with Senator Kyl on many issues, including, at the moment, our strong effort to pass a Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution. I know that in this debate these Senators are motivated by their genuine and deeply felt concern for America's national security. However, I must disagree with the view that we would be better off without this treaty, or by passing a resolution of ratification that essentially renders the treaty meaningless. Mr. President, the threat of chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or being used as a weapon of war by a rogue state, has increased dramatically in recent years. One need only reflect on the dangers faced by our military by Iraq's incipient chemical weapons program during the gulf war, or the tragedies our Nation has suffered with the bombing of the World Trade Center, the Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the Olympic Park in Atlanta, to fully appreciate the dangers posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons. In each of these cases, the tragedy and loss of life could have been magnified significantly had chemical weapons been used. The people of Japan know this first-hand. The deadly sarin gas attack carried out in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shunrikio cult was testimony to the power of even a relatively small amount of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are among the most barbaric of mankind's inventions. They are so awful, that the United States, by act of Congress, has decided to eliminate our own stocks of these weapons by 2004. They are designed to kill and incapacitate by causing such effects as skin blistering, blindness, lung damage, choking, nervous system disruption, paralysis, or oxygen starvation. Because of the ease of their dispersal over a wide area, chemical weapons are especially useful for targeting civilian populations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the most far-reaching attempt ever by the international community to control the spread of chemical weapons. It bans for the first time the development, production, and possession of chemical weapons and reinforces the international norm against their use. Since we are destroying our own chemical weapons, it only makes sense that we should want other nations to do so as well. The convention requires all signatory states to declare and destroy any chemical weapons and the facilities used to produce them. It requires member states to submit annual reports on the production and use of certain sensitive chemicals. This information, combined with our own intelligence resources, will significantly improve our ability to monitor and prevent illegal transfers and uses of such chemicals. Once the CWC takes effect, it will make it much harder and more costly for proliferators and terrorists to acquire chemical weapons. An intrusive verification system will be set up to detect violations. Sanctions will be imposed against nations that refuse to participate, making it more difficult for them to acquire precursor chemicals for poison gas and easier to monitor their efforts to do so. The intelligence-sharing and global verification network that will result from this treaty will increase the chances that terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons can be prevented before they ever occur--a net gain in the security of our troops and our citizens. Now, a number of very serious concerns have been raised about the CWC. I myself have shared some of these concerns. I will not speak to every criticism of the treaty, but I want to address some of these concerns now, because I believe very solid answers have been provided to virtually all of them. Verification: Critics of the CWC have complained that it is not verifiable, and that it will be easy for nations who sign up to the treaty to cheat without getting caught. We must start with the proposition that no arms control agreement is 100-percent verifiable. But with the CWC, we will know far more about who is trying to develop chemical weapons, where, and how than we would without the treaty. That is why the intelligence community has consistently testified that, while the treaty is not completely verifiable, they regard it as a highly desirable tool that will enhance our knowledge of chemical weapons programs and our ability to stop them. The CWC's verification regime requires routine inspections of all declared facilities working with significant amounts of chemicals listed by the treaty. In addition, any site, declared or not, may be subject to short-notice challenge inspections if there are suspicions that it is being used to produce or store banned chemicals. The CWC also establishes significant trade restrictions on precursor chemicals. These restrictions will make it more difficult for nations who are not parties to the treaty to acquire these chemicals, and will provide us with much more information than we currently have about who is seeking to import such chemicals, and in what amounts. So the concern about verification, while valid, I believe has been more than adequately addressed. We must go into this treaty with our eyes open, aware that it will not detect every violation. But why would we deprive ourselves of the extremely useful tools and information this treaty would provide on the grounds that they are not fool-proof? It would be incredibly short-sighted to do so. Sharing Defense Technologies: During one of the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, the concern was raised that Article X of the CWC would require the United States to share advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like Iran, who may sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the treaty required that, there would be significant grounds for concern. But I believe the concern is overstated. In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical weapons defense capabilities. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Berger's letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to alert this body to a very special event, which took place this past weekend, called NetDay. NetDay, which began in 1996, is a unique partnership between the public, private and educational communities with the common goal of fitting K-12 classrooms with the technological infrastructure needed for the 21st century. In the beginning of this year, on behalf of myself, Senator John Warner, Senator Conrad Burns, Senator Charles Robb, Senator Patty Murray, and Senator Barbara Boxer, I introduced Sense of the Senate Resolution 51, celebrating the success of NetDay activities and encouraging all schools to participate in 1997 NetDay activities, including the projects which took place this past weekend. As I did in February of this year, when I introduced the NetDay resolution, I would like to again commend the organizers and volunteers of NetDay, an excellent example of individuals creating a stronger community with the goal of increasing the quality of their schools. The success of this weekend was impressive. Although it is still too early to cite official statistics of Saturday's event, NetDay organizers have stated that ``schools up and down the State, in isolated towns in the north, farming towns in the central valley, and hundreds in urban communities all participated in NetDay.'' In addition, the 38 empowerment zone schools of the Los Angeles Unified School District were involved in NetDay activities and future planning. Last year alone, NetDay was successful in bringing out more than 100,000 Americans, including 50,000 Californians to volunteer in their neighborhood schools. These students, teachers, parents, and friends of the schools, came to wire classrooms and school libraries throughout the Nation. Thousands of individuals accomplished their goal to install communications cables, connect wires and switches to upgrading their schools for the 21st century. The success of NetDay is significant. Last year, over 25,000 elementary, junior and senior high schools were wired. I expect these numbers to dramatically increase as NetDay organizer compile results from Saturday's activities. Throughout the United States, volunteers climbed ladders and got on their hands and knees to install the wiring infrastructure needed to connect thousands of elementary and secondary school classrooms with contemporary technology. As I have mentioned in earlier floor speeches, NetDay began in California on March 9, 1996. The term was coined by cofounders John Gage of Sun Microsystems, one of the Nation's leading technology companies and Michael Kaufman of KQED, a California public broadcasting station. Mr. Gage and Mr. Kaufman saw this initiative as a day where hundreds of Californians came out to an ``old fashioned barn raising for the modern technology age.'' Just as volunteers would gather in the Nation's early years, with neighbor helping neighbor, to build homes, barns or community buildings, California's NetDay volunteers gather in support of neighborhood schools. Amazingly, and to their surprise, NetDay succeeded in one year in wiring 3,500 schools efficiently and cost- effectively, establishing and improving our classroom information infrastructure up and down the State. However, as our classrooms continue to modernize and improve their technological infrastructure there is much work to be accomplished, both in California and throughout the Nation. Consider the following: According to the Department of Education half of our K-12 schools lack full access to advance technology in the classroom. Ninety-five percent of those K-12 schools who want to but are not yet wired, do not have the needed budgetary resources or organized volunteer base to wire their schools. Rural areas and regions with high poverty continue to have less access to advanced educational technology compared to their suburban and urban counterparts. These few points illustrate that there is still much to be done in our children's classrooms. NetDay organizers are committed to working with under served neighborhoods and ensuring that the appropriate resources, both in volunteers and computer wiring kits, are channels to these communities. In addition, this year's NetDay will focus on communities that did not fully benefit from last years initial set of projects and activities. In all, NetDay continues to save schools and taxpayers millions of dollars in educational technology startup costs, while training and equipping teachers with the knowledge needed to be a successful and integral part of the technical educational experience. According to NetDay organizers, this year's relationship between private business, the labor community, and neighborhood schools is stronger than ever. Business sponsors and corporate volunteers will be instrumental in making NetDay a successful reality. The small, and large, companies continue to supply the project the needed computer and wiring equipment, and have also encouraged their employees to work with their children's or neighborhood schools. In addition, the labor community will continue to go into schools across America, where they are committed to work with private partners in ensuring that their local schools have the educational infrastructure needed for a well trained work force for the 21st century. The most valuable asset of NetDay continues to be the commitment of thousands of volunteers who will work in their community schools. As the communities throughout America celebrate their NetDay accomplishments and prepare for future activities for this year and beyond, it is my honor to once again, recognize the NetDay cofounders, Michael Kaufman and John Gage, and organizers, Ann Murphy and Teresa Wann, and the dozens of corporate sponsors and business partners, and the thousands of students, teachers, parents, and school administrators for their achievement. The success and commitment they have shown to America and my State of California should be applauded. My colleague and cochair on the U.S. Senate information technology caucus, Senator John Warner, Senator Conrad Burns of Montana, Senator Charles Robb of Virginia, Senator Patty Murray from Washington, and my California colleague Senator Barbara Boxer join me in supporting the advancement of educational technology by sponsoring this resolution. Together, we urge our Senate colleagues to affirm congressional support for preparing U.S. classrooms with the needed technological infrastructure for the 21st century. I invite my Senate colleagues to join this public-private partnership effort and I congratulate all the volunteers who participated in NetDay 1997 and encourage them to keep up the commendable and exemplary work.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a trusted colleague and dedicated public servant, Chuck Stevens. During his three-and-a-half-year tenure as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, he compiled an undeniably strong record. However, what may be most impressive about Chuck is his self- effacing demeanor in a position that often requires being pushed into the limelight. Chuck Stevens' career exemplifies the kind of integrity, dedication and skills essential for anyone who seeks to be an effective public servant. His success at the helm of the Eastern District in California so early in his career undoubtedly will be followed by great accomplishments in the future. A native of Cranford, NJ, Mr. Stevens moved to California to study law at the University of California, Berkeley where he graduated in 1982. Prior to his current position, he worked as a litigator in complex cases in the private sector and as an Assistant United States Attorney. Mr. Stevens returned to public service when he was appointed by President Clinton in November 1993 to be the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California. I had the honor of recommending Mr. Stevens to the President for appointment. Since then, Chuck has succeeded in prosecuting a multitude of crimes--from hate crimes to political corruption to halting health care fraud--with distinction and diligence. He was also appointed by United States Attorney General Reno to serve on her advisory committee representing United States Attorneys across the nation. The Sacramento-based Eastern District of California is the tenth largest of the Nation's 94 Federal judicial districts. It covers 34 counties with 6 million residents scattered across 87,000 square miles from Oregon to Los Angeles and Nevada to the coastal range. Members of the legal community and Federal investigative agents give Mr. Stevens universally high marks for his job performance. He is credited with having ``no ego about himself and his work, unlike most lawyers,'' according to Sacramento based Federal Defender Quin Denvir. As anyone who has worked with Chuck knows, his work speaks for itself. Recently, Mr. Stevens' office has handled the weighty responsibility of trying the Unabomber case for incidents that occurred in California. Due to Mr. Stevens' leadership, Sacramento was considered as a site for the Federal trial against Ted Kacyzinski. It comes as no surprise that this case has been handled without fanfare, but with the utmost professionalism Mr. Stevens is known for. Chuck has always been ready and able to provide valuable advice on some of the State's most troubling problems. He is one of the most practical problem solvers in the criminal justice system. Chuck leaves the United States Attorney's office to form his own law firm in California's capitol with his predecessor, former United States Attorney George O'Connell. I am sure this formidable pair will quickly make its mark in the Sacramento legal community. Congratulations, Chuck, on the great opportunities that lie ahead and thank you for your outstanding public service to the people of this State and this Nation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, when Congress approved and the President signed the comprehensive welfare reform legislation last year, it was clear to many that it was not a perfect bill. I, along with many of my colleagues expressed grave concern about a number of provisions that will have a devastating impact, not only on States and counties in terms of a huge cost shift, but on the lives and well-being of many elderly and disabled people--people who are now dependent upon public assistance for their survival. The provision denying supplemental security income [SSI] and food stamps to virtually all legal immigrants who are noncitizens, even those who are elderly and disabled, who cannot support themselves, who have no sponsor or other means of support, such as refugees, in my view, is one of the most egregious flaws in that bill, and one of the main reasons why I voted against its passage. Today, Senator Chafee and I, along with Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, DeWine, Lieberman, and Mikulski are offering legislation to correct this flaw. The Fairness for Legal Immigrants Act of 1997 would grandfather in from the ban on SSI and food stamps: those elderly and disabled legal permanent residents who were receiving SSI and food stamps on or before August 22, 1996 and, those refugees who were in the country as of August 22, 1996. This legislation prohibits SSI and food stamps for legal permanent residents who are not refugees and who were not receiving SSI and food stamps as of August 22, 1996. This legislation also prohibits SSI and food stamps for all legal permanent residents and refugees coming to this country following the date of enactment of the Welfare Reform Bill, August 22, 1996. Mr. President, to not correct this flaw in the bill represents an enormous unfunded mandate to States and counties by simply shifting the cost of caring for the seriously ill, disabled, and elderly legal immigrants who are destitute and have no other way to survive. As I speak, SSA is sending out 125,000 SSI ban notices per week, to 800,000 legal immigrants who are on SSI nationwide. SSA estimates that more than 62.5 percent or 500,000 people currently receiving SSI benefits nationwide will lose their benefits under the current law-- more than 40 percent, 205,000 of them in California. Many of these elderly and disabled legal immigrants have no family or friends to turn to for support and will become completely destitute. Their only recourse will be county general assistance programs or, at worst, homeless shelters. Let me give you an example from my home State: My staff met with a 73-year-old legal immigrant on SSI. She was welcomed to this county from Vietnam in 1980. She was a refugee from communism with no family in the United States. She speaks no English and she is suffering from kidney failure. She requires dialysis three times a week. Under this new law, this 73-year-old woman will lose SSI, her only source of support. Her well-being will become the responsibility of the county. I am the first to acknowledge that prior to welfare reform, there was abuse of the SSI program in this country. Elderly noncitizens could collect SSI, even if they lived with their children, as long as they claimed to be financially independent from the children. And the number of noncitizens receiving SSI has skyrocketed at a disproportionate rate to that of citizens. The number of noncitizens collecting SSI increased 477 percent in 14 years, from 1980 to 1994, while the number of U.S. citizens receiving SSI increased 33 percent during that same period. Although I strongly support efforts to hold sponsors accountable for the support of legal immigrants they bring into the country, the welfare reform bill passed by Congress simply went too far. It banned SSI and food stamps for virtually all legal immigrants, even those whose sponsors cannot afford to support them, or who have no sponsors at all. The current welfare reform bill will not just eliminate fraudulent cases from the SSI rolls. It will eliminate truly needy people like the 73-year-old elderly refugee. Surely, it was not the intent of this Congress to leave elderly, disabled, and destitute people with nowhere to go to except county relief or the streets. If we do not revise the welfare ban for legal immigrants the financial costs to States and counties will be enormous, and the human toll even greater: Los Angeles County estimates that 93,000 legal immigrants in its county will lose SSI benefits at a cost of up to $236 million a year to the county. San Francisco estimates that 20,000 legal noncitizens may turn to the county's general assistance program, at a total cost of up to $74 million annually. I believe this body must finish what it started last year. In this time of budgetary constraints where tough choices have to be made, we must act with prudence and compassion toward those who truly have no one to turn to, while at the same time preserving portions of the savings needed to balance the budget and enact meaningful reform. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. Mr. President, I ask that the SSA table be printed in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today, along with my distinguished colleague, Senator Charles Grassley, I am introducing the Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997. This legislation limits the accessibility and unauthorized commercial use of social security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and certain other types of sensitive personal information. In November, the news media reported that companies were distributing social security numbers along with other private information in their online personal locator or look-up services. In fact, I found that my own social security number was accessible to users of the Internet. My staff retrieved it in less than 3 minutes. I have the printout in my files. Some of the larger and more visible companies have now discontinued the practice of displaying social security numbers directly on the computer screens of Internet users. Other enterprises have failed to modify their practices. One problem thwarting efforts to protect our citizens' privacy is that there are thousands of information providers on the Internet and elsewhere in the electronic arena--it is impossible to get a comprehensive picture of who is doing what, and where. But one fact is clear, distributing social security numbers on the Internet is only the tip of the iceberg. Too many firms profit from renting and selling social security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and other forms of sensitive personal information. List compilers and list brokers use records of consumer purchases and other transactions--including medical purchases--along with financial, demographic, and other data to create increasingly detailed profiles of individuals. The growth of interactive communications has generated an explosive growth in information about our interests, our activities, and our illnesses--about the personal choices we make when we order products, inquire about services, participate in workshops, and visit sites on the Net. A Newsday article titled ``Your Life as an Open Book'' recently reported that an individual's call to a toll free number to learn the daily pollen count resulted in a disclosure to a pharmaceutical company that the caller was likely to have an interest in pollen remedies. It is true that knowledge about personal interests, circumstances, and activities can help companies tailor their products to individual needs and target their marketing efforts. But there need to be limitations. Prior to the widespread use of computers, individual records were stored on paper in Government file cabinets at scattered locations around the country. These records were difficult to obtain. Now, with networked computers, multiple sets of records can be merged or matched with one another, creating highly detailed portraits of our interests, our allergies, food preferences, musical tastes, levels of wealth, gender, ethnicity, homes, and neighborhoods. These records can be disseminated around the world in seconds. What is the result? In addition to receiving floods of unwanted mail solicitations, people are losing control over their own identities. We don't know where this information is going, or how it is being used. We don't know how much is out there, and who is getting it. Our private lives are becoming commodities with tremendous value in the marketplace, yet we, the owners of the information, often do not derive the benefits. Information about us can be used to our detriment. As an example, the widespread availability of Social Security numbers and other personal information has led to an exponential growth in identity theft, whereby criminals are able to assume the identities of others to gain access to charge accounts and bank accounts, to obtain the personal records of others, and to steal Government benefits. In 1992, Joe Gutierrez, a retired Air Force chief master sergeant in California became a victim of identity theft when a man used his Social Security number to open 20 fraudulent accounts. To this day, Mr. Gutierrez has been hounded by creditors and their collection agencies. ``It is pure hell,'' he said in an interview with the San Diego Union Tribune. ``They have called me a cheat, a deadbeat, a bum. They have questioned my character, my integrity, and my upbringing.'' As an additional problem, the unauthorized distribution of personal information can lead to public safety concerns, including stalking of battered spouses, celebrities, and other citizens. There are very few laws to protect personal privacy in the United States. The Privacy Act of 1974 is limited, and applies only to the use of personal information by the Government. With minor exceptions, the collection and use of personal information by the private sector is virtually unregulated. In other words, private companies have nearly unlimited authority to compile and sell information about individuals. As technology becomes more sophisticated, the ability to collect, synthesize and distribute personal information is growing exponentially. The Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997 will help cut off the dissemination of Social Security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and other personal information at the source. First, the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to ensure the confidentiality of personal information in the credit headers accompanying credit reports. Credit headers contain personal identification information which serves to link individuals to their credit reports. Currently, credit bureaus routinely sell and rent credit header information to mailing list brokers and marketing companies. This is not the use for which this information was intended. The bill we are introducing today would prevent credit bureaus from disseminating Social Security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, dates of birth, past addresses, and mothers' maiden names. This is important because this kind of information is subject to serious abuse--to open fraudulent charge accounts, to manipulate bank accounts, and to gain access to the personal records of others. An exception is provided for information that citizens have chosen to list in their local phone directories. This means that phone numbers and addresses may be released if they already are available in phone directories. As a second means of limiting the circulation of Social Security numbers, the bill restricts the dissemination of Social Security numbers by State departments of motor vehicles. Specifically, the bill amends certain exemptions to the Driver's Protection Act of 1994. The legislation would prohibit State departments of motor vehicles from disseminating Social Security numbers for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing, or solicitations. The bill requires uses of Social Security numbers by State Departments of Motor Vehicles to be consistent with the uses authorized by the Social Security Act and by other statutes explicitly authorizing their use. In addition to the above measures which will limit the accessibility of Social Security numbers, the Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997 penalizes the unauthorized commercial use of Social Security numbers. Specifically, the bill amends the Social Security Act to prohibit the commercial use of a Social Security number in the absence of the owner's written consent. Exceptions are provided for uses authorized by the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other statutes specifically authorizing such use. I believe this bill represents a major step in protecting the privacy of our citizens, and I urge my colleagues to support it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be included in the Record following our remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today, along with my distinguished colleague, Senator Charles Grassley, I am introducing the Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997. This legislation limits the accessibility and unauthorized commercial use of social security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and certain other types of sensitive personal information. In November, the news media reported that companies were distributing social security numbers along with other private information in their online personal locator or look-up services. In fact, I found that my own social security number was accessible to users of the Internet. My staff retrieved it in less than 3 minutes. I have the printout in my files. Some of the larger and more visible companies have now discontinued the practice of displaying social security numbers directly on the computer screens of Internet users. Other enterprises have failed to modify their practices. One problem thwarting efforts to protect our citizens' privacy is that there are thousands of information providers on the Internet and elsewhere in the electronic arena--it is impossible to get a comprehensive picture of who is doing what, and where. But one fact is clear, distributing social security numbers on the Internet is only the tip of the iceberg. Too many firms profit from renting and selling social security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and other forms of sensitive personal information. List compilers and list brokers use records of consumer purchases and other transactions--including medical purchases--along with financial, demographic, and other data to create increasingly detailed profiles of individuals. The growth of interactive communications has generated an explosive growth in information about our interests, our activities, and our illnesses--about the personal choices we make when we order products, inquire about services, participate in workshops, and visit sites on the Net. A Newsday article titled ``Your Life as an Open Book'' recently reported that an individual's call to a toll free number to learn the daily pollen count resulted in a disclosure to a pharmaceutical company that the caller was likely to have an interest in pollen remedies. It is true that knowledge about personal interests, circumstances, and activities can help companies tailor their products to individual needs and target their marketing efforts. But there need to be limitations. Prior to the widespread use of computers, individual records were stored on paper in Government file cabinets at scattered locations around the country. These records were difficult to obtain. Now, with networked computers, multiple sets of records can be merged or matched with one another, creating highly detailed portraits of our interests, our allergies, food preferences, musical tastes, levels of wealth, gender, ethnicity, homes, and neighborhoods. These records can be disseminated around the world in seconds. What is the result? In addition to receiving floods of unwanted mail solicitations, people are losing control over their own identities. We don't know where this information is going, or how it is being used. We don't know how much is out there, and who is getting it. Our private lives are becoming commodities with tremendous value in the marketplace, yet we, the owners of the information, often do not derive the benefits. Information about us can be used to our detriment. As an example, the widespread availability of Social Security numbers and other personal information has led to an exponential growth in identity theft, whereby criminals are able to assume the identities of others to gain access to charge accounts and bank accounts, to obtain the personal records of others, and to steal Government benefits. In 1992, Joe Gutierrez, a retired Air Force chief master sergeant in California became a victim of identity theft when a man used his Social Security number to open 20 fraudulent accounts. To this day, Mr. Gutierrez has been hounded by creditors and their collection agencies. ``It is pure hell,'' he said in an interview with the San Diego Union Tribune. ``They have called me a cheat, a deadbeat, a bum. They have questioned my character, my integrity, and my upbringing.'' As an additional problem, the unauthorized distribution of personal information can lead to public safety concerns, including stalking of battered spouses, celebrities, and other citizens. There are very few laws to protect personal privacy in the United States. The Privacy Act of 1974 is limited, and applies only to the use of personal information by the Government. With minor exceptions, the collection and use of personal information by the private sector is virtually unregulated. In other words, private companies have nearly unlimited authority to compile and sell information about individuals. As technology becomes more sophisticated, the ability to collect, synthesize and distribute personal information is growing exponentially. The Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997 will help cut off the dissemination of Social Security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and other personal information at the source. First, the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to ensure the confidentiality of personal information in the credit headers accompanying credit reports. Credit headers contain personal identification information which serves to link individuals to their credit reports. Currently, credit bureaus routinely sell and rent credit header information to mailing list brokers and marketing companies. This is not the use for which this information was intended. The bill we are introducing today would prevent credit bureaus from disseminating Social Security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, dates of birth, past addresses, and mothers' maiden names. This is important because this kind of information is subject to serious abuse--to open fraudulent charge accounts, to manipulate bank accounts, and to gain access to the personal records of others. An exception is provided for information that citizens have chosen to list in their local phone directories. This means that phone numbers and addresses may be released if they already are available in phone directories. As a second means of limiting the circulation of Social Security numbers, the bill restricts the dissemination of Social Security numbers by State departments of motor vehicles. Specifically, the bill amends certain exemptions to the Driver's Protection Act of 1994. The legislation would prohibit State departments of motor vehicles from disseminating Social Security numbers for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing, or solicitations. The bill requires uses of Social Security numbers by State Departments of Motor Vehicles to be consistent with the uses authorized by the Social Security Act and by other statutes explicitly authorizing their use. In addition to the above measures which will limit the accessibility of Social Security numbers, the Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997 penalizes the unauthorized commercial use of Social Security numbers. Specifically, the bill amends the Social Security Act to prohibit the commercial use of a Social Security number in the absence of the owner's written consent. Exceptions are provided for uses authorized by the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other statutes specifically authorizing such use. I believe this bill represents a major step in protecting the privacy of our citizens, and I urge my colleagues to support it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be included in the Record following our remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, 50 years ago a true American hero walked onto Ebbets Field one afternoon and forever shattered the color barrier with one swing of his bat. His name was Jack Roosevelt Robinson. On that day, 7 years before Brown versus the Board of Education allowed school children of all colors to sit in the same classroom, 16 years before Martin Luther King Jr. spoke of his dreams at the foot of the Lincoln Memorial, and 18 years before the Civil Rights Act became the law of the land, Jackie Robinson did more for the equal rights movement and the sport of baseball than had anyone before him. Jackie Robinson on April 15, 1947, became the first professional black athlete to play America's pastime, baseball. In his Brooklyn Dodgers uniform, he not only broke the color barrier, but he also broke numerous baseball records during his 10-year professional career. By the end of his tenure as a player, Jackie Robinson would become one of America's most celebrated and honored athletes. He became major league baseball's first Rookie of the Year--an award now named after him, the national league's Most Valuable Player, holder of the coveted batting title, a six-time member of Dodgers' World Series teams, a member of the 1955 world champion Dodgers, and a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame. As the senior U.S. Senator representing California, I am particularly proud of the fact that Jackie Robinson was from the Golden State, raised in Pasadena, and was a star athlete at the University of California at Los Angeles. At UCLA, Robinson became the first athlete ever to win varsity letters in four sports: baseball, basketball, football, and track. Such an amazing and talented athlete, however, was not welcomed into the arms of American baseball fans or of its players back in the spring of 1947. Jackie Robinson fought prejudice and harassment with every base he ran, every ball he hit, and every victory he helped win for his team. Players and coaches yelled racial slurs at him, and one team even threatened to strike in protest of Robinson's presence in their city. But Robinson, remembering how his mother refused to sell their family home and move away amid protests from white neighbors, persevered. He faced hatred and racism with courage and conviction, proving to teammates, opponents and fans alike that he had earned the right to play professional baseball through his sheer athleticism. Along the way, Robinson became the role model for future baseball icons such as Hank Aaron and Willie Mayes. Shortly after his retirement from baseball in 1957, Jackie Robinson helped to further the rights of all African-Americans by becoming a spokesman and fundraiser for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored people [NAACP]. He traveled the country urging black communities to work together for equal rights, educating and encouraging them to participate in the new civil rights movement. He became a role model all over again, this time to millions of men and women who saw inequality and wanted to change it. Jackie Robinson represents everything good with baseball, and everything great with America. By commemorating his achievements and his entrance onto the professional baseball fields, his legacy lives on, inspiring yet another generation of fans to realize their dreams and break new ground along the way. Jackie Robinson once said, ``A life is not important except in the impact it has on other lives.'' By that standard, Jackie Robinson's life was as important as America's greatest heroes throughout history, and we as a nation are all grateful and proud of his accomplishments. Major league baseball has recognized Jackie Robinson's achievements by dedicating the 1997 season to his memory. As part of these festivities, last week's opening day games were played in all major league stadiums with a Jackie Robinson commemorative baseball. Just last weekend, the Los Angeles Dodgers paid tribute to the Hall of Famer in a pregame ceremony attended by Rachel Robinson, Jackie's widow. The Dodgers plan many other activities throughout the year such as a Jackie Robinson poster distributed to all Los Angeles district schools, a special section devoted to Robinson on the Dodgers' official web site, a salute to Jackie Robinson scholarship winners, an historic Robinson display at Dodger Stadium and assistance with the Jackie Robinson Foundation Golf Classic. Additionally, President Clinton will honor his memory with Rachel Robinson in an April 15 ceremony at Shea Stadium during a game between the Dodgers and the New York Mets. I salute the memory of Jackie Robinson on this, the 50th anniversary of his becoming the first black baseball player in the major leagues.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Will the Senator yield for a moment?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank you. I would like to thank again the Senator from Georgia. It has been a great pleasure to work with him and Senator Hutchison. We began this effort over a week ago. It has been a very intensive effort. I believe it has resulted in a resolution which will have dominant support from this body, pass the House, and be signed by the President of the United States. More importantly, I think this resolution will become the law and will have teeth. And those teeth are: Administration: Report on September 1 the progress that has been made. Here are the specific areas in which we wish you to make progress. If there is inadequate progress made, it leaves no alternative really but to fuel up for a massive decertification battle in a year. I want to say one thing about America's demand problem. Because the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, who spoke on this issue, I think had it right. One of the things that I have found is that we have programs in this country that work and programs that do not work. And I would just like to recommend to everybody that might be watching this a program that does work, a program which has no Government funds, a program with whom my colleague from California and I are very well familiar. That is a program called Delancy Street in San Francisco which takes the hardest core drug addicts, with about a 4-year stay, and puts them through an intensive program--changes their environment, changes their lifestyle, and does rehabilitate. As mayor, I helped Delancy get some land right on the waterfront. The Delancy people built their own facilities, which are stellar. They run their own businesses. They pay for their program through their labor. And I would just like to invite--Delancy does not know I am doing this--anyone, anywhere in the United States that has an interest in replicating a program to rehabilitate American drug addicts that works, to go to San Francisco, to call Mimi Silbert, the director, and take a look at a program that works, does not take dime one of public money and does it all on their own. It is one of the most impressive programs anywhere in the United States. If we had more Delancys and more kinds of permeations of Delancy, Delancy Streets for young children, children 14, 15, 16 years old, I think we could turn this Nation around. If we had more programs like Facts on Crack from Glide Memorial Church in San Francisco, we could begin to turn this Nation around. But in the meantime, we have to retard the supply of drugs. And that is a major first step. So again, I say thank you to everyone that has participated. I look forward to the vote. I thank the Chair and I yield back the balance of my few minutes. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask to be recognized for such time as I might consume within the hour allocated to me.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you, very much. Mr. President, this country has always had a great debate about drugs. Do you fight drugs on the supply side, or do you fight drugs on the demand side? There is no question but that we have a demand problem. But there is also no question that we have a supply problem. My answer to that is that this country has never really done both really well. We have never really engaged in an all-out fight against drugs on both the supply side and the demand side. What is before us today is somewhat limited in scope because it has to do with the certification action involving Mexico and whether that action should, in fact, take place; whether Mexico should be certified, as the President said. The resolution now before this body, known as the Coverdell-Feinstein amendment, I think is significant. Let me tell you the two ways that I look at this. This resolution is either the first step to a new and forceful partnership to fight drugs all out on both the supply side and the demand side, and to join with Mexico in so doing, to accept President Zedillo's statement that drugs are the No. 1 security problem of Mexico, and to add to that the United States statement that drugs are, in fact, the No. 1 security problem for the United States of America, which I believe them to be, or this is the first step in a major battle next year, if this resolution is ignored, to decertify Mexico as being noncooperative in the supply side of the cooperation that goes into the retardation of drug flow into this country. Mr. President, I want to begin by once again paying my respects to the Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Senator Coverdell. He and I share a dedication to the idea that the status quo on United States-Mexican counterdrug cooperation is simply not acceptable, and his leadership on this issue has helped us reach this point. It has been an honor and a privilege to be his partner in this effort. And I look forward to continuing to work with him and his outstanding staff in the fight against international drug trafficking. I also want to acknowledge the Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, whose contribution to this effort was invaluable. Her State, like mine, shares a long border with Mexico. So this issue hits home to us in a direct and a meaningful way. Other Senators too numerous to list, with names like Dodd, Kerry, McCain, Domenici, as well as others, the majority leader, the Democratic leader, have all weighed in to bring this effort to fruition. And I have appreciated working with each and every one of my colleagues to get to this outcome. Just over a year ago, as has been said, Senator D'Amato and I started talking about whether Mexico merited certification as a fully cooperative partner in the war against drugs. Our view was that Mexico had simply not made enough progress in the war on drug trafficking to justify certification. At that time, despite the fact that we laid down 10 specific criteria, no one paid us much attention. Well, people have paid attention this year. On February 28 of this year, the President made the decision to certify Mexico as fully cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug trafficking. But it just didn't wash in the Congress. The evidence simply does not support the claim that Mexico met the standard of full cooperation in 1996. As all of my colleagues are well aware, Senate procedures made it impossible for us to get a vote on what many of us believed was the best option--to decertify Mexico but allow the President to waive the sanctions based on what is termed a ``national interest waiver.'' If decertification with a waiver had come up for a vote I believe it would have passed the Senate by a large and even possibly veto-proof margin. I do not say that lightly. In the House, it would have passed overwhelmingly. Instead, the House passed with over 250 votes a resolution that decertifies Mexico in 90 days unless specific conditions are met. So this resolution, which we will pass today, expresses Congress' deep concern over the lack of progress in key areas of Mexico's counterdrug effort. Let me quote from subsection (c) of the amendment. ``It is the sense of the Congress that there has been ineffective and insufficient progress in halting the production in, and transit through, Mexico of illegal drugs.'' This statement has never before been made by this body and the other body in concert. And I believe it will be, and no one should underestimate what that means. In short, while we could not decertify Mexico, the Congress rejects the administration's claim that Mexico has fully cooperated with the United States. The evidence I believe is overwhelming. Last week, I tried to lay this case out with some specificity, the case that Mexico has not earned decertification. I will not repeat here all of the facts to prove that Mexico has not met the test of full cooperation. But let me just remind my colleagues of a few of those facts. No. 1, cocaine seizures by Mexican authorities in 1996, 23.6 metric tons, were barely half of what they were in 1993 when there were 46.2 metric tons. You see how they have dropped and how they have barely picked up this past year. Drug related arrests in 1996 were 11,038, less than half of what they were in 1992. In 1992, what I am saying is that the cooperative effort on arrests was double what it has been this past year. And these are specific measurements that can't be challenged. They are there. You have to look at them. Another way of measuring this, for those of us that are familiar with how drugs reverberate on streets, is whether street prices are dropping or rising. If the street prices for cocaine and for heroin drop on the streets, you know there is more supply. If they rise on the streetcorners of New York and Los Angeles and Chicago and Dallas and other cities in this Nation, then you know there is less supply. Let us for a moment take a major city, a huge city, over 6 million people in Los Angeles, and let us look at street prices. The street prices of cocaine today, in Los Angeles, are 22 percent lower than they were in 1993. This is for a kilogram, $21,000 in 1993, dropping to $16,000 today. Let us take a look at the street value of black tar heroin, almost entirely transferred to the United States from Mexico. Here is the street value of this black tar heroin in California. In 1993, per ounce, it was $1,200. Look at it go straight down. Today, it is $400. Part of that is the fact that it is in competition with the pure white cocaine that comes from other places, but still the black tar heroin is heavily used by addicts, and you can see the drop in the street price, which clearly means more supply. Then you take the major traffickers. What has happened is that as the Cali cartels of Colombia become less potent in this area, the Mexican cartels have become more potent. Specifically, Senator Coverdell enumerated four of them--the Juarez, Tijuana, Sonora, and Gulf cartels. And our DEA has clearly stated to us in testimony, written and verbal, that the Mexican major drug cartels today are operating with impunity, and even the State Department admits that ``the strongest groups such as the Juarez and Tijuana cartels have yet to be effectively confronted.'' Mexican cartels have assassinated 12 high-level prosecutors and senior law enforcement officers in just the last year. Here is the clincher. None of these murders has been solved. Twelve major Federal and statewide prosecutors, sometimes the head prosecutor, people who want to do a good job, have been assassinated for doing that good job. It has often been said that those they cannot buy, the cartels will kill. Corruption is endemic in Mexico's Government, police, and military. The Mexican drug czar was arrested for corruption as was another senior army general just 2 days ago. DEA Administrator Constantine has said ``there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship.'' Mexico has enacted money laundering legislation last year. So far the legislation has not been implemented. Banking regulations were finally issued last week, 2 months late, but they do not take effect until May, and their effectiveness has not yet been evaluated. Mexico has failed to adequately fund the Binational Border Task Forces agreed to by the two sides in a much touted bilateral meeting, and as we all know, to this day Mexico has forbidden our DEA agents taking part in these border task forces, if they cross the border from our country to Mexico, to carry sidearms to protect themselves on that side of the border. Mexico has refused to allow United States Navy ships patrolling for drug smugglers to put into Mexican ports to refuel without 30 days' notice. The reason this is so important is that if you are trailing a ship, whether it is a fishing vessel or another maritime vessel, you may need to pursue it into Mexican waters. More drugs are now coming into our country via maritime channels. Fishing boats, commercial boats, ships, and other maritime transportation devices are today carrying increased tonnage of drugs. If we have a Coast Guard ship tracking one of these vessels, it may have to put into port--and the Mexican traffickers have become very sophisticated about moving out, taking the time so that they know the ship following them needs to refuel. If our vessels have to put in, they cannot because our ships have to give 30-day notice before they refuel. Well, of course, one of the biggest tonnages of cocaine transferred through maritime channels actually was a ship leaving Peru which our Navy was able to get to, but the cartels are very smart. They learn how to prevent this from happening. So this is an important area. And then finally a battle that we have had back and forth--and I still hold fast to this statement--Mexico has never extradited a single Mexican national to the United States on drug charges despite 52 extradition requests, for at least 13 of which the paperwork has been completed. Now they have made advances, they have begun to extradite Mexican nationals on other charges, and I think they should be commended for that. But that is not yet full cooperation. So I think the record is clear. It is not credible to make claim that Mexico has fully cooperated with the United States in combating drug trafficking, and that is the standard required by section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Despite these facts, the claim has been made by the administration that progress has been made, and I respect that. The administration has said that they believe some of the things I have just alluded to are in the process of being corrected. That is why originally we felt it was so important to have this body be able to monitor progress, comment on progress on September 1 in an expedited way, and make a finding if we found the progress inadequate. That has been removed from this resolution, but the administration will still report on progress. You can be sure that I and others in this body will come to the floor and make our comments on September 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 on whether we regard this progress as being adequate. So as we engaged in negotiations with the administration over the past week on this resolution, it was extremely important to put into place a mechanism by which we could hold the administration accountable. We have compromised here. But we also have 10 specifics. Subsection (d) requires the President to support on progress in 10 specific areas--and I urge Members to begin to look at this. It begins on page 6 of the resolution following this historic statement that ``it is the sense of Congress that there has been ineffective and insufficient progress in halting the production and transit through Mexico of illegal drugs.'' We say that not later than September 1 the President shall submit to the Congress a report and then we list 10 areas of concern to be addressed in the report. Let me outline those 10 areas. The first is effective action to dismantle the major drug cartels and arrest and extradite their leaders. This goes specifically to the two most powerful groups, the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, as well as others like the Sonora and the Gulf cartels. Second, better cooperation between the United States and Mexican law enforcement including the funding and deployment of the Binational Border Task Forces and allowing United States agents in these forces to arm themselves for self-defense. That is the implication. By September 1 we will know whether it has been achieved or not. The answer then will be yes or no. Third, better enforcement at the border. This means increased screening for and seizures of contraband. It also means, and Senator Hutchison was very effective in incorporating this into our resolution, that we call for the funding and the assignment of an additional 1,000 agents on the border this next year. The administration's budget has funding for 500. Let me say to the administration, from this side of the aisle, that is not adequate. We are asking for 1,000, by official action, incorporated in this legislation. Improved cooperation on extraditions--that is the fourth. This goes specifically to the need for Mexico to extradite Mexican nationals who are wanted in the United States on drug charges. A good start would be the 13 such requests pending. There are several dozen more on the way. On September 1, we will see how many extraditions there have been. Fifth states easier rules of prosecution of drug traffickers. At the present time, the evidentiary rules in Mexico--and Mexico is aware of this--are such that, in their country it is very difficult to come by a conviction. Sixth, full and ongoing implementation of effective money laundering legislation and enforced regulations--for banks and other financial institutions--these are the money-changing houses outside of banks-- with penalties and sanctions for those who do not comply and immunity for those who help, so people who turn in money launderers will not be assassinated. We are hopeful--and I commend Mexico for taking action in this regard--we are hopeful that last week's progress in issuing these regulations will lead, now, to effective enforcement. We all know it is one thing to have something on the books, it is another thing to see that something is carried out and enforced. On September 1, Senator Coverdell and I and others will both be looking at these. Are they in place? Have they been effected? Have they been enforced? Seventh, increased eradication of drug crops, including marijuana and opium--this is the seventh. We hope and expect that eradication figures will increase this year. I believe our Nation is prepared to play a role in any binational cooperation that the Mexican Government would wish in that regard. Eighth, implementation of a comprehensive screening program to identify, weed out, and prosecute corrupt officials at all levels of the Mexican Government, police, and military. This means vigorous screening of candidates before they are hired, not rehiring corrupt policemen after their dismissal, and prosecution of those found to be corrupt. We commend Mexico for firing 1,250 law enforcement officers. The problem is, none were prosecuted. That is the problem. And we are asking for cooperation. I think it is worth noting that the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday that 3 percent of the Mexican police tested positive for drug use in a recent survey. This was 3 percent of Federal personnel screened. I think it added up to some 424 Federal law enforcement officers who failed drug tests. We have that same problem in our Nation. So we admit it and we try and screen. We are asking our partner in Mexico to do the same thing. Ninth, we have a clause in there regarding support by the United States of Mexico's efforts to combat corruption. I cannot conclude without saying that Mexico has made efforts. I believe Mexico has made efforts. I simply question the adequacy of those efforts. But, for those efforts that have been made, we should provide support, and I believe every Member of this Congress, and certainly this Senate, wants to do so. So, this clause reads, ``the rendering of support to Mexico in its efforts to identify, remove and prosecute corrupt officials''-- they would ask us for that support, but we would certainly say that support would be forthcoming. The 10th and final provision calls for ``the augmentation and strengthening of bilateral cooperation.'' This is not specific in the law we are writing. It is nonspecific. At the administration's request, we removed a direct reference to air and maritime cooperation. But I think the record should show that Congress does expect this report to discuss progress made in areas such as aircraft overflight and refueling rights, aircraft radar coverage, and maritime refueling rights. I look forward to receiving this report on September 1. The record will reflect that, and Senator Coverdell and I and Senator Hutchison and others, come September 1, as sure as the sun will come up, we will make an inquiry to see what the progress has been. And if the Congress finds the progress cited by the administration to be inadequate, it will no doubt find ways to respond. This report, in essence, in addition to the findings carried up front in this resolution and the two senses of the Senate, urging the President on his visit to put forward this new, multilateral cooperative, hemispheric drive, if you will, reflect a new strategy, a new plan, new bilateral cooperation, and the specific sense of the Senate, and our conclusions as to why we would have to say there has not been full cooperation up to this point. I very much hope, in summary, that there will be a very strong vote in this Chamber for this resolution. If it passes, I have been assured by John Hilley of the White House Office of Legislative Affairs and General McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, that the administration will work hard to get this resolution passed by the House. If they do, I believe it will pass the House. John Hilley and General McCaffrey also assured me that the President will sign this resolution as passed by the Senate. We, for the first time in history, will have passed a law, not a sense of the Senate resolution, but a law which states a purpose, which states a new effort, which states specifics, and which asks that on both the supply side and the demand side there be a new effort by both the United States of America and the sovereign, independent country of Mexico, to address the drug problem together, both on the demand side here with us and the supply side there with Mexico. It is a very important, significant piece of legislation. I believe, I sincerely believe, it can have major, long-term impact. If it does not, the alternative is very clear next year. It is very clear. And it will not be just Senator D'Amato and I next year, or Senator Coverdell and I, and Senator Hutchison and others, and hopefully a majority this year. It will be a full-blown effort to see that this progress is carefully evaluated. And whatever action we must take, we will, in fact, take. Mr. President, let me express my thanks to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, for lifting his objection. I know he has very deep and heartfelt feelings about the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have said to him informally, and I will say here, I will certainly do everything I possibly can to provide him with any help I can give, to see that it comes to the floor. But I am very pleased he has withdrawn his objection and we will be able to bring this debate to a conclusion with a vote on this resolution. Mr. President, I ask how much time remains on my hour?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I would like to acknowledge that. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is, in fact, a cosponsor of this legislation. Like me, he had very strong feelings, and I know when you have very strong feelings, compromise is difficult. He did do that. I am very thankful, because I think we have a very strong piece of legislation as a result, and his support was certainly vital and, I think, crucial to getting this resolution on the floor and getting the vote that, hopefully, we will get. So I thank the Senator from Georgia.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the quorum time be applied proportionately to all who have time reserved.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Massachusetts has requested time. I will yield 7\1/2\ minutes of my time to him, and I believe the Senator from Georgia will yield time.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I really rise to lament the situation we are in. I believe the people of this Nation sent us to the Senate to work across the aisle, to work in a bipartisan way and particularly on issues of major concern. Whether Mexico is certified or not is an issue of major concern. It is of major concern certainly to Mexico; it is to America; it is to the cities of America; it is to every Representative in the House and to every Member of this body as well. I wish to pay tribute to the senior Senator from Georgia, with whom I have worked, with the junior Senator from Texas, with whom I have worked, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, to the administration team, and to many others. I believe we have demonstrated we can, in fact, work across party lines. We have developed a resolution which I think is a major achievement; it is law--it is not a sense-of-the-Senate resolution; it is a law--in which we state our concerns; we make findings; we ask the administration to move forward; we ask the President to move forward in his trips to Mexico and other Latin American nations to work in a multilateral way to bring back a new agreement; we indicate 10 areas where we would like to see progress; and we ask the administration to report to this Congress on September 1 on the progress made. We did not start here. Senator D'Amato and I began this a year ago. Not many people listened. We said we do not really believe that Mexico has fulfilled the test of a friend and neighbor and an ally who has been fully cooperative as the law calls for to be certified. At that point he and I put forward certain tests that we felt had to be met prior to certification. A year went by, and we saw very little progress, if any. And then the President made the decision to certify Mexico. In his mind, he had many good reasons to do so. It was a decision that was spiritedly debated within the White House. It was debated within the Department of State. And that was the ultimate decision of the President. There were those of us in this body, myself included, who had a profound difference of opinion with this decision. We thought that the Colombian model was the appropriate model and that Mexico should be decertified but with a national interest waiver as was the procedure with Colombia 2 years ago because we felt certification was not the appropriate vehicle. But it is the vehicle that we have, and therefore Mexico should be treated in the same way Colombia was if the findings were as we believe them to be. We have had meeting after meeting after meeting. The senior Senator from Georgia and I find ourselves in real agreement. The Senator from Texas and the two of us have worked together. Democrats came in; Republicans came in; the administration came in; and we forged an agreement which I believe, based on a conversation at least on my side with the Democratic leader of the House of Representatives last night, can be acceptable to the House and can be a clear statement which gives the President certain--not directives--but I think certain clear requests from this body to follow on his trip to Mexico which is upcoming and from which I believe our Nation, our big cities, our streets can derive significant benefit. I am profoundly disappointed to find ourselves in this situation and really urge colleagues on my side who are rightly concerned with the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty, rightly concerned, to please let this resolution go, let us have the debate, because absent that debate and given no opportunity in law to express ourselves, you leave us with no choice but to move for decertification because that is the only direct resolution that can come to the floor on an expedited procedure, as the majority leader has just said. I cannot tell you how strongly I feel about the cooperation I and others have had from the Republican side of the aisle. I have had an opportunity to work very closely with the senior Senator from Georgia, with his excellent staff, certainly with my excellent staff, with the Senator from Texas, Senators McCain, Kerry, Dodd, Domenici, all of whom came at a very critical time last night into these discussions and played a very helpful role. The administration has agreed in the areas of consensus. I think some things they did not want to be forced to put forward in law they have agreed to. We have agreed to take out something that the administration did not want, which was a September 1 expedited procedure giving us the opportunity to comment again in law on progress made between March 1 and September 1. We removed that. We have consensus. The administration has said the President would sign this; we believe the House will pass it; and we have a strong policy document with which to move forward. It would just be tragic if we fragment, if we have to use the only thing we have, which is a decertification, a straight and outright decertification, as the means to express ourselves. So I am very hopeful we would have an opportunity today, now, to bring this resolution to the floor. If we cannot achieve unanimous consent, as the majority leader has just said, it leaves him with no alternative but to call up the decertification resolution, and once that debate begins it would take unanimous consent to stop it, and unanimous consent to bring this resolution up during that 10-hour period, which I see really fraught with great difficulties. Once again, I cannot tell you how many hours the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Texas, I and a number of other people have been involved in this effort. We have consulted the Democratic leader as we moved along. I believe he is pleased with this outcome. So I plead with colleagues on my side not to hold this resolution hostage to an agreement on the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is too important. Please, do not do it. I thank the Chair. Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to support this simple but strong legislation to protect our children. This bill, sponsored by myself, Senator Boxer, and Senator Snowe, would provide three simple protections: First, the bill would prohibit list brokers from selling personal information about children under 16 to anyone, without first getting the parent's consent. All kinds of information about our children--more facts than most of us might think or hope for--is rapidly becoming available through these list brokers. It is only a matter of time before this information begins to fall into the wrong hands. Last year, a reporter in Los Angeles was easily able to purchase parents' names, birth months and addresses for 5,500 children aged 1-12 in a particular neighborhood. The reporter used the name of a fictitious company, gave a non-working telephone number, had no credit card or check, and identified herself as Richard Allen Davis, the notorious murderer of Polly Klaas. When ordering the list, the company representative simply told her ``Oh, you have a famous name,'' and sent her the information C.O.D. This is simply unacceptable. Second, the bill would give parents the authority to demand information from the list brokers who traffic in the personal data of their children--brokers will be required to provide parents with a list of all those to whom they sold information about the child, and must also tell the parent precisely what kind of information was sold. If this personal information is out there, and brokers are buying and selling it back and forth, it is only reasonable that we allow parents to find out what information has been sold and to whom that information has been given. Finally, this bill would prohibit list brokers from using prison labor to input personal information. This seems like common sense to most of us, but unfortunately the use of prison labor is not currently prohibited. Last year when I introduced this bill, I spoke of the plight of Beverly Dennis, an Ohio grandmother who filled out a detailed marketing questionnaire about her buying habits for a mail in survey. She filled out the questionnaire when she was told that she might receive free product samples and helpful information. Rather than receiving product information, however, she soon began to receive sexually explicit, fact-specific letters from a convicted rapist serving time. The rapist, writing from his prison cell, had learned the very private, intimate details about her life because he was keypunching her personal questionnaire data into a computer for a subcontractor. Ms. Dennis received letters with elaborate sexual fantasies, weaved around personal facts provided by her in the questionnaire. This bill would have prevented the situation from ever occurring. Finally, Mr. President, this year I have included in the bill exemptions for sales to law enforcement organizations, the Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and to accredited colleges and universities. We received a great deal of input since we introduced the bill last June, and I believe we have addressed most of the concerns about our bill with these exemptions. Schools will be able to get information about prospective students, law enforcement will be able to get the lists to help them find missing kids, and the Center for Missing and Exploited Children will be able to do likewise. This bill is really very simple. Some marketing companies may be unhappy that the government is trying to legislate how they do business, but we have to weigh the safety and well-being of our children against the small inconvenience of requiring parental consent in these cases. Given the rapidly changing nature of the marketing business and the ways in which child molesters and other criminals operate, this bill is an important step in protecting our kids from those who would do them harm. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I want to express my support for the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997. I believe that extending the basic term of copyright protection by 20 years is a step in the right direction. Perhaps the most compelling reason for this legislation is the need for greater international reciprocity in honoring copyright terms. The European Union has formally adopted a life plus 70 copyright term, and countries currently awaiting admission to the Union will adopt this standard in the future. Several countries outside of the European Union also have turned to the life plus 70 term, and many expect it to become the international standard. By extending to life plus 70 years, Congress will help ensure that American creators receive comparable protection in other countries. If we do not act, other nations will not be required to provide American authors and artists with any more protection than we offer them at home. And, before the United States is the world's leader in the production of intellectual property, and because the State of California is home to many of the leading copyright industries, this issue is of great importance to me. We could be the net losers if we do not move toward greater harmonization. Intellectual property--the collective creative output of America's makers of movies, music, art, and other works--is an enormous asset to the Nation's economy and balance of trade. The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates that copyright-related industries contributed more than $385 billion to the U.S. economy in 1994, with more than $50 billion in foreign sales. Many other countries have preferred to appropriate and re-sell American films, music, and computer programs--some of the great exports of my State of California--rather than license American works. The United States suffers greatly from illegal duplication of our work. Why, then, should we sit back and allow European companies to legally profit from the use of our works, without paying us in return? As Prof. Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School aptly, albeit bluntly, put it: ``Unless Congress matches the copyright extension adopted by the European Union, we will lost 20 years of valuable protection against rip-off artists.'' Since America is the world's principal exporter of popular culture, extension of the basic copyright term is an important step in the right direction. Reciprocity in copyright protection becomes even more necessary in today's global information society, where computer networks span the continents, and intellectual property is shuttled around the world in seconds. The world has changed dramatically since 1976, when Congress established the present copyright terms. Many copyrighted works have a much longer commercial life than they used to have. Videocassettes, cable television, and new satellite delivery systems have extended the commercial life of movies and television series. New technologies not only have extended but also have expanded the market for creative content. Cable television, which promises hundreds of different channels, has vastly expanded this market. Networked computers add to the demand for content. Interactive television promises to do the same. The Copyright Term Extension Act will go far to address the global developments I have mentioned. After introduction, I recommend that my colleagues and I further develop the language of the act to ensure that all contributors to the creative process receive benefits from the extended copyright term. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, this bill grants permanent residency status to Jasmin Salehi, a California constituent who is currently assisting the LA district attorney with the prosecution of her husband's murderer. Mai Hoa Jasmin Salehi is a Korean immigrant who was denied permanent residency after her husband was violently murdered at a Denny's in Reseda, CA, where he worked as manager. Local INS officials in Los Angeles denied Jasmin's application because the law requires legal immigrants be married for 2 years before they become eligible for permanent resident status. Jasmin and Cyrus Salehi were newlyweds who had been married only 11 months before the murder. I have previously sought administrative relief for Jasmin by asking the INS if any humanitarian exemptions could be made in Jasmin's case, but the local INS officials in Los Angeles has told my staff that there is nothing they can do. Jasmin met and married Cyrus Salehi, an American citizen, in March 1995 and has completed all the paperwork necessary to obtain her green card. But now, Jasmin has been told that she can stay in the United States as long as the district attorney needs her to prosecute her husband's murderer. Despite here assistance in the prosecution, Jasmin would be deported once the investigation and subsequent trial are completed. Jasmin has done everything right in order to become a permanent resident of this country--except for the tragedy of her husband's murder 13 months before she could become a permanent resident. I hope you support this bill so that we can help Jasmin begin to rebuild her life in the United States. Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent that the attached news article and the bill be entered into the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Remarks by Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today on the subject of Mexico and the Southwest Border Initiative. My comments today will be limited to an objective assessment of the law enforcement issues involving organized crime and drug trafficking problems with specific attention on Mexico and the Southwest border. This hearing is extremely timely, and during my testimony I will provide the subcommittee with a full picture of how organized crime groups from Mexico operate and affect so many aspects of life in America today. I am not exaggerating when I say that these sophisticated drug syndicate groups from Mexico have eclipsed organized crime groups from Colombia as the premier law enforcement threat facing the United States today. Many phrases have been used to describe the complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating out of Colombia and Mexico, and frankly, the somewhat respectable titles of ``cartel'' or ``federation'' mask the true identity of these vicious, destructive entities. The Cali organization, and the four largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico--operating out of Juarez, Tijuana, Sonora and the Gulf region--are simply organized crime groups whose leaders are not in Brooklyn or Queens, but are safely ensconced on foreign soil. They are not legitimate businessmen as the word ``cartel'' implies, nor are they ``federated'' into a legitimate conglomerate. These syndicate leaders--the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Colombia to Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, Juan Garcia-Abrego, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and the Arellano-Felix Brothers--are simply the 1990's versions of the mob leaders U.S. law enforcement has fought since shortly after the turn of this century. But these organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a great deal more impact on our day to day lives than their domestic predecessors. While organized crime in the United States during the 1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of American life, their influence pales in comparison to the violence, corruption and power that today's drug syndicates wield. These individuals, from their headquarters locations, absolutely influence the choices that too many Americans make about where to live, when to venture out of their homes, or where they send their children to school. The drugs--and the attendant violence which accompanies the drug trade--have reached into every American community and have robbed many Americans of the dreams they once cherished. Organized crime in the United States was addressed over time, but only after Americans recognized the dangers that organized crime posed to our way of life. But it did not happen overnight. American organized crime was exposed to the light of day systematically, stripping away the pretense that mob leaders were anonymous businessmen. The Appalachian raid of 1957 forced law enforcement to acknowledge that these organized syndicates did indeed exist, and strong measures were taken to go after the top leadership, a strategy used effectively throughout our national campaign against the mob. During the 1960's, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy was unequivocal in his approach to ending the reign of organized crime in America, and consistent law enforcement policies were enacted which resulted in real gains. Today, traditional organized crime, as we knew it in the United States, has been eviscerated, a fragment of what it once was. At the height of its power, organized crime in this nation was consolidated in the hands of few major families whose key players live in this nation, and were within reach of our criminal justice system. All decisions made by organized crime were made within the United States. Orders were carried out on U.S. soil. While it was not easy to build cases against the mob leaders, law enforcement knew that once a good case was made against a boss, he could be located within the U.S., arrested and sent to jail. That is not the case with today's organized criminal groups. They are strong, sophisticated and destructive organizations operating on a global scale. Their decisions are made in sanctuaries in Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, Mexico, even day-to-day operational decisions such as where to ship cocaine, which cars their workers in the United States should rent, which apartments should be leased, which markings should be on each cocaine package, which contract murders should be ordered, which official should be bribed, and how much. They are shadowy figures whose armies of workers in Colombia, Mexico and the United States answer to them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or pagers. Their armies carry out killings within the United States--one day an outspoken journalist, one day a courier who had lost a load, the next an innocent bystander caught in the line of fire--on orders of the top leadership. They operate from the safety of protected locations and are free to come and go as they please within their home countries. These syndicate bosses have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment and weapons in quantities which rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments. Whereas previous organized crime leaders were millionaires, the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico are billionaires. It is difficult--sometimes nearly impossible--for U.S. law enforcement to locate and arrest these leaders without the assistance of law enforcement in other countries. Their communications are coded. they are protected by corrupt law enforcement officials, despite pledges from the Government of Mexico to apprehend the syndicate leaders, law enforcement authorities have been unable to locate them and even if they are located, the government is not obligated to extradite them to the U.S. to stand trial. In Mexico, as is the case wherever organized crime flourishes, corruption and intimidation allow the leaders to maintain control. These sophisticated criminal groups cannot thrive unless law enforcement officials have been paid bribes, and witnesses fear for their lives. Later in my testimony I will discuss some of these problems in greater detail. It is frustrating for all of us in law enforcement that the leaders of these criminal organizations, although well known and indicted repeatedly, have not been located, arrested or prosecuted. the cali group and traffickers from mexico We cannot discuss the situation in Mexico today without looking at the evolution of the groups from Colombia--how they began, what their status is today, and how the groups from Mexico have learned important lessions from them, becoming major trafficking organizations in their own right. During the late 1980's the Cali group assumed greater and greater power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the criminals, who ran their organization from Cali, labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, posing as businessmen, just carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders-the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Santa Cruz Londono, Pacho Herrera--amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates composed what was until then, the most powerful international organized crime group in history, employed 727 aircraft to ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were smuggled into the United States, and then return to Colombia with the money from U.S. drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important alliances with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico. With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by brave men and women in the Colombian National Police during 1995 and 1996, all of the top leadership of the Cali syndicate are either in jail, or dead. The fine work done by General Serrano, who appeared before your subcommittee only two weeks ago, and other CNP officers is a testament to the commitment and dedication of Colombia's law enforcement officials in the face of great personal danger and a government whose leadership is riddled with drug corruption. Since the Cali leaders' imprisonment on sentences which were ridiculously short and inadequate, traffickers from Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the organizations from Mexico had benefits for both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers from Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, cocaine into the United States, and had established solid distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the Cali syndicate was concerned about the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal with the traffickers from Mexico, which reduced their potential losses. This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine into the United States. In 1989, U.S. law enforcement officials seized 21 metric tons of cocaine in Sylmar, California; this record seizure demonstrated the extent and magnitude of the Mexican groups' capabilities to transport Colombian-produced cocaine into the United States. This huge shipment was driven across the Mexican/U.S. border in small shipments and stored in the warehouse until all transportation fees had been paid by the Calif and Medellin cartels, to the transporters from Mexico are routinely paid in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right. The majority of cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of the cocaine enters the United States in privately owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There is a new evidence that indicates traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the inexhaustible supply of cocaine entering the U.S., trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking thousands of pounds of methamphetamine, and have been major distributors of heroin and marijuana in the W.S. since the 1970's. Major Traffickers from Mexico A number of major trafficking organizations represent the highest echelons of organized crime in Mexico. Their leaders are under indictment in the United States on numerous charges. The Department of Justice has submitted Provisional Warrants for many of their arrests to the Government of Mexico, and only one, Juan Garcia Agrego, because he was a U.S. citizen has been sent to the U.S. to face justice. The other leaders are living freely in Mexico, and have so far escaped apprehension by Mexican law enforcement, and have suffered little, if any inconvenience resulting from their notorious status, I believe that in order to fully expose these syndicate leaders, it is more beneficial to refer to them by their personal names than by the names of their organizations. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes The most powerful drug trafficker in Mexico at the current time is Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, who, as recently reported, allegedly has ties to the former Commissioner of the INCD, Gutierrez-Rebollo. His organized crime group, based in Juarez, is associated with the Rodriguez-Orejuela organization and the Ochoa brothers, from Medellin, as well. This organization, which is also involved in heroin and marijuana trafficking, handles large cocaine shipments from Columbia. Their regional bases in Guadalajara, Hermosillo and Torreon serve as storage locations where later, the drugs are moved closer to the border for eventual shipment into the United States. The scope of the Carrillo-Fuentes' network is staggering; he reportedly forwards $20-$30 million to Colombia for each major operation, and his illegal activities generate ten's of millions per week. He was a pioneer in the use of large aircraft to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and became known as ``Lord of the Skies.'' Carillo-Fuentes reportedly owns a fleet of aircraft and has major real estate holdings. Like his Colombian counterparts, Carillo-Fuentes is sophisticated in the use of technology and counter surveillance methods. His network employs state of the art communications devices to conduct business. His organization has become so powerful he is even seeking to expand his markets into traditional Colombian strongholds on the east coast of the United States. Presently, Carrillo-Fuentes is attempting to consolidate control over drug trafficking along the entire Mexican northern border, and he plans to continue to bribe border officials to ensure that his attempts are successful. Carrillo-Fuentes, who is the subject of numerous separate U.S. law enforcement investigations has been indicted in Florida and Texas and remains a fugitive on heroin and cocaine charges. Miguel Caro-Quintero Miguel Caro-Quintero's organization is based in Sonora, Mexico and focuses its attention on trafficking cocaine and marijuana. His brother, Rafael, is in prison in Mexico for his role in killing DEA Special Agent Kiki Camarena in 1985. Miguel, along with two of his other brothers--Jorge and Genaro--run the organization. Miguel himself was arrested in 1992, and the USG and GOM cooperated in a bilateral prosecution. Unfortunately, that effort was thwarted when Miguel was able to use a combination of threats and bribes to have his charges dismissed by a federal judge in Hermosillo. He has operated freely since that time. The Caro-Quintero organization specializes primarily in the cultivation, production and distribution of marijuana, a major cash-crop for drug groups from Mexico. The organization is believed to own many ranches in the northern border state of Sonora, where drugs are stored, and from which drug operations into the United States are staged. Despite its specialization in marijuana cultivation and distribution, like the other major drug organizations in Mexico, this group is polydrug in nature, also transporting and distributing cocaine and methamphetamine. Miguel Caro-Quintero is the subject of several indictments in the United States and is currently the subject of provisional arrest warrants issued by the United States government, yet in an act of astonishing arrogance he called a radio station in Hermosillo, Mexico last May indicating that he was bothered by statements I had made that he was an innocent rancher and charges made against him by DEA were untrue. He then had the audacity to give his address and invite law enforcement officials from Mexico and the United States to visit him--yet he remains at large. The Arellano-Felix Brothers The Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), often referred to as the Tijuana Cartel, is one of the most powerful and aggressive drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico; it is undeniably the most violent. More than any other major trafficking organization from Mexico, it extends its tentacles directly from high-echelon figures in the law enforcement and judicial systems in Mexico, to street-level individuals in the United States. The AFO is responsible for the transportation, importation and distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine, marijuana, as well as large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine, into the United States from Mexico. The AFO operates primarily in the Mexican states of Sinaloa (their birth place), Jalisco, Michoacan, Chiapas, and Baja California South and North. From Baja, the drugs enter California, the primary point of embarkation into the United States distribution network. The AFO does not operate without the complicity of Mexican law enforcement officials and their subordinates. According to extradition documents submitted by the Government of Mexico in San Diego, California, key family members reportedly dispense an estimated one million dollars weekly in bribes to Mexican federal, state and local officials, who assure that the movement of drugs continues to flow unimpeded to the gateway cities along the southwestern border of the United States. The Arellano family, composed of seven brothers and four sisters, inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix- Gallardo upon his incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his complicity in the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix assumed leadership of the family structured criminal enterprise and provides a businessman's approach to the management of drug trafficking operations. Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix, considered the most violent brother, organizes and coordinates protection details over which he exerts absolute control. The AFO maintains well-armed and well-trained security forces, described by Mexican enforcement officials as paramilitary in nature, which include international mercenaries as advisors, trainers and members. Ramon Arellano's responsibilities consist of the planning of murders of rival drug leaders and those Mexican law enforcement officials not on their payroll. Also targeted for assassination are those AFO members who fall out of favor with the AFO leadership or simply are suspected of collaborating with law enforcement officials. Enforcers are often hired from violent street gangs in cities and towns in both Mexico and the United States in the belief that these gang members are expendable. They are dispatched to assassinate targeted individuals and to send a clear message to those who attempt to utilize the Mexicali/Tijuana corridor without paying the area transit tax demanded by the AFO trafficking domain. The AFO also maintains complex communications centers in several major cities in Mexico to conduct electronic espionage and counter-surveillance measures against law enforcement entities. The organization employs radio scanners and equipment capable of intercepting both hard line and cellular phones to ensure the security of AFO operators. In addition to technical equipment, the AFO maintains caches of sophisticated automatic weaponry secured from a variety of international sources. A Joint Task Force composed of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been established in San Diego, California, to target the AFO; the Task Force is investigating AFO operations in Southern California and related regional investigations which track drug transportation, distribution and money laundering activities of the AFO throughout the United States. Jesus Amezcua The Amezcua-Contreras brothers operating out of Guadalajara, Mexico head up a methamphetamine production and trafficking organization with global dimensions. Directed by Jesus Amezcua, and supported by his brothers, Adan and Luis, the Amezcua drug trafficking organization today is probably the world's largest smuggler of ephedrine and clandestine producer of methamphetamine. With a growing methamphetamine abuse problem in the United States, this organization's activities impact on a number of the major population centers in the U.S. The Amezcua organization obtains large quantities of the precursor ephedrine, utilizing contacts in Thailand and India, which they supply to methamphetamine labs in Mexico and the United States. This organization has placed trusted associates in the United States to move ephedrine to Mexican methamphetamine traffickers operating in the U.S. Jose Osorio-Cabrera, a fugitive from a Los Angeles investigation until his arrest in Bangkok, was a major ephedrine purchaser for the Amezcua organization. Joaquin Guzman-Loera Joaquin Guzman-Loera began to make a name for himself as a trafficker and air logistics expert for the powerful Miguel Felix-Gallardo organization. Guzman-Loera broke away from Felix-Gallardo and rose to patron level among the major Mexican trafficking organizations. Presently, he is incarcerated in Mexico; however, Mexican and United States authorities still consider him to be a major international drug trafficker. The organization has not been dismantled or seriously affected by Guzman-Loera's imprisonment because his brother, Arturo Guzman-Loera, has assumed the leadership role. The Guzman-Loera organization transports cocaine from Colombia through Mexico to the United States for the Medellin and Cali organizations and is also involved in the movement, storage, and distribution of marijuana, and Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin. This organization controlled the drug smuggling tunnel between Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico and Douglas, Arizona through which tons of cocaine were smuggled. Guzman-Loera, who has been named in several U.S. indictments, was arrested on June 9, 1993 in Talisman, Mexico for narcotics, homicide, and cocaine trafficking and is presently incarcerated at the Almoloya de Juarez Maximum Security Prison in Toluca, Mexico. Effect of Mexican Organized Crime on United States Unfortunately, the violence that is attendant to the drug trade in Mexico is spilling over the border into U.S. towns, like San Diego, California and Eagle Pass, Texas. Last summer, ranchers along the Texas/Mexico Border reported they were besieged by drug organizations smuggling cocaine and marijuana across their property--fences were torn down, livestock butchered and shots were fired at the ranchers homes at night. Ranchers reported seeing armed patrols in Mexico with night vision equipment, hand-held radios and assault rifles that protected a steady stream of smugglers back packing marijuana and cocaine into the United States. The problem became so acute that the State of Texas and the Federal government sent support in the form of additional U.S. Border Patrol Agents, DEA Special Agents, Officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Texas National Guard. Life has returned somewhat to normal in that area, as the drug gangs reacted to law enforcement pressure and have moved their operations elsewhere. DEA information supports widely reported press accounts that the Arellano-Felix organization relies on a San Diego, California gang known as ``Logan Heights Calle 30'' to carry out executions and conduct security for their distribution operations. Six members of ``Calle 30'' were arrested by DEA's violent crime task force and the San Diego Police Department for the murder of a man and his son in San Diego. Since that time 49 members of ``Calle 30'' have been arrested by the Narcotics Task Force in San Diego on a variety of charges from trafficking to violent crimes. On December 11, 1996, Fernando Jesus-Gutierrez was shot five times in the face during rush hour in the then exclusive neighborhood, the Silver Strand, in Coronado, California, after his death was ordered by the Arellano-Felix organization. In 1993, a turf battle over the methamphetamine market between rival drug gangs from Mexico resulted in 26 individuals being murdered in one summer in the San Diego area. U.S. law enforcement strategy versus organized crime in mexico The Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI) is Federal law enforcement's joint response to the substantial threat posed by Mexican groups operating along the Southwest Border. The SWBI, now in its third year of operation, is an integrated, coordinated strategy that focuses the resources of DEA, FBI, the United States Attorney's Office, the Criminal Division, the U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service and state and local authorities on the sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating on both sides of the U.S./Mexican border. Through this initiative we have identified the sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating along the entire U.S. border. These groups are transporting multi-ton shipments of cocaine for the Colombia groups, as well as heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana. Imitating the Colombian groups, the Mexican organizations are highly compartmentalized, using numerous workers to accomplish very specific tasks, such as driving load cars, renting houses for storage sites, distributing cocaine, and collecting profits. Through the compartmentalization process each worker performs a distinct task and has no knowledge of the other members of the organization. We are attacking the organizations by targeting the communication systems of their command and control centers. Working in concert, DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Attorneys offices around the country conduct wiretaps that ultimately identify their U.S. based organization from top to bottom. This strategy allows us to track the seamless continuum of cocaine traffic as it flows from Colombia through Mexico, to its eventual street distribution in the United States. However, even though this strategy is extremely effective in dismantling the U.S. based portions of the organizations, we are frustrated by not being able to use this same information to reach the organization's bosses in Mexico and their current counterparts in Colombia. Criminals, such as Carillo-Fuentes and Arellano- Felix, personally direct their organizations from safe havens in Mexico and until we garner the complete cooperation of law enforcement officials in Mexico, we will never be truly effective in stopping the flow of drugs from their country. The Southwest Border Strategy is anchored in our belief that the only way of successfully attacking any organized crime syndicate is to build strong cases on the leadership and their command and control functions. The long-term incarceration of key members of these organization's command and control will cause a steady degradation of their ability conduct business in the United States and with the assistance of foreign governments, the long-term incarceration of the leadership will leave the entire organizations in disarray. The Cali syndicate once controlled cocaine traffic in the world from a highly organized corporate structure, with the incarceration of the Cali leaders we see the cocaine trade in Colombia has become far less monolithic and several independent unrelated organizations are controlling the exportation of cocaine to the U.S. and Mexico. This change is a direct result of the incarceration of the Cali leaders and their inability to fully control their organizations from prison. We spoke to you last year about the successes of Zorro II, conducted under the auspices of the SWBI, during which both a Colombian distribution organization and a Mexican smuggling organization were dismantled and the infrastructure of both organizations were destroyed. Ninety court authorized wire taps resulted in the arrest of 156 people and the seizure of $17 million dollars and 5,600 kilograms of cocaine. Most importantly, neither the Colombian or Mexican organizations have been able to reconstitute these distribution organizations. Zorro II confirmed our belief that cocaine distribution in the United States is controlled by the foreign syndicates located in Colombia and Mexico. Since Zorro II, we have continued to focus on the command and control function of other transportation and distribution cells operating along the Southwest Border and throughout the U.S. These investigations are time and resource intensive, but yield significant results. Additional investigations, of similar significance and importance as Zorro II, have been developed since that time, however due to the sensitive nature of the investigations. I am precluded from discussing them at this time. corruption and intimidation: tools of the trade Traditionally, organized crime has depended on the corruption of officials, and the intimidation of potential or actual witnesses, as well as violence against anyone who stands in the way of business. The Medellin and Cali traffickers were masters of corruption, intimidation and violence, and used these tools effectively to silence and coerce. Organized crime figures in Mexico routinely use these tools as well. The recent arrest of the Commissioner of the INCD in Mexico last week is the latest illustration of how deeply rooted corruption is in Mexican anti-narcotics organizations. A good illustration of the extent of corruption in Mexico was revealed when officials, seeking the extradition of two of Arellano-Felix's contract killers, who are currently incarcerated in the United States, submitted papers indicating that the State Attorney General and almost 90 percent of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges in Tijuana and the State of Baja California have been compromised and are on the payroll of the Arellano-Felix brothers. In addition, several high ranking police officers regularly provide the names of witnesses who give statements against the Arellano-Felixes and have even provided information that assisted in locating targets for assassination. Just recently, the Federal Police in Baja California Norte were replaced with military troops, a tacit admission of the level of corruption in that area. Yet, as we observed with the arrest of Gutierrez-Rebollo, the military is not immune from corruption either. Historically, corruption has been a central problem in DEA's relationship with Mexican counterparts. In short, there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship. Such a relationship is absolutely essential to the conduct of business in that, or any other nation where organized crime syndicates traffic in narcotics. In the brief time we have allotted to us today, I would like to provide you with some recent examples of the corruption which we encounter all too frequently in Mexico. This January, the Mexican Army raided the wedding party of Amado Carillo-Fuentes' sister. When they arrived at the scene. Mexican Federal Judicial Police were guarding the party. The MFJP had alerted Carillo-Fuentes about the planned raid, and he was able to escape. The Arellano-Felix organization routinely bribes government officials to obtain information from prosecutors' offices including information on potential witnesses. Despite the firing of over 1,200 government officials for corruption charges by President Zedillo, no successful prosecutions of these individuals has taken place. In March 1996, DEA Task Force Agents arrested two individuals who identified themselves as police officers from Sonora, Mexico. Eleven hundred pounds of marijuana were found on the scene, and the police admitted they worked at the stash house. In July a Mexican Army Division arrested nine Mexican Federal Judicial Police Officers and seized 50 kilograms of cocaine and $578,000 in U.S. currency. The defendants were acting under the direction of the Commandante for Culiacan, Sinalon at the time. While a great deal of the corruption plagues the law enforcement agencies in Mexico, the Mexican military and other institutions are also vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the narcotics trade. The Mexican Government has replaced police with military officials, who are not fully trained in all of the aspects of narcotics investigations. This situation is far from ideal. Political officials are also not immune to narcotics corruption: DEA has documented instances where public officials have allowed drug traffickers to freely operate in areas under their control. Corruption is the most serious, most pervasive obstacle to progress in addressing the drug trade in Mexico. In addition to the serious corruption problems plaguing anti-narcotics enforcement efforts in Mexico, murders and violence are commonplace methods of silencing witnesses or rivals. Since 1993, twenty-three major drug-related assassinations have taken place in Mexico. Virtually all of these murders remain unsolved. Many of them have occurred in Tijuana or have involved victims from Tijuana. In the last year, 12 law enforcement officials or former officials have been gunned down in Tijuana and the vast majority of the 200 murders in that city are believed to have been drug-related. A number of these incidents involving law enforcement officials are a serious indication of the depth and breadth of the power of the traffickers in Mexico. The Arellano-Felix organization was responsible for setting off a bomb at the Camino Real Hotel in Guadalajara, where they intended to kill a rival trafficker, hosting a party for his daughter. Two men were killed and fifteen people wounded. In September 1996, Jorge Garcia-Vargas, Sub-Director of the Tijuana office of the Institute for the Combat of Drugs (INCD) and former Commandante Miguel Angel Silva-Caballero were found shot to death in their car in Mexico City. The bodies showed signs of torture, similar to those on the bodies of Hector Gonzalez-Baecenas. Garcia-Vargas' assistant in Tijuana, and three body guards who were tortured and killed five days earlier in Mexico City. Garcia-Vargas' death came only one year after he took the job in Tijuana. Ernest Ibarra-Santes, the Director of Federal Police Force in Tijuana, and two police officers were executed by machine- gun fire as they drove along a main street in Mexico City. Ibarra-Santes was executed just 29 days after he became Director and two days after he reprimanded his own force stating ``The Police had become so corrupt they weren't just friends with the traffickers, they were their servants.'' A Mexican Army officer has been implicated in this murder. Baja State Prosecutor Godin Gutierrez-Rico was assassinated in front of his residence in Tijuana on January 3, 1997. Guiterrez a supervisory state attorney and former head of a special enforcement unit that investigated high profile homicides in Tijuana, had assisted DEA in identifying several assassins for the Arellano-Felix organization. Information strongly links the Arellano-Felix's to this murder which was particularly vicious; Guiterrez-Rico was shot over 100 times, after which his body was repeatedly run over by an automobile. It is hard to imagine that in our own nation, we would stand for such killings and for government inaction in solving the murders. The assassinations in Mexico are akin to three Assistant United States Attorneys, the Special Agent in Charge of the DEA office in San Diego, the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI office in Houston and the Chief of Police in San Diego being murdered callously by drug dealers. Americans would not accept these murders going unsolved and no arrests being made. For any country's law enforcement agencies to be viable partners in the international law enforcement arena, they must apprehend and incarcerate those criminals who murder with such impunity. cooperation with mexico The primary program for cooperative law enforcement efforts with the Government of Mexico is a proposed series of Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). The U.S. and Mexico signed a memorandum of understanding in 1996, outlining the framework for the United States Government and the government of Mexico to conduct joint investigations against targeted drug organizations. These Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's) were established in Juarez, Tijuana and Monterrey. The task forces in Tijuana and Juarez have been limited in their ability to collect intelligence and seize drugs and they have not met their most important objectives of arresting the leaders of the major syndicates and dismantling their organizations. During bilateral plenary meetings, Mexican officials promised they would allocate $2.4 million from seized assets the U.S. had shared with Mexico towards the financing of the BTF's; however, Francisco Molina Ruiz, the former head of the INCD, advised DEA that he had been unable to obtain the financial support necessary to make these Task Forces operational. The BTF's for the most part are staffed with enthusiastic young officers, however, they have neither received the training nor the equipment necessary to build cases on and arrest these sophisticated and wealthy drug traffickers. The most significant shortcoming of the B.T.F.'s however, lies in its leadership. On at least two occasions, after having been advised of pending enforcement actions by their subordinates, corrupt command officers in Mexico City compromised the investigations. One involved the attempted seizure of sixteen tons of cocaine belonging to the Arellano- Felix family. To be successful in Mexico, we must be able to share intelligence with the B.T.F.'s with the confidence that it will be promptly acted on and not be compromised by corrupt officials that is not the condition that we are currently faced with in our relationship with the bi-lateral groups. Unfortunately, I was recently forced to limit DEA participation in these B.T.F.'s, because of a decision by the Government of Mexico that would no longer allow us to guarantee the safety of our Special Agents while they were working in Mexico. The atmosphere in Mexico is volatile and threats against DEA Special Agents, along the border, have increased substantially; therefore I have rescinded travel authority for all DEA Special Agents to Mexico, to participate in counter-drug investigations, until they are provided appropriate protection, that is commensurate with the risks inherent in these dangerous assignments. prospects for progress Since coming to office, President Zedillo has promised that he would take action against organized criminal groups in Mexico. In that time period he has moved to make significant changes to the law enforcement process by sponsoring the Organized Crime Bill to provide the tools needed to successfully attack the criminal synidates and formed the Organized Crime Task Force and the Bilateral Task Forces. However, even with the improved process, the infrastructure of the mechanism, itself, is so decimated by corruption that short term results are very doubtful. The real test is in the mid- and long-term. Unless some meaningful reforms are made in the law enforcement systems responsible for targeting and apprehending major organized crime figures in Mexico, that nation, and unfortunately our own, will continue to fight an uphill battle as drugs will continue to flow into cities and towns across the United States. To date, our inability to successfully attack the major organized crime groups in Mexico, as we have the United States and Colombia, is a direct result of our inability to arrest the leadership of these groups. President Zedillo has acted against corrupt officials, and has stated that he is committed to professionalizing Mexican law enforcement. Yet the bottom line remains; until the major organized crime figures operating in Mexico are aggressively targeted, investigated, arrested, sentenced appropriately and jailed, both Mexico and the United States are in grave danger. What law enforcement steps are necessary for long-lasting progress against organized crime leaders in Mexico? We faced the same questions in our mutual struggle against the Colombian organized groups during the past decade. What it took was an all-out effort by the Colombian National Police to target and incarcerate the top leaders in Cali. Until the Government of Colombia was put on notice that their lack of commitment to this goal was unacceptable, the CNP did not have the moral backing it needed to move out aggressively. In Mexico's case, it appears that the political will to rid the country of the its narco- trafficking reputation is there; however, what is lacking are clean, committed law enforcement agencies willing to take on the most powerful and influential organized crime figures operating on a global scale. We hope that efforts towards this end will bear fruit. In November, 1996, the Government of Mexico passed an Organized Crime Law which provides Law Enforcement officials with many of the tools needed to successfully attack the sophisticated drug syndicates in their country. Included as part of the Law were: authorization to conduct electronic surveillance, a witness protection program; plea bargaining; conspiracy laws; undercover operations; the use of informants by police. For these new law enforcement tools to be utilized effectively, the new law mandated the Government of Mexico to form Organized Crime Units to conduct the investigations and further stipulated that the laws could not be enforced until the unit was formed and properly trained. The Organized Crime Units are now in place and consist of 60 officers to investigate crimes specified under the law. The Government of Mexico has agreed to insure the integrity of the Organized Crime Unit through the use of polygraphs and regular background investigations. However, like the Bilateral Task Forces, these units will not be successful and DEA might not be able to share sensitive information with them as long as their supervisors or managers are corrupt. It is important to remember that law enforcement in the United States did not have wiretap authority and wide ranging organized crime laws such as RICO and Continuing Criminal Enterprise until the late 1960's. The Government of Mexico is effectively 35 years behind us in establishing laws that were critical in our successful dismantling of organized criminal syndicates. If they work properly, the Bilateral task forces and our Southwest Border Initiative can be favorably compared to the Strike Forces established by Bobby Kennedy in the 1960's. This 1990's version of the Strike Force is international in scope and pools the resources, expertise and laws of several federal and state institutions in the United States with those in Mexico. It is absolutely essential that the Organized Crime Units and the Bilateral Task Forces have integrity insurance programs as part of their charter. Unless these units are trustworthy, informants who cooperate will not be safe, undercover investigations will be compromised and intelligence sharing process will not function at all. As we have seen recently, both the military and law enforcement have been grievously compromised by these criminal groups and this brings into question the ability of any program in Mexico to remain corruption free. However, last week we saw in the arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo, that some trustworthy units do exist and can work without compromise. The problems of establishing a corruption-free law enforcement infrastructure are not insurmountable. However, to become credible in the law enforcement arena the Government of Mexico must ensure the integrity of the units that have the responsibility of tracking down and arresting the syndicate leaders, insuring these individuals are either prosecuted in Mexico and receive meaningful sentence commensurate with their crimes or agree to extradite them to the United States where they will receive punishment similar to that of Juan Garcia-Abrego. Exhibit 2 U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Public Printer, Washington, DC, March 10, 1997. Hon. Diane Feinstein, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Feinstein: We return herewith your manuscript entitled ``Re: Remarks by Thomas A. Constantine'' submitted to this Office for insertion in the Congressional Record, and respectfully invite your attention to the following regulation of the Joint Committee on Printing: (1) No extraneous matter in excess of two printed Record pages, whether printed in its entirety in one daily issue or in two or more parts in one or more issues, shall be printed in the Congressional Record unless the Member announces, coincident with the request for leave to print or extend, the estimate in writing from the Public Printer of the probable cost of publishing the same. (2) No extraneous matter shall be printed in the House proceedings or the Senate proceedings, with the following exceptions: (a) Excerpts from letters, telegrams, or articles presented in connection with a speech delivered in the course of debate; (b) Communications from State Legislatures, and (c) Addresses or articles by the President and the Members of his Cabinet, the Vice President, or a Member of Congress. (3) The official reporters of the House or Senate or the Public Printer shall return to the Member of the respective House any matter submitted for the Congressional Record which is in contravention of these provisions. This manuscript is estimated to make approximately 5 pages of the Congressional Record at a cost of $1,152.00. If you still desire to have this matter published in the Record, permission must again be requested of the Senate for its inclusion and the probable cost should then be announced and this estimate attached to the manuscript sent to the Official Reporters. Sincerely, Charles C. Cook, Sr. Superintendent, Congressional Printing Management Division.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the State Department's statement of explanation on certification be printed in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. T.J. Bonner, president of the National Border Patrol Council, the union which represents nearly 5,000 Border Patrol agents, told my staff on March 4, 1997: The level of trust for Mexican authorities is almost non- existent. He said that ``the lack of cooperation includes failure to provide assistance, aiding and abetting criminal activity, and even acts of aggression against Border Patrol Agents.'' He described U.S. agents observing Mexican officers who were clearly escorting aliens and drug smugglers. The police chief of El Centro, CA, Harold Carter, told my staff that his officers are very leery of who they can trust in Mexico. These are the views of our law enforcement officers. But the question of whether Mexico is fully cooperating with the United States can also be easily answered by looking at Mexico's policies on working with DEA agents. In this area, there have been three significant failings. One was the failure of the Mexican Government--the same one that has just been certified as fully cooperating--to adequately fund and staff the binational border task forces that had been agreed upon by the high level contact group. What good are high-level meetings that produce agreements on cooperation if one side then fails to live up to its end of the agreement? Second, Mexico has hampered the ability of the United States military to contribute to interdiction efforts. Mexico refuses to allow United States Navy ships on patrol for drug smugglers in the Pacific to put into Mexican ports to refuel without 30 days notice--and without paying cash. As the cartels increasingly turn to sea-routes to smuggle their drugs, this policy seriously hampers our ability to stop them. Also, overflights by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft are still under negotiation. These flights would enhance the ability of both sides to find and disrupt drug shipments. The third major failing has been Mexico's refusal to allow United States drug enforcement agents to carry sidearms to protect themselves while on the Mexican side of the border. As a result, Mr. Constantine had no choice but to suspend operations in which DEA agents cross the border, because they cannot protect themselves. In the last several days, there has been a flurry of meetings between American and Mexican officials. Did the United States gain any concessions? Well, Mexican officials were quoted as saying that ``the rules have stayed exactly where they are''--which means no sidearms. There you have it. Full cooperation. Extraditions The State Department's statement of explanation makes another astonishing claim on the subject of extraditions. It says: The Government of Mexico established the important precedent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the United States under the provision of Mexico's extradition law permitting this in ``exceptional circumstances.'' Here is my understanding of the actual facts: First, Mexico says it has changed its policy to allow the extradition of Mexican nationals to the United States. Of course, we are talking about Mexican nationals who are wanted for crimes committed here in the United States. Second, to my knowledge, the Mexican government has sent three Mexican nationals to the United States. One was Juan Garcia Abrego, head of the gulf cartel, but he was expelled, not extradited, because he held American as well as Mexican citizenship. The other two were for murder and sexual abuse, not for drug charges. Third, to date, Mexico has never--never--extradited a single Mexican national to the United States on drug-related charges. That, I believe, is a fact. Now the Mexican Government says, and the State Department apparently believes, that Mexico is prepared to extradite Mexican nationals on drug charges in ``special circumstances.'' If this is truly a change of policy on the part of Mexico, let us see results. There are 52 outstanding extradition requests for Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges. Mexico should honor these requests now. It should be pointed out that these extradition requests are for crimes committed in this country. How can a good friend, ally, and neighbor deny extradition of 52 people wanted for drug-related crimes committed here, and the statement still be made that they are fully cooperating in our antidrug efforts? A good place for Mexico to start would be with Francisco Arellano- Felix of the Tijuana cartel, who is currently in custody in a Mexican prison and wanted on narcotics charges here in the United States. Another good start would be Miguel Caro Quintero, who walks the streets of Sonora without fear of arrest and grants interviews with the Washington Post. He has four indictments pending against him in the United States. Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges is clearly the highest priority. These include many of the drug kingpins. But there are other sensitive cases as well that need to be resolved. John Riley Henrique was indicted by a Federal grand jury in the eastern district of California for trafficking at least 150 kilograms of cocaine from Mexico to the United States. Henrique, an American citizen, is thought to be connected with Miguel Angel Felix Guillardo, the mastermind of the 1985 murder of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena. Law enforcement sources told my office that John Riley Henrique was detained by Mexican law enforcement and then suddenly released without warning. He is still believed to be in Mexico. The Mexican authorities should find him, apprehend him, and extradite him. T.J. Bonner of the National Border Patrol Council testified before the Senate Banking Committee on March 28, 1996, about the tragic fatal shooting on January 19, 1996, of a Border Patrol agent, our agent, Jefferson Barr. Agent Barr was killed while intercepting a group of marijuana smugglers along the border near Eagle Pass, TX. Before he died, Agent Barr wounded one of his assailants. The FBI interviewed the suspect, a Mexican national, in a Mexican hospital, and the United States later charged him with murder and sought his extradition. The Government of Mexico sentenced the individual to 10 years in prison on a narcotics-related charge but has refused to extradite him. For the State Department to say that Mexico is fully cooperating on the issue of extraditions under these circumstances dishonors the memory of Agent Jefferson Barr. America's law enforcement officers know how serious the problem is. I would like to quote from a March 2, 1997, press release put out by the National Border Patrol Council, local 1613, of San Diego. It reads: The certification of Mexico is a clear blow to the efforts of U.S. Border Patrol agents in their daily efforts at thwarting the massive amounts of illegal drugs entering the country every day. Additionally, this certification is a disgrace to the memory of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jefferson Barr. The Need to Waive Sanctions Some worry that decertifying Mexico will harm our relationship with an important friend and ally. Others worry that it will make Mexico's drug problem worse. Mexico is a friend and an ally, but I ask my colleagues: Do we do Mexico any favors by turning a blind eye to the depth of the problem? Do we do Mexico any favors by suggesting that the status quo is good enough? Will Mexico take the steps necessary to combat the flow of drugs if the United States keeps telling them year after year after year that they are doing enough and that they are fully cooperating? The truth is that failure to decertify Mexico makes a mockery of the entire certification process. Columbia is decertified. Mexico is not. And today, the drugs coming from Mexico are the greatest threat. It makes no sense. I know of few Members of this body, if any, who want to impose sanctions on Mexico. Senate Joint Resolution 21, which the Senator from Georgia and I introduced last week, decertifies Mexico but authorizes the President to waive all sanctions if it is in the vital national interest, and we will give testimony to that resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee the day after tomorrow. The same is true of House Joint Resolution 58, which passed the House International Relations Committee by a vote of 27 to 5 last Thursday and will likely pass the full House by a large margin later this week. I believe that we do have vital national interests in Mexico that require us not to impose sanctions at this point. All we are asking for is an honest, accurate assessment of whether Mexico has fully cooperated with us in the war on drugs, and to send the message that this cooperation must improve rapidly or Mexico will be fully decertified next year. This is what the law provides, and the facts, I believe, speak for themselves. Mexico has not met the test of full cooperation required for certification. Steps Toward Recertification I realize that the administration has been working feverishly to negotiate agreements with Mexico which will show that progress is being made, and I hope they can do that. But it is too late to improve Mexico's performance in 1996. The year is gone. But let me lay out some of the steps I believe Mexico needs to take in order to be eligible to be recertified, if she is decertified. First, effective action to dismantle the major drug cartels and arrest their leaders. Second, full and ongoing implementation of effective money-laundering legislation and rigorously enforced bank regulations with penalties for those who do not comply. Third, compliance with all outstanding extradition requests by the United States so that cartel leaders and major traffickers can be brought to justice. Fourth, help at the border. Mexico, as a friend, an ally, and a neighbor, should help enforce the border and prevent the flow of contraband. It is not enough to see this as simply America's problem. And this goes for the seas as well. Not to permit United States military ships to refuel in Mexican ports without 30 days notice is unacceptable from a friend. Fifth, improved cooperation with U.S. law enforcement officials, including allowing United States law enforcement agents to resume carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border, and for Mexico to pay their share of the effort and be fully supportive of United States help. Any legitimate American law enforcement officer detailed to Mexico and working drugs should be permitted to carry a sidearm --or they should not go. Sixth, implementation of a comprehensive program to identify, to weed out, and to prosecute corrupt officials at all levels of the Mexican Government, police, and military. If Mexico takes these steps, I would support recertification even during the current year, which the law allows if there is significant progress in a decertified country. Mr. President, I believe I have laid out a strong case that Mexico did not earn certification as fully cooperating on counternarcotics in 1996. Have there been instances of cooperation? Of course. But can anyone credibly say that Mexico has fully cooperated with the United States? It is not even close. It is important for us to be honest with ourselves about this issue. If we are not honest with ourselves, we unreasonably lower our guard against the incredible danger that Mexican drug trafficking poses to our children, our schools, and our communities. If we are not honest with ourselves, we dishonor the dedication of thousands of DEA and Border Patrol agents who put their lives on the line every single day to try to keep drugs from reaching our streets. I believe today those agents have every right to feel betrayed. Senator Coverdell, Senator Helms, myself, and others will continue trying to disapprove the Mexico certification and enact a vital national interest waiver. Similar legislation is moving through the House. We will make our best effort. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and ask unanimous consent that Senator Coverdell and Senator Hutchinson of Arkansas be permitted to speak during morning business charged to the time under my control.