Dianne Feinstein

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Hollings], has asked to cosponsor Senate Joint Resolution 19, Senate Joint Resolution 20, and Senate Joint Resolution 21, and has also asked for time, which I would ask be charged to my time.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I do this, Mr. President, because I think this is testimony that is crucial to a decision that will shortly be before the Senate. This is our No. 1 drug enforcement agency in the United States, and I think it is important that the testimony of the head of that agency be read by Members considering this issue. Perhaps the most powerful of all cartels today is the Amado Carrillo- Fuentes organization, also known as the Juarez cartel. This organization operates out of Rancho Hacienda de la Natividad today, near Cuernavaca, Morelos, outside of Mexico City. It runs multi-ton quantities of Colombian cocaine toward Mexican distribution sites and then into the United States. The organization runs these drug trafficking operations in Chihuahua, Mexico City, Mayarit, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, Baja, CA, Tamulipas, Veracruz, and Zacatecas, among others. Despite the ``encouraging results and notable progress'' cited by the State Department, the Juarez cartel is today as strong as it has ever been. Worse, it is spreading its tentacles into the United States, and this concerns me deeply. One law enforcement official told me it controls a majority of the cocaine in Los Angeles. Operations linked to the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization have today been identified in the Texas cities of El Paso, Houston, McAllen, Midland, Odessa and San Antonio, and in California's major cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento; also, in Nevada's major city, Las Vegas; Illinois' major city, Chicago; the major city in the State of New York, New York City; and Florida's major city, Miami. Do we know who the leaders of this cartel are? Yes, we do, and so do the Mexican authorities. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes heads the organization and controls the cocaine, marijuana and heroin transportation to the United States. His brother, Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes, is primarily responsible for the group's marijuana trafficking operation. These men are considered by President Zedillo to be Mexico's primary national security threat. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes has been indicted in Florida and in Texas on heroin and cocaine charges. Yet, he has never been tried in Mexico, nor has an extradition request for crimes committed in the United States been honored. Have the Mexican authorities taken any action whatsoever that has hampered the operations of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization? The answer to date is no. In fact, there is ample evidence to show that the Carrillo-Fuentes organization has federal police and government officials on their payroll, including the former head of the counternarcotics effort in Mexico, General Gutierrez, who was arrested 3 weeks ago. Just a few days ago, Mexico did try to arrest Mr. Carrillo-Fuentes. Let me read from the Los Angeles Times, dated Saturday, March 8: In an apparently stepped-up search for alleged drug lord Amado Carrillo Fuentes, more than 100 troops backed by light tanks commandeered a luxury hotel in Guadalajara late Thursday night. . . . Carlton Hotel manager Carlos Hodria said Friday that about 150 soldiers arrived unannounced in trucks and tanks and that the operation lasted about 40 minutes, jarring most of the hotel's personnel and 296 guests. He quoted military officers as saying they were ``searching for a person.'' Obviously, when you roll tanks up to a hotel, whomever you are looking for is going to know that and be long gone. To my knowledge, no arrests were made. The other major cartel at work in Mexico is the Arellano-Felix organization, also known as the Tijuana cartel. This organization transports multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana and large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine into the United States where it is distributed by agents employed by the cartel in this country. The cartel has its base of operations in Tijuana, but it is active in Sinaloa, Jalisco, Michoacan, Chiapas, Baja California Norte and Baja California Sur. It is of particular concern to me because Southern California is the primary entry point of most of the drugs trafficked by this organization. The Arellano-Felix organization has spread its influence deep inside American cities, often recruiting street gangs to do its distribution and enforcement work. Orders are given to these agents in U.S. cities directly from Tijuana through sophisticated telecommunications networks. Do we know who the leaders of the Arellano-Felix organization are? Again, we do, and so do the Mexican authorities. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix is the leader of the organization and has overall responsibility for management of the cartel's drug- trafficking operations. His brother, Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix, is responsible for the group's security operations, which include well-trained paramilitary- style forces who assassinate rivals and traitors. Has any action been taken by the Mexican authorities to rein in the operations of the Arellano-Felix organization? Have there been any arrests of its senior leaders? No, the State Department informs us. This cartel has ``yet to be effectively confronted.'' Is this an example of the ``encouraging results and notable progress'' cited by the State Department? The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes cartel and the Arellano-Felix cartel, to the best of my knowledge, are operating with absolute impunity. But even the smaller cartels are hardly touched by Mexican authorities. I think two recent incidents illustrate just what sort of cooperation the United States is receiving from Mexico with respect to the cartels. On February 26 of this year, the Washington Post published an hour- long interview--hour-long interview--with Miguel Angel Caro Quintero, leader of the Sonora cartel, who is under indictment in the United States for crimes committed in the United States and for whom the United States has requested extradition. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I understand the Government Printing Office estimates that it will cost $1,152 to print this testimony in the Record. I also ask unanimous consent that the Government Printing Office estimate be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, Senator Coverdell may well come to the floor during this period. I hope he does. I will be happy to defer, and yield parts of my time to him as well. Mr. President, 1 week ago I joined with Senator Coverdell and Senator Helms to introduce resolutions of disapproval, to overturn the President's decision to certify Mexico for antidrug cooperation. Last week I went home and I read the State Department's Statement of Explanation, which is just 1\1/2\ pages. I must say, I read this document with disbelief. At best, this document--which purports to make the case for Mexico's certification-- is a fairy tale. At worst, it is a complete whitewash. Today, I would like to take some time and go over parts of it, and indicate my thoughts on some of the subjects mentioned and refute some of the claims. Let me begin by saying that section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to certify that Mexico has ``cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on its own'' to combat drug trafficking. Despite the best intentions of President Zedillo and the best efforts of the State Department to put a pretty face on the situation, the Department's Statement of Explanation, I believe, defies credibility. The State Department claims that ``The Government of Mexico's 1996 counterdrug effort produced encouraging results and notable progress in bilateral cooperation.'' The facts tell a different story. Let me begin with drug seizures: The State Department's Statement of Explanation indicates that ``Drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996.'' While this is technically true--yes, there was a slight increase in 1996 in both drug seizures and arrests of drug traffickers--that is only because the 1995 levels were so dismal. A larger look of Mexico's record of drug seizures, going back just a few years to 1992, gives a very different perspective. The 23.6 metric tons of cocaine seized by Mexico, while slightly higher than in 1995, is just about half of what was seized in 1993. So, you see, in 1993 they seized 46.2 metric tons of cocaine. Look how it has dropped off and leveled off since then. Second, drug arrests did increase modestly in 1996 over 1995. But look back a few years and it tells a more compelling picture. In 1992 you had 27,369 drug arrests. In 1996 you had 11,038. That is not a stepped-up effort, it is a stepped-down effort. So, after a precipitous drop, by more than 50 percent, a barely discernible 5- or 10-percent increase, in my view, is not improvement. They are not encouraging results and there is not notable progress. Today, Mexico is the transit station for 70 percent of the cocaine, a quarter of the heroin, 80 percent of the marijuana, and 90 percent of the ephedrine used to make methamphetamine, entering the United States. These statistics reflect, I believe, more drugs flowing into our cities and our communities. How do we know this now? Just look at some of the street prices. According to the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, in 1993, when Mexican cocaine seizures were near their peak, a kilo of cocaine sold on the streets of Los Angeles for $21,000. Today, that same kilo of cocaine averages $16,500, and I am told that in places you can get it for $14,000 a kilo. You can see how these prices have dropped. The drop is even more dramatic if you look at black tar heroin, which the DEA says is nearly the exclusive province of Mexican family-operated cartels, based in Michoacan. The price per ounce has dropped from $1,200 in 1993 to $400 today. So today, the street price of black tar heroin has dropped to one- third of its price 4 years ago. Unfortunately, demand remains high, so when the prices drop, the obvious conclusion is that you have more supply. The falling price can be attributed to increases in the amounts of cocaine and heroin flowing across our southern border. I hardly consider this to be evidence of ``encouraging results and notable progress.'' When the street prices begin to climb, then I, for one, will begin to believe that the supply is being cut. So street prices are dropping despite the fact that stepped up enforcement on the U.S. side of the border has resulted in increased seizures. U.S. border agents at the McAllen, TX, border station seized 176,000 pounds of marijuana in 1996, 20 percent more than in 1993. But the burden of combating the increased drug shipments falls disproportionately on United States border agents because Mexico does little to enforce the border. United States Customs and Border Patrol officials have said publicly that Mexican traffickers are today going to extraordinary lengths to move their products. They are constructing secret compartments in 18- wheelers. They are saturating areas with hundreds of mules carrying backpacks with 40 kilos of marijuana each, and even sacrificing large loads of marijuana at the border to allow more valuable shipments of cocaine and heroin to slip through behind them. And they have begun to use sea lanes in much greater proportion. For the State Department to state that there has been improved performance by Mexico in intercepting drugs at the border is incomprehensible to me. Low seizure figures, low arrest figures, falling street prices in our cities--these are hardly indications of full cooperation by Mexican authorities in combating drug trafficking. Let me speak about the cartels in Mexico. The State Department's Statement of Explanation touts the arrests of ``several major drug traffickers,'' including Juan Garcia Abrego, leader of the Gulf cartel, Jose Luis Pereira Salas, linked to the Juarez and Colombian Cali cartel, and Manuel Rodriguez Lopez, linked to a minor operation called the Castrillon maritime smuggling organization. But who the Mexicans fail to capture tells a much more important story. In fact, the State Department admits as much when it says, ``the strongest groups, such as the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, have yet to be effectively confronted.'' Let me repeat that: ``the strongest groups * * * have yet to be effectively confronted.'' So here is the State Department explaining to us that Mexico has fully cooperated with the United States, and yet telling us in the same breath that Mexico has taken no serious action against the organizations and individuals most responsible for the bulk of the drug trafficking. This is also not how United States drug enforcement officials describe the efforts in Mexico. Let me share with my colleagues what our own drug enforcement officials say about how fully Mexico is cooperating in antidrug efforts. DEA administrator, Thomas Constantine, has described the Mexican drug cartels, in a statement he made to a House committee the week before last, as ``the leading organized crime organizations in the Western Hemisphere, and for some reason,'' he continues, ``they seem to be operating with impunity.'' His testimony is a chilling account of the extensive operations of the major Mexican drug cartels and how corruption within Mexican law enforcement agencies has allowed the cartels to conduct their deadly trade with virtual impunity. He also described how the Mexican drug cartels are expanding their criminal reach into the United States. As we debate whether or not to disapprove of Mexico's certification, I hope all of my colleagues will take the time to read Mr. Constantine's testimony. It makes the case better than anything I have seen that Mexico's efforts have, in fact, not met the standard for certification. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Constantine's testimony be printed in the Record after my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as he told the Post: I go to the banks, offices, just like any Mexican. Every day I pass by roadblocks, police, soldiers, and there are no problems. I'm in the streets all the time. How can they not find me? Because they're not looking for me. According to law enforcement, the Sonora cartel cultivates, smuggles, and distributes heroin and marijuana to the United States, as well as transporting Colombian cocaine. It has operations reaching into Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana. The Washington Post found him, but the Mexican police, up to the last few days, were not even looking for him. Perhaps the State Department would explain how this qualifies as ``full cooperation'' with the United States. I do not see it. The other incident was a typical February story. I sometimes wish February would last all year round because the pressure of the March 1 certification decision seems to produce all kinds of results that we are unable to get the rest of the year, but on March 2, frequently it is business as usual. Just hours before the President's decision on certification was to be made public, the Mexican Government announced with great fanfare the arrest of Humberto Garcia Abrego, a leader of the Gulf cartel. Leave aside the question of why Mexican authorities were unable to arrest this man the rest of the year but miraculously found him on February 27. What happened next is critical to the integrity of the effort. Only hours after the decision to certify Mexico was announced, Humberto Garcia Abrego simply walked out of custody. The Mexican Attorney General's office called his release ``inexplicable.'' You could not write a script that would illustrate our problem with Mexico's inability to deal with the cartels any better than this incident. Yet, the State Department assures us that there have been ``encouraging results and notable progress.'' Not with respect to the cartels. I sincerely do not believe that the cartels' operations have been altered, reduced or impeded at all. Those officials whom the cartels cannot buy they kill. The cartels have unleashed a reign of terror on honest Mexican law enforcement officials. The DEA reports that 12 prosecutors and law enforcement officers have been assassinated in Mexico in just the last year alone, most of them in connection with the Tijuana cartel. Let's start with an incident on February 22, 1996, just about a year ago. Approximately 40 Juarez municipal police opened fire on agents from the Mexican Attorney General's office, resulting in the death of one commandante and one agent. DEA suspects the local police were providing protection for drug traffickers. On February 23, 1996, Sergio Armanda Silva, a former operations chief of the Baja federal police, was assassinated. On April 17, 1996, Mexico City's previous top prosecutor, Arturo Ochoa Palacios, was gunned down while jogging. May 1996, Mexico City's top prosecutor, Sergio Moreno Perez, was kidnapped with his adult son in Michoacan state. Their bodies were later discovered in a car in Mexico City's suburbs. June 27, 1996, drug agency commandante Daniel Beruben-Jaime was assassinated in Jalisco. July 19, 1996, Isaac Sanchez Perez, the former Baja federal police commander, was shot in the back of the head and killed in Mexico City. August 17, 1996, Tijuana prosecutor Jesus Romero Magana was gunned down outside his home. He was investigating the Arellano-Felix organization. September 14, 1996, Baja federal police commander Ernesto Ibarra Santes, two of his bodyguards and a cab driver were machine-gunned down in Mexico city. Ibarra had vowed to go after the Arellano Felix brothers and to purge the federal police ranks of any corrupt federal agents who stood in his way. He held his post for 28 days. September 21, the body of Hector Gonzalez-Baecenas, assistant to Garcia Vargas, was found in the trunk of another car. Also tortured. September 23, 1996, the body of 43-year-old Jorge Garcia Vargas, Tijuana district chief of the Federal antinarcotics agency was found in the trunk of a car along with the body of Miguel Angel Silva Caballero, a former Federal police commander. Both showed signs of torture. November 3, 1996, a former prosecutor named Martin Ramirez-Alvarez was murdered in Tijuana. His wife reported that an unknown number of individuals stopped them in a vehicle utilizing red and blue police strobe lights. They dragged Ramirez-Alvarez out of the vehicle and shot him point blank six times. It is believed the Arellano-Felix organization is responsible for the assassination. On January 3, 1997, 27-year-old State Prosecutor Hodin Gutierrez-Rico was assassinated in front of his wife and children at his residence in Tijuana. Gutierrez-Rico was investigating the murder of a Tijuana municipal police chief and Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. More than 120 spent shells were found on the ground, and his body was deliberately run over several times by a van. And so it goes. These murders are, to me, the most compelling because their message is undeniable: ``Get too close, and you are dead.'' And not one of these cases has been solved to date. This is why the corruption of the military general placed in charge of the counternarcotics effort is so paralyzing. The question remains: If the highest military man can be corrupted, then who is left? But Mexico's failure to combat the cartels effectively is having an alarming spillover effect into American cities. Robert Walsh, special agent in charge of the San Diego office of the FBI told my office that all of the major Mexican cartels have members of United States gangs working for them. These agents distribute the drugs shipped in by the cartels and ship the cash generated from drug sales back to Mexico. They also carry out revenge murders on orders from Tijuana or Juarez. Prof. Peter Lupsha of the University of New Mexico, who has studied the cartels for decades, says, ``I don't believe anyone in La Cosa Nostra could order a murder 2,000 miles away and expect it to be carried out. Carillo-Fuentes can do that and much more.'' That is why the State Department's utter denial that the problem is getting worse is so dangerous. As much as these cartels are destroying Mexico, their reach is expanding. They have agents in many of our large and mid-size cities. Their drugs are reaching our children. The gangs they hire kill ruthlessly to protect their turf in our cities. It is no exaggeration to say that the lives of hundreds, if not thousands, of Americans are literally at stake in the war against the cartels. And the State Department's refusal to face up to facts does not protect a single child from the bullets of a drug-running gang or a driveby shooter. Let me speak about money laundering. The next item of progress in the State Department's statement of explanation is that ``the Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces of legislation which have armed the Government of Mexico with a whole new arsenal of weapons to use to combat money laundering, chemical diversion, and organized crime.'' Let us see how good the new money-laundering law is. It is true that in May 1996, the Mexican Congress adopted a law that for the first time specifically identified money laundering as a criminal act. At that time, Finance Minister Guillermo Ortiz Martinez committed to develop the regulations that would implement this law by January 1997. The draft of these regulations, which would require banks and other institutions to report suspicious transactions of currency, were due in January. Well, it is now March and the regulations have not been forthcoming. No doubt, the implementation date of these regulations, now scheduled for June 1997, will slide, as will the issuance of a second set of regulations, governing the reporting of large-scale transactions. These regulations are essential to combating money laundering. Reporting requirements discourage would-be money launderers, tip off law enforcement officials to unlawful activity, and create a paper trail that can be a powerful investigative tool. But until Finance Minister Ortiz issues the regulations and they are implemented, it is business as usual. To date, not a single Mexican bank or exchange house has been forced to alter its operations. And until the regulations have been issued, we have no real way of evaluating the impact of the law. Any law is only as good as its implementation. It is a giant leap of faith by the State Department to cite the passage of a money-laundering law as a sign of major progress when, to date, it has been neither implemented nor enforced. There are some key questions that must be answered: Will the regulations prevent bank employees or ministry staff from tipping off drug cartels about investigations? Second, will the regulations provide immunity for employees who report a suspicious transaction and are acting in good faith? If not, they may be reluctant to report transactions as required, or killed if they do. Third, will the regulations contain exemptions for any industries? They should not. In addition, there is a major weakness in the new law in that it does not provide for sanctions against banks and financial institutions that fail to comply with reporting requirements. Without such sanctions, Mexico's money-laundering laws will remain woefully inadequate. Now, there is a report today in the Financial Times of London that Mexico will introduce its antilaundering regulations this week. We shall see. Those regulations will need to be evaluated. But why has it taken Mexico until mid-March, and a crisis over certification, to get to this point? That is not a sign of a fully cooperating country. Meanwhile, massive money laundering continues in Mexico unabated. And it is spilling across the southwest border. California State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement Chief George Doane testified last March that ``at a money counting and shipping house in the Los Angeles area, agents located $6 million in cash and financial records in a residence occupied by three Hispanic nationals, indicating that $75 million had been counted, packaged, and shipped from the residence via a commercial bus company to Mexico.'' An analysis done by the DEA of all transactions between the San Antonio Federal Reserve and area depository institutions showed a currency surplus of $2.96 billion in 1995--a clear sign that cartels have successfully laundered money to their final destination in Mexico. The DEA's Donnie Marshall told Congress in September that a DEA investigation known as Zorro II in the Los Angeles area ``resulted in the arrests of 156 people, the seizure of approximately 5,600 kilograms of cocaine, and over $17 million in U.S. currency. The majority of this $17 million was seized as it was being prepared for shipment to Mexico or seized from vehicles that were en route to Mexico.'' Marshall also described cambios, or exchange houses outside the banking system, located along the borders of Texas and California, which are a significant factor in the laundering of drug proceeds where Mexican traffickers intermingle cash derived from drug sales with legitimate exchange business. My staff recently visited 22 of these exchange houses. So the State Department sees encouraging results and notable progress in the area of money laundering as well. I say that today there is no effective effort to deter the laundering of drug money anywhere in Mexico. Corruption The State Department's statement of explanation sees progress even where--by its own admission--none exists. This is how the Department describes Mexico's so-called progress on combating corruption: In an effort to confront widespread corruption within the nation's law enforcement agencies, former Attorney General Lozano dismissed over 1,250 federal police officers and technical personnel for corruption or incompetence, although some have been rehired, and the Government of Mexico indicted two former senior Government officials and a current Undersecretary of Tourism. Now, the sentence, in a sense, refutes itself. When you say that some have been rehired, of course, if they were innocent, we would want them to be rehired. But if they were guilty, we would want them to be prosecuted. So let's look and see what happened. According to the DEA, of the 1,250 officers dismissed for corruption, not a single one was successfully prosecuted--not one. The rash of murders of prosecutors and law enforcement officers in Tijuana is a case in point. These assassinations have been made possible in large part because the Tijuana police have been so thoroughly corrupted by the Arellano-Felix organization. According to the Los Angeles Times on March 3, 1997, court papers recently filed in United States district court by the Mexican Government in an extradition case contain testimony to the effect that--and let me remind you that this is from court papers submitted by the Mexican Government--``the state attorney general and almost 90 percent of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges in Tijuana and the State of Baja California . . . are on the payroll'' of the Arellano-Felix organization. In the same San Diego court documents, a former presidential guard, army lieutenant Gerardo Cruz Pacheco, told how he recruited soldiers to unload drug shipments and helped Tijuana cartel gunmen assassinate Baja federal police commander Ernesto Ibarra Santes in September. The Federal judicial police have been so corrupted by the cartels that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them and the criminals. That is why some were encouraged by the prospect of increased participation of the Mexican military, which has not been so tainted by corruption, in the anti-drug effort. But that's why the startling revelation about Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, the head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs--Mexico's top counternarcotics official--who is a 42-year veteran of the armed forces, has cast grave doubts upon that hope. When the Mexican Army planned a raid of the wedding of the sister of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the drug lord had been tipped off in advance, some say by General Gutierrez himself. As a result, he escaped arrest by leaving early or not attending. But Mexican troops found federal police providing protection for drug traffickers at the wedding. And most concering to me is that corruption is spreading rapidly across the border into the United States. For example: In Calexico, CA, former INS inspector Richard Felix admitted to FBI agents that he pocketed up to $500,000 in bribes for permitting loads of cocaine and marijuana to pass uninspected through his port of entry lane. In El Paso, former Customs and INS inspector Jose Trinidad Carrillo gave drug traffickers a price list for his help in getting drugs through his border-entry lane: $10,000 per car, or $40 per pound of marijuana and $250 per pound of cocaine. Stories of officials of U.S. border towns being bribed are now surfacing. Some of this I heard myself in the testimony of a border rancher to the Judiciary Committee last year. President Zedillo appears to be trying his best to fight drug trafficking, and he has honest people on his side, like Elvira Ruiz, one of the few female police chiefs in Baja, whose life has been consistently threatened by the cartels. But the efforts of these people are unfortunately being completely overwhelmed by the uncontrollable tide of corruption. The arrest of General Gutierrez has been cited by the administration as evidence of the Mexican Government's commitment to fight corruption. But the way in which this situation was handled raises serious questions about Mexico's willingness to cooperate with the United States. On February 6 of this year, Defense Secretary Enrique Cervantes Aguirre confronted General Gutierrez, asking him to explain how he came to live in an apartment that was beyond the means of his salary. The general began suffering a heart attack and was placed in the hospital. After 12 days of investigating, on February 18, Defense Secretary Cervantes had Gutierrez placed under arrest for accepting bribes from the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel. Yet during that entire 12-day period, the Mexican Government gave no indication to the United States that it suspected that its top drug official was corrupt. In that time, U.S. officials continued regular contacts with Gutierrez' National Institute to Combat Drugs, not knowing that its operations were directed by a man in the pocket of drug kingpins. General Gutierrez had been in Washington shortly before he was first questioned about his spending habits. He met with our drug czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who called him a man of absolute, unquestioned integrity. Why would Mexico allow Gutierrez to visit Washington when he was suspected of corruption, and why--at the least--would they not alert the United States side? Our own drug enforcement officials have been forced to conduct damage assessments to determine how much and what kind of intelligence was provided to the general, and perhaps passed right onto the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes. We are left to worry that the lives of our agents in the field and our informants have been placed in jeopardy. So we can praise the Mexican Government for arresting Gutierrez, but their delay in notifying the United States of their suspicions about the general begs an important question: Is this a sign of the full cooperation for which Mexico has just been certified? Cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement The State Department's statement of explanation then goes on to describe the extensive cooperation that has taken place between the Mexican and United States Governments: The United States and Mexico established the High-Level Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to explore joint solutions to the shared drug threat and to coordinate bilateral anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met three times during 1996 and its technical working groups met throughout the year. Under the aegis of the HLCG, the two governments developed a joint assessment of the narcotics threat posed to both countries which will be used as the basis for a joint counter-drug strategy. All the high-level meetings in the world don't amount to a hill of beans unless there is cooperation and coordination on the ground between law enforcement agencies of the two sides. Once again, the State Department's assertion that these meetings are a sign of real progress misses the point. Whether or not our leaders can work together is less important than whether our cops can work together. And plainly, at the moment, they cannot. Given the staggering level of corruption in the Mexican police, it is no wonder that DEA Administrator Constantine told the House Committee last week: ``In short, there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship.'' That statement by itself should call into question Mexico's qualification to be certified. It is echoed by law enforcement agents on the ground: On March 7, 1997, Ed Ladd, president of the California Narcotics Officers' Association, issued a statement in which he announced that the association's board had voted unanimously to support congressional efforts to overturn the decision to certify Mexico. This vote, Mr. Ladd said, ``is based on our longstanding experience with the widespread corruption and lack of cooperation shown by the Mexican government.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text the statement of Ed Ladd, president of the California Narcotic Officers' Association, be included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last year we approved the most comprehensive welfare reform this Nation has ever known. Because the changes were so comprehensive, this body approved the bill with much reservation, particularly on the provision for the elderly and disabled legal immigrants. Today, I correct one of the major challenges left over from the welfare reform last year that if uncorrected, will have a devastating impact on the States and counties by shifting the cost of caring for the seriously ill and destitute disabled and elderly legal immigrants who have absolutely no other means of support. I am here to offer the Elderly and Disabled Legal Immigrant Support Act with Senator Boxer as the cosponsor in the Senate, and Congressman Campbell and Congresswoman Lofgren as sponsors in the House of Representatives. The Elderly and Disabled Legal Immigrant Support Act of 1997 would exempt from the current ban on SSI, those elderly, disabled and/or blind legal immigrants, who came to this country prior to passage of the welfare bill--August 22, 1996, who can demonstrate that they have no family and have no other source of support. This legislation prohibits SSI for all legal immigrants coming to this country following the date of enactment of the welfare reform bill, August 22, 1996. This legislation corrects what I believe is a grave mistake in the Federal welfare reform law--a blanket denial of SSI to all legal noncitizens, no matter how elderly, disabled, destitute and ill they may be. Over 20 California county supervisors, both Republican and Democrat, have spoken out, in one voice, that the legal immigrant provisions of the welfare law will be disastrous for California counties and this legislation is critical for the Counties and for the country. In California alone, 200,000 to 326,000 people may lose SSI by August 22, 1997. Los Angeles County estimates that eliminating benefits for 93,000 legal immigrants in its county could cost up to $236 million a year. San Francisco estimates that 20,000 legal noncitizens may turn to the county's general assistance program, at a total cost of up to $74 million. Many top immigrant States and counties will also bear the burden of caring for the elderly, disabled, and blind legal immigrants who are banned from SSI. New York--126,860 legal immigrants may lose their SSI, costing the State approximately $240 million annually. Florida--77,920 legal immigrants may lose their SSI, costing the State approximately $300 million annually. Texas--59,160 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. Illinois--25,960 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. New Jersey--25,500 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. Massachusetts--25,140 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. The Republican Governors who supported the welfare reform bill now realize that the new law, as written, will result in a huge financial cost-shift to their states. President Clinton has also recognized that legal immigrants who become disabled after entry should not be banned from SSI and food stamps and has allocated $13.7 billion in the 1998 budget for this population who have nowhere else to turn. As we speak, 125,000 SSI cancellation notices are going out to elderly, disabled, and blind legal immigrants every week. Many elderly and disabled legal immigrants have absolutely no family or friends to turn to for support and will be destitute. They have no one to turn to, except county relief programs or, at worst, homeless shelters. Effective August 22 of this year, all legal immigrants currently receiving SSI will be cut from the rolls regardless of their circumstances. I know that prior to welfare reform, the door was open for sponsors to bring in their parents and then neglect to support them or, if they are unable to support them, to know that legal immigrants were eligible for SSI. The number of noncitizens collecting SSI had increased by 477 percent in the 14 years from 1980 to 1994, while for citizens the numbers increased by 33 percent during the same period. Clearly, one can extrapolate from these statistics that legal immigrants were using SSI at 15 times the rate of citizens. I hold the sponsors accountable for the support of legal immigrants they bring into the country who they have pledged to support. But the Federal welfare reform banning SSI for virtually all legal immigrants-- even those whose sponsors cannot afford to support them, or those refugees who have no sponsors at all--will create extreme hardship for those elderly, blind, and disabled legal immigrants who are unable to support themselves. Let me tell you the story about a 73-year-old legal immigrant in San Francisco on SSI. She was welcomed to this county from Vietnam in 1980. She was a refugee from Communism with no family in the United States. She speaks no English and she is suffering from kidney failure. She requires dialysis three times a week. Under this new law, this 73-year- old woman will lose SSI, her only source of support. Her well-being will become the responsibility of the county. I urge my colleagues to seriously consider and support this limited exemption from the current ban on SSI by allowing those elderly, blind, or disabled individuals, who were in the country prior to August 22, 1996, and who have no other means of support, to continue on SSI. The ban on SSI would apply to those coming into the country after August 22, 1996. Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a chart on number of aliens receiving SSI payments by legal status and State be included in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last year we approved the most comprehensive welfare reform this Nation has ever known. Because the changes were so comprehensive, this body approved the bill with much reservation, particularly on the provision for the elderly and disabled legal immigrants. Today, I correct one of the major challenges left over from the welfare reform last year that if uncorrected, will have a devastating impact on the States and counties by shifting the cost of caring for the seriously ill and destitute disabled and elderly legal immigrants who have absolutely no other means of support. I am here to offer the Elderly and Disabled Legal Immigrant Support Act with Senator Boxer as the cosponsor in the Senate, and Congressman Campbell and Congresswoman Lofgren as sponsors in the House of Representatives. The Elderly and Disabled Legal Immigrant Support Act of 1997 would exempt from the current ban on SSI, those elderly, disabled and/or blind legal immigrants, who came to this country prior to passage of the welfare bill--August 22, 1996, who can demonstrate that they have no family and have no other source of support. This legislation prohibits SSI for all legal immigrants coming to this country following the date of enactment of the welfare reform bill, August 22, 1996. This legislation corrects what I believe is a grave mistake in the Federal welfare reform law--a blanket denial of SSI to all legal noncitizens, no matter how elderly, disabled, destitute and ill they may be. Over 20 California county supervisors, both Republican and Democrat, have spoken out, in one voice, that the legal immigrant provisions of the welfare law will be disastrous for California counties and this legislation is critical for the Counties and for the country. In California alone, 200,000 to 326,000 people may lose SSI by August 22, 1997. Los Angeles County estimates that eliminating benefits for 93,000 legal immigrants in its county could cost up to $236 million a year. San Francisco estimates that 20,000 legal noncitizens may turn to the county's general assistance program, at a total cost of up to $74 million. Many top immigrant States and counties will also bear the burden of caring for the elderly, disabled, and blind legal immigrants who are banned from SSI. New York--126,860 legal immigrants may lose their SSI, costing the State approximately $240 million annually. Florida--77,920 legal immigrants may lose their SSI, costing the State approximately $300 million annually. Texas--59,160 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. Illinois--25,960 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. New Jersey--25,500 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. Massachusetts--25,140 legal immigrants may lose their SSI. The Republican Governors who supported the welfare reform bill now realize that the new law, as written, will result in a huge financial cost-shift to their states. President Clinton has also recognized that legal immigrants who become disabled after entry should not be banned from SSI and food stamps and has allocated $13.7 billion in the 1998 budget for this population who have nowhere else to turn. As we speak, 125,000 SSI cancellation notices are going out to elderly, disabled, and blind legal immigrants every week. Many elderly and disabled legal immigrants have absolutely no family or friends to turn to for support and will be destitute. They have no one to turn to, except county relief programs or, at worst, homeless shelters. Effective August 22 of this year, all legal immigrants currently receiving SSI will be cut from the rolls regardless of their circumstances. I know that prior to welfare reform, the door was open for sponsors to bring in their parents and then neglect to support them or, if they are unable to support them, to know that legal immigrants were eligible for SSI. The number of noncitizens collecting SSI had increased by 477 percent in the 14 years from 1980 to 1994, while for citizens the numbers increased by 33 percent during the same period. Clearly, one can extrapolate from these statistics that legal immigrants were using SSI at 15 times the rate of citizens. I hold the sponsors accountable for the support of legal immigrants they bring into the country who they have pledged to support. But the Federal welfare reform banning SSI for virtually all legal immigrants-- even those whose sponsors cannot afford to support them, or those refugees who have no sponsors at all--will create extreme hardship for those elderly, blind, and disabled legal immigrants who are unable to support themselves. Let me tell you the story about a 73-year-old legal immigrant in San Francisco on SSI. She was welcomed to this county from Vietnam in 1980. She was a refugee from Communism with no family in the United States. She speaks no English and she is suffering from kidney failure. She requires dialysis three times a week. Under this new law, this 73-year- old woman will lose SSI, her only source of support. Her well-being will become the responsibility of the county. I urge my colleagues to seriously consider and support this limited exemption from the current ban on SSI by allowing those elderly, blind, or disabled individuals, who were in the country prior to August 22, 1996, and who have no other means of support, to continue on SSI. The ban on SSI would apply to those coming into the country after August 22, 1996. Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a chart on number of aliens receiving SSI payments by legal status and State be included in the Record.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. The Senator is correct. I thank him very much for that comment because he is absolutely right. The jog up is so small when you compare it with the drop which is so steep and pronounced. So I thank the Senator very much. It leads me to the conclusion that the situation with Mexico has never been worse. DEA has suspended American agents going into Mexico because, just last month, Mexico forbade United States drug agents from carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border. I understand that there may be some agreement again to enable our agents to be armed, and then they will go in again. However, it should be pointed out that death threats against our agents are up. I would like to ask that all Members, if they would be willing, to simply read the testimony provided by Thomas Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, last week. It was played about three times on C-SPAN over the weekend. I heard it. I also read the remarks. And the remarks are really very, very profound. In this report, Mr. Constantine points out again: Since 1993, 23 major drug-related assassinations have taken place in Mexico. Virtually all of these murders remain unsolved. Many of them have occurred in Tijuana, or have involved victims from Tijuana in the last year. Twelve law enforcement officers, or former officials, have been gunned down in Tijuana, and the vast majority of the 200 murders in that city are believed to have been drug related. The Administrator also points out that of the 1,200 firings firings of Government officials for corruption made by President Zedillo, no successful prosecutions of these individuals have ever taken place. So of the 1,200 Government officials fired for corruption, there has not been a single successful prosecution. The arrest last month of Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo brings, I think, the level of drug-influenced corruption in Mexico into some glaring relief. It is frightening. But, as I have pointed out, it is just the tip of the iceberg. In September, a federal police commander, Ernesto Ibarra, who had vowed to take down the Tijuana cartel, was murdered, and some of the assailants were his own officers. That should tell us a great deal about the level of corruption. The celebrated army raid of a wedding last month of the sister of Amado Carillo-Fuentes, Mexico's most powerful cartel leader, seems to be an elaborate charade. The raid, which was organized by General Gutierrez, who we now know was on the Carillo-Fuentes payroll and the target of the raid, was tipped off in advance and either never did come to the wedding or escaped. Federal police were found to be protecting the drug traffickers at that wedding. The federal police were protecting drug traffickers. I find that just amazing. As former DEA Administrator Robert Bonner said, ``It would be hard for anyone to say with a straight face that the Mexican Government is taking effective action against the major drug traffickers at this juncture.'' Yet, they were just certified as so doing. The purpose of section 490 was not to deliver merit badges to nations whose leaders have good intentions. The world is filled with leaders who have good intentions. The act was designed to measure uniformly the actions taken by countries to assist the United States in antidrug efforts. Colombia was decertified last year and again this year because their efforts were ineffectual. How Mexico cannot be held to the same standards I have a hard time understanding. To certify Mexico in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary undercuts the certification process. So I ask all of my colleagues to join the distinguished Senator from Georgia and myself in voting to disapprove the President's decision on certification of Mexico but to allow him, if he sees fit, to enact a national-interest waiver. Then we should work with the President to devise conditions under which Mexico would be eligible for recertification. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, February 26, 1997. The President, The White House, Washington, DC Dear Mr. President: We are writing to urge you to deny certification that Mexico has taken sufficient actions to combat international narcotics trafficking when you report to Congress on the anti-narcotics efforts of major drug producing and drug-transit countries. We believe a reasonable examination of the facts leads to no other decision. Regrettably, we have concluded that there has been insufficient progress, or no progress, on a wide range of key elements of an effective counternarcotics program in Mexico. Some of these failures are due to inability; others are due to a lack of political will. But all have set back the urgent effort to end the plague of drugs on our streets. We want to bring to your attention a number of the most significant examples of Mexico's inability and unwillingness to deal with the drug trafficking problem effectively: Cartels: There has been little or no effective action taken against the major drug cartels. The two most powerful--the Juarez Cartel run by Amado Carillo Fuentes, and the Tijuana Cartel, run by the Arellano Felix brothers--have hardly been touched by Mexican law enforcement. Those who have been arrested, such as Hector Palma, are given light sentences and allowed to continue to conduct business from jail. As DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine says, ``The Mexicans are now the single most powerful trafficking groups''--worse than the Colombian cartels. Money Laundering: Last year, the Mexican parliament passed criminal money laundering laws for the first time, but the new laws are incomplete and have not yet been properly implemented. These laws do not require banks to report large and suspicious currency transactions, or threaten the banks with sanctions if they fail to comply. Promises to enact such regulations--which prosecutors need to identify money- launderers--have so far gone unfulfilled. Mexican officials said that such regulations would be developed by January, but they were not produced. Law Enforcement: While there have been increases in the amounts of heroin and marijuana seized by Mexican authorities, cocaine seizures remain low. Although slightly higher than last year's figures, the 23.6 metric tons seized in 1996 is barely half of what was seized in 1993. A modest increase in drug-related arrests brought the total to 11,245 in 1996--less than half of the 1992 figure. Cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement: Our own drug enforcement agents report that the situation on the border has never been worse. Last month, the Mexican government forbade U.S. agents to carry weapons on the Mexican side of the border, putting their lives in grave danger. Recent news reports indicate that death threats against U.S. narcotics agents on the border have quadrupled in the past three months. Some U.S. agents believe that all their cooperative efforts are undone almost instantly by the corrupt Mexican agents with whom they work. Extraditions: Mexico also has made very little progress in the area of extraditions. In the past year, they have failed to capture and extradite a single high-ranking member of any of the major drug cartels. There are 52 outstanding U.S. extradition requests for drug dealers, and Mexico has failed to comply with a single one of them. No Mexican national has ever been extradited to the United States on drug charges. In the last year, Mexico has fired two directors of its National Institute to Combat Drugs, one Attorney General, and several high-ranking officials in the federal police for their corrupt involvement with the drug lords. We should expect Mexico to pursue the cartel leaders with the same level of intensity used to expose and punish corruption by government officials. Corruption: Mexico's counternarcotics effort is plagued by corruption in the government and the national police. Among the evidence are the eight Mexican prosecutors and law enforcement officials who have been murdered in Tijuana in recent months. There has been considerable hope that the Mexican armed forces would be able to take a more active role in the counternarcotics effort without the taint of corruption. But the revelation that Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico's top counternarcotics official and a 42-year veteran of the armed forces, had accepted bribes from the Carillo Fuentes cartel, casts grave doubts upon that hope. Recent news reports indicate that U.S. law enforcement officials suspect judges, prosecutors, Transportation Ministry officials, Naval officers, and Governors of corruption and actively facilitating the work of drug traffickers. The National Autonomous University of Mexico estimates that the drug lords spend $500 million each year to bribe Mexican officials at all levels, and many consider that figure to be a gross under-estimation. Mr. President, we believe that the evidence is overwhelming and can lead to no decision other than the decertification of Mexico. It would send a strong signal to Mexico and the world that the United States will not tolerate lack of cooperation in the fight against narcotics, even from our close friends and allies. Accordingly, we urge you to establish a clear set of benchmarks by which you will judge if and when to recertify Mexico for counternarcotics cooperation. These benchmarks must include, but not be limited to: effective action to dismantle the major drug cartels and arrest their leaders; full and ongoing implementation of effective money- laundering legislation; compliance with all outstanding extradition requests by the United States; increased interdiction of narcotics and other controlled substances flowing across the border by land and sea routes; improved cooperation with U.S. law enforcement officials including allowing U.S. agents to resume carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border; and a comprehensive program to identify, weed out, and prosecute corrupt officials at all levels of the Mexican government, police, and military. You may feel, as many of us do, that U.S. interests in Mexico, economic and otherwise, are too extensive to risk the fall-out that would result from decertification. That is why Congress included a vital national interest waiver provision in Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act. But other vital interests are not a valid reason to certify when certification has not been earned. If you feel that our interests warrant it, we urge you to use this waiver. But an honest assessment of Mexico's cooperation on counternarcotics must fall on the side of decertification. Sincerely, Wayne Allard, Jeff Bingaman, Barbara Boxer, John Breaux, Richard Bryan, Max Cleland, Susan M. Collins, Kent Conrad, Paul Coverdell, Larry Craig, Alfonse D'Amato, Pete Domenici, Byron Dorgan, Dick Durbin, Russ Feingold, Dianne Feinstein, Wendell Ford, Slade Gorton, Judd Gregg, Chuck Hagel, Jesse Helms, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Tim Hutchinson, Dirk Kempthorne, Bob Kerrey, Jon Kyl, Mary Landrieu, Frank Lautenberg, Connie Mack, Patty Murray, Frank Murkowski, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Carol Moseley-Braun, Jack Reed, Harry Reid, Rick Santorum, Ted Stevens, Robert Torricelli, and Ron Wyden.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from Georgia. I am pleased to join with him in this joint resolution, disapproving the certification of Mexico. Mr. President, my disappointment in the administration's decision to certify Mexico's antidrug efforts last week, I think, was known to all. I believe that decision was a mistake, and I said so. The decision to certify Mexico in the face of what I consider to be an overwhelming lack of cooperation undermines the integrity of the certification process itself, as well as damaging the credibility of the United States in our dealings with other countries with whom we seek cooperation. I rise today to join with the Senator from Georgia and a number of my colleagues in introducing this resolution. But I do so with some regret. I regret the need for the resolution for two reasons. First, Mexico is a neighbor, a friend, and an ally of our country. Second, I very much regret the need to disagree with my President on this issue. I believe he made what he believes to be the right decision, but I respectfully disagree with him. Our intention is clear: We believe that the evidence overwhelmingly supports decertification of Mexico, and then if the President sees fit, invoking a vital national interest waiver. For that reason, Senator Coverdell has introduced a second resolution that allows the President to waive the sanctions on grounds of vital national interest after we enact our resolution of disapproval. Last week, a bipartisan group of 39 Senators sent a letter to the President urging that this be his decision. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to certify that Mexico has cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on its own to combat drug trafficking. It's just not tenable to claim that Colombia did not meet that standard, but Mexico did. Let me read one sentence from the decertification of Colombia in 1996. It reads: Critical to the U.S. judgment that the Government of Colombia did not fully cooperate on counternarcotics in 1995 is the assessment that corruption remains pervasive, despite the efforts of some dedicated Colombians to root it out. That is no different from the situation in Mexico today. There are dedicated efforts in Mexico, but the corruption is pervasive. I think the events of last week are an example in point. Just hours before the President's decision on certification of Mexico was to be announced, Mexican officials were touting the arrest of a reputed cartel leader, Humberto Garcia Abrego, brother of Juan Garcia Abrego, who was expelled from Mexico during last year's certification process. Then, just a few hours after the decision to certify was announced, guess what? Garcia Abrego simply walked away from Mexican custody a free man. The Mexican Attorney General's office claimed responsibility for setting him free. His release was ``inexplicable,'' they said. Mr. President, this is just one example of the kind of cooperation the United States has received. It has tightened up just before certification and then, just after certification, it's business as usual. With 70 percent of the cocaine, a quarter of the heroin, 80 percent of the marijuana, and 90 percent of the ephedrine used to make methamphetamine entering the United States from our southern border, Mexico's drug problem is America's drug problem, and the problem is getting worse, not better. Last year at this time, Senator D'Amato and I compiled a list of actions we considered necessary for the Mexican Government to take in order to show progress on their antidrug efforts. Regrettably, I believe the evidence shows there has been little or no progress on nearly all of the items on this list. Some of these failures are due to inability; others are due simply to a lack of political will. For example, some questions: Has Mexico extradited one Mexican national on outstanding drug charges? The answer is no. I was puzzled because the Secretary of State, in her statement on certification, made this statement: ``Mexico has set a precedent by extraditing its own nationals.'' One might conclude that this includes Mexicans wanted on drug charges. Yet, to the contrary, both the Department of Justice and the DEA tell me that not a single Mexican national has been extradited to this country on drug-related charges. If the State Department has information that Mexican nationals are being extradited on drug-related charges--and there are 52 of them on the extradition list--I ask them now to make that list public. Tell us which Mexican nationals have been extradited on drug-related charges. Francisco Arellano-Felix of the notorious Tijuana cartel is currently in custody in a Mexican prison and wanted on narcotics charges here in the United States. I say to Mexico, why not show good faith and extradite him? Mexican authorities tell us that there has been an agreement in principle on extraditing Mexican nationals, but there has been no change in their actions. Question 2: Has Mexico implemented new laws aimed at curbing the rampant laundering of drug money? No. Nearly a year ago, the Mexican Parliament passed criminal money laundering laws. But the new laws are a far cry from the stronger legislative action sought by U.S. officials. The new laws do not even require banks to report large or suspicious currency transactions. Promises to enact such regulations have, so far, gone unfulfilled. To my knowledge, not one money exchange house in Mexico has changed its operations. Have Mexican authorities significantly increased their seizure rate of cocaine or their arrest of drug traffickers? Let's take a look at it. The answer to that clearly is no. Cocaine seizures by Mexico, which increased slightly last year, are barely half of what was seized in 1993. Here are seizures in 1993--46.2 tons. Here they are in 1995--22.2 tons. And they are just slightly above that in 1996. Actually, instead of 22.2 tons, in 1996 they are 23.5. So that is the record. It has been effectively downhill, and then a straight line, and a small little jog up. Let's take a look at drug-related arrests in Mexico. Drug-related arrests last year are less than half of what they were in 1992. Here are the figures. In 1992, 27,369; down in 1993; down in 1994; and way down in 1995, all the way to 9,700. We don't have 1996 on this chart yet, but the 1996 figures are 11,245. That is a startling drop since 1992. So here is a country being certified as fully cooperative, and drug seizures have gone down and drug arrests have gone down in the last 3 years. One has to ask then: What is ``full cooperation"?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. The Senator is correct. I thank him very much for that comment because he is absolutely right. The jog up is so small when you compare it with the drop which is so steep and pronounced. So I thank the Senator very much. It leads me to the conclusion that the situation with Mexico has never been worse. DEA has suspended American agents going into Mexico because, just last month, Mexico forbade United States drug agents from carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border. I understand that there may be some agreement again to enable our agents to be armed, and then they will go in again. However, it should be pointed out that death threats against our agents are up. I would like to ask that all Members, if they would be willing, to simply read the testimony provided by Thomas Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, last week. It was played about three times on C-SPAN over the weekend. I heard it. I also read the remarks. And the remarks are really very, very profound. In this report, Mr. Constantine points out again: Since 1993, 23 major drug-related assassinations have taken place in Mexico. Virtually all of these murders remain unsolved. Many of them have occurred in Tijuana, or have involved victims from Tijuana in the last year. Twelve law enforcement officers, or former officials, have been gunned down in Tijuana, and the vast majority of the 200 murders in that city are believed to have been drug related. The Administrator also points out that of the 1,200 firings firings of Government officials for corruption made by President Zedillo, no successful prosecutions of these individuals have ever taken place. So of the 1,200 Government officials fired for corruption, there has not been a single successful prosecution. The arrest last month of Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo brings, I think, the level of drug-influenced corruption in Mexico into some glaring relief. It is frightening. But, as I have pointed out, it is just the tip of the iceberg. In September, a federal police commander, Ernesto Ibarra, who had vowed to take down the Tijuana cartel, was murdered, and some of the assailants were his own officers. That should tell us a great deal about the level of corruption. The celebrated army raid of a wedding last month of the sister of Amado Carillo-Fuentes, Mexico's most powerful cartel leader, seems to be an elaborate charade. The raid, which was organized by General Gutierrez, who we now know was on the Carillo-Fuentes payroll and the target of the raid, was tipped off in advance and either never did come to the wedding or escaped. Federal police were found to be protecting the drug traffickers at that wedding. The federal police were protecting drug traffickers. I find that just amazing. As former DEA Administrator Robert Bonner said, ``It would be hard for anyone to say with a straight face that the Mexican Government is taking effective action against the major drug traffickers at this juncture.'' Yet, they were just certified as so doing. The purpose of section 490 was not to deliver merit badges to nations whose leaders have good intentions. The world is filled with leaders who have good intentions. The act was designed to measure uniformly the actions taken by countries to assist the United States in antidrug efforts. Colombia was decertified last year and again this year because their efforts were ineffectual. How Mexico cannot be held to the same standards I have a hard time understanding. To certify Mexico in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary undercuts the certification process. So I ask all of my colleagues to join the distinguished Senator from Georgia and myself in voting to disapprove the President's decision on certification of Mexico but to allow him, if he sees fit, to enact a national-interest waiver. Then we should work with the President to devise conditions under which Mexico would be eligible for recertification. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, February 26, 1997. The President, The White House, Washington, DC Dear Mr. President: We are writing to urge you to deny certification that Mexico has taken sufficient actions to combat international narcotics trafficking when you report to Congress on the anti-narcotics efforts of major drug producing and drug-transit countries. We believe a reasonable examination of the facts leads to no other decision. Regrettably, we have concluded that there has been insufficient progress, or no progress, on a wide range of key elements of an effective counternarcotics program in Mexico. Some of these failures are due to inability; others are due to a lack of political will. But all have set back the urgent effort to end the plague of drugs on our streets. We want to bring to your attention a number of the most significant examples of Mexico's inability and unwillingness to deal with the drug trafficking problem effectively: Cartels: There has been little or no effective action taken against the major drug cartels. The two most powerful--the Juarez Cartel run by Amado Carillo Fuentes, and the Tijuana Cartel, run by the Arellano Felix brothers--have hardly been touched by Mexican law enforcement. Those who have been arrested, such as Hector Palma, are given light sentences and allowed to continue to conduct business from jail. As DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine says, ``The Mexicans are now the single most powerful trafficking groups''--worse than the Colombian cartels. Money Laundering: Last year, the Mexican parliament passed criminal money laundering laws for the first time, but the new laws are incomplete and have not yet been properly implemented. These laws do not require banks to report large and suspicious currency transactions, or threaten the banks with sanctions if they fail to comply. Promises to enact such regulations--which prosecutors need to identify money- launderers--have so far gone unfulfilled. Mexican officials said that such regulations would be developed by January, but they were not produced. Law Enforcement: While there have been increases in the amounts of heroin and marijuana seized by Mexican authorities, cocaine seizures remain low. Although slightly higher than last year's figures, the 23.6 metric tons seized in 1996 is barely half of what was seized in 1993. A modest increase in drug-related arrests brought the total to 11,245 in 1996--less than half of the 1992 figure. Cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement: Our own drug enforcement agents report that the situation on the border has never been worse. Last month, the Mexican government forbade U.S. agents to carry weapons on the Mexican side of the border, putting their lives in grave danger. Recent news reports indicate that death threats against U.S. narcotics agents on the border have quadrupled in the past three months. Some U.S. agents believe that all their cooperative efforts are undone almost instantly by the corrupt Mexican agents with whom they work. Extraditions: Mexico also has made very little progress in the area of extraditions. In the past year, they have failed to capture and extradite a single high-ranking member of any of the major drug cartels. There are 52 outstanding U.S. extradition requests for drug dealers, and Mexico has failed to comply with a single one of them. No Mexican national has ever been extradited to the United States on drug charges. In the last year, Mexico has fired two directors of its National Institute to Combat Drugs, one Attorney General, and several high-ranking officials in the federal police for their corrupt involvement with the drug lords. We should expect Mexico to pursue the cartel leaders with the same level of intensity used to expose and punish corruption by government officials. Corruption: Mexico's counternarcotics effort is plagued by corruption in the government and the national police. Among the evidence are the eight Mexican prosecutors and law enforcement officials who have been murdered in Tijuana in recent months. There has been considerable hope that the Mexican armed forces would be able to take a more active role in the counternarcotics effort without the taint of corruption. But the revelation that Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico's top counternarcotics official and a 42-year veteran of the armed forces, had accepted bribes from the Carillo Fuentes cartel, casts grave doubts upon that hope. Recent news reports indicate that U.S. law enforcement officials suspect judges, prosecutors, Transportation Ministry officials, Naval officers, and Governors of corruption and actively facilitating the work of drug traffickers. The National Autonomous University of Mexico estimates that the drug lords spend $500 million each year to bribe Mexican officials at all levels, and many consider that figure to be a gross under-estimation. Mr. President, we believe that the evidence is overwhelming and can lead to no decision other than the decertification of Mexico. It would send a strong signal to Mexico and the world that the United States will not tolerate lack of cooperation in the fight against narcotics, even from our close friends and allies. Accordingly, we urge you to establish a clear set of benchmarks by which you will judge if and when to recertify Mexico for counternarcotics cooperation. These benchmarks must include, but not be limited to: effective action to dismantle the major drug cartels and arrest their leaders; full and ongoing implementation of effective money- laundering legislation; compliance with all outstanding extradition requests by the United States; increased interdiction of narcotics and other controlled substances flowing across the border by land and sea routes; improved cooperation with U.S. law enforcement officials including allowing U.S. agents to resume carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border; and a comprehensive program to identify, weed out, and prosecute corrupt officials at all levels of the Mexican government, police, and military. You may feel, as many of us do, that U.S. interests in Mexico, economic and otherwise, are too extensive to risk the fall-out that would result from decertification. That is why Congress included a vital national interest waiver provision in Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act. But other vital interests are not a valid reason to certify when certification has not been earned. If you feel that our interests warrant it, we urge you to use this waiver. But an honest assessment of Mexico's cooperation on counternarcotics must fall on the side of decertification. Sincerely, Wayne Allard, Jeff Bingaman, Barbara Boxer, John Breaux, Richard Bryan, Max Cleland, Susan M. Collins, Kent Conrad, Paul Coverdell, Larry Craig, Alfonse D'Amato, Pete Domenici, Byron Dorgan, Dick Durbin, Russ Feingold, Dianne Feinstein, Wendell Ford, Slade Gorton, Judd Gregg, Chuck Hagel, Jesse Helms, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Tim Hutchinson, Dirk Kempthorne, Bob Kerrey, Jon Kyl, Mary Landrieu, Frank Lautenberg, Connie Mack, Patty Murray, Frank Murkowski, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Carol Moseley-Braun, Jack Reed, Harry Reid, Rick Santorum, Ted Stevens, Robert Torricelli, and Ron Wyden.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to certify that Mexico has cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on its own to combat drug trafficking. It's just not tenable to claim that Colombia did not meet that standard, but Mexico did. Let me read one sentence from the decertification of Colombia in 1996. It reads: Critical to the U.S. judgment that the Government of Colombia did not fully cooperate on counternarcotics in 1995 is the assessment that corruption remains pervasive, despite the efforts of some dedicated Colombians to root it out. That is no different from the situation in Mexico today. There are dedicated efforts in Mexico, but the corruption is pervasive. I think the events of last week are an example in point. Just hours before the President's decision on certification of Mexico was to be announced, Mexican officials were touting the arrest of a reputed cartel leader, Humberto Garcia Abrego, brother of Juan Garcia Abrego, who was expelled from Mexico during last year's certification process. Then, just a few hours after the decision to certify was announced, guess what? Garcia Abrego simply walked away from Mexican custody a free man. The Mexican Attorney General's office claimed responsibility for setting him free. His release was ``inexplicable,'' they said. Mr. President, this is just one example of the kind of cooperation the United States has received. It has tightened up just before certification and then, just after certification, it's business as usual. With 70 percent of the cocaine, a quarter of the heroin, 80 percent of the marijuana, and 90 percent of the ephedrine used to make methamphetamine entering the United States from our southern border, Mexico's drug problem is America's drug problem, and the problem is getting worse, not better. Last year at this time, Senator D'Amato and I compiled a list of actions we considered necessary for the Mexican Government to take in order to show progress on their antidrug efforts. Regrettably, I believe the evidence shows there has been little or no progress on nearly all of the items on this list. Some of these failures are due to inability; others are due simply to a lack of political will. For example, some questions: Has Mexico extradited one Mexican national on outstanding drug charges? The answer is no. I was puzzled because the Secretary of State, in her statement on certification, made this statement: ``Mexico has set a precedent by extraditing its own nationals.'' One might conclude that this includes Mexicans wanted on drug charges. Yet, to the contrary, both the Department of Justice and the DEA tell me that not a single Mexican national has been extradited to this country on drug-related charges. If the State Department has information that Mexican nationals are being extradited on drug-related charges--and there are 52 of them on the extradition list--I ask them now to make that list public. Tell us which Mexican nationals have been extradited on drug-related charges. Francisco Arellano-Felix of the notorious Tijuana cartel is currently in custody in a Mexican prison and wanted on narcotics charges here in the United States. I say to Mexico, why not show good faith and extradite him? Mexican authorities tell us that there has been an agreement in principle on extraditing Mexican nationals, but there has been no change in their actions. Question 2: Has Mexico implemented new laws aimed at curbing the rampant laundering of drug money? No. Nearly a year ago, the Mexican Parliament passed criminal money laundering laws. But the new laws are a far cry from the stronger legislative action sought by U.S. officials. The new laws do not even require banks to report large or suspicious currency transactions. Promises to enact such regulations have, so far, gone unfulfilled. To my knowledge, not one money exchange house in Mexico has changed its operations. Have Mexican authorities significantly increased their seizure rate of cocaine or their arrest of drug traffickers? Let's take a look at it. The answer to that clearly is no. Cocaine seizures by Mexico, which increased slightly last year, are barely half of what was seized in 1993. Here are seizures in 1993--46.2 tons. Here they are in 1995--22.2 tons. And they are just slightly above that in 1996. Actually, instead of 22.2 tons, in 1996 they are 23.5. So that is the record. It has been effectively downhill, and then a straight line, and a small little jog up. Let's take a look at drug-related arrests in Mexico. Drug-related arrests last year are less than half of what they were in 1992. Here are the figures. In 1992, 27,369; down in 1993; down in 1994; and way down in 1995, all the way to 9,700. We don't have 1996 on this chart yet, but the 1996 figures are 11,245. That is a startling drop since 1992. So here is a country being certified as fully cooperative, and drug seizures have gone down and drug arrests have gone down in the last 3 years. One has to ask then: What is ``full cooperation"?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from Georgia. I am pleased to join with him in this joint resolution, disapproving the certification of Mexico. Mr. President, my disappointment in the administration's decision to certify Mexico's antidrug efforts last week, I think, was known to all. I believe that decision was a mistake, and I said so. The decision to certify Mexico in the face of what I consider to be an overwhelming lack of cooperation undermines the integrity of the certification process itself, as well as damaging the credibility of the United States in our dealings with other countries with whom we seek cooperation. I rise today to join with the Senator from Georgia and a number of my colleagues in introducing this resolution. But I do so with some regret. I regret the need for the resolution for two reasons. First, Mexico is a neighbor, a friend, and an ally of our country. Second, I very much regret the need to disagree with my President on this issue. I believe he made what he believes to be the right decision, but I respectfully disagree with him. Our intention is clear: We believe that the evidence overwhelmingly supports decertification of Mexico, and then if the President sees fit, invoking a vital national interest waiver. For that reason, Senator Coverdell has introduced a second resolution that allows the President to waive the sanctions on grounds of vital national interest after we enact our resolution of disapproval. Last week, a bipartisan group of 39 Senators sent a letter to the President urging that this be his decision. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Good morning, Mr. President. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my legislative director, Susy Elfving, be permitted to be on the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. No, I disagree. Under the majority amendment it could not be done because, in the majority balanced budget amendment expenditures must equal outlays in every year. Therefore, you could not provide multi-year financing of major capital projects by floating debt. You have to meet the expenditures. Every opinion we have had says that the development of a capital budget would be prohibited.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. No. I respectfully direct the Senator to the amendment. It simply says, ``Enact and implement a separate capital budget.'' With every constitutional amendment, as the Senator well knows, the Congress would enact enabling legislation. The Congress would sit down and develop a capital budget if one was desired. My amendment does not mandate one, but if they felt that a capital budget was worthy and desirable and needed by this Nation, they would sit down and discuss the legal parameters and develop the legislation. All this does is permit it. That is all.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I am happy to answer that question. I want to read my amendment's specific language. The language does not talk about any specific capital budget plan. All the language says is ``Nothing in this article shall preclude the authority to enact and implement a separate capital budget for those major capital improvements which require multi-year funding and which would be excluded from the requirements of section 7.'' That is the requirement that outlays and expenditures balance. I will tell the Senator what I would develop a capital budget. I would set a basic amount of capital. Whether that amount would be anything above $5 million, $10 million, $15 million, or $20 million would be up to the Congress. But you set the basic amount for major capital purchases, for bridges, office buildings, or a battleship, whatever you want that to be. Also, because you float debt to be able to fund these items, you would also set a debt limit. That would most likely be a percentage of our Gross Domestic Product. For example, 2 percent of GDP would provide about $160 billion, 3 percent would be more, and so on. As I mentioned, we have dramatically dropped our infrastructure spending. It was 6 percent of the budget in the 1960's. It is now down to 3 percent of the budget.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I would add very quickly, Mr. President, that there is one, deep, soft underbelly in the majority balanced budget amendment. You cannot use Social Security trust funds and spend the money on operating expenditures, whether it be for a battleship or a satellite, and save those moneys for someone's retirement. I rest my case. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor and the remainder of my time.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator. I think that was my wrap-up.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, let me try and sum up what I have presented here, and then speak specifically in answer to some of the concerns of the opposition. Essentially, the amendment that I have on the floor differs from the majority amendment in four ways. The first and most important way this amendment differs is that it continues to use Social Security trust funds as part of the unified budget up to the point where we reach balance. According to Social Security Administration data, that represents about $570 billion, cumulatively, of Social Security trust funds that would be used to offset other spending by 2002. For 1996, we used about $77 billion of the surplus. Once Congress balances the budget, we would remove Social Security trust funds from the unified budget. That would essentially save for Social Security recipients a cumulative total of about $1.8 trillion and, therefore, maintain the integrity of the Social Security system. Additionally, unlike the majority amendment, it would not enshrine in the Constitution that Social Security is part of the unified budget forever, which, reneges on a major commitment to senior citizens in our country. As I pointed out earlier, Social Security is not funded from the income tax. Its revenue is not supposed to go into general operations of the Government. Social Security is funded from a specific FICA payroll tax. A worker pays 6.2 percent, matched by the employer who pays 6.2 percent. The 12.4 percent is supposed to go into a separate trust fund held for the retirement of workers. Social Security taxes have one purpose and one purpose only. That purpose is to provide a safety net for our Nation's seniors with supplemental income when they retire. Social Security deserves its unique treatment. Social Security is our largest single Federal program. It has more than 43 million beneficiaries, with 1996 spending of $350 billion. Additionally, Social Security plays a critical role in reducing poverty among seniors. Without Social Security, the poverty rate of the elderly would be 53 percent rather than the current 14 percent. For 38 percent of all retirees, Social Security is the difference between poverty and no poverty. If those statistics do not speak eloquently for the need to keep Social Security intact, I do not know what does. So this amendment, with regard to the point of Social Security, is a compromise. We meet the majority's concern that if we take Social Security trust funds out of the unified budget right now, it is too difficult to balance the budget. My amendment would continue to use the trust funds up to the point of balance and then separate them out after that. The practice of using Social Security trust funds to offset other spending is not enshrined in the Constitution forever and ever as a way of doing business. Second, we provide in this amendment for a serious economic emergency and for major natural disasters. I can tell this body that the probability of a major earthquake in Southern California, according to seismic experts, has gone up. If that should happen--I should say when that happens--the State's disaster needs are going to be tremendous. Passing the majority's balanced budget amendment tells California that the Federal Government will have no way of meeting these disaster needs. This is a critical difference. Let me speak about other economic emergencies. Earlier, I mentioned the savings and loan bailout. I was not here for the savings and loan bailout. I do not know how many Members of this body or the other body actually predicted it, but I never would have thought it would have happened. The total costs were $135 billion of taxpayer's moneys to maintain the full faith and credit of the Federal Government's guarantee to depositors. In 1 year alone, 1991, the cost to the Treasury was $66 billion. I would really be concerned about providing for an economic emergency. Last month, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report, citing the sensitivity of the budget deficit to the economy. They indicated this: If economic growth was one-half percent lower, it would increase the deficit by $50 billion in FY 2002. And these effects would continue to grow over time. So you see, this kind of even economic change impacts the deficit tremendously. If the economy fell into recession and growth were five-tenths of a percent below its forecast, a budget thought to be in balance, would develop a $50 billion deficit or higher. Under Senate Joint Resolution 1, the budget deficit would need to be eliminated in that fiscal year. As you can see, even a drop of five-tenths of a percent in the economy would create an additional $50 billion shortfall in the estimates of that fiscal year which Congress would have to eliminate. To close a $50 billion budget deficit, Congress would have to eliminate the equivalent of nearly the entire defense procurement budget in that year. Let me give you another example as to why providing for economic emergencies would be necessary. Economists estimate that a ticket shock triggered by higher oil prices similar to those of 1973 and 1974 and 1979 and 1980 could trigger a 1- to 2-percent drop in our economy. That would necessitate budget cuts of $100 to $150 billion that year. It would be devastating to an economy. I do not know if anyone here remembers what it was like when those prices of oil rose. Economists state it was the major reason for the economic downturn. No one can guarantee, that such a situation would not happen in the future. So the majority's balanced budget amendment does not address economic risks that face the Nation. I think that is a major weakness in the amendment. Our amendment would suspend the amendment in the event of a serious economic emergency or major natural disaster. This would have to be enacted by a constitutional majority of both bodies. We also permit a capital budget. My thinking is that when Social Security is withdrawn from the unified budget, we will need to be able to review our budget structure and proceed in a way that does not have a dramatic impact. One way is through the enactment of a capital budget. Now, the Constitution is not a document that should carry enabling legislation. The Constitution should be worded in general words subject to interpretation and also subject to enabling action by the Congress. Our amendment reads: ``Nothing in this article shall preclude,'' which means prevent, ``the authority to enact and implement''--that would have to be done by congressional enactment and implementation-- ``a separate capital budget.'' The amendment defines a capital budget: ``Those major capital improvements.'' Congress would have to determine what is a major capital improvement, which would require multiyear Federal funding. Those would be excluded from the provisions of this constitutional amendment that requires the strict expenditures must meet outlays. This means that for, say, Federal office buildings that would maybe run $40, $50, $80, $100 million or more, or a major transportation systems which could run $200 or $300 million, a multi-year financing program could be established. The interest on those programs would be paid out of operating capital, and the amount of interest would probably be limited every year. The amount of debt would be strictly limited. Perhaps the Congress would limit debt by using a percent of gross domestic product, of GDP. As I said, 2 percent would be about $160 billion. If you had 3 percent, it would be more, and still more at 4 or 5 percent. An effective limit would probably be somewhere between the 2 percent and, say, 6 percent, 7 percent, or 8 percent of GDP. Now, is this necessary to do? Even without a balanced budget amendment, spending for infrastructure since the 1960's has dramatically dropped. It was 6 percent in the 1960's. It is 3 percent today, 3 percent of the budget. We have 250,000 miles of Federal highways that are in disrepair. We have more than 100,000 bridges in disrepair, unable to be repaired in the present day situation. I think at some point the Congress may wish to look at a capital budget. All this amendment does is enable that review to take place. We mentioned what it means to be controlled by a minority. The fourth area where this amendment differs from the majority is with respect to the debt limit. I have tried to show this body how difficult it is to even raise a majority vote. Since 1990, no budget resolution or conference report has received a three-fifths vote of this body. Since 1990, no vote to raise the debt limit has received a three- fifths majority. The 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, was passed by 51 to 37. The 1990 budget reconciliation bill was passed by 54 to 45. The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act was passed by a vote of 51 to 50, just one vote. The 1995 budget reconciliation was passed by 52 to 47. The 1995 temporary debt limit increase was passed by 49 to 47. Consequently, last year, we reached our apex of minority rule when the Government was shut down not once, but twice while trying unsuccessfully to prove a point. Allowing a minority to block an effort to extend the debt limit essentially jeopardizes the full faith and credit of this country, something that those of us who have held executive office know is the true measure of the financial acumen of your city or your State. If you get a bad bond rating by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, the full faith and credit of the bonds you float is dramatically affected. But a minority in pique, pouting, desirous of showing their enormous clout, can effectively jeopardize the full faith and credit of this Government and put this Government into default. I must tell you, I think that is absolutely dreadful as a matter of public policy. Those are the four issues in this amendment. Social Security: Congress can use it up to 2002 to reach balance, but afterward, we must separate it out. This step will preserve $1.8 trillion in the trust funds for retirees. Economic emergency: Congress should treat spending for serious economic emergency or major national disasters just like it treats military emergencies. Capital budget: Congress should at least enable it, rather than prohibit it, which the majority amendment does. Debt limit: Please, have some sense and address it with a majority vote. These four issues are the only way this amendment differs from the majority amendment. Perhaps the majority has their votes. Perhaps they know they have 67 votes. If they do not, I respectfully submit to them, maybe this is worth looking at and reviewing. Maybe it solves a major problem. Maybe it provides some kind of constitutional flexibility to meet what might develop in the future. We could face another savings and loan crisis, or another shock from oil prices. We could face a major earthquake in southern California, the probability of which has been increased, or a major flood in the Mississippi River basin, a major earthquake rift zone in the center part of our country. We could face a range of emergencies and people will need Federal help. That is what we are here to do. We are here to protect the welfare and well-being of our citizens, and not the least among them are seniors. For many seniors, Social Security is the difference between a life of poverty and a life of being able to eat and pay the rent. I think this is a worthy amendment. I have given it a lot of thought. My distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee is present on the floor. I have listened to the hearings, heard the testimony of Secretary Rubin and really thought about whether your amendment could be improved. I decided that it could, but for some reason the balanced budget amendment is frozen in stone. I do not know who drafted the majority amendment. It was drafted, I assume, by the majority, but it has become the be-all and end-all: ``If you do not support us, you cannot be for a balanced budget amendment.'' I cannot accept that. I represent a big and deeply troubled State. I hazard a guess that the State of California will never ratify this balanced budget amendment. I cannot speak for any other State, but I think I can for California. And they will not do it because they know about serious economic emergencies. They know about a capital budget. We have 40 million people currently on Social Security, and it's going up every day. The people want this protected. So this is a compromise with Social Security, economic emergency, capital budget permitted, debt limit by a majority. I would hazard a guess that if this became the amendment of the majority, not only would it pass both bodies, it would be ratified by three-quarters of the States. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. May I ask, how much of my time is remaining?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I am happy to have the Senator use as much time as he wishes.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, may I ask the distinguished Senator from Illinois how much time he would require? Ten minutes? Mr. President, how much time remains?