Barney Frank

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, there has been a very interesting phenomenon in recent months that demands attention. A steady stream of former high-ranking Bush administration officials have conscientiously pointed out the inaccuracy of many of the claims the administration has made and continues to make about its policies. In December, last year, I inserted into these pages a very interesting article by Richard Haass, former chief of the policy planning staff of the State Department, who confirmed what many of us have long argued--namely, that the war in Iraq was a war of choice and not of necessity. That is, Mr. Haass made it clear that the decision to go to war with Iraq was not driven by a fear that Iraq was any serious threat to the United States of a physical sort, but rather was part of an administration policy about how the world ought to be structured. Most dramatically, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill has been widely quoted as a result of the book by Ron Suskind not only essentially agreeing with Mr. Haass about the genesis of the Iraq war, but making clear the great gap that exists between the reality of Bush administration economic policies and the rhetoric they have used to describe them. Recently, a third high-ranking Bush official has rebutted the administration's claims, and buttressed this with reference to actual events in which he participated as a member of the administration. Flynt Leverett was a high-ranking official at the National Security Council from 2002 until 2003, serving as Senior Director for Middle Eastern Affairs. In a recent article published in the New York Times, he refutes the administration's argument that the decision by Libya to renounce nuclear weapons was a direct result of the administration's war in Iraq. His argument is a compelling one, combining very thoughtful analysis with a good history of the events that led up to this. It is impossible to do justice to this thoughtful essay by compressing it, so I ask that it be inserted here so that Members and others may read it and draw their own conclusions. But I do believe that the conclusion of Mr. Leverett's article-- remember he was a high-ranking National Security Council official appointed by the Bush administration--is worth underlining: Until the Bush administration learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the mud of ideology. [From the New York Times] A Lesson in Diplomacy more than threats led to qaddafi's reversal (By Flynt Leverett) Washington.--As President George W. Bush made clear in his State of the Union address, he sees the striking developments in relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war on terrorism. The idea is that Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi's apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out the prospect of similar progress with other states that support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and brutalize their own people. However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq war, the president misrepresents the real lesson of the Libyan case. This confusion undermines America's chances of getting countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead. The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's first year in office. Indeed, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990's to seek normalized relations with the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 Washington acquiesced to the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya. Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a ``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case. We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: If Libya met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain would allow UN sanctions to be lifted permanently. This script became the basis for three-party negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue. By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, Washington allowed the UN sanctions against Libya to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted responsibility for its officials' actions. But during these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of UN sanctions. To get out from under the separate U.S. sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction. This is the context in which Libyan officials approached the United States and Britain last spring to discuss dismantling Libya's, weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead to the removal of American sanctions, perhaps by the end of this year. The lesson is incontrovertible: To persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction, the United States must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing Iranian or Syrian behavior. The President's lack of initiative on this point is especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration had a singular opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through diplomatic channels and to former officials (including myself) their interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations with Washington. Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President Bashar Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last week--have told me that they want a better strategic understanding with the United States. To achieve this, however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. As Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in return. One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more constructive course with Libya was that the White House, uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie case was approved by an informal coalition made up of Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of the loop. Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course involving Iran and Syria. However, until the Bush administration learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the mud of ideology.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. As the Member who has the honor of representing the district in which the Patriots play their home games, I very much appreciate, as I know the team does, the graciousness of the gentleman's remarks.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am increasingly distressed by the trend of public policy at the federal level. For years people blamed federal deficits and increased federal spending on excesses in programs that seek to alleviate poverty and meet the needs of lower income people. Today, from the standpoint of those of us who care about social justice, we have the worst of both worlds--a steeply increasing deficit at the budget level while the percentage of national resources devoted to meeting the economic needs of the poorest of our citizens decreases. I try to keep this issue constantly in focus, and I am greatly aided in doing so by one of the most dedicated fighters for social justice I have even met--Mark A. Sullivan, Jr., the Executive Director of Citizens for Citizens, an excellent community action program based in Fall River, Massachusetts, with responsibilities in much of the southeastern part of our state. Mark Sullivan is a man of very considerable talent. His intelligence, commitment, and organizing skills could have led him to a number of lucrative careers. He has instead for the past thirty years stayed at his post in trying to fight poverty and economic deprivation. Sadly, his job had been made much harder in recent years by the distorted budget priorities being followed by the current administration and Congressional majority. Too often people here vote for cuts as if they were dealing with abstractions without understanding the terrible human consequences of their efforts. No one I know does a better job of trying to make these impacts clear than Mark Sullivan, and in a recent excellent article in the Fall River Herald News, by Deborah Allard-Bernardi, Mr. Sullivan gives one of the expositions at which he excels about the negative effects of what we have been doing. Because in my mind no issue is more important than reversing this trend of cutting back on the help we give to the neediest among us, I ask that this important discussion by Mark Sullivan in the Fall River Herald News be printed here. [From the Herald News, Jan. 22, 2004] CFC Decries Lack of Funding (By Deborah Allard-Bernardi) Fall River.--If society doesn't see the invisible man, it's not looking for him, according to Mark A. Sullivan Jr., executive director of Citizens for Citizens Inc. Actually, it's not just the invisible man Sullivan is worried about, but an entire society of poor people including the elderly, single women and children as well as men. He says they . . . by the very entity that is charged with caring for them: the government. ``Low-income people are off the radar screen,'' said Sullivan at a press conference Wednesday. ``People in this country are locked into being poor.'' It's been cuts after cuts for CFC and other agencies that provide food, fuel assistance, housing, day care and other core services to the needy. CFC's most recent plight is a new unemployment formula that is threatening to close its Head Start program before its usual summer hiatus. The increased unemployment charges that CFC must pay to stay in business as a nonprofit organization rose on Jan. 1 from $125,000 a year to $255,000 a year. Sullivan said unemployment insurance rose from 4.9 percent for the first $10,800 each employee makes to 8.2 percent for the first $14,000. Coupled with a $63,000 deficit to the Head Start program, which Sullivan said CFC discovered about eight months into the fiscal year, it's devastating news for the anti-poverty organization. ``We'll have to shut down Head Start early,'' said Sullivan. He said unless there is some other solution, Head Start will close in June, about two weeks early. The program serves 410 children in Greater Fall River and Taunton. All 110 employees would be laid off. Sullivan said that even this solution will adversely affect CFC because it will have to pay higher rates when employees collect unemployment benefits. ``We're being squeezed by every aspect of government,'' said Sullivan. But Sullivan said he isn't surprised. After being employed at CFC for 30 years, he said it gets worse every year. There's a constant increase in need and a lack of funding. The newest victims of poverty, according to Sullivan, are the elderly and children. Currently, 62 percent of Greater Fall River CFC clients receiving fuel assistance are elderly. He said 34 percent of those eligible for the program have already exhausted their benefits, and it's only mid-January. CFC pays up to $490 per family for heat during the winter season, which runs until April. Feeding the hungry has also gotten more difficult. With a cupboard that is almost always bare shortly after being filled, CFC handed out more than 4,000 bags of groceries during the month of December. ``We're getting more and more people with less and less money,'' said Sullivan. ``The tragedy of this is (most of) our new clients are elderly.'' Sullivan condemned the way the government allocates funding and what it views as important. He laughed at the phrase ``jobless recovery'' when it is used to describe an economy that some say is getting better. ``How can you have a recovery when people have no jobs?'' asked Sullivan, who is passionate about helping the, needy and angered by what he calls ``double talk'' and unfulfilled promises by government officials. ``A budget is the reflection of the morality of a society. It's getting kind of scary what we deem as important,'' said Sullivan. With a one-third cut in discretionary spending by the federal government, Sullivan said that what is considered discretionary is what funds core services that help the poor and working poor stay warm and fed. ``Discretionary spending is what saves poor people from being destitute,'' said Sullivan. The losses and cuts in core poverty programs, along with the increases in rent and prescription drugs, are just too much for many families to handle, according to Sullivan, who admits that he has no solution. ``The poor are falling in the cracks and they need a way out,'' said Sullivan. ``I do wish people would start becoming concerned.'' Sullivan has also seen a decline in charitable donations to CFC and other nonproflt organizations. He said the middle class is the societal section that has always donated the most, but even it is feeling the pinch lately and giving less, if at all. ``Those are the people who used to take care of the poor. They're having a hard time taking care of themselves now,'' said Sullivan.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, because I am attending the important World Economic Conference in Davos, Switzerland, at which I intend to argue strongly for changes in international economic policy better to reflect the rights of working people and the importance of environmental protection, I am missing some votes in suspension. By their nature of course, bills scheduled this early in the session on the suspension calendar are entirely non-controversial so my inability to vote on some of them, while regrettable, was obviously irrelevant to the outcome. What my absence does mean is the lack of a chance to express my support for various of the principles affirmed in those resolutions, so I want to take this opportunity to express my agreement with their thrust. In particular, given the importance of Catholic schools in the district I am privileged to represent, I want to express my appreciation for the dedicated and effective work done by the educators in that school system whose commitment to young people is one of the great assets our society has. I am happy to be able to join my colleagues in expressing my gratitude to those dedicated men and women who devote themselves to the job of educating young people in an appropriate way.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, no situation in the world is more deeply troubling to me and many others than the ongoing conflict involving Israel and the Palestinians. I speak as a strong supporter of Israel and of the moral importance of its continuing to exist as a free, independent, secure nation. Sadly, from the moment Israel's creation was announced--in accord with a U.N. resolution--in 1948, the unremitting hostility of its Arab neighbors plunged that small nation into war. The years since have been marked by a continuation of that hostility in many parts of the Arab world, with consequent violence and with large numbers of people's lives being lost, but also some progress in achieving peace. Most notably, the government of Menachem Begin signed an important peace treaty with Egypt in 1978 which, despite the skepticism of many Israelis and some of Israel's strongest supporters in America, has in fact worked enormously for the benefit of Israel by providing a peaceful situation for much of its borders. This 1978 agreement was one in which Israel gave up a large amount of territory which it had gained in a defensive war, territory which had both important strategic value and from which Israeli settlers were moved as part of the agreement. This has obvious relevance as a precedent for an agreement to end the current conflict. In addition to this peace agreement with Egypt, Israel has over the years worked out arrangements with its neighbor to the east, the Kingdom of Jordan, which has similarly been beneficial compared to the strife that had previously existed in that area. The central remaining question is of course whether or not an agreement can be reached between Israel and the Palestinians which will preserve Israel's security while allowing it to maintain its important political and moral role as a free, Jewish, democratic state. I know there are people who argue that it is inappropriate for Israel to be a Jewish state. Such arguments seem to me quite hollow, particularly when they come from those who have no quarrel with the existence of a number of officially Islamic states throughout the Middle East. I strongly oppose theocracy but I do not think there is anything wrong with a particular democratic society including an official religion as long as it does so in a way that protects the rights of those in the society who do not follow that religion. Israel comes far closer to that goal than any of its neighbors, and criticism of Israel on that score therefore seems particularly hypocritical and motivated more by opposition to the existence of the state than to any commitment to principle. In fact, the importance of Israel remaining both Jewish and democratic is one key reason why a settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians is so important to me and many other strong supporters of Israel. As Prime Minister Sharon himself has noted, it is difficult to see how Israel can remain both democratic and Jewish if it continues to control all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the large number of Palestinian inhabitants there. Combined with the Palestinians who live within Israel, the number of non-Jewish citizens--indeed of many citizens hostile to the existence of a Jewish state--means that conducting democratic politics and maintaining the state's Jewish character are at odds. For this and other reasons, an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is greatly to be desired. It is in this context that I join in welcoming the efforts of those on both the Israeli and Palestinian side who have recently demonstrated what an achievable Israeli-Palestinian peace can look like. Recently, in Geneva, a ceremony was held in which leading Israeli and Palestinian citizens signed onto their version of a comprehensive peace plan which provides both for a Palestinian state, and a State of Israel, with both having the viability necessary to exist as independent nations, and in a way that minimizes the likelihood of ongoing violence between them. This initiative, led by Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, reflects a great deal of serious thought by people who have been deeply involved in trying to reach peace, and demonstrates that a true peace agreement is in fact achievable in ways that meet the needs of those in both Israel and the Palestinian areas who genuinely desire peace. In addition, a recent proposal outlined by Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh is less detailed but points in a similar direction. Mr. Speaker, I understand and there is both in Israel and in some Palestinian circles a great deal of unhappiness that these four men and others joining with them have engaged in these activities. I think the criticisms are unwarranted and in fact counterproductive. Denigrating these efforts does not seem to me to be consistent with a professed desire to reach the peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that is so manifestly in the interests of all parties in the area. On Friday, December 5, the distinguished newspaper The Forward, which has long been an important voice within America's Jewish Community, carried an editorial entitled The Truths of Geneva. Noting that ``the Geneva initiative does not represent anything like the threat to Israel's safety that its opponents suggest,'' the editorial goes on to note that ``by relying on respected, mainstream public figures from both sides to do the phrasing and map-making--including several of Israel's most trusted ex-generals and intelligence chiefs--they showed that a peace agreement could be reached that would satisfy the essential needs of both sides, if the leaders so chose.'' As the editorial went on to note, the Geneva initiative ``shows that there is a way out of Israel's deadly mess . . . it shows, in rough terms, what such a formula might look like.'' Mr. Speaker, I ask that this editorial from a source that has long been one of Israel's most thoughtful and ardent defenders be printed here, as part of the effort of many of us to express our appreciation to those who have undertaken this difficult effort to demonstrate how peace can be achieved and to pledge our continuing support for their efforts. [From the Forward, Dec. 5, 2003] The Truths of Geneva For all its theatrics, its celebrity cast and high-concept special effects, the ``launch'' this week in Switzerland of the so-called Geneva Understandings did not usher in a new era in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The document's authors and architects did not have the power to do anything of the sort. Private citizens all, they could hug and sing and display a document they had written together, but they could not make peace between the two warring nations. Only governments can do that. For that same reason, the Geneva initiative does not represent anything like the threat to Israeli's safety that its opponents suggest in their more overheated flights of rhetoric. The Geneva authors did not give anything away, because they had nothing to give away. All they did--all they could do--was to bring together groups of citizens from the two embattled communities and discuss ways the sides might settle their differences, if their leaders so chose. By relying on respected, mainstream public figures from both sides to do the phrasing and map making--including several of Israel's most trusted ex-generals and intelligence chiefs-- they showed that a peace agreement could be reached that would satisfy the essential needs of both sides, if the leaders so chose. But they did not produce the peace agreement. Only governments can negotiate peace. All the incendiary rubbish aside, there was nothing fraudulent going on at Geneva. The negotiators were not purporting to speak for the Israeli government any more than Tovah Feldshuh purports to be Golda Meir in her nightly appearances on Broadway. It's all play-acting, meant to draw an audience and, perhaps, make a point. And yet, this play's message must carry a real sting, judging by the desperation of its opponents to find something, anything, wrong with it. Consider their arguments: First, the document should be ignored because it is meaningless and toothless. Second, it should be fought because it endangers Israel by somehow handing over valuable assets. Third, the Israeli authors let themselves be duped by Palestinian extremists who will never be satisfied even by the sweeping Geneva concessions. Fourth, the authors undercut the Sharon government's negotiating position by raising Palestinian expectations, thus reducing the likelihood that they will somehow accept the far more limited concessions Sharon is contemplating as part of his own plan for extricating Israel from its deadly mess. That, in the end, is the Geneva initiative's real threat, and its only threat. It shows that there is a way out of Israel's deadly mess. It shows that there is a broad formula that could resolve the century-old dispute on terms both sides could live with. It shows, in rough terms, what such a formula might look like. By forcing itself into the spotlight and exciting public debate, it shows that there is a critical mass on both sides that could, with some effort, accept such a deal. And it shows who is against reaching such a deal and would rather keep fighting. Those are the truths of Geneva, and they are real ones. But they need not leave Israel isolated. Israel's friends could and should embrace the initiative--not for its details but for its vision--and encourage Israel's prime minister to do the same. He could, if he wanted, praise the initiative as a contribution to public discussion, details aside. He could point to the violent opposition of Palestinian hard-liners, who denounce the document for its betrayal of their ``right of return,'' as evidence of the uphill climb still ahead. And he could vow to begin that climb, so Israelis can know that their leaders genuinely want to end their long nightmare.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, on December 8, I inserted into these pages an extraordinarily important article by Richard Haass, formerly the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department in the Bush administration. This article by Mr. Haass, which appeared in the November 23 Washington Post, has received far too little attention. In it, this very high ranking State Department official under the presidency of George Bush acknowledged what many of us have been arguing in the face of the administration's efforts to prove the contrary; namely, that the war in Iraq was motivated not by a fear of weapons of mass destruction or of the need to combat terrorism, but rather as a conscious policy choice in service of the administration's view of the world. As Mr. Haass himself argued in the central point of his essay, Iraq was a war of choice and not of necessity. Obviously if it had been occasioned by the likelihood of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction or of his furthering the efforts of al Qaeda, it would have fallen into the war of necessity category. While I was disappointed that more attention had not been paid to this, I was not surprised to see in the December 8 Washington Post a very thoughtful article by Lawrence J. Korb underlining exactly how significant Mr. Haass's article was. Lawrence J. Korb who served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan has been for years one of the most thoughtful critics of national security excesses, and a strong articulator of rational foreign policy. As Mr. Korb explicitly notes, what Richard Haass says in explaining the war in Iraq is directly contrary to the rationale given by the President, the Secretary of Defense and other high administration officials. It is, as Mr. Korb notes, unfortunate that Mr. Haass ``was unwilling to go public with his views as did General Eric Shineski, while he could have made a difference.'' But while I join Mr. Korb in that regret, I do want to express admiration for Mr. Haass for speaking out now. Obviously he is aware of how much what he writes contradicts the official rationale for this war given by the Bush administration, and in this case the adage better late than never is relevant. Because Lawrence J. Korb so clearly emphasizes the importance of Richard Haass's original article and because this is a significant debate that is getting too little attention from the American public, I ask that Lawrence J. Korb's article be printed here. A War of Choice or of Necessity? (By Lawrence J. Korb) Eight months after the Bush administration got us involved in a bloody war in Iraq, we are now told by one of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's closest advisers that Iraq was a war of choice after all. According to Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department until June 2003 and still the Bush administration's special envoy to Northern Ireland, the administration ``did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options'' [op-ed, Nov. 23]. Really? This is not what the administration told us before the war and continues to tell us to this day. On March 20, as he was sending troops into Iraq because the regime of Saddam Hussein allegedly possessed weapons of mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld told them, ``We are at the point at which the risk of not acting is too great to wait longer. As you prepare, know that this war is necessary . . .'' Some three weeks into the war, Powell, who had made the case for war to the United Nations, stated: ``We do not seek war. We do not look for war. We don't want wars. But we will not be afraid to fight when these wars are necessary to protect the American people, to protect our interests, to protect friends.'' Even after it had become abundantly clear that the arguments the Bush administration advanced for going to war were specious, both Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz explicitly rebutted Haass's position. In an Oct. 10 speech to the Heritage Foundation in which he lashed out at those who said we had a choice about invading Iraq, the vice president said: ``Some claim we should not have acted because the threat from Saddam Hussein was not imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, policy putting us on notice before they strike? On Nov. 4 Wolfowitz stated: ``But one of the things that Sept. 11 changed was that it made it a war of necessity, not a war of choice.'' The president himself continues to proclaim how necessary the war was. On Nov. 22 he said at a press conference in London, ``Our mission in Iraq is noble and it is necessary. On Thanksgiving Day the president told the troops in Baghdad: ``You are defeating the terrorists here in Iraq so we don't have to face them in our own country.'' Even more surprising is Haass's contention that despite its public pronouncements, the Bush administration knows that, because this is a war of choice, Americans will not support it unless it is relatively short and cheap. This is why the administration has changed its policy and accelerated the timetable to hand over increasing political responsibility to Iraqis, even if it means reducing what it is trying to accomplish. Haass weakens his own case by arguing that the first Persian Gulf War was a real war of necessity and Vietnam was only a war of choice. Even those who argued against the recent invasion of Iraq would not contend that it was less necessary than the first Persian Gulf War. As Secretary of State James Baker noted in 1990, that war was really about oil. And Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as such defense hawks as Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), wanted to give sanctions more time to work before invading Iraq. (If it was so necessary, why did the administration of the elder Bush not invade until it got other nations to fund the war?) It is equally absurd to argue that the first Gulf War was more necessary than Vietnam. In the mid-1960s many Americans, including most of us who were in the armed forces, believed that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists all of Southeast Asia would soon follow and the containment policy would be undermined. This is why the American people supported that conflict through the Tet offensive of 1968, even though more than 30,000 Americans had died by then. Ironically, while Haass is wrong about Vietnam and the first Gulf War, he is right about Iraq. It is a war of choice--a bad choice as it turns out. Unfortunately, he was unwilling to go public with his views, as did Gen. Eric Shinseki, while he could have made a difference. This article should have been written nine months ago when Congress and the American people had a choice. Now our only real choice is to continue to stay and absorb the casualties and the cost.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important debates now being carried on in the United States has to do with the reasons for our war in Iraq. The administration and its defenders have argued that we had to go to war as a matter of self-defense. In varying combinations, the administration has argued that Iraq was deeply involved with al Qaeda and that the Iraqi war to a great extent was a logical next step after the war in Afghanistan, and also that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that were ready to be used against us. In short, they argued that this was a war of necessity. Many of us believe to the contrary that the linkage between Iraq and al Qaeda was slight, and that the weapons of mass destruction argument had been grossly exaggerated. Of course evidence since America's military victory have strengthened greatly the case of those of us who were skeptical on both counts. But the debate continues to be an important one. I was therefore struck by the article in the November 23 Washington Post by Richard Haass. Mr. Haass who is now the President of the Council on Foreign Relations was a very high ranking national security official of the Bush administration from its early months in office until June of this year--after the major military activity in the war against Iraq. While he does not explicitly rebut the Bush administration's case for the war, his article is in fact a strong argument against it. Talking of the distinction between wars of necessity--which is how the administration has characterized the war in Iraq--and wars of choice, in which countries use war as a means of policy, Mr. Haass, the Director of the State Department's policy planning team while the war was being planned and carried out, clearly asserts that Iraq was an example of the latter. As he notes, ``the debate can and will go on as to whether attacking Iraq was a wise decision, but at its core it was a war of choice. We did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options; to rely on other policy tools, to delay attacking, or both. Iraq was thus fundamentally different from World War II or Korea or even the Persian Gulf War, all of which qualify as wars of necessity.'' Mr. Speaker, the significance of this analysis from a man who occupied so high a post in the Bush administration is great, and because of that, I ask that Mr. Haass's very thoughtful article be printed here. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2003] Wars of Choice (By Richard N. Haass) Any number of lessons can be learned from the handling of the aftermath of the war in Iraq, but none is more basic than this: Democracies, in particular American democracy, do not mix well with empire. Empire is about control--the center over the periphery. Successful empire demands both an ability and a willingness to exert and maintain control. On occasion this requires an ability and a willingness to go to war, not just on behalf of vital national interests but on behalf of imperial concerns, which is another way of saying on behalf of lesser interests and preferences. Iraq was such a war. The debate can and will go on as to whether attacking Iraq was a wise decision; but at its core it was a war of choice. We did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options: to rely on other policy tools, to delay attacking, or both. Iraq was thus fundamentally different from World War II or Korea or even the Persian Gulf War, all of which qualify as wars of necessity. So, too, does the open-ended war against al Qaeda. What distinguishes wars of necessity is the requirement to respond to the use of military force by an aggressor and the fact that no option other than military force exists to reverse what has been done. In such circumstances, a consensus often materializes throughout the country that there is no alternative to fighting, a consensus that translates into a willingness to devote whatever it takes to prevail, regardless of the financial or human costs to ourselves. Wars of choice, however, are fundamentally different. They are normally undertaken for reasons that do not involve obvious self-defense of the United States or an ally. Policy options other than military action exist; there is no domestic political consensus as to the correctness of the decision to use force. Vietnam was such a war, as was the war waged by the Clinton administration against Serbia over Kosovo. Wars of choice vary in their cost and duration. Vietnam was long (lasting a decade and a half from the American perspective) and costly in terms of both blood (more than 58,000 lives) and treasure (hundreds of billions of dollars). By contrast, Kosovo took all of 78 days, claimed no American lives in combat and cost less than $3 billion. What these experiences suggest is that the American people are prepared to wage wars of choice, so long as they prove to be relatively cheap and short. But the United States is not geared to sustain costly wars of choice. We are seeing just this with Iraq. The American people are growing increasingly restless, and it is not hard to see why. We have been at war now in Iraq for some eight months. More than 400 Americans have lost their lives. Costs are in the range of $100 billion and mounting. The Bush administration knows all this; hence the accelerated timetable to hand over increasing political responsibility for Iraq to Iraqis. Such a midcourse correction in U.S. policy reflects in part the political realities of Iraq, where enthusiasm for prolonged American occupation is understandably restrained; even more, though, the policy shift reflects political realities here at home. Domestic tolerance for costs--disrupted and lost lives above all--is not unlimited. As a result, the president is wise to reduce the scale of what we try to accomplish. Making Iraq ``good enough''--a functioning and fairly open society and economy if not quite a textbook model of democracy--is plenty ambitious. None of this is meant to be an argument against all wars of choice. There may be good and sound reasons for going to war even if we do not have to, strictly speaking. Such reasons can range from protecting a defenseless population against ethnic cleansing or genocide to preventing the emergence of a threat that has the potential to cause damage on a large scale. But wars of choice require special handling. First, it is essential to line up domestic support. Congress and the American people need to be on board, not just in some formal legal way but also to the extent of being psychologically prepared for the possible costs. Better to warn of costs that never materialize than to be surprised by those that do. Second, it is equally essential to line up international support. The United States needs partners: to facilitate the effort of fighting the war, to share the financial and human costs of war and its aftermath, to stand with us diplomatically should the going get tough. We possess the world's most powerful military and economy, but the United States is not immune from the consequences of being stretched too thin or going deeply into debt. Third, no one should ever underestimate the potential costs of military action; no one should ever assume that a war of choice, or any war, will prove quick or easy. Here as elsewhere the great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz had it right: ``There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as war.''

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by saying that if we on the Democratic side were in the majority, this would be a different bill. We are not, so we have the bill that we have here. Given that, given that there are some differences, I must tell you that this is a better bill than I had hoped we would see. And I am very appreciative of my colleagues on the other side. They did not give in on any issues of principle that are important to them. We have on both sides of the aisle a strong commitment to making sure that the free- market system in this country can work. These credit allocations have become a very important part of that free-mark system. And this bill, I believe, preserves that system, the credit allocation system for individuals as well as need be. We also, though, have, as we often do with the free market, a situation where the market does well what it is supposed to do, but it does not do everything. There are areas where we need to step in and help the market. What is important is for us to do that in ways that do not impinge on the market function. I believe that working together we have come closer in doing that in this bill than I had thought. I would like if there had been fewer preemptions in the field, for instance, of identity theft; but as a result of a meeting which we had this morning, I think we agreed to preserve the integrity of the identity theft provisions that we have in there, to make sure that they can function without interference and without distraction, but did not unduly preempt if the States want to be additive in other areas. So there is, in fact, room for States to do something as long as the scheme that has been set forward in this bill is not interfered with, detracted from, and in particular, companies are not subjected to conflicting or confusing multiple requirements. We have done other things. People, as a result of this, will be able to get a lot more information. Until recently, credit and credit scoring have been kind of mystical things to a lot of people. Consumers, home buyers, automobile buyers, others have found their lives affected financially by factors of which they were only dimly aware. As a result of several provisions in this bill, the system will be allowed to work, but consumers will have a lot more information about it. And they will get that information in many cases early enough to act on it. Frankly, one of the things that some of our friends in the business community were skeptical of I think will wind up helping them. A requirement that people be notified if something they have either done or failed to do will cause them to have a negative comment on the credit report, I think that will have an incentivizing effect. I think the first time someone is late unneccessarily with a payment for a mortgage and is notified that this will be on your credit report, you are likely to see much less lateness. We also took steps to improve the accuracy of the data. The system on the whole works very well, but no system works perfectly. I think this credit system was a little bit flawed in that it did not adequately give people a chance to correct errors. We do a much better job of this. I would have liked there to have been a sunset on the preemptions. I think this bill benefits from the fact that it was here today. Congress did this 7 years ago. There was a sunset. And as a result, we are here today doing what everybody agrees is improving the bill. I would have liked, and my colleague from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kanjorski) offered an amendment to give us a chance to do that again. We lost on the floor, and that is the way the votes went. But I do hope and I believe that we may very well from experience learn that more has to be done or things have to be done differently. When this bill was passed in 1996, identity theft was not a big issue. The fact that it was sunsetted gave us a chance to deal with identity theft I think in a very effective way. This will not be the last time that the crooked people in this world will think of a way to swindle the great majority of the honest ones. So I just want to make it clear that while we will not have this automatically coming up, I hope we are all committed, and I believe we are, that as new problems come up we will be able to deal with them. Given the fact that the majority is the majority, I believe that we did a good job, not a perfect one, in adding consumer protections and safety factors to this general system of allowing the credit allocation to individuals to work, and for that reason, I would urge Members to vote for the bill.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), who has been so active on the privacy issue.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I have several.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hinojosa), another active member of our committee.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney), who played an important role in this bill. (Mrs. MALONEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), another member of our committee who played a very active role in this.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson), one of our most active and energetic members of our committee.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel), who was very active particularly with regard to the medical privacy provision of this bill.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kanjorski), who is the second ranking member of the full committee and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises and who has a major input to this bill. (Mr. KANJORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am glad to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hooley), a member of this committee who really did extraordinarily good work here and who early on became our task force head on identity theft, and this bill is really path-breaking in what it does for identity theft.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), the ranking member of the subcommittee from which this bill came.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I object.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. After all the razzle-dazzle, exactly what was the prevailing side?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I move reconsideration. I move reconsideration, thanks to your arm-twisting.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Objection.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.