Jeff Flake

Mr. FLAKE

Mr. FLAKE. I have an amendment at the desk, amendment No. 1.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. FLAKE. I will yield to the gentleman only if he will answer the question yes or no: Does Mother Nature target districts represented by appropriators?

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentleman. I think we all know that the alignment of appropriators and Members in powerful positions does not align with the gulf coast or any other geographic position. Getting back to the chart, 45 percent last year went to those in powerful positions; 45 percent to 25 percent. This year it is even starker: 71 percent of all earmark dollars in this bill are going to 25 percent of this body. That is a spoil system. I don't know how else you can claim otherwise, unless as I said, and I will yield simply for the purpose if somebody can stand up and say that Mother Nature targets this group more than others, then this is a spoil system. When we have here an earmark that has been over and over and over awarded, $74 million in taxpayer funding, $12 million in 2005, $20 million in both 2006 and 2007.

Mr. FLAKE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FLAKE. Let me just say first there have been a few statements first that imply that the Department of Homeland Security or FEMA in the case of the last two amendments somehow endorsed these amendments or endorsed these projects. According to OMB, the administration responses about earmark requests ``should not be construed as an evaluation or recommendation of specific earmark requests based on merit or value.'' So we can say that, hey, the agency wants this. But the official position of the administration is, We are taking no position. And of course, they really can't because these earmark dollars are sometimes taken from the account that they would otherwise use to give grants based on merit or based on risk. Again, this chart is even starker when we look at the overall bill that we are considering today. Homeland security earmark dollars secured by appropriators, leadership, committee chairs, and ranking members. FY 09, 45 percent--45 percent--of the total in earmark dollars in the bill went to this group. This group represents just 25 percent of the body.

Mr. FLAKE. May I inquire of the time remaining?

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, this amendment would remove $10 million in funding for the National Institute for Homeland Security based in Somerset, Kentucky, and reduce the overall cost of the bill by a commensurate amount. This is not the first time I have brought this earmark to the floor. This earmark is always noticeable if for nothing else the cost. Compared to most earmarks in the bill, this is one of the largest earmarks we have in the Homeland Security bill year after year. This year the earmark alone would cost taxpayers $10 million, and if approved, this would actually be the lowest dollar amount the institute has received since its creation in 2004. According to the Web site, the National Institute for Homeland Security is an independent, nonprofit corporation designed to allow universities in Kentucky to ``more effectively compete for research funds and projects aimed at improving homeland security.'' It goes on to say that the institute's end goal is to match up local universities with projects, then commercialize the resulting product. Madam Chairman, we all know that Congress has a problem with spending overall. We have a $7.87 billion stimulus package. We had a massive omnibus appropriations bill, we have had numerous bailouts of private companies. Now we are facing nearly $2 trillion in deficits just this year. When I came to this body just 8 years ago, our total budget was around $2 trillion. Now we will have a deficit by the same amount. Yet here we are; we are funding a nonprofit organization, which again, according to its own Web site, apparently would not exist without the assistance of Congress. And it seems that the purpose of this center is to attract other earmarks. It is an institute that seems to beget other earmarks. I simply don't think that we can continue to do this. Since it was created, the institute has received $74 million in taxpayer funding: $12 million in 2005; $20 million in both 2006 and 2007; $11 million in both 2008 and 2009. When will this end? When will we say enough is enough? We have funded this institute enough, and it will have to compete on its own for other grants. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FLAKE. I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. FLAKE. No thanks. I know better. But I believe my time is out. I urge adoption of the amendment. We simply have to be more fiscally responsible. And we have to have a system at FEMA that is based on risk and merit rather than spoils. This is a system based on spoils right now. That is why the adoption of the amendment should be done. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FLAKE. I'm a slow learner. Let me remind the gentleman that this district, Harris County, received $1 million when they applied for the funding before the earmarks started, 2 years ago, last year, I'm sorry, 3 years ago--2 years ago got a $1 million earmark, last year got another $1 million earmark, this year asking for a third $1 million earmark. And we just had another member of the Texas delegation stand just moments ago and offer an amendment to move money to the predisaster mitigation account because he couldn't get the funding for his district in Texas because 25 percent of the funding, by the time people in his district even applied for the funding, is gone. It is earmarked, cut off the top. And I already explained the spoils system that is here, and still nobody has taken me up on my offer. I will yield time to anybody who can tell me that Mother Nature targets districts represented by appropriators. It simply doesn't happen.

Mr. FLAKE. Reclaiming my time.

Mr. FLAKE. The East Valley.

Mr. FLAKE. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman 30 more seconds if you want to go on. You are making my case. Announcement by the Chair

Mr. FLAKE. May I ask the time remaining.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, this amendment would remove an earmark of $1 million for the Harris County Flood Control District and would return money to FEMA's Predisaster Mitigation Fund. This is a similar amendment to the one that I just offered. These are earmarks to the Predisaster Mitigation Fund, as I mentioned before. It used to be that when organizations at the local level wanted to apply for this funding, they submitted a proposal to FEMA. FEMA has a 70-page guidance document for people applying for these grants. Unfortunately, when people apply now, 25 percent of the money that was in this grant program is gone because it's earmarked. It's been taken away, taken off the top. Where it really wasn't before. And as I mentioned before, when you have one-quarter of this funding taken, we find that 40 percent of the value goes to just 25 percent of the Members or actually 40 percent of the value goes to just 13 percent of the Members in this body, those districts represented by appropriators. And, again, I will gladly yield time to anybody who can stand and say that Mother Nature targets districts by appropriators or other powerful Members more than Mother Nature does other districts. It simply doesn't happen. But, again, FEMA has asked if they could establish a more risk-based program where they could evaluate risk and allocate funding accordingly. That's how it should be done. But we in Congress have said no, because why? We like the system how it is because it's easy to earmark and it makes it more likely that Members, particularly of the Appropriations Committee, can get earmarks for their district. And that's what we have here. In this particular case, this flood control district, before we started earmarking this account, applied for a grant under the Predisaster Mitigation Program and got a grant. So competitively they established that they had need for it. That's how it should be. But then the next year I don't know if it was going to get the grant or just didn't want to apply, but money was earmarked and then the next year earmarked again. Now this year there's another earmark for that same flood control district. I think it's time to let FEMA decide under a risk-based formula where this funding should go. We all know the process here. It's why we have a commission to close military bases because we simply can't discipline ourselves as Members to say that base in my district may need to be closed, and then we move to protect other people's bases if they'll protect ours. The process of logrolling takes effect. That's why it's best to establish criteria and let the agency do the work. If we don't like how they do it, we exercise oversight and force them to change the program and to do it equitably. But to do it this way just means that a spoils system occurs, and that's what we have here. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, let me just say again here's a chart. This is FEMA predisaster earmarks secured by appropriators, leadership, committee Chairs, and ranking members. If we look here at fiscal year 2009 and 2010, again 49 and 51 percent respectively, the money is going to powerful appropriators or committee Chairs or ranking minority members that represent just 25 percent of the body. Again, I will yield anybody time who can stand and say with a straight face that Mother Nature targets districts represented by appropriators or committee Chairs or ranking minority members. I don't think that's the way it is. I have great respect for the gentlewoman from California. We have worked together on a number of issues. And this is not just an issue that anybody has with this particular earmark, but it is with many in this piece of legislation. We need to ensure that FEMA looks and does this on a risk-based way where they look at risk and award accordingly. When Members of Congress do an earmark, it simply becomes a spoils system; and, unfortunately, I think that's what we are seeing here. So I would urge support for the amendment. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, this amendment would remove $600,000 from the city of Emeryville, California, and return the money to FEMA's Pre- Disaster Mitigation account. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation account used to be awarded solely on the basis of merit. When we established the Department of Homeland Security, we were told time and time again, Don't worry. We're not going to earmark any funding in this legislation, or this bill will not be earmarked. We were told that for a couple of years. Now guess what--it was earmarked a couple of years ago. Now more, now more, now even more. Now there are well over 100 earmarks in the bill. Of course the State of California is no stranger to floods. In fact, according to FEMA, since the year 2000, parts of California have been declared a major disaster due to flooding five times. But there are many other areas of the country that also suffer from flooding. Louisiana, we all know, is a State that often gets pounded with hurricanes and has also had five major disaster declarations due to flooding in the past 10 years alone. Yet Louisiana doesn't receive a single earmark in this year's Pre-Disaster Mitigation fund. How can this be? The answer is easy. When you abide by a process that rewards some Members over others, you wind up with a spoils system. And I would submit that's what we have with the Pre-Disaster Mitigation fund is a classic spoils system. Unless we can determine that mother nature somehow finds those districts represented by appropriators and sends more floods, more earthquakes, more natural disasters somehow to those districts or to the districts of powerful people on powerful committees, then we have a spoils system. That is an example here. When we look at this year's Pre-Disaster Mitigation earmarks, we see of the $150 million appropriated for the grant program, altogether in this year's bill, more than $24 million is earmarked. There are a total of 58 pre-disaster earmarks. Nearly 30 percent of them go to members of the Appropriations Committee. When you consider the dollar value of these 58 earmarks, the picture becomes even bleaker. Nearly 40 percent of the funds earmarked for Pre-Disaster Mitigation are going to districts represented by members on the Appropriations Committee. Again, unless Mother Nature knows which districts are represented by appropriators, we've got a problem here. Appropriators make up just 13 percent of this legislative body. So 13 percent of the House will take home 40 percent of Pre-Disaster Mitigation spoils. Homeland Security earmarks, as a whole, favor Members who serve in a position of power, either as an appropriator, in leadership, as a chairman or a ranking minority member of the committee. If that's not a spoils system, I don't know what is. We ought to let this Pre-Disaster Mitigation program work as it should. A while ago the Department of Homeland Security asked if this account could be distributed with a risk-based formula, but the committee said no. They wanted to keep the same competitive grant formula, a competitive grant formula that really isn't competitive at all because a quarter of it is already earmarked; and within a few years, it will probably all be earmarked. And guess what--it will largely go to the districts represented by appropriators or those in powerful committee positions. I urge the adoption of the amendment. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FLAKE. I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. FLAKE

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I, too, went to the Rules Committee to testify last night to try to have an amendment ruled in order, an amendment that was germane; there was no problem with its relevance to the bill. It was not dilatory, it wasn't seeking to delay anything. It was to address a very real problem that we have. The problem that we have, Mr. Speaker, is that we have, that we know of, a number of investigations from the Justice Department going on right now examining the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions. They're looking at the process of circular fundraising where Members of Congress will secure earmarks, or in other words, no- bid contracts for their campaign contributors. The money goes out, taxpayer money, campaign money comes back in. Now, whether we want to admit it or not, the Justice Department is looking at this. We can talk until we're blue in the face, say there is no quid pro quo here. We're giving earmarks to those that we think need them. These no-bid contracts are going to companies that really need them. And whether or not they turned around and individuals from that organization or the lobbyists that represent them, if they contribute tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars back to my campaign committee, that's okay because it's not a quid pro quo. Whether we say that until we're blue in the face doesn't change the fact that the Justice Department seems to feel differently, and they're conducting investigations. Now I think we do feel differently because just a few weeks ago, we authorized or instructed our own Ethics Committee to reveal whether or not they were conducting an investigation that essentially looks into the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions. They have since indicated that they are. So now we have the Justice Department looking into the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions. We have our own Ethics Committee looking into that relationship, and yet we have, Mr. Speaker, our own Ethics Committee still issuing guidance to the Members of this body that campaign contributions do not constitute financial interest. In other words, whether or not you can contribute or give an earmark to a company, that company's executives and their lobbyists can turn around and give you campaign contributions the next day or the day before. That's okay according to guidance coming from our own Ethics Committee--the same Ethics Committee that is investigating the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions. The purpose of the Ethics Committee, Mr. Speaker, is to ensure that the dignity of this House is maintained, that we rise above it all, that we have a standard that is perhaps higher than perhaps others have. We should have a standard that's higher than whether or not Members can be indicted or convicted over behavior that takes place here. Yet, we're allowing the Ethics Committee to issue guidance that says, It's okay. That, Mr. Speaker, is wrong. What this amendment would have done is said that no money could be spent in the bill to implement that guidance. I can't think of many more pressing issues in this House than that. It's germane. There is no reason that it couldn't be brought up and be part of the amendments that were offered today, but the Rules Committee said ``no'' for no other reason than they didn't want to stop the practice. We have come to rely on earmarking to raise money around here. That's the bottom line. And we can't continue it if we're going to uphold the dignity of this body. Mr. Speaker, at some point we will decouple the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions. We have to. I just hope that we do it sooner rather than later and not have to wait to uphold the dignity of this body.

Mr. FLAKE

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentleman not at all for bringing that up. I had hoped to improve my batting average by coming to the floor tonight, and it doesn't seem that I have. So I will have to settle for the one triple.

Mr. FLAKE. Will the gentleman yield?