Member of Congress

John Glenn

Role
Former Senator
State
OH
Party
Democrat

Speeches

HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996--CONFERENCE REPORT1996-08-02

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I support the conference agreement on H.R. 3103, the Health Insurance Reform Bill. I am pleased that the Congress is taking long overdue final action on this legislation which is so important to working Americans and their families. As you know, it was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee 1 year ago today, and it passed the Senate in April. Once again, I would like to commend Senator Kassebaum and Senator Kennedy for their untiring efforts to work with our colleagues and all interested parties to forge the bipartisan bill we will pass today and send to the President for his signature. The bill we are passing today is not comprehensive health care reform, but it is an important step forward in addressing problems in our current health insurance system. People who maintain continuous health insurance coverage will not be denied insurance for preexisting conditions, after one initial 12-month exclusion, even if they change jobs or insurance plans; and individuals who lose their jobs or change jobs will be guaranteed the opportunity to continue their insurance through a group or individual plan. A compromise was made on medical savings account [MSA] provisions passed by the House of Representatives but rejected by the Senate. The bill provides for a four year pilot program in which up to 750,000 taxpayers with high-deductible health insurance plans can make tax deductible contributions to a medical savings account. At the end of the 4-year period, Congress would have to vote to expand the MSA program. This legislation also increases the health insurance deduction for self-employed individuals from 30 percent to 80 percent over a 10-year period, provides for a medical expense deduction for long term care insurance, and allows terminally ill individuals to receive tax free benefits from their life insurance. I regret that the Domenici-Wellstone amendment, which passed the Senate, was not included in this conference report nor was any compromise that the sponsors proposed. This amendment would require private health plans to provide medically necessary mental health services that are equal to the medical services provided. A great deal of progress has been made in diagnosing and treating mental illnesses, and I believe that we should provide health insurance coverage that will make this care affordable to people who need it. I will work with my colleagues during the remainder of this Congress to ensure that in the future people with mental illnesses have equal access to the care they need. The Health Insurance Reform Act will provide peace of mind to many working Americans who have health insurance but fear losing it, and it is a major improvement in our current health insurance system. providing tax exemption to state high risk health insurance pools

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FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 19961996-08-02

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, over the last 6 years, we have enacted several laws to improve Federal agency financial management. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 put into place the first requirements for agencies to prepare annual audited financial statements. These requirements were strengthened by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994, and now all the major agencies are covered by the CFO Act requirements. In oversight hearings conducted by the Governmental Affairs Committee, both when I was Chair and now as Ranking Minority Member, we have seen how these laws are making significant improvements in agency financial management. Unfortunately, we also have seen that many agencies still have a ways to go to make the necessary reforms. The legislation before us today, the ``Federal Financial Management Improvement Act'' (S. 1130), which I co-sponsored, helps agencies go those final miles to put into place necessary financial management systems and provide real accountability for the expenditure of public funds. The legislation addresses the financial management systems that are needed to provide financial accountability. Annual financial statements will not do it alone, if agencies do not have the systems or personnel in place to account for their financial operations. Accordingly, the bill requires agencies to comply with applicable accounting standards and systems requirements. The legislation further requires auditors to identify agencies with deficient financial management systems. This puts added teeth in the CFO Act financial statement process, and will lead to practical remediation steps, to be overseen by OMB. I am concerned, however, that the legislation's requirements for auditors to identify officials responsible for agency financial systems may have the untoward consequence of intimidating our civil servants. If this requirement is used to identify specific decisions that have frustrated the development of needed financial management reforms, it will be a success. It will also be a success if it creates incentives for improved training for financial management personnel. If, however, it is used to unfairly blame managers who are constrained by resource or policy decisions made above them, whether in the agency or by Congress, then we will have to revisit this requirement. At this point, however, I believe that on balance the time has come to demand more accountability from our agencies and agency officials for their financial management performance. I commend Senator Brown for introducing this bill and for working with us in Committee to improve it. I believe the ``Federal Financial Management Improvement Act'' is important legislation and will work to improve agency financial management. I urge my colleagues to support it.

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PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996--CONFERENCE REPORT1996-08-01

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, today the Senate will be voting to transform the Nation's welfare system. Despite some changes, I believe that the fundamental flaws of the Senate and House passed bills remain and therefore I will vote against the conference report. Children and low-income working men and women will be the victims of this legislation. There are already far too many poor children in this country and I believe that this bill will in the end cause many more children to live in poverty. I am particularly concerned that in Ohio alone, as many as 43,500 children will be pushed into poverty by the implementation of the bill before us. Mr. President, I cannot support legislation that would cause this kind of harm. I have been concerned from the start that simply washing our hands of the Federal responsibility for welfare and turning it over to States is no guarantee of success. This is risky policy and there will no longer be any mechanism for guaranteeing a national safety net for our poorest families. I am concerned that the work requirements in the bill can not be met. States that do not meet employment goals will lose part of their block grants. Penalties would rise from 5 percent in the first year to 21 percent in the ninth year. The Congressional Budget Office has already reported that most States will be unable to meet the work requirements. This legislation lacks the necessary commitment or resources to help people move from poverty to meaningful employment. It does not provide any specific funding for States to help people find or train themselves for better-paying jobs. Rather than moving people off welfare and onto work, this bill emphasizes cutting off welfare. While I support reform that promotes personal responsibility and community initiatives, I cannot support legislation which undermines the national safety net and reduces resources for hungry families.

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NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 19961996-07-31

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, when I first saw the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, S. 1271, I was very surprised at its apparent disregard to the rights of citizens and the protection of the environment. It appeared to me that proponents of that bill wanted to ignore those issues, all in the name of removing a burden from the nuclear industry. I can understand the desire to make the Federal Government live up to its promises, but not at the expense of the environment or citizen's rights. The bill, as originally written, contained provisions for prohibiting the Environmental Protection Agency from performing its legislatively mandated function of defining standards for radiation releases from the permanent or interim radioactive waste repository. Congress established what appeared to be a limit which disregarded scientific and public input on appropriate limits. Particularly galling was the prohibition of public input and EPA involvement in standard setting. Other issues of concern included: First, opening the door to reprocessing, called conditioning in the original bill; second, running rough-shod over the citizens of States through which the radioactive waste would be transported; and third, gutting Civil Service laws for a particular DOE office. I filed several amendments, in an attempt to correct provisions of the bill that in my view would result in unfair treatment or inadequate protection of citizens and the environment. Several of those provisions have been corrected, or at least modified. I am pleased to see that, in the latest version of the bill, the EPA and the NRC have been brought back into the process, albeit somewhat awkwardly. These two agencies are charged with responsibilities for setting standards for protection of the public, workers, and the environment from produced radioactive materials, which includes those found in nuclear reactors or radioactive waste repositories. I am very disturbed, however, with the legislatively imposed standard of 100 mrem per year to the average person in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. I understood that EPA and NRC have the responsibility and authority to establish radiation dose limits and standards. I certainly would not substitute my limited knowledge on the effects of exposure to radioactive materials, for that of the EPA and NRC. I doubt if there are any others in this Chamber who would be qualified to do that, either. We should leave it to the experts, at EPA and NRC, as well as to the public, instead of imposing an arbitrary standard of our own. It is claimed that EPA and NRC have veto rights in this bill. However, the bill's wording is such, that instead of giving the agencies the responsibility for establishing a standard, they are required to adhere to our standard, unless they determine that our standard constitutes an ``unreasonable risk to health and safety.'' What constitutes ``unreasonable risk''? How will EPA or NRC determine what is ``reasonable'' and what isn't in terms of risk? That is a subjective judgment, and it is an invitation to extensive litigation on that judgment. At the same time, the bill limits judicial review of rulemaking based on the 100 mrem standard. I am also concerned that our limit is significantly higher than limits imposed for other nuclear activities. Why is this so? Is it because someone has been told that we can't design a repository to tougher standards? Is this what health and safety regulation has come to? Don't set a standard that the National Academy of Sciences suggests you should set--their report suggests a much lower number than 100 mrem/yr. for exposure--instead let's pick one that the engineers say they can easily meet today--despite the fact that the repository will be around, maybe, for thousands of years. I understand that there is disagreement among scientists about the effects of low-level radiation. The EPA sets a limit of 25 mrem, and the NRC has historically set 25 mrem around nuclear power plants. International standards setting bodies have also allowed dose limits for waste storage of 15 to 25 percent of the 100 mrem total limit. The EPA has also opposed the legislatively mandated limit, in letters to Senate Committees and individual Senators. I have also been informed that EPA is going to issue their dose limits in the very near future. [Draft within a month.] I want to know what they say in this regard before I set a congressionally imposed limit, which may or may not meet our best scientific judgment. Beyond this, Mr. President, the philosophy behind this bill is one that is seriously questionable. The bill presumes that a permanent deep geologic burial site of nuclear waste is the most suitable solution to the waste problem and then sets up a structure that will inevitably lead to pressures to make the interim site the site of the permanent facility, and with legislated safety standards for the permanent repository. I simply do not believe that we now have the technology or engineering knowledge to credibly design and construct a permanent repository that can meet acceptable safety standards for tens of thousands of years. If we did have this ability and understanding, then it would not be necessary to contort our environmental laws and regulatory oversight as this bill does. Until we get closer to being able to design and construct a repository with appropriate safety standards, there is no reason why we cannot continue to have monitored retrievable surface storage of these dangerous materials. The level of risk is not greater than that posed by the construction of a central interim facility requiring continuing transportation of radioactive materials from all over the country. Accordingly, Mr. President, I am opposed to the passage of this bill.

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RECESS1996-07-23

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose what is called welfare reform but is really radical change and a surrender of the Nation's responsibility to our children. This measure ends our 60-year national guarantee of aid to the poor and the disadvantaged. Make no mistake, the poor and the disadvantaged to whom we refer are our children. Today one in five children live in poverty and I am not convinced that this bill will improve our problem and I fear that it will only make it worse. I want our welfare system reformed and I voted for an alternative Democratic welfare reform plan, the Work First Act of 1996, which was based upon last year's Democratic welfare proposal. Work First promotes work while protecting children. It requires parents to take responsibility to find a job, guarantees child-care assistance and requires both parents to contribute to the support of their children. When this alternative failed, I supported many of the amendments to improve the bill and guarantee assistance to poor children. I am concerned that there are already far too many poor children in this country. I believe that this bill will cause many more children to live in poverty. It is estimated that 130,185 children in Ohio will be denied aid in 2005 because of a mandated 5-year time limit; 52,422 babies in Ohio will be denied cash aid in 2000 because they were born to families already on welfare; 79,594 children in Ohio will be denied benefits in 2000 should assistance levels be frozen at 1994 levels. In total, at least 262,000 children in Ohio would be denied benefits when these welfare provisions are fully implemented. Last year's Senate-passed bill would have pushed an additional 1.2 million children into poverty. In Ohio alone, 43,500 children will be pushed into poverty by the bill now before us. Mr. President, I cannot support legislation that would cause this kind of unacceptable harm. I have been concerned from the start that simply washing our hands of the Federal responsibility for welfare and turning it over to States is no guarantee of success. This is very risky policy and we will no longer have a mechanism for guaranteeing a national safety net for our poorest families. Perhaps if we were more concerned with moving people from welfare to work rather than just moving people off welfare we would be making a real start. However, I am not convinced that merely putting a time limit on benefits will lead to employment. I am not convinced that this legislation ends welfare as we know it, it just ends welfare. In the end Mr. President, the changes we contemplate today will take away from those least able to afford it and will have a devastating impact on children's health, education, nutrition, and safety. Providing adequate assistance for our children will save money in the long run and be cost effective. I oppose this bill.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-07-18

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to S. 1894, the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1997. This bill suffers from the same fundamental defect as S. 1745, the national defense authorization bill, a bill I also opposed. The appropriations bill adds $10.2 billion to the President's budget request. The $10.2 billion is spent partially funding programs not requested by the administration for which we will pay billions in the outyears. For example, the bill adds $856 million for ballistic missile defense research, of which $300 million is added to the national missile defense account. The bill also adds $525 million in unrequested funds for the DDG-51, $701 million in unrequested funds for the new attack submarine, $300 million in unrequested funds for the V-22, $489 million in unrequested funds for the F/A-18 C/D, $760 million in unrequested funds for National Guard and Reserve equipment, $204.5 million in unrequested funds for the C-130, $107.4 million in unrequested funds for the F-16, and $210 million in unrequested funds for the JSTARS program. I have been a long time supporter of our efforts to ensure our national security. However, Mr. President, this is the second time in my Senate career that I have felt that I must oppose a Defense Appropriations bill. I cannot support adding billions and billions of dollars for programs that I am not convinced and the Pentagon does not believe we need. It is true that I would support additional funding for some of these programs but adding $10.2 billion in unrequested funding is simply too much particularly when we are cutting funding for critical programs elsewhere in the budget.

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THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION ACT1996-07-17

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in strong in support of the Stevens substitute to S. 704--legislation to set up a national commission to study the growth of legalized gambling in America and its relevant social, economic, and legal impacts. Gambling is an industry that is growing rapidly. In 1976--the last time we studied this issue on a national basis--legalized wagering in the United States totaled $22 billion, while legalized gaming approached $3 billion. In 1994, legal wagering exceeded $482 billion, while legal gaming reached $40 billion. We now have riverboat and land- based casino gambling in a number of States, and most States operate their own lotteries. In addition, Indian tribes are increasingly turning to casino and other forms of gaming as a tool for economic development. Finally, the gambling industry is looking toward the Internet and other electronic media as the markets for the future. This kind of explosive growth in an industry that brings with it both serious economic and social costs along with benefits is at least a cause for further study. So I support the establishment of a national commission. This issue has not been examined on a national or Federal level for nearly 20 years and I believe that it is time we looked at gambling in America in greater depth. The 1976 commission concluded that the regulation of gambling should be a State responsibility. With the exception of gambling on Indian lands where there is a shared Federal-State role, that is currently the case. But given the rapid growth of the industry in America in recent years, the proper role of the States and the Federal Government on this issue needs study and examination. There are important federalism and sovereignty questions that need to be answered. I don't have the answers--I'm not sure any of my colleagues do either. That's why establishing a commission to study gambling and to advise Federal, State, local, and tribal policymakers is both necessary and worthwhile. Some might argue that this commission represents an intrusion on states rights. I don't agree. This commission does not have the power to regulate, only to make recommendations. It is a study commission, not a regulatory body. This substitute represents a considerable improvement from the original S. 704. The commission's charter has been strengthened. It will assess: the impact of existing policies and practices concerning legalized gambling; the impact of pathological gambling on individuals and families; the relationship between gambling and levels of crime; the growth of electronic or Internet gambling; and the extent to which alternative sources of revenues could be developed for State, local, and tribal governments. Based on its examination of these issues, the commission will then make appropriate recommendations to policymakers at all levels of government. The substitute includes my proposal that the commission contract with the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] to assist in producing the study, with a particular emphasis on employing the NAS to study the problem of pathological gambling. This may be the most pernicious aspect of the growth of legalized gambling and we don't have much knowledge about it. We read the occasional story in the newspaper about some of the elderly cashing their social security checks to play the slot machines; teenagers gambling on the internet; the poor getting hooked on the lottery or keno; or others committing suicide under the weight of crushing casino debts. But we don't have much national or aggregate information on problem gambling and how it is being affected by the rapid growth of the industry. With its scientific expertise, the NAS is the ideal organization to gather and analyze this information. The commission is also directed to utilize the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR] to review existing State and local laws and policies on gambling, including existing enforcement and regulatory practices that address crime and gambling. Earlier drafts of the substitute had ACIR carrying out all the responsibilities of the commission. I thought that was too much for ACIR to do, first, because some of the aspects of the study are outside the scope of ACIR's expertise and second, because some in Congress have unfortunately succeeded in nearly zeroing out ACIR's appropriation, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for ACIR to carry out the commission's work. This version wisely focuses ACIR to look at the Federalism aspects of the gambling issue, where ACIR's expertise would be most helpful and where it will need less funding to do the work. The Stevens substitute does grant the commission limited subpoena authority. Some have argued that subpoena power gives the commission an open license to conduct a witchhunt in a legitimate industry. These arguments have been raised in discussing the House version, which grants the commission unlimited subpoena authority and charges it with such missions as investigating organized crime and political corruption. The Senate bill is different. We don't have the commission looking into organized crime or political corruption. Its mission is to focus on the broader socio-economic impact of gambling, with the only matter relating to crime that the commission is to look at is the correlation between gambling and crime rates. This would be valuable information for states or communities who are considering legalizing gambling in their jurisdictions. The Stevens substitute does grant the commission power to subpoena documentary information. I think such subpoena authority is needed to ensure that the commission has access to all the documents it needs to carry out its work in a thorough and independent manner. I would point out that the 1976 commission had subpoena authority. I would like to read an excerpt from a letter from Charles Morin, Chairman of the 1976 Commission, to Congressman Frank Wolf, sponsor of the House bill. The 1972-76 commission had subpoena power and, because of that, we never had to use it--in other words, when you have the power you will get cooperation. Obviously, the power need not be unrestricted and Congress may see fit to provide safeguards and, if the power were to be abused and there were non-compliance, the commission would be forced into court to compel compliance--something it would be most reluctant to do. On the other hand, if it were used legitimately, it would mean that information had been withheld for a reason--which is why you must have the power! And in the normal instance, as we found out from our years of experience, the knowledge that we had the power and would not hesitate to use it provided all the persuasion we needed. I think Mr. Morin sums up pretty well why subpoena power is needed. But he does note that Congress may wish to put some parameters and limits around the commission's subpoena power. We've done that. The commission may only subpoena documentary information, and that is only after those who possess the materials fail to supply them as requested by the commission. The commission cannot subpoena witnesses to compel public testimony. This should satisfy those who are concerned that the commission might misuse its subpoena authority to create some sort of public spectacle. The commission may also issue a subpoena in order to help it understand the materials already obtained pursuant to that authority, and the choice is given to the respondent to submit answers either through a sworn deposition or written interrogatories under oath. Finally, we require the commission to issue written notice to the Attorney General at least 10 days in advance of issuing any subpoena. Still, some remained concerned that the commission would misuse its subpoena authority to publicly disclose confidential business information, or violate the privacy of certain individuals who gamble. So we added an additional safeguard. We placed the commission under the Trade Secrets Act, Federal law which carries with it both civil and criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential business information by any Federal employee. Serious violations of the act can lead to a jail sentence of up to one year. The Trade Secrets Act applies to all Federal employees and officers of the Federal Government and we would extend its application to the members and employees of the commission. So we have put some limits on the commission and set up penalties if those limits are violated. Those who might argue that we have created some renegade commission are misguided. We have granted the commission the powers it needs to carry out its mission, but we've also ensured that penalties exist for those who abuse those powers. There are a couple of points I would like to clarify in the legislation since we did not file a report on it. First of all, we are making one change to the bill since the markup. We are correcting language in Section 5 to ensure that the Trade Secrets Act covers not only subpoenaed information, but information voluntarily supplied to the commission. Without this change, people would be discouraged from voluntarily supplying confidential business information to the commission as it would otherwise not be protected. Our change also includes a provision that ensures that the Trade Secrets Act applies only to confidential business information. Business or other information that is currently available to the public or already in the public domain, such as information in trade publications, journals, magazines, 10(k) filings, etc., would not be covered by the act. The commission should be able to publicly discuss and release information that is already in the public domain without fear of facing some frivolous lawsuit. The commission, under section 5(b)(2), is allowed to issue additional subpoenas to further its understanding about materials already produced by that means. The respondent, again, has the choice as to how to comply--either by a sworn deposition or through written interrogatories under oath. In my view, it is crucial to discuss what the verb ``to understand'' means in this regard. Indeed, it is a relatively new term of art in defining subpoena authority. A very narrow reading would limit such a subpoena to helping the commission understand only what is written on a page. I do not subscribe to this very restrictive interpretation and certainly do not think it is our intent to do so. Questions about the facts and circumstances beyond the four corners of a document--how it was developed, who was responsible for writing and/ or approving it, and under what context--may be well necessary and crucial to augment the commission's understanding of the materials at hand and carry out its duties. I think the commission should have such authority and use it, if necessary, to clarify and supplement the information contained in the documents themselves. That's the only way the commission will be able to fully comprehend the meaning and context of any subpoenaed documents. This commission will be closely watched by many, including those with the power and resources to tie the commission up in costly litigation. It is subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act [FACA], a statute which requires compliance with open meetings and public access, but also a statute that allows litigation, something we've seen a significant amount of in the last several years with various executive branch commissions and taskforces. So I would urge the commission at its first meeting to read FACA and to closely adhere to its requirements. We've given the commission significant latitude in establishing its own rules and procedures of operation. I would urge that at its very first meeting that the commission establish those procedures, and not wait until later when some issue arises and the commission has not set appropriate rules to deal with it. In particular, the commission should establish its rules for the issuing of subpoenas in their first meeting, and not wait to establish those rules just before the commission is actually considering issuing a subpoena. In closing, I want to thank Senators Simon, Lugar, and Lieberman and their respective staffs for working with Senator Stevens and I to develop this legislation. It is a well thought out proposal that will ensure a thorough, balanced, and fair examination of gambling in America. I urge my colleagues to support it.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS1996-07-16

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator McCain as an original cosponsor of this legislation to amend the Indian Child Welfare Act [ICWA]. By clarifying and improving a number of provisions of ICWA, this legislation brings more stability and certainty to Indian child adoptions while preserving the underlying policies and objectives of ICWA. This bill embodies the consensus agreement reached when Indian tribes from around the Nation met in Tulsa, OK, to address questions regarding ICWA's application. Mr. President, I believe that the overriding goal of this agreement, which I support, is to serve the best interests of children. The bill being introduced today deals with several issues critical to the application of ICWA to child custody proceedings including notice to Indian tribes for voluntary adoptions, time lines for tribal intervention in voluntary cases, criminal sanctions to discourage fraudulent practices in Indian adoptions and a mandate that attorneys and adoption agencies must inform Indian parents under ICWA. I believe that the formal notice requirements to the potentially affected tribe as well as the time limits for tribal intervention after the tribe has been notified are significant improvements in providing needed certainty in placement proceedings. Mr. President, I am also pleased that this legislation contains provisions addressing my specific concern: the retroactive application of ICWA in child custody proceedings. ICWA currently allows biological parents to withdraw their consent to an adoption for up to 2 years until the adoption is finalized. With the proposed changes, the time that the biological parents may withdraw their consent under ICWA is substantially reduced. I believe that a shorter deadline provides greater certainty for the potential adoptive family, the Indian family, the tribe, and the extended family. This certainty is vital for the preservation of the interest of the child. Mr. President, my concern with this issue and my insistence on the need to address the problem of retroactive application of ICWA was a direct response to a situation with a family in Columbus, OH. The Rost family of Columbus received custody of twin baby girls in the State of California in November 1993, following the relinquishment of parental rights by both birth parents. The biological father did not disclose his native American heritage in response to a specific question on the relinquishment document. In February 1994, the birth father informed his mother of the pending adoption of the twins. Two months later, in April 1994, the birth father's mother enrolled herself, the birth father, and the twins with the Pomo Indian tribe in California. The adoption agency was then notified that the adoption could not be finalized without a determination of the applicability of ICWA. The Rost situation made me aware of the harmful impact that retroactive application of ICWA could have on children. While I would have preferred tighter restrictions to preclude other families enduring the hardships the Rosts have experienced, I appreciated the efforts of Senator McCain, other members of the Committee and the Indian tribes to address these concerns. I believe that the combination of measures contained in this bill will significantly lessen the possibility of future Rost cases. Taken together the imposition of criminal sanctions for attorneys and adoption agencies that knowingly violate ICWA, the imposition of formal notice requirements and the imposition of deadlines for tribal intervention, provide new protections in law for children and families involved in child custody proceedings. Mr. President, I have reviewed the Rost case to reiterate that my interest in reforming ICWA has been limited to the issue of retroactive application. I have no intention to weaken ICWA protection, to narrow the designation of individuals as members of an Indian tribe, or to change any tribes' ability to determine its membership or what constitutes that membership. Once a voluntary legal agreement has been entered into, I do not believe that it is in the best interest of the child for this proceeding to be disrupted because of the retroactive application of ICWA. To allow this to happen could have a harmful impact on the child. I know that my colleagues share my overriding concern in assuring the best interest of children. Mr. President, I look forward to continued efforts to reform ICWA in ways that protect the best interest of children. I appreciate the work of Senator McCain and others to accommodate my concerns in this legislation and am pleased to cosponsor the bill.

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Introductory Statement on S. 19621996-07-16

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator McCain as an original cosponsor of this legislation to amend the Indian Child Welfare Act [ICWA]. By clarifying and improving a number of provisions of ICWA, this legislation brings more stability and certainty to Indian child adoptions while preserving the underlying policies and objectives of ICWA. This bill embodies the consensus agreement reached when Indian tribes from around the Nation met in Tulsa, OK, to address questions regarding ICWA's application. Mr. President, I believe that the overriding goal of this agreement, which I support, is to serve the best interests of children. The bill being introduced today deals with several issues critical to the application of ICWA to child custody proceedings including notice to Indian tribes for voluntary adoptions, time lines for tribal intervention in voluntary cases, criminal sanctions to discourage fraudulent practices in Indian adoptions and a mandate that attorneys and adoption agencies must inform Indian parents under ICWA. I believe that the formal notice requirements to the potentially affected tribe as well as the time limits for tribal intervention after the tribe has been notified are significant improvements in providing needed certainty in placement proceedings. Mr. President, I am also pleased that this legislation contains provisions addressing my specific concern: the retroactive application of ICWA in child custody proceedings. ICWA currently allows biological parents to withdraw their consent to an adoption for up to 2 years until the adoption is finalized. With the proposed changes, the time that the biological parents may withdraw their consent under ICWA is substantially reduced. I believe that a shorter deadline provides greater certainty for the potential adoptive family, the Indian family, the tribe, and the extended family. This certainty is vital for the preservation of the interest of the child. Mr. President, my concern with this issue and my insistence on the need to address the problem of retroactive application of ICWA was a direct response to a situation with a family in Columbus, OH. The Rost family of Columbus received custody of twin baby girls in the State of California in November 1993, following the relinquishment of parental rights by both birth parents. The biological father did not disclose his native American heritage in response to a specific question on the relinquishment document. In February 1994, the birth father informed his mother of the pending adoption of the twins. Two months later, in April 1994, the birth father's mother enrolled herself, the birth father, and the twins with the Pomo Indian tribe in California. The adoption agency was then notified that the adoption could not be finalized without a determination of the applicability of ICWA. The Rost situation made me aware of the harmful impact that retroactive application of ICWA could have on children. While I would have preferred tighter restrictions to preclude other families enduring the hardships the Rosts have experienced, I appreciated the efforts of Senator McCain, other members of the Committee and the Indian tribes to address these concerns. I believe that the combination of measures contained in this bill will significantly lessen the possibility of future Rost cases. Taken together the imposition of criminal sanctions for attorneys and adoption agencies that knowingly violate ICWA, the imposition of formal notice requirements and the imposition of deadlines for tribal intervention, provide new protections in law for children and families involved in child custody proceedings. Mr. President, I have reviewed the Rost case to reiterate that my interest in reforming ICWA has been limited to the issue of retroactive application. I have no intention to weaken ICWA protection, to narrow the designation of individuals as members of an Indian tribe, or to change any tribes' ability to determine its membership or what constitutes that membership. Once a voluntary legal agreement has been entered into, I do not believe that it is in the best interest of the child for this proceeding to be disrupted because of the retroactive application of ICWA. To allow this to happen could have a harmful impact on the child. I know that my colleagues share my overriding concern in assuring the best interest of children. Mr. President, I look forward to continued efforts to reform ICWA in ways that protect the best interest of children. I appreciate the work of Senator McCain and others to accommodate my concerns in this legislation and am pleased to cosponsor the bill.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-07-10

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. I agree. Such briefings could include: First, a list of defense nuclear facilities evaluated and a discussion of progress made in meeting the compliance requirements set forth in the Price Anderson nuclear safety regulations; second, a list of noncompliance events and violations of the regulations identified by line management and headquarters oversight; third, improvements in public safety and worker protection as a result of these regulations; and fourth, any other information which the Department deems important.

Mr. GLENN. I thank the Senator and congratulate him on his leadership on these issues on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I regret that the Senate again has produced a bill that is gravely flawed. It suffers from many of the defects associated with last year's bill. I voted to favorably report the bill out of committee in the hope that the bill would be improved when it was considered on the floor. While agreement was reached to eliminate unacceptable missile defense provisions from the bill, the bill remains fundamentally flawed. As a consequence, I will vote against its final passage. With respect to missile defense, I am pleased with the agreement announced by the majority leader on June 28th to drop sections 231 and 232 from the bill. These sections related to U.S. compliance policy for the development, testing, and deployment of theater missile defense systems, and to the demarcation between theater and strategic missile systems. I am also grateful to see that the language in the bill in section 233 with respect to the mutilateralization of the ABM Treaty has been dropped and converted into a sense of the Senate. I understand full well, however, that we will soon be back on the floor debating many of these same ill-advised proposals placed in another bill. I intend to speak in more detail about those proposals at the appropriate time. For now, I would just like to restate my conviction that it would ill serve the interests of our country--and surely not the interests of our taxpayers--to follow the misguided missile defense plan that the majority appears determined to pursue in the weeks ahead. As far as I am concerned, the missile defense language I cited above would have made for bad law if enacted on this bill-- simply moving this language into another bill will not change this basic quality of the proposal. The bill contains more than $11 billion in unrequested funding with huge increases in the procurement and research and development accounts. For the most part, these additions are based on the Services' so-called wish list--lists of programs the Services would like to see funded if additional funding were made available. I agree with some of the spending decisions, but I do not support this approach to defense budgeting. It undermines the objectives of Goldwater-Nichols by encouraging the submission of separate spending priorities for each service that are set without regard to our unified command structure's warfighting needs. Moreover, I cannot support the magnitude of the increase in funding especially when we are spending billions of dollars on programs we do not need now and some we may not need ever. The additions in procurement include $750 million for the DDG-51 destroyer program, $701 million for the new attack submarine program, $351 million for the V-22 program, $249 million for the C-17 program, $240 million for the E8-B program, $234 million for the F/A-18 C/D program, $204 million for the C-130J program, $183 million for the Apache longbow program, $158.4 million for the Kiowa warrior program, $147 million for the MLRS program and $107 million for the F-16 program. The additions in research and development include the $885 million for missile defense programs to which I already alluded, $100 million plus-ups for the Comanche Program and Army Force XXI, $305 million for the national defense sealift fund, $147 million for the Arsenal Ship and $116 for advanced submarine technology. The bill contains more than $600 million in unrequested military construction projects, an annual temptation that Members cannot seem to resist, even though there is no compelling reason to move these projects forward. I think it is particularly damning that at least $200 million of these projects not only did not make the initial cut of the budget request but also did not make the second cut of the services' wish lists. We are authorizing an additional $600 million in military construction projects just so Members can say that they have brought home the bacon. Another rite of spring, the addition of hundreds of millions of dollars in Guard and Reserve equipment warrants mention. Some progress has been made in avoiding the earmarking problem we had last year. Only about $485 million of the $760 million in funding is earmarked. Unfortunately, no real progress has been made in eliciting a realistic budget request from the Defense Department for Guard and Reserve equipment. This failure invites earmarking funds for programs in Members' districts and as a consequence, the funding decisions that become law only bear relation to the Guard and Reserves' requirements by happenstance. We should not be spending the taxpayers' money in this way. Several amendments to eliminate some or all of this unrequested funding were offered. Unfortunately, Mr. President, these efforts were defeated. On other matters, I am concerned about the criteria used in allocating an additional $200 million for DOE's environmental restoration and waste management program. I could support, and, fact, have long advocated increased funding for this program. However, rather than accept the recommendations provided by the Department of Energy which listed projects that, if given increased funding in the near term, could save substantial dollars in the out-years, the bill factors in additional criteria concerning site employment. I have grave concerns that the credibility of the entire DOE cleanup operation will be undermined if it is treated merely as a jobs program. A number of factors should be assessed when deciding to increase funding for cleanup projects such as: reducing the risk to the public, workers and the environment, lessening the long term mortgage costs of the program; mandates and the environment; lessening the long term mortgage costs of the program; mandates from Federal and State laws; and stakeholder input. I do not believe that the effect on a given site's employment should be among these factors. I disagree with the committee's report language concerning the external regulation of the Department of Energy. I believe Secretary O'Leary's Advisory Committee on External Regulation established credible reasons for moving to external regulation, and I believe that this goal can be accomplished without significant increased costs to the taxpayer and without any detrimental impact on our Nation's security. In my view, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board will continue to play a key role in ensuring the safe operation of the defense nuclear facilities. Since January of this year, the Department has been carefully reviewing the options available for transitioning to external regulation. A preferred option should be presented to the Secretary within the next several weeks. I believe that the Department should continue planning to move to external regulation for nuclear safety. It is my hope that the plan presented to the Secretary will outline the steps necessary for such a transition, recognizing that such a transition may take several years. During consideration on the floor, the committee accepted an amendment I offered regarding worker safety and health at DOE's Mound. For too long Congress has done too little to ensure that the workers in our nuclear weapons complex were adequately protected from the many hazards they face on a daily basis. While the situation has improved at many sites, it is unfortunately the case that the Mound facility is still not up to the standards of other DOE facilities, not to mention commercial nuclear facilities. This amendment requires DOE to report to Congress on progress to improve worker health and safety at the facility. On June 21, 1996, I received a letter from DOE Under Secretary Tom Grumbly. This letter clearly establishes the Department's intent and commitment to seriously and forthrightly address worker safety issues at Mound. The letter lists a series of discrete program improvements that will be taken at the mound site beginning immediately and continuing through 1997. These important upgrades should begin at the earliest possible opportunity. I remain concerned though that we may be forcing a trade off between worker safety and health improvements and the pace of cleanup at the Mound site. In order to avoid such a trade off, it may be necessary to seek an authorization for these activities during conference. Finally, I would like to mention a special retirement provision for Federal employees who happen to work at military bases where the work will be privatized as part of base closure. The Committee on Armed Services voted 11 to 9 to add nongermane legislation to the bill that appropriately is in the jurisdiction of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. This amendment also was recently introduced as a bill, S. 1686, which is pending before the Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Its stated purpose is to make privatization more likely to succeed by giving employees an incentive to stay at the base when a private employer takes over the workload. Under the terms of the amendment, 30 percent of the Federal civilian employees at two DOD bases, one in Indianapolis and one in Louisville, would enjoy civil service retirement system [CSRS] benefits that no other Federal employee enjoys today. I believe the authors of the amendment intended for it to apply to a third base in Newark, OH, but it is unclear whether the workers at the Ohio base will be eligible for the benefit. In addition, it is unclear whether bases in Texas and California will also be covered by the amendment. Under the terms of the amendment, additional retirement system credits would be given to employees in the civil service retirement system [CSRS] whose jobs are being privatized, and who are not eligible for immediate retirement benefits. The amendment would allow these employees to count their time as a private contract employee as qualifying service toward meeting the eligibility requirements under CSRS. In addition, their current high-3 years of salary would be indexed to general increases in Federal salaries. These benefits are independent of additional subsequent retirement benefits earned by the employees following privatization. Under current law, the affected employees would be eligible for a CSRS pension at age 62 with the high 3 years based on current employment by the Federal Government. Under the terms of the amendment, these employees could retire at an earlier age and their high-3 years of salary would be at a level indexed during the years of privatization. Of course, they would not even be required to contribute toward the cost of these extra benefits, although Federal employees in CSRS must contribute toward system costs. While the stated purpose of the amendment is to encourage Navy employees to accept contractor employment in Indianapolis and Louisville, the proposed retirement incentives do not apply to 70 percent of the work force at the two facilities. Nineteen percent of the employees at the two facilities are now eligible to retire under CSRS and therefore, are ineligible for the proposed retirement incentives. Fifty-one percent of the employees are covered under the Federal employees retirement system [FERS] and therefore, are also ineligible for the proposed retirement incentives. Therefore, in terms of increasing their Federal retirement benefits, it would be to the advantage of 70 percent of the work force at the two facilities, to relocate and seek other Federal employment. Newark Air Force Base in Ohio is privatizing in the same way that the bases in Louisville and Indianapolis are scheduled to proceed, although it is not clear from the legislation whether the employees at Newark would be included in the pilot program. The privatization at Newark has been working because employees want to remain employed and many want to stay in the Newark area. Based upon Newark's experience, it is my view that the amendment, offered by Senator Coats, proposes a solution to a problem that does not really exist. Regrettably, given the nature of the proposed solution, I believe that this legislation will create a host of problems. Problems of equity and fairness that will fall straight into the lap of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, the committee with jurisdiction over Federal employment benefits. We are in the process of downsizing the Federal Government. I note that through the efforts of the Armed Services and Governmental Affairs Committee and the administration, we have 240,000 fewer Federal employees than when President Clinton took office. Many Federal jobs are being privatized in place. Numerous Federal jobs are also being eliminated. One Ohio constituent recently wrote to me and explained that his job was being eliminated in July. He said that if we could provide him with 4 additional months of service credit, he could apply and be eligible for early retirement under the civil service retirement system. I cannot explain to this constituent why he should not be eligible for an additional 4 months of credit if we are providing years of service credit to other employees who are not even losing their jobs. They have the opportunity to continue working. They will be eligible to accrue private employer pension benefits in addition to the Federal benefits they will have already earned. Perhaps, the Congress should consider retirement inducements for all employees affected by privatization and downsizing. However, if this is to be done, it should be done in a studied fashion. Changing a system of universal retirement benefits--where everyone previously had participated under the same benefit rules--should be the subject of hearings in a bright light, where we understand exactly what equity problems are created as well as the long-term cost of providing such retirement credits. My problem with the amendment adopted by the Armed Service Committee is that it is not generous enough to discourage employees from seeking other Federal employment and this is the purported purpose of the legislation. The assumption that a majority of these employees will move onto other Federal employment also assumes that these employees will want to relocate and that they will find jobs through the priority placement program. These are two assumptions that I question. To repeat, the amendment is not generous enough to fulfill its stated purpose, while at the same time it is too generous when one considers that the Government is proposing to do nothing along these lines for other employees being separated from Government employment. It is these sorts of contradictions which should be the subject of congressional hearings before we act. western kentucky training site

Mr. GLENN. Would the distinguished Senator from the State of Idaho care to engage me in a colloquy concerning the Department of Energy's compliance with its nuclear safety regulations?

Mr. GLENN. I certainly do. As the Senator knows, DOE has recently issued regulations pursuant to the Price Anderson Act/Atomic Energy Act. These regulations are entitled Nuclear Safety Management, 10 CFR 830, and Occupational Radiation Protection, 10 CFR 835. A primary purpose of these regulations is to strengthen line management accountability for nuclear safety. These regulations are enforceable with sanctions, such as fines and penalties, as appropriate. The strength of the regulations is enhanced by public accountability, primarily of the DOE contractors, through self-reporting, as well as through DOE inspections. Does the distinguished Senator from Idaho agree that these regulations will enhance the DOE's goal of improving nuclear safety?

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-28

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. These important upgrades should begin at the earliest possible opportunity. As a result of Mr. Grumbly's letter and the committee's concerns, I will not offer my amendment which would specifically authorize funds to ensure that these upgrades take place. I remain concerned though that we may be forcing a trade off between worker safety and health improvements and the pace of clean up at the Mound site. Mr. President, I wish to ensure that Congress is kept fully informed on the status of the Mound worker safety and health programs.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, this amendment will authorize the President to impose Export-Import Bank sanctions against specific entities that knowingly aid or abet countries to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear materials for such weapons. Each of the Commanders in Chief and Secretaries of Defense of this country-- regardless of their party affiliation--has over the last half century recognized that the global spread of nuclear weapons constitutes one of the gravest threats to our national security, to the security of our friends and allies, and to world order. Though there are other weapons of mass destruction that may be easier to acquire and to use, a nuclear weapon has the unique ability to obliterate a whole city in an instant. For this reason, it is understandable that our national leadership and defense community have exerted considerable effort over the last several decades to reducing this threat to all Americans. The persisting and ever-changing nature of this threat, coupled with the many pathways that are available to countries to acquire such bombs, requires our Government--both the Congress and the Executive--to ensure that the tools we use to combat this threat are up to the job. When these tools are sharp and working as intended, the security of each and every American citizen is enhanced accordingly. Our law must continually respond to--but never surrender to--new challenges that arise with the passage of time. Current law--The Export Import Bank Act--requires the denial of Exim Bank credits to finance goods destined to: Any country that has violated safeguards or a U.S. nuclear agreement; any non-nuclear-weapon state that detonates a bomb; or any country that has willfully aided or abetted a non-nuclear-weapon state to get the bomb. The first two of these sanctions were enacted on October 26, 1977, whereas I authored the language in the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 which created the third sanction authority listed above. Revelations in 1996 that a government-owned Chinese entity had sent sensitive uranium enrichment technology to Pakistan raised the possibility of the denial of several billion dollars of Exim-financed credits for United States exports to China. Unfortunately, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation [CNEIC]--the specific entity involved in the transaction--escaped all sanctions since the law prescribed sanctions only against a country that willfully aids and abets proliferation. Also, the United States took no action against China because of insufficient evidence of willful intent on the part of China's leaders. The current law does not authorize the President to target Exim sanctions against specific entities--including state-owned entities like CNEIC operating as a business enterprise--that knowingly engage in illicit nuclear transfers. The amendment builds upon existing Exim Bank sanctions authorities for the most serious proliferation-related activities--that is, violations of safeguards and U.S. nuclear agreements, nuclear detonations, and willful state actions in promoting proliferation. It authorizes the President to target such sanctions against persons, including government-owned entities operating as a commercial enterprise, that knowingly aid or abet a country to acquire a nuclear- explosive device or nuclear material for such a device. The amendment also authorizes the President to terminate sanctions that are imposed against countries and persons that aid and abet such forms of proliferation, upon receipt of reliable assurances that the activity has stopped and will not recur. The intention here is to give the violator an incentive to cease the prohibited activity and a disincentive for continuing it. This new sanctions authority will by no means serve as a panacea for all of the proliferation threats that will face our country in the years ahead. But it is not intended to perform this function. It seeks to achieve a more specific purpose. By enabling the President to target sanctions against specific proliferators, the new language would strengthen the credibility of this sanctions authority and thereby work to discourage future business with enterprises like the CNEIC which knowingly promote the global spread of nuclear weapons. The amendment will work to ensure that the taxpayer dollars controlled by the Exim Bank are being used to advance the commercial interests of the United States, not the commercial interests of enterprises that are promoting the global spread of nuclear weapons. My intent is no more and no less than to move our legislation another step toward taking the profits out of proliferation. I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I should like to engage the Senator from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, in a colloquy concerning worker health and safety protection at the Department of Energy's Mound facility in Miamisburg, OH. As the Senator may know, the worker safety and radiation program at Mound has had numerous problems. For example, in 1994, it was discovered that some fluid samples of potentially contaminated workers had sat on a storage shelf for 3 years without being sent to the lab; furthermore, a huge backlog of samples existed. While the backlog has since been reduced and other steps taken to improve the situation, it is still clear to me that problems exist with the worker radiation protection program. Earlier this year, I met with some Mound workers who expressed serious concerns about this situation; I have also received numerous letters from workers at the site expressing similar concerns. Further, I have been informed that DOE's own technical experts believe that substantial upgrades need to be made at Mound in this area. For these reasons, I have filed an amendment which addresses the specific areas which I believe need to be improved. The technical program upgrades addressed by my amendment were developed with extensive input from the DOE. However, I understand that there are some concerns about the potential impact of my amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter to me from DOE Under Secretary Tom Grumbly. This letter clearly establishes the Department's intent and commitment to seriously and forthrightly address worker safety issues at Mound. The letter lists a series of discrete program improvements that will be taken at the Mound site beginning immediately and continuing through 1997. This list closely tracks the amendment which I have filed.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, a moment ago the Senate adopted three amendments to add additional funds to the military construction budget to fund an undersea weapons system lab in Newport, RI; phase I of a national range command and control center at White Sands Missile Range, NM; and phase I of a fuel farm at Elmendorf AFB, AK. I did not ask for a rollcall vote on these amendments, nor did I want to tie the Senate up with debate on these amendments. However, I would like to voice my opposition to these amendments. I am opposing these amendments because we in the Congress continue to add millions and millions of dollars to the defense budget in order to fund projects which are not requested by our military leaders. As I understand it, these projects do meet the criteria which the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Senator McCain, and I established several years ago. I am gratified that the Senate is exercising a degree of discipline by requiring that these military construction projects meet certain minimal criteria, such as whether a project is in a service's future years defense plan or whether a project is mission essential. I don't think that is too much to ask, Mr. President. Furthermore, I do not agree that just because a project meets these criteria we should fund each and every one of them. We have to exercise discipline in limiting the number of unrequested projects added each year, just as the Pentagon must learn to request appropriate levels of funding for the services' construction accounts. If our military leaders truly need these projects, then they should ask for them in the annual budget request. On June 19, during the Senate's consideration of Senator McCain's amendment to reduce the fiscal year 1997 military construction authorization by $600 million, I spoke at length about my position concerning construction adds. So, I will not belabor the point here. I will point out that it is my intention to continue to work with the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee to reverse the practice of adding millions of dollars to the budget for unrequested projects. Amendment No. 4406

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia on behalf of the Senator from Alaska. I hate very much to do that because this is a program that is undoubtedly worthwhile, but I do object to the process by which we are doing this. There has not been a definition given yet by the proponents of this as to what the bill actually provides. Let me make some comments on that. What this amendment does, as I understand it, is direct the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a $2 million grant to a program called CAMP, Children's Association for Maximum Potential, and this $2 million would be for construction of a support services facility for military dependent children with disabilities and their families at Lackland Air Force Base. Certainly, that is a most noble intent. I do not question the intent of it at all. What I do object to is bringing this up as part of the defense bill without it having been through any screening whatever, without having been submitted as part of the defense budget. I am sure that every single one of us has a similar situation that we would like to take benefit of, also, that would be similar to this particular program. The CAMP Program was established in 1980 as a nonprofit agency. What it does is provide comprehensive services to families with special needs. Currently, CAMP has 40 employees, as I understand it, and a $1.3 billion budget. It operates on Lackland in three World War II vintage barracks. Lackland officials have a base revitalization program, and they are demolishing old buildings. These three buildings are among those which are slated to be demolished. They have outlived their construction life cycles. They are costly to repair and maintain. The facilities in which CAMP operates are slated for demolition. The Air Force has identified a vacant parcel of property near the base medical center as a potential new site for CAMP. This $2 million grant, along with a private donation of $500,000, would enable CAMP to construct a new facility and continue its program to support military families with disabled children. The facility to be built with the grant money would be leased to CAMP by the Air Force under a 25-year lease agreement. As consideration for this lease, CAMP would assume responsibility for and costs associated with operating and maintaining this facility, as I understand it. Granting this facility would enable CAMP to continue their support of military families and special needs. The grant is simply a substitute for the good will of the Air Force in providing an operating space for CAMP in these old World War II structures. We do need special legislation to authorize the Air Force to use funds in this manner. However, arguing against the amendment, there is no agreement between the Air Force and CAMP for use of the facilities at all. It would benefit a small group and a specific site. The money we would be proposing to give to them does not cover the cost of the new facility. Most of all, we opened a floodgate to everybody who has a meritorious nonprofit group operating on their base in support of whatever good purpose, and we are not giving them a fair shot at the same thing. On the Senate Armed Services Committee, we have denied requests for DOD funds to assist in construction activities related to all sorts of things--military monuments, memorials, buildings for children on bases--and we have not funded those. While I know this is for a very good purpose, and I realize if we put this to a vote, there would not probably be very many votes that would be opposed to this idea of continuing help for dependent disabled children, children with special difficulties, on the base at Lackland, I do not propose to call for a rollcall vote on this amendment because I have no doubt about what the vote would probably be. The intention of the amendment is very noble and for a worthy cause, but for us to start out like this without having been through the budgeting process, without it having been through hearings, without having it considered by the committee or the Armed Services Committee and in competition with other projects like this at all, I question whether we should be doing this. The problem with it, then, is that it uses the defense budget to fund what may be considered to be a high-priority program but it is not a budgeted defense program item. I cannot support the principle here of taking millions out of the defense budget to fund it. Every single one of us has a program in his or her State that would benefit greatly if we simply handed out funds like this on the military bases. Many, many, nonprofit organizations do things on the bases that we would like to support, yet we do not do that because if we raided the defense budget every time that occurred, we would soon be out of money. The problem with that approach is there would be little left if each Member of this body came to the floor to collect the defense funds necessary to help out every nonprofit program like the very valuable CAMP Program that needed funding. I prefer to see with proposals like this that are put in, the Pentagon give their opinion as to what they are doing on the particular base, send that word over, and we take care of it in committee structure, compare them with others, and allot them money for programs like this. I am very happy to support them and work with the people to do it. But to bring them on the floor and make it competitive that we are trying to get something for individual bases for nonprofit organizations is something I have a lot of difficulty supporting. Let me conclude by stating I find it a bit ironic that the same majority that is cutting necessary domestic discretionary funding in order to add $12 billion to our defense budget is agreeing to an amendment like this, without any hearings or without any further information. It just says we need $2 million to give to a nonprofit organization, so we appropriated or we authorized here on the Senate floor. I am very much in support--let me go back to where I started my statement. I am very much in favor of the intent, certainly, on our bases. We want to support organizations like this. They are set up and they operate as nonprofit organizations. To have the money come out of our defense budget now to go into supporting these nonprofit organizations, no matter how good they are, just without any hearings, without conferring with other projects that we might prefer to see taxpayer-appropriated funds go into, is to me the wrong approach here. I would like to see these things gone into on a little more studied basis. Senator McCain and I have taken the lead over the past 4 years in trying to hold down things like this where we add things on the floor, add them in the committee that were never requested, never had hearings, never knew anything about them. Granted, this is not a budget buster that goes into billions. It is $2 million. But you add this up with every $2 million that I would like to have and the Senator from Virginia would like to have and everyone else would like to have, and it gets into quite a pile of money. We are taking it directly out of the defense budget to do this. Granted, it is in support of our military personnel at Lackland Air Force Base, but this is the only organization of its kind we are singling out for a $2 million grant. I am not going to ask for a rollcall vote on this, but I do wish to be recorded as being opposed to this amendment. I yield the floor.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, regrettably, I must rise today in opposition to the amendment offered by my colleague from New Jersey. I do this reluctantly. I think this whole program is being mischaracterized, to a large degree, here. I think that is unfair. Civilian marksmanship is an old program. It has been run since way back in the early 1900's. It has been, basically, a good program. I would like to disabuse anybody of the idea that this is somehow just an NRA program. You bring up NRA and you immediately get strong feelings on both sides of whether you should support something or not just by the fact whether NRA approves it or does not approve it. But this is not an NRA program and it is not a giveaway program and it is not a gun control issue. I want to address these things. Senator Lautenberg's amendment would terminate a program that represents a compromise. It was a compromise which was worked out last year as a way of changing from Army support with taxpayer money, Army support of the Civilian Marksmanship Training Program that is conducted at Camp Perry in Ohio, and has been, I do not know, for how many decades it has been run there. But it was a way of converting from Army control and taxpayer money being used over to a civilian nonprofit organization that would run a legitimate sport that is run as a gun sport, not hunting or anything like that, but target shooting, marksmanship, gun safety, and that has been the focal point of the matches that have been held at Camp Perry for a long, long time. This way to convert over to a civilian program without just killing the whole program outright was the compromise that was worked out last year. No. This program, Mr. President, has not even had a chance to go into effect yet. So what we are doing is dumping the compromise that we thought there was agreement on last year. This program's predecessor, the Civilian Marksmanship Program, was established by Congress in the very early 1900's. They have promoted firearms safety and marksmanship training ever since that time. Up until this year, the Civilian Marksmanship Program was run by the Army, using appropriated funds, as I said. In addition to providing firearms safety training, the Civilian Marksmanship Program conducts a national marksmanship competition each year. Quite legitimate; great. It is like people shooting bows and arrows get to have their competition. People shooting little .22 pistols have their competition. And people who want to fire a little heavier fire caliber rifles have their competition. Indeed, it is an Olympic sport in marksmanship. The training many of these people receive at Camp Perry, the competitions they were in in these matches, is what leads them into a position where they can even participate in the Olympics. So it is a legitimate sport. So, in addition to providing firearms safety training, they conduct the national marksmanship competition each year. The third element of the program has been the sale of World War II vintage M-1 rifles out of which some of the costs of the competition and the firearms training has been funded. Now these are M-1's as my distinguished colleague from New Jersey said, M-1's that everybody who was around the military back during World War II days certainly and the Korean war are very, very familiar with. This is not a weapon of crime. I do not think there is a single time on record where an M-1 rifle has been taken in and been used to conduct a crime or rob a bank or a 7-11 or anything else. Last year's defense authorization legislation simply took the old program run by the Army, with appropriated funds, and moved it into a federally chartered--federally chartered--not-for-profit corporation that would conduct the training, the national matches, and sell collector-type rifles to defray the costs of the operations. This was a transition program to help them change to this nonprofit operation. That was the only purpose of it. The program has not changed in the last year, other than to move it out of the Army and stop using Army appropriated funds and put it into a self-sustaining corporation called the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety. The use of appropriated funds was the complaint of the program's detractors last year, and that complaint was addressed by last year's legislation, Mr. President. I regret this issue is being characterized as a gun control issue because I believe that characterization is misleading, to say the least. Like Senator Lautenberg, I have been a strong supporter of gun control, but I do not believe the sale of these 50-year-old 9-pound rifles raises a gun control issue. As I said, as far as I know, there is not on record a single crime, not a single one, no robbery that anybody has on record as I understand it, of an M-1 rifle ever having been used. What is the attraction of these? The attraction of these rifles is nostalgic, quite frankly, for collectors, those who literally lived with that rifle back during World War II days and who want one to hang above the fireplace or on the wall or someplace or to show their kids. It is something they literally lived with in combat and which became an important symbol to them. You do not see a picture of World War II with the troops going up without the M-1's slung over everybody's back here. That is the attraction of them to collectors. It is not a matter of gun control at all. These rifles are being bought by collectors. They have never been recorded as involved in the commission of a single crime. They are heavy weapons and difficult to conceal. In addition, before a rifle can be purchased, a background check is required. The arguments about the program have never been about gun control before. The Army has been selling rifles and ammunition to the public under the auspices of the Civilian Marksmanship Program since 1924. Finally, I note these weapons are obsolete. They are not usable by the Army. So this is not a valuable giveaway where you can say these cost $400 or $500 to produce. These weapons, if they are stored by the Army--it will cost more to store them. I also add, the estimates of what it would cost to destroy these as opposed to selling them has been running--we do not have an accurate estimate, but the estimates have been between $500,000 and $3 million to destroy these things. I do not know what the true figure is here, but the lowest estimate we have had was $500,000. But in any event, these are not usable now. They will be destroyed if they are not transferred and sold into this program. So to the Government these rifles are not truly assets. Rather, they would be reflected on the books as a liability since their destruction would cost the Government money. So I think that sort of lays out the program, puts it in a little different light. It is not a program concerned with crime prevention. It is not a gun control issue; never has been. These are not the weapons of crime at all. It is not a giveaway because, if the Army does not want them, it will cost money to destroy them. What it is is a way of getting from the transition of the old Army- supported, taxpayer-supported matches that the Army used appropriated funds for and transferring that over to a nonprofit corporation to continue the marksmanship training, safety training, Olympic-hopeful training, and so on, that has occurred at Camp Perry for many decades now. So I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment offered by my colleague from New Jersey. Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to express my intention to vote in favor of the amendment offered by my colleagues, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici, concerning America's actions to alleviate threats to our country's security coming from Russia and from terrorists. This is important legislation, perhaps one of the most significant provisions in this entire bill, and I think it deserves some high praise and a few cautionary notes. First, the praise. I cannot think of a better investment in America's security than working to reduce the number of weapons of mass destruction that could be targeted or used against our country. The assistance provided in this bill aims at enhancing the security of controls over materials in the former Soviet Union that are associated with such weapons, and reducing the amounts of these materials. It is to me without doubt a sound public investment. The bill provides funds for improving the material protection, control, and accounting of materials that could be used in nuclear weapons--material that someday could otherwise either be illicitly exported to dozens of countries around the world or even targeted against the United States. It just makes sense to enhance controls over these materials. The bill also provides funds for improving the means to verify the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, a functions that is vital if we are to have the confidence to proceed with deep cuts of United States and Russian strategic arsenals under the START process. The bill contains a program aiming at the total elimination of the production of plutonium in Russian for use in weapons. I regret, however, that the amendment contains a provision (sec. 1332(a)(2)(C)) that also encourages Russia to convert this plutonium into nonweapons uses, which to me looks like a green light to a larger U.S. role in encouraging large scale stockpiling and transportation in plutonium for dubious commercial purposes. This is, in other words, a friendly pat on the back for the plutonium economy in Russia. I am not at all confident that the United States, any of our friends in Europe and Japan, and indeed any country on earth--not just the countries in the former Soviet Union--has truly adequate capabilities not just to protect but even to track or account for the disturbingly large amounts of weapon-useable nuclear materials that are floating around the world in the civilian sector. This is not the type of trade we should be promoting, either directly or indirectly. It is quite easy to stereotype this problem--as many of the findings of this particular amendment regrettably do--as one that is limited to Russia, rogue nations, rogue regimes, fanatic third world dictators, maniacal terrorists, and underworld gangsters. But the problem is of course much more complex than this caricature indicates. As I have stated many times before, the problem of controlling these materials and getting them out of world commerce is truly global in scope. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be made into devastating city-busting nuclear weapons even if they do not come from facilities in the former Soviet Union--the national origin of such materials is less significant than their potential availability for illicit uses and, surely, the ability of our country and international organizations to keep close track of the precise location and disposition of such materials. If anybody of my colleagues doubts that the problem of tracking such materials is exclusively a Russian problem, I would encourage each and every Member to read closely the recent work of the General Accounting Office on this subject. On December 27, 1994, GAO issued a report entitled, ``U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited,'' which reached the following conclusions concerning the system--called NMMSS or the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System--used by our government to track U.S. nuclear materials that are exported to other countries. Listen to what GAO had to say about America's own system for nuclear material tracking-- The United States relies primarily on the NMMSS to track the nuclear materials exported to foreign countries. However, this system does not have all the information needed to track the specific current location (facility) and status of all nuclear materials of U.S. origin that are supplied to foreign countries. For example, the system does not track exported U.S. nuclear materials that are moved from facility to facility within countries, nor does it show the current status of the nuclear materials (e.g., irradiated, unirradiated, fabricated, burned up, or reprocessed). Thus, the NMMSS may not contain correct data on where (at which facility) these materials are located within foreign countries or on their current status. OK, so that was the situation in 1994. In August 1995, GAO released another report bearing a now-familiar title: ``Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking System Makes Success Unlikely.'' This report found that the Department of Energy, ``has not implemented any of the recommendations contained in our prior report and has no plans to do so.'' According to GAO, ``Due to its lack of sound planning, DoE does not know if the [NMMSS] system will fulfill the needs of its major users or be cost-effective.'' Well how about 1996? On May 29, 1996, I received a letter from GAO commenting once again on the U.S. system for tracking nuclear materials abroad. Here is what GAO had to say: ``We continue to believe that the nuclear materials tracking system is significantly limited in its ability to track nuclear materials internationally and that the replacement system faces a high probability of failure because it has not been completely developed and tested.'' This letter is available from GAO as document B-271592, 5/29/96. Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. The Department of Energy described the NMMSS system in a news release dated June 27, 1994, as follows: ``* * * it is the official record used to maintain compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty.'' So are these limitations in America's ability to track nuclear materials of recent origin? Hardly. GAO issued a report on August 2, 1982--that is almost 14 years ago--bearing the title, ``Obstacles to U.S. Ability to Control and Track Weapons-Grade Uranium Supplied Abroad.'' Then on January 14, 1985, GAO issued another report entitled, ``The U.S. Nuclear Materials Information System Can Improve Service to Its User Agencies,'' once again documenting numerous shortcomings in America's own system of nuclear materials accounting. My point here is to emphasize that we should not be deluding ourselves that the amendment before us today will address the kinds of problem that GAO has been documenting or almost two decades in America's ability to monitor global--I repeat, global--tracking of nuclear materials. Scenarios involving so-called loose nukes just flowing out of Russia make for great speeches and play well in the media, but they offer just too simplistic an approach for understanding a vastly more complex and, once again, more global threat. I would like to turn now to the second highly positive feature of this bill, its emphasis on the need for greater attention to the problem of domestic preparedness to cope with incidents involving the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists inside the United States. This year's hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has adequately and competently documented the scope of this threat as well as America's lack of preparedness to deal with it. It may be that history will record that the sums provided in this bill to correct this problem were, if anything, inadequate to the job, given the magnitude of the challenges that lie ahead. Nevertheless, the authors of this legislation deserve credit for having spotted a key deficiency in America's responses to the global weapons proliferation threat and for taking some concrete steps to correct the problem. I regret that the bill merely contains hortatory language about increasing the penalties for offenses relating to the importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials or technologies. Even this hortatory language, moreover, does not include the Atomic Energy Act in its list of relevant laws that need to be reexamined. The Atomic Energy Act is the law that governs America's foreign trade in nuclear equipment and materials. There is also nothing in this bill encouraging the Government to make use of the reward authorities that were created in the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, which as I understand it, the State Department is reluctant to implement. In this respect, I would like to comment briefly on a letter dated March 18, 1996, that I have received from Mr. Andrew Fois, and Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department, addressing the subject of the payment of Government rewards for information about illicit transfers of nuclear materials or nuclear weapons. My specific inquiry focused on the record of the U.S. Government in implementing the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act of 1955. The Justice Department's response states that: ``The FBI has not promulgated special guidelines addressing the payment of rewards for information pursuant to the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act.'' The letter goes on to say: ``The FBI is not aware of any previous payment of a reward for information relating to the illicit transfer of nuclear materials or weapons.'' Furthermore, the letter adds, ``The FBI has not utilized the nuclear trafficking information rewards authority because the opportunity to do so has not arisen.'' The letter also indicates some concern that the act of offering rewards ``might generate a `market' which does not now exist, and would not resolve any existing problem.'' It might come as somewhat of a surprise to most observers that the United States has not used a rewards authority which has been on the statute books for 41 years, almost as long as the entire existence of the Nuclear Age. I only hope that it does not take a catastrophic nuclear explosion or act of terrorism involving radiological weapons to inspire a reexamination of this longstanding Government practice of neglecting a potentially useful tool against both nuclear weapons proliferation and terrorism. I believe that rewards will have to play a role dealing with these threats. It seems to me pretty ironic to watch all these heroic efforts now underway to enhance our preparedness to deal with future weapons of mass destruction threats here at home, without recognizing the need for the U.S. Government to obtain information about the nature of these threats. It is a regrettable fact of life, one that may well reflect a less admirable feature of human nature, that obtaining such information sometimes does require the payment of rewards. The final subject I would like to address today concerns subtitle D of the bill, which will create a ``National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters''--in other words, a de facto nonproliferation czar. I am not at all enthusiastic about this proposal and believe that its best feature might well turn out to be its sunset clause, which relieves the President of having such a post after September 30, 1999. I do not dispute the need for greater coordination between the various agencies in many areas relating to nonproliferation policy. The recent hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, for example, revealed serious lack of coordination at both the Federal- State-local levels and at the interagency level. I suspect that one could add to this list, coordination between the Executive and Congress, or even the organization of Congress for dealing with these threats, but such topics were omitted from the scope of this bill. I find it rather extraordinary that the so-called Committee on Non- Proliferation would be composed of such agencies as Commerce, Treasury, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency--but not the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the entity within our Government that has an explicit statutory nonproliferation mission. This amendment might have offered an excellent opportunity to enhance the role of ACDA in our Government, but instead the agency was not even cited in this portion of the amendment. I am very disappointed by the structure of this committee. The function of the coordinator also gives me some serious concerns. Though the word ``czar'' is not used in descriptions of this office, it is an apt term. Nonproliferation, after all, is a unbelievably complex activity. It involves intelligence matters. It involves diplomacy. It involves export controls which touch upon--or occasionally are even driven by--commercial considerations. It involves extremely technical issues. It involves the weighing of competing values and policy priorities. It involves coordinating the activities of many diverse organizations throughout our Government and our military. It involves research and analysis. It involves a huge number of Government contractors, subcontractors, laboratories, think tanks, academic establishments, consultants, and the media. And it involves Congress. So when we create a coordinator in charge of what we call nonproliferation we are talking about quite a lot--hence the notion of a czar. With such an expansive authority, one would have perhaps expected that any such individual occupying such a post would be expected to be accountable to the public for that person's actions. But there is no provision in his bill for Senate confirmation of this official. Moreover, as a member of the National Security Council, it is doubtful that Congress could even succeed in inveigling such individual to come to Capitol Hill to testify on the activities of that office. Honestly, as a former chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs and present ranking member of that committee, I think it is absolutely essential for individuals inside our Government with such sweeping authorities to be held strictly accountable to Congress and the public. Will the so-called coordinator prove to be a zealous advocate of commercial uses of plutonium? Will the coordinator come to this office with a disposition that proliferation only has military solutions? Will this coordinator place commercial considerations ahead of America's global nonproliferation treaty obligations? Will this coordinator take the view that proliferation is merely a problem dealing with so-called rogue regimes instead of a genuinely global threat? Will this coordinator simply be ignored by the current or future President by means of an internal organizational mechanism worked outside the NSC? Will this coordinator have adequate staff, budget, and control over budgets to give the individual the ability to perform the ostensible coordinating functions that the office is supposed to have under this legislation? These are just some of the too-many unanswered questions concerning the nonproliferation czar. Overall, however, I must support this legislation because of the good it does. I will work to address the shortcomings in this amendment the best I can and am optimistic that, without doubt, this legislation is in the overall interest of our country.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-26

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, we have been dealing with this subject here in the Senate for a long time. We started to get some agreement on these matters back as far as 1972 with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the SALT I interim agreements, START I and the START II Treaties, which came along a little bit later. These treaties first put a cap on the nuclear arms race. These were followed by some other agreements. In 1974 President Nixon got the Threshold Test Ban Treaty through and President Ford accomplished the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty in 1976. These were all great steps along the way. Many people thought, along the way, we would never get to a day when we would have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, where all nuclear explosives would not be tested anymore, that we would cap things at that point. But here we are, about to achieve it, just about to achieve it. Will we be able to make it? I do not really know at this point. But I do know this, the final stages of negotiating are underway right now with the CTBT. The administration has come out and given a very strong statement in a letter to Senator Exon that opposes this amendment because they feel, and I agree with them, that this amendment could not come at a worse time in these negotiations. The CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have a deadline of this Friday, the day after tomorrow, in which, by that time, we may be able to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for the first time since entering the nuclear age. It will, indeed, be a historic time if we accomplish that. This amendment we are considering here this evening could be interpreted by some of those States that are negotiating over there now as maybe a little subterfuge, as maybe we are not quite meaning what we are negotiating in Geneva. In fact, they may believe that we are pulling the rug out from under our negotiators at Geneva by even bringing this up for a vote. If this would happen to be agreed to, it would really be a tragic thing for our negotiators over there, because it would call into real doubt our intentions for the long-term future. The administration has no such plans or intentions to circumvent the provisions that they are negotiating over there. So I hope the people with whom we are negotiating are under no illusions about this and are not led astray in their thinking because of any proposal such as this amendment on the floor. The administration also has not requested any funding for any additional tests, so their intent is very clear. It is to go along with the way they have been negotiating in Geneva in good faith. Our allies and the people negotiating there should be assured of that. This has been in good faith. This amendment would, in effect, also relax the existing legislative moratorium just at the time when the only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China, has announced it will join the global moratorium in September. Three of us, Senator Feinstein, Senator Nunn, and myself, were in Beijing in January of this year. We brought this up to President Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China. We talked to him about what their view was on the CTBT. He said they are still negotiating on it, but if it was negotiated and went into effect by the end of the year, China would--in effect, they would make it a point to have all of their nuclear tests done by that time. That is exactly what they are planning to do. Because China has announced it will join the global moratorium in September. As to reliability of our stockpile, we are confident that, as they say in the letter from the White House, ``The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship will ensure we can * * *''

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