John Glenn

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. GLENN. They expired, but I thought the point was we did not have guts enough to assign sanctions against India--but we did. We have done it.

Mr. GLENN. The same sanctions expired on India. But, anyway, the issue here is not the money, small amounts of equipment and so on. The issue is: Does the United States of America have a nuclear nonproliferation policy worthy of the name or not? That is basically what we are talking about. Do we have one and are we willing to abide by it? Or is it a sham? Is it only for press conferences? Is it only for campaign talk and little else? That is the question. Talk about trusting the United States, let us talk about how much we can trust other nations of the world whom we try to help and work with. We have felt strongly enough about our nuclear stockpiles and what is going on around the world that we have exhorted other nations to please sign up under the nonproliferation treaty. At the same time, we pledged that if a situation ever got to where we could start working our stockpiles of nuclear weapons down, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, we would do that. Fortunately, at this day and time, after all these years of cold war, we have reached that point where we now are downsizing, as we call it, our nuclear weapons stockpiles. And we are all glad that is occurring. In the meantime we asked other nations to sign up under the NPT, to submit to IAEA inspections. And we have had 178 other nations that have put their faith in the United States of America, to follow our lead and say, ``Yes, we trust you. And, yes, we will go along, we will not develop nuclear weapons in return for America's cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.'' Who is the most egregious violator of all these things with regard to not signing up, refusing to sign up under the nonproliferation treaty, not cooperating in matters nuclear, in fact telling untruths, one right after the other, one right after the other, on and on and on and on and on? That is Pakistan. I can appreciate very much the situation Pakistan finds itself in. Some years ago China developed nuclear weapons. They have been part of the nuclear weapons scene across the world for many years. India and China have had border troubles, disputed territories. Both claimed certain areas up along the border, and they have been back and forth at each other for many, many decades, going way back. So, as soon as China developed nuclear weapons, India felt they had to do the same thing or they would not be safe. So they set about a nuclear weapons development program. In 1974 they set off their first nuclear device. They called it a PNE, a peaceful nuclear explosion. OK, that is fine, they can call it what they want, but a bomb is a bomb is a bomb is a bomb, whether you call it a peaceful bomb underground for test purposes or whether it is a bomb that is usable, an explosive device that will go off somewhere else. As a result of the Indian PNE, then we had Pakistan swore they would get the bomb one way or another, no matter what they had to do to do it. In fact then Prime Minister Bhutto, the current Prime Minister's father, who later died, said that, to quote his words, Pakistan would ``eat grass'' if it was necessary to get that nuclear capability. They have been embarked on a nuclear weapons program ever since, even though they have steadfastly denied it, year after year after year after year. And they have been untruthful to us. I went to Pakistan, met personally with President Zia back years ago, with Yaqub Khan, who was foreign minister, and their atomic energy commissioner at that time, met with all these people, sat and talked to them one on one, looked them right in the eye, and they swore up and down they had no nuclear program under way. And I think they even knew at that time that I knew that what they were telling me was not true, even though we had good intelligence information at that time. Let me just quote--I am going to put some of this in the Record later on at the end of my remarks, but let us bring it up to date here with the present Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. Listen to some of her comments on this. Going back when she was opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, shortly before she became Prime Minister, the Washington Post quotes her as saying: We don't want any controversy with the U.S. on the nuclear issue. We want it clear beyond doubt that we are interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons. That was on November 19, 1988. On November 28, 1988, once again opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, interviewed in Time Magazine, says: We believe in a peaceful nuclear program for energy purposes and nothing else. Now Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interviewed in the Calcutta Telegraph on December 14, 1988--she is now Prime Minister--is quoted as follows: I can tell you with confidence there is no bomb program in Pakistan. There is no bomb program. There is no bomb program. Later on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interviewed on MacNeil/Lehrer on December 16, 1988: We are committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't have any nuclear weapons policy. Pakistan doesn't have any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon. Bring it on up a little bit. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, once again addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress, on the other end of the Capitol from us, when she came over here and addressed us on June 7, 1989, said: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy. That was to the Congress of the United States. July 10, 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting together or making a bomb or taking it to the point where you can put it together. Another one quoted by AFP on August 29, 1989: We do have the knowledge but I do think there is a difference between knowledge and capability. So we do have a knowledge, if confronted with a threat to use, but we do not in the absence of any threat intend to [[Page S 13957]] use that knowledge. In fact, as a matter of policy, my government is firmly committed to nonproliferation. Then quoted in an interview in a German newspaper, as quoted by Reuters, on October 22, 1989: It is true that Pakistan has certain knowledge in the nuclear field but it has no intention of using this knowledge. To put it another way, we do not want to convert this knowledge into, shall we say, a nuclear capability at the present time. And the last one that I will read here out of a number of other examples I could give was in 1994, last November, November 18, 1994, being interviewed by David Frost on PBS. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: We have neither detonated one nor have we got nuclear weapons. Being a responsible state and a state committed to nonproliferation, we in Pakistan through five successive governments have taken a policy decision to follow a peaceful nuclear program. Well, at a later time I will ask to enter these in the Record at the end of my remarks. But those are examples of some of the statements and there are several dozen others here by various Pakistani officials that go along the same line. Well, so much for the protestations that they have made through the years. In 1987, Yaqub Khan, father of the bomb in Pakistan as he is known, in an interview, I believe it was in London, made the mistake of saying that, yes, they had the bomb. That was it, period. MTCR was brought up a little while ago as well as M-11's. When we talked to some of the people over at the White House today, after I said, what if the missile technology, MTCR, has been violated? What would be the administration's policy? I was told by the person I was talking to, not the President, but I was told by the person I was talking to, ``Well, if MTCR has been violated, we will abide by the law.'' I hope they mean it. I wish they would do the same thing with regard to the Pressler amendment and with the other legislation that we have had on the books for a long time. To understand how we arrived at this difficult state of affairs with Pakistan, in which they have paid $658 million in cash and used $200 million in credits for 28 F-16's but cannot have them delivered, I think we need to go back. I think we need to review a little bit of the history of Pakistan. I would also add that $658 million in cash and $200 million in credits comes up to about $858 million that we are talking about. But to go back a little bit, in the mid-1970's, Congress became concerned about increasing evidence of international nuclear trade in dangerous technologies associated with producing nuclear weapon materials. A number of countries, including but not limited to Pakistan, South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, were actively engaged in seeking such technologies, and suppliers such as France and Germany seemed prepared to meet the demand. Now, in an attempt to dampen such activity, in 1976 and 1977, Congress enacted what is now called the Glenn-Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which provided that countries importing or exporting such dangerous technologies under certain conditions would be cut off from U.S. economic and military assistance. This law was universal in its application. It was not directed specifically toward Pakistan at all. Nonetheless, in 1979, after much information became available about illegal Pakistani activities involving the smuggling of design information and equipment related to nuclear enrichment, President Carter invoked the Glenn-Symington amendment to cut off the Pakistanis. After the war in Afghanistan broke out, attempts by the Carter administration to restore some assistance to Pakistan in return for restraints on their nuclear program were rebuffed by the Pakistanis. When the Reagan administration arrived, aid to Pakistan and the mujaheddin was high up on the administration's foreign policy agenda. At that time, they even suggested repeal of the Glenn-Symington amendment. That was suggested during some of the congressional consultations we had with them. That was rejected. Instead, a proposal was made and adopted into law that allowed the President to resume aid to Pakistan for 6 years despite its violations of section 669 of the Glenn-Symington amendment which related to uranium enrichment activities. President Reagan used this authority in 1982 and also issued a waiver under section 670 of the amendment. This related to reprocessing activities--to exempt Pakistan indefinitely from the cutoff provisions of that section of the Glenn-Symington legislation as well. Now, he could not do the same under section 669 unless he had reliable assurances that the Pakistanis were not developing nuclear weapons. And such assurances were clearly not available. Thus, a specific waiver for Pakistan was created and has been subsequently renewed five times. That allowed them to escape from the sanctions imposed by United States law for proliferators. This has been done for no other country that I am aware of. So anyone who thinks we are being too harsh on Pakistan, poor little Pakistan, we have renewed that waiver on five different occasions. Nonetheless, Congress was unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan and stipulated in the waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if--if--it received or exploded a nuclear device. Now, in addition, Congress stipulated that an annual report would be provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm that United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb program as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration officials. We have a number of statements that they made at that time about what a big thing this was going to be, and that was the best thing to do to get the Pakis to hold back on their bomb program. So we required reports, and those reports, along with supplementary intelligence information, revealed there was no effect whatsoever on the pace or the direction of the Pakistani bomb program. The Pakistanis continued to say publicly they had no nuclear weapons program and continually lied to United States authorities whenever questioned. Indeed, then-President Zia and then-head of the Pakistani atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, both lied to me in my visit to Islamabad in 1984. Lying is a harsh word, but I cannot put any other word to it. That occurred when I asked about information I had concerning their nuclear program. The result of all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the Pakistani program was progressing, was the enactment of the Pressler amendment. The Pressler amendment was passed in 1985, which was designed to draw a new line in the sand regarding the extent of United States forbearance over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The amendment required the United President to certify annually that Pakistan did not ``possess,'' in quotes--``possess,'' key word--a nuclear explosive device in order for assistance to continue and that such assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan would possess such a device. Please note that the argument about the Pressler amendment being unfair because it applies only to Pakistan is completely disingenuous because it ignores the fact that Pressler was created to shape further the unique special exemption from United States nonproliferation law given to Pakistan years earlier. If we had not had the waiver, we would not have needed Pressler. It has been reported that CIA officials who were privy to intelligence information concerning the Pakistani program were very skeptical beginning from 1987 on that the President could make the appropriate certifications under Pressler to allow aid to continue; in other words, to say with some certainty that they did not possess any nuclear device and that our assistance was significantly reducing the risk that they would possess. Statements from high-ranking Pakistani officials around this time suggested they had the bomb within their grasp. Nonetheless, President Reagan in 1987 and 1988 and President Bush in 1989 made those certifications. It has also been reported that President Bush told the Pakistanis in 1989 that he would be unable to make this certification the next year in 1990. Now, the contract for the sale of 28 F-16's was signed in 1989, the year Pakistan ostensibly had been warned that there would be no further certification that would allow them to receive military equipment from the [[Page S 13958]] United States. The first cash payment by Pakistan of $50 million was made at the beginning of fiscal year 1990. Subsequent to the cutoff, which came because of the Pressler amendment which took affect in October 1990, Pakistan continued to send periodic payments for the manufacture of F-16's. That is, $150 million in fiscal 1991, $243 million in fiscal 1992, $215 million in fiscal 1993, for a total of $658 million. Why did they continue to send money when they knew that U.S. law would not enable them to receive the planes? That is a question only they can answer. But it is not unlike an investor buying a stock of a company whose assets are under lien in the hope that the lien will somehow be removed. If it does not get removed, the investor can hardly call foul. All this is to say that the Pakis are hardly entitled to any sympathy in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars with a much larger adversary, India, who is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and exploded a device in 1974. By virtue of the India nuclear program being indigenous and not in violation of the terms of the Glenn-Symington amendment, the Indians have not been subject to the amendment sanctions, which would not have been effective in any case since the Indians received only token amounts of economic or military assistance from the United States. But that is not the same thing as saying that United law is discriminatory in its application. Now, I indicated earlier we have 178 nations who have signed up and extended the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, made it a permanent treaty. It has been the policy of every American President over the past 25 years since the treaty went into effect to support the treaty, and we have been steadfast in that support. Now, the members of the treaty deserve our trust. We have to be deserving of that trust. They put their trust in us. Now, how will we be keeping faith with those 178 nations meeting in New York if the message that is sent is that a proliferator with a history of mendacity can receive from the United States a significant number of nuclear-weapons-delivery systems, that is, F-16's. Well, to even ask the question is to give the answer: The United States cannot be a champion of nonproliferation on the one hand and a facilitator of nuclear weapons development or delivery on the other. Sending F-16's to Pakistan before full realization of the history we laid out in this letter would indeed be a gross violation of our commitment to foster nonproliferation ethics in the world through the NPT and other means and would rightfully subject us to strong international criticism. I am certainly not an enemy of Pakistan. I visited there. I like the country. I supported them when they were threatened in the past, such as during the war in Afghanistan. I want their cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drugs. But surely we have to find a way to support them in these activities without enhancing their nuclear- weapons-delivery systems. As to the cash payments for the F-16's, we cannot ignore the fact that, contrary to the grossly incorrect public statement made by Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel at a White House briefing on April 11, no payments were made by Pakistan before fiscal 1990. Sticking to the payment schedule of the contract until fiscal 1993 was a gamble by Pakistan that did not pay off. Now they want to be held harmless from losing their gamble. Now, I want to get them their money back, if we can possibly do it. It is perhaps unfortunate that U.S. officials did not disabuse the Pakistanis of the hope that making those payments would put pressure on the United States to reverse the Pressler sanctions and deliver the planes. But that is no reason to turn that hope into reality right now. Mr. President, there have been a number of milestones in the United States-Pakistan nuclear relations. The background of this arms transfer scheme can be summarized by recalling a sequence of some 10 milestones in the history of our nonproliferation efforts in Pakistan. I guess milestone 1 would involve those waivers and favors. Throughout the 1980's, officials from the executive branch assured Congress and the American taxpayers that billions of dollars in aid that we shipped to Pakistan throughout that decade would shore up Pakistan's security and thereby act as a substantial break on Pakistan's nuclear program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at the end of my remarks a list of no less than 20 such assurances to Congress.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Iowa leaves, I want to point out, he was questioning whether we would have the guts to sanction India. I point out to him that we did sanction India under the MTCR. We had United States sanctions imposed against India, the Indian space research organization, and against Russia, Glavcosmos, for the Russian transfer of cryogenic rocket engines. That was in 1992, I believe. So we did actually have sanctions against India. What we did was we cut the United States exports of missiles for a 2- year period, I believe it was. I do not have the exact date it was put into effect--yes, we do. This is out of the May 12, 1992 Washington Post, an article by R. Geoffrey Smith titled, ``U.S. Imposes Sanctions Against Russian-Indian Concerns Over Rocket Deals.''

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter to the President regarding the Pakistani situation that I sent on April 19 be printed in the Record, and I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. GLENN. That is all right.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, as I understood it, we cannot carry this time over until tomorrow. The time has to be used this evening. We have 1 hour total equally divided. Is that correct?

Mr. GLENN. I thank my colleague and I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. GLENN. To get this aid to Pakistan, Congress had to create some special waivers for the President to invoke, discriminatory waivers tailored exclusively on Pakistan's behalf. There was a waiver of our uranium enrichment sanctions on February 10, 1982, just for Pakistan. There was a waiver of our plutonium reprocessing sanctions on the same day, February 10, 1982, just for Pakistan. There was another waiver of our uranium enrichment sanctions on January 15, 1988, just for Pakistan. There was a waiver of a nuclear procurement sanction on the same day, January 15, 1988, just for Pakistan. There was a waiver of our uranium enrichment sanctions on March 28, 1990, just for Pakistan. There were waiver authorities of uranium enrichment sanctions that Congress created but which fortunately were not exercised by the President on November 5, 1990, October 6, 1992, and September 30, 1993, once again, just for Pakistan. So much for the discrimination in United States policy, as though we are picking on Pakistan. By this record, the United States has unquestionably and shamelessly discriminated on behalf of Pakistan where American law was concerned. The next time I hear much complaint about the fact that the Pressler amendment only refers to Pakistan, I can only wonder what has happened to our memory about these waivers and about our appreciation for that history. The future of this great Republic depends upon our Nation's ability to learn from, not ignore, its experiences. I am tired of discrimination--all discrimination--but most especially discrimination in favor of proliferation. Of all the arguments that have been levied against the Pressler amendment, I have never heard anyone accuse it of being in favor of proliferation. That is more than I can say about the current proposal. Milestone 2, we title this ``Those Peaceful Nuclear Assurances.'' Officials from Pakistan, meanwhile, lost no effort in blanketing our Capital with a blizzard of peaceful nuclear assurances. My staff assembled an impressive collection of over 70 of these promises, assurances, pledges and other offerings intended to reassure America that Pakistan was not just taking our aid and proceeding with its bomb, which is, of course, exactly what Pakistan was doing. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record at the end of my remarks a collection of these assurances that was compiled by Michelle Fraser, an intern with the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I recall hearing the testimony of the State Department's Under Secretary James L. Buckley before the Nonproliferation Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs back on June 24, 1981. He stated: I was assured by the ministers, I was assured by the President himself that it was not the intention of the Pakistani Government to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. Buckley went on to argue how new United States aid would act to curb Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Recall that at the time those remarks were spoken, very few commentators or analysts were claiming that Pakistan was a de facto nuclear weapons state. Pakistan did not have bomb-grade uranium from its unsafeguarded enrichment plant at Kahuta. News reports had not yet circulated that China had provided a design of a nuclear weapon to Pakistan along with other nuclear assistance. We had seen virtually nothing about Pakistan engaging in high-explosive testing of components of nuclear weapons. Pakistan had no fleet of F-16 aircraft which could potentially be used as a delivery system for nuclear weapons. [[Page S 13959]] No, indeed, all the above came only after or during the massive flow of aid to Pakistan through the 1980's. Despite this record, we are hearing today some of the same old recycled arguments: Provide aid and it will buy us influence. Some people just refuse to believe that what Pakistan really wants is both its bomb and our aid. Milestone No. 3 we can title ``Proliferation Unbounded.'' By the mid- 1980's, the situation was really getting out of hand. Everybody knew that Pakistan's bomb program was rolling right along. This aid included substantial quantities of military assistance, even F-16 aircraft, that were quite suitable for use in delivering nuclear weapons. To illustrate the scope of the progress Pakistan was making on its bomb as we continued providing aid, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record at the end of my remarks a chronology showing how bad the problem was.

Mr. GLENN. I object.

Mr. GLENN. Just as the United States expects Pakistan to comply with its nuclear assurances, I think it is fair for the Congress to insist on the Executive honoring its own assurances to Congress when it comes to implementing our nuclear nonproliferation policy. Milestone 9, ``Some Early Signs of Restraint.'' Although Pakistan's bomb program is no doubt continuing, and it is indeed maintaining its nuclear and missile cooperation with China, it may have also acted to halt production of highly-enriched uranium I would like to inform my colleagues today that this is the most significant restraint I have seen in some 15 years in Pakistan's nuclear program--the bad news is that Pakistan's bomb program has not disappeared from the face of the earth, the good news is that it is not expanding as rapidly as we once thought, and the news which most Americans will probably be most gratified to hear is that this first demonstration of genuine nuclear restraint by Pakistan did not cost the American taxpayer a red cent--it is due entirely to the effect of the Pressler amendment. This is the law that detractors continue to tar as having been ``ineffective'' or ``inflexible.'' Supporters of the Pressler amendment make no apologies about standing up for this ``inflexible'' law. After all, my dictionary defines this term as follows, ``. . . of an unyielding temper, purpose, will, etc.'' To supporters of nonproliferation generally, the alternative of ``passive accommodation'' has little attraction indeed. Thus we have no quarrel with the charge that the Pressler amendment has been inflexible. Let us be glad it has. Unfortunately, this term is not quite accurate, given the significant flexibility that the law has shown in recent years to allow the following to occur in spite of Pakistan's continued violations of that law: First, the United States still issues licenses to export commercial munitions and spare parts to Pakistan, including spares for Pakistan's nuclear-weapon delivery vehicle, the F-16; second, United States military visits and joint training exercises continue to take place; third, United States aid with respect to agriculture, counterterrorism, nutrition, population control, literacy, advancement of women, health and medicine, environmental protection, disaster relief, and many other areas can continue to flow to Pakistan via nongovernmental organizations; fourth, the Export-Import Bank also has extended loans, grants, and guarantees to Pakistan; fifth, PL-480 agricultural aid continues; sixth, arms control verification assistance continues (a seismic station); seventh, millions of dollars of aid in the ``pipeline'' as of October 1990 was allowed to flow to Pakistan; eighth, cooperation on peacekeeping is continuing; and ninth, Pakistan continues to receive billions of dollars in development assistance via multilateral lending agencies. Also under this so-called inflexible law, Pakistan has used almost $200 million in FMS credits to fund the purchase of 11 F-16's between fiscal years 1989 and 1993, of which about $150 million were used after the Pressler sanctions were invoked. And the United States continues to review and license exports of dual-use goods and technology to Pakistan. Milestone 10, ``Today's Debate.'' Which brings us here today: a milestone of its own in the history of United States efforts to grapple with Pakistan's bomb. It is not so much a milestone as a crossroads--do we stand up for a strong nonproliferation policy, or do we tell Pakistan and the rest of the world that proliferation pays, in a big way? Here we stand, debating a proposal which I think is appropriate to call, ``Operation Deja Vu''--a scheme to ship, under the false flags of ``fairness'' and helping out an old friend, several more hundred million dollars of military equipment to Pakistan. Who knows, the argument goes, it may even lead to some sentiment of good will that may someday serve the cause of nonproliferation. There never was a better illustration a policy based on a triumph of hope over experience, than there has been with respect to United States policies toward Pakistan's bomb. Why in the world, given the chronology I have just reviewed, should any one Member of this August Chamber believe for a single moment that the delivery of this lethal military gear will have any effect whatsoever on restraining Pakistan's bomb program? Why should we be unconditionally lifting all economic sanctions on Pakistan? Has anybody really even considered the signal such a gesture would send to proliferators around the world? This gear that we would transfer under this proposal is, by the way, not only lethal, but it could well trigger a regional arms race that would destabilize the whole balance of power in South Asia. The Indian government has already said it would not simply stand by and watch hundreds of millions of dollars in new military gear flow from the United States to Pakistan. We are talking about delivering upgrades for Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Upgrades for Cobra helicopters. Additional P-3 antisubmarine aircraft. All kinds of tactical missiles: Harpoons, AIMs, TOW's, and battlefield rockets. Over a quarter billion dollars' worth of such items. To say the shipment of these goods will have no political or military consequences in South Asia is simply wrong. But the proposal does not only address new military transfers. It is the unconditional lifting of economic sanctions, also. The proposal would also lift unconditionally all economic sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressler amendment, even though Pakistan is still in violation of that amendment. It seems reasonable that before we rush off to provide United States Government guarantees for private loans to Pakistan, we should surely first take a close look at the potential risks and costs that will be borne by the American taxpayer who will, under the current proposal, underwrite those hundreds of millions of dollars in private United States investment in Pakistan--a country whose once-impressive leading city is now virtually off-limits to foreign visitors because it has become a battleground of urban terrorism. Editorials in Pakistani newspapers are themselves asking if Pakistan can survive in such a climate of domestic unrest. Economic aid might also not quite be the peaceful activity that some might believe it is. For years, our intelligence experts have been aware of the potential role that economic assistance can play in assisting a country to acquire the bomb. Then-CIA Director James Woolsey, for example, stated the following in a written reply to a question after a hearing of the Governmental Affairs Committee on February 24, 1993: Loans and grants from both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies free money for Pakistan to spend on its nuclear program . . . these untied funds helped finance civilian imports, freeing an equivalent amount of funds to spend on the nuclear program. No, unconditionally lifting economic sanctions on Pakistan is not a neutral benign act. It is an action that conflicts with, rather than promotes, our nonproliferation goals. Providing such assistance will not give Pakistan a free market. It surely does not have such a market today. Indeed, the Heritage Foundation recently issued a survey called ``The Index of Economic Freedom'' which placed Pakistan's market in the category, ``Mostly Not Free.'' As for foreign economic aid, here is what the study had to say about past aid to Pakistan: Much of this aid has been squandered in economically useless projects, and Pakistan has been unwilling to adopt significant economic reforms. Yet proponents of lifting economic sanctions still seem to believe-- despite both facts and reason to the contrary--that this is a great idea. That it will serve our economic interests. That it will discourage proliferation. All of this I feel is utter nonsense. The aid will only inspire the flow of American tax dollars out of the wallets of U.S. citizens to a country determined to have both the bomb and U.S. aid. I think that is the wrong course to go. Now to look at the F-16's for a moment. I have examined the list of items that would be shipped off to Pakistan under this proposal and find that it actually includes upgrades--that is right, reliability upgrades--to the engines for Pakistan's F-16 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. So here we are, waving [[Page S 13961]] our finger at Pakistan's bomb program, while bending over backward to assist Pakistan directly to deliver such weapons. With due respect to my colleague from Colorado and to a few offices in the Executive who support this scheme, there is simply no justification for such a transfer that serves our nonproliferation interests. None. I have heard it often said that basic ``fairness'' requires us to deliver this equipment since Pakistan already ``paid'' for it. What exactly did Pakistan actually pay for? Pakistan surely did not pay cash for all of these goods--a good part of their purchases were financed by United States taxpayers by means of foreign military sales credits, many of them, by the way were used well after sanctions came into effect in October 1990. All of the P-3 aircraft that Pakistan wants to use for antisubmarine operations, for example, had an FMF funding source. In February 1994, I regret to report, Pakistan engaged in joint naval exercises with Iran--by at least one account, P-3 aircraft were used in those exercises. Why are we even considering shipping antisubmarine aircraft to a country that engages in joint military exercises with a terrorist state--not just any run-of-the-mill terrorist state, but a terrorist state that our own Secretary of State has declared is pursuing a crash program to acquire nuclear weapons? The proposal would also upgrade Pakistan's Cobra helicopters-- evidently abandoning our current policy of not upgrading Pakistan's military capabilities. This assistance too is funded by FMF credits. How about tactical missile systems? The Harpoon antiship, TOW missiles, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and 2.75-inch rockets in this little package are also funded via the FMF route-- presumably these missiles are not exclusively for peaceful purposes, except perhaps by Pakistan's definition of the phrase. Even many of the engine upgrades for Pakistan's F-16 nuclear weapon delivery vehicle were paid for using FMF money. Eleven of the twenty- eight F-16's that Pakistan ordered, but which could not be delivered due to Pakistan's noncompliance with the Pressler amendment, were financed with FMF money. Recall that of the $199 million available in FMF credits for the eleven planes, Pakistan used only a quarter of these credits by the time sanctions were invoked in October 1990. They used the remaining three-quarters after sanctions were in place. As for the remaining 17 planes, they were paid for in cash--of these payments, however, over $600 million out of a total $658 million were paid by Pakistan after sanctions were invoked in October 1990. In short, they were paying for planes they knew they were not qualified to receive. Besides the issue of money, why should we help Pakistan to improve its nuclear weapon delivery capability? My staff has brought to my attention a major study performed by Stanford University's distinguished Center for International Security and Arms Control in 1991 entitled, ``Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control.'' Here is what the Stanford study had to say about Pakistan's F-16's: Pakistan is widely believed to have either already developed nuclear warheads or to be on the brink of acquiring them. Pakistani F-16 aircraft could be effective nuclear- delivery vehicles even if Pakistan's nuclear warheads are large and heavy. Now that quote is significant enough to leave little doubt about the capabilities of this aircraft; indeed, they are nuclear-capable in our own inventory. But it is also interesting that at least three officials of the current administration, including Secretary of Defense Perry, were listed as participants in that study. I am reminded also of a passage from Seymour Hersh's article in the March 1993 issue of the New Yorker. Writing about the near nuclear war between Pakistan and India in 1990, Hersh writes: The American intelligence community noticed an intense increase in Pakistani radar activity early in the year. Earlier reports showed that the Pakistani Air Force, working closely with officials from Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program, had stepped up its F-16 training to practice what seemed to be the dropping of a nuclear bomb. Further intelligence, from Germany, reported that the Pakistanis had designed a nuclear warhead that could be fitted under the wing of an F-16, and that the design had gone through a series of wind-tunnel tests. Pakistan was also reported to have learned to program its in-flight computer system to provide the correct flight path for a nuclear-bomb run. I ask unanimous consent that several quotes relating to Pakistan's F- 16's be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. GLENN. So now we are discussing shipping over some more spare parts for these nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Here is what Pakistan's federal minister for defense production, Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, said in an interview in 1992 concerning the various ways the Pressler amendment has been interpreted with respect to Pakistan's F- 16's: We did face tremendous problems in acquiring spare parts [for F-16's] after the suspension of U.S. military assistance, but now we have overcome this problem as the Americans have lifted [the] ban on commercial sales. See how this works. First we relax commercial sales of spare parts for Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. And now, here we are debating whether to provide on a government-to-government basis some gear to upgrade Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Let us not be blind to what we are proposing to do: after years of fighting for nuclear nonproliferation, the Congress under this proposal would put on the statute books America's first nuclear proliferation law. Rest assured, if this proposal passes, America will not be the only country with other nuclear proliferation laws on their own books. The race will be on to cash in on proliferation, rather than to prevent it. This is an extremely dangerous course and one which the Congress should summarily reject as contrary to the national security interests of the United States. It is an embarrassment to this legislature even to be debating this extremely ill-advised scheme. what is fair? I must come back to the basic question: what exactly is fair? Is it fair for Pakistan to have given the United States solemn assurances that it proceeded to break with impunity? Recently, Prime Minister Bhutto declared during her recent visit to the United States that Pakistan had kept its contract with America. I will repeat this: that Pakistan had kept its contract with America. Some of us might recall when Prime Minister Bhutto addressed a joint session of Congress back on June 7, 1989, when the Prime Minister solemnly stated the following: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess, nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. [Extended applause.] That is our policy. Mr. President, that was Pakistan's contract with America. That is what United States taxpayers were being told about Pakistan's bomb program. It is that contract, I submit, that Pakistan has proven so utterly incapable of fulfilling. Yet here we stand, debating fairness. The absurdity of the proposal that is the focus of this debate simply defies description. I read recently a statement from Mr. John Malott, then the interim director of the State Department's South Asia bureau, which appeared in an AFP wire service report on May 16, 1993. Here is what Mr. Malott had to say about the fairness issue: We kept our part of the bargain but Pakistan let us down by crossing the line in 1990 . . . we had promised Pakistan billions and billions of dollars if that line was not crossed. So much for what is fair. Mr. Malott put it exactly right: Pakistan broke its contract with America. It is now paying a price that should only go up with time, not down. To lower the price of proliferation is to condone proliferation. That is not our policy. That is not our domestic law. That is not at all consistent with our solemn international treaty commitments. That is how we should want other countries to treat proliferants. Mr. President, I want to restate very briefly the theme I used in starting out. This is not about fairness. We have been fair. Pakistan has been unfair with us. The issue here is, are we serious about nonproliferation in the world? Are we a world leader in nonproliferation or are we not? Do we have a proliferation policy or is it one that only [[Page S 13962]] comes out for press conference purposes or at time of political campaigns? We took the lead in getting 178 nations to sign the nonproliferation treaty. They put their trust in us. They also trusted that there would be sanctions against people who were not willing to cooperate, if they were egregious violators of what we thought was right. We have seen Pakistan be the most egregious violator. We have seen them be uncooperative with regard to nuclear matters. They have not joined NPT. They have not gone by NPT rules. They have violated every norm of diplomatic behavior in telling us things that were not true and that we knew were not true. I do not think that kind of mendacity should be rewarded by sending the material that is proposed by the amendment. These have been nothing but untruths told to us through the years, over and over again. I will not read those off again. It seems to me, if we are to deserve the trust of the nations that signed up under NPT and followed our leadership, then I believe we must refuse to approve this amendment. I know the Senator from California will have a proposal in the morning for a substitute amendment and we will look at it in the morning and see whether we feel we can support it or not. But as for the amendment we are debating tonight, it is one I just cannot support and I urge my colleagues not to support it. Exhibit 1 U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What were we trying to accomplish? Letters to Congress from Presidents Reagan & Bush, 1985- 1989, required under Sec. 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance Act (Pressler Amendment): ``The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available for us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.''--President George Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/89; 12/ 17/87; 10/27/86; & 11/25/85. President George Bush, letter to Congress (addressed to J. Danforth Quayle as President of the Senate), 12 April 1991, urging abandonment of Pressler certification requirement: ``. . . my intention is to send the strongest possible message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such a policy is required by law.'' Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989: ``None of the F-16's Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery . . . a Pakistan with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated to purchase a nuclear weapons capability.'' Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989: ``Finally, we believe that past and continued American support for Pakistan's conventional defense reduces the likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the nuclear threshold.'' Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck, testimony before House subcommittee, 17 February 1988: ``We believe that the improvements in Pakistan's conventional military forces made possible by U.S. assistance and the U.S. security commitment our aid program symbolizes have had a significant influence on Pakistan's decision to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.'' Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony before two House subcommittees, 22 October 1987: ``We have made it clear that Pakistan must show restraint in its nuclear program if it expects us to continue providing security assistance.'' Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, testimony before Senate subcommittee, 18 March 1987: ``Our assistance relationship is designed to advance both our non-proliferation and our strategic objectives relating to Afghanistan. Development of a close and reliable security partnership with Pakistan gives Pakistan an alternative to nuclear weapons to meet its legitimate security needs and strengthens our influence on Pakistan's nuclear decision making. Shifting to a policy of threats and public ultimata would in our view decrease, not increase our ability to continue to make a contribution to preventing a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Undermining the credibility of the security relationship with the U.S. would itself create incentives for Pakistan to ignore our concerns and push forward in the direction of nuclear weapons acquisition.'' Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Howard Schaffer, testimony before House subcommittee 6 February 1984: ``The assistance program also contributes to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals. We believe strongly that a program of support which enhances Pakistan's sense of security helps remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The Government of Pakistan understands our deep concern over this issue. We have made clear that the relationship between our two countries, and the program of military and economic assistance on which it rests, are ultimately inconsistent with Pakistan's development of a nuclear explosive device. President Zia has stated publicly that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear explosives device.'' Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony before two House subcommittees, 1 November 1983: ``By helping friendly nations to address legitimate security concerns, we seek to reduce incentives for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The provision of security assistance and the sale of military equipment can be major components of efforts along these lines. Development of security ties to the U.S. can strengthen a country's confidence in its ability to defend itself without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the existence of such a relationship enhances our credibility when we seek to persuade that country to forego [sic] nuclear arm . . . We believe that strengthening Pakistan's conventional military capability serves a number of important U.S. interests, including non-proliferation. At the same time, we have made clear to the government of Pakistan that efforts to acquire nuclear explosives would jeopardize our security assistance program.'' Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Marshall, 12 September 1983, before International Nuclear Law Association, San Francisco. ``U.S. assistance has permitted Pakistan to strengthen its conventional defensive capability. This serves to bolster its stability and thus reduce its motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.'' President Ronald Reagan, Report to Congress pursuant to Sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 Report''), for calendar year 1982: ``Steps were taken to strengthen the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan with the objective of addressing that country's security needs and thereby reducing any motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.'' ``President Ronald Reagan, Report to Congress pursuant to Sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 Report''), for calendar year 1981: ``Military assistance by the United States and the establishment of a new security relationship with Pakistan should help to counterpart its possible motivations toward acquiring nuclear weapons . . . Moreover, help from the United States in strengthening Pakistan's conventional military capabilities would offer the best available means for counteracting possible motivations toward acquiring nuclear weapons.'' Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, address before Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981: ``We believe that this assistance--which is in the strategic interest of the United States--will make a significant contribution to the well-being and security of Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives. Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations committee, 12 November 1981: ``We believe that a program of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant security partner and enhances its sense of security may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest as an important member of the world community.'' Testimony of Undersecretary of State James Buckley, in response to question from Sen. Glenn, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981, on effects of a nuclear detonation on continuation of cash sales of F-16's: ``[Sen Glenn] . . . so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear device before completion of the F-16 sale, will the administration cut off future deliveries? ``[Buckley] Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.'' Undersecretary of State James Buckley, letter to NY times, 25 July 1981: ``In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan's nuclear program imposed by the past Administration, we hope to address through conventional means the sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.''

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I would be prepared to yield back the remainder of my time, if the Senator from Colorado is prepared to do the same.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. GLENN. I yield the Senator 20 minutes.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the record is thus quite clear. There was a direct positive relationship between the flow of United States aid and the progress of Pakistan's bomb program, not the negative relationship that the executive repeatedly assured Congress would exist. Milestone No. 4, ``Congress Steps In.'' By 1985, Congress justifiably had enough. With the agreement of the executive and even the Pakistani Government, we passed a law known as the Pressler amendment to set some ground rules to permit the resumption of aid to Pakistan. That is overlooked, as my colleague Senator Pressler said on the floor just a while ago; that the Pressler amendment was supposed to set some ground rules to permit resumption of aid to Pakistan. First, Pakistan must not possess a nuclear explosive device, however; and second any new aid must reduce significantly the risk that it will possess such a device. Note how far the current legislative proposal departs from these responsible standards. Not only does the proposal call for resuming full economic aid and significant new arms deliveries to Pakistan despite its failure to satisfy the nonpossession standard, but the aid is supposed to be provided even if it has no effect whatsoever upon reducing the risk of Pakistan getting the bomb. For those who truly care about nonproliferation, this is truly a lose-lose proposition. Where is the beef? There is no beef. This brings me to milestone 5, the issue of the certifications that Pakistan did not possess the bomb. I guess we could title milestone 5, ``From Red Line to Elastic Clause.'' In the late 1980's, Pakistan crossed several additional red lines toward acquiring the bomb. Even its top nuclear scientists boasted in 1987 that Pakistan already possessed the bomb, and somehow Pakistan kept receiving its annual certification that it did not possess. As for the executive's approach to the word ``possess'' through that period, I am reminded of a quote from a character in Lewis Carroll's ``Through the Looking Glass:'' ``When I use a word,'' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ``it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more or less.'' That is where we find ourselves in regard to defining the word ``possess.'' It can mean so many different things. There comes a time when we need to hold the line against the temptation of our officials to redefine terms of law for diplomatic convenience. As for the possession standard, fate would soon catch up with Pakistan. Milestone 6, ``A Nuclear Near Miss.'' In the summer of 1990, Pakistan almost engaged in a nuclear exchange with India. If any of my colleagues are skeptical about the relevance of nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia to United States national security, I strongly recommend they read Seymour Hersh, in an article published in the New Yorker on March 29, 1993, aptly entitled ``On the Brink of Nuclear War: How Pakistan Came Close to Dropping the Bomb--And How We Helped Them Get It.'' This article is, incidentally, also a good candidate of the eccentricities of our system for enforcing export controls. The article describes a 1986 United States undercover operation to stop yet another planned Pakistani purchase of United States nuclear-related material. According to Hersh: The State Department's Near East Bureau was not told of the planned operation, for fear that the officers there would tip off the Pakistanis, as they had done in the past, by sending a diplomatic protest (known as a demarche) to the Pakistani Government. Though the operation ultimately led to the highly publicized arrest of Mr. Arshad Z. Pervez in July 1987 on charges of trying illegally to buy 25 tons of special steel used in Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, it was surely not due to much help from the regional experts in the State Department. In a statement related directly to our subject today, one nonproliferation official told Hersh in the article that. ``The only thing we had going for us. . .was the Pressler and Solarz amendments.'' Such accounts of our export control process only further reinforce my opposition to the scheme offered in the recent State authorization bill to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and transfer all of its functions to the State Department, in effect, making State the new nonproliferation czar. Fortunately, there do appear to be some individuals left in Government, as indicated in the last quote, who treat the Pressler amendment as a useful tool rather than an obstacle to be circumvented. Milestone 7, ``Judgment Day.'' By October 1, 1990, even the State Department lawyers had enough and finally ran out of words to explain why Pakistan deserved its annual nuclear certification. President Bush decided not to renew Pakistan's nuclear meal ticket. The time had finally come for proliferation to start costing something. Milestone 8, ``New Nuclear Assurances, This Time to Congress.'' Since 1990, representatives from both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have sought to repeal the Pressler amendment--these representatives promised Congress, in writing and repeatedly, that even if the Pressler amendment were repealed, rest assured, it would remain the policy of the United States to require Pakistan to satisfy the Pressler standards. Furthermore, Congress was assurred by the Executive that when it came to licensing commercial arms sales, we would never, never, never approve any ``upgrades'' to existing military capabilities in Pakistan. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a few samples of these assurances.

Mr. GLENN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from California.

John Glenn

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