John Glenn

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the amendment offered by Senator McCain and myself concerns a land issue which the Readiness Subcommittee considered during its markup proceedings. The amendment authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to convey 58 acres of property located at the Radar Bomb Scoring Site, Forsyth, MT, to the city of Forsyth, MT. The Air Force plans to vacate the few housing facilities and to declare the property excess to its needs. In receiving the property, the city of Forsyth must continue to use the facilities for housing purposes. The city of Forsyth has a justified need for these facilities to house the elderly in the community. The subcommittee recognized the local community's needs and the Air Force's desire to vacate and dispose of the property. However, the members of the Readiness Subcommittee chairman agreed to defer action on the proposal until the General Services Administration [GSA] completed an expedited screening of the property to determine if any Federal agencies had an interest in the property. Requiring GSA to screen the property is in keeping with my concern that we should not give away property without protecting the interests of the Federal Government. On July 11, GSA reported back to the subcommittee that no Federal interests in the property were expressed. In addition at Senator McCain's and my request GSA made a preliminary valuation of the property. GSA estimates that the property is worth $700,000. In keeping with the subcommittee's agreement, Senator McCain and I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the amendment offered by Senator McCain and myself concerns a land issue which the Readiness Subcommittee considered during its markup proceedings. The amendment authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to convey 24 acres of property located at the radar bomb scoring site, Powell, WY, to the Northwest College in Powell, WY. The Air Force plans to vacate the facilities as early as August 1995. In receiving the property, the college must continue to use the facilities for housing purposes and recreational purposes. The college has a justified need for these facilities to house and support students at the college. The Northwest College Task Force, which includes several members of the Wyoming Legislature and the Powell Chamber of Commerce, and the Air Force support this proposal. The subcommittee recognized the college's needs and the Air Force's desire to vacate and dispose of the property. However, the members of the Readiness Subcommittee Chairman agreed to defer action on the proposal until the General Services Administration [GSA] completed an expedited screening of the property to determine if any Federal agencies had an interest in the property. Requiring GSA to screen the property is in keeping with my concern that we should not give away property without protecting the interests of the Federal Government. On July 11, GSA reported back to the subcommittee that no Federal interests in the property were expressed. In keeping with the subcommittee's agreement, Senator McCain and I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, we have agreed to accept the amendment by Senators McCain and Feinstein which aims to revise and improve the base closure and realignment process. This is certainly not the first time that we have tried to improve this process. In 1993, under President Clinton's leadership, we passed significant revisions to the BRAC process which were aimed to give local, impacted communities a greater say in their own future. Those provisions were aimed to help speed up the process by which communities can initiate economic development efforts to move forward. Again last year another effort was made to revise the BRAC property disposal process. This effort resulted in legislation which quickened the property disposal process, with particular regard to addressing the needs of the homeless. While I believe that the amendment before us addresses some legitimate problems in the current BRAC process, for example it gives DOD the authority to utilize recent regulations promulgated by GSA, I am concerned about some particular areas. Overall, my greatest concern is that we have not given the existing process a chance to work. Only last month did DOD issue its regulations, developed after extensive interagency and public comment, which implement the 1993 and 1994 BRAC legislation I just mentioned. Communities are having a difficult enough time coping with the closure of their particular base without trying to determine which set of regulations, or which property disposal process, they need to operate under. Should this legislation result in another rewrite of the implementing regulation, it will translate directly into further delays for the communities. I am also concerned about the lease-back provisions of this legislation. I am concerned that the Federal Government's interest be fully protected in the cases where it retains a presence at a closing base. I recognize the need for communities to have assurances that future Federal use of these facilities is compatible with their own reuse plan. However, we must protect all taxpayers' interest as well. With regard to this provision as we proceed to conference with the House, I intend to seek the comments of the General Services Administration to ensure that appropriate controls are in place for future leasing. Another concern is whether the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has the necessary authority to provide their comments to the local redevelopment plan--and ensure that these comments are addressed. This provision is particularly important with regards to the concerns of the homeless. Mr. President, as we proceed to conference, I look forward to obtaining additional comments of the relevant officials in the Department of Defense, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as the General Services Administration regarding these provisions.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. We thought we were making some progress a little while ago, as the Senator from Michigan said a little while ago out in the lobby. And [[Page S 11435]] I understood that we were going to have some language drawn up, and we had all agreed to determine if we could have an agreement on. The next thing I know this was going on with the Senator from Colorado on the floor presenting it. I think just from what has happened here so far, we see this is a very, very complex issue. There was a report out of the Washington Post yesterday morning that because of MTCR violations, we should put more sanctions on Pakistan. He is right here if we want to have an executive session. I am not saying it is true. I think I would recommend that we go with the tone set by the Senator from Michigan a few moments ago. This claims that the MTCR has been violated. There is no doubt about it. This is only one item. I have a whole file full of things that I was going to talk about on the floor if this came up. The Senator is not guaranteed that we will bring up the arms matter later on. This is just dealing with the economic matters here. But I think in the context of this particular bill that we are on here, the defense authorization bill, this is an extremely complex matter, and I could not personally agree to any time agreement on it or even give an estimate of the number of hours we would have to talk about it. This is extremely complex. I am happy to have this brought up at a separate time and go into executive session and go into all of these things and get the same intelligence reports that some of us have been into, as I know other Members have at the agency, or whatever. But this is not something that is going to be solved I think on this. I would have to object to any time agreement. I hate to do that. I do not like to delay. But this is a very serious matter. Let me just add one other thing, if I might. The Senator from Maryland talked about waivers. He did not even get into them. I have nine specific waivers where we went into things for Pakistan. Each one of those should be the subject of thorough discussion here on the floor. I would be glad to go into them tonight, if you want to. But I do not think we can make any agreement for time on this at all.

Mr. GLENN. Time has not run out yet. Will you withhold the tabling motion?

Mr. GLENN. The point I want to make is we spent a quarter of a million dollars on the people in the academy for the 4 years. This is not a small expenditure. We require time for doctors who are going through training. We require additional years, I think it is 8 years or something like that, for flight training now. This is normal. This is not something unusual. If we make this big investment, we are expecting the academies to be the leaders of our military in the future. If they are not willing to make a commitment going in, I think we are shortchanging. We do not have any information that indicates we are getting a lesser quality academy applicant these days than we were in the past. I think it is a good deal for the taxpayers. We stay at 6, not go back to 5, unless we have a study that shows otherwise. [[Page S 11421]]

Mr. GLENN. Will the majority leader yield?

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the idea of minorities being influenced more by going from 6 to 5 years or 5 to 6 years, and making that particularly applicable to minorities, is a bit disingenuous, I submit. We have talked to the people at the Pentagon, who have indicated to us verbally--and I am sorry I did not get a letter--that there has not been any decline in minority applicants. The percentages remain about the same. As far as being experts, that brings up the key point of this amendment. This amendment says to do the study, get the experts, do not go with anecdotal evidence, like a single letter from the head of an academy, but do an honest-to-goodness study that breaks it down into minorities and SAT scores, and all the other things needed to get good academy applicants. We will know what we are doing. Next year I may join my friend to reduce it to 4 years to get the type people we need. But now we are saying ``ready, fire, aim.'' We are saying, ``OK, we are going to take it upon ourselves to say we will go from 6 back to 5.'' In this bill, it says we will do the study, and it is due in next April, and we are making the decision now even though the real study that gives us all the information will come later. That just, to me, does not make any sense. What I would much prefer to do is do a study. It will let us know definitively what the problem is, if there is a problem, if we are having a problem recruiting minorities, or anybody else, and then next year, we can make a very informed decision as to whether we reduce the required time or not. I was very disappointed in the letter that the Senator from Arizona referred to that came over from the Pentagon, because it certainly did not express what I had been told verbally from the Pentagon before as to what the situation was. It was my understanding that there was general support over there for the 6 years. Maybe I misread some of that. But let them do a study and it will be better information for the Pentagon as well as for us, also. Until we know what we are doing, let us not decide before we have the study done. That makes no sense whatsoever. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I do not take second place to anybody on this. The academies deserve to get the best students. It is not athletics, it is combat we are preparing people for. So our military deserves the very finest leadership possible. This amendment does not say keep it at 6. It says to do the study, then decide next year. And a study is already required in this legislation. I do not have to put that in. All I am saying with this legislation is, take the commonsense approach of getting the information before we make the decision, and do not rely just on anecdotal data. I believe all time has run out. I yield back the remainder of my time. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, how much time remains?

Mr. GLENN. One additional minute for each side.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, as I say, I rise because of concern about reducing the active duty service obligation for service academy graduates from 6 to 5 years without even waiting for the required study which asks for information on which we could make a good judgment on whether this is a wise move or not. The current policy, which requires graduates to serve 6 years, has been in effect since 1991, and it ensures that American taxpayers receive a high return on investment for the over three-quarters of $1 billion that we spend each year on our service academies. The actual figure is about $754 million. It also ensures that the candidates we select to attend the academies are committed to at least considering a career as a military professional. The change in this year's defense authorization bill is particularly troubling in two areas. First, it changes successful legislation that has still attracted top-notch students to the academies. At the same time, it directs the Department of Defense to submit a report that provides the information needed to make such a change. In essence, what we are doing, as I said, is shooting first and asking questions later. We are making the change. Then we are seeing if we can get the data to back it up, and that is the wrong way to make intelligent decisions. I received a letter the other day requesting my support of the 5-year obligation. One of the sentences in this letter said, and I quote, ``My guess is that with a 5-year obligation the Navy can attract more candidates from which to select.'' The key word here, Madam President, is ``guess.'' We should not change legislation because we guess it will do something. My amendment corrects that. All it does is say that we want the information, that we will continue the present policy until we get the study next year. It provides us with the time and information we need to make an educated decision. It provides us with the opportunity to make this decision without guessing. A second problem I have with the language in this bill is that this change will open up the possibility of attacks from groups that would like to see us totally shut down the service academies. I am not the only one who shares this concern. A former State Department official who recently stepped down from the Naval Academy's Board of Visitors said in a December 1994 Baltimore Sun article that he was also against lowering the service requirement because that move, he said, would raise the possibility of budget cuts at the Academy by those who believe we do not need academies, he said that ROTC, OCS, et cetera, can just as well provide our officer corps. In other words, if we get less use of the product, that is, newly commissioned officers, then why go to all the expense of spending all this money, a quarter of a million that we spend on each Academy graduate. Madam President, I have long been a supporter of the academies. I am not an Academy graduate myself, but I am a big supporter of it. I think they are necessary for our military. Although we allocate a great deal of money to run these institutions, I think it is worth it. We spend up to $272,000 per student. But I still believe this money is wisely spent. Some of our very greatest military leaders, including Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall, Patton, Bradley, Halsey, Nimitz, and Vandegrift are academy graduates. And if I believed for one moment there was a problem attracting qualified candidates to these schools, I would be the very first in line to make the changes necessary to keep the seats at the service academies filled. The fact is we have not had a problem finding qualified applicants to fill these seats. We have highly qualified applicants, more than we can possibly take care of. Over 30,000 young people in our country, as I understand it, apply to the academies each year, and we do not have any problem getting good people to fill the seats at the academies. In fact, an article in the September 16, 1994 edition of the Record addresses the kind of students applying to the academies, and it says the academies ``offer high-quality education as well as demanding training in military skills and discipline.'' A further quote, ``The big problem is getting in with so many well-qualified students applying.'' Madam President, there has been a decline in applications. I repeat that. There has been a decline in the number of applications to the service academies. But that decline has not impacted the quality of young people attending these schools. There are quite a lot of other reasons why the numbers have gone down, and I will address that. But we have not in any way changed the high standards required to [[Page S 11414]] qualify for admittance to these fine institutions, institutions that rank with the best schools in our country, indeed, the best schools in the world. Also, the decline in the number of high school students seeking an academy education started dropping in 1988, 3 years before the 6-year obligation was put into effect. I repeat that. The decline in the number of high school students seeking an academy education started dropping in 1988, 3 years before the 6-year obligation was put into effect. Now, I think there are a lot of reasons why we have experienced a drop in applicants but none of them have anything to do with service obligation, or very, very little. I think a headline from an article about the Air Force Academy points to one of the real problems on why we are having problems attracting young people to the Academies. It says, ``Applications to Academy Plummet 50 Percent. Job security blamed for big decline since record high in 1988.'' No doubt about it, there has been a decline in interest in the youth of America in serving in the military. And over the last few years we have dramatically reduced enlisted and officer positions in the military, and a lot of young people are getting very concerned about job security in a military career. Indeed, I would point out they have a right to be concerned because during an Armed Services hearing this year, witnesses told us that we should continue our reduction in military force structure. We started at a peak of about 2.1 million active duty military personnel in this country. We are down below 1.6, around 1.5 million right now, and we will go down to the current goal of 1.425 million, or they are proposing even going down to 1.2 or 1.1 million. Taking this into account, who on Earth would want to start a career in an organization that is laying off people after only 6 or 8 years of service? In fact, a West Point spokesman, Maj. Jay Ebbeson, said in a December 1994 article, ``Kids may want to have a stable employer. We just don't think the 6 years is the reason.'' A major reason the Air Force Academy is having problems is that there has been a decline in opportunities to go to flight school. We have fewer cockpits to fill. Most of the applicants to the Air Force Academy want to fly airplanes, and when they hear that only 25 percent of the graduates will go on to flight training, it is not surprising they decline in favor of attending a civilian institution. Another reason for declining applicants is that academy graduates are no longer guaranteed active duty commissions. After graduation, they receive a Reserve commission and then they are forced to compete for a limited number of active duty positions with other officers coming out of the OCS and the ROTC programs. Madam President, the argument that bothers me the most on why we should reduce service obligations is the one that says this policy is having a severe impact on the academies' ability to recruit high- quality applicants, the kind that are required if our academies are to be successful in division 1A football and basketball. Lest we think this is just a spurious thing I am tossing in here, back in 1990 when we were thinking about passing this legislation, I had visits from alumnae associations of the academies, and 2 out of 3 of those academies made a major point of this, that what I was doing was interfering with the ability to recruit high-quality athletes for the academies when I was advocating putting the required service up to 6 years. Well, I do not think there is any question that the 6-year obligation has had a severe impact on the competitiveness of our academy teams in this conference. As the excerpts from the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun on a chart that I have in the office--that I was going to bring over and did not bring--point out, the 6-year obligation has been a major factor for football players who may have aspirations for turning pro, or basketball players. (Mr. GORTON assumed the chair.)

Mr. GLENN. I yield myself such time as may I require. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. In 1990, we required academy graduates to do active duty service beyond their academy years. We moved that requirement from 5 years up to 6. The bill this year requires the study of that, whether it has worked well, whether we are still getting good people or not, what the status is. And my idea was that we wait until we get the study before we go ahead and make that decision, so we will know what we are doing. We just have anecdotal information unless we do that. What was put into the bill was that the bill reduces from 6 back to 5 without getting the study. And, to me, that is like ready, fire, aim. It puts the cart before the horse, or any other cliche you want to have in there. I think we should have the best study we can. There is anecdotal information that varies all over the lot. Basically, the information I have is that the SAT scores for academy students across the average of all three academies for 1996, 1997, 1998 is 323 points higher than the national average. The class at the military academy had scores higher than previous classes. Some of the falloff in the number of applicants started in 1988 because of some of the downsizing of the military. We have the Air Force Academy in particular; their scores have remained very, very high. The grade point average at the end of the freshman spring semester was higher than the class of 1992-1994. All I am proposing is that since we are not under duress in this area, since all the SAT scores appear to be back--I may lead the charge next year to reduce it to 5 or 4, if there is a problem. But let us do a definitive study and then decide. Let us not decide now to reduce the number and then get the study next spring. That is keeping things in the wrong order. All I say is, get the study. We will decide next year. It is that simple. Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its consideration.

Mr. GLENN. Without losing the floor.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I rise today to offer this amendment because I am concerned about the provision in this year's bill that would reduce the active duty service obligations for service academy graduates from 6 to 5 years. To do this reduction from 6 to 5 years without waiting for the study that is required in this legislation, we are asking for information but we are taking action before we even get the information to know what the impact would be from the experts at the Pentagon and at the service academies. In other words, it is sort of like ready, fire, aim, instead of the other way around. The current policy, which requires graduates to serve 6 years, has been in effect since 1991 and it ensures that American taxpayers receive a high return on investment for the other three-quarters of a billion dollars.

Mr. GLENN. That is fine. Amendment No. 2123 (Purpose: To strike out the reduction in the period of obligated active duty service of graduates of the service academies)

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote. [[Page S 11393]]

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am glad to be a cosponsor of the Cohen amendment and urge my colleagues to support it, as well. This amendment contains two sets of provisions regarding information technology [IT] management and procurement reform. Both are important, and both deserve support. While I am cosponsoring the amendment because of its substantive merit, I must add that as a matter of process, I believe the amendment should have been considered more fully by the Committee on Governmental Affairs. The amendment differs significantly from the original legislation, S. 946. The one subcommittee hearing held to consider that bill does not suffice for a thorough review of the issues presented in either that bill or the revised language before us today. In my view, I would have preferred for a bill as significant and important as this one to go through the committee process so that we would have a report to turn to in the years ahead to know why we did what we are about to do. But, given my work on these issues, I am now comfortable with the amendment. This amendment is needed because of the state of Federal Government information activities. Recent press stories about repeated failures of FAA air traffic computers alone should convince people of the need to substantially improve the way the Government buys, uses, and manages information technology. This year Congress already took a major step toward addressing this issue when it passed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. This law not only tackles the problem of public paperwork burdens, but also sets in place new requirements for broader improvements in information resources management [IRM]. The first set of provisions in the amendment before us today establishes detailed guidelines for implementation of the information technology management provisions of the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act. The administration has been moving vigorously to implement the new act and has found that additional requirements would be useful to press agencies to improve their information technology investment planning and control processes and to provide greater accountability for information technology acquisition and management decisions. The administration supports these elements of the Cohen amendment and I commend those in the administration who are showing their commitment to making significant improvements in the management of Government information resources. The second set of provisions in the amendment, also supported by the administration, provides related reforms in the area of procurement of information technology. These provisions are key to our buying of IT. They include such provisions as modular acquisitions and pilot projects which will give us the flexibility we need to procure information technology at a pace that is consistent with its rapid development. After all, that's what this amendment is all about. I would also add that the bill as originally written contained many more procurement provisions than those included in this amendment. I am pleased that Senator Cohen deferred on these provisions--which are just as significant to IT as they are to other procurements--so that they will be considered by the acquisition reform working group. This bipartisan group will produce another piece of governmentwide acquisition reform legislation in the next couple of months to follow up on last year's success of the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor Senator Cohen's amendment and appreciate his work on this issue. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Recruiting quality athletes has been a problem, been such a problem that even some groups are saying, ``We should waive the immediate military service obligation for academy athletes, should they be good enough to play pro football following graduation.'' Well, I do not buy those arguments. We have a purpose for the academy. We know what that purpose is. It is not to be a minor league for the professional sports. Maybe it is time we take another look at having the academies compete in NCAA Division I-AA. I am not proposing that. But I think when something like the professional sports thing and how we have a problem getting people in because they are not willing to come in if they have to make a commitment after they get this education and over a quarter of a million dollars spent for their education, they will not come because it will interfere with their pro career, maybe we have to look at a different direction. However, Mr. President, I do not think you will find a lot of support out there for going to Division I- AA because college football is a big money business. In a June 1994 report from the Defense Advisory Committee On Service Academy Athletic Programs, the committee advised the academies not to move to a lower division so as to not lose income from big time football. There is no wonder there are organizations out there pushing for a reduction in active duty obligation. Mr. President, although I believe collegiate sports play an important part in development of our country's future leaders, I have to agree with Adm. Charles Larson, Superintendent at the Naval Academy, who said in a Washington Post interview: Having a winning football program is something which all of us here at the Naval Academy would like to see. However, it is important to stress that our primary mission is not to produce professional athletes. Our mission is to produce future Navy and Marine Corps officers with character, men and women who are prepared to lead and show the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and professional performance. In other words, what we are looking for, Mr. President, are those young men and women that have stars in their eyes, men and women of all races and religions who are ready to make a sacrifice for their country, young, hard-charging individuals who really do not make the fact whether it is 6 or 8 or 10 years the major factor in their service to this country. They are people that want to lead, people that want to command aircraft squadrons, infantry battalions, people that want to follow in the footsteps of some of our country's greatest leaders. We do not want those who are looking just for a free meal ticket, those who are looking for a way to beat the system, those who basically are asking, what can my country do for me? We need people who want to do something for their country. These people, Mr. President, are not so completely focused on service requirements that the 5 or 6 makes a difference. Yet we get much more for the taxpayers' money with that extra requirement that is the law now. I get over 1,300 applications each year from high school students in Ohio who would give their eyeteeth to attend one of the service academies. I can tell you these are not average students. They are cream of the crop. Most of them, if not selected for an academy seat, still end up attending some of the very finest civilian schools in our country. Mr. President, I want to read an editorial from the January 10, 1995, edition of the Baltimore Sun, titled ``An Honor and a Bargain,'' that so accurately reflects my feelings on this issue. We fail to understand the hand-wringing at the U.S. Naval Academy over the drop in admission applications. According to a recent Sun article by reporter Tom Bowman, the academy's advisory Board of Visitors is asking President Clinton to reconsider a new requirement that increases the time academy graduates must serve in the military. The board says that by increasing the graduates's service obligation from five years to six, some of the nation's top students have been discouraged from applying to the academy. ``These kids don't think past a burger Saturday night,'' the dean of admissions said. And they're saying, ``That's 10 years of my life.'' Maybe some students are turned off by the six-year requirement, but we believe it should remain. It costs $250,000 to educate a young person in a service academy. The additional year was added to a graduate's military service to give taxpayers more for their money. In today's political climate, it would be unreasonable to demand less. But there are other reasons to leave it intact. The decline in applications to the academy is no tragedy because it comes at a time [[Page S 11415]] when the institution is under orders to pare the size of the brigade anyway. Academy enrollment, which reached a high of 4,500 midshipmen in 1990, must be reduced to 4,000 by next September, Currently, a little more than 4,100 midshipmen attend the academy. Understandably, U.S. Naval Academy officials want to attract this country's best and brightest young people, but an applicant's dedication to a military career ought to be considered as well as scholastic performance. Maybe some young people cannot look beyond the next weekend, but they are not the kind of people we want to be training as military officers. For a young person aspiring to a military career, a service academy education is a tremendous bargain as well as an honor. A midshipman at Annapolis receives one of the best educations in the country--for free. Even more important, a graduate from the Naval Academy is guaranteed a good job as a military officer. That is more than many young people can expect upon graduation from traditional college and universities these days. We don't think it is too much to ask that Naval Academy graduates serve their country for six years in return. Mr. President, I am sure that a few of my fellow Senators will argue that the length of obligated service for academy graduates should be reduced from 6 to 5 years. However, I believe there is more than enough evidence that justifies why we should not change our current policy. No matter how you feel about this issue, I strongly believe we would be making a terrible mistake to change this legislation before we receive the analytical data required to make an informed decision on this matter. The informative data that we are asking for, the analytical data, is required to be reported to us by next April by the legislation that we are working on here now. So it is not a matter of whether we are going to do it or not. They are going to make that analytical data available to us after having studied this matter as to what the impact would be. Yet we are proposing here to go ahead and make a change before we get the information. So delaying a change in this policy until we receive this report makes sense and is the right thing to do. That is all we require with this amendment, is just say the present 6-year requirement will not be changed back until we get the information. And then next year, depending on what that information says, I may be leading the charge next year to reduce this requirement myself. But I want to make that recommendation only on the basis of the best information. If the study recommends that length of active duty service should be 6 years, which I believe it will, then next year we would be forced to revisit the issue and reverse our position for the third time in 6 years. And that makes no sense. It seems to me that while we reinvent Government and ask Government personnel to do more with less, we cannot tell the military academies to do less with more. So I hope all our colleagues will support this amendment to maintain the current active duty obligation that has attracted top-notch candidates to our service academies. Now, Mr. President, I know that one of things we brought up will be in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. I sent a letter over there asking their response--I requested their views on this matter of section 502 of S. 1026. And they wrote back and responded that--it is in response to my letter. They say: Enactment of this section would reduce the active duty obligation . . . of service academy graduates from six to five years.'' They said: As you are aware, the current six year [active duty service obligation] was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act . . . for Fiscal Year 1990, and will be effective for graduates of the academies beginning in 1996. Neither this mandate-- This is a key section. Neither this mandate nor section 502 of S. 1206 were requested by DOD. Very correct. And then the next paragraph says: A review of the history of the mandate to change the ADSO-- The active duty service obligation. reveals that the Department appealed the Senate provision during the Senate-House conference. In other words, they had doubts about it at the time, and during the conference between the House and the Senate they asked that not go in. Then to quote again from their letter: Despite that appeal, the Senate's provision to change the ADSO from 5 to 6 years was sustained. In other words, their request lost. Further, the underlying rationale for the decision was apparently based on the significant defense investment in service academy graduates. Absolutely correct. That is correct. Then there last sentence: The Department maintains its original position on this matter. I am sure that will be taken to mean the Defense Department opposes this, but that is not the case. They do not say that the new system has not worked well. They do not say that we are getting a lesser qualified academy applicant. They do not say they have even studied this matter. They do not give any data whatsoever, yes or no on this. They do not say whether it is a better deal for taxpayers or not which, as they correctly said in here, was based on the significant defense investment in service academy graduates. What I am saying is, they have not addressed the problem yet and they do not say they have addressed the problem yet. So what I say is we are asking them in this legislation to address the problem, do a study, report back to us by next April 1. I will say, if they cannot say when they do that for us, they will study and let us know what the best way to go is next year, that is the time to be reducing or increasing or remaining the same on the ADSO, the active duty service obligation, of academy graduates. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. GLENN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense be printed in the Record at the end of my comments.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I think there has been a misperception on a lot of these things, why recruiting is getting harder. There was a study done, called the ``Enlistment Propensity.'' There has been a misconception that the youth of the military are no longer hiring because the military is a declining industry and a lot of other events recently: Drawdown, personnel cuts, base closure, press reports of unfavorable events, such as Tailhook and so on, reduced importance of military life, domestic issues, crime, health care, economy, jobs, decline in defense-related industries in the communities, and so on. There are many reasons why some people are not applying to the academies. But we do not have any study, other than some anecdotal evidence, that shows we have a real decline in the quality of people we are getting. In fact, quite the opposite. I will state out of one of the studies we do have on this subject, the class of 1997 at the military academy, as far as scholastic aptitude tests go, on SAT scores, had an average for the class of 1997 of SAT scores higher than the classes of 1989 through 1992 and 1995. They were only 2 points below the classes of 1993 and 1994. So in regard to scholastic aptitude, education and intelligence, we do not have a problem recruiting highly qualified applicants. Grade point average for the Air Force, to use another example. The grade point average for the class of 1998 at the end of the freshman spring semester was higher than the classes of 1992 through 1994 and equal to the class of 1995. The grade point average for the class in 1997, at the end of both the sophomore fall and spring semesters, was the highest in the last 6 years. The grade point average for the class of 1996 at the end of the junior fall semester was the highest in the last 5 years. Mr. President, there is absolutely no information whatsoever, except a few anecdotal stories, that indicate that the 6-year requirement has adversely affected the type people we are getting at the academies. I think it is incumbent upon us to say keep it at 6, do the study this year and then we will know what we are doing when we get that study next year. And if it is required that we put it down to 5 to get the kind of people we need, fine, but we will have data, we will have the study by the Pentagon of [[Page S 11416]] all the academies, not just one--not just Navy, not just West Point, not just the Air Force. We will have studies from all the academies, and then we can make an informed decision of what to do. All this amendment does, I repeat once more, is say that we will await the study that is required before we make our decision to reduce the active duty service obligation. That to me is so common sense that I hope we can almost adopt this by unanimous consent. I know that is not going to be the case. I reserve the remainder of my time. Exhibit 1 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, August 3, 1995. Hon. John Glenn, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Glenn: This is in response to your request for the Department's views on Section 502 of S. 1026. Enactment of this section would reduce the active duty service obligation (ADSO) of Service academy graduates from six to five years. As you are aware, the current six year ADSO was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1990, and will be effective for graduates of the academies beginning in 1996. Neither this mandate, nor Section 502 of S. 1026, were requested by the DoD. A review of the history of the mandate to change the ADSO reveals that the Department appealed this Senate provision during the Senate/House Conference. Despite that appeal, the Senate's provision to change the ADSO from five to six years was sustained. The underlying rationale for the decision was apparently based on the significant Defense investment in Service academy graduates. The Department maintains its original position on this matter. Sincerely, Francis M. Rush, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. I thank my friend from Nebraska. Mr. President, this discussion is taking place on the anniversary of the end of World War II and the use of atomic weapons, as we all are aware from the news reports of the last few days. It was the first time we really had weapons of mass destruction used like this, and we saw what nuclear weapons could do. My view in that area, as an aside, is that we really saved lives, both Japanese and American, by what happened out there. But out of World War II we came into the cold war, where bomb and missile development became very major programs and became survival for this country. At the same time, though, that we were proceeding along those lines, we kept our concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear material, and hoped all along that someday we [[Page S 11362]] could get control of our nuclear stockpiles as well as those of our major adversary for all of those years, the Soviet Union. Then, in the meantime, we hoped that others could be persuaded not to go the nuclear route. We had hopes that someday we might get control of some of these matters. Until that day, we wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We did not want to see nuclear information, nuclear weapons, be spread to smaller and smaller nations where maybe their use would be common in border wars and things that the rest of the world would not deem that important. And we would see new levels of terror around the world that would make Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like tiny firecrackers compared to the potential of what might happen. So what did we do? Well, in the hope that we might be able to make some advances in this area, we formed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and we have just gone through the 25th anniversary. The purpose of NPT was to tell nations foursquare with the nuclear weapons route, if you will, that we will cooperate with you on peaceful uses of nuclear material for medicines or whatever purposes. Meanwhile, we will try to get control of this nuclear stockpile on both sides, Soviet and American, try to get it under control. We passed legislation here in 1978 just a couple of years or 3 years after I came into the Senate called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The Pressler amendment came much later. Other laws have been put on the books through the years, all with the objective of keeping control of nuclear weapons around the world. We finally at last, in our day and time, are seeing a reduction in these stockpiles of weapons. We still hope that we can get to a comprehensive test ban sometime, one that is verifiable and justifies the faith that these other nations have placed in the United States. So here we are, in 1995, having really moved down the road a long, long way. We have made a lot of progress. So, Mr. President, I rise to speak as a cosponsor of the amendment offered by my colleague from Nebraska, Mr. Exon, to strike what I view as an ill-advised provision in the bill pertaining to low-yield testing of nuclear weapons. On May 12, 178 parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty agreed to make that treaty permanent. That was a big fight. They agreed to make that treaty permanent, not a 5-year review as we have been going through, but to make it permanent. And America's success in achieving this outcome was substantially encouraged by promises made by the nuclear weapons states to conclude, to do everything we could to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996. Shortly after the celebration died down, after that NPT extension, China set off a nuclear device, and said more would follow. France then declared it, too, would fire off a few before halting next year. China continues to support the right to conduct so-called PNE's, peaceful nuclear explosions. These steps by China and France do not help at all to advance the cause of nuclear nonproliferation of either variety-- horizontal nonproliferation which seeks to prevent the geographical spread of the bomb in more countries, or vertical proliferation which seeks to prevent the increased growth and sophistication of weapons already in the stockpiles of the nuclear weapons states. Yet, instead of expressing its opposition to the actions of France and China and proceeding along the lines that we have developed through all of these years, the hoped-for area where we really could get nuclear stockpiles under control, the Armed Services Committee voted on June 29 to require the President to make ``preparations to commence low-yield hydronuclear experiments,'' a policy that would substitute low-test for no test. It was stated here that these have nothing to do with nuclear explosions, but they do. The title of them is hydronuclear--small amounts, very small amounts, but they are nuclear experiments. They are low-test nuclear experiments. That is the definition of them. That is the reason they are called hydronuclear experiments. These experiments are basically an attempt to say that we will look at the hydro characteristics of a low-yield explosion-- in other words, the wave patterns, the way the motion occurs internally, combine that with computer techniques that can tell us something about safety. That is true. But it could also be used by a nation that could develop sophisticated computer techniques to give them a lot of clues how to go ahead and do their own weapons development. So the question comes down to, do we want a comprehensive test ban or does this undermine a comprehensive test ban? In the dreams of its supporters, this action could well pave the way for nuclear test explosions with yields ranging from 4 pounds to several hundred tons of TNT equivalent--even within something called a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And recall, 100 tons is 200,000 pounds equivalent of TNT--100 tons, 200,000 pounds of TNT. By comparison, the blasts at Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were equivalent to the explosive yield of between 1,000 and 2,000 pounds of TNT. The FBI has not released its official estimate figure yet, but it is in the ballpark because on August 3, 1995, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms informed my staff that their own explosives experts estimate the yield of the Oklahoma City bomb at about 2,100 pounds of TNT equivalent. More explosive than these detonations, however, will be the punch that will come from angry members of the global nonproliferation regime if the United States and the other nuclear weapons States start to play games over their commitment not to engage in any further nuclear tests, which was a key item during deliberations over whether we were going to extend the NPT. Many of these countries have already sent a blizzard of demarches, aide-memoirs, nonpapers, and other such diplomatic missives to remind the United States and the other nuclear weapons States about that basic arms control and nonproliferation goal, perhaps best summarized in the preamble of the NPT itself of seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosives of nuclear weapons for all time. Any resumption by the United States of such tests, or even active preparations to resume such testing, would jeopardize this hard-won consensus on the permanent extension of the NPT. Essentially, if we heed the nuclear testing policy dictated in this bill, we will only invite the following type of collective declaration by the nonnuclear weapons States: Halt all testing or we leave the treaty. I think some nations might well do that. If we are having trouble today affording a limited missile defense and curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the NPT and ABM Treaties, just imagine how worse these conditions would be if these treaties collapsed. I do not think we can afford to take such a risk. The testing policy dictated in this bill is all the more mystifying given that even veteran bomb designers do not believe that low-yield nuclear test explosions are vital to ensure either the safety or reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Former Livermore Director Herbert York does not believe such tests are necessary. We have conflicting testimony here about the JASONs. And the JASONs, I might add, are an advisory group to the Department of Defense. They are academics and defense experts, think-tank experts. They are one of the most top-level scientific groups that advises the Department of Defense, so their expertise in this area is without question. Now, the JASONs in the past have said they see some advantages to this type of testing but the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages in the dangers to nonproliferation, to the NPT, and so on--outweigh this--and that has been their view in the past. Another view was expressed on the floor this morning. We are asking for some clarification of that. And I hope we can get that before our debate here is concluded this morning. In November 1994, just last fall, the JASONs specifically cited the effect of renewed underground nuclear testing upon U.S. nonproliferation goals as grounds for their conclusion that they oppose it. After considering NPT and considering the advantages, and some of which there were, they say, ``On balance, we oppose hydronuclear testing.'' That was last November. Even our nuclear weapon labs have come around [[Page S 11363]] to the view that such testing is not necessary to maintain the nuclear arsenal. Dr. Frank Von Hippel, until recently the Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, goes so far as to say that a resumption of nuclear testing--and this would be just low-level nuclear testing, hydronuclear testing . . . would be seen as a fraud by virtually all of the 170 nonnuclear states that agreed this spring to an indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty after receiving a commitment that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be signed next year . . . Based on U.S. experience, the objective value of ``reliability'' tests is negligible in comparison with the costs of reneging on the deal with the nonweapons States, which promises that we will all work together against the spread and to reduce the numbers of these terrible devices. That was published in the Los Angeles Times on July 26 of this year. We have all sorts of definitions of ``comprehensive,'' I guess. I think comprehensive is pretty clear myself, but comprehensive to me means these lower-level tests also. So we need obviously a bit more predictability when we attempt to forge a national policy or craft a permanent international treaty. But we cannot go on unilaterally contriving new definitions of our international treaty commitments, a lesson that unfortunately has yet to be learned by supporters of provisions in the current bill addressing the ABM Treaty. Mr. President, a basic nuclear fission explosion is caused when a chemical explosion forces a sudden release of energy from the nucleus of atoms, typically plutonium or highly enriched uranium. In testing a nuclear explosive device, there is no nuclear explosion if the total energy released from a detonation is equal to the yield from the detonation of just the chemical explosives in that test device. If, however, you get some energy release greater than the energy that is released from the chemical explosive, then you have a nuclear explosion. A device that produces such explosions is what we call a nuclear explosive device. Under current nuclear proliferation sanctions legislation, our country imposes tough sanctions if nuclear nonweapons states detonate a device that produces a nuclear yield of only 1 pound, 1 pound of TNT equivalent. The source for that is section 834 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, Public Law 103-236. This was a standard used by the United States during a nuclear test moratorium between 1958 and 1961. It was used at that time to define what was called a hydronuclear experiment. Section 3135 of the current bill makes available $50 million for, ``Preparation for the commencement of a program of hydronuclear experiments.'' Later on, in section 3165 of the bill, the bill makes it clear that this bill intends to include detonations with nuclear yields on the order of 20 tons of TNT to fall within the category of ``hydronuclear tests''--that is in the bill--although the series of tests during the old moratorium had nuclear yield of far less than a pound of TNT. The bill is therefore not only an extreme diversion from historic U.S. practice but in establishing a 4-pound testing level, it adopts a standard that is four times higher than the standard we now apply to other countries in implementing our nuclear proliferation laws. I think it opens up a Pandora's box for arms control professionals and intelligence professionals who are responsible for verifying compliance with a comprehensive test ban. Verifying such a ban is difficult enough, but I think it is far easier to verify that there have been no nuclear explosions whatsoever, than it is to determine whether a given nuclear explosion at an unknown location had a yield of 1, 3, 4, 5 pounds, or whatever. Moreover, our current 1-pound definition for sanctions, which is still the law, has nothing to do with restraints on nuclear testing. As I clearly stated on the floor in my remarks a couple years ago, on May 27, 1993, this definition: . . . is not intended to foreclose any other definition that may be adopted in the course of the negotiation of any future international agreement limiting the testing of nuclear explosive devices, including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I would today go further and say, no test ban treaty that deserves the word ``comprehensive'' in its title can allow nuclear explosions of any size, period. That is what comprehensive means, no nuclear explosions. Explosive tests at even 1 pound and below can give a proliferant country some potential benefits, no doubt about that, especially in the areas of weapons safety, though there is no indication that any proliferant country has chosen that route to acquire the bomb. When you go to 4 pounds, then 40 pounds, then 400 pounds, and beyond, then you obviously run into more and more proliferation risks. We drew the line at 1 pound for sanctions purposes many years ago, not to legitimize tests below that level but simply to guarantee that no proliferant country could escape from the force of U.S. sanctions by undertaking exactly the type of so-called hydronuclear experiments described in the current bill. In short, America should not be encouraging the world community to engage in low-yield nuclear testing. A comprehensive test ban must eliminate all nuclear explosions. As I said on this floor last March 16, it is essential that we proceed with several measures to strengthen controls against the global spread of nuclear weapons, including: Negotiation at the earliest possible date of a verifiable-- underline verifiable--permanent comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices, with emphasis on those words ``verifiable,'' ``permanent,'' ``comprehensive'' and ``ban.'' Mr. President, we in the past have seen Taiwan have a program for nuclear weapons. We were able to bring them around to turn that program off. South Korea had a similar program at one time. We turned that off. Iran is in the process, we believe, now of heading for nuclear weapons. We are trying to turn that off. Pakistan has already gone that route against our very serious objections. India went that route in 1974. Are we now to come into this debate today and say that we are going to perform little bitty nuclear explosions, but you people cannot do the same things? It just does not make sense if what we are trying to go to is a comprehensive test ban. The debate today is ironic given that we just do not need to perform hydronuclear experiments to maintain the reliability of our nuclear arsenal. In fact, our Government is now investing billions in special facilities that will enable our country to ensure the safety and reliability of the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. And that includes hydronuclear testing. This is what is known as to the stockpile stewardship program. Are there advantages to hy- dronuclear testing? Of course there are. I agree with that. But the dangers to the NPT and the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons as other countries see us testing and decide to do the same thing is far greater. The danger is far greater than any advantage we get out of the hydronuclear test. If the hundreds upon hundreds of nuclear tests that we have undertaken over the last half century have still not given us a reliable arsenal, then this dubious record surely offers sufficient cause for us to question whether testing is truly as efficient a method for establishing a method of safety and liability as its proponents claim it is. The truth is, of course, that we already have a safe and reliable arsenal. And a good way to keep it that way without testing is to leave the designs alone. Supporters of the nuclear testing section of the bill appear to want it both ways, twice. They want both to resume nuclear testing and fund big-ticket nonnuclear test facilities. They also want both to expand current nuclear and missile defense capabilities and to propagate the view that our potential adversaries will do nothing in response that will adversely affect our national security. I am opposed to such reasoning, and I am sure I am not alone in challenging these totally incompatible goals. I applaud the leadership of my friend from Nebraska. Over the years he has fought for restraints on nuclear testing. I am proud to be included as a cosponsor of his amendment today. I hope our colleagues have been following the debate here on the floor today. And I hope we have an overwhelming vote in support of the Senator from Nebraska. I reserve the remainder of my time. [[Page S 11364]]

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment to strike the missile defense provisions in the bill, because, if passed as is, I think this language will greatly complicate the work of our military and of our diplomats in the years ahead. I have been interested to hear that one of the reasons we have this in the bill, apparently, is because we have sent a number of letters, or some Members have sent a number of letters to the President, and did not get a response. They either got no response or one they did not like, so they decided to put it in legislation. I can only say that I think taking that kind of action, when the leadership, in negotiating treaties and in seeing they are adhered to, is a function of the executive branch, does not ring very strongly with me, because I can remember--I could probably go back to the files and bring out a dozen or more letters I wrote during the Reagan administration, during those 8 years and during the 4 years of the Bush administration, and I may have gotten responses to some of those but certainly not to all of them. That did not mean to me that I took over what the constitutional powers of the President are and put into law things that would have tried to put my view into law, as opposed to what treaty requirements were or what treaties had been negotiated. I say further that I think we are, obviously, talking a lot here about the demarcation between theater missile defense and national missile defense. That is a legitimate thing to try and work out. But to take over and unilaterally on the part of the Congress define language that would change the ABM Treaty or have that potential, I think, is wrong. I think we have to tread very carefully when we do that. I think this could possibly harm our efforts to proceed with nuclear arms reduction, not just with Russia, when we try and negotiate these things with China, Britain, and France. It will raise new threats to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially its cornerstone, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT. It could establish an extremely undesirable new method for unilaterally reinterpreting treaties, thus setting up a precedent that will obviously be used against us in the years ahead. I think it could establish programs that would cost us a fortune. It could divert money from military needs that are, in my opinion, much more vital to the country and ultimately leave America substantially no safer as a result. It tramples on the President's constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief and as the individual in charge of American foreign policy. In short, I think this would be a very bad mistake for this country. I would like to begin with a few comments about the general level of partisanship that we have seen from the proponents of these provisions on the ABM Treaty. I hasten to add that I think missile defense should not be a partisan affair. All Americans understand that (a), the national interest may require the deployment of U.S. forces in unstable areas around the world. This bill contains some very undesirable features, I feel, that, if enacted, could greatly complicate the work of our military and our diplomats in the years ahead. Let me talk about ballistic missile defense. So (a), the national interest may require deployment of U.S. forces in unstable regions around the world; and (b), these forces may be the targets of missile attacks, including missiles delivering weapons of mass destruction; and (c), such forces must be protected. That is something I am sure we can all agree on. Now, though the committee has approved many of the administration's requested theater missile defense projects, the majority's refusal to yield on several controversial proposals dealing with key missile defense issues gives these proposals the quality of partisan ultimata rather than a sound foundation for policy. In other words, it is either or else. Similarly, the bill's heavy emphasis on investing in expensive hardware for missile defense detracts from an equally, if not more important, goal: Pursuing means to reduce the numbers and performance characteristics of offensive missiles that may be fired against us in theater conflicts. This goal typically requires significant improvements in export controls, intelligence capabilities, analytic capabilities for the conduct of arms control and nonproliferation verification activities, better coordination between our military and our diplomats and other such means. The committee, however, is placing inordinate reliance upon technical fixes to counter missile attacks, rather than strengthening efforts to slow our halt of the proliferation of such missiles in the first place. This position is unfortunate, since the latter will ultimately prove to be a better investment of scarce taxpayers' dollars. With respect to the missile defense provisions the bill does support, many of these would considerably erode the stable consensus that exists to support ballistic missile defense efforts, would jeopardize both antiballistic missile, ABM and START II treaties, usurp the President's constitutional powers with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and the performance of the role of Commander in Chief, or otherwise erode, rather than enhance, U.S. national security. These conclusions, to me, follow from an examination of the following provisions of the bill: First, the bill mandates, as a statutory policy objective, an action that would violate the ABM Treaty. It establishes a policy of deploying a multiple-site national missile defense network by the year 2003. That is in violation. Second, the majority places into U.S. law a formal definition of an ABM-permissible ballistic missile defense system. We can justifiably assume, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, has warned, any such statutory definition could jeopardize prospects for early ratification of the START II Treaty in the [[Page S 11254]] Russian Parliament and negatively impact our broader security relationship with Russia. It seems only prudent that before the Congress ventures off with a unilateral interpretation of a major bilateral arms control accord, we should consider very carefully several implications of such an action. They would include: Is this the type of precedent we wish to establish as a basis for treaty interpretation? Do we want to set an example that can lead the Duma to legislate its own preferred definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and disarmament treaties? In other words, what if the Russian Duma, what if we had word coming through or had pictures on TV this evening on the news that the Russian Duma is unilaterally deciding to put a new interpretation into the ABM Treaty. What would we do? I know what we would do. We would think the whole thing is null and void if they went ahead and legislated preferred definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and disarmament treaties. If Russia deployed enough ballistic missile defense sites containing missiles just falling below the dictated threshold, could they collectively acquire an ability to counter United States strategic nuclear forces? What will be the reactions of China and other powers if the United States moves away from its ballistic missile defense restraints? I point out that these agreements are hammered out word by word by word over agonizingly long negotiations. The ABM Treaty was no exception to that. To change some of that wording, or to change an interpretation of it unilaterally, means that our word in any other treaty that we might have with any other place around the world-- whether China, Russia, wherever--is not going to be looked at as being worth very much. While the committee majority has raised the specter of structural nuclear disarmament--a term that is supposed to describe our alleged inability to expand our nuclear arsenal in the event of future threats--it ironically ignores completely the effects on our deterrent force of releasing Russia from the treaty obligations that prevent it from acquiring a national missile defense capability. The Russians are not going to just stand by and see us reinterpret that treaty without feeling free to go their own way. They will no longer be bound by that agreement that was hammered out over a long period of time. So, if the opponents in the ongoing missile defense debate have their way, and that ``fearsome beast,'' the ABM Treaty, is finally slain, the credibility of America's strategic missile forces would almost immediately be called into question as Russia begins to deploy its own large-scale national missile defense force. What would prevent them from doing it? Certainly not the treaty that we would have violated at the time. It seems to me, if the majority is truly interested in avoiding this structural nuclear disarmament, as it is called, it should do all it can to ensure that U.S. nuclear deterrent retains its credibility. This is exactly what the ABM Treaty helps to achieve, by barring Russia from creating its own national strategic missile defense system. The treaty accomplishes this, moreover, without the need for a diplomatically and financially costly expansion of our offensive nuclear capabilities. So-called deficit hawks in Congress today should, therefore, love the ABM Treaty, not revile it. It works to preserve our deterrent and saves plenty of money at the same time. One of the estimates by CBO has indicated that even a partial national missile defense system would cost about $48 billion, at a time when we really do not need it, as testimony and as the letters from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated. I am afraid our colleagues in the majority, however, have turned a collective blind eye to these considerations. They appear to believe that unilateral United States actions to ensure against our own national missile vulnerability will instantly translate into a safer America and not lead Russia to reduce its vulnerability to our own strategic missile attacks. In its enthusiasm not to miss an opportunity to bash the ABM Treaty, the majority is urging a course of action that can weaken our nuclear deterrent capability, can stimulate an offensive nuclear arms race, and eventually funnel tens or hundreds of billions of dollars into elaborate strategic national missile defense schemes, none of which, of course, will ever free American citizens from risk of nuclear attack. The bill seems to enshrine into law what is known as the fallacy of the last move, which holds that any increment in our own security will take place without any detrimental side effects. I lose a lot more sleep over the side effects than I do over the slogan of ``structural nuclear disarmament.'' The Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings, coupled with the Tokyo gas attacks should serve as a sobering reminder that weapons of mass destruction can be delivered by a variety of means other than missiles. It does not mean we are not concerned about missiles. We are. Furthermore, our intelligence officials have repeatedly testified the United States will not face a new missile threat until sometime in the next century. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. James Clapper, testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence last January: ``We see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the continental United States with a long-range missile for at least the next decade.'' We should not permit a fixation with delivery systems to distract our attention from the important goal of halting the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Third, the majority voted down on a straight party vote a proposal by Senator Levin to ensure that America's theater missile defense systems will not be given strategic antiballistic missile capabilities, a proposal that was essentially a restatement of existing law, existing law under the ABM Treaty. Fourth, the majority insisted on almost doubling the size of the administration's request for national missile defense projects, despite the majority's complete inability to identify any new foreign threat against which such a defense would be directed. I do not believe that a highly conjectural North Korean missile threat to the Aleutian Islands sometime in the 21st century is sufficient grounds for America to abandon the ABM Treaty. I doubt North Korea will even manage to survive as a country by that time. It may not, anyway. Furthermore, there is a fundamental contradiction in the majority's willingness to write a blank check on behalf of national missile defense and yet apply the sternest possible accounting standards for the more modest sums that we authorized elsewhere in this bill to such programs as humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief. I would add, the systems we are talking about have yet to be invented. We made some progress in setting up systems, or doing some research in years past, but to mandate at this point we will have any of these systems by the year 2003, which is what is in the systems we are proposing here, is wishful thinking. Some of the claims under star wars were made back some years ago. I talked to the people at the Pentagon who were working in these areas, who had some confidence in those systems, or said they did. I thought some of the claims were so preposterous I went out to some of the laboratories where work was going on on the so-called star wars system. The scientists who were working on the systems out there almost laughed about some of the claims being made on star wars at that time. It was not just a matter of having the money to deploy, to cut the hardware and deploy it. We had not yet invented the systems. Yet we are talking about now we can set up a national missile defense system, just a partial one, for $48 billion, with equipment that has yet to be invented and certainly should not be deployed on a timetable between now and the year 2003. Within 8 years, we are supposed to now have this and it has to be deployed. And that is ridiculous. Star wars before was talking about deformable laser mirrors, 12 feet across, that could take lasers of a power not yet invented, and focus it on a spot out there several hundred miles in space the size of a golf ball. At least [[Page S 11255]] the first step would be to focus it on a mirror in space that could be deformed, then focus it in turn on a spot the size of a golf ball several hundred miles away on a missile coming up at a changing rate of speed, and keep it focused on that area. We do not have the computer capacity nor the technology yet developed to enable us to do some of those things that were claimed years ago. Now we are saying we have some different systems. But those systems are anything but proven and are anything but systems that should be set up on a time schedule that would have to be in place by law by the year 2003. What do we think the Soviets would be doing all this same time? I know what the Duma would probably do, our counterpart over there in Russia. The Duma probably is going to say, OK, if all bets are off on the ABM Treaty, then the very first thing we are going to do is put all the coordinates back in on American targets we just took out of our missiles in agreement with the Americans, back just a few months ago. To me, that would be very silly if we did anything that might lead them into that kind of activity. Yet, if the Russians were doing the same thing we are debating here today, I can guarantee the first thing I would be doing on the floor would be demanding we put their coordinates back in our missiles if they were advocating abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying a missile defense system that neither side thought we needed to deploy. Much has been written about the dangers of new isolationism as a foreign policy doctrine. Its companion in defense policy I guess would be called a fortress America. Nothing is more reflective of this doctrine than the current bill's fundamentally misguided policy approaches on nuclear testing and the ABM Treaty. So I am still hopeful a new bipartisanship will emerge in the years ahead, however, behind policies that reflect a greater awareness of the costs of a modern national defense, a greater sensitivity to international reactions to U.S. defense actions, greater appreciation of the unexploited potential that lies in creative international solutions to security problems, and a greater emphasis on preventing proliferation rather than trying to manage it. If we abrogate the ABM Treaty or put language in here, in this legislation, or permit language to stay in that allows the Duma, in its own right, to start reinterpreting the ABM Treaty, then I do not see any option but what we are into an arms race again. Just as we spent probably most of the past decade taking some of those dangers down, reducing our arms, taking the targeting out of our missiles and the Soviets took it out--the Russians took it out of their missiles, I think we are in danger of reversing this whole direction, this trend that has been set in place over the past 10 years, and to cope with a threat that is not out there, by the best testimony we have from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and spend a lot of money in the whole process, $48 billion for a very limited defense system that will not be a full national missile defense. It would be, basically, a missile defense that covers five States. So I support the change proposed by the Senator from Michigan. I hope our colleagues will look at this very, very carefully. If we are to put into law something that encourages the ABM Treaty to be questioned and the Soviets to have less confidence in the American willingness to abide by that treaty, I think we will have made a drastic mistake in the Senate of the United States. I yield the floor.