John Glenn

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I urge the amendment. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I believe this amendment has been accepted, cleared on both sides. It has three major parts. It requires the President in next year's budget to submit legislation for an orderly sunset or reconsideration of existing tax expenditures; No. 2, it requires the administration to conduct performance reviews of tax expenditures just as they do now with regular discretionary spending; and three, it makes it out of order to consider a new tax expenditure if it does not consider a sunset or reconsideration, of course before that sunset time. The amendment will increase scrutiny of tax expenditures and help make the line-item veto more effective. I am happy that the Dole substitute to S. 4 provides the President with the authority to item veto some new tax breaks. There seems to be some disagreement about the scope of authority under the current language. I believe that it should be interpreted quite broadly. However, regardless of how broadly you read the language, it still does not include the $453 billion in existing tax expenditures which still remain off limits. Now if you divide up the budget pie, tax expenditures are a huge slice. Tax expenditures are growing at a rate six times faster than discretionary spending. And unlike discretionary spending, these tax expenditures generally do not receive regular scrutiny. Since the first corporate tax law of 1909, special provisions have been placed in the Code and generally forgotten. In fact, many would be surprised to learn that nearly half of the revenue losses from these expenditures stem from provisions placed in the Code before 1920. I do not believe that all of these expenditures are unnecessary. In fact, I support many of them. But I believe that--after some of them have been in the Code for the better part of a century--it is time we set up a review process to determine whether budget savings and program improvements are achievable. My amendment utilizes a concept that we have mandated for discretionary spending--performance review. It would require the President to determine just how well these programs are achieving their goals. Are we getting our money's worth? We have spent a lot of time talking about instituting cost-benefit analyses for Federal regulations. Would it not make sense to have a similar process for programs that cost $453 billion this year. This was first suggested in Governmental Affairs Committee report language that accompanied the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs, the senior Senator from Delaware, was the father of that important law which for the first time established measurable objectives for agency programs. My amendment codifies report language of that bill to include expenditures. While providing a better understanding of the effectiveness of current tax expenditures, it will also help the President to determine when it may be advisable to item veto new tax expenditures and even new spending. Under performance review, the President will be able to better identify where current tax expenditures overlap or duplicate newly proposed tax expenditures. And it will help him to identify whether new spending programs are unnecessary because existing tax expenditures are adequately achieving the same policy goals. My amendment also requires the President to submit legislation to Congress which lays out an orderly schedule for the sunset and reauthorization of current tax expenditures. Just because something was placed in the code at the beginning of the century does not mean that it should be exempt from any congressional review. We might be surprised with what we find if we are forced to sit down and reauthorize many of these programs. The President would not have to propose the sunset off all tax expenditures. There may be some that he will suggest remain permanent. But it will provide us with a roadmap for more comprehensive congressional review of tax expenditures. The tax expenditures that the Congress determines should come under a reauthorization process, will also be subject to the President's veto pen in the future. In addition, under my amendment, it would be out of order to consider new tax expenditures that did not include a sunset date at least within 10 years. I don't think we should go through another century before the taxes we enact today are reviewed. I think this merely sets forth a good Government approach on tax expenditures. It is high time we shed some light on this area of the budget. I understand that my amendment has been cleared by both the minority and majority leaders and I hope my colleagues will join me in support of this amendment. Madam President, I think it has been accepted on the other side. I ask my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Arizona, if he has any comments? I would be prepared to urge the amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the pending amendment.

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, next month, representatives of the 173 members of the NPT will gather in New York to determine how long the treaty shall remain in force. I support this amendment because I believe that the NPT, despite some shortcomings--and it has been far from perfect--still continues to advance U.S. national security interests and a peaceful world order. Accordingly, I urge all my colleagues to join in a sense of the Senate in favor of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The NPT has come under attack over the years for not having fully halted the global spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in the case of certain NPT parties, with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea being the most celebrated examples. Some critics say the NPT gives too much emphasis on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology and not enough on its safeguards system. This argument has been directed specifically at the enforcement of the primary goal of safeguards; namely, the timely detection--timely detection--of the diversion of a significant quantity of special nuclear material for nuclear explosive uses. Simply put, the more countries come to engage in large-scale commercial uses of bomb-usable materials, the more likely it will be that some such materials will wind up in the hands of black marketeers or terrorists or nations bent on proliferation and getting their own nuclear weapons capability. Other criticisms, particularly coming from certain developing countries, have alleged that the NPT focuses too much on preventing the global spread of nuclear weapons and not enough on promoting nuclear disarmament. Anti-NPT propagandists have condemned the treaty's alleged system of atomic apartheid and its hidden purpose of, as they say, disarming the unarmed. Other critics have found fault with the treaty's easy exit clause, permitting a State to leave the treaty on 90 days' notice. The treaty does not define certain key terms like nuclear explosive device and manufacture. Nor does it prohibit exports of sensitive nuclear weapons- related technology. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at the end of my remarks an analysis prepared by Dr. Leonard Weiss, the staff director for the minority of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, which describes and assesses these and several additional criticisms of the NPT.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, why should the United States press for an indefinite extension of such an imperfect treaty? Rather than rebut all of the allegations made by the treaty's critics, or recount all of the many arguments used on behalf of the treaty by its proponents, I would like to summarize briefly my own views on why the NPT should be extended indefinitely. First, to the ends. The world community needs a formal legal instrument to give form and substance to the international effort to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. Given its near-universal support in the world community, the NPT helps to delegitimize the further proliferation--and, ultimately, the possession--of nuclear weapons. It contributes to a global nonproliferation ethic that is invaluable to international security. Any short-term extension or extensions would only weaken the incentives of the nuclear-weapon states to expedite their nuclear disarmament activities. Such short-term extension options amount, in my opinion, to NPT confidence-reduction measures. Now, as to the means. The NPT was never intended as a silver bullet, as something magic. Nobody expects the NPT to act as a panacea to the global nuclear weapons proliferation threat. The NPT works best when it is supported by complementary national policies of its parties. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China have undertaken binding legal obligations that they will not in any way assist the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each of these nuclear-weapon states must promulgate domestic laws and regulations to ensure this commitment is being upheld. At a time when each of these countries--including most particularly our own country--is experiencing great pressure to relax export controls under the false flag of economic competitiveness, now is not the time to abandon or weaken an obligation that serves to preserve responsible national systems of sanctions and export controls. Without the NPT, the world nuclear market would become a free-for-all--the new motto of the so-called post-cold war world order would soon become, ``Sell what you can while you can. At the same time prepare for the worst.'' As to fairness, the NPT involves reciprocal duties on the parts of the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states. The former have no choice. They must not assist other countries to get the bomb, they must negotiate in good faith to curb the nuclear arms race, pursue nuclear disarmament, and work toward a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The latter also have no choice: they must not acquire the bomb, they must agree to safeguards over the full scope of their activities involving nuclear material, and also pursue global disarmament objectives. Though these are very different types of obligations, it is not correct to condemn the treaty as simply discriminatory. I doubt that this treaty would have 173 parties, 173 nations all signed up, if those nations truly believed that this treaty was discriminatory. If the treaty--backed by strong national nonproliferation policies--helps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, all nations stand to gain the freedom from fear of regional or global nuclear wars. Now what are our next steps? The NPT is not a quick fix. It must be supplemented by strong national leadership and international cooperation. Here are just a few suggestions of some NPT regime. No. 1. Increased efforts by all countries to integrate fundamental NPT obligations into domestic laws and regulations of all states party to the treaty. I have proposed legislation in our own country here and sent a bill, S. 102, that seeks to bring U.S. controls over exports of nuclear dual-use goods into line with U.S. obligations under the NPT and nuclear supplier guidelines. Now, I urge my colleagues to support this effort and to examine very closely the various pending proposals to reauthorize the Export Administration Act to ensure that these bills will advance rather than undercut our international nonproliferation commitments. For those who may think my use of the term ``undercut'' is a bit harsh, I would encourage them to read a report prepared last year by the General Accounting Office at my request. The report is entitled ``Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to be Strengthened.'' No. 2. Pursuit of an international moratorium, preferably a ban, on the commercial sale, production, or use of separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium. In other words, bomb-rich material. A partial ban on the production of such materials for weapons or outside of safeguards is--assuming for now that it would not amount to a license to produce such materials under safeguards--a useful first step but is by no means a substitute for this more important goal. We cannot for long sustain an international arrangement that smiles upon large-scale commercial uses of such materials in certain privileged states while frowning upon such activities elsewhere. In other words, we need consistency of our policy. No. 3. Reaffirmation by the nuclear weapon states of their intention to live up to their obligation under article 6 of the NPT. In particular, we need rapid progress both on START II and on further reciprocal and verifiable cuts of strategic nuclear arsenals around the world, including those of France, the United Kingdom, and China. The nuclear-weapon states must devote less effort to attacking the basic goal of nuclear disarmament and more effort to exploring the means by which this objective can be achieved. No. 4. Negotiation at the earliest possible date of a verifiable-- underline verifiable--permanent comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices, with emphasis on those words ``verifiable,'' ``permanent,'' ``comprehensive,'' and ``ban.'' No. 5. Increased transparency both of the size and disposition of existing nuclear arsenals around the world, along with the size and disposition of existing stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material, including so-called civilian material. The ability of the United States to monitor the ultimate disposition of its own nuclear materials in international commerce is badly in need of improvement, as the GAO recently concluded in its report ``U.S. International Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited.'' That report was prepared at my request, also. The longer such shortcomings are permitted to exist, the sooner the NPT will find itself in the position of the emperor with no clothes. No. 6. Strengthen both the capabilities and finances of safeguards implemented under the NPT. The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, enacted last year as title 8 of the foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, Public Law 103-236, contains a sense of the Congress urging 24 specific improvements in these safeguards. As the author of those provisions, I intend to monitor closely U.S. efforts to advance these much-needed reforms in the months ahead. No. 7. Reaffirmation of the prevention, not management, of proliferation as the foremost goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy. I see a great deal of attention being directed to implementing military responses to proliferation. The more I see of these efforts, however, the more convinced I become that the best defense against such weapons is to redouble our efforts to prevent their proliferation in the first place. One single attack using a biological or nuclear weapon could destroy virtually any city anywhere, regardless of the best of defenses. Stopping proliferation is somewhat analogous to fighting cancer: A few ounces of prevention will yield many kilograms of cure. Mr. President, in conclusion, even if these and other proposals were to be implemented today and even if the NPT is finally extended indefinitely, we will still have to live with a global nuclear weapons proliferation threat. I would prefer to address this threat, however, having a permanent NPT and these supplementary measures in my diplomatic tool kit rather than not having them. Accordingly, I hope that all my colleagues will join me in supporting the amendment of my distinguished colleague from Delaware on behalf of an indefinite extension of the NPT. Let us just get on with the business of nonproliferation. Mr. President, one additional remark. If we did not have the NPT, I think we would have to invent it. This is a group of 173 nations that gradually, over a series of 5 years, since back in the early 1970's, has come together to say that they forswear the development of nuclear weapons in return for our cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have supported that. We have been actively pursuing that. I do not believe that we need any more of these 5-year period reviews. I would like to see this extended indefinitely, and that is what the U.S. policy is trying to do as the 173 nations meet at the U.N. in New York next month, and I hope that they pass this as an indefinite extension of the NPT to show we are truly serious about this matter. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and yield the floor. Exhibit 1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Strengths and Gaps (By Leonard Weiss) I. Introduction The evolution of a strong nonproliferation ethic in the world is, ultimately, the best stable long-term tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an ethic can stimulate, and is, in turn, stimulated by the creation of international institutions incorporating the notion of nonproliferation at their core. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\1\ (NPT), despite the confused philosophy of its provenance, has become such an institution and has demonstrated its value especially during the past few years. It remains, however, a flawed institution that requires considerable tending to, including constant efforts to obtain a consensus of its parties concerning evolving interpretations of its provisions in order to maintain its effectiveness as a nonproliferation tool, if not its survival altogether. Footnotes at end of article. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It should not come as a surprise that the Treaty is an imperfect nonproliferation instrument. It was created in response to nonproliferation concerns arising from burgeoning nuclear trade accelerated by a misguided atoms-for-peace policy, trade promoted aggressively by nuclear policymakers, technocrats, and diplomats whose visions of nuclear technology-generated prosperity obscured the very real national and international security problems being created. Those problems, when they emerged, seem to have been viewed as much in terms of the threat to future nuclear commerce as they were in terms of the threat of life. Accordingly, the Treaty was designed to endorse and encourage the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes at the time it was to constrain, indeed prevent, the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The incompatibility of these aims became apparent after the Treaty went into effect in 1970 as some nuclear suppliers, particularly Germany and France (one an NPT party and the other pledged at the time to act as an NPT party) prepared to export technology and equipment for production of fissionable material, albeit under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to countries that either were not NPT parties and were embarked on secret military programs to develop nuclear weapons (Pakistan and Brazil) or were NPT parties whose nonproliferation credentials were suspect at the time (South Korea). What followed over the next few years, and is continuing today, was the development of other institutions outside NPT designed to patch the omissions, ambiguities, ill-conceived constraints and other flaws in the Treaty. Thus, we now have nuclear supplier agreements, bilateral agreements, national and multinational export controls, national technical means of surveillance and international intelligence links, and positive and negative security assurances to assist us in keeping genie in the bottle. These tools, along with the NPT and the associated IAEA safeguards system, are referred to, collectively, as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, a regime that is still evolving in the direction of greater effectiveness, but is not yet at the point where any of the nuclear weapon states would be prepared to put their nuclear arsenals aside with confidence. necessary to create all these auxiliary tools to combat proliferation? What have we learned over the past 25 years that, had we known it in the 1960s, would have enabled us to construct a better NPT and a better safeguards system? And, in the end, does it matter, i.e., would a stronger NPT enable us to rely for our security on this institution? ii. a review of the major elements of the treaty A. Articles I and II Article I mandates that each nuclear-weapon-State Party to the Treaty may not transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and may not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to obtain control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II prohibits non- nuclear-weapon-States from receiving those things which weapon-States are prohibited in Article I from giving, and are specifically prohibited from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear explosive devices. The first problem with Articles I and II is that it is unclear what constitutes ``assistance'', ``encouragement'', or ``inducement'' to a non-nuclear-weapon-State; the second problem is that it is unclear what constitutes ``manufacture'' of a device; the third problem is that it is unclear what constitutes a nuclear device because there is no consensus on the definition of a nuclear explosion; and the fourth problem is that there is no prohibition on a non- weapon-State assisting another non-nuclear-weapon-State to acquire nuclear weapons. George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, who were among the negotiators of the text of the NPT, have written on the question of what constitutes ``manufacture''\2\, and quote the testimony of the Chief of the American delegation, William C. Foster, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Foster said that ``the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would not be covered by the term `manufacture' as would be the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device''. He also made reference to ``activities'' by a non-weapon-State that would ``tend'' to put the Party in noncompliance of Article II if the purpose of those activities was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device.\3\ In order to allay concerns about how one would determine the purpose of certain fuel cycle activities that could be peaceful or weapons-related, Foster added that: ``Neither Uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as those activities were safeguarded.'' The reference to safeguards in his statement is immaterial, because if a program is, indeed, peaceful, then there is no violation of Article II even if the activity is unsafeguarded. (In that case, the Party would be in noncompliance with Article III, but that is another matter). This points up a problem that runs throughout the NPT--lack of definitive interpretation. Bunn/Timmerbaev write that the Foster criteria for manufacture have generally been accepted as authoritative interpretations by historians of the NPT negotiations, but whether all current Parties to the NPT would agree with those interpretations is unclear. It is important to note that until the Iraq situation arose, there was no indication that many of the Parties to the NPT viewed the International Atomic Energy Agency as an appropriate verification instrument to ensure that non-nuclear weaponization activities weren't being carried out. Indeed, there were debates in the past as to whether IAEA inspectors were obligated to report any untoward activities they observed (e.g., noting the presence of bomb components such as machined hemispherical metal shells somewhere on the premises) that were unrelated to the negotiated safeguards agreement. However, the Iraq situation and the South African decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program has allowed the IAEA to put its toe in the water on non-nuclear weaponization activities. In the case of Iraq, the agency has been provided information by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) regarding the Iraqi program and in the case of South Africa, the IAEA was invited to examine with full transparency the scope, nature, and facilities of the weapon program after dismantlement. This included some non-nuclear weapon components. This coupled with the acceptance by the NPT members of the IAEA's ability to do ``special inspections'' in the wake of the Gulf War is a start toward significant reform. By contrast, one may also note that the U.S./North Korea Framework Agreement makes no mention of any non nuclear weaponization activities or the disposition of any weapon components that North Korea may have manufactured, and the IAEA considers North Korea not in compliance with its safeguards obligations because of its failure to allow inspection of two nuclear waste sites. Ostensibly, if North Korea were to allow these inspections and the result were to show that all the plutonium in North Korea can be accounted for, North Korea would then be considered by the IAEA an NPT Party in good standing since there are not other allegations officially pending regarding its NPT commitments. Since the existence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in an assumption shared by most observers of the scene, it is hard to believe that some weapon components have not been manufactured by North Korea. However, it appears that the IAEA will ignore this possible violation of the NPT, at least for the time being, until it can account for all the nuclear material in North Korea. Another issue concerning manufacture is that of R & D, particularly design information. Japan, in 1975, submitted a paper to the Geneva Disarmament Conference arguing that the NPT does not explicitly prohibit weapons-oriented R & D short of actual production of nuclear explosive devices.\4\ In rebuttal, much has been made of a statement made by the drafters during the NPT negotiations that receipt by a non- weapon-State of ``information on design'' of nuclear explosives is barred by virtue of the probibition on assistance in the ``manufacture'' of such explosives\5\; however, it is unclear whether this can be extended to prohibit a non-weapon-State from doing its own design without external assistance. It is a stretch to argue that the Foster criteria barred such activity based on an assumption that the only purpose of design is to acquire a nuclear explosive device. Some years ago, Los Alamos asked some recently hired young physicists with no weapons background to design a weapon based on the open literature to see if it could be done and thereby to gauge the possible extent of proliferation by this route. The purpose of the activity was not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The Treaty's vague language on ``manufacture'', unless appropriately interpreted, would appear to allow anyone to design weapons using the Los Alamos experiment and rationale without violating the Treaty. Once again, however, even if the Treaty were to be air tight on this issue, verification of compliance would be virtually impossible. It is evident the Foster criteria do not settle the question of what constitutes ``manufacturing''. The criteria also don't settle some other important questions that arise from consideration of the safeguards regime. Such consideration will also reflect on the question of what constitutes direct or indirect assistance or encouragement to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons which are discussed in a later section. B. Article III Article III has four parts. Article III.1 begins by requiring Non-weapon-State Parties to accept safeguards, ``as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded'' with the IAEA in accordance with the IAEA's statute and safeguards system, ``for the exclusive purpose of verification of the Parties' NPT obligations with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons''. The remainder of Article III.1 states that safeguards procedures shall be followed with respect to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. Note that while there is nothing in this language explicitly referring to the effectiveness of safeguards, effectiveness is to be inferred from the context. That is because the Treaty cannot be an effective non-proliferation instrument if it allows equipment, material, and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes to be transferred with ineffective safeguards attached. Unfortunately, this point was not explicitly addressed by the drafters, and the question of the relationship of trade to effectiveness of safeguards (as opposed to the mere attachment of safeguards) has accordingly become a contentious issue. In their deconstruction of the language of Article III.1, Bunn/Timerbaev argued that Article III.1 authorizes the IAEA to verify that non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons are not being manufactured.\6\ It would not be a difficult case to make if the Article did not contain so much emphasis in connecting safeguards to nuclear materials rather than equipment (either nuclear or non-nuclear). As a result, Bunn and Timerbaev lean part of their argument on an interpretation of the phrase stating the purpose of safeguards as ``verification of the fulfillment of (the State's) obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy * * *'' Bunn and Timerbaev connect the clause ``with a view to preventing diversion * * *'' to the State's obligations under the Treaty not to manufacture weapons, but an equally if not more plausible interpretation is that the antecedent of this clause is safeguards, and that the clause has been added to provide focus as to how safeguards relate in a practical way to the State's NPT obligations. (Indeed, under the Bunn/ Timerbaev interpretation, Article III.1 would put States under an NPT obligation to establish effective physical security over nuclear materials. That it does not was recognized and remedied by the voluntary (!) Physical Security Convention developed by the IAEA and adopted by many (NPT and non-NPT) countries with nuclear programs). This is not to say that a case can't be made for safeguards applying to non-nuclear weaponization activities, and Bunn/ Timerbaev have made the best case possible. It is just that the emphasis in Article III on material safeguards along with the history provide no confidence that a majority of members of the IAEA that are State Parties to the NPT share this broad view of safeguards. Taking the broadest view of the stated purpose of safeguards as ``verification of the fulfillment of a (Non- weapon-State's) obligations'' under the NPT could arguably subject to inspection the agreements and arrangements by which non-weapon-States allow weapon-States to place nuclear weapons on their territory (Inspections of the agreements could ensure that there were no protocols under which transfer of authority or control over the weapons could take place). Whether the weapon-States would agree to have the IAEA inspectors examine these arrangements is, one suspects, more than problematical. Article III.2 This Article provides that suppliers Party to the Treaty shall not provide nuclear materials or equipment for processing, use or production of such materials to a non- weapon-State unless safeguards are attached. Over a period of years, it became apparent that a more detailed and finer screen for nuclear transfers than this had to be devised in order to ensure uniformity of compliance by suppliers. The result was the so-called ``Zangger'' list of nuclear items to which safeguards must be attached, and, more recently, a list of dual-use items requiring safeguards as well. In addition, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has identified nuclear export items requiring consideration of ``restraint'' and ``consultation'' before the item is sent.\7\ Article III.3 This Article is designed to ensure that safeguards arrangements will not intrude on the ability of non-weapon- States to obtain assistance for or otherwise develop their nuclear energy activities. It references Article IV which has been the basis for many complaints over the years regarding the policies of the suppliers, particularly the U.S. Article III.3 reflects the mindset of the nuclear establishments and the non-weapon-States at the time of the drafting of the Treaty, which was that the Treaty was also to be an instrument for facilitating international nuclear commerce. This mindset resulted in a safeguards system that was designed more for its nonintrusiveness than for its effectiveness. This is still a problem despite the improvements in the wake of the Gulf War. Article III.4 Provides for a timetable by which States Party to the Treaty must enter into appropriate safeguards arrangements. This timetable has not been met many times in the past, but the most egregious example was that of North Korea, which took six years to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. No sanction was imposed on North Korea or other violators of this provision. The Safeguards System of the IAEA The IAEA was established in 1957 in the wake of the U.S. Atoms-for-Peace initiative and began operating an inspection program in the early 60's designed to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material. The NPT expanded the scope of the agency's work significantly, and in response, the IAEA developed a model safeguards agreement for NPT Parties contained in the document INFCIRC/153. In this document, the IAEA states that the goal of safeguards is the prevention of proliferation by ``the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of detection''. This was adopted in 1970 at a meeting of the so-called Committee of the Whole which deliberated for 11 months before the text of INFCIRC/153 was approved. Mr. Rudolph Rometsch was the head of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards at the time, and he was recently quoted in an interview saying that the 1970 Committee meeting led to ``a sort of dogma for field work--if not to a taboo. It was a question whether inspection should be designed also to detect undeclared facilities. The conclusion was clear at the time: looking for clandestine activities was out of the question and the inspection system was designed accordingly''\8\. Thus, inspectors paid attention only to activities or structures within defined strategic points, and were discouraged from asking questions about anything else lest they become persona-non-grata with the State (which had the right to refuse an inspector) and perhaps ultimately at IAEA headquarters. INFCIRC/153, in addition to laying out the obligation on the part of the State to have safeguards apply to all its peaceful nuclear activities (so-called ``full scope safeguards''), also stresses the importance of protecting industrial and commercial secrets, not interfering in peaceful nuclear activities, and not hampering economic and technological development in the safeguarded state. This is in keeping with the Agency's dual role. Its charter makes it a promoter of nuclear energy at the same time it is to verify that no diversions have taken place. As a result, much negotiation follows the signing of the main Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the State to be inspected. The main agreement is followed (ostensibly within 90 days) by Subsidiary Arrangements that specify what the Agency and the State have to do in order for safeguards to be applied. Nuclear installations must be listed, and requirements for reporting to the Agency are specified in negotiated detail. These subsidiary arrangements are not published. The most specific safeguards documents are the facility attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements. These state exactly what will be done at each facility containing nuclear material, and lay out the ``Material Balance Areas'' the Agency will establish for accounting purposes. The flow of nuclear material across these areas must be reported to the Agency. The facility attachments also specify the points at which measurements can be taken or samples withdrawn, the installation of cameras, the access to be afforded to inspectors, the records to be kept, and the anticipated frequency of inspections. These negotiated arrangements are also not published.\9\ Some years ago, the Agency developed internally a set of technical objectives that provide a guideline for determining the level of inspection and reporting that would ensure that, at least for declared facilities in an NPT State, the goal of timely detection by any diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear materials would be met. Concern by inspected States about intrusiveness has resulted in negotiated safeguards agreements that do not come close to meeting these technical objectives, and therefore cannot be said to be producing effective safeguards by any objective criterion. Inspected States have also leaned on the Agency to not even exercise its full rights under the Agreements. In some cases, the Agency itself refrains from exercising its full rights in order to conserve resources. This is a basic problem in that the IAEA's safeguards agreements do not provide for the agency to inspect any location--declared or undeclared--at any time (outside of regularly scheduled routine inspections) without some evidence that the site should be subject to inspection. Nor do the agreements provide for IAEA inspectors to verify use of any material formally exempted from safeguards. Thus, when inspectors doing a routine inspection in Iraq before the war were asked about buildings adjacent to an Iraqi reactor, they were told it was used for nonnuclear research. Since they were undeclared sites and IAEA had no evidence of suspect activity, the agency had no basis to inspect the building, which, as it turned out, contained a radiochemical laboratory used for research on plutonium separation. Furthermore, the safeguards agreements ensure that there is no such thing as a surprise inspection, even though, in principle, IAEA has the right to make ``unannounced'' or short-notice inspections. Routine inspections must provide the state with at least 24 hours notice, and IAEA must advise the State periodically of its general program of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general period when inspections are foreseen. Hence, States generally know when and where inspections will occur, and in any case, have control over the timing of admission of inspectors to the country and to the facility. The Gulf War has produced a situation where the IAEA has successfully used its authority to conduct special inspections in Iraq backed up by U.N. authority, and has received voluntary offers from a number of states to allow such inspections of declared or undeclared facilities. One of those states was North Korea, which afterward withdrew its offer after the agency demanded to inspect two sites the North Koreans didn't want inspected. Those sites will be inspected at some time in the future (at least 5 years) under the U.S./North Korea framework agreement, which has the unfortunate effect of leaving the agency holding the bag despite its claims of access. The IAEA has also not resolved the problem that it cannot verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials exempted by the agency from inspection. Such materials may involve (1) special fissionable material in gram quantities used for instrumentation; (2) nuclear material for production of alloys or ceramics in non-nuclear applications; (3) plutonium (Pu) of a certain isotope concentration (e.g., high in Pu- 238); or (4) limited quantities ranging from 1kgm of Pu to 20 tons of depleted uranium. Iraq used an exemption for a spent fuel assembly to conduct research on separating plutonium without informing the agency. The agency had no authority to routinely verify what Iraq said it was doing with the spent fuel assembly. It should be emphasized that the IAEA's problems are not only with the Iraqs of the world. It has problems with many states who are not suspected of weapons development. As Lawrence Scheinman has pointed out; ``Over the past twenty years, the Agency has experienced restraints on its right of access, on the intensity and frequency of inspection efforts, and even on the extent to which it could exercise its discretionary judgment in planning, scheduling, and conducting inspection''\10\. To this should be added that the Agency's technical objectives are themselves unrealistic because they are based on ``significant quantities'' of fissionable material that are at least twice as large as the amounts that a non-weapon- State might need to construct its first nuclear explosive device. Why doesn't the IAEA lower the amount it considers a ``significant quantity''? Because inspections would then have to be more frequent and more intrusive, and the agency political support to make this move. Raising the financial question exposes the agency's ``dirty little secret''. Because safeguards are supposed to be applied nondiscriminatively, much of the Agency's safeguards budget goes to safeguards in Germany, Japan, and Canada, while the largest current proliferation concerns are elsewhere. The agency, which has been on a zero-growth budget for the better part of a decade, attempts to address its budget problems by slacking off on some inspections of facilities it considers not of proliferation concern. But in so doing it converts its nondiscriminatory character to the status of myth and risks internal political turmoil. It cannot help this because the cost of safeguarding bulk- handling nuclear facilities such as enrichment, reprocessing, or fuel fabrication plants is enormous, requiring, in most cases, on-site location of inspectors and much better instrumentation and measurements. While the IAEA has only been required to safeguard small reprocessing plants thus far, the ability of the agency to safeguard effectively (leaving aside the expense) a commercial scale reprocessing plant, such as the one being built at Rokkasho in Japan, has been called into question by many people over the years. A very interesting analysis done by Marvin Miller11 for the Nuclear Control Institute shows that, for a reprocessing plant with an 800 tonne/yr. capacity and an average plutonium content of 0.9%, with a (1)% uncertainty in the input measurement of plutonium (and assuming this dominates the error in measuring MUF); and with a material balance calculation done once a year, the absolute value of the MUF variance (i.e., the error in measuring MUF) will be 72 kgm/ yr. In that case, the minimum amount of diverted plutonium that could be distinguished form this measurement ``noise'' with detection and false alarm probabilities of 95% and 5% respectively is 246 kgm or more than 30 significant quantities. No other conclusion is admissible than that ``timely detection'' of plutonium diversion from a reprocessing plant is an oxymoron. This problem was recognized during consideration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 where the concept of ``timely detection'' of a diversion was translated into the concept of ``timely warning'' of weapons development or construction. The intent of the authors was that, from a technical point of view, timely warning was unavailable in the case of plutonium diversion if it is assumed that the non-nuclear elements of the bomb have been constructed or assembled a priori. The NNPA provided that the President could still allow U.S.-origin spent fuel to be reprocessed in a foreign country if political factors make the risk of proliferation sufficiently low even though ``timely warning'' of weapons construction would not be available to the United States. Not wanting to admit that reprocessing, especially commercial scale reprocessing, was a dangerous, not effectively safeguardable, activity, Reagan Administration officials boldly and falsely interpreted the NNPA language as incorporating political factors into the definition of timely warning, thereby depriving the concept of any objective meaning. (See 12 for a full discussion of the history of the ``timely warning'' criterion in the

Mr. GLENN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. BAUCUS addressed the Chair.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include my name as a cosponsor of the amendment offered by my colleague and friend from Delaware, the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Roth, expressing the sense of the Senate on the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, better known as NPT, which entered into force on March 5, 1970.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I would like to raise my concerns related to the pending supplemental appropriations bill. I certainly understand the difficulty under which the Appropriations Committee must work, particularly when the budget deficit looms as large as it does. But, I am concerned, Madam President, about the precedent set in this bill by requiring that emergency supplemental spending be fully offset. In the past, Congress and the administration have agreed to allow for emergency spending without requiring offsets, but taking offsets in a more benign manner, usually in cases where programs have been canceled or where contract funds were available because they could not be obligated during the fiscal year for which they were provided. The supplemental before us takes a much different approach that bears dramatic consequences. By requiring complete offsets from prior year funding, we really are not cutting lower priority programs as a result of tight fiscal constraints. We are victimizing programs basically because they are in slower spending accounts and their funds are still available to raid. I know a number of my colleagues have expressed similar concerns and I am hopeful that we can craft a new method of funding future emergency spending. I also note, Madam President, that this approach may be more easily accomplished in the earlier quarters of a fiscal year, but what happens later in the year after we have exhausted the resources of these slower spending accounts? Will we bring our normal planned operations, maintenance, and training to a screeching halt? Will we stop paying our troops? This is what will happen when we require the cost of contingency operations to be paid from the current operating budget for operations in places like Iraq, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. Shortfalls in training and maintenance are the very kinds of actions for which the administration has been criticized and which the President's supplemental request is intended to avoid. I appreciate the committee's desire and attempt to impose fiscal responsibility and I appreciate the committee's efforts to keep the technology reinvestment project, the so-called TRP, alive, but I don't believe we should fool ourselves that requiring complete offsets does not have important implications for the overall readiness of our Armed Forces. The effect of this bill, Madam President, is to reduce current defense spending by $1.9 billion. This is particularly curious, Madam President, at a time when the majority, in its Contract With America, calls for additional spending to ensure readiness. Today's supplemental eats our seed corn in a number of important areas. This bill will cut over $500 million from defense research and development programs. To me, research and development ensures the Nation's future readiness. Make no mistake, yesterday's investment in R&D is what is winning today's battles. It is short sighted, in my view, to downplay or overlook the critical research and development plays in our overall readiness. I would like to take a moment, to direct my comments to two programs that have been embroiled in the debate over how to fund this supplemental request. They are the TRP Program and the Department of Commerce's Advanced Technology Program. I am very much relieved that the committee did not take the same kind of draconian cuts the House made and I urge the committee to maintain its position on these programs in conference with the House. I, like virtually every other Member of this body, have been a strong supporter of the technology reinvestment project [TRP]. When Congress first crafted this program in 1992, incorporating the recommendations of both the Democratic and the Republican task forces on defense conversion, the program received virtually universal support. Several Members on both sides of the aisle came to the floor to express their support for the program and the amendment providing funding for the program was adopted by a vote of 91 to 2. To suggest now that TRP funding is not a high priority is to forget the level of support this program has enjoyed. It is not surprising either because the TRP is an innovative, and I might add a more cost effective, way for the Department of Defense to meet its research and development requirements. The Defense Department has always spent a portion of its R&D funds on dual-use technologies, notwithstanding recent claims that funding for dual-use technologies is some sort of a handout. The truth of the matter is that DOD will continue to be involved in developing dual-use technologies, because one of the uses in any given dual-use technology is its military use. The operative question becomes how do we go about developing this dual-use technology that the military needs. The military can pay the full freight and develop it on its own as it has in the past. Or, the military can try to get the private sector to pay for half of it, since the dual-use technology also will have a commercial application. It seems simple to me. Do we want to pay full price or half price? I prefer to take advantage of the discount. TRP is not a subsidy or grant program for contractors. If anything, it is like a reverse subsidy for DOD, Mr. President. Just one example bears this out. The uncooled infrared rifle sight technology under development through TRP funding will help soldiers locate and engage the enemy in bad weather. In the private sector, it can be used by industry to detect energy losses in houses and buildings. Under a TRP funded, dual use approach the military's goal is to reduce per unit, by tapping into the potential commercial market which is 10 times larger than the military requirement. Without TRP, the military could pay 10 times more for the same technology. TRP funding is a small investment, accounting for less than two- tenths of 1 percent of this year's Defense budget request. Yet, it leverages those defense dollars through industry cost-sharing and it could yield significant benefits to long-term military readiness. To kill the technology reinvestment project, as the House bill would do, would be like killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. It just does not make sense. Madam President, my concern about efforts to erode government- industry joint efforts to develop next-generation technology extends to the House-passed $107 million rescission of funds for the Advanced Technology Program [ATP]. ATP is cost-shared, industry-led, competitively awarded R&D which pursues cutting edge technologies with strong potential for later commercial success but technology that presently is too risky or too long term to be pursued by industry alone. Like TRP, ATP was developed with strong bipartisan support in the Congress. ATP is intended to capitalize on America's strength in research and development to create jobs and economic growth, and increase our competitiveness in the global economy. While I believe any cut in these critical technology programs is extraordinarily short- sighted, at least the Senate has reduced the amount of the rescission to $32 million; I urge my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to do everything they can to maintain the Senate position in conference. Finally, Madam President, I cannot yield the floor without expressing my concern over the cuts taken in both the Defense Environmental Restoration Account and the Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program. A number of my colleagues have identified environmental cleanup as lower priority spending that could be used for other programs. This is terribly wrong headed Mr. President. I hope that the cuts taken in this supplemental do not signal the beginning of a full scale assault on these important programs in the future. Both DOD and DOE have legal obligations to clean up their facilities. We already know that failure to meet cleanup milestones will result in fines and penalties. In addition, for DOE, the cost to cleanup will increase substantially simply by virtue of the delay. I intend to address this issue at greater length in a separate statement. Like the mechanic in the transmission commercial, you can either pay me now or you can pay me later. But, it will cost more later. I yield the floor.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by my friend from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers. While we share many similar interests and beliefs, it seems that we are usually on opposite sides of the issue when it comes to debating NASA and aerospace issues. In this case, I believe my friend's amendment is misguided and would bring a premature end to what promises to be valuable national facility. I would also like to congratulate the chairman of the HUD/VA Appropriation Subcommittee, Senator Bond, as well as Senator Mikulski for laying out the very convincing arguments for proceeding with this program. Mr. President, no one can doubt the vital role which wind tunnels play in the design of aircraft and engines. In fact in my earlier career, I had first-hand experience with what can be learned with these type of facilities. I would like to begin my remarks with a short description of how these facilities are actually used. Wind tunnels are used in two major ways for airplane design. First, they are used to develop and confirm aerodynamically the geometric shape of the airplane and its wings. Improvements in airplane aerodynamics lead to reduced fuel consumption and improved economics. While computer testing, called computational fluid dynamics, is playing an increasingly important role in aircraft design, it has in no way replaced wind tunnel development and testing. The second major way wind tunnels are used in airplane design is to help predict handling qualities, controllability, aerodynamic loads, fuel consumption, inlet/nozzle/nacelle and such important characteristics as takeoff and landing speeds. Wind tunnel testing provides the most accurate method for predicting crucial airplane characteristics. Wind tunnel test data are used in preflight prediction of drag, weight, and propulsive efficiency. Mr. President, during the debate on wind tunnels we will hear mentioned two particular parameters used to describe the capability of wind tunnels. The first term is ``Mach number'' and the second is ``Reynolds number.'' Mach number is the more familiar term and is defined as a ratio of vehicle speed to the speed of sound. Determination of Mach number is critical for high-speed flight. The Reynolds number is defined as the ratio of the inertia forces to the viscous forces that a fluid exerts on a surface as it flows past. The Reynolds number is also related to Mach number. The National Academy of Sciences has found that ``high productivity, high Reynolds-number subsonic and transonic development wind tunnels * * * [will lead to improved aircraft] cruise and takeoff/landing performance by at least 10 percent each.'' Mr. President, a 10-percent improvement in airplane performance benefits our economy and our environment. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the executive summary from the aforementioned National Academy study, Aeronautical Facilities: Assessing the National Plan for Aeronautical Ground Test Facilities. The value of such scientific advances in helping to keep the American aircraft industry in the forefront of international sales is obvious. In fact, had it not been for the outstanding work done over many, many years by our aerodynamicists using the world's most advanced wind tunnels, our leadership in both military and commercial aircraft would never have taken place. Commercial sales of U.S. aircraft would not comprise our largest single factor in balance of payments outside of agriculture. Now we see foreign nations with more modern tunnels than we have, along with an expanding group of scientists and aerodynamicists. This does not bode well for America's future lead in designing and building the finest aircraft in the world. That is important for both our military and commercial aircraft. Existing U.S. wind tunnels have served us well; and have helped make the U.S. aircraft industry the world leader. In fact much of what has been learned from wind tunnels has occurred in my home State of Ohio, at NASA's Lewis Research Center. Unfortunately the upgrades and improvements to the been made. Existing U.S. wind tunnels have the following problems: Inadequate capability in Reynolds number; low productivity, with emphasis on research; average of facilities is between 30-40 years, with the associated problems of old technology and high maintenance costs. In fact, all but two of the U.S. wind tunnels have been operating for more than 30 years, and the two exceptions are low Reynolds number, special purpose facilities used only for light commercial and military airplane development. Mr. President, most existing U.S. wind tunnels were funded by the Federal Government. And as my colleagues have discussed, the newer facilities in Europe have been built with substantial Government support. While I believe that Senator Bumpers is correct in pointing out the apparent disparity in the industry's contribution to this facility, I would argue that a final deal has not yet been signed. I would encourage the administration to continue to pursue the best possible sharing of cost. Mr. President, I will conclude by asking our colleagues to look to the future. In 10-20 years I hope that environmentally acceptable, supersonic commercial airliners and transports will be a practical, economic reality, and will be manufactured in the United States of America. Mr. President, I encourage my colleagues to vote against the Bumpers amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the aforementioned summary of the National Academy study be printed in the Record.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. For example, during this same timeframe, the Farmers Home Administration [FmHA] obligated over $34 billion for disaster emergency loans and wrote off about $7.5 billion. That is not too bad in a situation like this, I do not think. To sum up, we have spent directly over $64 billion between fiscal years 1977 and 1993 and some $55 billion indirectly through low-cost Government loans. While this data is the best we have to date, it is not exhaustive. It excludes what we have spent to repair or rebuild damaged Federal Government facilities, which we do not currently track. It also does not include costs incurred by the Federal Government through subsidies and disaster insurance programs. During this timeframe, we spent about $10 billion on the Federal Crop Insurance Program and almost $3 billion in costs through FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program. Last year, Congress did change both of these programs to make them more cost-effective, to minimize potential losses but still provide protection from these tragic events at a reasonable cost. We soon will consider another supplemental bill to pay for additional costs from the Northridge earthquake. I know this is something my distinguished co-chair will be holding a hearing on, I believe tomorrow, in the HUD-VA Subcommittee on Appropriations, and particularly how we are going to pay for this request. That is a tough one. As our communities continue to grow, so do our potential risks and liabilities. We need to see if there are better ways to prepare financially for such catastrophic events. Increasingly, the debates on disaster relief aid and where the money comes from have grown rather contentious, and that is understandable. Since these measures are deemed ``emergencies,'' they have not been subject to budget caps requiring program offsets, so they add to the deficit. Also, these bills have become too often the proverbial Christmas trees for items that may have little or no bearing on our disaster response efforts. In other words, people know this legislation is going to go through, it is going to pass in some form, so whatever their pet program is, with the Senate's lack of germaneness rules, it can be brought out and attached. It is something I think we ought to correct in Senate rules and procedures sometime in the future. But anyway, this tendency to treat some of these emergency bills as Christmas trees has attracted heightened scrutiny and distracts us and the public from our purpose at hand, which is to help fellow citizens in their time of need. The report we are releasing today proposes several funding and budgetary options for consideration of the Senate. By changing current procedures, these options could reduce the use of emergency supplementals and lower total Federal spending--but at a price, making it harder to provide such aid. Our mission with this report was not one of coming up with one firm, solid recommendation. It was to lay out options for the Senate's consideration. It was to define problems, how we have dealt with these things in the past, and what options we have for dealing with them in the future. Each of these options is more fully described in an appendix to my statement, which I ask unanimous consent be included at the completion of my remarks, Mr. President.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I want to say once again what a great job Senator Bond did on this report. I think that is exactly what the Senate had in mind when they asked us to do this. I congratulate him. We worked on it very closely together.

Mr. GLENN. Each of these options has its own advantages and disadvantages, and there probably is no clean, pure and simple magic bullet because, for one reason, we do not have clean and simple disasters out there so we can plan for them in advance like we might prefer to do. There are five basic options: First, tighten the criteria for using the emergency safety valve of the Budget Enforcement Act. In other words, setting a threshold on what is categorized as truly emergency spending. This could mean that States don't always request Federal funding on things that normally, in times past, could and should have been taken care of by the local community or the county or the State government. Second, fund disaster programs at historic average levels. Third, establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster expenses for Federal disaster relief. Fourth, eliminate the emergency safety valve and cut other spending to offset the cost of disaster assistance. Fifth, allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental containing an emergency designation. Those are five options. With increasing budgetary constraints, these approaches deserve serious consideration. I know Senator Bond is going to be on the hot seat grappling with these issues on his appropriations subcommittee, particularly what the implications are if his subcommittee accounts will have to absorb much of the current supplemental request. In other words, what is going to get cut if it all has to come out of his subcommittee accounts. I do not think it right that this should happen, but that is one of the things he has to deal with--whether these funds will come out of veterans programs, out of the space station, or out of low-income housing, all of which are covered under his subcommittee. And those are going to be tough decisions. I hope he would not have to make those decisions from within just the confines of that budget restriction, and that we could make separate funds available for emergency consideration. Being forced to change the rules in the middle of the game is a very serious policy change and one we should not adopt lightly. Another area I wish to address is the rise in the number of Presidentially declared disasters. disasters, but in 1993 there were 58. Now, whether that is the result of Mother Nature becoming more testy or whether it is classifying more types of events as declared national disasters than in the past, or more generous Presidents--or a combination of all of these things--remains to be seen. But as the report suggests, we might want to examine setting very explicit and objective criteria for Presidential disaster declarations. I also want to note two integral components of our emergency management system. We depend on the States and localities--the emergency managers, the firefighters, the rescue squads and, sometimes, the National Guard--to be the primary responders in times of difficulty, times of disaster. And that is as it has been in the past. We do not want it to be that every time some disaster occurs, the Federal Government is called in to do everything rather than having State and local people be mainly responsible themselves. The efforts of these primary responders, the emergency managers, the firefighters, rescue squads and, sometimes, the Guard are augmented through the good work of charitable organizations like the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and many other worthy religious, church, and professional groups. Locally, they provide what historically has been the way in this country of ours, and that is that neighbors take care of neighbors, locals take care of locals, States take care of their own situation as much as possible and only call on the Federal Government to supplement their efforts when things are basically out of control. Now, our report highlights their special role and the enormous contributions made by thousands of dedicated volunteers. But we, the Federal Government, need to supplement their efforts where disasters get beyond the resources of local communities. By and large, this system has worked well for the vast majority of disasters. It is only when we have a truly catastrophic disaster, one that is beyond the capabilities of these entities, that the Federal Government enters the picture in any significant way. It is not to say, however, there is no room for improvement. A section of our study looks at how Federal assistance to States, localities and individuals is being spent. The short answer is: We really do not know. We must do a better job in overseeing what results we are getting for our money, whether the funds are being used effectively, and if program objectives are being met. Further, I was also struck by the sheer number of Federal disaster programs we currently have spread across many agencies. I think it is imperative we begin to look at whether any of these are redundant or duplicative, can be done more efficiently, or organized differently. Can they be streamlined or consolidated to maximize resources and increase their efficiency? In a time of budget constraints, a thorough review of the mission, the management and organization of these various agency programs is long overdue. We must also remember that our disaster response system is, in fact, a partnership which is, indeed, a hallmark of our federal system. I know that some States take these matters quite seriously but others, perhaps, less so. As States have been faced with their own fiscal constraints, too often their emergency management programs get cut to the bone with the assumption: ``Why bother; the Feds will come to the rescue.'' That is the wrong attitude. Our own position is shaky enough. We must ensure that the States are doing their part to uphold their end of the bargain. I think it is telling that before this study took shape, neither FEMA nor the States had an idea of what the States were spending or getting for their emergency management and related programs. And thanks to this effort, FEMA is now working with the National Emergency Managers Association [NEMA] to do just that. I think it is critical to know exactly how the States shape up in this regard. The report also suggests a number of ideas to improve Federal-State coordination such as: adopting performance standards; providing incentives for planning and mitigation; cost-sharing reductions for those not up to par; more frequent exercises and training, and; very importantly, I believe, post disaster analysis to learn what worked, what did not, were the money and resources well spent. In short, to determine lessons learned after each disaster. We should work with the States to implement these approaches, and FEMA is now beginning to do that. We also must make sure FEMA itself has the capabilities to effectively manage and oversee this effort so we will better know how well or how poorly the States are doing their job. So, again, I wish to recommend to my colleagues they take a look at our task force report. I thank all those who have devoted their time and effort to putting it together. In particular, GAO did an outstanding job in supervising and coordinating this effort. It is a job well done. And I already have asked unanimous consent the appendix be printed in the Record. I want to close by giving full credit to my cochair in this effort, Senator Bond. After the election of last fall, when the leadership in the Senate changed, we sort of changed roles on this a bit. He took a major role from there on in putting this whole thing together and has done a superb job. I compliment him for his efforts in this regard, for leading this effort. It has been a pleasure to work with him on it. We have made a report that does not solve all of our problems, but under his leadership, and working with him, I think we have been able to put together a report that is the most definitive report ever on disaster relief assistance, the Federal role, its historical connotations, and to provide some suggestions for the Senate's guidance of how we should deal with this in the future. It has been a pleasure to deal with Senator Bond on this. I know he will submit our report on this officially. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 Appendix--Task Force Budgetary and Funding Options i. tighten criteria for using the emergency safety valve of the budget enforcement act (bea) This option would require Congress and the President to issue specific, written justifications for designating appropriations as emergencies to escape funding constraints. Such formal criteria could impose a higher threshold that funding measures would have to hurdle to avoid the disciplines of the BEA. How high the threshold would be raised--and how much savings might result--is an open question. But such written justifications would provide Members more information and would presumably give those opposing such funding a more defined target. ii. fund disaster programs at historic average levels This alternative would require appropriations for FEMA, SBA disaster loans, and other disaster programs to be made in regular appropriations bills in amounts equal to an historic average or expected funding need for each program before the emergency designation could be used for supplemental funds. In theory, this should increase regular appropriations for such programs and lower the amounts of emergency supplementals. Currently, the appropriation request for FEMA is loosely based on an historic average, which was calculated years ago and excludes the costs of major disasters. FEMA's regular appropriation was $292 million in 1994. Had the 10-year average of about $645 million been appropriated, the size of FEMA supplementals would have been about $350 million smaller. If the appropriations caps were unchanged--meaning spending in other programs was reduced to accommodate this-- the Federal deficit would have been $350 million less. It should be noted that, since 1993, firefighting programs of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have been funded based on a 10-year moving average. These programs also have the authority to borrow from other accounts. Since this practice was begun, no supplementals for these activities have been necessary. On the other hand, unobligated balances could accumulate in the program accounts during some periods. If they grew large enough, it would be awfully tempting to lower the threshold of what is really a disaster, be more generous in our response, or to raid it for other purposes. Of course, setting strict definitions of eligible disasters and developing procedures that would isolate this account money could be part of any legislative package to carry out this option. III. establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster expenses for federal disaster relief This approach would create a so-called rainy day fund, or reserve account, financed raising new taxes, or a combination of both. Annual payments to the fund could be made until some desired balance is reached. Spending from this account could be subject to appropriation at the whenever the need arose. Unlike the previous option--where the executive branch could obligate accumulated account funds on their own--this approach would allow Congress to retain the discretion over using this money. This option would cause disaster relief to be paid for up front--either by spending cuts or higher taxes--rather than borrowing and increasing the deficit, as we do now. But again, there could be some temptation--particularly in times of fewer, less costly disasters--for Members to be more generous than envisioned in utilizing any large, accumulated balances in this account. IV. Eliminate the Emergency safety valve and cut other spending to offset the cost of disaster assistance This alternative would remove the emergency safety valve provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. Disaster assistance would be paid for by reducing other spending, thereby lowering the Federal deficit. One version of this option would require that current year spending be reduced. Another approach would mandate that discretionary caps be reduced in future years to offset the increase in current year spending. Under both these scenarios, if there is any unnecessary or excess relief now provided, it would be far less likely to occur in this modified pay-as-you-go procedure. Of course, as spending caps grow increasingly tighter, finding the programs to cut to accommodate the variable needs of disaster relief is going to be all the more difficult. V. allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental containing an emergency designation This option would establish a new point of order in the House and Senate against considering any bill or joint resolution containing an emergency appropriation if it also provides an appropriation for any other nonemergency activity. While not directly addressing disaster assistance funding, it seeks to eliminate the ``Christmas tree'' addons. Opponents of this change could argue there is a longstanding practice of considering supplemental funding needs en masse, and this would be akin to requiring separate votes on provisions of regular appropriations bills. Whether or not this approach would actually reduce the deficit is also open. Nonemergency items in supplementals must be estimated to have no net effect on the deficit, since there is no room left under the spending caps. So some would contend that while the policy might change, the Federal deficit likely would not.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am very pleased at this time, along with my friend and colleague from Missouri, Mr. Bond, as cochairs to lay before the Senate the Final Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief. The task force was established pursuant to a sense-of- the-Senate resolution contained in Public Law 103-211, the emergency supplemental appropriations relief bill for victims of the Northridge, CA, earthquake. I think I can speak for Senator Bond when I say that our sense of accomplishment in presenting this report is somewhat tempered by events past and present, in that we have just marked the solemn 1-year anniversary of the devastating California earthquake. For all the good that has happened in the past year, thanks to selfless efforts by friends, neighbors, charities and, yes, Government bureaucrats of all stripes, we know that for so many their lives have been irrevocably changed. We also share the grief and shock of the Japanese people who had a tragedy of their own, the horrendous Kobe earthquake. We know the character of the Japanese people, and given some time and help--and we are glad President Clinton and the able Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], James Lee Witt, have offered some of our technical expertise--we know the Japanese will soon be on their feet again. These catastrophes--and need I mention the terribly destructive floods which recently rained down on California--underscore the importance of having an integrated and comprehensive emergency management system, and we are making great progress toward that goal today. Our task force was commissioned to look at Federal disaster assistance programs, funding and effectiveness, possible program and policy modifications, budgetary and funding options, and the role of State, local, and other service providers. The report covers a spectrum of issues on how we can best ensure that Federal assistance will always be there when needed and how our disaster response system might be made more efficient and more cost- effective. Given the enormity of this project, Senator Bond and I decided to enlist the resources of congressional entities such as the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], the Library of Congress, and, in particular, the General Accounting Office [GAO], which we tasked to coordinate and take the lead working with our staff on the preparation of this study. The end product, I believe, is a testament to the professional work and collaboration of all of these different groups and bodies. Many individuals labored long and hard, and we in the Senate owe them a debt of gratitude. One of the more striking aspects we found was the lack of comprehensive Government-wide data on Federal disaster expenditures. I had thought going in this would be readily available. We found it was not. While most agencies can produce statistics for a particular disaster or annual spending, the number of persons assisted and estimated benefits, these have not been systematically collected across Government--until now. GAO has totaled up how much we have spent across the board between 1977 through 1993. In doing so, they examined our disaster planning, mitigation response, and recovery programs, and these programs I would like to describe in just a little bit more detail. Our disaster preparedness and mitigation programs consist chiefly of FEMA grants and assistance for fire suppression, floodplain management, earthquake and hurricane vulnerability; flood control and coastal erosion works under the Army Corps of Engineers; NOAA's severe weather tracking programs; U.S.G.S. earthquake and volcanic reduction programs, and; coastal zone management activities through the Department of Commerce. In the area of Federal disaster response and recovery programs, we are dealing primarily with FEMA's individual and public assistance grants, temporary housing, community disaster loans, and unemployment benefits; Small Business Administration loans; repairing crucial roadways through the Department of Transportation; aid for the restoration of school facilities by the Department of Education; disaster Administration; emergency disaster assistance loans, payments and food stamps administered by the Department of Agriculture, and; the Army Corps' emergency water supply operations and flood control and coastal works repair. To state the obvious, our emergency management system is far, far more complex than most people realize. It involves quite a number of Government agencies. I should note that these figures do not include FEMA's mission assignment requests of other agencies to provide specific types of assistance, depending on the situation and the need. There is a pervasive cynicism in our land today that derides Government's ability to deliver efficient and effective services and to return taxpayer dollars in a meaningful way to those who sent them to Washington in the first place. In short, to touch people's lives when there is a desperate need. What I just listed does that and more. We may talk about cutting Government, but these programs I feel are real, they are vital, and they are indispensable. If in times of major emergencies we do not provide this assistance, then who will? I spent many days on the floor managing the minority side for the unfunded mandates bill and agree with much of what is said by States and localities regarding Federal mandates. But what we, the Feds, have spent in helping States and our citizens prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters has never really been quantified until today. This report shows that from fiscal years 1977 through 1993, Federal agencies obligated almost $120 billion for emergency management programs--$120 billion in constant 1993 dollars for emergency management programs. Most of which, about $87 billion, was for post-disaster recovery assistance. Over $64 billion, 54 percent of the total, was in the form of either grants to disaster victims and communities or expenses from disaster-related activities and response. Some $55 billion, 46 percent of the total, consisted of various disaster recovery loans made by FEMA, SBA, or the Farmers Home Administration. Since a large portion of the loans will ultimately be repaid, the entire loan amount is not necessarily a Federal cost, though costs are incurred through subsidized interest rates and when loans are forgiven or are written off. (Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate return to regular order.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted time to submit the final report of the Senate Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, which Senator Bond and I were commissioned to do last year. And I ask that the pending business be set aside so we can present that report.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. The Senator is correct. The ADA and sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are explicitly excluded from coverage under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Specifically, the bill provides that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any provision in a bill or joint resolution before Congress and any provision in any proposed or final Federal regulation that establishes or enforces any statutory rights that prohibit discrimination on the basis of * * * handicapped or disability status.

Mr. GLENN. I thank the Senator for raising these important issues.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, in thanking people who were instrumental in putting together this kind of legislation, I think we probably were remiss in not thanking Tony Coe, who did so much in the legislative counsel's office in putting together draft after draft after draft of this. I saw him walking through the Chamber a moment ago, and I want him to step outside just for a moment. I say to Tony, we thank him for all his efforts. I know he does long hours over in the legislative counsel's office putting together some of these legislative proposals which have to be written and rewritten, as this one was. We were spelling out a while ago people instrumental in getting this legislation through, and Tony certainly deserves to be commended for his efforts on behalf of this legislation, too, and we are glad to recognize him for it. Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.

Mr. GLENN. I yield back my time.

Mr. GLENN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. The vote, as I understand it, will be the second vote tomorrow. Is that correct?

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask that the time be charged to both sides.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I object.