John Glenn

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, this week our nation celebrates the 27th anniversary of Earth Day. In 1970, the inaugural year of Earth Day, the Nation's consciousness was raised about the plight of our environment. The Great Lakes were held up as some of the worst examples of human abuse; Lake Erie was given up for dead, the victim of unrestrained pollution and the misuse of its precious natural resources. The Cuyahoga River caught fire and phosphate-based soap suds washed up on shorelines throughout the Nation. The Great Lakes region responded to the alarm with unprecedented vigor. In 1971 I headed the Governor's Task Force on Environmental Protection in Ohio, a forerunner to today's Ohio EPA. In a spirit of regional cooperation, the surrounding States, Native American Tribes, and Canada entered into collective agreements that recognized the Great Lakes as a set of shared resources within a single ecosystem. Important environmental legislation was designed and implemented to combat pollution and clean up the environment. Since that time, water quality has improved dramatically and fisheries scientists are witnessing recovery of fish populations in each of the lakes. Lake Erie is experiencing rebounds in lake whitefish populations thought impossible just 10 years ago. This past summer, the Fish and Wildlife Service announced that lake trout populations in Lake Superior are now self-sustaining, needing no further stocking. There are many success stories in the Great Lakes, suggesting the ecological health of our lakes is on the mend, but the job is not yet complete. Degraded habitats, reduced fish and wildlife populations, and the threat from nonindigenous species still imperil the well being of our lakes. Today my colleague from the House of Representatives, Congressman La Tourette of Ohio, and I will introduce a bill into the House and Senate that will continue the recovery process of the Great Lakes and their associated natural resources. This bill, the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1997 builds upon the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1990. The 1990 act authorized the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to undertake a comprehensive study to first, assess the status of fishery resources and their habitats and second, to gauge the effectiveness of management strategies used to protect these resources. The study's findings recommend a definite course of action for the continued restoration of the region's natural resources. The full implementation of the strategic plan for management of Great Lakes fisheries and the institution of a comprehensive and standardized ecological monitoring system for all lakes are just 2 of 32 specific recommendations set forth by the study. The Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act represents a new generation of environmental legislation, one that recognizes the complexity and interrelatedness of ecosystems. This act seeks to address natural resource management in a comprehensive and conscientious manner by building partnerships among the Great Lakes States, United States and Canadian Governments, and Native American tribes. Through regional cooperation, I believe we can address the environmental and economic concerns of the Great Lakes basin and continue the recovery that began some 27 years ago. By supporting this legislation, we in the Congress will be taking the right next step toward responsible stewardship of the Great Lakes as we venture into the new millenium.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, this week our nation celebrates the 27th anniversary of Earth Day. In 1970, the inaugural year of Earth Day, the Nation's consciousness was raised about the plight of our environment. The Great Lakes were held up as some of the worst examples of human abuse; Lake Erie was given up for dead, the victim of unrestrained pollution and the misuse of its precious natural resources. The Cuyahoga River caught fire and phosphate-based soap suds washed up on shorelines throughout the Nation. The Great Lakes region responded to the alarm with unprecedented vigor. In 1971 I headed the Governor's Task Force on Environmental Protection in Ohio, a forerunner to today's Ohio EPA. In a spirit of regional cooperation, the surrounding States, Native American Tribes, and Canada entered into collective agreements that recognized the Great Lakes as a set of shared resources within a single ecosystem. Important environmental legislation was designed and implemented to combat pollution and clean up the environment. Since that time, water quality has improved dramatically and fisheries scientists are witnessing recovery of fish populations in each of the lakes. Lake Erie is experiencing rebounds in lake whitefish populations thought impossible just 10 years ago. This past summer, the Fish and Wildlife Service announced that lake trout populations in Lake Superior are now self-sustaining, needing no further stocking. There are many success stories in the Great Lakes, suggesting the ecological health of our lakes is on the mend, but the job is not yet complete. Degraded habitats, reduced fish and wildlife populations, and the threat from nonindigenous species still imperil the well being of our lakes. Today my colleague from the House of Representatives, Congressman La Tourette of Ohio, and I will introduce a bill into the House and Senate that will continue the recovery process of the Great Lakes and their associated natural resources. This bill, the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1997 builds upon the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1990. The 1990 act authorized the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to undertake a comprehensive study to first, assess the status of fishery resources and their habitats and second, to gauge the effectiveness of management strategies used to protect these resources. The study's findings recommend a definite course of action for the continued restoration of the region's natural resources. The full implementation of the strategic plan for management of Great Lakes fisheries and the institution of a comprehensive and standardized ecological monitoring system for all lakes are just 2 of 32 specific recommendations set forth by the study. The Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act represents a new generation of environmental legislation, one that recognizes the complexity and interrelatedness of ecosystems. This act seeks to address natural resource management in a comprehensive and conscientious manner by building partnerships among the Great Lakes States, United States and Canadian Governments, and Native American tribes. Through regional cooperation, I believe we can address the environmental and economic concerns of the Great Lakes basin and continue the recovery that began some 27 years ago. By supporting this legislation, we in the Congress will be taking the right next step toward responsible stewardship of the Great Lakes as we venture into the new millenium.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. I thank the Chair, and I ask the Chair to please notify me when I have used 6 minutes. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to vote in favor of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention with its 28 agreed conditions. So far in this century, we have witnessed the use of chemical weapons in Europe, in China and in the Middle East, and we have seen the absolutely revolting photographs of victims of chemical weapons attacks at the Iraqi village of Halabja and the Tokyo subway. Some of us may have seen the famous photograph of the great violinist, Isaac Stern, performing in Israel while wearing a gas mask during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Let there be no doubt about it, these weapons do present a clear and present danger to our security and the security of our allies around the world. They have not acquired the nickname, ``poor man's nukes'' for nothing. They are cheap to make, easy to conceal, and can have devastating effects. Since 1995, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs has held six hearings titled ``Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' which documented in vivid detail the gravity of the threat our country faces from both chemical and biological weapons. The three committee prints covering these hearings contain over 2,000 pages of relevant documentation. While I was chairman of that committee, I chaired personally four hearings on ``Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons.'' In 1989, that produced another 746 pages of documentation on these threats and the various choices facing our country by way of responses. Mr. President, today is not the day for additional hand wringing over these nightmares. Today is the day finally to do something truly constructive to alleviate these threats and stop the hand wringing. In this case, constructive means multilateral, since we are dealing here with a truly global threat, not one susceptible to solution by unilateral U.S. legislation. For example, bills like S. 495, which passed a badly divided Senate last week after virtually no serious debate and without a single hearing, would, if enacted, impose yet another death penalty, while opening up several new loopholes for continued U.S. possession of both chemical and biological weapons. Fortunately, we have an alternative approach to consider. Today, we can vote on a resolution providing our advice and consent to ratify a treaty that does not just address the problem of halting the proliferation of these weapons, but a treaty that will also set the world on a course finally to eliminate such weapons everywhere. Though we will not obviously achieve these goals overnight simply by ratifying the CWC, we will be taking a crucial step toward achieving that ultimate goal. My argument, simply put, is that we just cannot solve the global problems of the CWC destruction, proliferation, terrorism and warfare by acting alone. The international framework, machinery, reporting procedures, and enforcement and verification mechanisms of this treaty will complement and reinforce--not compete with, substitute for or compromise--our own national military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts against the global CW threat. The time has now come to put into place the international legal foundation necessary to eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. I am proud to be here on this historical occasion to speak on behalf of and to vote in favor of U.S. ratification of this treaty. Mr. President, let me get into some highlights of the CWC. The CWC bans the development, the production, stockpiling, use, and proliferation of chemical weapons. It requires the destruction of existing weapons, chemical agents, and CW production facilities. It breaks new ground with a system of verification that is the most extensive in the history of weapons of mass destruction. On November 23, 1993--over 3 years ago--President Clinton sent this treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Though the Senate has proceeded very, very slowly with the consideration of this treaty, the rest of the world seems prepared to go forward with or without us. Over 160 countries have now signed the treaty and 74 have already ratified it. So with or without U.S. ratification, the treaty will enter into force on April 29 of this year. At that point, world commerce in chemicals and chemical equipment will begin to take place within a multilaterally coordinated system that imposes real costs on nonparties to this convention. It is one reason why I support this treaty. There is a widespread consensus among the military, the intelligence and the defense experts inside our Government that this treaty will serve our national interest. This consensus is bipartisan. Indeed, the convention was negotiated during the Reagan administration, signed by President George Bush and sent to the Congress by President Clinton. Except with respect to nonparties, this treaty is completely nondiscriminatory: It obligates its parties not to develop or to possess chemical weapons, period. It does not divide the world up into one set of countries that may have these weapons and another set that may not. It works from a different premise, one more closely aligned with its cousin, the Biological Weapons Convention--by outlawing such weapons among the parties to the treaty, it will significantly strengthen international diplomatic efforts to make the prohibition truly global. To ensure compliance, the treaty provides a verification system that operates on two dimensions. First, it provides for routine monitoring of potentially sensitive activities at declared chemical weapons sites, storage areas, and relevant civilian chemical industries. Second, it provides for a system of on-site challenge inspections operating on the principle of managed access to ensure the protection of proprietary information, constitutional rights, and national security interests. These inspections will be conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW]. This system of verification has been worked out not just in consultation with industry, but with the strong and continuing support of industry. nothing perfect I believe that this system of verification--coupled with the increased transparency of chemical transfers and activities at chemical facilities around the world--will, when backed by robust national intelligence capabilities, build a level of confidence in the world community sufficient to ensure that the treaty is being observed by its parties. even if imperfect--better than present with no restrictions This view is shared today by our military and intelligence officials. On June 23, 1994, Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized this judgment quite clearly when he testified that--``From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest.'' On August 11, 1994, he specifically testified that--``Because of the regime of declarations, which then can be verified through routine inspection and challenge inspection, I believe that the CWC can be effectively verified.'' The treaty has also been supported by former generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, among many other top military and intelligence officials. It has the full support of the Joint Chiefs. the verification system, in short, represents an appropriate balance between the need for intrusiveness and the need to protect commercial secrets and national security information. As a whole, the treaty will serve U.S. national interests in a number of ways. It will reduce the risk that chemical weapons will be used against our country. It will potentially reduce--but of course not eliminate entirely--the risk of terrorism involving chemical weapons. It will enhance the transparency of activities at chemical facilities around the world and thereby build confidence in CW disarmament. It will serve U.S. interests in combating the proliferation of chemical weapons. And it will, after the 10-year process of destroying existing CW stockpiles, remove many serious environmental hazards that faced citizens who live near plants that produced or stored chemical weapon agents. common criticisms It is not surprising that any great achievement in the realm of disarmament would encounter criticism. I am not going to claim that each and every one of these criticisms is totally unfounded. I am also not going to question the motives of those who make such criticisms. I believe it is good to hear the views of such critics, to listen carefully to their interpretations of the flaws of this treaty, to debate points on which there is disagreement, and to come to a decision on what is in the long-term interest of our country. This is what the whole ratification process is all about. Though no treaty is perfect and the CWC is no exception to this rule, by my reckoning the flaws in this treaty are not sufficient grounds for the Senate not to proceed with ratification. I would now like to discuss briefly some of the main criticisms of the treaty that I have encountered over the many years this treaty has been awaiting a vote in the Senate. No. 1. Lack of universality. It is true, not ever country is a party to this treaty, nor is universal membership even a likelihood anytime soon. It may never be a universal agreement. There are several Arab countries, for example, that will no doubt refuse to enter into binding CW disarmament agreements until an agreement can also be reached concerning Israel's nuclear capability. Is this a sufficient cause to vote against the treaty? Absolutely not. I know of no multilateral disarmament agreement that is truly universal, if that term is defined to mean that all countries on Earth are parties. True, the more countries that join the better. But opting for isolation hardly seems to me to be a rational way for a country to pursue the goal of universality. I cannot imagine anything that would set back the goal of universality of this treaty more than a decision by the Senate of the United States not to vote for ratification of this treaty, or to approve it with killer amendments. I believe this treaty will stand the test of time and will approach universality of membership as confidence grows in its credibility as a force for international peace and security. It will be a challenge for diplomats and national leaders of the 21st century to induce the hold-out countries into the CWC regime. As for the treaty hold-outs specifically in the Middle East-- including Iraq, Libya, and some other Arab states that critics cite as a reason why the United States should not join this treaty--let us remember that no country has a bigger stake in putting a halt to chemical weapon proliferation in that turbulent region than does Israel. And I think it is instructive that Israel has considered and chosen to ignore this particular criticism--it has signed the treaty. No. 2. Verification problems. Now nobody questions that verifying a global ban on possessing or manufacturing chemical weapons will be a difficult undertaking, maybe even an impossible one, if the test of success is the ability to detect the secret manufacture of a small number of such weapons. Nobody doubts the widespread availability of the dual-use materials and know-how needed to make and to deliver chemical weapons. Nobody doubts that such weapons can be manufactured in very small facilities, some even as small as some hearing rooms here in the Senate, as our intelligence officials have openly testified. In light of these basic facts of life about chemical weapons, the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the ``U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention'' (Rpt. 103-390) identified several potential difficulties in verifying this treaty. The committee's report, however, reads not as an indictment of the treaty, but as a convincing reminder of the need for America to maintain and upgrade its intelligence capabilities to grapple with such problems. I am concerned that some of my colleagues and outside commentators have looked at these challenges and simply concluded that it is impossible to verify this, or indeed any, CW disarmament treaty. Though the treaty offers no absolute guarantee against cheating at the level of relatively small-scale violations--it will leave us far more secure than we would be without such a treaty. First, the reporting and inspection provisions of the treaty will enhance the transparency of global flows of chemicals and chemical production equipment--it will also give us better information about how such chemicals are used after they leave international commerce. Second, the challenge inspection system will give the United States a new means to check up on suspicious activities inside countries, including activities that may not even involve chemicals or chemical equipment that entered international commerce. In short, we stand a much better chance of detecting, assessing, and mobilizing collective international action against potential CW-related activities by having a multilateral system of CW disarmament, than we would under the ``go-it-alone'' approach we would be left with as a non-party to this treaty. I think Maj. Gen. John Landry--testifying before the Armed Services Committee as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces--accurately summarized the view of the U.S. intelligence community when he said on August 11, 1994, that ``we are better off with the treaty than without it.'' Former Defense Secretary Perry similarly observed on March 28, 1996, that despite the inherent difficulties of detecting illicit production of small quantities of chemical weapons, ``we also recognize that that [detection capability] would be even more difficult without a CWC.'' Let us keep in mind that when it comes to verifying international compliance with arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation treaties, America does not rely exclusively upon the verification mechanisms in those treaties to judge compliance. Verification is achieved by these mechanisms operating alongside our own national intelligence capabilities. As I stated in my additional views to the SSCI's report on the CWC, the difficulties of monitoring this treaty underscore the importance of maintaining a highly capable U.S. intelligence community. If we work hard toward the goal of universal membership in the CWC and maintain or increase the capabilities of our intelligence community, then the lingering questions about compliance and verification would only fade accordingly. I would not be at all surprised if Russia were to ratify this treaty very soon. It is useful to recall that the Russian scientist who blew the whistle in 1991 and 1992 on illicit Russian chemical weapons activities is now a firm supporter of the CWC as a means to combat just such activities. On November 1, 1995, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov testified as follows before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations about the risk of theft of chemical agents in Russia: I am sure that the system of international inspections provided for under the Chemical Weapons Convention will help address this problem . . . These are very strong tools and I hope that you will do your part to see that they are applied in Russia by pressing for the Senate's ratification of the Convention. The fact that this statement came from someone who is one of Russia's toughest critics on chemical weapons issues will, I hope, inspire other treaty critics to reexamine their own views. No, this is not the time to badger the CWC's verification system because it is unable to guarantee perfect international compliance. I wish we had some domestic criminal laws that would guarantee perfect compliance. Today is a day to rejoice that the CWC's verification system will soon be generating information that will be useful to our national leaders in detecting, characterizing, and defending against chemical weapons threats. When I hear all these criticisms about the treaty's verification system, I can only wonder--if these arguments are true, then why would Israel, which is located in one of the most dangerous neighborhoods on Earth, and which has so much at stake, sign such a treaty? The answer is that the CWC serves Israel's national security interests for precisely the same reason it serves our own national security interests. It deserves the support of all nations, and the more support it has, the better the verification system will become. Remaining outside the CWC is no way to improve its verification system. No. 3. Cost. Now with respect to cost, nobody can possibly predict exactly what it will cost to implement this treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency's annual budget of about $200 million does not serve as a useful indicator of the cost of implementing the CWC given the many different functions of the respective treaty organizations, the IAEA and the OPCW. For fiscal year 1998, the administration has requested $25 million for meeting our CWC assessment and an additional $21 million for multilateral verification at U.S. facilities should that be necessary. This annual financial contribution approximates the cost of a couple of F-16 aircraft. The Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] has estimated that the cost to industry of complying with this treaty is about ``. . . one- onehundredth of one percent of the cost of environmental reporting in the United States.'' CMA estimates that industry's total CWC reporting costs for 1997 would come to less than $250,000 and will decline in subsequent years. CMA has also estimated, however, that the cost to industry of America not ratifying this treaty would be ``hundreds of millions of dollars'' and thousands of jobs. As for the claim by some critics that the treaty will place a heavy regulatory burden on industry, CMA reports that in a recent field test it took less than 2 hours for producers of the broadcast category of materials--discrete organic chemicals--to fill out the appropriate reporting form. Some plant managers have estimated that they could complete this form in as little as 15 minutes. In recent field tests involving materials that are more tightly controlled, it took companies between 2-8 hours to complete the relevant paperwork. This does not seem to me to be an unduly burdensome procedure. We all know that the costs of destroying CW agent material will of course be considerable, particularly in countries like the United States and Russia which have tens of thousands of tons of this material. But U.S. law already requires us to destroy these materials, whether or not we join the CWC. The costs of having to defend against the use of such weapons--costs we have to pay regardless of whether America is a party to the CWC-- will remain considerable, though this expense will decline as the world's stockpiles of CW materials gradually diminish in accordance with the treaty. The treaty, it should be noted, does not outlaw national defenses against chemical weapons nor does it ban military retaliation for CW users. When it comes to measuring the true costs of this treaty, there is an absolute way and a relative way to measure these costs. The absolute approach merely adds up the costs of implementing the treaty and considers such costs in a vacuum. The relative approach compares these costs against various alternatives, such as costs we would have to pay in a world in which chemical war remains a clear and present danger, or a world with a CWC without the United States as a party. I think that any fair assessment would need to compare the costs of implementing the CWC against the costs of chemical war--preparing for one, fighting one, defending against one, deterring one, and recuperating from one. Now there is no way that the absolute costs of implementing this treaty would ever outweigh the devastating costs of coping in a world armed to the teeth with chemical weapons. I just do not accept the argument that the costs of implementing this treaty are greater than the benefits to our national security from membership. No. 4. Sovereignty and secrecy. Under the Constitution, the CWC will be a supreme law of the land. Ironically, some of the same critics of the CWC who argue that the treaty is not verifiable because it is not intrusive enough, also argue that the treaty is too intrusive insofar as it allegedly jeopardizes the U.S. constitutional rights. These questions have already been examined closely by the Congress, as well they should, and most Members would agree that these arguments have been overdrawn. The main problem with this criticism is that it ignores the many safeguards that exist in the treaty to protect sovereign rights. First and most fundamentally, there is the right of withdrawal from the treaty on 90-days' notice. Second, the treaty's inspection system is far from a ``no-notice'' system--it prescribes a series of timetables which allow a state party time to prepare a site for inspection. The inspection itself is limited in time. As the Department of State put it in its letter transmitting the treaty to the President, ``The inspected State Party has the final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site.'' That is from the letter of November 20, 1993. This gets at the whole notion of ``managed access,'' which lies at the heart of the CWC inspections system. Under this approach, the State Department letter continued, ``the inspected State Party may give only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems, and it may restrict sampling and sample analysis.'' Indeed, it is highly improbable that the U.S. chemical industry would have been such strong and chronic supporters of the CWC if this industry had concluded that the treaty would harm the competitiveness of U.S. industry or jeopardize company secrets. Aside from industry, I can imagine that the scientific community should be quite well informed about the merits of this treaty, especially its alleged intrusiveness. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the end of my remarks a list of 151 members of the National Academy of Scientists who are chemists or biochemists and who support this treaty, and another list, compiled by the Federation of American Scientists, of 45 Nobel laureates who also endorse this treaty. No doubt about it, American support for this treaty is both broad and deep.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, No. 5. Other Criticisms. These are not the only lines of attack that critics have taken against the treaty in recent years. First, would the CWC require a new strategic nuclear doctrine that actually encourages the use of tactical nuclear weapons, given the unavailability of a CW alternative? Not very likely, given that our military has unparalleled conventional military options that are available to respond to and to deter any CW attack. In this respect, critics who urge the retention of a CW arsenal underestimate the power of our conventional military capabilities and overestimate both the value and likelihood of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Typically, such critics also tend to ignore the impact of making such nuclear threats upon our global nuclear nonproliferation policy. Second, it is true that the parties to the CWC are nation states, not nonstate entities such as terrorist groups that may seek to acquire such weapons. Though the treaty offers no guarantee against CW terrorism, the treaty's transparency provisions will at least operate to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire equipment or materials for use in making such weapons and that in itself is a positive feature of the treaty. In particular, it will make it much more difficult for terrorists to engage in large-scale production of chemical weapons without detection. Since the CWC has never been intended to serve as a substitute for national efforts against sub- national terrorism, I find this whole argument that the treaty is weak on terrorism to be a red herring. I find it quite interesting that Japan--which was the victim of a recent chemical weapons attack by terrorists--has already ratified the CWC. In fact, Japan's Diet ratified the CWC within a month of the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Though the treaty may not have been able to guarantee that this specific attack would not occur, Japan's leaders have obviously concluded that their country would still be better off with this treaty than without it. So would our country. Third, critics have argued that the treaty lacks teeth. In fact, the CWC does not repeal the fundamental principle of national sovereignty that has dominated world affairs for over 300 years. The treaty does not intend for the OPCW to perform as a police force in a world state. Though the treaty provides procedures for mobilizing international action against treaty violators, sanctions must still be implemented by individual state parties to the treaty. Nonparties to the treaty, however, will feel the teeth of this treaty. They will have a harder time participating in the world market for chemicals and chemical equipment. The few remaining CW states will in time feel the inevitable political pressures that come with the possession of internationally outlawed weaponry. And as the taboo on possession settles in the world community, so will the likelihood of strong international action against countries that would actually use such weapons. Sanctions against all forms of proliferation could always be strengthened, and I would certainly hope that this would be a high priority national security goal of this and future administrations. But the lack of mandatory sanctions in this treaty should not be confused with any lack of teeth--it will fall to the national diplomats, the leaders, and ultimately the people of the states that are CWC parties to sharpen this treaty's teeth. Though teething pains can be expected in the years ahead, sharper teeth will come. Fourth, and most recently, critics have pointed to trade and cooperation provisions in the treaty as evidence of an alleged obligation to provide chemicals and chemical equipment that will help treaty cheaters to make chemical weapons. Frankly, this argument is hogwash. The very first article of this treaty obligates its parties ``* * * never under any circumstances * * * to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone'' to acquire chemical weapons. Given this obligation--and given the treaty's inspection system and national intelligence capabilities to back it up--the only appropriate response to the accusation that the treaty will encourage peaceful trade and scientific exchanges is, so what? The administration has been more than reasonable in accommodating the concerns of the critics. The fact that agreement was reached on 28 conditions hardly suggests a posture of stonewalling by anybody. But I cannot support any of the five additional conditions that have been offered concerning Russian chemical weapons activities, requiring terrorist states to join the CWC before we do, asserting a unilateral U.S. right to bar certain inspectors from certain countries, requiring the United States to seek the renegotiation of key provisions of the treaty on certain trade and CW defense issues, and adopting a verification standard based on a concept of military significance that is both inappropriate and unworkable. To the limited extent that these final conditions touch upon legitimate concerns, let us address these concerns inside the tent of the CWC, not by howling in the wilderness outside that tent. conclusion Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks on a personal note. I have come a long way when it comes to the issue of CW disarmament. On May 21, 1985, I joined with three of my Senate colleague to argue in an Op-Ed in the Washington Post in favor of modernizing America's chemical weapons arsenal. At the time, there was scant prospect of a Chemical Weapons Convention. The Soviet Union was sitting on a huge CW arsenal and was threatening United States interests around the world. And our old so-called unitary chemical weapons were at best a national embarrassment, at worst an actual danger to American citizens and our own troops. I favored the safer binary weapons--safer for our own troops if they ever had to use them. But times have changed. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist and there is significant support inside the Russian Government to follow through with Russia's obligations under the CWC, support which America has every reason to encourage in any way it can. Yes, there still are countries in the world today that have chemical weapons. There still is a terrorist threat involving such weapons. There is still a CW proliferation threat. Russia, though it will hardly be alone in this respect, will no doubt still seek to compete with us in many arenas of world affairs. And many of those old unitaries are still sitting around like rusting relics of a by-gone age. Yet the world today is closer than ever to outlawing one of the most dangerous weapons that mankind has every devised. As a U.S. Senator for over 20 years now, I have at times encountered some of my colleagues who were simply unprepared to reconsider policy positions that they took in considerably different times and circumstances. I am determined not to follow that practice.

Mr. GLENN. In partial answer to Senator Kyl's comments on export controls, I ask unanimous consent that this release by the Australia Group, which deals with export controls, be printed at the end of my remarks.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the only other thing I would add is that I have examined this treaty and listened to arguments both pro and con. I am convinced the time has finally arrived to move the campaign to eliminate chemical weapons into high gear. The CWC certainly offers no panacea to all risks concerning their proliferation or use of chemical weapons. It does, however, represent a substantial step along the way to alleviating these risks and, therefore, deserves the full support of the Senate and the people of the United States. I urge all my colleagues to vote for ratification. I thank the Chair. Exhibit 1 February 24, 1997. Hon. Trent Lott, 487 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned scientists, urge you to work as a matter of national urgency to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention to a vote in the Senate before April 29 of this year. That is the date when the Convention will automatically enter into force, with or without the United States. Negotiated by the administrations of Presidents Reagan and Bush, and signed by the United States under President Bush in January 1993, the Convention was formally submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by President Clinton in November 1993. Since then it has been the subject of thirteen hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Central Intelligence and the representatives of the Chemical Manufacturers Association have all testified strongly in favor of ratification. More than 65 countries, including all of our major allies, have ratified. If the Senate fails even to vote on the CWC, after three administrations have been its leading architects and proponents, the United States will have surrendered by default its essential leadership in combating the proliferation of chemical weapons. Respectfully, Julius Adler. Robert A. Alberty. Sidney Altman.\1\ Fred C. Anson. W. O. Baker. John D. Baldeschwieler. Robert L. Baldwin. Allen J. Bard. Neil Bartlett. Helmut Beinert. Howard C. Berg. R. Stephen Berry. Richard Bersohn. Jerome A. Berson. Klaus Biemann. Jacob Bigeleisen. Virgil Boekelheide. Jan L. Breslow. Leo Brewer. Herbert C. Brown.\1\ Giulio L. Cantoni. John A. Carbon. Herbert E. Carter. Charles P. Casey. Thomas R. Cech.\1\ David Chandler. Carolyn Cohen. Mildred Cohn. Robert E. Connick. John D. Corbett. Stanley J. Cristol. James E. Dahlberg. Samuel Danishefsky. Earl W. Davie. David R. Davies. Peter B. Dervan. William Doering. Paul Doty. Harry G. Drickhamer. James L. Dye. Isidore S. Edelman. Mary P. Edmonds. David Eisenberg. Mostafa A. El-Sayed. Ernest L. Eliel. David A. Evans. John D. Ferry Edmond H. Fischer.\1\ Marshall Fixman. Marye Anne Fox. Josef Fried. Carl Frieden. Gerhart Friedlander. Joseph S. Fruton. Marshall Gates. E. Peter Geiduschek. Martin Gellert. Walter Gilbert.\1\ Roy G. Gordon. Robert H. Grubbs. Lowell P. Hager. George S. Hammond. Dudley Herschbach.\1\ George P. Hess. Robert L. Hill. Mahlon Hoagland. Bernard L. Horecker. Donald F. Hornig. William P. Jencks. Harold Johnston. Isabella L. Karle. Martin Karplus. Joseph J. Katz. Walter Kauzmann. Sung-Hou Kim. James L. Kinsey. William Klemperer. Judith P. Klinman. Irving M. Klotz. Edward D. Korn. Roger Kornberg. Daniel E. Koshland, Jr. Henry Lardy. Robert Lehman. Nelson J. Leonard. Robert L. Letsinger. Stephen J. Lippard. William N. Lipscomb.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Nobel Laureate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F.W. McLafferty. Jerrold Meinwald. Matthew Meselson. Thomas J. Meyer. Josef Michl. William H. Miller. Kurt Mislow. Mario J. Molina.\1\ C. Bradley Moore. Manuel F. Morales. Howard A. Nash. Daniel Nathans.\1\ Elizabeth F. Neufeld. Marshall Nirenberg.\1\ Harry F. Noller. Leslie E. Orgel. Mary J. Osborn. Norman R. Pace. Charles S. Parmenter. Robert G. Parr. George W. Parshall. Ralph G. Pearson. Gregory A. Petsko. Kenneth S. Pitzer. Charles M. Radding. Julius Rebek. Lester J. Reed. Howard Reiss. Stuart A. Rice. Frederic M. Richards. Irwin A. Rose. F. Sherwood Rowland.\1\ William J. Rutter. Lewis H. Sarett. Robert T. Sauer. Howard K. Schachman. Peter G. Schultz. Glenn T. Seaborg.\1\ K. Barry Sharpless. Robert G. Shulman. Maxine F. Singer. Robert L. Sinsheimer. Emil L. Smith. David B. Sprinson. George R. Stark. Donald F. Steiner. Joan A. Steitz. Thomas A. Steitz. Walter H. Stockmayer. Gilbert Stork. Jack L. Strominger. Julian M. Sturtevant. Dean Stanley Tarbell. Henry Taube.\1\ H.E. Umbarger. Peter H. von Hippel. Salih J. Wakil. Frederick T. Wall. Cheves Walling. James C. Wang. Gregorio Weber. Samuel I. Weissman. Frank Westheimer. Ralph S. Wolfe. (All signatories are members of the United States National Academy of Sciences in the field of Chemistry or biochemistry) Exhibit 2 Nobel Laureates Urges Senators To Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention March 11, 1997. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has sent a letter to US Senators urging the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention without delay. Support for the letter's goal of prompt ratification came from 45 Nobel prize winners who specifically confirmed their desire for CWC ratification. The letter, signed by FAS Chairman, and former Deputy National Security Adviser to the President, Carl Kaysen, reminds Senators of the importance of U.S. ratification. The treaty requires ``total elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans assistance for such activities, and bars trade with non- parties in certain relevant chemicals.'' In ratifying the treaty, the U.S. would join 70 countries-- including all major NATO allies and all other G-7 members-- who have already ratified it. The Federation of American Scientists is a national organization of scientists and engineers concerned with issues of science and global security.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise with a great deal of pleasure and pride to inform my colleagues that the 1997 National Teacher of the Year is Sharon Draper, an English and language arts teacher at Walnut Hills High School in Cincinnati, OH. Ms. Draper won the 1997 Ohio Teacher of the Year Award and was selected from four finalists to the receive the Nation's top teacher award. President Clinton presented this award at a White House ceremony. In addition to her talents as a teacher, Ms. Draper is an accomplished award-winning author. Her novel ``Tears of a Tiger'' won the 1995 Corretta Scott King Genesis Award. Her second novel, ``Forged By Fire,'' has been recently published. Ms. Draper's dedication and outstanding commitment to education as well as her efforts to improve education are the envy of every school system and Ohio is justifiably proud of her accomplishment. At a time when our education is under a great deal of scrutiny and in need of much improvement, it is important to remember that there are many examples of educational excellence. Certainly one outstanding example is Sharon Draper. I had the opportunity to meet with Ms. Draper and it was an honor. I was at the White House to participate in the ceremony where she received the Teacher of the Year Award. Ms. Draper's 25-year teaching career has been filled with creativity and enthusiasm. I understand that she requires a research paper in her senior level classes. When her students turn in their paper the day before the prom she gives them a T-shirt that proclaims ``I survived the Draper paper.'' She says that she was probably born to be a teacher. I am pleased that the Council of Chief State School Officers and Scholastic, Inc., have selected Ms. Draper as Teacher of the Year. I know that her students, school, the city of Cincinnati, and our State are very proud. I congratulate Sharon, her husband Larry, and children Cory and Crystal for the contribution they have made to public education.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. We each have 17 minutes, is that correct?

Mr. GLENN. I yield myself such time as I shall use. Mr. President, today is April 15. We do not need to tell everybody that. It is tax day for most Americans. On this day, honest hard- working citizens voluntarily--voluntarily--share their most personal and sensitive financial information with their Government. All Americans should have unbridled faith that their tax returns will remain absolutely, unequivocally confidential and zealously safeguarded. That is the hallmark of our taxpaying system, and if this trust is breached, it shakes the whole foundation of our very Government, because it means our people are losing faith in their Government. That is why I am proud to be standing here today as one of the authors, one of the sponsors, the Democratic sponsor of legislation to outlaw what I have come to term as ``computer voyeurism.'' That is the unauthorized inspection of your tax information by those not entitled to see it, not the people legitimately working on your tax account. In 1993 and 1994, as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I held hearings which first exposed this insidious practice. We came across it almost by happenstance. In 1990, I was pleased to work with my distinguished colleague who just spoke, Senator Roth, then ranking member of the committee, to pass into law the Chief Financial Officers Act. That measure required major Government agencies to do something for the first time which our own private businesses take for granted. That is, producing annual auditable financial statements so we know how much money is being spent, where it is being spent, and how it is being spent. I figured that of all the Government agencies which should be able to balance its books and come up with a good auditable statement, it would be the IRS; it should be able to account for all the revenue taken in, and the IRS would be the agency we would look at first. In fact, before the CFO Act, we had no idea of the differences between what revenues the IRS reported it was collecting and what was actually on the books. Little did I know then how wrong I really was. For 4 years running now, the IRS has not been able to pass its own audit. The General Accounting Office, which we asked to go in and help audit the IRS, still cannot even render an opinion on the reliability of the IRS's own books due, in part, to missing records, unsubstantiated amounts, and unreliable information. If we have that situation in the IRS, you can imagine what the situation is in some of the other agencies of Government. The IRS, I guess if we put it in our own household terms, it would be records in a shoe box under the bed. If your return was being audited and you could not come up with the documents, you would be called on the carpet for that. You would not get too much sympathy. But all that is another story, one of which the Governmental Affairs Committee has held numerous oversight hearings on. But it was through these initial GAO CFO audits we first discovered the problems IRS was having in preventing and detecting employees who get their kicks, apparently, out of surfing through other people's tax returns, ones they are not supposed to be working on or looking at. Our hearings revealed that in the years 1989 to 1994, more than 1,300 IRS employees were investigated on suspicion of snooping through private taxpayer files. Those probes resulted in disciplinary action against 420 workers, primarily in the Southeast region where the investigation was concentrated. My investigation found that some IRS employees had been browsing through the financial records of family members, ex-spouses, coworkers, neighbors, friends and enemies, and celebrities in particular. They also had submitted fraudulent tax returns and then used their computer access to monitor the IRS review of those returns. They used the computer to issue fraudulent refunds to family and to friends and, in fact, one employee was reported to have altered about 200 accounts and received kickbacks from inflated refund checks. We, in Congress, at that time were absolutely stunned at these revelations and did not believe it could happen, but it did. But it did not light a candle to the firestorm across the country from outraged-- appropriately outraged--American taxpayers because we got a wave of indignation. Taxpayers were shocked to know that the most personal information they voluntarily, and in good faith, provide to the Government could, in effect, become an open book for others' private entertainment. Even worse was the pitifully low number of employees fired for committing these awful actions. It turned out that no criminal penalties existed for these kinds of browsing offenses. Mr. President, above the entrance to the main IRS building in DC are inscribed the famous words uttered by Oliver Wendell Holmes: Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society. Unfortunately, what American citizens have been subjected to in this case is downright uncivilized behavior. At our hearings, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pledged to implement a ``zero tolerance'' policy. Warnings of possible prosecution for unauthorized use of the system began appearing whenever workers logged on to the main taxpayer account database. Explicit memos went out to all employees warning them against such unauthorized activities. Finally, a new automated detection program, called EARL--electronic audit research log--was installed on the primary computer system to monitor employee use and alert managers to possible misuse. To evaluate the effectiveness of these actions, particularly the new computer detection system, I asked GAO to conduct a review. I also asked the inspector general at the Department of Treasury to perform an inspection. In the meantime, we worked with the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice and the IRS to come up with a legislative solution for closing the legal loophole that let browsers off the hook from criminal punishment. That effort culminated in the legislation, the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, which I introduced in 1995 during the 104th Congress and as S. 523 for the 105th Congress. The goal was simple: to make willful browsers subject to a criminal misdemeanor penalty of up to $1,000 and a year in jail, and if any IRS employees are convicted of such an offense, they would be fired immediately. Zero tolerance should mean what it says--absolutely, positively no tolerance. That legislation was incorporated into this amendment and was the basis for the bill as is currently being considered in the House. We were not able to pass my bill in the last Congress--we did come close to trying to move it in the Senate--the issue has gotten more exposure now due to two recent court cases. Just last year, in Tennessee, a jury acquitted a former IRS employee who had been charged with 70 counts of improperly peeking at the tax returns of celebrities such as Elizabeth Taylor, Dolly Parton, Wynonna Judd, Michael Jordan, Lucille Ball, Tom Cruise, President Clinton, and Elvis Presley, just to name some of them. More recently, just a few weeks ago, a Federal appeals court in Boston reversed the conviction of a former employee who had been found guilty of several counts of wire and computer fraud by improperly accessing the IRS taxpayer database. It is reported that he had browsed through several files, including those of a local politician who had beaten him in an election, and a woman he once had dated. The Government had alleged that this worker was a member of a white supremacist group and was collecting data on people he thought could be Government informers. In both of these cases, though there was unauthorized snooping, because there was no subsequent disclosure to third parties, no criminal penalties could be meted out. As the First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held: Unauthorized browsing of taxpayer files, although certainly inappropriate conduct, cannot, without more, sustain a felony conviction. Sounds ridiculous, but that is what the court ruled. That was their interpretation of the fine print of the law. I doubt these kinds of decisions give great comfort to honest law-abiding citizens. I should note that last year, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. My good friend, Senator Leahy, played a major part in this effort. This law does provide title 18 criminal penalties for anyone intentionally accessing a computer without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, and obtaining any information from any Department or agency of the United States. This section may be helpful in prosecuting future cases, since it would apply to tax information stored in computers. This provision is not enough in our efforts to deter and punish browsing, for, according to the IRS, it does not apply to the unauthorized access or inspection of paper tax returns, return information in other forms, such as documents or magnetic media, such as tapes. That is why we, all taxpayers, need the protections originally espoused in the bill and incorporated in this amendment to specifically fill this gap and ensure unauthorized browsing or inspection of any tax information in any form is subject to criminal penalties, and that is what this does. It will also provide those criminal sanctions within the Internal Revenue Code so that the confidentiality scheme governing tax information and the related law enforcement mechanisms are preserved in the same section. While I do feel the recent court decisions have spurred us on, I also believe the new findings contained in a GAO report I released last weekend entitled ``IRS Security Systems: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due to Serious Weaknesses,'' have brought this problem to the forefront. This report is the evaluation I asked GAO to undertake in 1994 in response to the actions implemented by the IRS to prevent browsing and enforce its zero tolerance policy. It was released by GAO earlier this year; however, because some of the specific details could potentially jeopardize IRS security, the report was designated for ``Limited Official Use'' with restricted access. I have been involved in this important issue for a long time and because I believe the public has a right to know, I requested that GAO issue a redacted version of the report suitable for public release. I thank GAO for their hard work in this matter and also the IRS for their cooperation in making this possible. The findings of GAO's report are disturbing. Even more important, their conclusions are reaffirmed by the IRS in a comprehensive internal report of their own compiled last fall. In addition, I should add, they are buttressed to some extent by a review I asked the Treasury Inspector General to conduct on IRS computer security controls and the Service's progress in addressing the shortcomings. That report, too, is ``Limited Official Use.'' But I can tell you, while there have been some positive actions taken to proactively confront this problem, we are nowhere near any satisfactory resolution. The bottom line is although the IRS efforts in this area are well- intentioned, unfortunately they have come too late and fall far short of the commitment and determination sorely needed to tackle this problem head on. The findings of GAO's report are disturbing. Just as important, their conclusions are affirmed by the IRS in a comprehensive internal report of their own compiled last fall. GAO found that serious weaknesses in IRS's information security makes taxpayer data vulnerable to authorized use, to modification, or to destruction. According to GAO, the IRS also has no effective means for measuring the extent of the browsing problem, the damage being done by browsing, or the progress being made to deter browsing. Finally, and this is something I am having GAO look at further, we do not know to what extent the detection and control systems exist in other IRS databases, besides ``IDRS,'' the primary taxpayers' account system looked at here. That may be open for further problems. I was struck by the candor in the IRS's own internal report on the ``EARL'' detection system. That report found its progress in management programs to prevent and detect browsing ``painfully slow,'' as they determined. Quite distressing to me, the IRS internal report indicated that some employees felt IRS management does not aggressively pursue browsing violations. Some workers, when confronted about their snooping activities, saw nothing wrong and believed it would be of no consequence to them even if they were caught. Hard to believe. Mr. President, we have to fix that. When you have over 1,500 investigations of browsing cases since my last hearings 2 years ago, and only 23 workers fired, something just is not right. That does not sound like zero tolerance to me. I have a more detailed summary of the major findings contained in both the GAO and internal IRS report which I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the end of my statement.

Mr. GLENN. I also point out the effectiveness of controls used to safeguard IRS systems, facilities, and taxpayer data. GAO found serious weaknesses in these efforts, especially in the areas of physical and logical security. For example, the facilities visited by GAO could not account for over 6,400 units of magnetic storage media such as tapes and cartridges which might contain taxpayer data. Now, IRS responded last week they have located 5,700 of the units, but that means that 700 are still unaccounted for. That begs the question: Where are they? Are they deemed lost? And can they be misused? Each of the units can store tax information on thousands of Americans. We need to know where they are. Moreover, GAO only visited selected facilities. I just wonder if the IRS is able to track all of its inventory at the other major sites not visited by GAO. We would like to know what the results are there, too. GAO also found that printouts containing taxpayer data were left unprotected and unattended in open areas of two facilities, where they could be compromised. I do not want to say much more on this portion of the report than I have already said, except that these matters and the others referred to by GAO must be dealt with swiftly and effectively. I am glad to have brought this matter to the Senate's attention and am pleased to have the support of colleagues. I commend the efforts of Senator Coverdell in this area. He has added very significant provisions to some of the original language. I think we have an excellent bill. I want to congratulate him for taking the initiative in bringing this up. The first of the sections that Senator Coverdell brought would require that a taxpayer be notified by the Secretary of the Treasury when a criminal indictment or charge is brought against an IRS employee for unlawful inspection of that taxpayer's return or return information. This is something I remember Senator Pryor, our former colleague, bringing up before the Commissioner at one of our earlier hearings. The second new section will provide taxpayers with a civil remedy in such unauthorized inspections as similarly provided under current law for unlawful disclosures. This provision clarifies that civil liability will not be a remedy in cases where the inspection is requested by the taxpayer or in any instance which results from an accidental review of a return or return information. I want to be clear about that last point in reference to the legislation at hand. I do not want to compromise IRS employees' ability to do what they are supposed to be doing, especially in the areas of return processing, examination, and inspection. Under this bill, IRS employees will continue to be able to inspect tax returns or return information as authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or tax administration purposes without penalties. Only intentional, willful, unauthorized inspections will be subject to prosecution, where you knew or should have known it was wrong. As the report by the House Ways and Means Committee states: ``Accidental or inadvertent inspection that may occur--such as, for example, by making an error in typing in a TIN [Taxpayer Identification Number]--would not be subject to damages because it would not meet this standard.'' These are good provisions and I welcome their inclusion. I also want to thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Roth, who sat with us as ranking member of the Governmental Affairs Committee during our hearings last year during consideration of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, pledged his commitment and support for bringing this legislation to the floor. Let me say a word about the men and women who work at the IRS. The vast majority of the people who work at the IRS are just as fine a people as there are in this room or anywhere else in this country. They are dedicated. They are trying to do a good job. I do not want to unduly scare anyone that this is commonplace or that their privacy has been violated. You have a few bad apples over there, but I am sure most of the people over there want to turn in themselves because most of the people of the IRS, including the Commissioner, are proud of the work they are doing. The Commissioner has done a good job in many areas. I have been complimentary of her. Her plan to deal with the IRS is a good one. The way of getting it downhill to the centers and the different regions and having it done there did not occur the way it should have, with what I thought was a very good plan. I do not want to condemn all the IRS over there. Normally, the people look down on the tax man every April 15. We know that. It is not popular to pay taxes. The people working there are doing a great service for this country, and we want to weed out those few bad apples that may be over there. I have visited some of the sites and I know what some of the IRS employees are up against. It is not an easy job. They are, by and large, a dedicated bunch, committed to their job and laboring under difficult conditions with very outmoded systems. Unfortunately, in this day and age, they must also fear for their own personal safety. However, even just a single incidence of this behavior is one too many and cannot be tolerated. The IRS has a moral and legal obligation to uphold when Americans provide the Government with their most personal and private information. The IRS must have the complete trust and confidence of taxpayers. That means we cannot tolerate any of this browsing or mishandling of accounts. The American people expect and demand nothing less. I thank you, and I reserve the balance of my time. Major Findings From GAO Report, Supplemented With Excerpts From the IRS' Earl Executive Steering Committee Report the irs system designed to detect browsing (earl) is limited The main monitoring system, EARL, is supposed to be able to detect patterns of potential abuse by IRS employees in the IRS' primary database (IDRS). GAO found that the EARL system is ineffective because it can't distinguish between legitimate work activity and illegal browsing. Only through time-consuming manual reviews, which, according to internal IRS documents can sometimes take up to 40 hours, can actual instances, of snooping be positively identified. Moreover, EARL only monitors the main taxpayer database. There are several other systems used by employees to create, access, or modify data which, apparently, go unsupervised. This is something I have asked the GAO to look into further. According to GAO, ``because IRS does not monitor the activities of all employees authorized to access taxpayer data . . . IRS has no assurance that these employees are not browsing taxpayer data and no analytical basis on which to estimate the extent of the browsing problem or any damage being done.'' In fact, according, to the IRS' EARL report: ``The current system of reports does not provide accurate and meaningful data about what the abuse detection programs are producing, the quality of the outputs, the efficiency of our abuse detection research efforts, or the level of functional management follow through and discipline. This impedes our ability to respond to critics and congressional oversight inquiries about our abuse detection efforts.'' irs progress in reducing and disciplining browsing cases is unclear IRS' management information systems do not provide sufficient information to describe known browsing incidents precisely or to evaluate their severity consistently. The systems used by the IRS cannot report on the total number of unauthorized browsing incidents. Nor do they contain sufficient information to determine, for each case investigated, how many taxpayer accounts were inappropriately accessed or how many times each account was accessed. Consequently, for known incidents of browsing, IRS cannot efficiently determine how many and how often taxpayers' accounts were inappropriately accessed. Without such information, IRS cannot measure whether it is making progress from year to year in reducing browsing. Internal IRS figures show a fluctuation in the number of browsing cases closed in the last few years: 521 cases in FY'91; 787 in FY'92; 522 in FY'93; 646 in FY'94, and; 869 in

Mr. GLENN. I thank my distinguished colleague from Georgia. I know we are approaching the time when we are supposed to have a vote. The American people have to have the utmost confidentiality in the IRS. We have to have somebody collect the taxes that does everybody in this country good, that builds roads, the airways, does everything, so those who say we are mad at the IRS and we will do away with it, if they will just think what they are saying, what we need is to have zero tolerance for browsers and misuse of the system. That is what this addresses today. Our legislation will get the snoops out of the IRS. Our legislation says if you are going to snoop, you are going to jail. It is that simple. If you are going to snoop, you are going to pay also. You are also going to lose your job. I think browsing angers me just like being violated personally, almost. Everybody has to feel that way because you trust your Government. We say we are giving this information willingly, honestly, and then they are misusing it. They are browsing, and the information may not remain confidential. We don't know what is going to happen to it. The American people deserve better than that. I deplore those who are guilty of engaging in IRS-bashing. And it always seems to build to a crescendo on April 15. I repeat that most IRS employees are just as honest as anybody in this room or anybody in America. They are dedicated workers. They want to clean out this snooping and they want to see this problem go away just like all the rest of us do, so that more Americans don't lose faith in our voluntary tax system. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add John Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator Kohl of Wisconsin to the bill as cosponsors.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill, as amended, was passed.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Government Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, legislation whose objective is to reorganize the executive branch into a form and a structure that is capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The bill is cosponsored by my distinguished colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman. We are in an era of contraction at the Federal level. Some of this contraction is needed in my opinion, in some areas I don't think it's a good idea. But it is a fact. Many programs are being cut, others have been eliminated or consolidated into block grants to the States. Agencies and departments are being downsized and in some cases eliminated. In the last Congress, the Bureau of Mines, Office of Technology Assessment, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations were all terminated. In addition, agency rules and paperwork are being pruned. And Federal employment has been cut by over 250,000 positions in the last 4 years and continues to fall. These are big and historic changes, spurred on by our efforts to reach a balanced budget and the desire of the American people for a more cost-effective Government. However, despite the overall downsizing effort, the basic structure of the Federal Government remains unchanged. In fact, the basic structure of the Federal Government has changed little in the last 25 years, despite structural changes in the private sector, the economy, and our society over that same time period. The Federal Government has been the last to follow suit--and that's as it should be in a democracy--but that does not mean it should be immune from change forever. We cannot keep the status quo in the existing executive branch structure while continuing to downsize, cut budgets and programs and reduce personnel levels and also expect these same Federal agencies to perform effectively and maintain adequate levels of service. We'll end up with what I call the hollowing out of Government. We'll have the same agencies and departments in place doing most of the same activities as they do now. But with less money and less people on hand, these activities will be carried out less effectively. We'll have a less costly Federal Government, but not a more cost-effective one. That is, unless we address reorganization and consolidation of Federal agencies and functions in a comprehensive, well-thought-out way. Reorganization issues are very difficult, perhaps among the most difficult issues we face in Government. It raises questions that don't have simple, right and wrong answers. Should we have greater centralization of Government functions in less, but larger Cabinet departments? This is the traditional, centralized model of how Government bureaucracy is organized. Or should we decentralize and spread Government functions across many smaller agencies and departments? Such an approach fits what many call the entrepreneurial model of Government organization. Well, I can think of pros and cons to both approaches. To add to this difficulty, reorganization necessarily involves questions of turf and jurisdiction. Turf battles in this town are as hotly contested as any policy issue. I know this through experience. Several years ago I proposed consolidating the Government's trade and technology functions into one Cabinet department and I faced very stiff opposition. Likewise, turf is just as jealously guarded at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Ask the President's National Performance Review. They proposed integrating the Agency for International Development into the State Department in addition to consolidating the Federal law enforcement agencies only to be faced down by the bureaucracy. So I don't think comprehensive reorganization can be tackled successfully by either the Congress or the executive branch. That's why I'm in favor of establishing a Government commission to examine executive branch organization. My bill establishes a nine- member, bipartisan Commission to make recommendations to the President and the Congress in 2 years on consolidating, eliminating, and restructuring Federal departments and agencies in order to eliminate unnecessary activities, reduce duplication across programs, and improve management and efficiency. This Commission would be not just any old Commission, producing some big thick study that would wind up largely unread in some recycling bin, or on the dusty shelf of academia. Rather the Commission's recommendations would be submitted to the Congress and have to be considered on a what I call a flexible fast-track basis. They could not perish in committee, as so often occurs with commission reports and recommendations. There is precedent for such a commission. In fact, the few successful Government reorganization efforts that have taken place have come about because of the work of a commission. Let me give you some background. The Hoover Commission is probably the most famous Government restructuring commission from recent times. It was formed in 1947 and chaired by former President Hoover. The 12-member commission operated until 1949 and issued 19 reports to the President recommending various changes in the structure of the Federal Government. From these recommendations, President Truman submitted eight reorganization plans to Congress in 1949, of which six became effective. The following year he submitted 27 reorganization plans, 20 of which became effective. Included among these plans were the creation of the General Services Administration, the expansion of the Executive Office of the President, and the creation of a centralized Office of Personnel. A second Hoover Commission was formed in 1953 and made 314 specific recommendations over the following 2 years, 202 of which were implemented. However, generally this Commission was not considered as successful as the first Hoover Commission, as it engaged itself in more controversial matters of policy rather than solely focus on management and organization as the first commission had done. Our next restructuring effort of note was put forward by President Nixon's Ash Council, which was in operation from 1969 to 1971. Headed by Roy Ash, chairman of Litton Industries, the Council supplied the President with nine memoranda detailing with specific reorganization and consolidation proposals. The Council recommended the formation of OMB, the EPA, and NOAA from the consolidation of existing programs. These proposals were all implemented. The Council also recommended the creation of several super-Departments, including a Department of Natural Resources, but these proposals ultimately did not pass the Congress. The next notable Commission came during the Reagan years, the Grace Commission, which was established by Executive order in 1982 and was in operation through 1984. The panel was composed of 161 corporate executives and it issued a massive 47 volume report with nearly 2,500 recommendations. Many of its recommendations were policy-based rather than organizational in nature, hence they generated controversy and polarized debate in the Congress. Still, many of the recommendations were implemented, primarily through executive branch action. And the Commission did call for stronger financial management in the Federal bureaucracy. That's something we have built on in the Committee on Governmental Affairs through enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act. More recently, the Committee on Governmental Affairs passed legislation to establish a bipartisan reorganization commission as part of our efforts to make the VA a Cabinet department. That Commission became law, Unfortunately, in order to pass it, we had to place a mechanism to trigger the activation of the Commission through a Presidential certification that the Commission was in the national interest. Unfortunately, that certification was not made, Had it been, perhaps we would have in place today the blueprint for the Government of the 21st century. Then in the 103d Congress, we reported out a Glenn-Roth-Lieberman Commission bill by a 12 to 1 vote. But we did not move it to the floor because the President's National Performance Review was just getting underway and we wanted to see what it might come up with before establishing the commission. Finally, last year the committee reported out a version of a government reorganization commission; however, it was tied to legislation dismantling the Commerce Department and thus died. Late in the session, Senator Stevens developed a substitute retaining the commission but dropping the dismantling provisions, We came close to an agreement and my hope this Congress is that we will reach one. For a more detailed history of government restructuring commissions I would refer my colleagues to an excellent report prepared by CRS titled ``Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the Twentieth Century: Landmark Commissions.'' I believe that a commission would complement nicely the efforts of the NPR. The Federal work force has been reduced by over 250,000 positions, Federal paperwork and redtape has been simplified, procurement reform has been enacted, and unnecessary field offices at the Department of Agriculture has been closed. These accomplishments are due in significant part to the work and the efforts of the NPR. However, the NPR has generally not focused on government restricting. In the instances where it has made proposals--I noted two examples earlier in my statement--they have been rebuffed by the bureaucracy, the Congress or both. Recent congressional efforts have fallen short also, as several of my colleagues learned in advocating the dismantling of four Cabinet departments--HUD, DOE, Commerce, and Education. Those efforts were heavy-handed in my view and would have created more problems then they would have solved. In closing, I believe an examination of the experience of the private sector in restructuring and downsizing is instructive in differentiating between the right and wrong ways to downsize. A 1993 survey of over 500 U.S. companies by the Wyatt Co. revealed that only 60 percent of the companies actually were able to reduce costs in their restrucuting efforts. Both the Wyatt Survey and a similar one conducted by the American Management Association concluded that successful restructuring efforts must be planned carefully with a clear vision of their goals and objectives, and that proper attention be given to maintaining employee morale and productivity. Otherwise, the costs of reorganization may outweigh its benefits. There is a right and a wrong way to reorganize and downsize. I believe that the Commission approach is the right way. I hope my colleagues will support this legislation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Government Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, legislation whose objective is to reorganize the executive branch into a form and a structure that is capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The bill is cosponsored by my distinguished colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman. We are in an era of contraction at the Federal level. Some of this contraction is needed in my opinion, in some areas I don't think it's a good idea. But it is a fact. Many programs are being cut, others have been eliminated or consolidated into block grants to the States. Agencies and departments are being downsized and in some cases eliminated. In the last Congress, the Bureau of Mines, Office of Technology Assessment, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations were all terminated. In addition, agency rules and paperwork are being pruned. And Federal employment has been cut by over 250,000 positions in the last 4 years and continues to fall. These are big and historic changes, spurred on by our efforts to reach a balanced budget and the desire of the American people for a more cost-effective Government. However, despite the overall downsizing effort, the basic structure of the Federal Government remains unchanged. In fact, the basic structure of the Federal Government has changed little in the last 25 years, despite structural changes in the private sector, the economy, and our society over that same time period. The Federal Government has been the last to follow suit--and that's as it should be in a democracy--but that does not mean it should be immune from change forever. We cannot keep the status quo in the existing executive branch structure while continuing to downsize, cut budgets and programs and reduce personnel levels and also expect these same Federal agencies to perform effectively and maintain adequate levels of service. We'll end up with what I call the hollowing out of Government. We'll have the same agencies and departments in place doing most of the same activities as they do now. But with less money and less people on hand, these activities will be carried out less effectively. We'll have a less costly Federal Government, but not a more cost-effective one. That is, unless we address reorganization and consolidation of Federal agencies and functions in a comprehensive, well-thought-out way. Reorganization issues are very difficult, perhaps among the most difficult issues we face in Government. It raises questions that don't have simple, right and wrong answers. Should we have greater centralization of Government functions in less, but larger Cabinet departments? This is the traditional, centralized model of how Government bureaucracy is organized. Or should we decentralize and spread Government functions across many smaller agencies and departments? Such an approach fits what many call the entrepreneurial model of Government organization. Well, I can think of pros and cons to both approaches. To add to this difficulty, reorganization necessarily involves questions of turf and jurisdiction. Turf battles in this town are as hotly contested as any policy issue. I know this through experience. Several years ago I proposed consolidating the Government's trade and technology functions into one Cabinet department and I faced very stiff opposition. Likewise, turf is just as jealously guarded at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Ask the President's National Performance Review. They proposed integrating the Agency for International Development into the State Department in addition to consolidating the Federal law enforcement agencies only to be faced down by the bureaucracy. So I don't think comprehensive reorganization can be tackled successfully by either the Congress or the executive branch. That's why I'm in favor of establishing a Government commission to examine executive branch organization. My bill establishes a nine- member, bipartisan Commission to make recommendations to the President and the Congress in 2 years on consolidating, eliminating, and restructuring Federal departments and agencies in order to eliminate unnecessary activities, reduce duplication across programs, and improve management and efficiency. This Commission would be not just any old Commission, producing some big thick study that would wind up largely unread in some recycling bin, or on the dusty shelf of academia. Rather the Commission's recommendations would be submitted to the Congress and have to be considered on a what I call a flexible fast-track basis. They could not perish in committee, as so often occurs with commission reports and recommendations. There is precedent for such a commission. In fact, the few successful Government reorganization efforts that have taken place have come about because of the work of a commission. Let me give you some background. The Hoover Commission is probably the most famous Government restructuring commission from recent times. It was formed in 1947 and chaired by former President Hoover. The 12-member commission operated until 1949 and issued 19 reports to the President recommending various changes in the structure of the Federal Government. From these recommendations, President Truman submitted eight reorganization plans to Congress in 1949, of which six became effective. The following year he submitted 27 reorganization plans, 20 of which became effective. Included among these plans were the creation of the General Services Administration, the expansion of the Executive Office of the President, and the creation of a centralized Office of Personnel. A second Hoover Commission was formed in 1953 and made 314 specific recommendations over the following 2 years, 202 of which were implemented. However, generally this Commission was not considered as successful as the first Hoover Commission, as it engaged itself in more controversial matters of policy rather than solely focus on management and organization as the first commission had done. Our next restructuring effort of note was put forward by President Nixon's Ash Council, which was in operation from 1969 to 1971. Headed by Roy Ash, chairman of Litton Industries, the Council supplied the President with nine memoranda detailing with specific reorganization and consolidation proposals. The Council recommended the formation of OMB, the EPA, and NOAA from the consolidation of existing programs. These proposals were all implemented. The Council also recommended the creation of several super-Departments, including a Department of Natural Resources, but these proposals ultimately did not pass the Congress. The next notable Commission came during the Reagan years, the Grace Commission, which was established by Executive order in 1982 and was in operation through 1984. The panel was composed of 161 corporate executives and it issued a massive 47 volume report with nearly 2,500 recommendations. Many of its recommendations were policy-based rather than organizational in nature, hence they generated controversy and polarized debate in the Congress. Still, many of the recommendations were implemented, primarily through executive branch action. And the Commission did call for stronger financial management in the Federal bureaucracy. That's something we have built on in the Committee on Governmental Affairs through enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act. More recently, the Committee on Governmental Affairs passed legislation to establish a bipartisan reorganization commission as part of our efforts to make the VA a Cabinet department. That Commission became law, Unfortunately, in order to pass it, we had to place a mechanism to trigger the activation of the Commission through a Presidential certification that the Commission was in the national interest. Unfortunately, that certification was not made, Had it been, perhaps we would have in place today the blueprint for the Government of the 21st century. Then in the 103d Congress, we reported out a Glenn-Roth-Lieberman Commission bill by a 12 to 1 vote. But we did not move it to the floor because the President's National Performance Review was just getting underway and we wanted to see what it might come up with before establishing the commission. Finally, last year the committee reported out a version of a government reorganization commission; however, it was tied to legislation dismantling the Commerce Department and thus died. Late in the session, Senator Stevens developed a substitute retaining the commission but dropping the dismantling provisions, We came close to an agreement and my hope this Congress is that we will reach one. For a more detailed history of government restructuring commissions I would refer my colleagues to an excellent report prepared by CRS titled ``Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the Twentieth Century: Landmark Commissions.'' I believe that a commission would complement nicely the efforts of the NPR. The Federal work force has been reduced by over 250,000 positions, Federal paperwork and redtape has been simplified, procurement reform has been enacted, and unnecessary field offices at the Department of Agriculture has been closed. These accomplishments are due in significant part to the work and the efforts of the NPR. However, the NPR has generally not focused on government restricting. In the instances where it has made proposals--I noted two examples earlier in my statement--they have been rebuffed by the bureaucracy, the Congress or both. Recent congressional efforts have fallen short also, as several of my colleagues learned in advocating the dismantling of four Cabinet departments--HUD, DOE, Commerce, and Education. Those efforts were heavy-handed in my view and would have created more problems then they would have solved. In closing, I believe an examination of the experience of the private sector in restructuring and downsizing is instructive in differentiating between the right and wrong ways to downsize. A 1993 survey of over 500 U.S. companies by the Wyatt Co. revealed that only 60 percent of the companies actually were able to reduce costs in their restrucuting efforts. Both the Wyatt Survey and a similar one conducted by the American Management Association concluded that successful restructuring efforts must be planned carefully with a clear vision of their goals and objectives, and that proper attention be given to maintaining employee morale and productivity. Otherwise, the costs of reorganization may outweigh its benefits. There is a right and a wrong way to reorganize and downsize. I believe that the Commission approach is the right way. I hope my colleagues will support this legislation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the date of April 15 is indelibly etched in the minds of most Americans. For it is on or by that day that honest, hard-working citizens voluntarily share their most personal and sensitive financial information with their Government. All Americans should have unbridled faith that their tax returns will remain absolutely confidential and zealously safeguarded. That is the foundation of our taxpaying system. If this trust is breached, then the bonds that tie citizens with their Government may break, with disastrous consequences for us all. In 1993 and 1994, as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I held hearings which first exposed that vulnerability. We found out that hundreds of IRS employees had been investigated for what I term ``computer voyeurism'', where they call up returns of friends, enemies, celebrities, relatives, or neighbors just to snoop and satisfy their own prurient interests. Even worse, in some cases, IRS employees either altered their own returns to get refunds, or conspired with other taxpayer friends to change their returns and get a kickback from those refunds. My investigation revealed serious flaws in the IRS' ability to monitor, prevent, and detect browsing. In response, the IRS Commissioner pledged a zero tolerance policy to protect taxpayer privacy and vigorously discipline those who abuse this trust. The Commissioner also implemented a new system called EARL-- Electronic Audit Research Log--to help identify inappropriate and unauthorized access to taxpayer information stored in the IRS' main computer system. That primary system, IDRS--Integrated Data Retrieval System--handles more than 100 million transactions per month and is used by over 55,000 IRS employees. At least one-third of those employees are authorized to input adjustments to tax account records. I had asked the General Accounting Office [GAO] to review the progress made by the IRS in reducing computer security risks and in curbing browsing. Earlier this year, GAO produced that report. However, because some of the specific details could jeopardize IRS security, that report was designated for ``Limited Official Use'' with restricted access. Due to my involvement in this important issue, and because I believe the public has a right to know, I requested that GAO issue a redacted version of the report suitable for public release. I would like to thank GAO for their hard work in this matter and also the IRS for their cooperation in making this possible. The findings of GAO's report are disturbing. Even more important, their findings are reaffirmed by the IRS in a comprehensive internal report of their own compiled last fall. Before I get to the specifics, I just want to say a couple of things. Point One. The vast majority of IRS employees are dedicated and committed to their jobs, and labor in extremely difficult conditions with very outmoded systems. Unfortunately, in this day and age, they must also fear for their own personal safety. Some 99.9 percent of them would never engage in such snooping or fraud. It is not as if every American has reason to believe that his or her privacy and tax return information has been compromised. But even just a single incidence of this behavior is one too many and cannot be tolerated. Just last year, in Tennessee, a jury acquitted a former IRS employee who had been charged with 70 counts of improperly peeking at the tax returns of celebrities such as Elizabeth Taylor, Dolly Parton, Wynonna Judd, Michael Jordan, Lucille Ball, Tom Cruise, President Clinton, and Elvis Presley. More recently, just a few weeks ago, a Federal appeals court in Boston reversed the conviction of a former employee who had been found guilty of several counts of wire and computer fraud by improperly accessing the IRS taxpayer database. It was reported that he had browsed through several files, including those of a local politician who had beaten him in an election, and a woman he once had dated. The Government had alleged this worker was a member of a white-supremacist group and was collecting data on people he thought could be Government informers. In both of these cases, because of a loophole in the law, no criminal penalties could be meted out. The reason? No disclosures had been made to third parties. I doubt these kinds of decisions give great comfort to honest, law- abiding citizens. That is why today I am reintroducing my legislation-- the Taxpayer Privacy Protection Act--to close this gap and ensure that any unauthorized access or inspection of return information, in whatever form, is punishable as a criminal offense and that employees so convicted are fired immediately. I know that the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee is interested in passing such a bill as are several of my Senate colleagues including Senator Coverdell. I commend everyone for their interest and looking forward to making this bill--finally--a reality. Let's pass this by April 15 and send a signal across the land that those who violate the privacy of tax paying Americans will be fined, will be fired, and will be jailed. The public rightfully expects no less. Point Two. The IRS has recognized this serious issue and has undertaken some responsive actions. Warnings of possible prosecution for unauthorized use of the system appear whenever employees log onto the taxpayer account database. They have installed automated detection programs in some of their systems to monitor employee use and alert managers to possible misuse. And, the IRS has just created a new Office of Systems Standards and Evaluations to centralize and enforce IRS standards and policies for all major security programs. I have confidence that this Office, if given the proper resources, will be a positive force in this effort. The problem, however, is that these efforts, while well-intentioned, have come too late and fall far short of the commitment, management, and determination sorely needed to confront this matter head-on. The sad fact is that with 1 week to go until tax returns are due, one thing is clear: the IRS has flunked its own audit and has let down the American people. The agency promised zero tolerance for browsing. Today's information suggests that they have failed to live up to that pledge--1,515 new cases of browsing have been identified since our last report. Of those only 27 have resulted in employees being fired. I don't know what kind of new math they may be using, but that doesn't sound like zero tolerance to me. GAO even found that the 1,515 figure may drastically underestimate actual incidents because--and I quote--the agency's ``ability to detect browsing is limited''. Overall, GAO found that IRS' approach to computer security is not effective. Serious weaknesses persist in security controls intended to safeguard IRS computer systems, data, and facilities and expose tax processing operations to the risk of disruption and taxpayer data to the risk of unauthorized use, modification, and destruction. Further, although IRS has taken some action to detect and prevent browsing, the fact remains that the IRS has no effective means for measuring the extent of the browsing problem, the damage being done by browsing, or the progress being made to deter browsing. This finding is candidly confirmed in IRS' own internal report: progress in developing efficient prevention and detection programs has been painfully slow. The program has suffered from a lack of overall consistent, strong leadership and oversight. Quite distressing to me is the finding, as stated in the IRS' own report, that employees, when confronted, indicate that they browsed because they do not believe it is wrong and that there will be little or no consequence to them if they are caught. Before summarizing the major findings, I also want to point out another facet of this report. That is, the effectiveness of controls used to safeguard IRS systems, facilities, and taxpayer data. GAO found serious weaknesses in these efforts, especially in the areas of physical and logical security. For example, the facilities visited by GAO could not account for about 6,400 units of magnetic storage media, such as tapes and cartridges, which might contain taxpayer data. Further, they found that printouts containing taxpayer data were left unprotected and unattended in open areas of two facilities where they could be compromised. I really don't want to say much more on this portion of the report than I have already. Except that these matters, and the others referred to by GAO, must be dealt with swiftly and effectively. I have summarized GAO's findings in a handout. Where appropriate, I have also included references from IRS' own recent internal report on their browsing deterrence and detection program. As I mentioned earlier, that report--[Electronic Audit Research Log (EARL) Executive Steering Committee Report, Sept. 30, 1996]--and I commend the IRS for its candid and frank evaluations in it--affirms most of GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. I will briefly highlight the major findings in these attachments: the irs system designed to detect browsing [earl] is limited GAO found that the system used to monitor and detect browsing is ineffective because it can't distinguish between legitimate work activity and illegal browsing. Moreover, EARL only monitors the main taxpayer database. There are several other systems used by employees to create, access, or modify data which, apparently, go unsupervised. This is something I have asked the GAO to look into further. According to GAO: because IRS does not monitor the activities of all employees authorized to access taxpayer data . . . IRS has no assurance that these employees are not browsing taxpayer data and no analytical basis on which to estimate the extent of the browsing problem or any damage being done. In fact, according to the IRS' EARL report: The current system of reports does not provide accurate and meaningful data about what the abuse detection programs are producing, the quality of the outputs, the efficiency of our abuse detection research efforts, or the level of functional management follow through and discipline. This impedes our ability to respond to critics and congressional oversight inquiries about our abuse detection efforts. IRS Progress in Reducing and Disciplining Browsing Cases is Unclear The systems used by the IRS cannot report on the total number of unauthorized browsing incidents. Nor do they contain sufficient information to determine, for each case investigated, how many taxpayer accounts were inappropriately accessed or how many times each account was accessed. Consequently, for known incidents of browsing, IRS cannot efficiently determine how many and how often taxpayers' accounts were inappropriately accessed. Without such information, IRS cannot measure whether it is making progress from year to year in reducing browsing. Internal IRS figures show a fluctuation in the number of browsing cases closed in the last few years: 521 cases in fiscal year 1991; 787 in fiscal year 1992; 522 in fiscal year 1993; 646 in fiscal year 1994, and; 869 in fiscal year 1995. More distressing, however, is the fact that in spite of the Commissioner's announced zero tolerance policy, the percentages of cases resulting in discipline has remained constant from year to year, averaging 29 percent. IRS itself reported that almost one-third of the cases detected were situations where an employee accessed their own account, which, according to the report, is ``generally attributable to trainee error''. Their answer creates simply more questions, however. Why are employees accessing their own accounts? Is this a wise policy? Penalties for Browsing are Inconsistent Across IRS Despite IRS policy to ensure that browsing penalties are handled consistently across the agency, it appears that there are disparities in how similar cases are decided among different offices. For instance, the number of browsing cases resulting in employees being terminated in the last year surveyed ranged from 0 percent at one facility to a high of only 7 percent at another. The percentage of browsing cases resulting in employee counseling ranged from 0 percent at one facility to 77 percent at another. Even more incredible to me--and quite distressing--is the extremely low percentage of employees caught browsing each year who are fired for their offense, according to the IRS' own figures. Would you believe that, for all of the browsing cases detected and closed each year, the highest number of employees fired in 1 year has been 12. Between fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1995, only 43 employees were fired after browsing investigations. That is generally 1 percent of the total number of cases brought each year. Even if you include the category of resignation and retirement, the highest percentage of employees terminated through separation or resignation/retirement in any 1 year has been 6 percent. I could go on and on, but I think you get the idea. Taxpayer privacy is being jeapordized and the IRS is not doing enough to address it. A new law to make browsing a crime will be an important tool and I have worked with the IRS and the Justice Department in crafting my legislation. I will also be looking forward to Thursday's hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee when the IRS will be testifying and this issue is likely to come up. In closing, I do not want to be standing up here again next year talking about browsing. Although the computer age makes guarding taxpayer privacy more difficult and complex, the fact remains: the IRS can and must do better. The American people expect and demand nothing less.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the date of April 15 is indelibly etched in the minds of most Americans. For it is on or by that day that honest, hard-working citizens voluntarily share their most personal and sensitive financial information with their Government. All Americans should have unbridled faith that their tax returns will remain absolutely confidential and zealously safeguarded. That is the foundation of our taxpaying system. If this trust is breached, then the bonds that tie citizens with their Government may break, with disastrous consequences for us all. In 1993 and 1994, as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I held hearings which first exposed that vulnerability. We found out that hundreds of IRS employees had been investigated for what I term ``computer voyeurism'', where they call up returns of friends, enemies, celebrities, relatives, or neighbors just to snoop and satisfy their own prurient interests. Even worse, in some cases, IRS employees either altered their own returns to get refunds, or conspired with other taxpayer friends to change their returns and get a kickback from those refunds. My investigation revealed serious flaws in the IRS' ability to monitor, prevent, and detect browsing. In response, the IRS Commissioner pledged a zero tolerance policy to protect taxpayer privacy and vigorously discipline those who abuse this trust. The Commissioner also implemented a new system called EARL-- Electronic Audit Research Log--to help identify inappropriate and unauthorized access to taxpayer information stored in the IRS' main computer system. That primary system, IDRS--Integrated Data Retrieval System--handles more than 100 million transactions per month and is used by over 55,000 IRS employees. At least one-third of those employees are authorized to input adjustments to tax account records. I had asked the General Accounting Office [GAO] to review the progress made by the IRS in reducing computer security risks and in curbing browsing. Earlier this year, GAO produced that report. However, because some of the specific details could jeopardize IRS security, that report was designated for ``Limited Official Use'' with restricted access. Due to my involvement in this important issue, and because I believe the public has a right to know, I requested that GAO issue a redacted version of the report suitable for public release. I would like to thank GAO for their hard work in this matter and also the IRS for their cooperation in making this possible. The findings of GAO's report are disturbing. Even more important, their findings are reaffirmed by the IRS in a comprehensive internal report of their own compiled last fall. Before I get to the specifics, I just want to say a couple of things. Point One. The vast majority of IRS employees are dedicated and committed to their jobs, and labor in extremely difficult conditions with very outmoded systems. Unfortunately, in this day and age, they must also fear for their own personal safety. Some 99.9 percent of them would never engage in such snooping or fraud. It is not as if every American has reason to believe that his or her privacy and tax return information has been compromised. But even just a single incidence of this behavior is one too many and cannot be tolerated. Just last year, in Tennessee, a jury acquitted a former IRS employee who had been charged with 70 counts of improperly peeking at the tax returns of celebrities such as Elizabeth Taylor, Dolly Parton, Wynonna Judd, Michael Jordan, Lucille Ball, Tom Cruise, President Clinton, and Elvis Presley. More recently, just a few weeks ago, a Federal appeals court in Boston reversed the conviction of a former employee who had been found guilty of several counts of wire and computer fraud by improperly accessing the IRS taxpayer database. It was reported that he had browsed through several files, including those of a local politician who had beaten him in an election, and a woman he once had dated. The Government had alleged this worker was a member of a white-supremacist group and was collecting data on people he thought could be Government informers. In both of these cases, because of a loophole in the law, no criminal penalties could be meted out. The reason? No disclosures had been made to third parties. I doubt these kinds of decisions give great comfort to honest, law- abiding citizens. That is why today I am reintroducing my legislation-- the Taxpayer Privacy Protection Act--to close this gap and ensure that any unauthorized access or inspection of return information, in whatever form, is punishable as a criminal offense and that employees so convicted are fired immediately. I know that the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee is interested in passing such a bill as are several of my Senate colleagues including Senator Coverdell. I commend everyone for their interest and looking forward to making this bill--finally--a reality. Let's pass this by April 15 and send a signal across the land that those who violate the privacy of tax paying Americans will be fined, will be fired, and will be jailed. The public rightfully expects no less. Point Two. The IRS has recognized this serious issue and has undertaken some responsive actions. Warnings of possible prosecution for unauthorized use of the system appear whenever employees log onto the taxpayer account database. They have installed automated detection programs in some of their systems to monitor employee use and alert managers to possible misuse. And, the IRS has just created a new Office of Systems Standards and Evaluations to centralize and enforce IRS standards and policies for all major security programs. I have confidence that this Office, if given the proper resources, will be a positive force in this effort. The problem, however, is that these efforts, while well-intentioned, have come too late and fall far short of the commitment, management, and determination sorely needed to confront this matter head-on. The sad fact is that with 1 week to go until tax returns are due, one thing is clear: the IRS has flunked its own audit and has let down the American people. The agency promised zero tolerance for browsing. Today's information suggests that they have failed to live up to that pledge--1,515 new cases of browsing have been identified since our last report. Of those only 27 have resulted in employees being fired. I don't know what kind of new math they may be using, but that doesn't sound like zero tolerance to me. GAO even found that the 1,515 figure may drastically underestimate actual incidents because--and I quote--the agency's ``ability to detect browsing is limited''. Overall, GAO found that IRS' approach to computer security is not effective. Serious weaknesses persist in security controls intended to safeguard IRS computer systems, data, and facilities and expose tax processing operations to the risk of disruption and taxpayer data to the risk of unauthorized use, modification, and destruction. Further, although IRS has taken some action to detect and prevent browsing, the fact remains that the IRS has no effective means for measuring the extent of the browsing problem, the damage being done by browsing, or the progress being made to deter browsing. This finding is candidly confirmed in IRS' own internal report: progress in developing efficient prevention and detection programs has been painfully slow. The program has suffered from a lack of overall consistent, strong leadership and oversight. Quite distressing to me is the finding, as stated in the IRS' own report, that employees, when confronted, indicate that they browsed because they do not believe it is wrong and that there will be little or no consequence to them if they are caught. Before summarizing the major findings, I also want to point out another facet of this report. That is, the effectiveness of controls used to safeguard IRS systems, facilities, and taxpayer data. GAO found serious weaknesses in these efforts, especially in the areas of physical and logical security. For example, the facilities visited by GAO could not account for about 6,400 units of magnetic storage media, such as tapes and cartridges, which might contain taxpayer data. Further, they found that printouts containing taxpayer data were left unprotected and unattended in open areas of two facilities where they could be compromised. I really don't want to say much more on this portion of the report than I have already. Except that these matters, and the others referred to by GAO, must be dealt with swiftly and effectively. I have summarized GAO's findings in a handout. Where appropriate, I have also included references from IRS' own recent internal report on their browsing deterrence and detection program. As I mentioned earlier, that report--[Electronic Audit Research Log (EARL) Executive Steering Committee Report, Sept. 30, 1996]--and I commend the IRS for its candid and frank evaluations in it--affirms most of GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. I will briefly highlight the major findings in these attachments: the irs system designed to detect browsing [earl] is limited GAO found that the system used to monitor and detect browsing is ineffective because it can't distinguish between legitimate work activity and illegal browsing. Moreover, EARL only monitors the main taxpayer database. There are several other systems used by employees to create, access, or modify data which, apparently, go unsupervised. This is something I have asked the GAO to look into further. According to GAO: because IRS does not monitor the activities of all employees authorized to access taxpayer data . . . IRS has no assurance that these employees are not browsing taxpayer data and no analytical basis on which to estimate the extent of the browsing problem or any damage being done. In fact, according to the IRS' EARL report: The current system of reports does not provide accurate and meaningful data about what the abuse detection programs are producing, the quality of the outputs, the efficiency of our abuse detection research efforts, or the level of functional management follow through and discipline. This impedes our ability to respond to critics and congressional oversight inquiries about our abuse detection efforts. IRS Progress in Reducing and Disciplining Browsing Cases is Unclear The systems used by the IRS cannot report on the total number of unauthorized browsing incidents. Nor do they contain sufficient information to determine, for each case investigated, how many taxpayer accounts were inappropriately accessed or how many times each account was accessed. Consequently, for known incidents of browsing, IRS cannot efficiently determine how many and how often taxpayers' accounts were inappropriately accessed. Without such information, IRS cannot measure whether it is making progress from year to year in reducing browsing. Internal IRS figures show a fluctuation in the number of browsing cases closed in the last few years: 521 cases in fiscal year 1991; 787 in fiscal year 1992; 522 in fiscal year 1993; 646 in fiscal year 1994, and; 869 in fiscal year 1995. More distressing, however, is the fact that in spite of the Commissioner's announced zero tolerance policy, the percentages of cases resulting in discipline has remained constant from year to year, averaging 29 percent. IRS itself reported that almost one-third of the cases detected were situations where an employee accessed their own account, which, according to the report, is ``generally attributable to trainee error''. Their answer creates simply more questions, however. Why are employees accessing their own accounts? Is this a wise policy? Penalties for Browsing are Inconsistent Across IRS Despite IRS policy to ensure that browsing penalties are handled consistently across the agency, it appears that there are disparities in how similar cases are decided among different offices. For instance, the number of browsing cases resulting in employees being terminated in the last year surveyed ranged from 0 percent at one facility to a high of only 7 percent at another. The percentage of browsing cases resulting in employee counseling ranged from 0 percent at one facility to 77 percent at another. Even more incredible to me--and quite distressing--is the extremely low percentage of employees caught browsing each year who are fired for their offense, according to the IRS' own figures. Would you believe that, for all of the browsing cases detected and closed each year, the highest number of employees fired in 1 year has been 12. Between fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1995, only 43 employees were fired after browsing investigations. That is generally 1 percent of the total number of cases brought each year. Even if you include the category of resignation and retirement, the highest percentage of employees terminated through separation or resignation/retirement in any 1 year has been 6 percent. I could go on and on, but I think you get the idea. Taxpayer privacy is being jeapordized and the IRS is not doing enough to address it. A new law to make browsing a crime will be an important tool and I have worked with the IRS and the Justice Department in crafting my legislation. I will also be looking forward to Thursday's hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee when the IRS will be testifying and this issue is likely to come up. In closing, I do not want to be standing up here again next year talking about browsing. Although the computer age makes guarding taxpayer privacy more difficult and complex, the fact remains: the IRS can and must do better. The American people expect and demand nothing less.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. I ask unanimous consent to finish my statement.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, they wanted to cut out any investigation of Capitol Hill. That is the reason we came to this situation. It was not that most Members don't want to correct campaign finance reform on our side. We asked for campaign finance reform legislation to be brought to the floor all this year. We would like to see the McCain-Feingold proposal voted on. But regardless of that, we think that an airing of everything to do with what happened in campaign financing over the past several elections, really, as this has built up to a crescendo that just inundated us in 1996, we think that should be looked into to lay the base for real campaign finance reform and give us that kind of educational base. What happened? Those who were against this got a deal cut, and instead, all the things we were going to look into which was submitted as the original part of Senate Resolution 39 from the Governmental Affairs Committee to the Rules Committee for approval were all struck, the total language, and the additional funds in the last part of this that are operable in Senate Resolution 39 as brought to the floor state that funds can only be used for the sole purpose of conducting an investigation of illegal activities. That takes out all those other areas of soft money that we wanted to look into. The amendment I proposed would restore the scope of the investigation, as the chairman and I and as all members of the Governmental Affairs Committee, including those who are on the Rules Committee, voted out of committee. They voted for these things to go into this type of scope. They did not disagree with it then. But as part of the deal that was cut then, that kind of scope was taken away from us. Now I would propose, with my amendment, to restore that. What has happened this morning is now the majority leader has proposed an amendment to my amendment, a second-degree amendment in the nature of a substitute, that would again say that ``the Committee on Rules and Administration, not the Committee on Governmental Affairs, has jurisdiction under rule 25 over all proposed legislation and other matters relating to--(1) Federal elections generally * * * [and] (2) corrupt practices * * * [and] the Committee on Governmental Affairs shall refer to the Committee on Rules and Administration any evidence of activities * * * [that] are not illegal but which may require investigation * * *'' In other words, this takes us back where we were. It second-degrees my amendment and takes us back to the intent of Senate Resolution 39, which cut back the authority on the committee. There has been a good discussion of this this morning. But to my way of thinking, this boils down, very, very simply, to one area. And one thing that is correct is, it is a choice. Do we want campaign finance reform or do we not? We want the broadest possible investigation so we can come out with good campaign finance reform that I think will be follow on to McCain- Feingold if we are ever able to get it to a vote. On the other side, they do not want any investigation in this area and are opposed to campaign finance reform. That is the bottom-line choice we are talking about here. I will end with that because my good friend from Virginia has been very kind in granting me extra time here. I have run over several minutes, I know. I thank him very much.

Mr. GLENN. I yield 5 minutes.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. I would, indeed.

Mr. GLENN

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I welcome the remarks by Senator Thompson. I think his statement is excellent. I think it does provide a new basis for starting ahead with these investigations, a better basis than where we were before, I am sure he would agree. It is a new day, and we can make a fresh start. We can set priorities, and those priorities can be set as a matter of judgment between us on not only just what is illegal, you would have something that is barely illegal but some giant thing that is improper that we now can look at on a priority basis, and we can make those judgments. And that is fine. I agree with that. I think what we have called scope, or whether you want to call it jurisdiction, we are on a much better basis than we were before, and I think we are now prepared to move ahead. I will have some other remarks in the colloquy that is to be provided in this half hour. I know that Senator Dorgan had a couple of particular things he wanted to mention. He has another commitment. And I ask if he might be able to do that now. How much time?

Mr. GLENN. Go ahead and address your questions. Five minutes?

Mr. GLENN. Fine.

Mr. GLENN. I would like to engage the senior Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Tennessee in a colloquy regarding the issue of referrals to the Ethics Committee. The resolution before us, as amended, states that ``the Committee on Governmental Affairs shall refer any evidence of illegal or improper activities involving any Member of the Senate revealed pursuant to the investigation authorized by subsection (b) to the Select Committee on Ethics.'' In the event the Governmental Affairs Committee develops facts which implicate a Senator or Senators in any illegal or improper activities, as those terms are used in this resolution, they shall report such findings promptly to the Ethics Committee; however, such reporting does not preclude the Governmental Affairs Committee from continuing its investigation, provided it is not for the specific purpose of determining the culpability, or lack thereof, of such Senator or Senators. Do my distinguished colleagues agree?

Mr. GLENN. I think the vote was called for 6:30. I think we have about exhausted everything we need to comment on. I will yield back my time.