Bob Goodlatte

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment. The class-action reform contained in this bill is entirely reasonable. It is strongly supported by a large number of bipartisan folks. In fact, legislation very similar to what is provided here will be introduced by myself, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) and others next week which will deal with class-action reform in a broader sense. But the principle is very simple. Nobody should be able to go forum shopping in one county, in one State and bring a nationwide class- action suit before a judge that is predisposed to certify such class- action suits when the case considered on a larger scale would not be brought. There are judges in this country who have certified large numbers of class action lawsuits and, in fact, far more than the entire Federal Judiciary combined. And so this is simply a reasonable reform. The gentleman from New York makes reference to not wanting to hear cases over and over and over again. That is exactly what this legislation will do, because if it is truly a diverse class action with plaintiffs from across the country, the case will be removed to Federal Court and only heard once, whereas a class action could be brought in a number of States and retried a number of times under different legal theories. This is a sensible way to address that. The provisions of this section of the bill are also very reasonable and, in fact, some of them are included in both the substitute offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and are supported by the White House, including the minimum injury requirement. This provision simply states that where it is claimed in a class action that a product or service is defective, one can file a class action only where the court finds that the alleged defect was material as to a majority of the class members. The provision simply says that an individual should not be able to file a class action unless the majority of people on whose behalf the action is brought have allegedly suffered some sort of real injury. The notice provision is also entirely reasonable. It is impossible to see how this provision can be controversial. It simply requires that class members in a Y2K class action must be notified directly that they are parties to a lawsuit, that they have claims that are going to be resolved, that they have certain rights in the lawsuit, and that they may opt out of the lawsuit if they wish. Such notice is critical to a fair litigation system. Some class members may want to opt out of a class action and insert their claims individually. In other instances, class members may object to having litigation brought on their behalf without their permission and for that reason may likewise wish to opt out. What justifying could there be for not providing such information to the class members who are being represented in the case, the people on whose behalf the litigation supposedly has been brought? The dismissal prior to certification provision merely provides that a court may rule on a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion before deciding whether a case may be prosecuted on behalf of a class. This provision should also not be controversial. Under present law both Federal and State courts engage in this practice every day. The Federal jurisdiction provisions, to me, are most important. H.R. 775 would not make any changes where individual Year 2000 actions may be filed. If the cases are meeting Federal jurisdictional requirements, they may be filed in Federal District Court, otherwise they may be filed in an appropriate State court. However, H.R. 775 does provide that larger Year 2000 class actions, that is cases in which the total of all claims asserted exceed $1 million, may be brought in Federal Court or may be removed to such court by the defendant. There are two exceptions: Local class actions. The bill does not create Federal jurisdiction for Year 2000 class actions in which a substantial majority of the members of the proposed class are citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also citizens and to the claims asserted will be by the laws of that State. Also, State action cases. The bill creates no Federal jurisdiction over Year 2000 class actions in which the defendants are States or State entities against which a Federal District Court may be foreclosed from ordering relief. Defendants wishing to remove Year 2000 cases to Federal Court under these provisions would simply employ the existing removal statutes as they apply to Federal question matters. The bill does not alter existing removal procedures. The creation of Federal jurisdiction over certain larger Year 2000 class actions is appropriate for several reasons: First, H.R. 775 is prompted in part by a concern that a proliferation of Year 2000 actions by opportunistic parties may further limit access to the courts by straining the resources of the legal system and depriving deserving parties of their legitimate right to relief. To address that concern, the bill would establish certain subsequent prerequisites in bringing Year 2000 class actions, particularly the material defect requirement I mentioned earlier. In the interest of consistent, rigorous enforcement of these important provisions, it is critical most such matters be heard by our Federal courts. Second, overlapping class actions asserting similar claims on behalf of the same persons undoubtedly will be filed in numerous different State courts nationwide. In the interest of consistent, efficient adjudication of such class actions they should be consolidated before a single court. That consolidation is not possible if those claims remain in State courts. Only our Federal courts can achieve sump consolidation through their multi-district litigation authority. Thus, allowing these cases access to Federal courts is critical to the fair, orderly adjudication of such claims. Third, as drafted, the bill makes proper use of Federal question jurisdiction. Even though State law typically will apply to many aspects of Year 2000 class action claims, the bill will be supplying important new Federal substantive law to such cases, as mentioned above. Thus, there is a basis for Federal question jurisdiction. There is precedent for the use of Federal question jurisdiction in such circumstances, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act that authorizes certain claims be asserted in Federal Court, even though many aspects thereof are governed by State laws. Fourth, the bill includes appropriate limits on the available Federal question jurisdiction over Year 2000 class actions to avoid having small or local disputes heard in Federal Court. For example, for many years, until 1980, the general Federal question statute contained a jurisdictional amount requirement. Finally, by enacting H.R. 775, Congress will be declaring Year 2000 litigation to warrant priority attention. It is thus appropriate for our Federal courts to be empowered to hear the largest Year 2000 cases that will touch the most Americans; the inevitable class actions asserting Year 2000 claims. Mr. Chairman, for these reasons I oppose this amendment and strongly urge my colleagues to vote against it. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. In response to the contention that we are going to flood the Federal courts with class action lawsuits, that assertion is disproved by the U.S. Judicial Conference's own statistics. According to those data, the number of diversity jurisdiction cases being filed in Federal Court is going down dramatically. During the 12- month period ending March 31, 1998, diversity of citizenship filings fell 6 percent to 54,547 cases, accounting for less than 20 percent of the civil cases filed in Federal Court during that period. For the 12- month period ending December 31, 1998, the downward trend is even more dramatic. The Judicial Conference's position fails to take account of the impact of class action on our entire national judicial system, particularly the fact that many State courts face even greater burdens and are less equipped to deal with complex cases like class actions. Many State courts have crushing caseloads. And as a group, State courts have had a much more rapid growth in civil case filings than have Federal courts. Civil filings in State trial courts of general jurisdiction have increased 28 percent since 1984 versus only a 4 percent increase in the Federal courts. For that reason, and the reasons that I outlined earlier, I urge my colleagues to object to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Conyers substitute. I commend the gentleman from Michigan, the gentlewoman from California, and the gentleman from Virginia for their efforts to work in this area, but this amendment, this substitute, simply does not address the problems that are addressed in the bill offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Davis), and as a result, I must support the bill. Let me point out what those differences are. First, the amendment would allow vague and unsupported allegations of fraud to survive a motion to dismiss. Like H.R. 775, the Conyers amendment recognizes that heightened pleadings standards are necessary to screen out frivolous suits at the motion to dismiss stage before defendants and plaintiffs run up huge litigation costs. Unlike H.R. 775, however, the substitute would not require plaintiffs to plead with particularity the facts supporting allegations of fraud. This is a major omission. Prior to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, abusive fraud suits were a major problem. Similar suits inevitably will be brought in the Y2K area, yet it is fundamentally unfair for a plaintiff to accuse a defendant of acting with a fraudulent state of mind unless the plaintiff is able to articulate some factual basis for that allegation. The substitute does not impose a meaningful duty to mitigate damages, and therefore does not encourage remediation. The Conyers amendment provides that a plaintiff may not obtain damages that it could reasonably have avoided in light of information that it received from the defendant, but unlike H.R. 775, the substitute does not create a mitigation requirement if the plaintiff becomes or should have become aware of the information from other sources. Surely, however, if someone could easily avoid damage by taking simple steps of which he or she is or should be aware, it is perverse to allow that person to avoid taking those steps to suffer the damage and then sue a third party for compensation. The amendment does not impose meaningful limits on joint and several liability and thus does nothing to prevent strike suits against defendants with deep pockets. Proportionate liability is an essential response to the threat of abusive litigation. Without proportionate liability, plaintiff's lawyers always will name a deep-pocketed defendant in their suits so long as there is any chance that the people who are really responsible for the injury are judgment-proof. The lawyers will know that the deep pocket will have to pay the entire judgment so long as a jury can be persuaded to find it even 1 percent responsible. As was true in the securities context prior to enactment of the PSLRA, that kind of scheme simply encourages strike suit litigation by giving lawyers the leverage to bring abusive suits that the defendant will have no choice but to settle. The Conyers amendment, however, does not impose a real limit on joint and several liability. It makes joint and several liability the rule unless a judge exercises his or her discretion to order otherwise. This scheme offers no protection in State courts with plaintiff-friendly judges. Because the outcome in every case will be uncertain, defendants who will not know until after trial whether they face joint and several liability will have to pay coercive settlements even when they did nothing wrong. Indeed, the amendment would make the law considerably worse than it is now by preempting the many State laws that depart from pure joint and several liability. Also, this substitute does nothing to advance reasonable efforts to remediate Y2K problems. It does not limit punitive damages and, therefore, does nothing to discourage abusive suits by lawyers who seek to win the litigation jackpot. The substitute would keep national class actions involving out-of- State defendants in State court, an abuse that we have attempted to correct in this legislation and is one of the main reasons why I cannot join in supporting this substitute. I urge my colleagues to oppose it and to support H.R. 775. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes, and I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers) for the purpose of a colloquy.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan and appreciate hearing his concerns about the additional issues that this legislation could be expanded to address. As he accurately stated, I have agreed to attempt to specifically address these matters as work on the bill continues in conference. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey), our distinguished majority leader.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Bryant), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. BRYANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) for the comity in which this debate has taken place, and I extend my compliments to other Members on his side of the aisle as well, including a number who are supporting this legislation, but I must rise in strong opposition to his motion to recommit. The motion raises significant constitutional and international law concerns, represents a serious potential irritant in our bilateral relations with other countries and raises a specter of foreign retaliation against American firms, and that is the matter on which I am most strongly opposed. If we were to go ahead and enact this provision, we would be opening U.S. companies all over the world to treatment different than they are receiving now because they are receiving it under international treaty obligations that would expose them to treatment in courts elsewhere that would jeopardize their position. Mr. Speaker, one of the provisions of this motion to recommit would subject foreign corporations to trial in U.S. courts without their ever having to be in the courtroom, and if the same provision were applied to U.S. companies in countries all over the world, one can only guess what kinds of denial of due process would occur for U.S. companies and U.S. businessmen and women treated with this same consideration in the courts of other countries who today comply with international treaty obligations that do not expose our corporations and businessmen and women to those considerations. The amendment implicates the fifth amendment and international law, and it is possible that it would compromise the due process rights of a foreign defendant. The extent to which American statutes apply to foreign nationals already is a point of contention in our foreign relations. We should proceed very cautiously in this area, especially since the gentleman's motion to recommit was not the subject of hearings. The amendment's requirement to force a foreign defendant to comply with U.S. discovery requirements failed to accord appropriate deference to the sensibilities and prerogatives of other countries. Mr. Speaker, because the motion to recommit would invite retaliation against U.S. companies doing business overseas and might affect the level of foreign investment in the U.S., thereby creating unemployment, the business community and others in this country are strongly opposed to this amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to vote against the motion to recommit. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Davis).

Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, this is an outstanding bill; and I urge my colleagues to oppose the motion to recommit and support this reform legislation which will truly help us enter the new millennium and deal with the potential Y2K bugs in a way that resolves these problems without encouraging the massive explosion of litigation that many have predicted. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to eliminate class-action lawsuits. We are simply saying that, if they are diverse, they ought to be heard in Federal court and not recognize that the current forum shopping that takes place where they find a judge in one small county in one State who likes to certify nationwide class-action suits, those class-action suits that have merit will be treated fairly by the entire 600-judge Federal judiciary and those that are appropriately certifiable will be certified and go forward. Y2K is a particularly good issue in which to reform class action because it is limited and because it will only proceed for a limited period of time. So in order to avoid a mass of class-action suits in a whole host of States, let us be practical, let us make sure that those that are truly diverse are removed to Federal court and heard in a more orderly, efficient, and economical fashion. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I am in strong opposition to this amendment. The punitive damage caps that are contained in this legislation are badly needed and entirely reasonable. They provide for $250,000 in punitive damages in each case, in each instance of liability, or three times the amount of economic loss that the plaintiff may have suffered, whichever is greater, except in the case of very small businesses with fewer than 25 employees, in which case, they can still suffer $250,000 in punitive damages or three times their economic loss, whichever is lesser. The reasonable limits on punitive damages contained in H.R. 775 are very important. In many instances, the pleading of punitive damages amounts to an extortion threat to companies. Unfortunately, many companies settle those cases, although the company was not responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. The settlement occurs because the company does not want to take a chance in a legal lottery that could make it liable for millions of dollars in punitive damages when the actual harm alleged by the plaintiff is several orders of magnitude less. Let me give an example. The May 11, 1999, editions of the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times illustrate what can happen when a company decides to take a case to trial. A jury in Alabama has awarded $580 million in punitive damages against Whirlpool Corporation for a satellite dish loan program. The satellite dishes cost $1,124. In addition to the punitive damages, the two plaintiffs were awarded $975,000 for mental anguish. This type of outrageous award is what this legislation is trying to curtail. Punitive damages are awarded primarily as punishment to a defendant. They are intended to deter a repeat of the offensive conduct. Punitive damages are not awarded to compensate losses or damage suffered by the plaintiff. But Y2K cases are unusual in that the conduct is not likely to occur again. That is because Y2K is going to resolve itself here with time. Thus, there is little deterrent value to awarding punitive damages. Without a deterrent effect, punitive damages serve only as a windfall to plaintiffs and attorneys. Additionally, since we have eliminated personal injuries from coverage of the bill, the only harm caused by defendants will be economic damage, which can be appropriately compensated without the need for punitive award. Furthermore, excessive punitive damage awards will simply compound the economic impact of Y2K litigation, and the cost will be passed along to the public and consumers through higher prices. In this situation, punitive damages truly become a lottery for the plaintiff. Thus, they should be limited. Our limitations of $250,000 or three times the economic loss cap are entirely reasonable. I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham). (Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), chairman of the Committee on Rules, a leader on this and other technology issues. (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 775.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for his kind words, and for his leadership in this excellent piece of legislation that I rise today to strongly support, H.R. 833, the Bankruptcy Reform Act, and to oppose the Nadler substitute, which would take us back to the current situation where we reward people who act irresponsibly and penalize hardworking consumers who make every effort to pay their bills on time; pay their own bills, and pay a portion of someone else's bills when that person files bankruptcy and does not take responsibility for their actions. With a record high 1.4 million bankruptcy filings last year, every American must pay more for credit, goods, and services when others go bankrupt. I worked to pass H.R. 3150 last year, which passed the House by a vote of 300 to 125 in the final conference report, which this legislation is very similar to, and am pleased to cosponsor this legislation this year because it is high time that we relieve consumers from the burden of paying for the debts of others. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 restores personal responsibility, fairness, and accountability to our bankruptcy laws, and will be of great benefit to consumers. For too long our bankruptcy laws have allowed individuals to walk away from their debts, even though many are able to repay them. That is not fair to millions of hardworking families who pay their bills, mortgages, car loans, student loans, and credit card bills every month. The loopholes in our bankruptcy laws have led to a 400 percent increase in personal bankruptcy filings since 1980, at a cost of $40 billion per year. These costs have been passed directly to consumers, costing the average household that pays its bills an average of $400 each year. Under the current system, some irresponsible people filing for bankruptcy run up their credit card debt immediately prior to filing, knowing that their debts will soon be wiped away. These debts, however, do not just disappear, they are passed along to hardworking folks who play by the rules and pay their own bills on time. The Bankruptcy Reform Act ends this practice by requiring bankruptcy filers to pay back nondischargeable debts made in the period immediately preceding their filing. In addition, new debts for luxury goods incurred during this period would be presumed nondischargeable. While ending the abuses of our bankruptcy laws, the Bankruptcy Reform Act is strongly pro-consumer in other ways, as well. This legislation, for example, helps children by strengthening protections in the law that prioritize child support and alimony payments. Additionally, the bill protects consumers from bankruptcy mills that encourage folks to file for bankruptcy without fully informing them of their rights and the potential harms that bankruptcy can cause. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) outlined some of the problems that we have with the Nadler substitute. I would like to point out some others. The so-called refinements of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) are simply inexplicable, or even worse, inane. For instance, we allow the debtor's income to be adjusted upward in a fixed amount on an annual basis if the number of individuals in the debtor's household exceeds four. The substitute of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) takes that annual figure and converts it into a monthly figure. As a result, he would allow an adjustment in that in an amount that is 12 times greater than the amount contemplated in our bill. Thus, for a family of let us say eight members, their income could be as high as $79,000 per year and still not be subject to their so-called needs- based test. The substitute is also substantively flawed. We spent many months examining the current consumer bankruptcy law and crafting ways to reintroduce balance into the bankruptcy system. One important principle that we wanted to achieve was to allow greater creditor participation in the system. The substitute in many respects undercuts that principle. One example is the provision on page 12 of the substitute that would prohibit a creditor from filing a Section 707(b) motion until the United States Trustee has acted. This provision is simply unfair to creditors, and effectively resuscitates current law, which prevents creditors from filing these motions. Another substantive flaw in the substitute is its provision for determining a debtor's income. It excepts from the income side of the needs-based formula a series of items that, under current law, are considered as income. If we do not take into consideration all of the debtor's income, but we do take into consideration all of the debtor's expenses, the result is a mathematical imbalance that frustrates the purpose of the formula. The substitute contains what is in effect a back door effort to amend the Truth-in-Lending Act. Section 112 would disallow a claim for the creditor's failure to comply with any of a very long series of requirements spelled out in that section. Without even reading this section, one can simply tell from its near seven pages that the substitute essentially wants to establish an entire new set of requirements for lenders that do not even exist under the Truth-in- Lending Act. This tactic is simply wrong. The Truth-in-Lending Act already imposes various penalties for violations of its provisions. The effect of this substitute would be to establish two sets of standards that lenders would have to comply with, one for purposes of the Truth-in-Lending Act and the other for purposes of establishing a claim in bankruptcy. Mr. Chairman, bankruptcy should remain available to folks who truly need it, but those who can afford to repay their debts should not be able to stick other folks with the tab. Enactment of this carefully- crafted legislation by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) and opposition to the legislation by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) would send a big signal towards those who would abuse our bankruptcy system that the free ride is over. I want to commend my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) for his outstanding work on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this fair and reasonable bill.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to announce the introduction of the Internet Freedom Act of 1999. This bipartisan legislative initiative, which I am introducing along with Congressman Boucher of Virginia, addresses the challenge that face the Internet by building on the strengths that have made the Internet the major engine of growth and development in the new Information Age. The legislation ensures that the qualities that have provided the explosive growth of the Internet in recent years will continue into the new millennium. The initiative addresses the crucial challenges currently facing the Internet and its future: providing freedom from burdensome government regulation, ensuring consumer choice through open competition, and protecting consumer-friendly open access to the Internet. The Internet is currently at a crossroads. One path continues to encourage the principles mentioned above: freedom, competition, and consumer choice. The other path, which is looming on the horizon, is characterized by heavy government regulation, limited competition, higher prices and less choice for consumers. Following this path could mean that any company with market power can restrict the ability of businesses to compete on the Internet, and the ability of consumers to access the Internet provider and content of their choice could be subject to the control of a single company. The Internet as we know it--open, competitive, and easily available to consumers--will cease to exist. That path, unfortunately, is the one we are following now. Congress must act now to ensure that the qualities that made the Internet a revolutionary tool for both business and users-- deregulation, competition, and easy consumer access--remain fundamental components of the Internet for future generations. The Internet Freedom Act accomplishes this by achieving three goals. The first goal of the Internet Freedom Act is deregulation: the bill gets the FCC out of the business of regulating the Internet. It accomplishes this by eliminating existing FCC regulations that are inhibiting the development and rollout of certain types of broadband Internet service in non-urban and rural areas. Broadband technology is up to twenty times faster than the old modems used for Internet access, and can be compared to the old ``T-1'' telephone lines offered for $1,000 a month, but at a fraction of the cost. In some areas, it is now possible to obtain broadband Internet service, in a variety of forms, for as low as $40 a month. The development of broadband technology has the potential to not only make fast Internet access available to consumers and small businesses, but to make it affordable as well. The FCC is currently ignoring its responsibility under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to provide regulatory relief to incumbent phone companies by removing existing regulations on data traffic that were originally intended to encourage competition in voice traffic. The FCC regulations currently prohibit the incumbent phone companies from competing in the Internet backbone market. The ``backbone'' is the very high speed, high capacity lines that crisscross the country linking major cities. Existing suppliers of Internet backbone are simply unable to keep up with the demand for high speed, high capacity backbone bandwidth. They also have little incentives to invest in many parts of the country that are far away from the main backbone routes. Our legislation would allow local phone companies into the backbone market, increasing competition and lowering prices for businesses and consumers. In addition, many areas of the country are located far from these backbone pipes (often but not exclusively in rural areas). Traffic from these areas must be hauled to the closest backbone connection point (often miles away) and the connections used for this are of much smaller capacity than those on the backbone. More backbone investment will mean that more facilities will eventually become available in more places than ever before. Local phone companies and others may be able to justify building major connection points to the Internet in more locations, allowing traffic to be aggregated by ISPs and encouraging the build-out of more connections closer to customers. This will make it possible for more customers to be able to access the Internet without being required to make a long distance call. The second goal the Internet Freedom Act accomplishes is freedom of competition: One of the main goals of the Telecommunications Act was to open the local phone markets to competition to ensure non-discriminatory access and safeguard against anti-competitive behavior. However, certain networks unaffected by the Act remain closed to competitors and other closed networks could be just around the corner. Under this scenario, a consumer who wants high-speed broadband service, whether by cable, satellite, or copper wire, would be forced to buy it from their access provider's ISP. If they wanted service from AOL or another ISP, they would either not be able to receive it or would essentially have to pay twice. A closed network also provides undue leverage over Internet content, since one company would possess the ability to give content providers preferential access to their ``hostage'' customers. This ability to leverage its monopoly vertically can curtail competition and innovation in the content market and raise prices for such information or programs. It could also limit the variety and availability of content that has made the Internet so successful. This legislation preserves competition among broadband Internet providers without involving the heavy-handed bureaucracy of the FCC. The bill achieves this goal by giving a private right of action to ISPs who have been unable to compete fairly against other ISPs by broadband transport providers. For example, if a company limits the ability of an ISP to offer its services over their facilities on the same terms and conditions that the cable company offers to another ISP, the first ISP would be able to seek relief in the courts. The section also preserves competition among ISPs by using existing antitrust law. Under this section, evidence in a civil action that a broadband access transport provider with market power has limited the ability of an Internet service provider to compete in the ISP marketplace would be presumed to have violated the Sherman Act. This section recognizes that each type of broadband transport provider technology is unique, whether two-way cable, copper wire, sport-beam satellite or wireless transmission. Each technology is recognized under this bill as a separate type of broadband market, and therefore providers cannot under current antitrust law abuse that power to limit the competitive marketplace of Internet service providers. The second section would also ensure openness and competition among broadband Internet transport providers by ensuring that the same rules apply to the incumbent phone companies, which are already required to open their networks to ISPs. In return for removing rate and price regulations on data traffic for local phone companies after meeting certain rollout requirements, this section would presume a Sherman Act violation if the phone company failed to make its ``local loop'' available to other carriers who wanted to compete in the provision of DSL broadband technology. Finally, the Internet Freedom Act encourages open consumer access for consumers by making the Internet a more user-friendly environment. The third section addresses the problem of illegal mass e-mail, also known as ``spamming.'' This section would make it a federal crime for a person to knowingly use another person's Internet e-mail address, or ``domain name,'' to send unsolicited mass e-mails. The penalty for violating the section would be the actual monetary loss and damages of $15,000 per violation or up to $10 per message, whichever is greater. The principles of free-market competition, low government regulation, and open consumer access have guided the growth of the Internet. If this growth is to continue, we must ensure that public policy reflects the best interests of the consumer. The environment that has nurtured the early growth of the Internet must be preserved and strengthened to spur continued innovation and ensure that the Internet and information- based economy continue to flourish. But, there are several inefficiencies currently in the marketplace that could stifle the continued development and innovation of the Internet and the growth of our economy. We must fix these problems now, before they require heavy- handed regulations that slow down the Internet, drive up costs, hinder consumer access to information, and cause this engine of potential economic growth and future prosperity to sputter and fail.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the legislation introduced by my good friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble). This important legislation represents a much- needed compromise that will enable thousands of folks, many of whom live in my district, to continue to receive their network signals through satellite service. For those who can receive their network signal over the air, this compromise will ensure that they get the antenna they need to receive a quality over-the-air signal. Finally, this bill will speed the roll-out of local-into-local satellite service by requiring a joint study by the Copyright Office and the Commerce Department on how to best deliver local-into-local into rural areas. Mr. Speaker, this legislation provides a badly needed solution to a problem that cannot be delayed any longer. I urge my colleagues to support this important compromise and keep this legislation moving to provide relief to the hardworking Americans who deserve it.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I say to my friend from Texas that we have been pushing for tax relief across the board. We have been pushing to scrap the entire Internal Revenue Code which would eliminate the vast majority, if not all of the so-called loopholes he refers to which were created overwhelmingly during his party's majority rule in this House for more than four decades. I would say to the gentleman that we simply want to correct this problem, and obfuscation about it is not the way to cure it. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for sponsoring this important legislation which I rise today to strongly support. Mr. Speaker, in 1913 taxpayers remitted an average of about 8 percent of their total income in Federal, State and local taxes. Today's average family is paying almost 40 percent of their income on taxes. That amounts to more than the typical family spends on food, clothing and housing combined. Not since World War II has the tax burden on American workers been so high. Mr. Speaker, even with the federal budget surplus projected at $4.9 trillion over the next 15 years, many in Congress and the administration are calling for even higher taxes on American families. Mr. Speaker, this is exactly why we need a tax limitation amendment. This is the surest way to keep the hard-earned money of American families out of the hands of the Washington politicians who want to raise their taxes and spend their money and keep it in the hands of those who know best how it should be spent, the American taxpayer.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as co-chairman of the bipartisan Congressional Internet Caucus to recognize a major step taken last week to develop the growing Internet economy of the United States. In my home state of Virginia, just a few hours from the United States Capitol, the University of Virginia took the first step last week toward developing America's most technologically advanced Internet Engineering curriculum. As we all know, high-tech and the Internet are a major part of the economic growth we have enjoyed these last few years. Over the next five years high-tech will create 1.8 million new jobs in the U.S.--1.8 million. Because of an innovative public/private partnership, and thanks to the generosity of Cisco Systems and MCI/Worldcom, which have just donated over $1 million in new equipment to the University, UVA is now creating VINT-Lab, the premier high-tech training facility of its kind. You see, Mr. Speaker, the thing about creating nearly two million new, high-tech jobs is that no good comes of it unless there's qualified people to fill them. What the folks at UVA and Cisco are trying to do is make sure that the young people of today are prepared to build the economy of tomorrow. I think we'll be seeing a lot more public/private partnerships like this in the future, and as co-chairman of the Internet Caucus, I will certainly be working to promote them.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, several months ago, I was contacted by one of my constituents, Mrs. Linnae Hedgebeth of Salem, Virginia. She requested that my office intervene on a matter of great importance to her family, and others across the country. Mrs. Hedgebeth is the widow of Roger Hedgebeth, Sr., a decorated World War II veteran and a career civil servant. When Mr. Hedgebeth passed away in 1997, he requested that his body be donated to assist in medical research, and that his ashes be memorialized at Arlington National Cemetery. Following his wishes, his family donated his body to science, but unfortunately were not able to give this military hero the final recognition that he deserved at Arlington National Cemetery. As it stands now, due to various legal concerns, no ashes of individuals who donate their bodies to science are returned. And unfortunately, current regulations at Arlington National Cemetery prohibit memorializing veterans in the Columbarium unless their remains are actually inurned there. While I understand that space is limited at Arlington, and it is necessary to follow strict guidelines regarding burial and memorialization, I cannot accept that an entitled veteran can be denied appropriate recognition simply because he has donated his remains to further medical research. While our nation is blessed with many treasures, none is more cherished than the peace we enjoy in our prosperous country. Arlington National Cemetery has long been a sanctuary for remembrance to veterans who provided and safeguarded that peace. We should not deny any eligible veteran that recognition simply because they may choose to help others by donating their remains to medical study. With that said, Mr. Speaker, I submit this bill which seeks to modify current regulations to allow otherwise eligible veterans, who have donated their bodies to science, to be memorialized at the Columbarium in Arlington National Cemetery, not withstanding the absence of their physical remains. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. GOODLATTE

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce bipartisan legislation that will continue the war on drugs by prohibiting federal funds from being used to develop needle exchange programs. These programs are harmful to communities and undermine our nation's drug control efforts. Similar legislation overwhelmingly passed the House last year with broad bipartisan support. Drug abuse continues to ravage our communities, our schools and our children. Heroin use is again on the rise. Unfortunately, thousands of children will inject hard core drugs like heroin and cocaine for the first time this year, and many of them will not make it to adulthood. To deal with this problem, we must have a firm commitment by the federal government to end the cycle of addiction and abuse that destroys so many lives. Not only are needle exchange programs in conflict with federal law, but the results of community-based needle exchange programs have been disastrous. Needle exchange programs result in towns with higher crime, schools that are littered with used drug paraphernalia, and neighborhoods that are magnets for drug addicts and the high-risk behavior that accompany them. Providing free hypodermic needles to addicts so they can continue to inject illegal drugs sends a terrible message to our children--that Congress has given up on the fight to stop illegal drug use and that the federal government implicitly condones this illegal activity. As lawmakers, we have a responsibility to rise up and fight against the use and spread of drugs everywhere we can. We should start by making it harder, not easier to practice this deadly habit. This bipartisan, common sense legislation will reaffirm the federal government's commitment to the war on drugs. While supporters of these dangerous programs can overlook the damage they do to our communities and our children simply because they believe they serve a public health interest, the medical evidence is simply not there. Studies have shown that addicts who use needle exchange programs are more likely to contract HIV or other blood-borne viruses. A recent study published in the American Journal of Epidemiology concluded that there was no indication that needle exchanges protected against blood- borne infections. In fact, the study concluded, ``there was no indication of a protective effect of syringe exchange against HBV or HCV infection. Indeed, highest incidence of infection occurred among current users of the exchange, even after adjusting for confounding variables.'' Mr. Speaker, when the President unveiled his anti-drug strategy, Vice-President Gore stated, ``We must mount an all-out effort to banish crime, drugs and disorder and hopelessness from our streets once and for all.'' Yet, in the words of the President's own National Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, ``these programs are magnets for all social ills--pulling in crime, violence, addicts, prostitution, dealers and gangs and driving out hope and opportunity.'' Mr. Speaker, we will never banish crime, drugs, disorder and hopelessness by providing those responsible for it with the tools of their trade. The United States government must never give up on the war against the deadly drugs that continue to destroy our neighborhoods, our schools and so many of our families. We should not tell our children ``Don't do drugs,'' on the one hand, while giving them free needles to shoot up with the other. We need a national drug control policy which emphasizes education, interdiction, prevention and treatment--NOT subsidies for addicts. I urge my colleagues to heed the advice of General McCaffrey and ensure that the federal government is not in the business of subsidizing irresponsible, reckless and illegal behavior. The federal government should provide leadership, NOT needles.