Porter Goss

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to the committee for its attention to Florida in this bill, and, more particularly, the Florida manatee. There are many here who probably have never seen a Florida manatee. Come to Florida and see one. It is an extraordinary thing, and there are not many left. Despite being listed as endangered for almost 3 decades, the protection and recovery of the manatee population continues to be a matter of some concern. I was pleased to see that the Interior bill contains an earmark of a million dollars for manatee protection, doubling the amendment provided last year. I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio (Chairman Regula), and Members of the Interior subcommittee have always been attentive to the needs and concerns of Florida, which is a vast and wonderful place. This is always a tough bill, given the many worthy programs competing for a small amount of money. However, I do want to take this opportunity to discuss issues related to manatee protection. In January of this year, 18 environmental organizations filed suit against the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior, as well as the Army Corps of Engineers and the State of Florida alleging they were not enforcing their own rules designed to help save the manatee. Specifically, the groups asked for a moratorium on permitting until a plan is in place to prevent increased boat traffic and development from harming manatees. Although the Federal agencies involved deny it, since the lawsuit was filed, all permitting has ground to a halt. As a result, many landowners are caught in limbo, unable to complete construction projects and facing significant financial losses as a result. Of serious concern is that these landowners find themselves being referred from one government agency to another, the quintessential government shuffle, catch-22. These folks deserve an answer; the Government cannot continue to shuffle them back and forth. I have heard some express the concern that the Clinton administration is dragging its feet intentionally on this issue because it does not want to upset a particular constituency in an election year. I surely hope that is not the case. The Florida manatee deserves better and so do the American people and so do the boat owners and users in Florida. In the end, the question is how do we protect the manatee? A fair question. Some seem to see boats as the enemy. By banning boats or limiting boat traffic, the thinking goes, we can save the manatee. This is not a practical solution. About one-third of manatee deaths are attributable to boats. Clearly, there is more at play than just that. On the boating question, it seems to me the solution is very simple, responsible use. I know that is a heretical thought for some, but responsible use should go with boat use. This will likely require more money for enforcement and a crackdown on those who behave irresponsibly, as it should. I believe we must ask quickly to devise a protection policy for the manatee. It is incumbent on the Fish and Wildlife Service to work with other agencies in the State of Florida to fashion a science-based consensus policy that protects the manatee in a reasonable manner. We are all for that. The urgency of this situation became clear a few weeks ago with a report from the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission indicating that 100 manatees died in the first 3 months of this year, up substantially from the 80 deaths in the first 3 months of 1999. Too many manatees dying for an endangered species. Clearly, the approach of the Fish and Wildlife Service has shortchanged all parties to this debate. There have been no additional steps taken to protect the manatee, and landowners have been lost in this moratorium. Solving this problem requires real leadership on the part of Fish and Wildlife Service. I hope they will begin to see the urgency of this situation and move quickly, and that is the reason I have made this statement. Once again, I want to commend the committee for its attention to the manatee issue, and I want to express my thanks and gratitude for the committee's efforts for the State of Florida.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee on Rules, for the opportunity to speak and also for his very extraordinary leadership in bringing this matter finally to culmination. Mr. Speaker, I think that, as we go through the debate today, we are going to find out that there are many ways to look at this debate, many ways to look at the issue. We certainly have already heard some during the subject of this very fair rule, very appropriate rule for this particular legislation. My perspective today is the consequences of this debate on our national security. There will be consequences. There is no question about that. The status quo can no longer remain once this debate has been engaged. And it has been engaged. So what we have to look at, from my perspective, is what is best for the security of the United States of America, Americans at home and abroad, in whatever their pursuit may be. I cannot predict with any certainty, and neither can anybody else, whether China will be our allies or our opponents or our friends or our enemies as we go into the future. But I can say with very sincere conviction, from my perspective as the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that supporting this legislation is in the best national security interest. I firmly believe that. I make this assertion after reviewing the materials, after discussing with knowledgeable people, and after weighing the pros and cons literally on a yellow pad of a China opened up for U.S. trade and influence versus a China isolated as a denied area to the powers of the free market and the beneficial influences of the United States. I also believe that the true reformers in China, and there are some, will have their best opportunity for success in a society that is more open to new ideas and new products. I know there are some who will be disagreeing with that. I know there are some who have said that CIA has taken a policy position one way or another on this matter. That is simply not true. CIA does not take policy positions. It is not a policy agency. It is a capability agency, and it also does provide assessments about threats to national security. As I said, the status quo is over. We are now into the next century and a new type of relationship with China. I think that we need to understand there are short-term consequences of getting things wrong because things are so tense in the Taiwan Straits and a miscalculation could hurt. One of the best ways to avoid miscalculation is to have open dialogue and open understanding. I think that is yet another reason to move forward with this legislation. For any Members who feel that my position would like further explanation more than time allows now, I would be happy to consult with them if they will come and contact me on the floor of the House during this debate. I will be happy to share my yellow pad on how I got to this conclusion. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) for the opportunity to state my position.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 4392, the Clerk be authorized to make such technical and conforming changes as necessary to reflect the actions of the House.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 4392, the bill just considered and passed.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are having this debate again. We had it in committee. It was voted down in committee 11-5. In an abundance of fairness, the Committee on Rules has given us an open rule and done all these things, and we are getting to the point. I think there are a couple of points that need to be said. First of all, accountability is very important, and I believe our committee does a fabulous job on accountability. The point that has been made by several who have spoken on this, any Member can come upstairs and satisfy themselves on any aspect. The American people look to us for that accountability. We are pleased to invite our colleagues to come up to the committee to make sure we are doing our job properly. So far, it seems we are because, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) pointed out, there is not a huge groundswell on this subject. The second point that has been made as well it would be great to have some information out there. It might be confidence building. Well, it is true that the President of the United States who does have the authority to disclose this number, it does lie with the President of the United States to reveal it, chose to reveal it through the Director of Central Intelligence in 1997 and 1998. I do not believe there has been an uptick in confidence in the intelligence community because of that. But something else did happen that caused us a problem. When they got to 1999, they discovered, whoops, we are getting into a trend-line situation. And the President said, ``I do not think it is in the national security interest to create these trend lines that our enemies can follow,'' and he chose not to disclose the number. In fact, the DCI was taken to court over the number, over the issue. When the DCI got through making his defense, at the appropriate time I will put this in the record, he came to the conclusion that the trend- line fashion could be reasonably expected to damage national security. Judge Hogan for the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia sustained the DCI's conclusions and dismissed the lawsuit on the summary judgment. So I have the President of the United States, head of the intelligence community, and the courts all agreeing we have got something new, and it is different here. Now, some point has been made by the Aspin/Brown Commission. I do not claim infallibility for the Aspin/Brown Commission. I was on it. I can ensure the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), who has made the amendment, that we thought a consensus report was very important. We had quite a debate in Aspin/Brown. And rather than make a big issue over this, we said, let us have a unanimous report, and we put it out. I would not read too much in it. What I would read into it is that other reports done at the same time, the IC-21 report and the CFR report, does not exactly come to the same conclusions. I think what we found is that, of the many recommendations that came out of Aspin/ Brown, this one did not prove to be particularly useful. In fact, because of this trend-line problem, which we did not debate, incidentally, it did not turn out to be helpful. Another point that has been made tonight is sunshine. We need just one ray of sunshine. Here is 48 pages of sunshine with lots of numbers, disclosure of the things that will not damage our national security. That is important. We make the decisions, if we think it can be disclosed, it should be disclosed, and we try and do that. Of course the President has the final word on the question of classification. It lies with the executive. The final point I would make, I think, is this; and, again, I do not want this to be contentious, we have had the debate, and there are different views, and they are entirely legitimate, and I accept them. We work in a nonpartisan way upstairs, and we have come to a conclusion that this is not an amendment we wanted on our authorization, but we are bringing it to the Members because one of our Members did. I honestly believe that the President trusts Americans. We trust Americans. Our committee trusts Americans. Trusting Americans is not what this is about. I do not trust our enemies. I do not know whether they can get anything useful, but I do not want to take the chance if the President of the United States feels that we should not. I do not want to give to any terrorist, to any drug dealer, to any weapons proliferator any information that could be used against us. So perhaps it is an abundance of caution on my part. But those who have the first line of responsibility on this said, no, let us not reveal it. I think they have made the right judgment. I do not think we should override that judgment. It is for that reason that I think that we should not approve this amendment, and I will urge our colleagues to vote against the Roemer amendment. Mr. Chairman, I include the following materials for printing in the Record. United States District Court for the District of Columbia Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists, Plaintiff, v. Central Intelligence Agency, Defendant. Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH) Declaration of George J. Tenet introduction I, GEORGE J. TENET, hereby declare: 1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). I was appointed DCI on 11 July 1997. As DCI, I serve as head of the United States intelligence community, act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security, and serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I am generally familiar with plaintiff's civil action. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, upon information made available to me in my official capacity, and upon the advice and counsel of the CIA's Office of General Counsel. 3. I understand that plaintiff has submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for ``a copy of documents that indicate the amount of the total budget request for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 1999'' and ``a copy of documents that indicate the total budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence- related activities for fiscal year 1999, updated to reflect the recent additional appropriation of `emergency supplemental' funding for intelligence.'' I also understand that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld such documents. I shall refer to the requested information as the ``budget request'' and ``the total appropriation,'' respectively. 4. As head of the intelligence community, my responsibilities include developing and presenting to the President an annual budget request for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly comprise the budget of the United States for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. 5. The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) because they are currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958, and on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(3) because they are exempted from disclosure by the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The purpose of this declaration, and the accompanying classified declaration, is to describe my bases for determining that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security and would tend to reveal intelligence methods. 6. I previously executed declarations in this case that were filed with the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 11 December 1998. Those two declarations described my bases for withholding the budget request only. Since the CIA filed its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an amended complaint seeking release of the total appropriation also. For the Court's convenience, the justifications contained in my earlier declarations are repeated and supplemented in this declaration and the accompanying classified declaration and describe my bases for withholding both the budget request and the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999. Prior Releases 7. In October 1997, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the time of this disclosure, I issued a public statement that included the following two points: First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be considered only after determining whether such disclosure could cause harm to the national security by showing trends over time. Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence budget: whether the information concerns particular intelligence programs. In other words, the Administration intends to draw the line at the top-line, aggregate figure. Beyond this figure, there will be no other disclosures of currently classified budget information because such disclosures could harm national security. 8. In March 1998, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so only after evaluating whether the 1998 appropriation, when compared with the 1997 appropriation, could cause damage to the national security by showing trends over time, or otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. Because the 1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion increase--or less than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 appropriation, and because published reports did not contain information that if coupled with the appropriation, would be likely to allow the correlation of specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs, I concluded that release of the 1998 appropriation could not reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, and so I released the 1998 appropriation. 9. Since the enactment of the intelligence appropriation for fiscal year 1998, the budget process has produced: 1) the fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations; 2) the Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 (a subject of this litigation); 3) the fiscal year 1999 regular appropriation (a subject of this litigation); and 4) the fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental appropriation (a subject of this litigation). Information about each of these figures--some of it accurate, some not--has been reported in the media. In evaluating whether to release the Administration's budget request or total appropriation for fiscal year 1999, I cannot review these possible releases in isolation. Instead, I have to consider whether release of the requested information could add to the mosaic of other public and clandestine information acquired by our adversaries about the intelligence budget in a way that could reasonably be expected to damage the national security. If release of the requested information adds a piece to the intelligence jigsaw puzzle--even if it does not complete the picture--such that the picture is more identifiable, then damage to the national security could reasonably be expected. After conducting such a review, I have determined that release of the Administration's intelligence budget request or total appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, or otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. In the paragraphs that follow, I will provide a description of some of the information that I reviewed and how I reached this conclusion. I am unable to describe all of the information I reviewed without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration. 10. At the creation of the modern national security establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the less they could publicly debate about the object of such appropriations without causing damage to the national security. They struck the balance in favor of withholding the amount of appropriations. For over fifty years, the Congress has acted in executive session when approving intelligence appropriations to prevent the identification of trends in intelligence spending and any correlations between specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Now is an especially critical and turbulent period for the intelligence budget, and the continued secrecy of the fiscal year 1999 budget request and total appropriation is necessary for the protection of vulnerable intelligence capabilities. Classified Information FOIA Exemption (b)(1) 11. The authority to classify information is derived from a succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is Executive Order 12958, ``Classified National Security Information.'' Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines ``classified information'' as ``information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure.'' The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation as classified information under the criteria established in Executive Order 12958. classification authority 12. Information may be originally classified under the Order only if it: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls within one or more of the categories of information set forth in section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security that the original classification authority can identify or describe. The classification of the budget request and the total appropriation meet these requirements. 13. The Administration's budget request and the total appropriation are information clearly owned, produced by, and under the control of the United States Government. Additionally, the budget request and the total appropriation fall within the category of information listed at section 1.5(c) of the Order: ``intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.'' 14. Finally, I have made the determination required under the Order to classify the budget request and the total appropriation. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, ``National Security Information'', 3 C.F.R. 513 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the President designated me as an official authorized to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority. I have determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Consequently, I have classified the budget request and the total appropriation at the CONFIDENTIAL level. In the paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the foreseeable damage to national security that reasonably could be expected to result from disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation. damage to national security 15. Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security in several ways. First, disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weakness. The difference between the appropriation for one year and the Administration's budget request for the next provides a measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the United States. A requested budget increase reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs are just adequate to meet our needs. 16. Similar insights can be gained by analyzing the difference between the total appropriation by Congress for one year and the total appropriation for the next year. The difference between the appropriation for one year and the appropriation for the next year provides a measure of the Congress' assessment of the nation's intelligence programs. Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure indicates the degree of change. 17. Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation would provide foreign governments with the United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting their own resources to frustrate the United States' intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to our national security. Because I have determined it to be in our national security interest to deny foreign governments information that would assist them in assessing the strength of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for my determination without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration. 18. Second, disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to assist foreign governments in correlating specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Foreign governments are keenly interested in the United States' intelligence collection priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better reflected than in the level of spending on particular intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by foreign governments. 19. However, no intelligence service, U.S. or foreign, ever has complete information. They are always revising their intelligence estimates based on new information. Moreover, the United States does not have complete information about how much foreign intelligence services know about U.S. intelligence programs and funding. Foreign governments collect information about U.S. intelligence activities from their human intelligence sources; that is, ``spies.'' While the United States will never know exactly how much our adversaries know about U.S. intelligence activities, we do know that all foreign intelligence services know at least as much about U.S. intelligence programs and funding as has been disclosed by the Congress or reported by the media. Therefore, congressional statements and media reporting of the fiscal year 1999 budget cycle provide the minimum knowledge that can be attributed to all foreign governments, and serve as a baseline for predictive judgments of the possible damage to national security that could reasonably be expected to result from release of the budget request or the total appropriation. 20. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert operations, scientific and technical research and development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign intelligence services to do no less if armed with the same information. While other sources may publish information about the amounts and objects of intelligence spending that damages the national security, I cannot add to that damage by officially releasing information, such as the budget request or the total appropriation, that would tend to confirm or deny these public accounts. Such intelligence would permit foreign governments to learn about United States' intelligence collection priorities and redirect their own resources to frustrate the United States' intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to our national security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on the basis for my determination without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration. 21. In addition, release of both the budget request and the total appropriation would permit one to calculate the exact difference between the Administration's request and Congress' appropriation. It is during the congressional debate over the Administration's budget request that many disclosures of specific intelligence programs are reported in the media. Release of the budget request and total appropriation together would assist our adversaries in correlating the added or subtracted intelligence programs with the exact amount of spending devoted to them. 22. And third, disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to free foreign governments' limited collection and analysis resources for other efforts targeted against the United States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources. Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of the United States' intelligence spending are resources that cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the United States. Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation would free those foreign resources for other intelligence collection activities directed against the United States, with the resulting damage to our national security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. 23. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating United States' intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons, singularly and collectively, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined that the budget request and the total appropriation are currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL. Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemption (b)(3) 24. Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the intelligence community, ``shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'' Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation would jeopardize intelligence methods because disclosure would tend to reveal how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence agencies. 25. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. The appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the intelligence community are hidden in the various annual appropriations acts. The specific locations of the intelligence appropriations in those acts are not publicly identified, both to protect the classified nature of the intelligence programs themselves and to protect the classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and between intelligence agencies. 26. Because there are a finite number of places where intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical intelligence budget by aggregating suspected intelligence line items from the publicly-disclosed appropriations. Release of the budget request or the total appropriation would provide a benchmark to test and refine such a hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of either the budget request or total appropriation could provide more data with which to test and refine a hypothesis. Confirmation of the hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in the appropriations acts where the intelligence funds are hidden, which is the intelligence method used to transfer funds to and between intelligence agencies. 27. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 constitute the legal authorization for the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds. Together, these two sections implement Congress' intent that intelligence appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded from public view. Simply stated, the means of providing money to the CIA is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation could assist in finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations, and thus defeat these congressionally-approved secret funding mechanism. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation would tend to reveal intelligence methods that are protected from disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for my determination without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration. Conclusion 28. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head of the United States intelligence community, as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect classified information and intelligence methods from unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons set forth above and in my classified declaration that the Administration's intelligence budget request and the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999 must be withheld because their disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security and would tend to reveal intelligence methods. I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 6th day of April, 1999. George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence. Memorandum Opinion Pending before the Court is Defendant Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA'')'s Motion for Summary Judgment. After careful consideration of Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's reply, the arguments presented at the November 1 hearing, and upon a second review of both classified affidavits as well as the unclassified affidavit filed by Defendant in this case, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. background Plaintiff Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists, seeks disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (``FOIA''), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, of the Administration's total budget request for fiscal year 1999 for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities. Defendant, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA''), denied plaintiff's request on the basis that the information is exempt from FOIA's disclosure requirements because it is properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign policy (Exemption 1) and because release of this figure would tend to reveal intelligence sources and methods that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (Exemption 3). On December 11, 1998, the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of three declarations from George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (``DCI''), one unclassified filed as an exhibit to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and two classified which were filed under seal and ex parte for the Court's in camera review. These declarations explain why DCI Tenet believes the release of the figure requested by Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security and would tend to reveal intelligence methods and sources. discussion I. FOIA Exemption 1 Exemption 1 of FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure records that are: (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1). The Executive Order currently in effect is Executive Order (``E.O.'') 12958, ``Classified National Security Information.'' Courts have prescribed a two-part test, part substantive and part procedural, to be applied in determining whether material has been properly withheld under Exemption 1. Substantively, the agency must show that the records at issue logically fall within the exemption, i.e., that an Executive Order authorizes that the particular information sought be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Procedurally, the agency must show that it followed the proper procedures in classifying the information. Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982). If the agency meets both tests, it is then entitled to summary judgment. See, e.g., Abbotts v. NRC, 766 f.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). a. The Procedural Requirements of Exemption 1 Based on the unclassified Declaration of DCI Tenet, the CIA has demonstrated that it has followed the proper procedures in classifying the total budget request for intelligence activities. Proper classification must be made by an original classification authority who determines that the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; that it falls within one or more categories of information set forth in section 1.5 of the Executive Order; and that the information's unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security that the original classification authority can identify or describe. See E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.2(a); see also 32 C.F.R. Sec. 2001.10(b) (Information Security Oversight Office directive explaining that agency classifier must be able to identify and describe damage to national security potentially caused by unauthorized disclosure). DCI Tenet is an official authorized to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority. Tenet Declaration para. 13; see Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, ``National Security Information,'' 3 C.F.R. Sec. 513 (1996); E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.4(a)(2). Further DCI Tenet has determined that the amount of the budget request for all intelligence activities is owned by the United States Government, see Tenet Declaration, para. 12; that it falls within the category of information listed at section 1.5(c) of the Executive Order, described as ``intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology,'' see Id.; and that its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, see Id. at para.para. 13 et seq. Plaintiff contends that DCI's determination is at odds with that of the President of the United States and that this conflict renders DCI determination invalid. However, although the President clearly has the authority to do so, the President has never released or ordered the release of, the Administration's budget request or the total appropriated amount for intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. Therefore, the statement of a Presidential spokesman, made three years earlier, that, as a general matter, the President believed ``that disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes will not, in itself, harm intelligence activities,'' is neither on point nor in any way legally binding. Plaintiff has offered this Court no evidence that the President has ever addressed the impact of disclosure of the Administration's budget request or the total amount appropriated for intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. The fact that the President encouraged release of similar information in earlier years is not determinative here. Unless or until the President explicitly orders the release of this information or withdraws his authorization of DCI Tenet to make these classified determinations, and absent a finding by this Court that DCI Tenet was somehow acting in bad faith in refusing to release this information, the Court finds that TCI Tenet is authorized to make this highly fact-dependent classification determination at issue in this case, and that he has properly done so here. b. The Substantive Requirements of Exemption I To demonstrate that the budget request for intelligence falls within Exemption 1, the CIA must also explain why the information at issue properly falls within one or more of the categories of classifiable information, in this case ``intelligence sources or methods,'' see E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5(c), and why its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national security. When determining whether the records at issue are properly within the scope of the exemption; this Court must ``determine the matter de novo.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). In Exemption 1 cases, Congress has indicated and courts have consistently recognized, that an agency's determination as to potential adverse effects resulting from public disclosure of a classified record should be accorded substantial weight. See, e.g., Bowers v. Department of Justice, 930 F.2d 350, 357 (4th Cir. 1991) (``What fact or bit of information may compromise national security is best left to the intelligence experts.''); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the agency's determination should be accorded ``utmost deference''); Washington Post v. DOD, 766 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (judicial review of agency classification decision should be ``quite deferential''). The agency's determination merits this deference because ``[e]xecutive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record.'' Salisbury, 690 F.2d at 970 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)). Thus, summary judgment for the government in an Exemption 1 FOIA action should be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they simply contain ``reasonable specificity'' and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). DCI Tenet's Declarations meet this deferential standard. Essentially, DCI Tenet explains that disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security in several ways: (1) disclosure ``reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses,'' Tenet Declaration para. 14; (2) disclosure ``reasonably could be expected to assist foreign governments in correlating specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs,'' Tenet Declaration para. 16; and (3) official disclosure could be expected to free foreign governments' limited collection and analysis resources for other efforts targeted against the United States, Tenet Declaration para. 18. Obviously, DCI Tenet cannot be certain that damage to our national security would result from release of the total budget request for 1999, but the law does not require certainty or a showing of harm before allowing an agency to withhold classified information. Courts have recognized that an agency's articulation of the threatened harm must always be speculative to some extent, and that to require an actual showing of harm would be judicial ``overstepping.'' See Halperin, 629 F.2d at 149. In the area of intelligence sources and methods, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that substantial deference is due to an agency's determination regarding threats to national security interests because this is ``necessarily a region for forecasts in which the CIA's informed judgment as to potential future harm should be respected.'' Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Further, the Court noted that ``the CIA has the right to assume that foreign intelligence agencies are zealous ferret.'' Id. In this case, plaintiff has offered no contrary record evidence undermining the validity of DCI Tenet's highly fact- dependent determination. First, the Brown Commission's 1996 recommendations in favor of disclosure are not binding on this Court. The Brown Commission was a congressionally- charted commission made up of private citizens who lacked classification authority and who made non-binding recommendations to Congress and the President on intelligence matters. Neither Congress nor the President ever enacted the Brown Commission's recommendation on public disclosure of the intelligence budget. Nor did the Brown Commission ever consider the precise issue of classification presented here: whether, in 1999, and under the circumstances described in DCI Tenet's unclassified and classified declarations, it would recommend disclosure of the budget figures for that particular year. Second, the fact that DCI Tenet disclosed the total intelligence budget in prior years is not necessarily adverse record evidence. On the contrary, this Court finds that it indicates DCI Tenet's careful, case-by-case analysis of the impact of each disclosure and his willingness to accommodate budget requests whenever possible. When he made these prior disclosures, DCI Tenet emphasized that he would continue to make that case-by-case determination in future year. Tenet Declaration para. 7. Here, DCI Tenet has explained, in both his classified and unclassified declarations, the rationale underlying his predictive judgment that release of the figures for fiscal year 1999 could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security. Therefore, the Court must defer to DCI Tenet's decision that release of a third consecutive year, amidst the information already publicly- available, provides too much trend information and too great a basis for comparison and analysis for our adversaries. II. FOIA Exemption 3 The CIA is also entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the budget request is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3. Exemption 3 excludes from mandatory disclosure information that is ``specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(3)(A) & (B). In examining an Exemption 3 claim, a court must determine, first, whether the claimed statute is a statute of exemption under FOIA, and, second, whether the withheld material satisfied the criteria of the exemption statute. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In this case, the CIA has withheld information from plaintiff because DCI Tenet has determined that the budget request falls within Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403-3(c)(6) (formerly section 403(d)(3)), which requires the DCI to ``protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'' It is well settled that section 403-3(c)(6) falls within Exemption 3. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. Thus, the Court need only consider whether the Administration's budget request falls within that statute. Id. There is no doubt that the scope of the statute is broad; as the Supreme Court has commented, ``[p]lainly the broad sweep of this statutory language comports with the nature of the [CIA's] unique responsibilities.'' Sims, 471 U.S. at 169. The legislative history of Sec. 403-3(c)(6) also makes clear that Congress intended to give the [DCI] broad authority to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence process.'' Id. at 170. To establish that the budget request is exempt under FOIA, therefore, the CIA need only demonstrate that the information ``relates'' to intelligence sources and methods. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 762. Like the DCI's determination under Exemption 1, the DCI's determination under Exemption 3 is entitled to ``substantial weight and due consideration.'' Id. One nexus between the Administration's budget request and ``disclosure of intelligence sources and methods'' is found in the special appropriations process used for intelligence activities. Disclosure of the budget request would tend to reveal ``how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence agencies.'' Tenet Declaration para. 20. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. Appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the intelligence community are hidden in the various appropriation acts. Id. para. 21. The locations are not publicly identified, both to protect the classified nature of the intelligence programs that are funded and to protect the classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and between intelligence agencies. Id. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 403f, 403j, provide the legal authorizations for the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds. Id. para. 23. DCI Tenet has asserted that since there are a finite number of places where intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a budget analyst could construct a hypothetical intelligence budget by aggregating suspected intelligence line items from the publicly-disclosed appropriations and that repeated disclosures of either the budget request or the budget appropriation would provide more data with which to test and refine the hypothesis. Id. Plaintiff denies the viability of this argument but provides no conclusive evidence of its implausibility. Several courts have held that information tending to reveal the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds is exempt from disclosure under FOIA as an ``intelligence method.'' See e.g., Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Therefore, because DCI Tenet has determined that release of the total budget request would tend to reveal secret budgeting mechanisms constituting ``intelligence methods,'' it is also exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3. conclusion The Declarations of DCI Tenet logically establish that release of the Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 could reasonably be expected to result in harm to the national security and to reveal intelligence ``sources and methods.'' On the basis of these declarations and the entire record in this case as well as the discussion above, this Court will grant the CIA's Motion for Summary Judgment. An order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion. November 12, 1999. Thomas F. Hogan, United States District Judge. Order In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Central Intelligence Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. It is further hereby ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice. November 12, 1999. Thomas F. Hogan, United States District Judge.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) for yielding. I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio for his interest and his work with the committee and his support for our men and women of our intelligence community. I appreciate his efforts on behalf of the economy of the United States of America, which he is very outspoken on and very forthright. This amendment is eminently reasonable, and I would accept the amendment on behalf of the committee. I appreciate the consideration of the gentleman from Ohio of the best interest of the intelligence community and his willingness to cooperate with the committee on that amendment.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) for yielding to me again. I appreciate his efforts to raise the consciousness of the House to the risk we face from the People's Republic of China. He has obviously done it very well. I certainly believe the DCI can operate within the 60-day timeframe that we have talked about. In fact, I think he can do it more speedily than that, given the other matters going on of interest to this body. I would be prepared to accept the amendment and thank the gentleman again for his contribution.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and that I may include tabular and other extraneous material.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks with the distinguished ranking member about Ilene Romack. In fact, I would like to associate myself with all remarks about our staff today. I do that at some peril. We may have heard too many good things about staff today, but they do deserve it. I also want to thank those who spoke for the kind words about myself and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon). It is very nice to have a committee that is working as smoothly as it does, and I will tell my colleagues, it has a lot to do with the membership of those committees. And we have wonderful Members on our committee. Speaking from my side of the aisle, I know that everybody brings a contribution, we have heard some of them speak, various talents, various bridges to other committees, and I think that is the essence of why this is a permanent select committee that does so well. I congratulate the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for his Members as well for the same reason, that we bridge to the committees we need to. We do not always agree on everything. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has brought up one of the areas where we have a slight disagreement. We will have a little debate on that, but we do it in the best of deliberative debate forum trying to make the points, and then Members taking the positions they think are the appropriate ones. Mr. Chairman, this is, I think, the right kind of assurance to provide to the United States of America and its people that there is good oversight of our intelligence communities. It works, and it is effective. The result is, I think we can stand here and assure the American people that our intelligence community are operating effectively and within the rules, but there is so much more to do in the world we face today with the type of challenges, which are very difficult, and the type of technology which is obviously very different. And this authorization tries to move us in that direction. I am not suggesting we are going to get all things done that need to be done for the community in terms of this authorization, but we are certainly doing, I think, a human part of the job. For all involved, I want to say thank you. We will do the amendments, I understand, next week.

Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentleman he will be in the mix. Mr. Chairman, with the understanding that the ranking member is in agreement, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum), my colleague who is the chairman of our subcommittee that makes makes a lot of good things happen on the committee.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished chairman of our subcommittee, the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the chairman of the Committee on International Relations has spoken correctly about this situation. The bill does address the issue of the diplomatic communications system. As the gentleman is well aware, there will be ample time and opportunity prior to conference on this bill to address the matters of concern to the gentleman and his committee. I appreciate the chairman's willingness to support the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this issue, and I am happy that he has previously expressed his support for the general direction taken by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this matter.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001. H.R. 4392 authorizes for fiscal year 2001 the budgets of the 11 agencies and 13 programs of our Nation's Intelligence Community. Our bill authorizes the expenditure of what our country needs to keep its eyes and ears on the rogue states, the terrorist nets, the drug cartels overseas that threaten our well-being. It puts our satellites up and over our adversaries, our agents in their meetings and our linguists on their communications. Mr. Chairman, our committee has examined every line of the President's budget request for the Intelligence Community. We have had over 200 briefings and have held 11 hearings on the particulars of the request. Members of the committee have personally visited a number of places throughout the world to ensure that the men and women of our Intelligence Community, many of whom must work in anonymity and obscurity, have what they need to do their critical jobs. Through this long and painstaking process, the members of our committee have had to work through some troublesome and complicated issues to come to the unanimous bipartisan recommendations that are in this bill. Every member of our committee contributed to this effort and I must mention the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), my ranking member, for his outstanding work in helping us to shape this bill. Also the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the vice chairman of the committee, who is also the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, which appropriates the intelligence funds, deserves full commendation for the outstanding work that has meant that this bill and his appropriations bill are indeed coordinated in lock-step. Finally, let me thank the staff of the committee. Yet again they have worked together in a way that has greatly assisted the members in what would otherwise have been an impossible task in reviewing so many programs in so much depth. I would note also that this bill represents the swan song for a senior committee staffer, Tom Newcomb, who is leaving the legislative branch where he has helped to make laws, to go to the Department of Justice where he will now have to help enforce those laws. Let us hope they were good laws. Tom has my personal thanks for his help these last 3 years on the committee and I wish him the best of luck. I hope he is listening. Mr. Chairman, those who have read the unclassified, public bill or the press accounts of it know that we have made many criticisms of the current state of intelligence in our Nation. This is constructive criticism. The vast majority of these criticisms derive from the weakened condition that intelligence, our first line of defense, is in after years of underinvesting and making do. The men and women of the Intelligence Community and its leaders deserve commendation for what their ingenuity and perseverance have done to hold together a vastly complicated set of programs with some proverbial chewing gum and bailing wire. As with our military, our intelligence resources are stretched to the breaking point. Indeed, it has this last year tragically unraveled and even broken more than once. For example, a few months ago at NSA's headquarters we went deaf for 3 days, largely due to inadequate resources for maintaining their computer systems. Fortunately, again, other elements of our community kicked in and picked up what slack they could and we did okay. But let me say clearly, had we been actively engaged at that time in hostilities in the Balkans or the Middle East or elsewhere it could have been a disaster of very high degree with American lives gravely threatened and possibly lost. Elsewhere, the problems are just as serious. In some places our agents do not have resources to recruit and run clandestine sources to penetrate hostile threats to our Nation. We soon will not have the funds to process and actually make full use of extraordinary pictures taken by our satellites. I could go on and on. We cannot expect our Intelligence Community to do more and more without giving them the resources to do what we ask of them. I wish I could say that this bill dramatically reverses the situation. It does not. Unfortunately, the way intelligence is funded, paid from the same budgetary pot as our military forces, the military would have to make do with even less. This is obviously a Hobbesian choice we should not have to make, sacrificing intelligence to pay for defense or vice versa. But it is the only choice we have, given the way the administration has presented the budget. We tried to address the critical problems that we have uncovered. We cannot go all the way but we at least are going down the road in the proper direction. We do increase funding for our intelligence disciplines of human intelligence, HUMINT as it is called, and signals intelligence, SIGINT; that is, espionage and foreign communications interception. These two activities give us our most sensitive information on the plans and intentions of our adversaries. As last year, in the area of imagery intelligence, the use of photographs, we are moving closer towards funding and planning adequately for the tasking of systems and the processing, exploitation and dissemination of the imagery derived from them. Nevertheless, our efforts do not sufficiently meet identified needs even with these efforts. This bill also addresses some of the most urgent concerns that we have with inadequate security and counterintelligence practices within the Department of State, which we have been reading about, and other agencies as well. Mr. Chairman, none of these issues should be a surprise to anyone. We have been telling the Intelligence Community and the administration and the public, when we can, about them and other issues for quite some time, sounding, I think, a bit like a tree falling in an empty forest. What we have done, Mr. Chairman, is to do the best we could with the available resources. Two years ago, we started rebuilding. Since then we have made steady but agonizingly slow process to provide capabilities to enable us to confront the world as it is today, with its new threats and its new technologies. I can only hope that some day we can accelerate the rebuild rate. I can also hope that future administrations will approach intelligence funding differently and with more commitment. That day is not here, though, and knowing that lives can hang in the balance and do because intelligence can be very risky business, indeed we have tried to balance critically important competing priorities properly. Mr. Chairman, as much as I wish I could have done more I believe that as a committee working in a bipartisan, or rather I should say nonpartisan manner, we put before the House the best intelligence authorization act possible. I am proud of this legislation and the people who worked on it. I strongly encourage my colleagues to support it. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule. I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for a colloquy. (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend, the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 506 is a modified open rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act. The most notable provision in this modified open rule is the requirement that Members wishing to offer amendments were asked to have them preprinted in the Congressional Record prior to their consideration. Notice of this requirement was provided on Monday of this week. This provision does make sense, given the unique nature of the matters covered in this particular bill. In the past, we have found it works well to allow the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence the opportunity to review potential amendments ahead of time in order to work with Members to ensure that no classified information is inadvertently disclosed or discussed during our floor debate. By no means is it our intent to shut out any debate on the bill in any way; we simply want to use extra caution in terms of making sure sensitive material is properly protected. As is customary, the rule provides 1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule makes in order the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as an original bill for the purpose of amendment. The rule further waives points of order against the amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI, which prohibits nongermane amendments. This is necessary because the introduced bill was more narrow in scope, as it usually is, than the product reported out by the committee. Finally, the rule provides the traditional motion to recommit, with or without instruction. Mr. Speaker, this is a fair rule, given the nature of this bill, and, as far as I am aware, it is without controversy and it is the traditional rule. That said, I encourage Members to vote for this fair rule. Furthermore, I encourage support for the underlying legislation, which I believe is well prepared and an excellent bipartisan product that will continue our joint efforts to reform and revitalize our intelligence capabilities on behalf of our country and its citizens. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the Vice-Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 506 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.