Porter Goss

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 169, Tanner amendment in nature of substitute, had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 170, final passage of H.R. 4275, had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings) for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, we have always known that the war on terrorism was going to be lengthy and difficult. President Bush told us that from the very beginning. Americans everywhere have girded up for a sustained conflict across the globe, around the world. We have great and justifiable pride in our troops and all they have accomplished. We have accepted the necessary sacrifices in the war on terrorism with a heavy, but a resolute heart in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it is impossible to accept the apparently isolated, but nonetheless totally deplorable instances of blatant prisoner mistreatment that have surfaced in the past week. These actions, particularly when contrasted with the courageous and honorable decisions made day in and day out by the vast majority of our American soldiers in difficult circumstances, must be strongly condemned. The charges of abuse will be examined fully and immediate corrective measures taken to prevent against their reoccurrence. That is assured. No equivocation can be tolerated. Wrong is wrong. The international community will be watching America's actions closely, and now is the time to demonstrate anew that the American soldier respects the rules of engagement and always values justice and humane treatment of detainees and prisoners. We all abhor the slaughter and maiming and carnage of innocent victims, which, of course, is the terrorists' hallmark. Mr. Speaker, I rise today because our military has worked too hard and accomplished too much to be stained by the actions of a few. By acknowledging that this is a tremendously hurtful anomaly in an otherwise impressive effort, I hope that justice may be swiftly served and the trust in America restored. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence routinely and regularly oversees interrogation activity for intelligence purposes, and we are giving comprehensive attention, of course, to these newly- discovered abusive treatment cases. In fact, as we speak, our committee is receiving briefings upstairs and asking some very tough questions, and I will return to that meeting forthwith. The conduct of appropriate and professional interrogation is extremely important to the successful prosecution of the war on terrorism and the protection of our troops and citizens at home and abroad. Terrorism is a bad thing, and interrogation on a proper level of a terrorist is an important tool for us to preempt the mischief that they can cause us. This rule brings forward a clear resolution that supports the views I espouse and that other Members have espoused articulately. I urge passage for this rule and for this resolution.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, on roll call Nos. 128, 129, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.'' Preferential Motion Offered by Mr. Baird

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this afternoon I was called away from the floor to conduct official business. As a result, I was not able to be present for rollcall votes 78 and 79. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea'' on both.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the chairman yielding me the time. Mr. Speaker, I think this debate is about the rule, and that is what we are going to be talking about in order to have more chances to articulate the sentiments as were just expressed so articulately by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha). And I have the highest feelings of praise also for Mr. Murtha and his very strong record on behalf of our defense forces, our troops. He knows the subject, and he attends to them very well. And I am sorry that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) is aggrieved by the procedure today. I need to tell you that I was not consulted either. This is a leadership resolution that is simply designed after 1 year of fighting the war on terror, the chapter in Iraq of the book on the war on terrorism for 1 year and all the extraordinary success and work that has happened over there. It is entirely appropriate to commend our troops who are working so hard and the members of the Coalition. That is the main thrust of this resolution. Now, I admit it also says that we are commending and acknowledging and recognizing the courage and the accomplishment of the Iraqi people to go through very difficult days. And it is entirely appropriate to do that. It is no mean thing to come up with an interim constitution in the operational climate that those folks are operating. And I think it is entirely appropriate for the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, the people's House, to say we sympathize with them, we understand what they have been through. And we are very grateful that they have got the patience to go forward with it and the commitment to do this hard work. This is a democracy-building exercise in an area where democracy has had many false starts and very little success. This is good news. It is entirely appropriate for us at the end of the year to celebrate the good news. There has been some concern, as we saw last night in the Committee on Rules, about whether or not we should be declaring that we are better off without Saddam. And the language that was used was that the world is safer without him. We did not say the world is safe. We are in the middle of a war on terror. And everybody needs to know that. And we need the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) and all his good works and everybody's good works in this body to support the war on terror because the war on terror will not be won without commitment. We know how these people work, and we have to be smart enough to resist the temptations, the wedges they drive, the propaganda they put out, apply our capabilities and get the job done. It will take all of us.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a member of our committee and the chairman of a subcommittee as well. (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 557 and claim the time set aside for us under the rule, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, our President, having exhausted all other options, made the decision to take action against Saddam Hussein and the threat posed by his evil tyranny. During that course, the debate about that, this House was presented with an overwhelming body of evidence detailing the brutal inhumanity of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the suffering of the Iraqi people under his repressive dictatorship, the threat that Saddam presented to his neighbors and to the world, and indeed the piles of bodies in neighboring countries he left behind. Today, now that Saddam has been removed from power and the mass graves, the secret laboratories, the vast military stockpiles, missile capacities that he had, have all been exposed to the world, the world is a safer place. Certainly the Iraqi people, all Iraqi people, have a new hope for a better future today than they did just a year ago. Just a year ago. What a remarkable accomplishment by our troops and the coalition. Yet we continue to hear claims from some that the liberation of Iraq, no matter how worthy the result, no matter how necessary to improving U.S. national security, was somehow a flawed endeavor. Yes, it was hard, but they claim it was a flawed endeavor because the intelligence that the United States had prior to the war was not perfect. Some apparently feel that either the Intelligence Community was pressured by the administration into stating that Iraq was a threat or the Intelligence Community did not really believe Iraq was a threat but the administration misused the intelligence provided to it. The truth is neither of those are correct. But that has not deterred some conspiratorially critics from contorting themselves, trying to make both arguments simultaneously. Looking back about a year and a half ago, while the Intelligence Community was focused heavily on Iraq, the President stated that Saddam was ``a grave and growing threat.'' And he was right. Today we have the benefit of hindsight, of a presence on the ground in Iraq, and of the thousands of hours of studying all there is to study on the prewar intelligence picture of Iraq, and we have barely begun to get that job finished. Taking advantage of all these benefits, I would like to share my assessment so far, and I would note that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House, and I know of the Senate also, is underway in coming forward with a formal review of all this, which I hope we will be able to share with our colleagues before too long. That is our plan. The intelligence picture of Iraq, of the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors and to the United States, including the assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, was entirely consistent over a period of almost a decade. The assessment is consistent in the finished intelligence and the daily current intelligence pieces from the mid- 1990s onward. It is consistent in the classified records that have been provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence over the past year. So I have to conclude on that basis alone, if the intelligence adjustments regarding Iraq were the result of political pressure or manipulation, any such machinations must have occurred in the middle of the 1990s. But I do not believe that that is the case. Therefore, if the intelligence picture is unchanging, was there a change in the substance or tone used by this administration to describe that threat? We do not need to go to the Intelligence Community or to any classified records to answer that question. We just need to compare public statements that have been made, and they are available to the world. In 2003 President Bush said this: ``Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies who would use them without the least hesitation.'' In 1998 then President Bill Clinton said: ``In the next century,'' which is now, ``the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists . . . who traveled the world . . . if we fail to respond today, Saddam . . . will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity.'' And again in 1998, then President Bill Clinton said: ``There should be no doubt, Saddam's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that region and the security of the world . . . His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us.'' President Clinton, 1998. Fast forward, 2003, President Bush: ``Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike . . . Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.'' Actually, there is not a lot of difference in the leadership that was taking place in this country on the question of the threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime and weapons of mass destruction that might be at his disposal were to the rest of us. It is pretty clear that that was a consistent view. So, were the intelligence assessments perfect? No. In fact, comparing the intelligence assessment to what has been found in Iraq today, it is clear there were insufficiencies in our intelligence capabilities and they are of concern to us, and on a bipartisan basis we are looking into that. What was the cause of these insufficiencies? Perhaps Iraq, under Saddam, was a difficult target. It was sort of a denied area. There was a ruthless security apparatus there that made information gathering inside the country extremely difficult, very dangerous. We also know that Iraq instituted a truly massive denial and deception program designed to mislead anyone attempting to learn about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and related programs. Virtually everybody who tried found out that he was involved in denial and deception. So these factors made intelligence collection a little difficult, but it is the tough job that intelligence is there for. So, what else? I found that cuts in intelligence resources, personnel, and political support in the mid-1990s made many aspects of the intelligence mission in Iraq even more impossible than what we are up against. Where were these cuts most severe? In the case of Iraq, it turns out it was the decline in our intelligence capabilities that hurt the most. Human intelligence is where we get more than pictures, more than fragments. We get insight into the plans and intentions of our target. What is going on in the minds of the troublemakers? And without good human intelligence, HUMINT, as we call it, it is very difficult indeed to get an accurate picture of what an adversary is up to. Yet from 1991 to 1998, a time of cutbacks for military and intelligence resources across the board, our human intelligence capabilities suffered dramatically. The number of officers collecting information shrank by about a quarter; the number of operating locations overseas dropped by about a third; reporting sources declined by almost 40 percent; and the number of intelligence reports produced were cut in half or thereabouts. So we add on top of that the politically correct ``nice spies'' guidelines that were posed in 1995, the risk aversion problem, and we begin to see why information in Iraq was so hard to come by. Good information about plans and intentions, the eyes and ears, just were not sufficient. So despite these severe limitations, I think the scorecard shows that the United States Intelligence Community provided the best assessment it could. And referring Members to the Director of Central Intelligence's recent speech at Georgetown, the assessments were not as far wrong as some critics of the war would have us believe. In the final analysis, I think it is important that we get it right. Saddam was a threat. The United Nations believed he was a threat. The vast majority of the Western nations, even those outside of the U.S.- led coalition, believed he was a threat. The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed consistently that Saddam was a threat. The previous administration told the American people that Saddam was a threat. And it has been the official policy of the United States to seek regime change in Iraq since 1998 across two administrations. The difference between 1998 and 2003 is that President Bush took the bold action necessary to address a grave threat where others before him did not. The world is a safer place for it. Freedom is not free. The purpose of this resolution is to recognize the hardships that the men and women who are doing the dangerous, risky work of protecting our freedoms, the people in our military services, the people in the coalition, the people who are taking risks. After a year, we are here to say, you are doing great work, keep it up, we are so grateful. We are also including some applause for the people of Iraq who have gone through miserable times and now have some hope, and they have completed the remarkable achievement of a temporary constitution already. This is the sign of a spirited people who are looking for a better life. This resolution simply says that and commends that. I believe we can all agree that these are the times that we can get together and say, well done, more to do, let us get on with it. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), and chairman of one of our critical subcommittees.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is also a subcommittee chairman of the committee. (Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of the committee.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), a former member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 45 seconds. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) working as the ranking member on our committee to improve our Intelligence Community and to build support for the Intelligence Community in this House. It is important that we deal with a subject like this on a bipartisan basis. I know the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) is anxious and sincere in her call for action. I am too. I believe we did have a call for action after 9/11, and I think that call for action has led us to go forth as the United States of America and to try to do the right thing on the war on terror. And I think from time to time as we go through that war, it is fine for us to say to the troops, well done, God bless you, and it is time to say to people involved in places like Iraq, we know it is tough, thanks for hanging in there, you have a better future ahead. That is what this is about. I thank all Members for having that kind of understanding and looking ahead. We have a lot to do; we have got to get along and get it done.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this evening I had to depart early for a previously scheduled meeting. As a result, I was not able to be present for rollcall votes 52, 53, and 54. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no,'' on rollcall votes 52 and 53. I would have voted ``yea,'' on rollcall vote 54. I request that this statement appear at the appropriate place in the Record. Thank you.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 2136) to extend the final report date and termination date of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, to provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, this evening I had to depart early for a previously scheduled meeting. As a result, I was not able to be present for rollcall vote 18. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall vote 18. personal explanation

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at any time on Wednesday February 4, 2004, for the majority leader or his designee to call up the following resolutions: H. Res. 493, H. Res. 496, H. Res. 497, H. Res. 498, H. Res. 511, H. Res. 512, and H. Con. Res. 355; and each resolution be considered as read and the previous question be considered as ordered on each resolution to final adoption without intervening motion except (1) 1 hour of debate and (2) one motion to recommit.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the conference report on H.R. 2471.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker pursuant, to House Resolution 451, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring before the House the conference report for H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. And I want to personally thank members and staff of the committee for their industry, their skill, their professionalism, and their dedication in crafting what I believe is a strong nonpartisan bill which will see us well through the year. Perhaps the job was made a bit more difficult this year given the attempts by some in the media and elsewhere to throw American intelligence capabilities into the meatgrinder of partisan Presidential politics, but I am confident that a review of this legislation will show just how successful the members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been in putting the Nation's security needs first, rejecting the divisiveness, the partisan trickery and treachery that has been elsewhere. H.R. 2417 authorizes funding for all intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Disability System. Generally speaking, we have authorized funding for the National Foreign Intelligence Program in fiscal year 2004 at a level slightly above the President's request and substantially equal to that provided in the appropriations process. There is much in the bill to recommend it to Members of the House. I would like to mention just a few of the important provisions and highlights. First and foremost, this conference report supports the men and women in the intelligence community who are dedicated to protecting our Nation's citizens and their freedom, many of whom do this work under a shroud of secrecy, carrying out very tough tasks and, in fact, heroic deeds with little, if any, recognition. Intelligence is the fundamental element of the global war on terrorism. It is crucial to America's efforts in the hot parts of the war such as Afghanistan and Iraq, just as it is essential to protecting Americans overseas and at home, that is, offense and defense. This conference report funds many important counterterrorism programs. Also of note in the fight against terrorism, we are witnessing history being made this day. This is the first intelligence bill to authorize funds for the intelligence functions of the new Department of Homeland Security. We on the committee are acutely aware of the vital need for intelligence community resources to be effectively marshaled in protecting the homeland. In the past year, the Federal Government has moved to realign national resources to better leverage capabilities in the war on terrorism. We have been hard at work on that. In addition to the establishment of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate over at the Homeland Security, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center was created and is under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, and a new Terrorist Screening Center is being established and put to work at the FBI. These resources, among others that we have been working on previously, will require continued investment and strong leadership to overcome a number of challenges including, by the way, the challenge of being the first of their kind. Our committee will continue to be actively engaged in defining how the intelligence community is evolving to meet the challenges of homeland security. We actually have no greater obligation. Counterterrorism and counterintelligence are the driving forces behind section 374 of the conference report. This provision brings the definition of ``financial institution'' up to date with the reality of the financial industry. The current definition in the Right to Financial Privacy Act was crafted back in 1978. That was a quarter of a century ago. This provision will allow those tracking terrorists and spies to ``follow the money'' more effectively and thereby protect the people of the United States more effectively. This conference report contains a provision that has received some degree of attention, section 405 dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency's compensation reform proposal. The conferees support the idea that improvements can be made, should be made, in the old GS system of pay and promotion. I certainly feel we can do better by the officers at CIA. However, it is important to replace the outdated system with a better one, not just a new one. So section 405 will assist CIA management in finding the right system by allowing important fine- tuning and workforce buy-in. The conferees were concerned that CIA managers were rushing a bit into the implementation of an undertested and unevaluated compensation system. To address this concern, section 405 delays slightly the implementation of CIA's compensation reform plan to allow time for the review, evaluation, and for adjustment, where needed, of the compensation program currently being tested in a congressionally mandated pilot program which we have all been very interested in and are following very closely. I think the final result will be a better system for managers and employees alike and a significant improvement for the institution. If it takes a month longer to get there, I think it is going to be well worth the investment. I could go on for some time detailing many other worthy provisions, but I will conclude my opening remarks here with the observation that this conference report reflects the committee's view that the U.S. intelligence community is making progress in many areas. In the past 3 years, it has recovered to a degree from the devastating cutbacks and budget personnel capabilities and frankly flagging political support that occurred during the mid-1990s. But as I have said, it will be a long road to recovery, and it takes time to build intelligence capability. It will take years of sustained effort and attention and reinvigorated political backing to rebuild a fully capable intelligence community that does all the things we need it to do for us. We are on the road to recovery. I am proud of that. Investment in timely intelligence is the best investment for our homeland and national security, and I hope most Members agree with that. This conference report represents progress on that road, and I urge the House to adopt it. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman of the committee who is also chairman of our Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy and National Security. He is indeed a busy man. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence and, obviously, a critical member of the team who has also been one of our world travelers to places that not everybody wants to go to.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a very dedicated member of our committee who is well known for other capabilities as well.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time. I just want to take a few minutes to congratulate my ranking member for the superb job that she has done on her side of the aisle in this conference report and throughout the year. To say she is hardworking and dedicated does not quite get it. I have words here that say her determination is fierce and she is definitely a force to be reckoned with. That does not quite say it either. She is a very valuable asset, and we are very grateful for her energies and suggestions and leadership and the way she goes about her business. This is her very first conference report as ranking member I think, if I have got my history right; and she obviously was of significant importance in bringing the report through for the authorization bill that the House did, but she was also significantly helpful in the negotiations with the other body which I am not allowed to mention. I would also like to thank each and every member of HPSCI for their undying dedication to the security of our Nation and the protection of the people of the United States. That is what we do. Each member works very hard learning the business of intelligence, and it is not an easy subject. What they come to understand in that process is that this Nation is far better off with our intelligence professionals than we would be without them. I know sometimes the debate rages about whether intelligence is an appropriate thing for gentlemen to be discussing in a civilized society. Well, I can tell my colleagues we could not exist without it. The rank-and-file employees of the intelligence community every day, as the gentlewoman has said, protect the very liberties we cherish. They do it day in and day out; and as they go about gathering the secrets and information necessary for our policy-makers to make the very tough decisions they have to make, they incur a lot of risk. The members of the HPSCI understand this pretty clearly. That is because we have been out and about and talking to them. We do travel a lot. We go to the places that not everybody wants to go to. We get into the issues not everybody wants to fool around with. Frankly, that is why it is easy to leave partisanship outside the door of the committee chamber. Finally, I want to thank committee staff, all HPSCI staff, all sides, both together, including, obviously, Democratic members and Republican members and those who do not want to declare either side who we call our support staff. Without staff support, it is obviously their expertise, their dedication, our committee would not do much of anything. They do work late hours. I know that occasionally when I work late hours I find them there. I find them occasionally when I come in early I find them there. They do wonderful things for us, and they get very little recognition. I know a lot of the work is tedious and mundane and a lot of it is exciting, and I appreciate their contributions in all of those areas. The other thing I know for sure is the work space up there leaves a lot to be desired, and I promise we are going to work on a lavatory soon. We do feel the days have come when there is indoor plumbing, and we should acknowledge that on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Everybody deserves congratulatory words today, and I want to thank everybody, and I mean that very sincerely. There is one person on the committee I am going to single out today, though, who serves as the committee's budget director who is entitled, I think, for specific recognition this year. Mike Meermans has served the government for now, I am told, 30 years, in fact something in excess of that. Among other jobs in the United States he served in the United States Air Force, and he has been engaged by the government as an Arab linguist. Mike has been with HPSCI since 1995. This is his 8th year on the committee. It has been a very trying year for Mike, whose college-age son early in the year was diagnosed with cancer. Throughout his son's course of treatment, Mike was by his side, I know, every step of the way, being a great father, and all the while managing the committee's authorization process, crunching numbers, writing the report language, negotiating with the executive branch and with the other body, and frankly, getting into mysteries in the intelligence community that I find too complex to understand. He did all of this with energy, with fortitude and aplomb. He is the manifestation of the wonderful and professional staff which HPSCI is blessed with and is well served by. I just wanted to say to Mike that he is appreciated not just for his legislative talents but more so because he is a good guy. He is a nice guy, a great father. His only purpose in serving HPSCI is actually to make America stronger, and this year when he had family duties, he understood those as well and met them. To his wife, Lois, and their family, especially their son Brian, I thank them for allowing him to work so hard for us, and I am sorry we had to take him away so much of the time. We are better and the Nation is stronger because of him, and their pride in him is very well deserved. We share that pride. Mike, for you, thank you for all your hard work in years past, this year especially. You made an extremely difficult year for you personally a successful year for the committee. You made it seem routine. We are all extremely happy to hear your son is on the mend and recently received more good news from the doctors. Our prayers for continuous good news are with you. You deserve our gratitude, and we express it here now. I also want to say that about a year ago we were just packaging up the joint inquiry product. We had an extensive effort with our colleagues in the other body to understand 9/11, what went wrong. We came up with a good report. It was a long one. I think it steered us in some directions that corrections have already been taken. It also created a follow-on commission, the national commission, which is at work now under the leadership of Governor Kean and former member Lee Hamilton, for whom we have great admiration. I think that I should point out to the people in the United States of America that we are part of the review they are doing. We have invited them to conduct oversight of how we do oversight. So the American people can be reassured that there is oversight of the intelligence community, and some of the things we cannot talk about are indeed watched by others. My time has come to an end. We have had a good year. We look for a better year ahead dealing with capabilities to make sure our country is safer.