Porter Goss

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee who have worked so hard in putting this bill together. In particular, I appreciate the very fine work of the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], our subcommittee chairmen. But I also have to point out that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the committee's ranking Democrat, and other Democratic members of the committee have played an extraordinarily constructive and helpful role in the formulation of this legislation. It is truly bipartisan. Finally, I would like to say to the staff on both sides of the aisle, ``Thank you for a job well done.'' They are a dedicated, talented, and professional group who have very special knowledge that serves the United States of America extremely well. This bill, which the committee reported out unanimously, is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, and cooperation. The committee held seven full committee and two subcommittee budget hearings. In addition, there were over 100 staff and member briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests. H.R. 1775 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1998 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for intelligence be specifically authorized. This is the only route we have. The intelligence budget has three major components: the national foreign intelligence program, known as NFIP; the tactical intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA; and the joint military intelligence program, known as JMIP. NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. TIARA, or Tactical Intelligence Activities, reside exclusively in the Department of Defense. They consist in large part of numerous reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information in support of military operations. The Joint Military Intelligence Program provides military intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers. Although our committee has jurisdiction over these three intelligence programs, we must work closely with the Committee on National Security, particularly in the oversight and authorization of the TIARA and JMIP programs where we share jurisdiction. I would like to publicly acknowledge and personally thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] for the extraordinary cooperation that we received from him, the members of his committee and the members of his committee staff. I would be remiss if I did not also mention the cooperation we have received from the Committee on Appropriations, particularly and most importantly from my colleague on this committee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young], who also chairs the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and sits, of course, on HIPCE. Due to the classified nature of much of the work of the Committee on Intelligence, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the House except in the broadest terms. In order to understand those specifics, I strongly urge those Members who have not already done so to read the classified annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in the Capitol. It is about a 2-minute walk from here, for those who are interested, and I hope all are interested. Despite classification restrictions, there are several major elements of the bill that I can discuss here today. In this year's budget review, the committee continued to place heavy emphasis on understanding and addressing the future needs of the intelligence community, preparing for those needs and the several distinct roles that intelligence is going to play in our national security in what is, in fact, a different world situation today. Based on the threats we believe the United States will confront in the future, the committee's budget review focused on two specific areas. First, we looked at which intelligence programs are properly structured and sufficiently prepared to meet future needs and requirements. Second, we looked at the intelligence community's collection and analytical shortfalls. Unfortunately, the committee review revealed few areas where the intelligence community is well situated for the future, and an overabundance of shortfalls were found. These shortfalls are due, in part, to the fact that intelligence resources are stretched too thin while handling an ever-increasing multitude of issues. I would like to point out that this is not any kind of a shock to the intelligence community. It is realizing the fact that we are stretched thin and need to deal with it. Nonetheless, the committee is concerned that the intelligence community is not moving fast enough in some of the areas to address the threats of the future. Given these concerns, the committee has begun to address the shortfalls we see in the intelligence community's budgeting and responsibilities. In this year's mark the committee has specifically addressed the following issues: First, we have taken actions to help the intelligence community improve its analytic depth and breadth through improved training, targeted hiring, and the use of analytic tools. There is no point to have information if you cannot value enhance with the proper analysis. Second, the intelligence community places too much emphasis on intelligence collection at the expense of downstream activities. Downstream activities are processing the information we get, analyzing, disseminating, and so forth. We have to get a better balance. If we spend all our money collecting and none for analyzing, we will be awash in information that is not going to do us much good. Third, our espionage capabilities are limited and dependent on ad hoc funding. We have taken steps to tie funding for clandestine operations to the long-term needs of analysts, policymakers, and the military. That is putting it where we need it. I think that is almost the most critical part of this whole bill, from my personal perspective. Fourth, we have pushed the intelligence community toward developing, acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible technological capabilities in order to collect key information on the highest priority targets. Finally, we have continued our efforts from the last Congress to make the intelligence community work corporately across traditional bureaucratic boundaries and to enhance flexibility. The committee believes that such efforts are absolutely essential if the intelligence community is to succeed in dealing with increasingly complex threats to U.S. national interests. Very clearly, turf wars have no place in national security. Again, I congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], the former chairman, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for the work they did to bring this matter forward in the previous Congress, and we are following forward on that. Those threats and concerns are broader and more diverse to our national security than they ever have been. Among them are those issues that have been called the transnational threats. Those include terrorism, the proliferation of advanced weapons and weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking and global criminal racketeering. Such problems demand that the intelligence community have a worldwide view and a highly flexible set of resources. Given the nature of these threats, our intelligence eyes and ears and brains are more important than they ever have been. As an example, in the realm of counterterrorism, we are aware of the recent success our intelligence community has had in locating international terrorists so as to allow law enforcement agencies to apprehend them and bring them to justice. Less well known, however, because we must guard against revealing intelligence methods, are the numerous successes intelligence has had in recent months in detecting terrorist activities in advance and foiling them, so Members did not read about them in the paper. U.S. facilities that would have been destroyed are intact today. American lives that could have been lost have been saved. As another example, in the area of counterproliferation, I would direct my colleagues' attention to this unclassified report which has been prepared by the CIA which describes the role of various countries in providing technologies and material for the development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by various rogue regimes around the world. This report, entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction Advanced Conventional Munitions,'' put out by the Director of Central Intelligence, covers the time between July and December 1996 at the request of this committee. It is a very important report. The media has picked it up. It is unclassified. It tells us the world is real, the world is dangerous and there are people involved in serious mischief. It has received a great deal of attention in the press because of its rather extraordinary findings. When we read the classified evidence that is behind that report, we find it is even more extraordinary. That includes a great deal of specific and reliable intelligence that has given our policymakers and our military excellent insights into the activities of various countries and what we must do in response. Anyone who does not see the immense value to our national security to such work by the intelligence community I think is probably living in blissful ignorance of the dangers growing around us from rogue regimes that are getting closer and closer to being able to threaten Americans anywhere in the world with terrible weapons of extraordinary power. In closing, I strongly urge all Members to support this authorization. It is the unanimously accepted product of a bipartisan committee. It makes significant improvements, measured by over 200 cuts, yes, I said cuts, and some additions to the President's budget request, and yet it comes in at less than 1 percent above the President's request when all is said and done. I am convinced that in supporting it, we are supporting the development of critically important intelligence capabilities that will make us all safer and will surely save the lives of many Americans, whether they be soldiers in the field, tourists on their vacation abroad, common Americans at home going about their business and their lives, all of this for today and for the years ahead. Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to take one more moment to acknowledge an individual who is, I am sure, celebrating his last authorization process on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I said we had extraordinarily good staff. We do. But this year an individual, Mr. Ken Kodama, the senior substantive expert on the minority side, is retiring later this year after 9 years on the committee. Mr. Kodama represents the finest level of professionalism that other staff should emulate. His service to the full committee has been invaluable as well as to the subcommittee. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the reason that I could make some of the comments that I did at the beginning of this statement was in large part due to our ability to interact with Mr. Kodama in a truly bipartisan nature. To put it simply, he will be sorely missed. We wish him the best in his future endeavors, and I personally want to thank him for his assistance. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that it is the intent of the committee that the legislative history of this provision as it was developed in the debate in 1995 is applicable to the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R. 1775 reiterates the joint explanatory statement of the committee of conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 to make completely clear that the original legislative history of this provision continues to govern its implementation.

Mr. GOSS. That is certainly the intent of the committee.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado if the gentleman will yield.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentleman is exactly on the point that if it does no damage then there is no reason to keep it hidden. That is a very valid point. But it is a point that applies to several other pieces of information, which is exactly why the committee has provided at the gentleman's request, which I totally agree with, conceded to, applauded in committee, that we provide for a study on declassification. Does the gentleman believe that this should be outside of the study of the declassification that we have provided for, committed funds for and I hope we will have the funds when we get through with this process to proceed with the study.

Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.

Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the situations where there is a lot of misinformation, a lot of perception, a lot of misperception frankly. There clearly is a slippery slope here, because the gentleman from Michigan's amendment talks about the annual statement of the total amount for intelligence expenditures. The problem with that is that if we give a number and we say these are intelligence expenditures, then we have to start defining what is intelligence. It is not exactly what other people think it is going to be. We will have to start paring out different programs and different functions to determine what we mean. Are you talking about the amount we spend on national security? That should surely be a big number. It is required in the Constitution. That is something the Federal Government does. Are we talking about the intelligence function in national security? And if so, what does that number mean and what specifically does it include and what does it leave out? What is intelligence? Is the State Department gathering of information or reading Le Figaro, is that part of intelligence? Is that open source intelligence or not? You have to start making further descriptions and definitions. That is the slippery slope.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster]. (Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald].

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would respond, if the gentlewoman will yield, that it is very much my intention to make sure that where taxpayers' dollars are used there is an appropriate accounting; if there is anything classified that justifies classification, we will have to deal with that. But it is not my intent to do that. It is my intent to report back what we find. That is the purpose of the investigation, and we will be dealing with the work of not only our own investigation but the investigation, as the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] has said, with the other IG's that are doing work, and frankly there is another committee in the other body working also. So I believe we do not know all of the answers yet, but I think the gentlewoman can go forward in good faith, understanding we are going to do our best to be fully accountable.

Mr. GOSS. Assuredly. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] my colleague who serves us well on the committee and serves well on the Committee on the Judiciary as well.

Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. GOSS. Again, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I believe that the question of declassification includes the question of classification, because I think there is great abuse there, as the gentleman has heard me say. I believe this is comprehensive and should be treated as such.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to assure the gentlewoman from California that I am interested in the truth. All of the resources and assets that we have and are bringing to bear on this are designed to bring the truth to the people of the United States of America, and particularly to those who are affected in Los Angeles. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Boehlert], a member of the committee who is not only my great friend, but has shown me the way forward on some of these issues. I think we are going to hear about that. (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Gibbons], a new member of our committee who has brought a wealth of value and experience. (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I quite agree. The gentlewoman from California said one of the worst kept secrets in Washington is the intelligence budget. One of the worst kept secrets in Washington is, what is the intelligence part of the intelligence budget? What is the intelligence part of the defense budget? Some have said that we are hiding something from Americans. We are not trying to hide anything from Americans. We are trying to keep some secrets from our enemies. That is true. We are trying to do that. But I would point out to those who say we are trying to hide something from Americans, we have a representative form of government. This is democracy at its finest in the world. Those of us here represent those of us abroad in our land. Those of us on the committee are charged with the responsibility of oversight. It was not always such good oversight. It is very good oversight now, and we are accountable. I would say we are hiding nothing from the Americans because there is no American that I would look at right in the eye and say, we are spending the money as wisely and as well as we can and as appropriately as we can. Fifteen men and women, good and true, making that decision about what our intelligence needs are at this time, I have no problem with that. I think that is entirely reasonable. When I go beyond that and start talking about specifics, I start removing some of the confusion the enemy seize out there. I think confusion to our enemies is not a bad thing. It is somewhat Biblical, in fact. I think it has worked very well over in the past. I do not see the game. If it is accountability, the accountability is there. We already have it. The final point of the gentlewoman from California, the President is somehow waiting for the signal; whoever made that statement, perhaps it was not the gentlewoman from California, let me tell my colleagues that it was President Clinton himself who classified the number when he sent his budget submission to Congress in March. It was not the Congress. We do not have the authority to classify anything. It is the executive branch that classifies things. We are putting money in our bill to examine the question of declassification because we are properly concerned about it. That also in my view means abuse of classification. I know that takes place. So I would suggest the right way to deal with this is to go to the comprehensive study we have called for in our bill, that we have provided for in our bill, authorized funds for and I hope we will get those funds from the appropriators, and I believe we are and that we proceed in an orderly way. That way we protect national security. We provide for accountability. And we give the President and his people the opportunity to chime in on the debate. Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Conyers amendment.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations.