Porter Goss

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, in order to assist Members planning, which we are trying to do, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the Conyers amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 40 minutes, equally divided.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, a gentleman who is well versed on this issue. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis], subcommittee chairman.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I think this is, as the gentleman from Michigan has said, a debate we have had many times, and I tend to believe that not much has changed and the previous wisdom we have had that it is correct, that the matter should remain classified. I realize that the gentleman has quoted the Aspen Brown report, and in fact I did dissent from the vote on that. That was a consensus report. I argued for the position of keeping the matter classified. In that particular group of people, it was not seen that way. Not all of those people have had the same experience that those of us on the Senate committee have had, and there is a legitimate disagreement about this. The other point I think is very important is that no good deed seems to go unpunished, no matter what we do around here. I would point out, and I am reading from the committee report, the committee has authorized additional resources in the fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA classification management, including declassification activities in support of Executive Order 12958. Now I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has a cutting amendment we are going to hear, and I know the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] had a cutting amendment. Well yes, we did put more money in this bill to get to the declassification question, and I certainly believe as part of the declassification question we ought to be examining the issue that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] has raised. I think it is a very fair debate to ask and we should do it in a comprehensive way. So I am totally prepared to say that as part of the initiative of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] a very valued member on our committee, to deal with declassification, that this should be part of that study. I just do not want at this point to create an initiative to go forward and say, well, we suddenly made a decision that really is of interest in the Beltway, but not for the American people to suddenly declassify this matter. It will be of interest to those who have interests that are inimicable to the United States of America. They would dearly love to have this information. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is right, it is a slippery slope. Now I realize that there are some Members who serve on other committees who would love to know what a percentage of the NRO budget is so they can get their hand on a number and say, surely the interests of my committee match this and surely, therefore, we could take a little bit here and put a little bit there. But as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has said, under 602(b) we are still in line, and I think that is extremely important. So my colleagues can rest assured that there is not really any opportunity here, there is no pork here, this is all proper. The other thing I have got to point out on this besides the slippery slope and the fact that there is not a clamor across this country to have this information, I hardly ever at a town meeting get asked, gee, exactly how much money is being spent on intelligence? Sometimes I get asked exactly what is intelligence doing, and there is this perception that it is all CIA, and as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has properly said earlier in this debate today, it is much, much more. The CIA is indeed a very minor part of it. I am very happy to say it is a minor part of it. I do not think I ought to say specifically what that minor part is though. The other thing I have got to point out here, the President of the United States in fact can go ahead and release information. He has that ability. The President does not do that. The President has made the choice to keep the matter classified. Before we go off and do something like this, I think it should be properly studied and have the proper input from our folks in the other part of Government, our sister branch of Government. After all, he is charged with the national security. It is a matter of the Constitution, it is a matter of his specific charge, and he can declassify when he chooses with a stroke of his pen. Every President since Harry Truman has decided to send us the bill with the number classified. I suspect there is a reason for that, and I suspect that we probably ought to take the President and his people into consideration before we go off in a new direction. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a brief question?

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I originally rose in opposition to the Waters amendment, but now I am rising in support of my substitute amendment. I think it is very important that we understand here that this is not a new subject and that there are unclassified documents available to the public on Khamisiyah and what happened there. One is entitled Khamisiyah Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence of 9 April 1997. And the second, more to the point, is CIA Supports the U.S. Military During the Persian Gulf War of 16 June 1997, which deals very directly with the subject at hand. These are available for all Members and the public at large, any veterans or soldiers or military civilians or anybody who would be interested. It is a very important subject. I quite agree with that. The gentlewoman has pointed to her love of veterans and soldiers, and I certainly admire that and I will also say that I agree with it. I have a great many veterans in my district. We have a very large veterans population, seems to grow larger every day, which is not surprising given the wonderful area where I live in southwest Florida. I think it is very important, however, that we understand that this is not an issue that has been ignored. I would like very much, therefore, to explain a little bit further what my substitute amendment will do in addition to these reports that are already out. The gentlewoman is seeking an IG report and we have designed an approach that would bring about a result, I think, while avoiding some of the pitfalls I see in going with the gentlewoman's original amendment. The Intelligence Committee is obviously very concerned about the issue of chemical weapons exposure during the gulf war or any other time, and we have been closely monitoring the DCI efforts to examine this subject fully. Again, the committee was very pleased to see the April release of the unclassified report from the DCI, that would be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, related to the events at the Khamisiyah storage facility where Iraqi, and I underscore, Iraqi chemical weapons were stored and were subsequently destroyed by U.S. troops. And in that process it is apparent that some have suffered exposure to chemical weapons. The question has to be asked. What happened? What went wrong? We tried to find out. Since this is the first I have heard from the gentlewoman on this subject but not the first I have heard on the subject, I am going to encourage her to read these reports. And I will make them available if she has not already. From the report we know that there was a breakdown in analysis and communications between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense related to the knowledge of chemical weapons storage at this particular facility. There was a ground location problem involved and how it was referred to. We also know that steps are already being taken by both the intelligence community and the defense to make sure that this does not happen again. Again it is addressed in these reports. Our committee remains very vigilant about monitoring the progress of that effort and other efforts because we know the catastrophic consequences of mishandling or not knowing the maximum amount about chemical warfare and all its ramifications. The Waters amendment implies that the CIA or CIA employees were complicit, and I think that word was used in her amendment, in the use of chemical weapons against U.S. troops. That is an accusation that obviously disturbs me and any American very greatly and warrants immediate consideration. The facts that I know are that intelligence and defense were never closer in their working relationship even though there were opportunities for things to go wrong as there are in any hostile combat situation or any peacetime situation, as we know. But former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, is I think, a man well regarded and certainly was well regarded in accomplishments of his duties in these events stated, and I quote: No combat commander has ever had as full or complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story. I am not making that up. That is not a newspaper story. That is something that Colin Powell said. Mr. Chairman, I note that there are many, many studies that have been or are being conducted, several under the watchful eye of the Presidential Commission on Gulf War Illness. This is entirely appropriate. This committee will continue its oversight responsibilities and continue to look at activities related to this issue that belong in the area of the intelligence community, as I have said we are doing, as witnessed by these reports. I have said in my substitute that the gentlewoman's amendment calls on the CIA's Inspector General to conduct a review to determine what knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course of the gulf war. This report would be submitted to the intelligence committees of the Congress, that would be both committees, no later than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. And, frankly, I think it will happen much sooner because much of the work has already been done. I believe the substitute will reach the goal the gentlewoman seems to have, the goal of getting as much information as possible about what we knew of the presence or use of chemical weapons during the gulf war without prejudging the outcome or implying complicity on the part of the men and women who work so hard on behalf of our national security. I want to point that out. People are watching this debate. We are on C-SPAN. I know that it is for the benefit of the Members, but inevitably there are other observers who watch what goes on here, including the men and women of our intelligence community. I am sure that they feel a little bit let down when somebody implies that they may have been using or complicit in chemical warfare against American troops overseas. I have trouble with that. I hope they do not believe that that is the feeling of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence because it is clearly not. I believe very strongly in oversight, the need for good discipline, a piercing look at what we are doing, calling it when we see it when there is a problem, not shrinking from that, but I certainly do not think we want to denigrate the men and women who are working so hard for our national security if it is not warranted. And in my case I have not seen any facts whatsoever to warrant it. I hope the gentlewoman will support our approach, which is offered for our mutual interest of getting at the truth. And that is what we seek, the truth. I will urge my colleagues to support the substitute to the Waters amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for yielding this time to me, and I obviously rise in strong support of this fair and I think very appropriate rule for what we are about, which permits consideration of 2 important measures, the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act, in fact probably one of the most important things we will do in this session of Congress. Today, we take another major step toward the first balanced budget in over a generation, as the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] said, and the first actual relief for American taxpayers in almost a generation. Despite this indisputable progress, we continue to hear this same tired rhetoric, we have already heard it, this class warfare from the defenders of the status quo. As usual they claim they have a study or they will get one that proves that the majority of the tax cuts are going to go to the, quote, rich. Of course, they define rich to suit their own purpose. Mr. Speaker, if someone earns $40,000 a year, the big Government crowd is going to consider them rich, and this is how they are going to do it: artificially inflate their income through the addition of their future pension as well as the potential rental value of their home. I am sure this is going to be news to thousands of new-found rich people in my district, and I imagine they are going to be a little shocked by it, as the rest of America will be as they discover they have been elevated to rich. Mr. Speaker, actually the definition of rich is, ``If you're not on welfare, you're rich.'' Given these partisan distortions it is important to let the American people know that what we are doing today is important work and it is going to affect them, and it is going to affect them positively. We are taking the necessary steps to save the Medicare Program, and it is facing impending bankruptcy. But instead of resorting to the tax increases and the draconian provider cutbacks that we have talked about in the past, we achieve our savings through patient choice. Americans want choice in their medical care, and we are providing choice, and we are using free market competition, and we believe Americans will have better access, better choice, better medical service in the end, and we think we will end up with a stronger Medicare program as a result. We are also providing overdue relief to families through the child tax credit and reform of the punitive death tax. I do not understand why we do not all understand that any American who works hard, saves little and wants to provide for his wife and his kids after he is gone, or his grandkids, should be able to do that. Why should the Government come in and take all of his hard work? After all I think what propels a great amount of the work in this country is the responsibility individuals have to go to work and provide for their families. As a father of four I certainly feel that way. I think most Americans do. I think I owe it to my family and to my community and to my country to look out for my family and provide for them. I do not go for this new mantra that Uncle Sam has been replaced by Father Government. Government is not my daddy, and it is not anyone else's either. I think we need to get away from that and remember that the people who work in this country work with the sense of responsibility to their family and should be able to provide for them after they are gone. We will furnish responsible Americans with more ways to save for their future by expanding IRA's, and we will promote economic growth by slicing the punitive capital gains tax. But most important, today we will send a message to our children and our grandchildren that their future is not going to be mortgaged for Washington's profligate spending habits, and we all know what they are. The last time this Congress balanced the budget our national debt stood at $368 billion, and $368 billion is a lot of money. Today that national debt is at $54 trillion, trillion, and it is still climbing. With this package Congress has finally acknowledged what most American have known for a very, very long time: Uncle Sam is obese, Uncle Sam needs a diet, and it is time. Mr. Speaker, today is about historic progress; slow and steady, yes, but it is progress. This package is not perfect, but it is very good work, and it is bipartisan, and it is multibranch. And, yes, there is more to do, and there always will be if we are going to have jobs up here in Washington representing the people of this country, and that is the form of Government we have. But above all this package represents a hard-earned victory, I think, for the American taxpayer, the middle-income earner, the hard worker, the people out there worrying about the future of their families and their kids. And I think it is a victory for our kids, too, because we are going to rein in taxing and not send the bill to them any more. I very passionately urge for a ``yes'' vote on this rule and for the important reconciliation bills that it carries. This is the work we are about; this is what we are asked to do.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from California for yielding me this time. I continue to believe that we must remain engaged in China; clearly the power to be reckoned with both now and in the next century. However, I have to say it is with increasing reluctance this year that I am going to support these normalized trade relations. I have just about had it. As chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I have two major concerns: First, China's flagrant and inexcusable weapons proliferation activities; no denying it. Specifically, the provision of advanced weapons systems, equipment, and technologies to nations, including some that are hostile to America, that are known to have active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. I want to be sure President Clinton knows how serious this is; I want to hear him say it, I want to hear him say he is going to do something about it. The other issue clouding the debate for me is the serious allegation that Chinese officials engaged in improper and possibly illegal activities to influence the outcome of U.S. elections. This matter is still unresolved, and it deserves cooperation, and I hope also we will get the cooperation of the administration on this.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, June 20, I was absent for rollcall votes 218 through 224. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on votes 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, and 224. I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall No. 221.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to transmit herewith, pursuant to clause 1(d) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a report on the activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence during the 104th Congress. Report This report covers the activities of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence during the One Hundred Fourth Congress. Larry Combest (Republican, Texas) served as Chairman; Norman D. Dicks (Democrat, Washington) served as Ranking Democratic Member. In carrying out its mandate from the House regarding oversight of U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities, the Committee created two subcommittees: Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence Jerry Lewis (Republican, California), Chairman C.W. Bill Young (Republican, Florida) Porter J. Goss (Republican, Florida) Bud Shuster (Republican, Pennsylvania) Bill McCollum (Republican, Florida) Michael N. Castle (Republican, Delaware) Ronald D. Coleman (Democrat, Texas) Bill Richardson (Democrat, New Mexico) Julian C. Dixon (Democrat, California) David E. Skaggs (Democrat, Colorado) Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence Robert K. Dornan (Republican, California), Chairman James V. Hansen (Republican, Utah) Jerry Lewis (Republican, California) Bud Shuster (Republican, Pennsylvania) Bill McCollum (Republican, Florida) Michael N. Castle (Republican, Delaware) Nancy Pelosi (Democrat, California) Norman D. Dicks (Democrat, Washington) Robert G. Torricelli (Democrat, New Jersey) David E. Skaggs (Democrat, Colorado) The stated purpose of H. Res. 658 of the 95th Congress, which created the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, was to establish a committee ``to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence- related activities and programs of the United States Government and to submit to the House appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the House concerning such intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs.'' H.Res. 658 also indicated that the Committee ``shall make every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and agencies of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation. It is further the purpose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.'' report scope of committee review U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The National Foreign Intelligence Program consists of activities in the following departments, agencies or other intelligence elements of the government: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); (4) the National Security Agency (NSA); (5) the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); (6) the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; (7) the Department of State; (8) the Department of Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; and (12) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) was established in 1995 to provide integrated program management of defense intelligence elements that support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence discipline (for example, Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence) or function (for example, satellite support or aerial reconnaissance). The programs comprising JMIP also fall within the jurisdiction of the National Security Committee. The Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence activities outside the defense intelligence program that respond to requirements of military commanders for operational support information as well as to national command, control, and intelligence requirements. The programs comprising TIARA also fall within the jurisdiction of the National Security Committee. intelligence authorization acts for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 During the 104th Congress, the Committee authorized funding and personnel levels for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. This activity was carried out at the full Committee level, rather than through a separate subcommittee, as had been the practice in past years. The Committee conducted detailed and extensive reviews of the President's fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 budget requests for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. These reviews included substantive and programmatic hearings member briefings and numerous staff briefings. The Committee conducted hearings organized across functional lines within the Intelligence Community rather than by agency. This permitted the Committee to take a broader view of each of the issues and analyze how the various intelligence functions relate to one another. Testimony on the President's budget submission was taken from the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (CI); the Directors of the DIA, NSA and the FBI; and major intelligence program managers. The Committee began its review of these budget submissions with the view that the Committee's recommended authorization levels for the past several years had been driven to some degree by political considerations as to an ``acceptable'' intelligence budget level. For the fiscal years 1996-1997, the Committee emphasized the future needs and requirements of the Intelligence Community, believing firmly that the U.S. must start building now for the Intelligence Community we will need in the 21st century. Four themes were central to the Committee's budget deliberations: (1) evaluating each budget line solely on the merits of that program; (2) eschewing the practice of establishing an arbitrary budget ceiling and then forcing program trade-offs to remain within the ceiling; (3) giving increased emphasis to ``downstream'' activities (the processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data and analysis) in order to create a better balance between these activities and collection; and (4) thinking about longer term intelligence priorities. As a result of these themes and its detailed reviews, the Committee recommended very modest increases for both fiscal years in order to reverse the decline of past years and to create some stability in which intelligence program managers could make necessary and appropriate plans for the future. areas of special interest The following issues were of special interest to the Committee during the 104th Congress: IC21: The Intelligence community in the 21st century IC21 was a major focus of the Committee's activities during the 104th Congress--a review of the roles, functions, missions and capabilities of the Intelligence Community with an emphasis on how well suited these were to likely national security concerns in the 21st century. IC21 started from the premise that the United States continues to need a strong, highly capable and increasingly flexible Intelligence Community and that this need has not diminished with the end of the Cold War. IC21 emphasized opportunity--a propitious time for us to undertake such a review and to implement recommended changes, not reform. All facets of the Intelligence Community were subject to scrutiny; there were no preconceptions as to the ``right answer'' to this study. The IC21 effort was buttressed by a significant intellectual underpinning. Over 40 current and former national security officials, academics and intelligence veterans were queried in order to shape the initial inquiry. It was decided that a functional approach (requirements; the management of resources, collection, production; systems development, the various collection disciplines; analysis; infrastructure; evaluation) to intelligence was preferable to an agency-by-agency review. The committee believed that an agency-by-agency review would more likely lead to either a confirmation or rejection of the status quo without providing a basis for projecting future intelligence needs and how best to meet them. IC21 was, to the fullest extent possible, an open and public process. The Committee held seven open hearings and one closed hearing that has since been declassified. Witnesses included the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and six of his eight predecessors, representing a wealth of professional experience; experts in future technologies; and former senior policy and intelligence officials. The Committee also drew upon the extensive work that had been done for the fiscal year 1996 and 1997 intelligence budgets. Committee staff also conducted dozens of interviews and held several staff panels with other intelligence experts. Majority staff used this functional approach as a template for 14 staff studies, which were published in April 1996. The IC21 staff studies included 87 findings and 105 recommendations. Chief among them was the need for a more ``corporate'' Intelligence Community, i.e., an Intelligence Community in which all components understand that they are part of a larger coherent process aiming at a single goal: the delivery of timely intelligence to policy makers at various levels. The staff studies also identified continued shortcomings in and recommended strengthening the authorities (versus responsibilities) of the DCL, particularly in the areas of budget and personnel, where individual program managers often appear to have greater independence. The study also recommended designating the Director, DIA as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and supporting him with a DMI Staff, in order to improve corporate thinking in that major part of the Intelligence Community. Among the more controversial proposals were several in the area of intelligence collection, including the creation of a Technical Collection Agency (TCA), combining signals intelligence imagery intelligence and measurement and signatures intelligence in a single agency so as to break down the ``stovepipes'' in which these collection disciplines are often bound and the creation of a Technology Development Office (TDO), to be responsible for all research and development of collection-related technology. IC21 also recommended that the Clandestine Service be organizationally separated from the CIA, giving the DCI direct authority over that service. The concept of a TCA was in contrast to the proposal made by the DCI to create a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) that would combine all imagery assets, including collection, processing, exploitation and analysis in a single Defense Department combat support agency. A majority of the Committee did not support NIMA, citing concerns about the ability of a Defense combat support agency to serve all national customers. Similarly, concerns about the possibility of tactical intelligence needs overwhelming competing national needs for imagery was a key consideration in the Committee's opposition to the creation of NIMA. There were also concerns about putting imagery analysts within the collection agency and the NIMA would reinforce the concept of separate and competing collection ``stovepipes,'' rather than a more corporate and cooperative system. Despite the opposition of a majority of this Committee, NIMA was created as part of the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. As reported by the Committee in June 1996, the IC21 bill advanced more modest changes in six main areas: (1) improving the support structure for the DCI to carry out his Community- wide responsibilities, including a second Deputy DCI for Community Management and an enhanced Community Management Staff; (2) limited increases in the SCI's authority to transfer personnel and money within the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (3) establishing the Director, DIA as the DMI, with a DMI Staff; (4) improving executive guidance and direction, creating two committees on the National Security Council, Foreign Intelligence and Transitional Threats; (5) creating a Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System in the Defense Department; and (6) authorizing the DCI and Secretary of Defense to undertake a study on the future of intelligence collection, including the concepts put forward in the IC21 study. The IC21 staff study also recommended changes in the House rules for this Committee. Specifically, it recommended that the system of rotating membership on this Committee be ended and that membership be made permanent, although still selected by the Speaker and the Minority Leader. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence incorporated its own proposals for ``intelligence community reform and renewal'' in its version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. The conference over these bills then became the venue in which final decisions ere made about IC21 issues and alternative Senate proposals. H.R. 3259 enacted the following provisions related to Intelligence Community management and structure: Created National Security Council Committees on Foreign Intelligence and on Transnational Threats; Created a Deputy DCI for Community Management, subject to confirmation by the Senate; Under this new Deputy DCI, created three Assistant DCIs: Collection; Analysis & Production; Administration. Each will be subject to confirmation by the Senate; Strengthened the evaluation function of the National Intelligence Council; Enhanced the DCI's authority over Intelligence Community budget and personnel; Made the General Counsel of the CIA a statutory position, subject to Senate confirmation; Required the concurrence of the DCI in the appointment of the Directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Imagery & Mapping Agency; and Required consultation with the DCI in the appointment of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence & Research; and the Assistant Director of the FBI for the National Security Division. The main thrust of these provisions is to enhance of the DCI's ability to carry out his Community-wide responsibilities either directly or through the enhanced Community Management function. The National Reconnaissance Program In perhaps no area did the Committee have greater success in meeting its goal of shaping a 21st century Intelligence Community than in the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), which is responsible for the development, launch and operation of spaceborne collection systems. Beginning with its work on the fiscal year 1996 intelligence budget, the Committee raised serious questions about current management practices of the NRO and the future of collection systems. Although the Committee approved 99% of the funds requested for the NRP in that fiscal year, these funds were significantly redistributed, a reordering that was not without controversy on the Committee. The Committee and, ultimately, Congress also mandated in the fiscal year 1996 Authorization Act that the DCI create a panel to assess the feasibility of moving to smaller satellites in the future. In asking for this report the Committee was not advocating an immediate shift to such satellites. Rather, the Committee believed the time was ripe to look at the feasibility of such a step in the future, with the clear understanding that if a panel of experts advised against it, then it would not be an option. Nonetheless, the Committee was gratified when the panel reported to the DCI in May 1996 ``that now is an appropriate time to make a qualitative change in the systems architecture of the nation's reconnaissance assets.'' The panel stated that capabilities currently exist to build an imagery satellite 75% lighter but with 50% more capacity than the currently planned systems. The Committee agrees with the DCI that much more work and study need to be done on the transition to such systems. However, this change offers the prospects of satellite systems that will be more flexible and less expensive in terms of launch costs--both of which will be important contributors to an improved Intelligence Community. Guatemala The Committee undertook an extensive review of allegations concerning CIA involvement in certain activities in Guatemala, especially the murder of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine and the disappearance of Efrain Bamaca, a Guatemalan guerrilla. The Committee also investigated allegations of the destruction of documents by U.S. Army officers purported to prove U.S. human rights violations in Guatemala, and a possible circumvention of U.S. laws relating to the cut-off of assistance to Guatemala via intelligence liaison relationships. Many of these allegations were raised publicly by Representative Torricelli. A draft report of the results of the investigation was prepared by Committee staff but not considered by the Committee during the 104th Congress. The draft report concluded that there was no evidence to support these allegations. There was no evidence that U.S. Government personnel played any role in either the death of DeVine or the disappearance of Bamaca, or that the U.S. Government concealed any action that might have constituted a violation of U.S. law. Further, the allegations concerning document destruction by two Army officers appear to have been fabricated by the person who provided them to Representative Torricelli. This fabrication remains under investigation by the U.S. Attorney in Baltimore, Maryland. The draft report also concluded that the U.S. did not use intelligence channels to unlawfully compensate Guatemala for the cutoff of overt assistance. Finally, although there was no evidence that any U.S. government employee knowingly misled Congress's intelligence oversight committees, the draft report concluded that the CIA failed in its obligation under 50 U.S.C. 413 to keep those committees ``fully and currently informed.'' The President's Intelligence Oversight Board which also conducted a review of these activities, made note of this failure in its report. The draft report will be reviewed and released, as appropriate, at the beginning of the 105th Congress. Haiti The Committee undertook an investigation as to whether intelligence collection and reporting on Haiti was being politicized by policy officials. The Committee heard testimony from a variety of witnesses, including representatives of CIA, DIA and the State Department. A report has not been prepared pending further investigation and the completion of an inquiry on Haiti by the Inspector General of the Department of State. Iran/Bosnia In April 1996, press articles asserted that the Clinton administration had not objected to the shipment of arms from Iran into Bosnia. Specifically, the U.S. ambassador, when asked by Croatian government officials for the U.S. position regarding such shipments, was ordered by senior State Department and NSC officials to respond to the Crotians that he had ``no instructions.'' The Committee voted to investigate ``those aspects of the transfer of arms to Bosnia that fall within the committee's responsibilities to conduct oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States Government.'' Specifically, the Committee's investigation focused on the following issues: How was the ``no instructions'' policy implemented? How did the State Department, National Security Council (NSC) and CIA react to this policy? What effect did the CIA's lack of understanding of the policy have on events in the region and on relations within the embassy itself? Did the implementation of this policy constitute a covert action? The Committee will review the findings of the investigation and issue a report in the 105th Congress. The Ames espionage case The Committee continued to work on issues that arose as a result of the espionage of Aldrich Ames. One issue, identified in the Committee's 1994 report on this case, was the failure of the CIA to keep the oversight committees fully and currently informed of the 1985-86 losses of assets and of important developments in its efforts to determine the cause of those losses. This failure was made more egregious by the fact that, in several instances prior to Ames' arrest, members of the Committee had asked pointed questions about ongoing counterintelligence problems. Acting DCI Admiral William Studeman stated that the CIA had failed to meet its obligation under Section 502 of the National Security Act, requiring that Congress be informed of all intelligence activities including ``any significant intelligence failure.'' The Committee then investigated whether this failure to notify was intentional. The Committee, as a result of the inquiry, did not find that any senior CIA official ever directed the withholding of information from Congress. The investigation did reveal, however, that CIA officials did not consider bringing the issue of espionage problems to the attention of Congress. Not all CIA officials understood the requirement of Section 502. Congress does not have to ``ask the right questions'' in order for information to be conveyed the Intelligence Community must be forthcoming. A second issue relating to Ames' espionage concerned whether intelligence reporting that may have come from controlled Soviet sources influenced U.S. decision making. The Committee's investigation revealed management problems in the dissemination of certain reports and the degree to which these were conveyed to policy makers with accurate and proper caveats. However, neither this Committee, the Defense Department nor the CIA were able to discover any U.S. decisions that were influenced by controlled-source reports. Indeed, given the inherent complexity of Defense acquisition decisions, it would be highly unusual--if not impossible--for this process to be influenced solely by such reports alone, whether accurate or controlled. Finally, the Committee asked the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to conduct a review of the FBI's performance in the Ames case. The Department of Justice agreed to do this in February 1995. However, by the end of the 104th Congress the Justice IG had not yet finalized what has been described as a voluminous and weighty report that the Committee expects to be of great value in its review of the Nicholson and Pitts espionage cases. CIA drug trafficking investigation In August 1996, the San Jose Mercury News published a series of articles regarding the introduction, financing, and distribution of crack cocaine into communities of Los Angeles. The articles alleged that one of the drug trafficking rings responsible for introducing crack cocaine to Los Angeles was operated by a Nicaraguan who used some of his drug profits to provide lethal and non-lethal assistance to the Contras. Furthermore the Mercury News articles implied that the CIA either backed, or at least condoned, the drug trafficking activity. In September 1996, the Committee began a formal investigation into these allegations. Separate investigations were also begun by the Inspectors General (IG) of the Department of Justice and the CIA. The scope of the Committee's investigation focuses on the following questions: Were any CIA operatives/assets involved in the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area? If CIA operatives or assets were involved, did the CIA have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area by anyone associated with the Agency? Did any other U.S. Government agency or employee within the Intelligence Community have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area between 1979-1969? Were any CIA officers involved in the supply or sales of drugs in the Los Angeles area since 1979? Did the Nicaraguan Contras receive any financial support, through the sale of drugs in the United States, during the period when the CIA was supporting the Contra effort? If so, were any CIA officials aware of this activity? What is the validity of the allegations in the San Jose Mercury News? The Committee, in keeping with past practice, also stated that it would await the completion of the two IG investigations and review the results as part of the Committee's inquiry into this matter before issuing a report. Since the beginning of its investigation, the Committee has engaged in many activities to gather information, including: tasking the Congressional Research Service for background data related to the Iran-Contra investigations; taking the IGs of the Department of Justice and CIA to provide access to all material that they compile in the course of their investigations conducting several interviews in Washington, Los Angeles, and attending and participating in two ``town hall'' meetings in South Central Los Angeles. The Committee's investigation will continue into the 105th Congress, with much more data to be reviewed and interviews to be conducted. For example, the CIA IG has identified over 6000 documents available for Committee review. The Committee also anticipates additional travel related to this investigation, including additional trips to California and Nicaragua. As previously mentioned, the Committee will not complete its investigation until it has had the opportunity to review the results of the two separate IG investigations that will likely not be completed until the end of 1997.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Glen Falls, NY [Mr. Solomon], the chairman of the Committee on Rules, for yielding the time, and I rise in support of this fair structured rule as outlined by the chairman. I think that the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] have clearly laid out what is before us in terms of how this is going to unfold. While we could not possibly make each of the 120, actually I think it was more than 130-plus, amendments in order, I believe that this rule allows for debate on amendments in all of the major policy areas. Providing for the national defense is arguably one of the only 100- percent legitimate, constitutionally mandated functions of the Federal Government. And that is the business today. Unlike some of my colleagues and some of the folks in the administration, I have never been able to share the unrelenting optimism of those who greeted the end of the cold war as the time to set aside all of our national defense systems. I happen to believe that the world is still a very dangerous place. What this means is that we must place a premium on good intelligence and highly trained and responsive armed services. While we have been very successful at cutting spending in some areas since the 1980's, I cannot support further massive defense cuts, cuts which would undermine our long-term security for the sake of some short-term gain. H.R. 1119 ups the funding in key readiness accounts and halts reductions in active duty military personnel. It gives our soldiers and their families long overdue assistance and improved quality of life by closing pay gaps, improving military housing and bolstering the defense health care system, all matters that we have heard spoken to so far today. H.R. 1119 will also put modernization programs back on track by giving priority to unfunded requirements, encouraging technological innovation, and there are many that are very promising, and ensuring that the Reserve Forces that are more and more often being called to duty have the training and the equipment they need when they are in harm's way. This is all designed to ensure one thing, that we are up to the national security challenge, whatever that challenge is, when it comes: The next Pearl Harbor, the next Desert Storm, whatever the form, wherever the place, whenever the time. Of course, in today's budgetary climate we also recognize that no department can or should escape scrutiny or reform. This legislation does include measures to downsize unnecessary and low priority bureaucracies in the Defense Department and to improve business practices in the Defense Department. And the rule before us makes a bipartisan manager's amendment in order that is going to take further strides in this area. Those who serve their country deserve our honor and respect. The best way to serve them is to maintain our strong commitment to them and to their families and to ensure that they have the resources and the training they need when they move on to the battlefield. This legislation gets us on the right path. I support it. I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, the chairman, for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, my concern is that we should err on the side of caution. While I know that there are very good arguments that are being made by other people, including the distinguished chairman, and this is a debate that is very worthy, it is the same as the debate on encryption, in my view, where we have to make a balance in this House between national security, law enforcement, and our export opportunities and our economic opportunities and our economic muscle overseas. My view is based on the reports I have. We have three facts. One is that the administration has in fact relaxed controls twice. Where they have relaxed those controls in the case of the Russians, they have given the Russians a capability 10 times greater than anything they ever had before with regard to nuclear weapons. That is what concerns me. Secondly, I am very concerned that the Chinese academy of sciences, which is involved in nuclear weapons and missile research, has access to these computers also. That is a fact. That bothers me. Reports, there are reports we have that things are a little out of control in terms of areas of proliferation. This is not a good place to have things out of control. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is probably the single biggest categorical threat to our Nation that I can think of. So I think we ought to err on the side of caution. I think that the proposals in the amendment are definitely reasonable. I do not see anything in there, when talking about approvals and verifications, those are things that seem reasonable to me. I realize this is not the last word on this. I realize there are other sides to be heard on it as well, but I am going to support this amendment because I think it errs on the side of caution, which is where we ought to be on this issue.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 164 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley], my friend, ranking member, former distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only. Mr. Speaker, this rule is straightforward, fair, was reported without dissent by the Committee on Rules. Under House Resolution 164, any Member seeking to improve the bill by offering a germane amendment may do so. The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate, 40 minutes equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Resources and 20 minutes afforded to their counterparts from the Committee on Science, as we heard from the reading from the Clerk. The rule also reconciles a slight difference between those committees by considering an amendment in the nature of a substitute as the base text for consideration. It is a sensible process that allows us to consider the bill in a timely fashion without restricting the rights of the minority or individual Members, the deliberative process at work in the people's House. H.R. 437 reauthorizes the National Sea Grant College Program. This program leverages a small Federal investment of approximately 50 million a year which is matched by nonfederal funds to over 300 sea grant institutions and affiliated schools throughout our Nation. Located at the Nation's premier research universities, sea grant focuses the skills of hundreds of researchers on issues affecting the development and use of our marine and coastal resources. It is a program that is working. I am proud to be a cosponsor of H.R. 437, especially as a Representative from the great State of Florida and its wonderful coastline and beaches. I am particularly pleased that my home State of Florida is a leading participant in the program. All nine of our State universities are involved in sea grant activities, along with several private universities and marine research laboratories. Sea grant provides a good example of the national benefits that can come with local investment. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this wide-open fair rule that makes this important bill in order. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted that we both share, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts and myself, appreciation for this program. I have been to Woods Hole many times and applaud what a marvelous facility it is, and I invite the gentleman to come to Florida to some of our facilities. I know that he will have equal respect for them. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the distinguished gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. Morella].

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the communication from the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts. I want to explain to him that he has experienced just the beginning. There is so much more than Shamu, but that is a good start. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to announce to all Members of the House that the permanent select committee has ordered H.R. 1775, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998, reported to the House. That report was filed this morning. I would also like to announce that the classified annex and the classified schedule of authorizations accompanying H.R. 1775 are available for review by Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in room H-405 of the Capitol. The committee office will be open during regular business hours for the convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to its consideration by the House. It is my understanding that H.R. 1775 will be considered on the floor the week we return from the Independence Day recess. I would recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff to assist Members who desire that assistance during the review of the classified materials. I urge Members to take some time to review these classified documents before the bill is brought to the floor in order to better understand the recommendations of the committee. The classified annex to the committee's report contains the intelligence committee's recommendations to the intelligence budget for fiscal year 1998 and related classified information that may not be disclosed publicly but which Members are entitled to. It is important that Members keep in mind the requirements of clause 13 of rule XLIII of the House adopted at the beginning of the 104th Congress. That rule only permits access to classified information by those Members of the House who have signed the oath set out in rule XLIII. For Members who wish further instruction on rule XLIII and the oath, they can also call the intelligence office.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, ``Attention turns to Aristide as the Haitian Government crumbles,'' says the news report this weekend. ``An immense ambition for power'' is responsible for insecurity and disorder in the Capital, Port-au-Prince. This is how one-time confidante Paul DeJean describes former President and his former friend, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti. In fact, this sentiment is nothing extraordinary. If we peruse the weekend press on Haiti, it appears to be a mainstream opinion as Haiti drifts deeper into misery and despair. Reports from the wire and from Michael Norton of the Washington Post describe a litany of Aristide's increasingly obvious efforts to advance his own personal ambition at the expense of economic recovery and at the expense of democratization in Haiti. President Clinton's man in Haiti is systematically destroying democracy there. Unfortunately, this comes at the expense of the American taxpayer. Members will remember that $3 billion of democracy building we just provided? What, we have to ask, is the White House going to do about their man in Haiti? Is the Clinton White House backing democracy in Haiti, or is it backing another darling of the left strong man? Is this Papa Doc all over again? We need an answer.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], my friend and the chairman of the Committee on Rules. Certainly his leadership and commitment have prevailed in bringing us here today, and I have nothing but the greatest admiration and commendation for what he is doing. Mr. Speaker, the stars and stripes is certainly one of our greatest and most enduring monuments. It may be cloth, but it lasts longer than the monuments of steel, the monuments of cement, and the other monuments that we have made, because it is a monument in our heart. Its remarkable simplicity of design has made it perhaps the most universally recognized symbol around the world. It is literally a symbol of hope to millions and millions of people as the representation of freedom and democracy. There is actually a place in the world where there is freedom and democracy. It is the subject of our National Anthem. When we count the stars, it shows our historical growth and the unity as the United States of America. It is the inspiration for our war fighters, as we have heard testimony here this morning. It is the beloved welcome home sign for Americans traveling abroad. But even more than that, it is a visual reminder of the millions of Americans who have shed their blood and lost their lives in defense of liberty for the United States of America. These are our fathers, mothers, daughters, sons, grandparents, spouses, people we may never have the chance to know again. So as a nation we proudly display the flag in respect of their courage and the rights they fought to defend. They are the brave who made possible the fact that our homes are in the land of the free. This amendment clearly has the weight of public opinion behind it. More than four out of five Americans believe that we should have laws to protect the symbol of freedom from physical desecration. Mere statutes have proven ineffective, strangely enough, because of curious and, I would say, wrong-headed Supreme Court decisions passed by the narrowist of margins. Since those rulings, in fact 49 out of 50 States have passed resolutions asking the U.S. Congress to ensure that States have the right to protect the flag. Now is the time for Congress to get on with it. This has been a challenging process. There is nothing more integral to the lives of all Americans than our Bill of Rights. We all understand that here. But we would certainly never do anything that will infringe on our most sacred and protected freedoms. But this proposed amendment will not interfere with our right to free speech. Anyone who wishes to express his or her ideas about our flag is certainly free to do so, and accept the consequences. As the Chairman has said, this narrow amendment will simply preclude physical desecration of the flag. I would say in my district in southwest Florida that burning a flag could well be more of a threat to public safety and public order than screaming ``fire'' in a crowded theater, which the court has said is a permissible restraint on free speech. This is an overwhelmingly popular idea whose time has come. As we look toward Flag Day this Saturday, we want to be able to send to our Nation's veterans and in fact to all Americans the simple gift of knowing that the flag that stirs their hearts, that so many have fought for and so many have died for will be as sacred and secure as the freedom and the liberty that it embraces. I personally feel, if one burns the flag of the United States of America, one is burning a little piece of me, because I feel I have a little piece of that flag and I suspect every American feels that way. I think if one tears the flag, one is tearing a little piece of me. I think every American feels that way. I would suggest that we do not want to encourage that kind of thing; we should discourage it, and I would suggest that in the event that there is an incident involving the flag, the side of law and order ought to be on those who are protecting the flag, not on the side of those who would destroy one of our most sacred symbols.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], and congratulate him on his successes earlier today. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the European Security Act strongly. Today we stand on the threshold of the July Madrid summit, where the invitations to seek membership in NATO will be issued, and they are sure to be among the most coveted invitations of the year. What this means is that it is time for this Congress to offer not only words but substantive measures designed to enhance the NATO enlargement process. The Europe Security Act of 1997 is a strong statement in support of expansion with concrete measures designed to improve the European security environment. It reiterates this round of expansion cannot and should not be the last; that all countries able to meet the requirements for membership should be permitted to seek it. It also seeks to ensure that those countries not included in the first tranche are not left out in the cold, in some kind of a security vacuum. H.R. 1758 seeks to do so by expanding the circle of countries eligible for enlargement assistance. It also addresses concerns that my colleagues and I have regarding the conventional forces in Europe and includes language to discourage the administration from making further agreements with nonmember states that will undercut the security of the alliance. In other words, it says no to appeasement. Still further, it is intended to enhance Europe security with measures specifically designed to overcome legal and foreign policy impediments to ballistic missile defense by holding the line on the implementation of demarcation agreements negotiated with Russia and proposals from the White House that would multilateralize the ABM treaty. The Europe Security Act will offer the opportunity to enhance U.S. security from ballistic missile attack, something of interest to all of us. In the end, the Europe Security Act is about consolidating the process of democratization in the central and eastern Europe, about ensuring that those countries that share our values and took the risks associated with casting off the Soviet Union will be part of the new European security order and enjoy the benefits of freedom. Mr. Speaker, as the Madrid summit approaches, we know that a difficult process still lies ahead, but it is absolutely certain that enlargement is the right choice. We must not retreat from our world leadership role, we must not forsake our allies, old or new. We have dealt with Russia, the Ukraine and all the interested parties in the past few years on this matter, and it is time to get on with it. We have worked with the parliamentarians in the North Atlantic Assembly. We have visited with the governments and the people on their turf in Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltics, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and many others. And, of course, we have been to our NATO's home port and talked to them about this. This is not a new subject. This is a subject whose time has come. I support this legislation and I urge my colleagues to do so.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, is all quiet on the southern front? No, not really. Despite the resounding silence from the press and the White House on the current situation in our neighboring country Haiti, things are far from quiet. In fact, things are so bad that the prime minister quit yesterday. Over the past few weeks, we know Haitians have rioted in the streets of Port-Au-Prince and other towns. Incidents of assaults, rock throwing, and general lawlessness have resulted in death, injury and damage. Yesterday, as I said, things took a turn even for the worse when Prime Minister Rosny Smarth submitted his citing, in fact, the recent fraudulent elections. Obviously, this is bad for democracy because at this time it appears that only one major party is participating in the elections, and that is not exactly democratic, but it is also bad for reform in Haiti, because with Prime Minister Rosny Smarth leaving, so goes one of the few champions of the tough but necessary economic program that we had envisioned for Haiti. Economic reform is all but a thing of the past in Haiti anyway, and without economic reform there is absolutely no hope for a Democratic future in Haiti. So through all of this upheaval, one interesting and frankly disturbing fact seems to have surfaced, and that is the fact that the Haitian National Police have had to be supplemented with our military personnel to deal with basic law and order issues in that country. As one diplomat quoted in a wire report recently, ``It is clear the military presence in Haiti is not just building roads.'' Our ``road builders,'' including Special Forces, have been seen responding to the riots carrying on, doing the law and order business, extensive activity in the areas of drug control, those types of things. Not only do these reports suggest that our troops on the ground are outside of the range of the mission we understood them to be on, which was road building, but it also suggests that our soldiers are at more risk than we have been led to believe. I think it is time for a little candor from the White House about what is going on. We asked the White House, what is going on? So far we have not heard anything. Official silence reigns as well on the topic of Haiti's recent disappointing local assembly and Senate elections, which is the real reason behind the Smarth resignation and what should have been the starting point for the creation of a new judicial system and permanent electoral council forum in Haiti, which are mightily needed. Because without a judicial system, there is no hope for democracy in Haiti either. Because the electoral council has decided not to handle blank ballots properly, they have wrongly allowed some candidates, like the infamous Fourel Celestin, to get past the finish line when according to the law they did not win the election. So we now have people who did not win serving as senators in Haiti. Action on this issue is pending in the Parliament, but the Haitian electoral council is pushing forward for another round of elections, no matter what, this coming weekend. The fact is that each successive election in Haiti has disenfranchised and disenchanted ever more of the Haitians voters, a point illustrated well in the single digit turnout in the last election in April, which, as I say, were fraudulent elections. Yet, I understand less than 10 percent of the people turned out to protest that fact. What, we ask, will another election under a still darker black cloud do to advance democracy in Haiti? At the very least, the American taxpayers have a right to hear from the administration that enough is enough and that their tax dollars will not go to assist the Haitians to run another questionable if not fraudulent election this weekend. Mr. Speaker, all is not quiet on the southern front. We know that. What we do not know is when the White House is going to tell us what is going on, when our troops are coming home, and whether or not that will be before the ruinous Haiti policy that the White House has put forth puts us back where we started more than 4 years and 3 billion of the U.S. taxpayers' dollars ago, sadly enough, with thousands of Haitians now today who believe that a dangerous trip across the windward passage to Florida offers them more hope than staying in Haiti. Is that a policy that we want to back? Certainly not. I think it is time for the White House to give us some explanation and to end the silence of what is really going on in that tragic country where our friendly neighbors are suffering. All is not quiet on the southern front.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, since I spoke about Haiti at morning business early today, I have seen still more evidence to suggest that there is a de facto strong man regime being run in Haiti by former President Aristide, one that functions contrary to and does damage to the embryonic democratic process the United States is supporting there with so many United States tax dollars and so much of our credibility. International observers and Haitian political parties alike say that the April 6 elections were fraudulent. They were rigged in favor of Aristide, a man who today is sabotaging the economic reform process that is so desperately needed in Haiti, the poorest nation in this hemisphere. Worse still is the fact that all the candidates who are not of Aristide's Famille Lavalas Party are boycotting this Sunday's elections because they are based on a flawed process, as well. Mr. Speaker, I ask, where are those colleagues today, those champions of Aristide who rallied at the White House to support him when he was President-in-exile? Will they be around to support democracy in Haiti, which is what this is about, rather than restoring a strong man?

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution. I believe it is extremely appropriate that we tell the world that we are happy to celebrate this occasion and that we are still committed very much to overseeing our responsibilities toward peace in the area. I take the view that we are in the business here of underscoring our commitment to the peace process. I do not believe that one can raise the issue of Mideast geopolitics without somehow conveying the idea that there is controversy. But I think that the issue before us is without controversy. It is on the suspension calendar, and I think it is merely a question of acknowledging the leadership of those who have made this possible to come before us. I associate myself with the distinguished remarks of the gentleman from New York, who I think put them so eloquently. I would suggest that to fail to pass this today would send a very bad message. On the other hand it deserves our unanimous support. I congratulate the distinguished chairman for bringing this to our attention.

Mr. GOSS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, during the considering by the Committee on House International Relations of this bill, language was adopted which would have significant and unfortunate consequences for the future of the Office of Inspector General at the State Department, and potentially for all other inspectors general in the Federal Government. This proposal could greatly limit the IG's ability to conduct effective oversight and departmental investigations, and it is a serious matter. While this proposal was slightly modified and approved, I understand, before it was adopted by HIRC, this proposed legislation will undermine important oversight law that IG's across the Government have performed since the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, almost 20 years ago. My amendment is quite simple. It strikes the provision, section 1329, in its entirety. I understand and I can sympathize with the interest of some Members in sending a warning shot across the bow of the Inspector General so as to ensure the treatment of all government employees must be fair and evenhanded. That is certainly a proposition I stand for. I would suggest that the debate so far on this has been a message sent and a message already received down at the Department of State. So I think that the genesis of this and the author's intent has in large part been taken care of. But I have got real trouble with the attempted fix that is actually in the bill now, and I believe it must be stricken. For the benefit of Members who may not have had a chance focus on this provision, I would like to briefly outline several problems with the inspector general proposal in this bill. The language in the bill that the Goss amendment strikes is language that imposes significant and unprecedented limitations on the role and investigation prerogatives of the State Department's Inspector General. It places State Department's Inspector General outside of standard Federal law enforcement policies and procedures and severely undermines the State IG's ability to carry out investigative functions. Why in the world would we want to do that in this day and age? Letters that I received from the Inspectors General, Department of Defense, Justice, Commerce and Energy, and the CIA express the gravest possible concern about this proposal. I am also informed that the Director of OMB is opposed to the proposal. If implemented, this legislation would, in my view, create a dangerous precedent which could undermine the investigative and oversight capabilities of IG's throughout the Government, not just in State. It is my understanding that no other IG office in the Government is currently subject to the restrictions that are envisioned by this bill. Understandably, the various IG's fear that this proposal is the proverbial foot in the door toward undermining their investigative and oversight role. Again, why we would want to do that? The bill language would significantly diminish the State Inspector General's ability to hold the departmental employees accountable for criminal wrongdoing. I do not think that is a good proposition. This provision would appear to require the State Inspector General to provide special privileges to employees during the course of a criminal investigation that are inconsistent with the rest of the Federal law enforcement community. They are privileges enjoyed by no one else as in the bill now. This could result in anomalous situations, such as potentially requiring the State IG to provide advice on rights to counsel to individuals in undercover investigations and otherwise disclose the existence of and possibly interfere with sensitive ongoing investigations. Not a good idea. Is there already a remedy for overaggressive IG procedures in place? The answer is yes; there is. Under current authority, any individual being interviewed by State's IG can already assert his or her right to counsel. Moreover, all State Department employees are routinely provided a written summary of their rights in an OIG investigative process. But, in fact, State employees involved in interviews with the IG already have a right to know who is in the room. What is going on here? And if they do not like what is happening, they can vote with their feet, they can simply leave. In my view, this language imposes a further reporting requirement on State's Inspector General that is unwarranted and unnecessary. This proposal would require State's IG to prepare and submit a report to the relevant committees providing detailed descriptions of any instances in which any disclosure of information to the public by an employee of the Office of Inspector General about an ongoing investigation occurred. My understanding is the State IG makes no such disclosure of information to the public about any ongoing investigations. And it is thoroughly appropriate given an individual's privacy concern that would be at stake. So they are doing the right thing already. I am informed that the only disclosures that the State IG actually makes concerning ongoing investigations are to the Secretary of State, which is understandable, the Deputy Secretary of State, as is appropriate, the Department of Justice and other cooperating law enforcement officials if, in fact, there is an investigation going on. I would, therefore, ask Members to support my amendment to strike this language and ensure that we do not inadvertently defang the inspectors general, the people's watchdogs within the executive branch, especially when there is a good remedy already in place for State employees who find themselves in noncustodial formal interviews by the IG. In other words, this is not necessary and it is debilitating for the investigative process. It is well-intentioned. I understand that. I have the greatest respect for the author. I have offered to work with the author. I think we can find a much better solution. But I think it is very important that we take this damaging language out of this bill as it now stands. Therefore, I urge strong support for my amendment. Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the letters I referred to previously. Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, June 3, 1997. Hon. Porter Goss, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Capitol, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to express my concern about an amendment to Section 209(c) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. Section 3929) that has been included in the Foreign Policy Reform Act of 1997. Section 1329 of the Foreign Policy Reform Act would require the State Department Inspector General (IG) to provide special, vaguely-worded rights to employees during the course of a criminal investigation that are inconsistent with the practices of the rest of the federal law enforcement community. This amendment would have the effect of placing the State IG outside of standard federal law enforcement policies and procedures and, as such, could undermine the authority of the IG to carry out her statutory investigative functions. I am very concerned that such an amendment would be a dangerous precedent that subsequently could be made applicable to other IG offices, including the IG at the Central Intelligence Agency. In effect, it grants to employees of the State Department rights that no other citizen of the United States in similar circumstances has during the conduct of a criminal investigation. I know of no justification for treating State Department employees differently. This amendment is at odds with existing case law and policies and procedures set forth by the Department of Justice (DOJ). My office generally follows DOJ policy and procedures during the course of criminal investigations and it has been our experience during the course of joint investigations with the State IG that the State IG has also followed such policy and procedures. Because the proposed amendment would establish different standards for the State IG than for all other IGs, it could impede the ability of my office to conduct effective joint investigations with State