Bob Graham

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. If I could just finish. The Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs has reviewed this on a repeated basis. The Presiding Officer is a member of that committee, as am I. All of the members of the committee, Republicans and Democrats, rejected the proposed increases in copayments or in the $250 annual enrollment fee. All Members agree Congress needs to appropriate sufficient funds to obviate the need for these abhorrent out-of-pocket costs to veterans. The committee also recognized the need to protect vital specialty services. These were not included in the President's budget. Can you believe we are not going to fund the long-term care needs of the veteran population which is aging in place and which will have increasing demands for either community-based services or institutional care as they are unable to be fully independent? It also would substantially reduce mental health services to a population which as it ages encounters increasing and more severe mental health problems. It is insulting to laud this budget but continue to bar veterans from the VA health care they have earned by their service. It is unfair to double prescription drug copayments for other veterans so some veterans can have their increased costs paid through that means rather than through the appropriations to the Veterans Administration. This is nothing short of hypocrisy to deliberately reduce demand for health care services and count that reduction in demand as if it were savings.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Madam President, I appreciate the Senator from North Dakota yielding me 10 minutes. I hope he will not take offense at what I am going to say. The Senators from Oklahoma and North Dakota have just given us a very accurate and descriptive statement of how certain parts of the budget procedures operate. But let me say, I do not believe this issue is about the arcane features of budget policy; rather, they are first about choices. When we voted in 2001 and again in 2003 for the most massive tax cuts in American history, targeted primarily at the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans, we were making a choice. One of those choices comes home today, and that is, will we be able to adequately finance our responsibility to the health care of American veterans as well as the health care of those American men and women who have been injured as a result of the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? That comes to the second thing this is about. This is about real people. I take a different job every month, and in November, on Veterans Day, I worked at a VA hospital in Miami, FL. While I was there, I met a returning soldier. I will use the name ``John'' in order to respect his confidentiality. John is approximately 24 years old. He was born and lived most of his life in Puerto Rico. The reason he is in the Miami VA hospital is because it has responsibility for certain specialty care that is provided to veterans from most of Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. John was a member of the Puerto Rican National Guard and was called up to duty in Iraq. Prior to his reporting for duty, he married a beautiful young lady who I will call Linda. John was a tanker. He was assigned to a tank unit that led the surge from the Kuwait border into Baghdad. After the conflict ended, his tank crew was given the assignment of taking down some of the buildings Saddam Hussein had constructed in Baghdad, some of them because they were no longer safe by virtue of U.S. military action, some because of their symbolic importance. John's assignment was to stand by the side of the tank as the tank was used as a battering ram to take down these buildings. Unfortunately, in the course of this he was hit by a falling wall from one of these structures and is now a paraplegic. He is in the spinal cord injury program at the Miami VA hospital. You can imagine the devastation of John and Linda, as their plans for a life together, functioning as a normal couple, have been devastated by this spinal cord injury. John is who we are talking about here today and John very specifically is who we are talking about here today because this Congress, in the late 1990s, took on for the Veterans Administration the responsibility for 2 years after discharge from active duty for the care for Americans who had been injured in combat. John is one of those veterans. Last year we asked the VA how much it was going to cost to carry out this responsibility. They did some calculations based on, first, what their experience was in the first Persian war as to what percentage of troops would be injured and become eligible for this VA service, and what is the current per-capita cost of delivering this service. Do you know what they came up with? The cost would be $350 million. The administration objected to that cost, and after extended negotiation that figure was reduced to $100 million--less than a third of what the VA estimated the cost would be. Then do you know what happened. They didn't spend it on health care. They spent it to improve the processing capability of the VA for a variety of veterans applications. That may be desirable to do, but that is not what even the miserly $100 million was appropriated to do. John now sits there in his wheelchair facing many years--possibly a lifetime--as a paraplegic, and his country told him last year he wasn't worthy of having that service he had been promised by the Congress. Now we are about to tell him again he is not worthy of having that service financed. We need to be realistic. This budget for American veterans and the brave fighting men and women who are returning is totally inadequate. It does not provide even enough to cover the cost for medical inflation, including payroll increases for the health care of the current group of U.S. veterans. This budget, unfortunately, reflects this administration's priority. If enacted, it will have a devastating effect on the men and women who have served this country with honor and those who are currently serving with honor because this administration has said this is all it is willing to do. Rather than funding these programs as our veterans were promised, the President seeks to fund the shortfall in his request by increasing the out-of-pocket costs to the so-called higher income veterans. That means veterans who have earnings starting at approximately $24,000. We would raise the prescription drug copayment from $7 to $15. But, more importantly, we would charge a $250 enrollment fee which not only has as its goal to generate some additional revenue but, more importantly, it will artificially reduce the demand for VA services by veterans who either cannot or do not feel it would be advantageous to pay that $250 enrollment fee.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. If possible.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Madam President, the locals call it ``God's country.'' The Apalachicola River, beginning at the confluence of the Chattachoochee and Flint River, near the borders of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, was and remains an important waterway in the southeast. The river's purpose as a waterway, however, has changed since its colonial fame. The Apalachicola is the largest river east of the Mississippi. In its heyday, the Apalachicola was an important tributary that served as the largest port of the Gulf of Mexico--harboring ships carrying cotton to Europe and New England. In the 21st century, while no longer an essential route of transport, the Apalachicola River is an important environmental and commercial asset. The history of the Apalachicola River as an Army Corps of Engineers project began in 1945 and the Rivers and Harbors Act, which authorized dredging of navigation channels. Over the past 59 years, millions of taxpayer dollars have been swept down the river in an effort to dredge and maintain the 9-foot-deep channel. The Corps has had difficulty maintaining the channel, and combines dredging with water releases in order to raise water levels and provide navigation windows. This system is hopelessly flawed. Dredging is unmanageable and navigation windows are unreliable, making the process a fiscal waste. Add to this fact that over the last few years, commercial barge traffic has slowed from an intermittent stream to a virtually non- existent trickle. River traffic dropped dramatically in the late 1990s, with fewer than 200 barges a year using the river system. By 2001, only 30 barges used the entire tri-river system with the cost of dredging the channel exceeding $30,000 per barge. Most recently, in 2004 the only company that used barges to carry cargo on the upper reaches of the river ceased operations. Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the average cost per ton-mile from 1995-98 at 14.1 cents, almost 24 times more than the cost of the Upper Mississippi River at .597 cents. In light of these circumstances, continued dredging of Florida's largest river is not just wasteful, it is foolish. Ending the dredging is not just about how wasteful this project is-- it is also about the environmental destruction that is being inflicted on the Apalachicola River and Bay. There are beaches of sand where there were once river banks. There are walls of dredged spoil--some towering like buildings four stories high--where the river waters used to meander. To date, dredged sand has resulted in the destruction of approximately one-quarter of the banks of the Apalachicola. The large amounts of sand have choked sloughs and cut off the water supply to surrounding habitat, ultimately threatening the local economy. Navigation windows remain a imperil threatened and endangered species like the Gulf Sturgeon, the Fat Three-Ridge and the Purple Bank Climber. The April 2000 navigation window resulted in an almost complete failure of sportfish spawn along the entire Apalachicola River and reservoirs upstream. Sportfish population have been in rapid decline along the river since 1990. This time frame corresponds with the Corps' continued reliance on water releases to provide adequate water for navigation. The constant and gross interruptions of the natural system have degraded the environment of the Apalachicola River and quality of life of those who depend upon it. It comes as no surprise that the Apalachicola has repeatedly earned the designation by American Rivers as one of our Nation's Most Endangered Rivers. The Apalachicola has also been included in the 2000 Troubled Waters Report and the 2001 and 2002 Green Scissors Report. Manipulation of the Apalachicola poses a serious risk to the local economy. Important businesses, such as farmers who produce Tupelo honey and the fishermen who harvest oysters and shrimp in Apalachicola Bay, are dependent on the river's overall health. Additionally, commercial fishing operations along the Gulf Coast also rely on the Bay for their livelihood. The negative impacts of dredging and the low commercial use of the Apalachicola River led former Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Joe Westphal, to describe the project as not ``economically justified or environmentally defensible.'' Dredging the Apalachicola exacts too high a price from both taxpayers and the environment. Clearly it is time to rethink this expensive and ecologically devastating practice. The bill I offer today, the Restore the Apalachicola River Ecosystem (RARE) Act, was originally introduced in 2002 and subsequently passed by the Committee on Environment and Public Works. It authorizes the actions necessary to reform the Apalachicola River project. It is my hope that this legislation will again be approved by the committee and then by the full Senate. The first thing my bill does is put an end to the navigational dredging on the river. Second, it instructs the Corps to submit to Congress a comprehensive restoration plan that corrects the past harms done to the Apalachicola. The only way to restore the Apalachicola River to its former greatness is to cease navigational dredging. The designation of the Apalachicola as one of the nation's most endangered rivers should be a wake-up call to Congress and the Army Corps of Engineers to permanently end the dredging of the Apalachicola and allow the river to return to its natural state free of man's manipulation. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, which is both fiscally sound and environmentally responsible. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I wish to share a few observations and thoughts about the current circumstances, the tragic circumstances in our near neighboring country of Haiti. Haiti was once a beautiful country. It was one of the jewels of the Caribbean. Its people, who secured their freedom from France in 1804, have suffered a long history of despair, poverty, and misrule. This country has now fallen into chaos. Regrettably, Haiti is one of the poorest nations on Earth. It is ranked 172 out of 208 countries in per capita gross national income. It is the only country in the Western Hemisphere to be labeled a least- developed nation. Haitians are also among the most malnourished people in the Western Hemisphere. The World Health Organization reports that the average daily caloric intake for Haitians is the lowest in the hemisphere and on a par with the poorest nations in Africa. Violence is on the rise. At least 70 people have been killed in the recent uprising, and the number of dead and wounded grows daily. Indeed, the country of Haiti now faces twin crises. The first is the possible collapse, if not the violent overthrow, of a democratically elected government, with no agreed-upon follow-on governmental structure. An opposition leader predicted on Sunday that the capital, Port-au-Prince, would fall to armed rebels in 2 weeks. Second is the humanitarian catastrophe, primarily caused by the violence and the disruption that the violence has created. The current humanitarian crisis is forcing poor Haitians to literally eat the seeds they have saved for spring planting. With nothing planted, there will be no harvest. These desperate food shortages will strike at the same time the weather improves, and a massive exodus by sea will be feasible and more likely. The question before the United States and the world is, What should be our priorities? Tragically, it appears that our administration has taken a firm stance on the side of indifference. This may prove to be the longest running and biggest crisis of all for Haiti. The diplomatic effort this past weekend, unfortunately, has accomplished nothing to date. Cap Hatien, the second largest city in Haiti, fell to the rebels the day after our Assistant Secretary of State left the country. We sent 50 marines to Port-au-Prince on Monday to protect our embassy. From what I can tell, there is no administration plan B. Furthermore, I have detected very little concern for the potential impact of this crisis on the United States itself, with my State of Florida being on the front lines. As we have seen repeatedly over the past two decades, one of the impacts of this catastrophe will almost certainly be a dramatic increase in the number of refugees risking their lives in leaky and unsafe boats to try to escape the violence. Yet there has been little or no contact between Federal agencies and the State and local authorities, our first responders, to prepare for the potential influx of refugees. The principal agencies of the Federal Government have limited capacities to handle yet another immigration crisis. I am told the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, has the capability to handle only 150 additional refugees once they reach our shores. This is in large part because of, in my judgment, the inappropriate use of what is supposed to be a temporary holding facility as, in fact, the permanent prison for long- term detainees. But that is another story. The Defense Department is understandably hesitant to mix Haitian refugees with the detainees from the war on terror at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Bush administration's feeling--which appears to be shared by others in the international community--is that the problem in Haiti is a political crisis, and that until these paltry and late-starting diplomatic efforts run their course, there is no basis for dealing with the humanitarian crisis. When asked at a briefing yesterday what the administration is planning to do to halt the violence, Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, responded: We remain actively engaged in these diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful, political solution to the situation in Haiti. That is simply and obviously not enough. Our first priority must be the humanitarian crisis and finding a way to halt the violence which has fueled it. A political solution should, of course, be actively pursued, but not at the cost of abandoning efforts to address the humanitarian crisis and loss of lives which are occurring daily in Haiti. There was already a humanitarian crisis as seen by the level of malnutrition. It is now crashing to new levels with the killings and the threats of violence which have forced international aid organizations to reduce support to the poor and impoverished of Haiti. If we wait for a political settlement, we will be tolerating more scores of people being killed and more deaths due to the meager food supply and lack of adequate health services. Sadly, most of those who are feeling this humanitarian crisis, who are dying today, are innocent women and children. If we continue to wait for a political solution, the country will be controlled by armed gangs, drug dealers, and thugs. These conditions represent a clear threat to the national security of the United States of America and to the security of friendly allies even closer to Haiti than we are. It is estimated, for example, that approximately 30 percent of the population of the Bahamas represents Haitian refugees. Allowing the crisis in Haiti to continue could destabilize the Bahamas and its other neighbors, such as the Dominican Republic. What do we need to do to avoid a humanitarian tragedy? What do we need to do to make that priority No. 1? First, we need to see a sense of urgency on the part of the United States, and that sense of urgency needs to start at the White House. Just a few days ago, I met with the top administration official who effectively said that it was the policy of the administration to stand on the sidelines and hope that someone else--France, Canada, the Organization of Caribbean Nations, CARICOM, or the Organization of American States--would take the lead in settling the problem. This is unacceptable as American foreign policy. There is no other alternative but the use of U.S. influence. We must become engaged at a serious and sustained level or, failing to do so, be prepared to pay the cost of chaos 700 miles off our coast and on the seas which separate us from Haiti. Second, the next step should be a police presence of sufficient scale that it can quell the violence. This can and should be done under the auspices of the Organization of American States, but the United States must be a leader and full participant. Third, to assure the success of that police presence, the U.S. military should serve as a visible backup force. Recently, this visible backup force worked off the coast of Liberia when we sent a marine amphibious group aboard Navy ships to stand by off the coast while we put ashore a marine security team to protect our embassy. If we can provide the powerful influence of U.S. military troops 3,000 miles away, certainly we can do so in our own neighborhood. Next, we must enhance our humanitarian presence starting with emergency deliveries of additional foodstuffs and medical supplies, and we must assure that delivery of those supplies is available throughout the countryside. Next, given the indifference of the State Department and the National Security Council, the President should seriously consider the appointment of a high-level delegation to Haiti, such as that represented by President Carter, Senator Nunn, and General Powell in 1994, to make certain that our expectations, as well as our level of commitment, is clear. Next, we must enhance our capacity to understand what is happening inside Haiti. In a manner which is eerily similar to the situation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, our capacity to gather information inside Haiti is woefully inadequate to the scale and the significance of the crisis. Among other problems, all diplomatic personnel are confined to the capital Port-au-Prince. As one senior administration official described it: Our intelligence is very thin. This limited understanding, without question, has contributed to our allowing the situation to reach near anarchy without the United States assertively engaging itself. These circumstances in Haiti are part of a disturbing pattern of our current international relations. One, by its unwillingness to engage in a leadership role in the world, with the dramatic exception of Iraq, this administration is ceding its sovereignty to other nations. We have ceded to China the leadership for negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear capability. We have ceded to the French, the Canadians, the OAS, and the Caribbean leadership our sovereignty in dealing with the crisis in Haiti. That loss of sovereignty comes at a heavy price in our ability to influence other nations and international organizations from a position of strength. How can we challenge China on its trade practices when we are relying on China to handle the most sensitive negotiations with North Korea? Just a year ago, our fragile relations with France were center stage. How can we now rely on France and regional organizations alone to defend our national interests in the Caribbean? The current administration appears indifferent, at best, to our neighbors in the hemisphere, specifically those in the Caribbean and Latin America. This is surprising and distressing because candidate George W. Bush stated that as President George W. Bush he would pursue a policy of much greater U.S. involvement in Latin America. On August 25, 2000, speaking at Florida International University in Miami, FL, candidate George W. Bush declared: This can be the century of the Americas. . . . Should I become president, I will look South not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment to my presidency. . . . Those who ignore Latin America do not fully understand America itself. After crises in Argentina, in Bolivia, in Venezuela, and now this test in Haiti, the Bush administration has yet another credibility crisis and yet another failure of intelligence. While not on the scale of missed opportunities to disrupt the plots of September 11 or the misinformation which led us to war in Iraq, again we have a failure of intelligence to inform national leadership as to the true state of an international situation or of national leadership to effectively utilize the intelligence which was provided. Had we secured and utilized accurate and timely information on Haiti, possibly our response would not have been as impotent and retarded as it now is. Finally, this is the latest example of the need for a United States or international capacity to respond effectively in nation sustaining, even nation building, after our military has successfully secured the territory. In 1994, the United States effectively invaded Haiti in order to remove a military dictatorship and replace its democratically elected president. We did that with the kind of surgical precision that has come to characterize our military efforts. We then proceeded to spend almost $3 billion attempting to sustain and build the nation of Haiti. I suggest that today, 10 years later, Haiti is in worse condition than it was when we invaded in 1994. The very things that make our military so effective; recruitment, training, support, the exercises of actions, have allowed us to have such a string of successes in the military phase of dealing with a hostile or chaotic foreign situation. Unfortunately, none of those characteristics is true of the efforts that are made after the war concludes. We need to take the leadership, either unilaterally or, I believe, preferably with other international allies, to develop a capability which has the same characteristics of recruitment, training, support. Having exercised, before actual use, the security, the development of democratic institutions, the restoration of a governmental structure, the development of infrastructure necessary to support the population and a market economy, which can be available after the bullets stop flying, assures our future investments in nation sustaining and nation building are not as ineffective as they have been in the last decade. The failure to have such a capacity after the 1994 invasion is a primary reason why today we stand on the edge of the volcano of chaos in Haiti yet again, 10 short years later. Let us today, by our inaction and indifference, not provide as a heritage to future generations in America and to future generations in countries like Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia the heritage of a failed effort because we were not able to complete the mission that began so brilliantly with military actions to the conclusion of a stable, democratic, functioning country that gave to their people some reasonable prospect of prosperity and personal peace. I ask that immediately after my remarks editorials from the Miami Herald, the St. Petersburg Times, the Palm Beach Post, the Washington Post, and the New York Times be printed in the Record.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, today, I am introducing legislation that increases the Federal commitment to help families meet the increasing costs of higher education. In today's economy--as well as with life in general--getting a higher education is essential. A college educated male worker can expect to earn $29,000 more each year than his counterpart without such education. Over a working career, this edge results in more than $1 million. For women, the importance is even more pronounced. A college- educated woman can expect to earn twice what her counterpart with only a high school diploma will earn (Condition of Education 2000, U.S. Department of Education). Perhaps Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan put it best when he said ``we must ensure that our whole population receives an education that will allow full and continuing participation in this dynamic period of American economic history.'' Having college-educated parents also forms the foundation for better lives for their children. Census data reveals that children of college- educated parents are twice as likely to go to college, as are those with parents who did not go to college. Research also suggest that children of college-educated parents are healthier and perform better academically than children of those with only a high school diploma. Recognizing the importance of an advanced degree is only part of the battle. Attendance at a college or university is an expensive proposition for most American families. Worse yet, it is getting even more expensive. According to the Congressional Research Service, increases in tuition over the last twenty years on a constant dollar basis have outpaced growth in the average household's income. The difficulty of paying for college is particularly acute for lower-income families. In 1980, college costs consumed 32 percent of the average household income for a family in the lowest income quintile. By 2000, the percentage of that family's income needed to pay for college increased to 56 percent. In the 2001-2002 school year, about $90 billion was awarded in student aid. The Federal Government provided seventy percent of this aid through appropriations, guaranteed loans, and tax credits. Although this $90 billion represents a substantial increase in the amount of aid provided by the Federal Government from just ten years ago, the Federal Government can and should do more. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office examined the cost of attending colleges and universities and how those costs are borne. CBO estimates that the average annual cost of attendance at public four-year colleges in the 1999-2000 academic year was nearly $11,300 after taking into consideration that portion of the costs that are covered by the institutions themselves or as a subsidy from State legislatures. Parents and students on average are responsible for nearly three-quarters of this amount, which is a significant financial hurdle, particularly for low-income families. Under current law the maximum credit available under the HOPE Scholarship tax credit program is $1,500 assuming the student has at least $2,000 of tuition costs. The bill I am introducing increases the credit percentage to 100 percent of tuition costs and increases the maximum credit available to $2,500. Second, the bill extends the HOPE Scholarship credit to cover four years of higher education. It recognizes that our economy increasingly demands that tomorrow's worker has a college degree, and to get such a degree requires at least four years. We shouldn't have a program designed to assist students in obtaining those degrees that abandons them mid-stream. Third, the legislation makes the HOPE credit refundable. Refundability is the only way to provide financial assistance through the tax code to families with low incomes. And that assistance is sorely needed. According to CBO the HOPE tax credit amounts to $147 of assistance, on average, for families with income less than $30,000. Finally, the bill creates a mechanism by which families can get the benefits of the credit sooner than it is currently available. Today, families must pay the tuition costs and then file for the credit in April of the following year when they file their income tax returns. The bill directs Treasury to create a program that would allow it to transfer the value of the credit directly to an educational institution on behalf of the taxpayer. A similar mechanism is currently available to those eligible for the tax credit for health insurance costs. The bill I am introducing today focuses on those students who follow a more traditional path to higher education. I will be introducing separate legislation in the near future that makes changes to the Lifetime Learning credit designed to make it more useful for ``nontraditional'' students.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, today, I am introducing legislation that increases the Federal commitment to help families meet the increasing costs of higher education. In today's economy--as well as with life in general--getting a higher education is essential. A college educated male worker can expect to earn $29,000 more each year than his counterpart without such education. Over a working career, this edge results in more than $1 million. For women, the importance is even more pronounced. A college- educated woman can expect to earn twice what her counterpart with only a high school diploma will earn (Condition of Education 2000, U.S. Department of Education). Perhaps Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan put it best when he said ``we must ensure that our whole population receives an education that will allow full and continuing participation in this dynamic period of American economic history.'' Having college-educated parents also forms the foundation for better lives for their children. Census data reveals that children of college- educated parents are twice as likely to go to college, as are those with parents who did not go to college. Research also suggest that children of college-educated parents are healthier and perform better academically than children of those with only a high school diploma. Recognizing the importance of an advanced degree is only part of the battle. Attendance at a college or university is an expensive proposition for most American families. Worse yet, it is getting even more expensive. According to the Congressional Research Service, increases in tuition over the last twenty years on a constant dollar basis have outpaced growth in the average household's income. The difficulty of paying for college is particularly acute for lower-income families. In 1980, college costs consumed 32 percent of the average household income for a family in the lowest income quintile. By 2000, the percentage of that family's income needed to pay for college increased to 56 percent. In the 2001-2002 school year, about $90 billion was awarded in student aid. The Federal Government provided seventy percent of this aid through appropriations, guaranteed loans, and tax credits. Although this $90 billion represents a substantial increase in the amount of aid provided by the Federal Government from just ten years ago, the Federal Government can and should do more. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office examined the cost of attending colleges and universities and how those costs are borne. CBO estimates that the average annual cost of attendance at public four-year colleges in the 1999-2000 academic year was nearly $11,300 after taking into consideration that portion of the costs that are covered by the institutions themselves or as a subsidy from State legislatures. Parents and students on average are responsible for nearly three-quarters of this amount, which is a significant financial hurdle, particularly for low-income families. Under current law the maximum credit available under the HOPE Scholarship tax credit program is $1,500 assuming the student has at least $2,000 of tuition costs. The bill I am introducing increases the credit percentage to 100 percent of tuition costs and increases the maximum credit available to $2,500. Second, the bill extends the HOPE Scholarship credit to cover four years of higher education. It recognizes that our economy increasingly demands that tomorrow's worker has a college degree, and to get such a degree requires at least four years. We shouldn't have a program designed to assist students in obtaining those degrees that abandons them mid-stream. Third, the legislation makes the HOPE credit refundable. Refundability is the only way to provide financial assistance through the tax code to families with low incomes. And that assistance is sorely needed. According to CBO the HOPE tax credit amounts to $147 of assistance, on average, for families with income less than $30,000. Finally, the bill creates a mechanism by which families can get the benefits of the credit sooner than it is currently available. Today, families must pay the tuition costs and then file for the credit in April of the following year when they file their income tax returns. The bill directs Treasury to create a program that would allow it to transfer the value of the credit directly to an educational institution on behalf of the taxpayer. A similar mechanism is currently available to those eligible for the tax credit for health insurance costs. The bill I am introducing today focuses on those students who follow a more traditional path to higher education. I will be introducing separate legislation in the near future that makes changes to the Lifetime Learning credit designed to make it more useful for ``nontraditional'' students.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, in response to the threat to end the debate on the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003--the acronym is SAFETEA--I rise in opposition to cloture on this legislation. I do so for several reasons. First, I believe strongly that increasing investment in our Nation's infrastructure--our transportation system, our water and sewer systems, our electric grids, our crumbling schools--is critical to our Nation's future well-being. Today, we are debating one of the keystones of that investment--transportation, highways, public transit, and rail. Transportation is an integral part of everyone's daily life. It is an integral part of America's current and future economic well-being. Federal investments in transportation infrastructure increase our economic vitality and our international competitiveness. I believe the key question for the foreseeable future of America is how we maintain America's standard of living while at the same time competing in a global marketplace where lowest unit cost of production is the holy grail. That is going to be a significant challenge to our generation and to future generations of Americans. I don't think there is any easy answer, but I believe the answer begins with an investment in three things: No. 1 is innovation. America must continue to be the leading edge on whatever the next wave of technological progress will be in this world. No. 2, we must have the best educated citizenry in the world so that they in turn can be the most efficient. No. 3, we must invest in our infrastructure, not just because it contributes to our daily quality of life but because it is a critical factor in our productivity and ability to compete in the world. We are having a big controversy now over what the elements of America's long-term economic future are. We have people saying outsourcing jobs is going to be the key to our economic success. We have others who say various forms of tax policy. They, in my opinion, miss the point. We have to invest in those things that will make us more productive, and infrastructure is one of the keys to that progress. I think there are three factors by which you evaluate the legislation that is before us: No. 1, increasing Federal investment in infrastructure to avoid a further decline in the highway network and to reduce congestion. No. 2, assuring that users pay for the highway system to avoid additions to America's burgeoning deficit. No. 3, greater fairness among the States. I am concerned that SAFETEA will shortchange the American people on all three factors. First, what should be the goal of transportation funding? From a number of the speeches I have heard on the Senate floor and in committees, it appears as if the debate is over numbers. The President said he will veto any bill that exceeds his proposal of $206 billion for highways over the next 6 years. Senator Inhofe, chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, said cutting funding below the $255 billion level for highways would place the allocation of funds among the States in jeopardy. Congressman Don Young, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, is advocating a level of $300 billion over the next 6 years for highways. What I think is missing in all of these pronouncements is an evaluation of what these numbers mean to the condition of America's highways over the 6-year life of this legislation. When the Transportation Act for the 21st Century--TEA-21--was approved in 1998, I stood on this floor and predicted that when the bill expired in 2003, our Nation's transportation system would be in worse physical condition and with a higher level of congestion than on the day we passed the bill. That prediction has, unfortunately, come to pass. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Conditions and Performance Report, capital investment by all levels of government between 1997 and 2000 remained below the cost to even maintain the system we currently have. The result? Overall performance of the system declined. Since the passage of TEA-21, the highway system has degraded by 6 percent. Twenty-three percent of the highways in the Nation's urban areas are now considered ``unacceptable'' by the standards of U.S. Department of Transportation. Twenty-nine percent of the Nation's bridges are considered structurally deficient or in a deteriorating condition. Additionally, according to the annual congestion study by the Texas Transportation Institute at Texas A&M University, the agency to which the U.S. Department of Transportation looks for the evaluation of congestion, the average commute delay in urban areas has increased by 14.3 percent since 1998. This means the commute that used to take 25 minutes in 1998 will now add an extra 2 hours per month to the commute of the average American. I will make the same prediction today that I made in 1998; that is, if the Senate adopts the funding levels currently in this bill, our Nation's highways will be in worse physical condition, with increased congestion, by the end of this authorization in the year 2009 than it is today, February 11, 2004. The failure to address these conditions in the past has created the situation we must address in the future. By the U.S. Department of Transportation estimate, by the year 2009 we will face an additional $400 billion in infrastructure backlog and congestion costs will balloon to over $90 billion. We are not even able to maintain the current quality of our roads under the SAFETEA authorization level. In order to maintain the highway system in its current level of fiscal condition and without increasing congestion, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials estimates that investment of $92 billion a year by Federal, State, and local governments, close to $300 billion of that Federal, will be required over each of the next 6 years. In addition, our problem is compounded by the distinguished majority leader's statement yesterday that SAFETEA, already inadequate, must be trimmed to avoid a Presidential veto. We are now at a point of decision. Are we prepared to tell the American people we are willing to accept a further deterioration of our highways and bridges and increased congestion? If we have the same experience over the next 6 years that our highway system has experienced in the last 6 years, we will see a degradation from 1998 to 2009 of approximately 12 percent and a commute delay will increase 30 percent. Is this an acceptable result for the safety, the quality of life, and the economic expectations of the American people? In my judgment, the answer is clear. The answer is no. The President supports an even more accelerated rate of decline in the conditions and congestions of our highway system than SAFETEA. He has insisted that the highway portion of SAFETEA be funded at $206 billion, roughly 65 percent of what is required just to maintain our highway systems at their current levels. We must do more. We cannot continue to ignore the problem and allow a critical component in our quality of life and our economic future to deteriorate. I have a second concern. As I stated, a fundamental principle is users should pay for the use they get of our transportation system. That has been a principle throughout our Nation's history, particularly when we launched the Interstate Highway System. President Eisenhower increased the Federal motor fuels tax in order to be able to finance the Interstate Highway System, not leave it as a burden for our children and grandchildren and we, this generation of Americans, are the beneficiary of that wise judgment. During the Finance Committee consideration of SAFETEA last week, I discussed the option of raising the Federal motor fuel user fees to fund the bill at the level needed to maintain current conditions. Many of my colleagues were not comfortable with the idea of increased fees, raising the Federal user fee just 3.7 cents per gallon. That is what we would be required if it were indexed for inflation to fully fund a Federal program of the $300 billion over the next 6 years, which is required to at least maintain the status quo in the quality of our highways. Again, President Bush has made it very clear he will not support any highway bill that is financed by an increase in user fees, by bonding, or by funding from the general fund. I am sorry to hear the President neither supports funding the Nation's infrastructure at the levels recommended by his own Department of Transportation, nor does he support the principle that the users of the system should support the levels of investment needed to maintain and improve our highways. If we are not willing to fund the SAFETEA bill at the appropriate level to maintain their current condition and reduce or maintain the current levels of congestion--to do as the first principle of a physician ``do no harm,'' to the system--if we are unwilling to do that, maybe we should not be considering a 6-year bill at all. Instead, the Senate should work on a 1-year extension of the current program with a commitment to work on a more substantial long-term bill next year after the Presidential elections. We are not willing to raise fees on those who use our highways but instead have approved ``offsets'' for the spending in SAFETEA. But many questions about how the deficit will be affected as a result of these offsets remain. Last week, the Finance Committee equalized losses to the general fund by using offsets from what already had been used. For example, $22.3 billion worth of already committed tax changes. One offset used is a crackdown on corporate tax shelters, a policy that I have long supported. However, this offset has already been used in two other pieces of legislation approved by the committee and awaiting final action by the Congress--the charitable giving or CARE Act and the JOBS Act, which is our response to the WTO abolition of our current means of financing international transactions and other tax provisions, such as ending the tax bills that come with incorporating in other countries to avoid paying taxes, eliminating tax benefits for individuals who expatriate for tax reasons, and closing tax loopholes uncovered as a result of the Enron scandal again. But, again, these were the provisions that have already been used to fund other legislation. The fiscal imprudence does not end with using offsets that have already been previously used. The bill also employs a gimmick of requiring corporations to pay their 2009 taxes in order to make it appear in the year 2008 we have raised a sufficient amount of revenue over the 6-year period of the bill. Obviously, the consequences are we will start the next 6 years in the hole because we used money through an accounting gimmick to make it appear as if it were revenue within this 6-year cycle. These overpaid corporate taxes will ultimately be refunded, however, meaning we do not really offset the cost of the bill over the period that the highway spending occurs. This is shady bookkeeping, reminiscent of the procedures that this body worked so hard in the recent past to reform in the private sector. Is it fair to offset the spending in this bill with already used revenue raisers or accounting gimmicks? It is duplicative at least, irresponsible at worst. We must legitimately pay for this bill. Third, I have fought for many years to create a funding structure that is based on equity, on providing States that face the highest level of need with their fair share of Federal funds. This bill has a fatal flaw. It creates a formula for highway funding that has absolutely no solid basis in rationale public policy. In my State of Florida, traffic delays cost the average motorist in our eight largest cities $485 per year in lost time and fuel. By the year 2020, Florida will add about 6 million new residents, doubling its international trade, and welcome more than 100 million tourists per year. This additional growth will multiply congestion and delay tremendously. This is only a snapshot of the growing problems in my State and not an uncommon story for many States in the South and West. Over the past 15 years, America's population has grown by 18 percent. Florida's population has grown at twice that rate, 39 percent. Vehicle miles traveled, a good measure of the use of our highway system, has grown by 48 percent nationally but 90 percent in Florida. Lane miles, a measure of the extent of the system, have grown less than 10 percent nationally over the last decade, and only 11 percent in Florida in the face of a 90-percent growth in the use of our highway system. High growth States all face similar circumstances. In 1982, just 10 of the 25 most congested areas pursuant to the Telecommunications Transportation Institute study were located in high-growth areas such as Maryland, Colorado, Texas, Arizona, California, and Florida. Today, 15 of the most congested areas in the Nation are in those States. But the funding formula we are considering has failed to catch up with this reality. Under SAFETEA, these growth States are continuing to receive the lowest level of return on contributions to the highway fund, despite their obvious and growing needs. This bill attempts to get these States to 95 percent by providing what is referred to as an equity bonus. But the equity bonus, unfortunately, does not cover all the funds available for distribution. And it will keep our State at the TEA-21 level return of 90.5 cents for every dollar sent to the Federal motor fuels trust fund until the year 2009. Most important, however, is this entire concept assures that an unfair scheme will remain in place. All States should be guaranteed equal treatment with a formula that incorporates a yearly increase in the rate of return or the glidepath to get all States to a 95-percent return on the amount of funds they send to the motor fuel tax by 2009. The bill we voted out of committee was significantly different from the bill we will vote on here on the Senate floor. The pending committee amendment exceeds 1,300 pages and includes significant changes from the status of the bill as it left the committees. This means the formulas which have been circulated by the committees of jurisdiction at the start of the debate no longer reflect the state of the bill. For example, what effect will the Finance Committee's actions have on State-by-State allocations? A provision approved by the Finance Committee to change the way gasohol is taxed will change each State's contribution levels to the highway trust fund. Will any of the amendments accepted by the managers of the bill affect the equity bonus, diluting the rate of return to our States? This seems to be part of a disturbing trend in this body. Whether it is the energy bill, the prescription drug bill, or now it seems the transportation bill, there is a tendency to pass things now and ask the tough questions later. That practice is unacceptable in the world's greatest deliberative body. Before the vote on cloture on SAFETEA, the Senate should be honest about what SAFETEA will do. One, it will guarantee our roads, bridges, and transit systems will be in worse shape in 2009 than they are today. Is that acceptable? It will increase the size of the Federal deficit. Is that acceptable? It will ensure that States will not receive their fair share of Federal highway funding. Is that acceptable? The answer is no. Are Members of the Senate comfortable moving forward and approving a bill this week with open questions about how the formulas work, at what level the bill will be funded, and how any changes made here on the Senate floor will affect the ``delicate balance'' as described by the chairman? I am not satisfied. For these reasons, I will oppose cloture. Thank you, Mr. President. Amendment No. 2311

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, during this week, I have spoken--and this will be the third statement--about the need to reform our Nation's intelligence agencies. I have suggested that the horrific acts of September 11, 2001--acts which killed nearly 3,000 Americans in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania--could have been avoided if our intelligence agencies had been more organized and more focused in dealing with the threat of international terrorism. These conclusions were largely the result of the work of the House-Senate joint inquiry on September 11, 2001. This bicameral, bipartisan committee finished its investigation on December 20, 2002, and filed its report. In that report, it concluded there were a number of problems with our existing intelligence networks and it made 19 recommendations of how to fix those problems. Repairing the flaws in our intelligence community is a matter of national security, a matter of the highest importance and urgency. As we are now learning in the context of the war with Iraq and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, policymakers cannot make wise decisions affecting the security of American people without timely, accurate, credible information, and tough-minded, independent analysis, and will use that information to shape the judgments of the President and other decisionmakers, not to validate previously held opinions. If we fail to accurately perceive future threats, we will be poorly prepared to respond to them. If we do not perceive current threats accurately, then our response may be either inadequate or excessive. Whether restraining the development of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or interdicting terrorists, now, more than ever, intelligence matters. If there is another terrorist attack on American soil, the American people will demand to know what the Congress, what the President, what other governmental institutions learned from the September 11 attacks, and now the prewar intelligence in Iraq, and how that information was used to protect them. There will be no avoidance of accountability for the next attack, either for Congress or the President. We must take our responsibility seriously. Further, we must recognize that every day needed intelligence reforms are delayed is a day of unnecessary risk for the American people. Unfortunately, with regard to the recommendations of the joint inquiry committee, very little has been accomplished to date. In my two previous statements, I discussed the status of these recommendations dealing with the intelligence community reform and specific responses to terrorism. I particularly commend Senator Dianne Feinstein for her leading role in the area of reorganization of the intelligence community. Today I will turn to two additional areas of particular concern: the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, which governs the use of electronic eavesdropping on foreign nationals in the United States. Here, I particularly recognize the contributions of Senators DeWine, Durbin, Edwards, and Kyl to this section of our report. We know now the FBI did not have or did not give adequate attention and resources to the problem of terrorism prior to September 11, 2001. For the FBI, terrorism was a lesser priority and its personnel did not understand the FISA and therefore did not use effectively its available investigative authority. Important information was not shared with other agencies, was not shared even within the various branches of the FBI itself. During the summer of 2001, separate parts of the FBI had information that could have been used to disrupt or destroy al-Qaida's hijacking plot, but that information was never collectively analyzed. For example, what agents in Minnesota knew about Zacaria Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker who was taken into custody in August of that year, is he was studying to fly commercial airlines but was disinterested in either taking them off or landing them. Meanwhile, a Phoenix field agent of the FBI had become suspicious of radical Islamists who were also learning to fly airplanes. An agent in San Diego was working with an informant who knew at least two of the hijackers. The informant was aware that one of the future hijackers was moving to Arizona with a fellow terrorist--again to attend flight school. If these agents had been aware of each other's activities or if the analysts at FBI headquarters had connected these geographically separate events, portions of the September 11 plot might well have been uncovered and disrupted. Unfortunately, the FBI lacked the sufficient number of analysts to process all the relevant information, and barriers to sharing information prevented agents from learning about each other's activities, even though both the Phoenix memo which expressed concern that bin Laden was sending young recruits to the United States for pilot training and the Moussaoui investigation were handled by the same unit at FBI headquarters. Furthermore, although existing laws gave FBI agents the authority to pursue these leads, individual agents were in some cases unaware of their powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and this confusion prevented them from pursuing aggressively potentially helpful lines of investigation. With these facts in mind, the joint inquiry made four recommendations related to the FBI and FISA which I will now discuss. Recommendation No. 6 calls for the FBI to improve its domestic intelligence capability as fully and as quickly as possible and to establish clear counterterrorism priorities for the agency to follow. Specific areas for improvement are mentioned, including the need to improve analytical capability, the need to disseminate intelligence information within the FBI and among Government agencies, the need to improve knowledge of national security laws, the need to hire more personnel with linguistic skills, and the need to fix persistent information technology problems. Our joint inquiry report gives a thorough explanation of why each of these improvements is necessary. In the years leading up to September 11, the FBI was faced with a shortage of counterterrorism personnel partly due to a lack of overall resources, partly because counterterrorism priorities were not clearly established or followed. In particular, the number of qualified intelligence analysts was at a critically low level. This is the reason the memo from the FBI agent in the Phoenix field office did not generate any further discussion or analysis and is also the reason no one at the FBI headquarters was able to connect the dots and see that information collected by the FBI in California, in Minnesota, in Arizona was all related to a larger terrorist plot. The analyst shortage was compounded by outdated information technologies and the lack of a good counterterrorism database which made it difficult for analysts to assess and organize crucial information. Prior to September 11, the FBI also had a severe shortage of linguists. For example, 35 percent of all materials collected by the FBI in the Arabic language were not even reviewed because there were not enough persons within the FBI to translate that material. This one fact may have deprived the Bureau of potentially valuable terrorist- related intelligence which could have avoided September 11. Even in those cases where the Bureau did collect and identify information on terrorist activity, it failed to share that information with other agencies, both inside and outside the intelligence community. For example, if the Federal Aviation Authority had been told in August of 2001 that the FBI had identified a potential airline suicide hijacker in Minnesota, the FAA would have had at least the opportunity to increase security precautions on domestic flights such as by reinforcing the doors between the cockpit and the passenger cabin. Tragically, this did not happen. I am pleased to report some improvement has been made in these problem areas. In 2003, the Bureau developed a strategic plan outlining its top counterterrorism priorities. It has also increased hiring and training and many agents have been permanently reassigned to high priority areas. However, while hiring and training have increased, the General Accounting Office has suggested the FBI continues to lack fully adequate analytical capability and that the Bureau continues to face a shortage of linguists and information technology personnel as well as administrative staff. Even more troubling is the fact that officials in Federal agencies, State governments, and local levels continue to report they do not consider the current information-sharing system to be effective. With few exceptions, these individuals say they are not receiving all the information they need to fulfill their responsibilities as the front line of our war against terrorism. In some cases this is because information is simply not available. But too often it is because of institutional practices that prevent important information from being shared. Even when information is disseminated, officials at all three levels report that it is frequently inaccurate, irrelevant, and not received in a timely fashion. This situation is made worse by the fact that none of these problems are new. In the year 2000, two separate commissions on national security pointed to these same weaknesses within the FBI and urged that they be corrected. The National Commission on Terrorism, also known as the Bremer commission, issued its report in June of 2000, and the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, known as the Gilmore commission, issued its second report the following December. Both commissions stated that the FBI needed to improve its analytical capability and disseminate information in a more timely manner inside and outside the Bureau. The two commissions also suggested that FISA gave the FBI more investigative powers than were currently being used, and the Gilmore commission suggested that this was due to misunderstanding and confusion regarding the law. The Bremer commission also called attention to the shortage of skilled linguists within the agency, which is a problem that we still face today. Since September 11, FBI Director Mueller has initiated a serious and sustained effort to reform and reshape the FBI to fight terrorism. Progress has been made. However, much is left to be done. One particular area of concern is the information technology systems at the FBI. The computer and communication systems at the FBI have been notoriously outdated. I recall a meeting at one of our CIA stations in the Middle East during which the agency personnel pleaded with the Members of Congress who were present to push the FBI toward adopting computer systems that would be compatible with the CIA's so that basic information could be shared. A recent report by the General Accounting Office on this subject is highly critical of the FBI's attempts to improve its information technology systems. As we saw in our investigation of the September 11 attacks, the best work of skilled agents is wasted if they cannot communicate it to those who will use it. We cannot rest until we are certain the FBI has made all the changes it so desperately needs. Recommendation No. 7 advises the Congress and the administration to evaluate and consider changes to the domestic intelligence sector. In the short term, our national security interests are best served by taking actions to improve the capabilities of the FBI. However, over the long term, we must decide on the best way to organize our domestic intelligence agencies and consider serious restructuring if we conclude that the current structure is inadequate to serve our national security interests. The joint inquiry recommended that FISA be included in this review. This recommendation reflects concerns that the FBI, which is primarily a law enforcement organization, is inherently ill-suited to the challenge of domestic intelligence gathering. While the agency has done a commendable job carrying out its law enforcement missions, preventing attacks before they occur requires an approach very different from finding and punishing criminals after they have acted. Throughout its history, the FBI's focus has been on investigating crime and arresting criminals rather than preventing crime. The lapses that preceded 9/11 may therefore be in part the consequence of requiring the same agency to carry out two very different functions. One example of this tendency of the FBI is how it defines investigatory targets. It tends to do so in terms of those that are likely to result in a prosecution as opposed to those that pose the greatest threat. I recall during one of our Senate Intelligence Committee hearings a senior FBI official was asked to provide an estimate of the number of suspected terrorists within a specific region of the country. He responded by giving us the number of open investigative files at a certain field office--clearly a law enforcement methodology rather than the approach that an intelligence agency would take. I would note that none of the 19 hijackers of September 11 had an open FBI file that would have marked them as a suspected terrorist in our midst. Our recommendations on the FBI consisted of three parts: First, we said in the short term we should do everything possible to strengthen the capability of the FBI to fight the war on terror. The FBI is all we have at the present time, and we need to make it as effective as possible. Second, we need to conduct an open debate on the type of domestic intelligence that we as a nation want and need. We can look to other nations for models which are based on the perceived threat within the borders of each of those nations. They range from the extremely high level of surveillance that the Israeli Government exercises to protect its citizens from internal terrorist threats to the resistance to scrutiny of private citizens in certain regions of Germany. Third, we need to evaluate the enhanced capability of the FBI against the model that we establish as our desired end state, and then determine if our security needs could be better met by creating a separate domestic intelligence agency, leaving the FBI to focus on law enforcement priorities. That model exists in Great Britain, where Scotland Yard, like the FBI, handles national domestic law enforcement matters, but there is a separate agency, the MI5, which performs domestic intelligence gathering. To date, no changes have been made to FISA since we issued our report, nor has the larger debate regarding the structure of our domestic intelligence community taken place. Our joint committee called for Congress to request a report from the administration regarding the structure of our domestic intelligence program. So far, no action has been taken on this recommendation. Recommendation No. 8 calls for the Attorney General and the FBI to assure that the FBI uses its powers effectively and disseminates information quickly. In particular, it calls for FBI personnel to receive in-depth training on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and to implement a plan to use FISA to assess the threat of terrorist groups within the United States. It specifically refers to the need to identify whether and how any of these groups receive funding or support from foreign governments. The need for clearer guidelines and better training regarding the FISA was made abundantly clear during the FBI's investigation of Zacharias Moussaoui. Agents in Minnesota correctly suspected that he was involved in a hijacking plot, but even after he was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agents concluded that FISA did not give them the authority to search his belongings since it was not established that Moussaoui was acting as an agent of a foreign power. This conclusion was incorrect under the FISA law. It demonstrates the significant confusion and ambiguity that has developed surrounding the use of FISA and that reform is important and urgent. FISA is also one of the best tools we have for tracking terrorist funding. However, it is not always used to its fullest potential. For example, the chief of the FBI's Financial Crimes Section told our committee that if asked, he would have been able to locate hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mindhar by tracking credit card and banking transactions. These same powers could have been used by the FBI to track foreign sources of terrorist funding, with the aim of cutting off funds for terrorists and attacking these sources of funding directly. The FBI has made significant progress in increasing awareness and knowledge of FISA. The Attorney General has issued new guidelines regarding terrorist investigations, and both current personnel and new hires are now receiving training on these guidelines. Unfortunately, the Bureau has not made very good progress identifying foreign sources of funding for terrorist groups within the United States. As an example, as I emphasized in my previous statements, the joint inquiry uncovered significant evidence of foreign government involvement in the 9/11 attacks, and raised the possibility that foreign governments continue to provide support to terrorist groups within the United States. In spite of this alarming assessment, the FBI has not even developed an effective plan to assess the threat of foreign funding for terrorist groups, let alone combat this threat. The USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent modifications have given the Bureau expanded access to banking and financial records, but it has been widely noted that terrorist groups use alternative methods of collecting, moving, and storing their money. These methods include illegal drugs and other contraband; shipment of gems and other commodities; informal financial networks, such as the hawala system; and nontransparent organizations, such as charities and religious organizations. The FBI, which is responsible for leading these investigations into terrorist financing, has acknowledged it does not systematically collect and analyze data on alternative financing mechanisms. Unless al-Qaida develops a policy of transferring money entirely by ATMs, the FBI's current investigatory methods are unlikely to be very effective. The final recommendation of this report is No. 9, which urges the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees to evaluate the FISA, and all modifying legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, to ensure that our legal system adequately addresses current and future terrorist threats. These House and Senate committees have effectively begun to follow through on this task, and I am confident they will continue to do so. This last report is one bright spot on an otherwise disappointing report card. In evaluating the status of the joint inquiry's recommendations, I have tried to give due attention to those areas in which progress has been made. However, we must not ignore those shortcomings that remain, particularly when so many of them are of such a serious nature. We must overcome bureaucratic inertia and organizational difficulties to fix these problems in an effective and expeditious manner. We must not continue to be a slave to the status quo. Our national security and the well-being of the American people demand nothing less, as does the memory of nearly 3,000 innocent American lives lost on September 11, 2001. I ask unanimous consent that the recommendations of the Joint Inquiry Committee, as adopted on December 10, 2002, be printed in the Record.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague for his graciousness. I also commend him for the leadership he has been providing to this body, particularly as the chair of the Intelligence Committee. That is the subject of my remarks today.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I wish I could do that, but I have a request that it be no later than 3:30. Frankly, if I had started when we began this debate over parliamentary procedure, I would have been a third of the way through the speech.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Thirty minutes. I would like to have it commence no later than 3:30 because I have previous commitments.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Well then, I would have to object to the unanimous consent request.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. If I could add to your unanimous consent request a time certain that I could present my third statement on intelligence reform; and Senator Feinstein also wishes to make a statement on the same subject.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Reserving the right to object, I would like to ask a question. I was under the impression that I had an opportunity today to complete a series of statements I was making on intelligence reform, and that was to begin at 1 o'clock.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I withdraw my request.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. Leader, may I make one request, that morning business begin no later than 9:30 in the morning?

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. If I may ask, when will we commence the session tomorrow?

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke to the Senate relative to my assessment of the responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001, some of the lessons learned from those attacks, and the status of the implementation of those lessons. I explained that my view was that those terrible events would have been prevented if our national intelligence community had been better organized and more clearly focused on the problem of terrorism. And if the Congress and the President had drawn on those lessons learned from the tragedy of 9/ 11 and initiated reforms of the intelligence community, we might well have avoided some of the embarrassments of the flawed intelligence on weapons of mass destruction or the misleading use of that intelligence which formed the basis of the war against Iraq. Today I would like to continue my discussion of those lessons that we should have learned and implemented. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for most of the 107th Congress, I had the honor of cochairing a bipartisan, bicameral committee charged with investigating the events of the intelligence community and their activities before and after the attacks of September 11. We set out to determine whether or not there was anything more we could have done to prevent the attacks and, specifically, if our intelligence community had problems that needed to be corrected. The importance of our task was well understood. The 9/11 attacks were not the work of a crazed individual but, rather, were the result of a sophisticated plot carried out by a group of 19 terrorists and an undetermined number of facilitators who prepared for the execution of their plot over a period of almost 2 years. We can, we must, improve our ability to detect and disrupt plots of this nature. We can do so by ensuring that our intelligence-gathering networks are operating in an optimal manner and that any flaws in our intelligence community are addressed as quickly and effectively as possible. Our committee identified a number of problems with our current intelligence-gathering system. We followed up with recommendations on how to fix these problems. By conducting this inquiry, making these recommendations, Congress not only assumed the responsibility for determining what happened before and after September 11 as related to our intelligence community, but it also assumed a responsibility relative to the implementation of the recommendations. The American people will respond to future terrorist attacks by asking: What did we learn from the previous attack and how has that information been used to give the American people greater protection? They have the right to ask this question and we have an obligation to give them a good answer: What have you done with the information and the lessons learned? How have you implemented those lessons in a way to give me and the American people a greater sense of security? So far, we have not made acceptable progress toward providing an answer to the American people. In fact, if we had to give it today, it would not be an answer of which we would be proud. A large number of the problems identified by the joint inquiry and a series of commissions which preceded the joint inquiry have not been addressed. In my previous statement, I discussed those recommendations which related specifically to the issue of counterterrorism. This morning, I would like to address those recommendations which deal with the structure of the intelligence community. Our national intelligence community is beset by a number of serious problems. There is a lack of leadership at the top and the absence of a coordinated national intelligence policy that gives us agencies with priorities, missions, and resources that do not necessarily complement one another. As an example, in December of 1998, the Director of Central Intelligence, the man who has the statutory responsibility for the coordination of all of our various intelligence agencies, told senior managers of the CIA that he considered the United States to be at war with al-Qaida and that the intelligence community, all of its agencies, working in a coherent manner, should devote as many resources as possible to combating that terrorist organization. While this statement might seem to be a positive step, a step in the right direction, our joint inquiry found that the DCI was either unable or unwilling to enlist other intelligence agencies in this effort. The troops either didn't hear or simply ignored the bugle call of war. The lack of consistent, coordinated priorities is paralleled by a lack of consistent, predictable funding as well as the lack of internal accountability. This shortage of resources meant that the intelligence community simply did not have enough personnel to perform all the functions that were needed. This left the intelligence community ill- prepared to deal with the rapidly changing terrorist threat. One of the reasons for the unpredictability and decline of funding of the intelligence community was the mistaken belief that the end of the cold war yielded a peace dividend for the American people when it came to defense spending, including a reduced need to spend money on intelligence. Mr. President, in fact, the change from the single focus on the Soviet Union and its allies to the current world of diverse, constantly changing, emerging threats such as weapons of mass destruction and international terrorist groups has increased demand and, therefore, the cost of intelligence. The first recommendation made by our commission urges the creation of a Cabinet-level director of national intelligence, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. We made this our first recommendation because we think it is the most important recommendation and one that can do the most to prevent another 9/11 tragedy. I gratefully recognize the excellent work of Senator Feinstein in championing this issue. The director of national intelligence would be responsible for establishing consistent priorities for all of our national intelligence agencies and assuring that these agencies work together, rather than independently, by coordinating budgets and resources and managing interagency relationships. We made this recommendation because of the obvious need for strong leadership in our intelligence community. It is clear that prior to 9/11 our intelligence-gathering agencies had no comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism. Intelligence priorities were inconsistently formulated and applied throughout the various agencies and were not effectively leveraged through interagency coordination. The joint inquiry report offers specific details of FBI supervisors who thought there was no need to pay attention to Saudi citizens in the United States while at the same time the CIA was tracking suspected Saudi terrorists around the world. The director of the national security agency, which is responsible for our electronic eavesdropping, described the problem of unclear priorities when he said: ``We had about 5 number 1 priorities.'' Although the Director of Central Intelligence is normally the head of the intelligence community, in practice he has functioned as the head of one of those agencies, the CIA, with limited influence over other organizations. The limited ability of the Director of Central Intelligence to mobilize other intelligence agencies in the war against al-Qaida is a tragic example of this point. Before 9/11, personnel in many intelligence agencies--particularly the FBI--had not even heard his statement on the topic, let alone acted upon it. The DCI does have some budgetary authority, but it cannot be exercised effectively without the cooperation of the Department of Defense since many intelligence agencies are run through the Department of Defense. It is therefore necessary to appoint a strong director of national intelligence who is not the head of any specific intelligence agency. This is a recommendation which has been consistently made by citizens, commissions, and governmentally appointed commissions which have reviewed the intelligence community in the recent past. So far, Congress and the administration have not acted on this first recommendation and indeed appear to be moving in the opposite direction. The recent creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will serve to further separate the Defense Department from the civilian intelligence agencies rather than improving cooperation. Legislation has been introduced to accomplish this necessary restructuring, but as of this date it has not had a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is an issue which now sits upon the shoulders of the Congress. If we fail to act, we will be held accountable when the next preventable terrorist act occurs. Another important recommendation was No. 11, which called for the recruitment and development of greater numbers of quality intelligence personnel. Obviously, the need for more counterterrorism training is a major part of this recommendation, as is the need for more linguists and an expanded intelligence community reserve corps that could provide relevant expertise when special circumstances arise. The committee also recommends an expansion of education grant programs, such as the national security education program. Included among the suggestions for improving the workforce was one calling for legislation that instills the concept of jointness or interoperability among the various agencies. This is similar to the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols Act, which applied the concept of jointness to the military. One way jointness has been instilled in the military is by having service members serve tours of duty with another service or in a multiservice command. This reform is widely recognized as having substantially improved our military's ability to fight and win wars, as was so dramatically demonstrated in Iraq. In the intelligence community, there is too much isolation among intelligence agencies and between those agencies and the users of intelligence. As an example, the intelligence community, having examined the likely means of attack by al-Qaida, identified hijacking of commercial airliners to be used as weapons of mass destruction as a particularly significant part of the arsenal of al-Qaida. However, the Federal Aviation Administration was not notified of this new form of threat. Therefore, the training and protocols of flight crews had been to not attempt to resist hijackers but, rather, to succumb until the plane was on the ground and then let other law enforcement and professionals attempt to negotiate with the hijackers, and that was the form of action that was still in place on September 11. Possibly, had the FAA been aware of this new threat of taking command of a plane not for economic or political purposes but to use it as a weapon, airlines would have been better prepared to deal with this particular generation of hijackers. We need our intelligence community to substantially improve its capability in the same way that the military has. By working and training on a joint basis, intelligence agencies can conserve resources and help personnel gain an appreciation for a wider variety of intelligence-gathering tactics and techniques. If this recommendation had been implemented earlier, it could have reduced our vulnerability. Our joint inquiry found that a shortage of staff was a near universal problem for intelligence agencies before 9/11. For instance, at the CIA's counterterrorism center, employees were required to work extremely long hours with no relief. Overworking these critical personnel made them less effective and lowered their morale to the point where retention had become a problem. Problems similar to that of the CIA's counterterrorism center existed at the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the shortage of Arabic linguists at the National Security Agency became especially pronounced. Linguists continue to be in short supply, in part because qualified linguists cannot be trained overnight. Counterterrorism training has been stepped up in other areas, but raising our capabilities to an adequate level will still require more personnel with enhanced and expanded training. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 included pilot programs for training students who will form the future of the intelligence community. No legislation regarding jointness has yet been passed despite the clear, positive results achieved by previous efforts in similar and relevant parts of the Federal Government. The joint terrorism task forces set up by the FBI have had some success in bringing together officials from different agencies. It was one of these groups which was responsible for the capture of Zaccaria Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker. If more of these task forces had been set up before 2001, and if those that did exist had all the personnel they needed to be effective, we can only imagine what might have been accomplished, what might have been prevented. Recommendation No. 12 regards our national intelligence budget and suggests several measures to ensure our investments in intelligence provide maximum benefits. It calls for more flexibility in the budget to be accompanied by greater oversight and raises the idea of a cost- benefit analysis by an independent agency. It also urges the President and the Congress to develop a budget that includes a sustained, long-term investment in counterterrorism to replace the unpredictable funding stream that currently exists. Providing the intelligence community with an adequate level of base funding would obviously increase budget stability and assist in long- term planning. Contrary to that, for the past several years, counterterrorism programs have been funded primarily through supplemental appropriations which were often in response to a specific event, such as the September 11 tragedy, and therefore the supplemental appropriations varied greatly from one year to the next. Intelligence officials who were interviewed by our joint inquiry were understandably critical of this system since it makes it more difficult to plan sustainable counterterrorism programs. This dynamic still persists, despite its obvious flaws, despite its obvious contribution to the increased--the unnecessarily increased--vulnerability of the American people. There have been significant increases in our intelligence budget, but in 2003, a substantial portion of our counterterrorism budget still came from supplemental appropriations. Another problem with the intelligence budget is the way it is tied to the Defense Department's budget. During the 1990s, we made significant cuts to the Defense Department budget, and the intelligence budget was cut proportionately. While the end of the cold war meant we could reduce the size of our Armed Forces, intelligence requirements actually increased due to the diversification of the threat. In addition, greater budget stability in our efforts to fight terrorism would be better served by greater budget flexibility. It is currently quite difficult for intelligence officials to shift resources from one priority to the other as circumstances require. Even small adjustments require prolonged formalized approvals. For instance, a number of CIA officials were aware of the need for more agents in Afghanistan prior to 2001 but were unable to reassign resources away from other priorities. The Director of the National Security Agency has discussed similar problems. The 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act permits the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize the employment of additional civilian personnel if he believes this is necessary. This is a small step in the right direction, but more flexibility is still needed. This flexibility must be accompanied by increased congressional oversight. It became apparent during the course of our joint inquiry that the intelligence community does not have a clear idea of how much money it spends on counterterrorism, and accounting methods vary among the different agencies. In light of this, it seems appropriate that a cost-benefit analysis from an outside agency would be very helpful, but so far no real efforts have been made to undertake such a step. Recommendation No. 15 suggests that the President and the Congress evaluate and consider revising the intelligence classification process. This task would pursue the twin goals of expanding access to important information and assuring that classified intelligence information is not disclosed inappropriately. The current system of intelligence classification is not the result of a thoughtful, open debate, but is, rather, the product of a series of Executive orders rooted in cold war mentality and issued with little or no consultation of Congress. Many people with extensive knowledge of the system have suggested there is a tendency toward too much secrecy and that this has had a predictably negative effect on the flow of information. There was an interesting column recently in the New York Times talking about one of the core problems within the Government of Saddam Hussein prior to the war, and that was that all parts of that society practiced secrecy and deception; that the army deceived Saddam Hussein as to just what it was doing to prepare for war; scientists deceived Saddam Hussein as to the state of their development of weapons of mass destruction; Saddam Hussein attempted to fool the people of Iraq, and our intelligence agencies were fooled by all of the above. Allowing an increase in a curtain of secrecy to fall over the information of our United States agencies will have the same effect the veil of secrecy did in Iraq, and that is to make us less secure, more vulnerable because we have not shared information in a way that can increase our security. By treating so much of this information as treasure to be guarded, intelligence agencies can actually reduce the information's usefulness. By reducing biases toward excessive secrecy, Congress and the President can help make sure more information gets to the people who need it, particularly those such as first responders, local government, law enforcement officials, and Federal agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Agency. There is a suspicion among many Americans--and I believe it is justified--that classification is being used to shield politically embarrassing information from public scrutiny, as was the case with the information on the role of foreign governments in the September 11 attack. Unfortunately, little progress has been made so far in the task of reviewing the use of classified information, particularly in the area of intelligence. The Intelligence Authorization Act requires the President to report on the barriers to sharing classified information. Congress has not yet given serious consideration to this important topic. Another very important recommendation issued by the joint committee, which has also been largely ignored, is recommendation No. 16, which calls for a new standard of accountability in the intelligence community. Given the continued and increasing use of intelligence information in our national policymaking, whether it is to fight terrorism, to determine the true capability of a potential adversary, or to reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is critically important that we have accountability mechanisms in place that review intelligence agencies' failures in order to learn from those mistakes. To date, no personnel in intelligence or other affected agencies has been sanctioned as a result of the tragedy of September 11. It is also true that no one has been sanctioned for the apparently incorrect intelligence assessments upon which the case to go to war in Iraq was predicated. Weapons of mass destruction alleged to exist in Iraq have not been found and, according to David Kay, our lead investigator, it is unlikely they will ever be found. This raises in stark terms the responsibility of the President to determine who is accountable for intelligence failures and what should be the appropriate sanction of those responsible. It is as though the chairman of the steamship company that owned the Titanic put all of the blame for the tragedy on the iceberg and declared that was the end of it; the captain of the ship would be let off scot-free. At the same time, it is unclear if any rewards or recognitions have been given for outstanding performance in the intelligence community, outstanding performance such as that of those who contributed to the capture of Saddam Hussein. If we want our intelligence agencies to be as good as they can be and they must and should be, then we must assure that they have systems in place to reward exceptional performance and to deal with bad performance appropriately. Currently, there are no systems performing this function and all attempts to bring accountability to our intelligence-gathering programs have been made in an ad hoc manner. We must demand that the intelligence community establish standards of accountability since reliable intelligence is critical to our security as citizens and our credibility as a nation. The last recommendation I would like to address today is No. 17. This calls for the removal of inappropriate and obsolete barriers between intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism. It advises the administration to report to Congress regarding the removal of these barriers so that Congress can take whatever legislative actions are appropriate. Our joint inquiry found that the various agencies engaged in counterterrorism have been surprisingly reluctant to share information with each other. Example: In the months before the September 11 attack, the CIA was aware of two terrorists associated with al-Qaida, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. These two terrorists had attended a planning session in Malaysia, a session at which both the attack on the USS Cole, which was to occur in November of 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed effort that ended in a field in Pennsylvania had been discussed. Both of these terrorists attended a planning conference for purposes of proceeding with those two terrorist attacks, and then acquired visas for travel to the United States, because the CIA had not informed law enforcement or border protection agencies of the threat posed by these individuals. The FBI and other agencies did not seem to have received this information which could have helped disrupt the 9/11 attack. Similarly, the FBI prevented its agents from participating in an effort to track down these terrorists on the grounds that this was not a job for criminal investigators. The FBI was reluctant to share information regarding counterterrorism because of concerns about legal barriers preventing collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These concerns sprang partly from an overly restrictive Department of Justice policy and partly from misunderstanding among agents regarding the law. Sharing of intelligence information with law enforcement agencies was seen as particularly difficult, almost taboo. This was a clear contradiction of the law that existed prior to September 11. Legal considerations also seem to have impaired information sharing by the National Security Agency and the CIA as well. However, these agencies, particularly the CIA, were also motivated by an overly zealous desire to protect sources. While protecting sources and methods is certainly an important goal, these sources and methods are not very useful if we cannot effectively use the information they provide to us. From a legislative point of view, significant progress has been made in this area. Congress has passed legislation removing legal restrictions regarding the sharing of intelligence information. Agency heads have updated obsolete and inappropriate guidelines. Intelligence community personnel now seem to have a much clearer picture of what methods and actions are available to them. Unfortunately, while the legislative barriers to information sharing have been removed, the fact is that effective information sharing is still not taking place between intelligence and law enforcement, and this is a special problem between Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies and State and local law enforcement. I frequently hear complaints that agency culture, habit, and inertia, have preserved problems that should have been solved, making this yet another area in which the lessons of 9/11 have not been learned and not been applied effectively. September 11 was a wake-up call. It alerted us to the fact that our intelligence agencies were not performing at the level required during this era of terrorism. We have just received our first report card. The report card is to tell us how well we have done since September 11 in applying lessons learned to the greater protection of the American people. We have received a grade of F. The false assertion of large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq demonstrates that we have not yet made the reforms to our intelligence agencies that are required. The next report card will come when we have the next intelligence failure. The President and the Congress will both be held accountable if we have not acted on these necessary reforms to protect the safety of the people of America.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I say to the Senator, when I take the floor, I am going to be here for about 30 minutes. If the Senator has something he would like to say prior to that, I will yield.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I think that self-imposed standard that we have to do this in the next 2 weeks is unacceptable. This has to be done, yes, but it ought to be done when we have had an opportunity to view all the pieces and understand the implications of all the pieces. By trying to do this between now and what happens to be President's Day is arbitrary and does not serve the interests of our public and does not serve our ability to represent our constituents.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. No. Even if we provide adequate financing to assure that this level will be allocated, I think we are doing as we did 6 years ago with TEA-21, assuring that whoever is here in 2009 is going to be facing a transportation system that has been further degraded.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. I don't deny that this legislation is better than it has been. I make two points: One, it is not enough to keep pace with the annual demands on the system, both for maintenance and to avoid increasing congestion. Every survey I have seen, including those I just cited, give statistical validation to that. The second concern is that we are going to be adding to one of the other deficits in this country, which is our fiscal deficit, by diverting money which otherwise would have gone into general revenue in order to pay the cost of both the highway and the public transit system. Finally, the specific elements of that transfer from general revenue to the transportation fund are extremely questionable. I mentioned one set of so-called tax loophole closers that we have already spent before. How much confidence can we have that this bill is going to get to the finish line before the jobs bill or the charitable giving bill, so that this essential part of the financing package is still available? I think it is a high risk. I say that to someone who knows something about high risk. I think it is an unstable platform on which to place our Nation's transportation funding.