Matt Gaetz

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following proclamation. Whereas: The Blue Angels were formed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, on April 24, 1946, to raise the public's interest in naval aviation and boost Navy Morale. Whereas: The Blue Angels are recognized as the second-oldest formal aerobatic team in the world. Whereas: The 2023 season marks the 77th anniversary of this impressive outfit. Whereas: The United States Navy Blue Angels have called Pensacola home since 1955, practicing daring and awe-inspiring maneuvers from the cockpits of F/A-18 Super Hornets in the skies above the city. Whereas: The mission of the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron is to showcase the pride and professionalism of the United States Navy and Marine Corps by inspiring a culture of excellence and service to the country through flight demonstrations and community outreach. Whereas: An estimated 11 million spectators view the squadron during air shows each year. Whereas: The 2023 season marks the first in which the Blue Angels welcome their first female demonstration pilot, Lieutenant Amanda Lee, to the left-wing Number 3 position. Now, therefore, be it Resolved: On this occasion of their 77th, birthday, the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, the Blue Angels, are recognized for their contribution to Northwest Florida, as they have distinguished themselves as ambassadors for the Cradle of Naval Aviation by inspiring and entertaining millions of Americans each year. It is an honor to have them call Florida's First District home. Bravo Zulu and Happy Birthday, Blue Angels.

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great patriot such as Mr. James of Michigan. I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop presence in 2023. The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where their presence was known and where their location was easily identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated. Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy I say that. I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light. There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and this resolution would bring them home. Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what is going to save a country of 17 million from a hardened group of 7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and sectarian violence. The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes. Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century since, we have seen a constant state of despair. So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia? Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last heart of the last Somali? That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology. Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work against. There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt in the INDOPACOM theater. What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to ensure the enduring success of our Nation. My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identity even current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by Americans or that they participated in coups. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from The Intercept: ``AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share `core values' with coup leaders.'' [From The Intercept, April 10, 2023] Africom Chief to Congress: We Share ``Core Values'' With Coup Leaders (By Nick Turse) In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO, and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup last year. U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the press. Flintlock provides a ``critical training opportunity'' for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a chance to ``exchange best practices,'' Rear Adm. Milton ``Jamie'' Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept and other reporters on a conference call last month. He didn't mention that, by the Pentagon's own assessments, militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA began Flintlock trainings in 2005. ``The Sahel now accounts for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,'' reads a recent report: by the Defense Department's Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers overthrow their governments--while admitting he didn't know the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R- Fla., to ask, ``Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train people who then lead coups in Africa?'' Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in at least eight) across five West African countries, including Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times), Mauritania, and the Gambia. Before he toppled Burkina Faso's democratically elected president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020, according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen. Gilbert Diendere, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in 2015. Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi Goita headed the junta that overthrew Mali's government. After staging that coup, Goita stepped down and took the job of vice president in a transitional government tasked with returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he seized power for a second time. Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise, according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya's unit took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the presidential palace and depose their country's 83-year-old president, Alpha Conde. Doumbouya soon declared himself Guinea's new leader. The U.S. ended the training and distanced itself from the coup. ``Core values is what we start off with,'' Gen. Michael Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services Committee last month. ``Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?'' asked Gaetz.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, in this piece, it highlights five countries-- Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia--where the very people who led the coups were the very people who received this training from the United States. I would note that any comparison here to Afghanistan is sorely misplaced. This legislation provides one year to remove 900 people. That is far different than unwinding the double helix that was our multidecade engagement with Afghanistan. I agree with the sentiment that my colleague Mr. James stated, that our friends must trust us and our enemies must fear us. But what I have observed, after 20 years of American war in the Middle East and in North Africa, is that our enemies often mock us when we try to be the world's policeman and the world's piggy bank. That should not be the goal of our country. We should not be engaged in nation-building in Somalia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. These 900 U.S. troops have no end state. They are engaging in largely police force operations. I suggest they should come home, and a vote for this resolution would do that. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman from New York that we will have a more fulsome discussion regarding the continent of Africa because the next in our legislative series may very well be Niger. We will have that opportunity, as well. To my colleague from Minnesota, I think she really hits the nail on the head that the partnerships between the existing government in Somalia and the clans that exist throughout the country is the essential glue to resist the violence and destabilization that we see from Al-Shabaab. It is my belief that the government's entrees to those groups to get them to not side with Al-Shabaab are not facilitated by extensive U.S. presence. I just don't believe that to get one group of Somalis to stop killing another group of Somalis that the essential ingredient is us. It may be other African influencers to a positive extent, but there is great wisdom in what the gentlewoman shared regarding the utility of those partnerships and relationships. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, if what it takes to protect the 17 million people in Somalia is 900 U.S. troops forever, then I don't have high hopes for them. I have far more confidence in the strategy that Congresswoman Omar laid out, which was the Somali Government working to create some sense of national identity among Somali clans, and no one has made a compelling argument that we are essential to that process. I take some exception to my colleague from Texas calling this a get- out-quick resolution. It gives us a year. Can't we move 900 people in a year? My colleague from Georgia argued that Somali troop presence was essential to keep America safe. Let me be clear: I fear China and some crazy Russian general with nuclear codes far more than I fear Somali warlords fighting over who controls aid streams. It is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of our military leaders at AFRICOM. It was Brigadier General Bailey who said recently: What we have seen is not necessarily holding land or territory. It is more extortion, closer to an organized crime organization. That was on February 27, 2023, on ``Nightly News with Lester Holt.'' Even General Bailey doesn't view this as a way to get land, seize land, and keep it away from Al-Shabaab. He is saying that they are not really holding land. They are just engaged in low-level thuggery, and it seems unworthy of a sustained U.S. troop presence. Let's make clear that while the debate was elegant and compelling about the need to engage Africa, the vote on this resolution is whether 900 U.S. troops should stay in Somalia or come home. Those who vote against my resolution are functionally taking the position that the 2001 AUMF, which was voted on when 89 percent of us who are currently in the House were not even here to vote on it and which was voted on before Al-Shabaab even existed, has become a global permission slip for U.S. interventionism everywhere. Al-Shabaab had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that they have co- branded with al-Qaida is not indicative of any interoperability. Mr. Speaker, as we are evaluating whether or not we have to keep 900 troops in Somalia for the safety and security of Americans, the principal goal of Al-Shabaab is to rule greater Somalia under sharia law and overthrow the government. That is not my opinion. That is a February 2023 Congressional Research Service conclusion. That very same CRS report indicates that Al-Shabaab does not have the capability to attack the United States. I guess it is easy to stand up and say that we should be the police force everywhere because anywhere some bad person could harbor the desire to kill us, but the best research we have says that that is not in line with their existing capabilities. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the February 2023 Congressional Research Service report. [From Congressional Research Service, updated Feb. 14, 2023] Al Shabaab Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled ``the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al Qaeda affiliate in the world today.'' AFRICOM reports that the group poses the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East Africa, and is a threat to the United States. background Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing of the federation of Islamic Courts that took control of Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When Ethiopia, which backed Somalia's nascent transitional government, intervened militarily--with U.S. support--to oust the Courts, Al Shabaab used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to draw recruits and support, including among the diaspora in the United States. Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU) forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-2012 and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab has nevertheless retained control over parts of the country, despite international recognition of Somalia's federal government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence and the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas. relationship with al qaeda Some of Al Shabaab's founding members trained with Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed--the late mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania--have been associated with the group. After expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda in Al Shabaab's early years, the groups announced a formal affiliation in 2012. While Al Shabaab's leaders appear to broadly share Al Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group maintains ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with which it runs a smuggling network. In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown against IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern Somalia survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and appears to view the IS cell as a rival. the threat Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in Somalia. Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since 2017, when a truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500 people (Al Shabaab's deadliest single attack to date). While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it is also threatens the countries participating in the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known as AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring countries and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in Kenya, which launched a military operation in Somalia against the group in 2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). The group has killed hundreds of Kenyans, many through hit-and-run attacks near the Somali border. Its 2015 assault on a university in northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147 people, was the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaeda's 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy. Al Shabaab's July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its largest operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly involving some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate that as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it a foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group. Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the region and called for attacks against the United States. Attacks on international targets in Kenya's capital--the 2013 Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel assault-- raised the group's international profile. Over 50 U.S. citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when the attack started--all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used by the U.S. military near the Somali border. The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States. It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the Philippines and later extradited to the United States on charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States. objectives Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred to the airfield as one of the ``launch pads for the American crusade against Islam in the region.'' Al Shabaab activities in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there. leadership Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has led Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama Administration described as responding to an ``imminent threat,'' citing Godane's oversight of ``plots targeting Westerners, including U.S. persons in East Africa.'' Godane's predecessor was killed in a U.S. strike in 2008. Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who consolidated power by assassinating rivals, reportedly including American jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013. Some prominent commanders left the group or surrendered to Somali authorities in exchange for amnesty during that time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar Robow defected, and later ran for state office, drawing on support from his clan. He was detained during his 2018 campaign and held without charge until 2022. He was released by Somalia's new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role, Robow is tasked with countering Al Shabaab's extremist ideology. area of operations and capabilities AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between 2011 and 2014. Al Shabaab 's control oflarge areas of south and central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged from 2015, when AMISOM's major offensive operations ceased, until 2022, when the Somali government launched a new offensive in coordination with local militias and a grassroots uprising. Al Shabaab has since lost significant territory in central Somalia, but it continues to conduct reprisal attacks there. While Al Shabaab's loss of Mogadishu and other port cities initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an extensive taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts businesses even in government areas. It generates between $50 and $100 million annually, according to UN monitors, and uses at least 25 percent on military purchases; Al Shabaab also supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds. UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have 7,000-12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills local governance roles, providing basic services and resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters, including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya, reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack. Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other areas beyond its control, including through complex vehicle- borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy the plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab's explosives-making capacity led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of explosive precursors to Somalia in 2019. u.s. responses The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two dozen related persons for sanctions, either under Executive Order (E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224 (on terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan clerics implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the group and members of its smuggling and weapons trafficking network in Yemen. The United States has prosecuted several U.S. citizens for fundraising on Al Shabaab's behalf. The United States provides security assistance to AU and Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S. forces have engaged in ``advise, assist, and accompany'' missions with Somali and AU forces since 2016. In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al Shabaab an ``associated force'' of Al Qaeda in the context of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015, when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S. military action in the country--previously ``to counter Al Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab''--to cover support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating there. The tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump changed the rules of engagement for U.S. operations in Somalia in 2017, authorizing offensive airstrikes and designating parts of the country as an ``area of active hostilities.'' Airstrikes have continued, after a brief pause, under President Biden: AFRICOM conducted over a dozen airstrikes in Somalia in 2022, citing most as ``collective self-defense,'' in support of the Somali army. In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used by the U.S. military in central Somalia--it was the largest attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty years. No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces--then estimated at 700--from Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022. outlook After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some ``high-value'' targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries. Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption have hampered the Somali government's ability to extend state authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced support for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by the end of 2024. The ``total war'' Somalia's new government launched against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be a turning point, but Somalia has struggled to ``clear and hold'' when AU forces have managed to gain ground in the past. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia.

Mr. GAETZ. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing the government in Somalia achieve gains in large part because of local discontent with Al-Shabaab. Because of climate change, we are not seeing the same amount of agricultural and livestock opportunities for people in Somalia, so many of the groups that were paying extortion money to Al-Shabaab are not able to pay it anymore because a lot of the land is dried up. That resulted in Al-Shabaab being incredibly brutal to those local clans and tribes. They poisoned the water, killed family members, and publicly executed people. Then what happened was a lot of those local tribes pushed back and said they would rather align with the government. That is not a victory delivered at the end of a U.S. missile or weapon. That is a victory that is occurring as a consequence of the conditions in Somalia and the choices that Somalis are making. Finally, Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the ACLED piece that details how the government is making gains in ground and Al-Shabaab is losing them. It is titled: ``Somalia: Counterinsurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist.'' [From ACLED, Apr. 21, 2023] Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist somalia at a glance: 18 march-14 april 2023 Vital Trends ACLED records more than 180 political violence events and over 420 reported fatalities from 18 March to 14 April 2023. Most political violence centered in Banadir region, where al- Shabaab launched attacks targeting Somali security forces and civilians. Middle Shabelle region had the highest number of reported fatalities, with over 120 recorded during the reporting period. Sool region followed, with more than 80 reported fatalities. Violence involving al-Shabaab was linked to over 74 percent of total fatalities. Clashes between Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) militia and Somaliland security forces around Laascaanood town resulted in most of the remaining fatalities. The most common event type was battles, with over 100 events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with nearly 60 events. Over 46 percent of explosion/remote violence events occurred in Banadir region, a nearly 70 percent increase compared to the previous four weeks. Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al- Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced the second phase of the military offensive against al-Shabaab at the end of March. The new phase reportedly aims to flush out al-Shabaab from the remaining parts of the country under its control, following the first phase that began in August 2022. While the operation initially focused on central Somalia, starting in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state, the second phase aims to expand to southern regions--Southwest and Jubaland states. In the first phase, the government sought support from clan militias from the Hawiye clan, and regained substantial territory from al-Shabaab. Subsequently, clan militias have played a vital role in the government-led operation. Since August 2022, these groups have been involved in more than 155 political violence events against al-Shabaab. Additionally, they have supported security forces in nearly 60 percent of events where government forces have regained territory from al-Shabaab. During the first phase of the offensive against al-Shabaab, Somali security forces regained control of over 215 locations previously under al-Shabaab's control, mostly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. However, Somali security forces, who failed to fully drive out al-Shabaab militants from both states, still lack the military capacity to hold newly liberated areas. Al-Shabaab, in turn, took advantage of this weakness to maintain bases and launch complex attacks against government troops. In particular, they regained lost territories in Hirshabelle as the government expanded the offensive to Galmudug state. As the federal government anticipates a lack of support from clans in the south for the second phase of operations, it is seeking more support from neighboring states who are already present in Somalia under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)--possibly indicating a plan to scale down the role of clan militias in the operation. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have reportedly promised over 30,000 soldiers to support the offensive in the coming months. This situation update analyzes the activities of al- Shabaab and the security forces during the second phase of the offensive and assesses the risk that political differences between the federal government and some of member states, like Jubaland and Puntland, may undermine the operations. Al-Shabaab Aims for Hirshabelle While Continuing Attacks in Banadir After the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab expanded to Galmudug state in early 2023, Hirshabelle state became a vulnerable target for al-Shabaab attacks. These vulnerabilities have forced Somali security forces to stay focused on Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions in the second phase of the offensive rather than expanding to Jubaland and Southwest states. From 18 March to 14 April, ACLED records 19 political violence events involving al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle state, resulting in at least 145 reported fatalities (see map below). Over 68 percent of these incidents were remote violence events, which record an increase of 30 percent compared to the previous four weeks. In Middle Shabelle region, al-Shabaab launched several attacks in Adan Yabaal district--in most instances using explosives. On 25 March, al-Shabaab detonated three under- vehicle IEDs (UVIED), targeting security forces and Abgal clan militias at a base in Run-nirgod village. The explosion and heavy gunfire exchange that followed resulted in over 50 reported fatalities. A few days earlier, on 20 March, another al-Shabaab attack at a base in Daarul- Naciim village reportedly killed at least 55 people from both sides. The attacks came before the visit of the Somali President on 26 March to Adan Yabaal town, where he announced the launch of the second phase of the offensive against al- Shabaab. The same day, a high-level Ethiopian delegation that included the head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and senior government officials arrived in the capital of Hiiraan region, Belet Weyne town, to help Somali forces plan the next phase. Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants in Somalia since 2006 independently, and as part of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since January 2014. AMISOM was eventually replaced by ATMIS in 2022. Meanwhile, security forces continued offensive operations in Hiiraan to avert al-Shabaab attacks. The government deployed troops from Mogadishu to the region, traveling along the main supply route that connects Mogadishu to Hiiraan. On 25 March, security forces captured Jibiley village in Jalalaqsi district and Quracley village in Bulo Burto district from al-Shabaab. While militants peacefully vacated those villages, they continued to launch attacks on security forces and clan militias' new bases near Belet Weyne town. On 29 March, an al-Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne IED attack targeted security forces and Hawadle clan militias at a base- in Baardheere village, followed by clashes. Further, al-Shabaab continued measures to end the alliance between government forces and the Hawadle sub-clan in the second phase of the offensive. The Hawadle sub-clan of the Hawiye clan is the largest and most prominent sub-clan in Hiiraan. There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahanweyn, with each having several sub-clans and those sub-divisions, some supporting al-Shabaab, and others supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab. Since al-Shabaab controls several remote villages in Hiiraan and other regions, sub-clans consider it necessary to reach an agreement with al-Shabaab for their safety, and in return for their support or neutrality, al-Sahabab offers them peace deals. On 5 April, al-Shabaab claimed to have signed an agreement with Hawadle Galible Hassan Agoon sub-clan in Buqda Caqable village, Bula Burto district. The agreement stipulates that the sub-clan would not be part of the ongoing offensive in Hiiraan region. Similar agreements were reportedly signed between al-Shabaab and at least seven other sub-divisions of the Hawadle sub-clan in Buqda Caqable village this year. Al-Shabaab also reached an agreement with clan elders from Habar Gedir Salebaan sub-clan in Xarardheere town, Mudug region, in December 2022. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab continues its efforts to destabilize the government operation by launching attacks in urban towns. The capital Mogadishu records the highest number of al- Shabaab attacks compared to other urban areas in Somalia, with 49 political violence events and at least 21 reported fatalities. Al-Shabaab's use of explosions and remote violence increased in the capital by over 87 percent during the reporting period compared to the same time period prior; the group's use of grenades, in particular, increased more than four-fold. On 5 April, al-Shabaab carried out coordinated hand grenade attacks in all 17 districts of Mogadishu. The grenade attacks targeted security force checkpoints, the house of the mayor of Mogadishu and governor of Banadir, the house of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, and the house of a federal senator. Further, the militants launched mortar shells targeting the presidential palace, with some striking the house of the petroleum minister, reportedly killing a security officer. Political Differences Undermine the Offensive As part of the second phase of the offensive, the federal government plans to expand the offensive to Jubaland and Southwest states in southern Somalia. Political differences due to power-sharing disputes in Jubaland and Puntland, however, undermine the operation. Amid an ongoing dispute with the Jubaland administration based in Kismayo, Gedo region politicians and government officials unilaterally announced the recruitment and mobilization of local clan militias to participate in the military operation against al-Shabaab in the region. On the other hand, Jubaland State Minister of Security Yusuf Hussein Dhuumal reportedly rejected such plans to involve local clan militias. The most prominent sub-clan in Gedo region is the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, which opposes Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam--also known as `Madobe'--from the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clan. Marehan and Ogaden sub-clans have been fighting over the control of Kismayo since the 1990s. The current dispute between Gedo politicians, who are mostly from the Marehan sub-clan, and the Madobe administration escalated in 2020 when a leadership dispute led to the federal government's decision to deploy troops in the region. Jubaland administration fears that arming Marehan clan militias in Gedo would trip the balance of power in favor of the Marehan sub-clan. Nevertheless, Jubaland security forces continued conducting military operations against al-Shabaab despite the lack of support from local communities. Further, on 3 April, Ethiopian security forces deployed troops in Doolow town, Gedo region, as part of Ethiopia's commitment to increase its military presence in Somalia during the second phase of the counter- insurgency operation. Political differences between the Puntland administration and the federal government have also complicated plans for the counter-insurgency operation. In mid-March, the federal government and member states held a national consultative council meeting in Baidoa town to discuss the fight against al-Shabaab and to foster cooperation between the federal and member state governments. Puntland state president did not attend the meeting citing political differences with the federal government, including the appointment of the new special envoy for Somaliland affairs. On 9 January, Puntland state suspended cooperation with the federal government after skipping the signing of two outcomes of a national consultative council meeting held in Mogadishu in late December. Although al-Shabaab activity decreased in Puntland during the reporting period compared to the previous four weeks, fighting between al-Shabaab and IS militants led to the reported deaths of at least 40 al-Shabaab militants, including senior members. The fighting erupted after several al-Shabaab militants moved to the mountainous Bari region, likely fleeing from the government's offensive. Different administrations in Somalia have adopted distinct approaches to the fight against al-Shabaab, often deeply tied to the clan affiliations of Somali leaders. The previous government--in power from 2017 to 2022--focused on foreign policy, rebuilding security forces, and leading reconciliation between clans. Meanwhile, the current administration has enlisted support, first from clan militias and now from neighboring countries, in an intensive offensive to flush out al-Shabaab militants. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is from the Hawiye clan that has sub-clans supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab, including Hawadle and Abgal in Hirshabelle and Habar Gedir in Galmudug. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as `Farmajo,' who is from the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, failed to get support from the Majerteen sub-clan in Puntland, and Ogaden sub-clan in Jubaland, with the latter intensifying the dispute between Gedo and Kismayo administration. The progress made through the government operation has put Somalia in a more positive position compared to the last six years. These efforts could help the country recover the decades-long political and security instability, but only if effectively managed through power sharing, reconciliation, and integration of clan militias into security forces. Nonetheless, the greater role of forces from neighboring countries in the offensive might lead to a divide between clan militias and government forces, and claims of a `foreign invasion' may be used by al-Shabaab in its propaganda in order to recruit fighters. Consequently, military support from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya might not be a solution but rather a setback in the fight against al-Shabaab. The regional countries are already present in Somalia under ATMIS, although they have not participated in the ongoing offensive due to funding issues and have only offered logistical support and medical evacuation. The Abgal, Habar Gedir, and Hawadle clan militias have played an important role in the security forces' success since August 2022, and scaling down their involvement will likely undermine the government's efforts to defeat al-Shabaab. For the government to claim ownership of the offensive, integrating clan militias into security forces should be considered a priority.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close. In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. James), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia exactly? Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there? Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to automatically just dissolve into the sands? Are we waiting for some other foreign power? I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace. That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes. A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it is not as a consequence of U.S. presence. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from the International Crisis Group, ``Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al- Shabaab,'' and it is from 21 March 2023. [From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023] Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab What's new? The Somali government has gained ground in its war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu's leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form alliances with clan militias. Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the country, reestablishing the government's presence in regions that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops are now planning to move into the insurgency's southern bastions. What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It should establish holding forces, work for communal reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet local expectations around service delivery. Overview Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al- Shabaab's southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas, support local reconciliation efforts and step up service delivery, while carefully managing residents' expectations. If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab, which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound. The government's push marks a breakthrough in a war that has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically, overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in rural areas. International forces, in particular the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)--which was rebranded as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022-- , have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in conjunction with local clans. A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance. Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali military. The insurgents' taxation of communities under their control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia's borders appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to take a tougher line against the group. The government now plans to continue the offensive in southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different set of challenges--for one thing, clans in the south have not shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Before it launches major new attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation efforts and improve basic services of which residents have long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could prove difficult, and international donors will need to step in to provide support. Even if the government is successful in holding down central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al- Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The government should thus keep open the possibility of negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government's recent wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its position if it indeed decides to engage in talks. From Local Anger to ``All-out War'' The Birth of an Offensive The Somali government's move to wrest back control from Al- Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al- Shabaab's persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits, as well as the group's violent measures of collective punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the government has made headway. The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled, sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al- Shabaab's tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo, situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state). They tolerated Al-Shabaab's presence in their area, for the most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An influential community member told Crisis Group that this directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab's demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in the younger generation. The Salebaan's refusal to comply with this de facto draft triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al- Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected villages nearby in revenge. Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle sub-clan's historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle's aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took control of the road connecting Hiraan's capital Beledweyne to the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne, reportedly for having participated in government elections. The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region. Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne. Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with regional officials. Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women and children. More clan members joined the militias as a result. Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August 2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the Somali capital--a common meeting place for government officials--putting the premises under siege for 30 hours before security forces could dislodge them. The operation-- which led to the death of more than twenty people--may have been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been elected to a second nonconsecutive term that May, out of taking an aggressive posture toward the group. If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first returned to office--repeatedly talking about the need for ``different security strategies and tough negotiations'' with Al-Shabaab--his stance changed dramatically after critics accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to the siege. He proceeded to declare an ``all-out war'' on Al- Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed, he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than eradicate the group. The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's physical control. Expansion in Central Somalia The government was eager to replicate the success in eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters, or macawisley (``those who wear the macawis'', a Somali sarong), relying on prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to the local population, sparing the government from going it alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact. The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab, Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as ``historic''. Turkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat thus far, The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in central Somalia to contract. The government seized the insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in Galgaduud--although militants remain on the outskirts. The military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory east of the Shabelle River. The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold the area without support from Somali special forces. Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region, floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that the government had previously failed to support them in fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation. Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al- Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost, even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state) was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy, with the offensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial control. Still, the government has advantages in its current offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous offensives typically focused on securing cities, inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing. Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from 2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed in the background, essentially serving as the holding force for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less densely populated areas. There is also evidence that both the federal government and the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration, demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia. Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former. Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance, showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al- Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in addition to making regular incursions into areas the government has seized. Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be changing its approach to the population in central Somalia, realising its coercive model for securing obedience has backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks, emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha) in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the government in return for the release of hostages and seized property. The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain community relations. Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, we must continue to bring to this floor areas in the world where U.S. troops are present where there is no clear end game, where there is not an end state that is clearly achievable. What our generation has learned as a consequence of observing the great patriotism expressed by many of my colleagues who participated in this debate today is that we don't have the ability to beat an ideology out of anyone. We don't have the ability to go into these places that oftentimes have been riddled with bloodshed and violence and somehow convince them that a democracy or a parliamentary system is more beneficial than the greed that has been driving them for far too long. That is the story of the Middle East. That is the story of North Africa. If my constituents have to go to Somalia and Syria, then I think everyone here should have to vote one way or the other, and I don't expect to win that vote, but I was expecting probably during this discussion to maybe hear a little bit more about what it is that we expect these people to do in Somalia to ultimately get them out. What we have heard is some version of the argument that we have got to fight them over there so we don't fight them over here, even though all the evidence in the Record suggests that they don't have the capability to even strike us here, and that the harboring of terrorism that seems to justify the 2001 AUMF permission slip for American intervention in no way relates to the activities, capabilities, goals, ambitions of this particular group. What this group wants to do is they want to be able to overthrow the government in Somalia and orient greater Somalia under their sharia law, and they are losing in that fight. What we see online and what many of us have received in briefings in Congress is that when U.S. troops are present, that serves as a propaganda vehicle for a lot of these groups to be able to go out and recruit and add folks to their ranks, and that is certainly not what we want to see. If the African Union had a greater role, if the African Union stepped up and worked to fill that vacuum with greater credibility with particular partners and particular localized clans, then that might achieve this objective in the absence of the death, the danger, and the deployment that has had our military spread far too thin for far too long. Mr. Speaker, I heard in my colleague's opening that we have to reject the siren song of isolationism. I would observe that globalism is no lullaby. It is often soaked in blood and mired in civil war and violence, resulting in worse conditions than we found ourselves in. There are 17 million Somalis. I am rooting for them. I hope that when my life ends, Somalia isn't synonymous with famine and failed states and civil wars and coups. I really hope that. However, we must also exercise sufficient humility in this body to understand the capabilities of persuasion for a relatively small batch of American troops given the problem set. I return to the argument that I made earlier in this discussion. There is an opportunity cost to this in people. There are specific units that call my district home that are having to split between AFRICOM and INDOPACOM when the reality is whether or not our children are speaking Mandarin, our grandchildren are being dominated by the Chinese Communist Party is not going to be the result of who wins the battle of Mogadishu. It is going to be the result of who holds the high ground against our true pacing adversaries. Becoming the neighborhood block captain of Somalia is certainly not the behavior of a serious country engaged in various serious challenges against serious adversaries. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I certainly thank the leadership for permitting me such time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise to honor the Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps with the following proclamation. Whereas: Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (Pace NJROTC) was established in 1993 at Pace High School, Pace, Florida. Whereas: Pace NJROTC has previously distinguished itself as NJROTC Nationals Academic, Athletic & Drill Champions in competition in both 2021 and 2022. Whereas: The NJROTC Nationals Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships remain the most comprehensive test of overall JROTC training and performance in existence today, hosting the top-25 out of over 600 NJROTC Units in the Nation. Whereas: Under the supervision of Commander Patrick Vegeler (USN, Retired) and First Sergeant John Baker (USMC, Retired) and leadership of Cadet Commander Sadie Resmondo and her Battalion Staff, Pace NJROTC returned to the NJROTC National Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships for the seventh consecutive year. Whereas: On Friday, March 31, 2023, and Saturday, April 1, 2023, Pace High School competed representing Area 8 in the 2023 NJROTC National Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Pensacola, Florida. Whereas: Pace NJROTC placed 1st in Personnel Inspection; 1st in Unarmed Basic Drill; 2nd in Academics; 3rd in Color Guard Drill; 4th in Unarmed Exhibition Drill; 4th in Curl-ups Team Overall; 5th in Push-ups Team Overall; and 1st in Unit Overall. Whereas: In the face of stiff competition, Pace NJROTC came away victorious and successfully defended their title for the third consecutive National Championship. Now, therefore, be it resolved: That Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps has brought pride to Northwest Florida, and we applaud their dedication, determination, and patriotism while distinguishing themselves as exemplary students, remarkable athletes, and inspiring citizens upon the occasion of their third consecutive victory at the NJROTC National Championship. Their achievements have brought great pride and recognition to all of Florida's First District, the State of Florida, and the United States of America. Go Patriots.

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise to vindicate the most American of values, and that is work. When John Smith landed at Jamestown, he said: ``He who does not work, neither shall he eat.'' We have drifted far away from that, creating a social safety net that has been converted into a multigenerational hammock for far too many Americans. As we reach America's credit card limit, I am proud to stand with my many House Republican colleagues who believe there should be no increase in this debt limit absent rigorous work requirements. If you could see President Clinton and Newt Gingrich coming together for work requirements in the 1990s, there is no reason we cannot do that in divided government now to cut spending where it is wasteful and to grow this economy where it is necessary.

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, most Americans don't know a single Syrian, and so people watching this debate might wonder, how has it come to be that Syria has become the great platform of great power competition in the world? It begins in 2011, during the Arab Spring, when Assad, who is undeniably a madman and a despot, opens fire on his own people protesting. Then part of the Syrian Army defects; they engage in warfare against Assad, and all of a sudden, they have a whole lot of weapons and money being sent from the rich gulf monarchies, through Jordan, into Syria. So Iran is not just going to watch this. Assad is their ally. They activate Hezbollah, they then invade Syria. So now you have Jordan, the gulf monarchies, Iran. But wait, Russia is pitching their vision of the world as a regime preservation force, whether you are Maduro or Assad. So they get involved. What do they get for their time? A warm-water port in the Eastern Mediterranean. So we have got Russia, the gulf monarchies. Israel starts to get worried about Hezbollah and Iran, so Israel cuts a deal with Russia to keep Iran out of southern Syria. If it doesn't get any worse than that, now all of a sudden, you have got the Kurds who declare war on Syria, and it makes it a little messy that the Kurds are also in conflict with Turkiye, which is a NATO ally. Then somehow the United States in 2015, says, you know what? We need to get involved in this mess in Syria. Since we have been there, we have seen Americans die. We have seen tens of billions of dollars wasted. What is hilarious about the 2001 AUMF--that the neo-conservatives wave around like some permission slip for every neo-conservative fantasy of turning an Arabian desert into a Jeffersonian democracy--is that that very 2001 AUMF would justify attacking the people that we are fighting against and the people we are funding because both have ties to al-Qaida and, of course, the 2001 AUMF dealt with al-Qaida. All this talk about a reemergence of ISIS; I would encourage my colleagues to go read the inspector general's report of the last quarter that indicates that ISIS is not a threat to the homeland. And with the Turks conducting operations in Syria against ISIS, with Assad and Russia having every incentive to create pressure on ISIS, I do not believe that what stands between a caliphate and not a caliphate are the 900 Americans who have been sent to this hellscape with no definition of victory, with no clear objective, and purely existing as a vestige to the regime change failed foreign policies of multiple former Presidents. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I would ask my colleagues how many more remaining speakers they have and are they prepared to close?

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, much of the discussion today has revolved around whether or not withdrawing from Syria will ignite some new ISIS caliphate. We have pointed out time and again to inspector general reports saying that is unlikely. I am not entirely sure that our having troops in Syria deters ISIS more than it is a recruiting tool for ISIS. Moreover, President Trump said that if Russia wanted to kill ISIS, then we should let them. I think there is wisdom in that. Both Assad and Turkiye are in stronger positions today to put downward pressure on ISIS. Maybe if we weren't giving weapons to people shooting at Assad, then Assad would have every incentive to be able to engage ISIS in a way to ensure that it doesn't come back. We have to also acknowledge Syria and Iraq are the two countries on the planet Earth where we have done the most to fund ISIS. We give weapons to these so-called moderate rebels--which I actually thought was an oxymoron--and it turns out that they are not so moderate. Sometimes the rebels we fund to go fight Assad turn around and raise the ISIS flag. So it is quite silly to be saying we have to withdraw to stop ISIS when it is our very presence in Syria in some cases that has been the best gift to ISIS. There are groups like al-Nusra and associated entities that are like our frenemies when they are in Syria, and then they cross over the border into Iraq and they become full-fledged jihadists posing a so- called threat to the homeland. There are 1,500 different groups in Syria, so today's friend is tomorrow's ISIS. There is no real clear delineation as to what the enduring defeat of ISIS means. Do we have to keep 900 Americans in Syria until the last heartbeat stops of the last person who holds some sympathy for ISIS? I would certainly hope not. It would mean we would have to be there forever. Israel has made their deal with Russia to be protected, the Kurds have made their peace with Assad to be protected, and what we see among this quagmire is that there is really not a role for the United States of America in Syria. We are not a Middle Eastern power. We have tried this time and again to build a democracy out of sand, blood, and Arab militias, and time and again the work we do does not reduce chaos. Oftentimes it causes chaos, the very chaos that then subsequently leads to terrorism. My colleagues and my staff who have served in Syria and my constituents tell me that often these anti-ISIS raids are just raids of local thugs and drug dealers who have some cousin that is in ISIS, and it is not appropriate to put Americans at risk. Often our Americans are guarding these oil fields where the Iranians are sending Kamikaze drones, and I am shocked that we have not had escalatory accidents or even more casualties for our U.S. servicemembers. So if this is all one big Georgetown School of Foreign Service essay exam about great power competition in Syria, then you go tell that to the parents of the Americans who have to sleep tonight in Syria, and who have to guard oil fields with Iranian drones coming at them, that they are necessary to preserve the balance of power. That is not true. The Kurds have an opportunity to pave their path. Let's pave ours. And if we are so worried about threats to the homeland, how about we actually focus on our true point of vulnerability, which is not the emergence of some caliphate, it is the fact that terrorists are crossing our southern border on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. We seem far less concerned about that than we undeniably should be. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution to reassert Congress' power to speak on these matters of war and peace. So often we come to the floor and we debate frivolities. This is one of the most important things we can be talking about: how we use the credibility of our fellow Americans, how we spend America's treasure, and how we spill the blood of our bravest patriots. We have stained the deserts in the Middle East with enough American blood. It is time to bring our servicemembers home. Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support the resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, my patriotic colleague, Mr. Zinke of Montana, gave up the game when he said ISIS will never be gone. So, presumably, the position of those holding that viewpoint is that we have to stay in Syria forever, maybe make it the 51st State. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. Greene), a member of the Homeland Security Committee and the House Oversight Committee.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my colleague, I would observe that we have done a lot for the Kurds: $1.5 billion. We can love the Kurds, but it is not a marriage. It is not until death do we part. It seems as though the Kurds have made book with Assad and that that would provide a structure for them to continue to exist. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills), a patriotic American who served in our military, who served in Iraq and Syria, a member of the House Armed Services Committee and my colleague.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, Republicans and Democrats alike have been citing the 2001 AUMF. It is important to note that there are Americans fighting in Syria today who were not born when the 2011 AUMF was approved. About 9 out of every 10 of us in the House of Representatives weren't here to vote on it. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs).

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, Syria is such a mess. We are sometimes funding both sides in the same battle. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record an L.A. Times piece titled: ``In Syria, militias armed by the Pentagon fight those armed by the CIA.'' [From the L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 2016] In Syria, Militias Armed by the Pentagon Fight Those Armed by the CIA (By Nabih Bulos, W.J. Hennigan, Brian Bennett) Syrian militias armed by different parts of the U.S. war machine have begun to fight each other on the plains between the besieged city of Aleppo and the Turkish border, highlighting how little control U.S. intelligence officers and military planners have over the groups they have financed and trained in the bitter five-year-old civil war. The fighting has intensified over the last two months, as CIA-armed units and Pentagon-armed ones have repeatedly shot at each other while maneuvering through contested territory on the northern outskirts of Aleppo, U.S. officials and rebel leaders have confirmed. In mid-February, a CIA-armed militia called Fursan al Haq, or Knights of Righteousness, was run out of the town of Marea, about 20 miles north of Aleppo, by Pentagon-backed Syrian Democratic Forces moving in from Kurdish-controlled areas to the east. ``Any faction that attacks us, regardless from where it gets its support, we will fight it,'' Maj. Fares Bayoush, a leader of Fursan al Haq, said in an interview. Rebel fighters described similar clashes in the town of Azaz, a key transit point for fighters and supplies between Aleppo and the Turkish border, and on March 3 in the Aleppo neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsud. The attacks by one U.S.-backed group against another come amid continued heavy fighting in Syria and illustrate the difficulty facing U.S. efforts to coordinate among dozens of armed groups that are trying to overthrow the government of President Bashar Assad, fight the Islamic State militant group and battle one another all at the same time. ``It is an enormous challenge,'' said Rep. Adam Schiff (D- Burbank), the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, who described the clashes between U.S.-supported groups as ``a fairly new phenomenon.'' ``It is part of the three-dimensional chess that is the Syrian battlefield,'' he said. The area in northern Syria around Aleppo, the country's second-largest city, features not only a war between the Assad government and its opponents, but also periodic battles against Islamic State militants, who control much of eastern Syria and also some territory to the northwest of the city, and long-standing tensions among the ethnic groups that inhabit the area, Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. ``This is a complicated, multi-sided war where our options are severely limited,'' said a U.S. official, who wasn't authorized to speak publicly on the matter. ``We know we need a partner on the ground. We can't defeat ISIL without that part of the equation, so we keep trying to forge those relationships.'' ISIL is an acronym for Islamic State. President Obama this month authorized a new Pentagon plan to train and arm Syrian rebel fighters, relaunching a program that was suspended in the fall after a string of embarrassing setbacks which included recruits being ambushed and handing over much of their U.S.-issued ammunition and trucks to an Al Qaeda affiliate. Amid the setbacks, the Pentagon late last year deployed about 50 special operations forces to Kurdish-held areas in northeastern Syria to better coordinate with local militias and help ensure U.S.-backed rebel groups aren't fighting one another. But such skirmishes have become routine. Last year, the Pentagon helped create a new military coalition, the Syrian Democratic Forces. The goal was to arm the group and prepare it to take territory away from the Islamic State in eastern Syria and to provide information for U.S. airstrikes. The group is dominated by Kurdish outfits known as People's Protection Units or YPG. A few Arab units have joined the force in order to prevent it from looking like an invading Kurdish army, and it has received air-drops of weapons and supplies and assistance from U.S. Special Forces. Gen. Joseph Votel, now commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and the incoming head of Central Command, said this month that about 80 percent of the fighters in the Syrian Democratic Forces were Kurdish. The U.S. backing for a heavily Kurdish armed force has been a point of tension with the Turkish government, which has a long history of crushing Kurdish rebellions and doesn't want to see Kurdish units control more of its southern border. The CIA, meanwhile, has its own operations center inside Turkey from which it has been directing aid to rebel groups in Syria, providing them with TOW antitank missiles from Saudi Arabian weapons stockpiles. While the Pentagon's actions are part of an overt effort by the U.S. and its allies against Islamic State, the CIA's backing of militias is part of a separate covert U.S. effort aimed at keeping pressure on the Assad government in hopes of prodding the Syrian leader to the negotiating table. At first, the two different sets of fighters were primarily operating in widely separated areas of Syria--the Pentagon- backed Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeastern part of the country and the CIA-backed groups farther west. But over the last several months, Russian airstrikes against anti- Assad fighters in northwestern Syria have weakened them. That created an opening which allowed the Kurdish-led groups to expand their zone of control to the outskirts of Aleppo, bringing them into more frequent conflict with the CIA-backed outfits. ``Fighting over territory in Aleppo demonstrates how difficult it is for the U.S. to manage these really localized and in some cases entrenched conflicts,'' said Nicholas A. Heras, an expert on the Syrian civil war at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington. ``Preventing clashes is one of the constant topics in the joint operations room with Turkey.'' Over the course of the Syrian civil war, the town of Marea has been on the front line of Islamic State's attempts to advance across Aleppo province toward the rest of northern Syria. On Feb. 18, the Syrian Democratic Forces attacked the town. A fighter with the Suqour Al-Jabal brigade, a group with links to the CIA, said intelligence officers of the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State know their group has clashed with the Pentagon-trained militias. ``The MOM knows we fight them,'' he said, referring to the joint operations center in southern Turkey, using an abbreviation for its name in Turkish, Musterek Operasyon Merkezi. ``We'll fight all who aim to divide Syria or harm its people.'' The fighter spoke on condition of anonymity. Marea is home to many of the original Islamist fighters who took up arms against Assad during the Arab Spring in 2011. It has long been a crucial way station for supplies and fighters coming from Turkey into Aleppo. ``Attempts by Syrian Democratic Forces to take Marea was a great betrayal and was viewed as a further example of a Kurdish conspiracy to force them from Arab and Turkmen lands,'' Heras said. The clashes brought the U.S. and Turkish officials to ``loggerheads,'' he added. After diplomatic pressure from the U.S., the militia withdrew to the outskirts of the town as a sign of good faith, he said. But continued fighting among different U.S.-backed groups may be inevitable, experts on the region said. ``Once they cross the border into Syria, you lose a substantial amount of control or ability to control their actions,'' Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official, said in a telephone interview. ``You certainly have the potential for it becoming a larger problem as people fight for territory and control of the northern border area in Aleppo.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Luna), a veteran and also a military spouse of one of our brave patriots who fought in Syria.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. Madam Speaker, it is my honor to rise and celebrate the life of one of the greatest Florida men to have ever lived: Lewis Bear. Lewis was a legend for all times. He was a prolific businessman and an even more prolific philanthropist. Lewis was CEO of Florida's oldest privately held company, the Lewis Bear Company. It was started by his grandfather in 1876. Lewis grew this small family grocery distribution business to one of Florida's largest beer distributors. If you have cracked open a beer in my district, there is a pretty good chance that Lewis moved it. Lewis' generosity did not stop with libations. Through the Lewis Bear Family Foundation, he donated tens of millions of dollars to local organizations and charities, including hospitals and nonprofits focused on curing childhood cancer. He single-handedly protected the Deepwater Horizon oil spill settlement funds for northwest Florida and saw that the money was used for lasting economic development. I know that Lewis will be sorely missed by our family and by his family, especially by his wife, Belle, and their three children: Lewis, Cindi, and David. Northwest Florida will never be the same without Lewis Bear. We are certainly grateful that we had my friend for 82 years.