Jane Harman

Ms. HARMAN

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to agree with the comments of the last speaker and commend his service as part of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings great expertise to this House, and I as one Member value it enormously. He may not know that the Bremer Commission on which I served recommended that the Deutch Guidelines not apply in the case of recruitment of terrorist spies. We, too, found that, though well- intended, and I believe they were well-intended, those guidelines inhibited the aggressive recruitment of people who had the qualifications to penetrate the worst terrorist organizations, which we need them to do. Yes, these are unsavory characters, and yes, we need them, provided that they are reasonably vetted so that we know that they are reliable, but nonetheless, yes, we need them. I do not want to be heard to be ambivalent about this at all. A few years ago, our committee found that those guidelines had not been rescinded; and on a bipartisan basis, we directed that the DCI rescind them and replace them, and that was done at our direction. That was one of our impressive bipartisan actions, and so I would just point out that, while the language of this amendment commending our people in the field who take risk on our behalf is excellent, the problem we are having on this side is with the findings that very narrowly focus on a very few years of history. The history is longer, and let me say in the spirit of bipartisanship that we all got it wrong after the Cold War. We all thought the world would be more peaceful. We all thought there would be a peace dividend. That is why the 41st President, President Bush, began to draw down both the Defense and Intelligence budgets, anticipating a more peaceful world, which obviously did not come to pass. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Texas that I appreciate his comments welcoming my comments. That, again, is in the spirit of bipartisanship. We all do better when we are bipartisan. I would just also make a comment to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). I certainly agree that a lot of material is in our committee spaces, but we will consider an amendment later this afternoon on this subject of the committee's ability to oversee the detainee problem. Some of us remain skeptical that our committee has gotten all the material we need and certainly skeptical that we have gotten adequate candid testimony from administration officials. I would also point out to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) that while we were in Baghdad, we should have been told about some issues directly relevant to our jurisdiction, such as this issue of ghosting of detainees as described by General Taguba in his report, and that is the placing of detainees without revealing their numbers or their identity in prisons so that, as I understand it, the International Red Cross and other outside observers would not be aware of their existence. This is a serious issue directly relevant to our jurisdiction. I believe that it was known to those we met with in Baghdad and they should have informed us; at least that is my personal opinion. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), another member of our committee to comment on the Johnson amendment.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I see no additional speakers on our side. I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I do not think we have any further speakers on this amendment, but I would like to enter into a dialogue with the amendment's sponsor to suggest to him that we might agree by unanimous consent that the sense of Congress in his resolution be the entire resolution. We strike the findings, because our side feels that they are not complete and that some of them may be misleading. And that, as I said, on a bipartisan basis we all were wrong in 1990 when the wall came down and we expected a more peaceful world. Would the gentleman be amenable to striking the findings and having his resolution be the Sense of Congress, as he has drafted it, which I would predict would be adopted unanimously?

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, and I will control the time on our side.

Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thought our Sicily stop was outstanding, which is why I brought it up. But I think that the improvements made to this amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) are noteworthy. What he did, as I understand it, was to insert a bit of the history here, the role of sanctions initiated by President Reagan, the role of international legal negotiations to get Libya to renounce terrorism and turn over terrorism suspects to international courts, and the role of diplomacy in previous administrations and by the British and others before the beginning of this administration. Though this administration did play a role, and I commend it, in President Qadhafi's stunning decision to do the right thing, that should be reflected, and is, in this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I will put two very important articles on this subject in the Record. One is by Dr. Flynt Leverett entitled ``Why Libya Gave Up the Bomb'' from the January 23, 2004, New York Times; and the second is a Middle East Institute Policy Brief by two former assistant Secretaries of State and former ambassadors, Martin Indyk and Edward S. Walker entitled ``What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?'' dated April 7, 2004. Finally, let me make two other points. We have seen in recent days troubling allegations that Colonel Qadhafi was himself involved in ordering assassinations of Saudi leaders. These are, of course, press reports. But these stories remind us that the success of our policies toward Libya remain an open question, and I am sure the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) agrees with me that we need to be clear-eyed and diligent to make certain that these promises by Colonel Qadhafi are kept, and that in other respects, he does not convert to any of his old habits.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on this side; and I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) not only for the amendment but for, as he said, engaging the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) in a constructive effort to improve the amendment, and I think it is a lot better. Frankly, I wish that our bill that we are considering and voting on today had engaged the minority more constructively at an earlier stage; I think it would have been a lot better. I do support the Boehlert amendment. I fondly remember our trip, six countries, 6 days. I think the gentleman left out Sicily, so we might add 7 countries in 6 days.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on our side.

Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my support for this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I will support the amendment, though I wish it had included a clear statement about the importance of U.S. obligations to adhere to international laws, conventions and treatises to prevent torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of human beings. Mr. Chairman, one of the most troubling aspects of this whole detainee issue, besides the absolutely reprehensible abuse of prisoners, is the all-out assault on the rule of law that is clearly revealed in legal memos that seem to justify abuse and even torture of detainees. None of us is naive here, and as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I strongly believe in the importance of interrogations and understand that interrogations can yield information that protect thousands or millions of Americans. We have to interrogate prisoners, but over the many years of our country's history, we have always done those interrogations consistent with the rule of law, and only recently have some very troubling memoranda surfaced at the highest levels of the Justice Department and the Defense Department that raise questions and that actually assert that the President of the United States in his role as commander in chief could actually be above the law. I thought, Mr. Chairman, that we had defeated that idea at Runnymede centuries and centuries ago and that our country was built on a foundation of the rule of law, and I worry, Mr. Chairman, that if we do not observe the rule of law, not only do we undercut our moral authority, but we endanger our troops who might be treated just the way some of our people are treating other troops. Now, let me add quickly that the beheading of Americans and other nationals is absolutely outrageous, and nowhere do I think that behavior is consistent with even rational or humane behavior. It is abhorrent and appalling, and I strongly condemn it. But in conclusion, I think it is important that we support this amendment, but I think it is also important that as we do support this amendment, we think about the fact that the rule of law must always apply as we treat detainees and proceed with the important work of interrogations. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for those comments and strongly agree with them. In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just mention that on that trip that was described, we did spend a day and evening in Baghdad. It was my second visit. We met with troops, but we also met with all of our intelligence personnel at the scene in addition to the leaders of the CPA. What is troubling about that, and I believe the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has commented on this in another appearance, our appearance yesterday in the Committee on Rules, because the timing of our trip was February 2004. While we were in Baghdad, General Taguba was doing his investigation of prison abuse and so forth in Baghdad, and we were never told by these intelligence leaders that that investigation was ongoing. That was wrong. That diminishes our oversight, and those folks whom we support as robustly as we can need to be fully candid with our committee, especially when we are seeking them out to try to help them. Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by saying that I support the gentleman's amendment as improved by the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos). [From the New York Times, 23 January 2004] Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb, (By Flynt Leverett) Washington.--As President Bush made clear in his State of the Union address, he sees the striking developments in relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war on terrorism. The idea is that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was a largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out the prospect of similar progress with other states that support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and brutalize their own people. However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq war, the president misrepresents the real lessons of the Libyan case. This confusion undermines our chances of getting countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead. The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations sanctions against Libya. Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a ``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case. We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted permanently. This script became the basis for three-party negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue. By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted responsibility for its officials' actions. But during these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of United Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction. This is the content in which Libyan officials approached the United States and Britain last spring to discuss dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead the removal of our own sanctions, perhaps by the end of this year. The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing Iranian or Syrian behavior. The president's lack of initiative on this point is especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has a singular opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through diplomatic channels and to former officials (including myself) their interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations with Washington. Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President Bashar al-Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last week--have told me that they want a better strategic understanding with the United States. To achieve this, however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. As Mr. Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in return. One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more constructive course with Libya was that the White House, uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie case was approved by an informal coalition made up of Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of the loop. Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course involving Iran and Syria. However, until the administration learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the mind of ideology. Flynn Leverett, a visiting fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Politics at the Brookings Institution, was senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security Council from 2002 to 2003.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much more time do we have?

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me just say to the sponsor of the amendment that all of us in this House, on a bipartisan basis, recognize and respect and honor the heroism and sacrifice of the men and women in the intelligence community. I have spoken to it two or three times already today. That is not the issue. The issue is additional language in this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Ms. HARMAN

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her leadership on the Committee on Rules and for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this rule and to the previous question, which I understand will be offered, because it deprives our colleagues of the opportunity to strengthen the Intelligence Authorization Act. Strong intelligence is our first line of defense in the war on terrorism; and make no mistake, we are at war. The gruesome beheadings of Danny Pearl, Nick Berg, Paul Johnson, and yesterday's murder of 33- year-old Kim Sun Il of South Korea are stark reminders of the nature of our enemy. Our brave men and women of the intelligence community are on the frontlines fighting that enemy. They risked their lives for our freedom, and they deserve our unflinching support. Yet, unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this rule deprives them of that support. H.R. 4548 provides less than one-third of the key counterterrorism funding the intelligence community has told us it needs to fight the war on terrorism. Less than one-third. Members of our committee had proposed an amendment to fully fund counterterrorism operations. This rule denies us the opportunity to consider that amendment. I think it is irresponsible of us to shortchange our counterterrorism efforts, particularly when we know al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are planning attacks against us right now. By providing one-third of the counterterrorism funding, the majority's bill essentially says to the brave men and women of the intelligence community, you can count on operations for 3 or 4 more months, but after that, that is rough, until next April. That, Mr. Speaker, is exactly what this bill does, and that is not acceptable. A better rule, a much better rule would have allowed the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) of our committee to fix this bill with an amendment that would have provided for 100 percent of the funding that the intelligence agencies say they need. Their amendment would have done away with the dangerous practice of budgeting by supplemental, of saying let us kick this problem down the road. And in this case, let us kick it down the road until well after the November election. A rule limiting amendments may be appropriate for other legislation, but this legislation is different, and here is why. As you know, Mr. Speaker, much of our work is classified and, therefore, is not discussed in the open. However, a large portion of our work on the intelligence policy is unclassified and is contained in the public portion of our legislation. This information does not compromise our intelligence sources and methods, and for that reason we asked the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to hold the markup of the public portion of our bill in public. On a party-line vote, the majority refused. Therefore, these amendments have never been debated or voted on in public, even though they are not classified and even though they would, if adopted, be part of the public part of our bill. Mr. Speaker, there is no secret law in the United States, and it is anathema to this House to stifle open debate about important policy issues. For that reason, it is important that the full House have the opportunity to debate these amendments. This rule kills that debate, shuts down any effort to fully fund counterterrorism, and tries to sweep this issue under the rug. Well, this issue is too important, too vital to our national security to be swept under the rug. The Democrats on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence offered five amendments, all of which were good, all of which would have strengthened the bill and strengthened our oversight. All but one were rejected by this rule. That is a shame, Mr. Speaker, because instead of having a rule that could bring us together under one bipartisan banner, we have a rule that ensures this bill will trigger a bitter partisan divide. In case the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the Republicans have not noticed, the terrorists did not check our party labels before launching their attacks against us on 9/11, and they will not check them when they launch the next attack. I would have hoped that we could debate the bill not just as Democrats and Republicans, but as Americans. And for the sake of the country and for the sake of national security, I am sorry that the majority let us down. Again, I ask for a ``no'' vote on the rule and a ``no'' vote on the previous question.

Ms. HARMAN

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on this.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I believe that having the CIA Inspector General conduct an impartial independent audit of the intelligence reporting on this matter is a good idea, and I support his amendment. Let me just mention something that I do not believe has come up the debate, and that is that there is a real difference pre-war and post- war. From my review of the sources provided to our committee on the nature of this relationship, I have concluded that pre-war there were contacts but no operational relationship. Post-war is a different story. Post-war there is an operational relationship between terrorists and folks on the ground in Iraq. Saddam Hussein is no longer there, but there is a massive both recruiting and enabling effort in Iraq for terrorists around the world. Iraq has now become fly paper. Let me just suggest to the amendment's sponsor that the results of the audit should be made public. I think that might help eradicate some of the confusion that has been discussed. I think his amendment is a public service, and I support it.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I want the gentleman to know that I support his amendment. For years the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has extolled the virtues of open-source reporting, as he calls it, OSINT. Often they are the most reliable form of intelligence available, as his charts illustrate. Yet, in spite of this, I believe the intelligence community has not invested sufficiently in open sources of information, and I am pleased that this amendment is being offered, and I think it improves the bill we are debating. On that subject, Mr. Chairman, let me just return to an earlier conversation about full funding of counterterrorism. While we have been spending the last 4 hours on the floor, a letter was received from the DCI, George Tenet. It was addressed to me and to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), and he states in his letter that he is planning to release it. It is a comment on the majority report language to the bill, and I just want to quote in part. He says, this is a letter dated today: ``I find it hard to accept that any serious observer would believe, as the committee apparently does, that there is an unhealthy emphasis on counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts or that we are placing too much emphasis supporting the Nation's Iraq effort at the CIA. I am deeply disappointed at the way the report has chosen to question the leadership and capabilities of the clandestine service.'' Now, these are the opinions of DCI George Tenet. I would just point out at this point in the debate that the minority was never consulted about the majority report. We filed our own report, and I would just like the record to reflect that these are the reactions of DCI George Tenet to portions of the majority report. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on our side?

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a revote on the Sam Johnson of Texas amendment.