Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HATCH. Please tell me. This is a sincere question.

Mr. HATCH. Madam President, our Nation's recent history has been marred by some horrific crimes committed because the victim was a member of a particular class or group. The beating death of Matthew Shepard in Laramie, WY, and then the dragging death of James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper TX. These two spring readily to mind. I firmly believe that such hate-motivated violence is to be abhorred and that the Senate must raise its voice and lead on this issue. During the last 30 years, Congress has been the engine of progress in protecting civil rights and in driving us as a society increasingly closer to the goal of equal rights for all under the law. Historians will conclude, I have little doubt, that many of America's greatest strides in civil rights progress took place just before this present moment on history's grand timeline: Congress protected Americans from employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion and national origin with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Congress protected Americans from gender-based discrimination in rates of pay for equal work with the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and from age discrimination with the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; Congress extended protections to immigration status with the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, and to the disabled with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. And the list goes on and on. Yet despite our best efforts, discrimination continues to persist in so many forms in this country, but most sadly in the rudimentary and malicious form of violence against individuals because of their membership in a particular class or group. Let me state, unequivocally, that this is America's fight. As much as we condemn all crime, crimes manifesting an animus for someone's race, religion or other characteristics can be more sinister than other crimes. A crime committed not just to harm an individual, but out of the motive of sending a message of malice to an entire community-- oftentimes a community that has historically been the subject of discrimination--is appropriately punished more harshly, or in a different manner, than other crimes. This is in keeping with the longstanding principle of criminal justice--as recognized by the Supreme Court in its unanimous 1993 decision in Wisconsin versus Mitchell upholding Wisconsin's sentencing enhancement for crimes of animus--that the worse a criminal defendant's motive, the worse the crime. Moreover, crimes of animus are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes; they inflict deep, lasting and distinct injuries--some of which never heal--on victims and their family members; they incite community unrest; and, ultimately, they are downright un-American. The melting pot of America is the most successful multiethnic, multiracial, and multifaith country in all recorded history. This is something to ponder as we consider the atrocities so routinely sanctioned in other countries--like Serbia or Rwanda--committed against persons entirely on the basis of their racial, ethnic or religious identity. I am resolute in my view that the Federal Government can play a valuable role in responding to crimes of malice and hate. One example here is my sponsorship of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, a law which instituted a data collection system to assess the extent of hate crime activity, and which now has thousands of voluntary law enforcement agency participants. Another, more recent example, is the passage in 1996 of the Church Arson Protection Act, which, among other things, criminalized the destruction of any church, synagogue, mosque or other place of religious worship because of the race, color, or ethnic characteristics of an individual associated with that property. To be sure, however, any Federal response--to be a meaningful one-- must abide by the constitutional limitations imposed on Congress, and be cognizant of the limitations on Congress's enumerated powers that are routinely enforced by the courts. This is more true today than it would have been even a mere decade ago, given the significant revival by the U.S. Supreme Court of the federalism doctrine in a string of decisions beginning in 1992. Those decisions must make us particularly vigilant in respecting the courts' restrictions on Congress's powers to legislate under section 5 of the 14th amendment, and under the commerce clause. We therefore need to arrive at a Federal response to this matter that is not only as effective as possible, but that carefully navigates the rocky shoals of these court decisions. To that end, I have prepared an approach that I believe will be not only an effective one, but one that would avoid altogether the constitutional risks that attach to other possible Federal Responses that have been raised. Indeed, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that States and localities should continue to be responsible for prosecuting the overwhelming majority of hate crimes, and that no legislation is worthwhile if it is invalidated as unconstitutional. This is worth repeating. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that States and localities should continue to be responsible for prosecuting the overwhelming majority of hate crimes, and that no legislation is worthwhile if it is invalidated as unconstitutional. There are two principal components to my approach: First my amendment creates a meaningful partnership between the Federal Government and the States in combating hate crime by establishing within the Justice Department a grant program to assist State and local authorities in investigating and prosecuting hate crimes. Much of the cited justification given by those who advocate broad Federal jurisdiction over these hate-motivated crimes is a lack of adequate resources at the State and local level. Accordingly, before we take the step of making a Federal offense of every crime motivated by a hatred of someone's membership in a particular class or group, it is imperative that we equip States and localities with the resources necessary so that they can undertake these criminal investigations and prosecutions on their own. Second, my approach undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the raw data that has been collected pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. 534, the law requiring the collection of data on these crimes--a bill that I worked very hard to pass. The Federal Government has been collecting this data for years, but we have yet to analyze it. A comparison of the records of different jurisdictions--some with hate crimes, others without--to determine whether there is, in fact, a problem in certain States' prosecution of hate crimes also is provided for in my amendment. Before we make all hate crimes Federal offenses, I believe we should provide assistance to the States and analyze whether our assumptions about what the States are doing, or are not doing, are valid. It is no answer for the Senate to sit by silently while these crimes are being committed. The ugly, bigoted, and violent underside of some in our country that is reflected by the commission of hate crimes must be combated at all levels of government. For supporters of the Kennedy amendment, Federal leadership necessitates Federal control. I do not subscribe to this view, especially when it comes to this problem. Thus, I oppose Senator Kennedy's amendment. It proposes that to combat hate crimes Congress should enact a new tier of far-reaching Federal criminal legislation. That approach strays from the foundations of our constitutional structure--namely, the first principles of federalism that for more than two centuries have vested States with primary responsibility for prosecuting crimes committed within their boundaries. As important as this issue is, there is little evidence that a broad federalization of hate crimes is warranted. Indeed, it may be that national enforcement of hate crimes could decrease if States are told the Federal Government has assumed primary responsibility over hate crime enforcement. In addition, serious constitutional questions exist regarding the Kennedy hate crimes amendment. First, the Kennedy amendment, if adopted, would not be a valid exercise of congressional authority under section 5 of the 14th amendment. The Supreme Court has made clear in recent years that legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to section 5 of the 14th amendment may only criminalize action taken by a State. Just last month, the Supreme Court in the recent United States v. Morrison case re-emphasized the State-action requirement that limits Congress' authority to enact legislation under the 14th amendment. The Court stated: Foremost among these limitations [on Congressional power] is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action. The principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the . . . Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The Kennedy amendment, however, seeks to prohibit private conduct-- crimes of violence committed by private individuals against minorities, religious practitioners, women, homosexuals, or the disabled. It therefore is very similar to the provision of the Violence Against Women Act--a bill I worked very hard to pass, called the Biden-Hatch Act--that sought to prohibit crimes of violence committed by private individuals against women. The Supreme Court in Morrison held that that provision of the Violence Against Women Act was not a valid exercise of congressional power under section 5 of the 14th amendment. To be sure, Congress can regulate purely private conduct under its commerce clause authority. But the Kennedy amendment likely would not be a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce clause either. The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez, and especially its recent Morrison decision, set forth the scope of Congress' commerce clause power. The Morrison opinion, in particular, changed the legal landscape regarding congressional power in relation to the States. Thus, legislation that was perfectly fine only 2 months ago now raises serious constitutional questions. The Kennedy amendment is not consistent with Lopez and Morrison. Both Lopez and Morrison require that the conduct regulated by Congress pursuant to its commerce clause power be ``some sort of economic endeavor.'' The Court has held that a statute that is ``a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,'' does not meet constitutional muster. Here, the conduct sought to be regulated--hate crimes--is in no sense economic or commercial, but instead, by its very terms, is non-economic and criminal in nature, just like the conduct Congress sought to regulate in the Gun Free Schools Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act--statutes that were held to be unconstitutional in Lopez and Morrison. In light of the Morrison decision, the Kennedy amendment makes an effort to require a direct link to interstate commerce before the Federal government can prosecute a hate crime based on sexual orientation, gender, or disability. It permits Federal hate crimes prosecution in four broad circumstances: No. 1, where the hate crime occurred in relation to interstate travel by the defendant or the victim; No. 2, where the defendant used a ``channel, facility or instrumentality'' of interstate commerce to commit the hate crime; No. 3, where the defendant committed the hate crime by using a firearm or other weapon that has traveled in interstate commerce; and No. 4, where the hate crime interferes with commercial or economic activity of the victim. None of these circumstances provides an appropriate interstate nexus that would make the legislation constitutional. First, the interstate travel requirement of the Kennedy amendment's first circumstance where Federal prosecution would be appropriate does nothing to change the criminal, non-economic nature of the hate crime. The requirement of the second circumstance, that the defendant commit the hate crime by using a channel, facility or instrumentality of interstate commerce, may provide a interstate nexus, but it is unclear precisely what hate crimes that would encompass: hijacking a plane or blowing up a rail line in connection with a hate crime? The third circumstance's requirement that the defendant have used a weapon that traveled in interstate commerce would blow a hole in the commerce clause; Congress could then federalize essentially all State crimes where a firearm or other weapon is used; for example, most homicides. Finally, the fourth circumstance's requirement that the victim be working and that the hate crime interfere with his or her work is analogous to the reasoning the Court rejected in Morrison; that is, that violence against women harms our national economy. In the case of the Kennedy hate crimes amendment, the argument would be that hate crimes harm our national economy and therefore they have a nexus to interstate commerce. The Court in Morrison and in Lopez rejected those ``costs of crime'' and ``national productivity'' arguments because ``they would permit Congress to regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.'' Finally, the Kennedy amendment's catch-all provision, that the Federal government may prosecute a hate crime only if the crime ``otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce,'' not only merely restates the constitutional test, it misstates the constitutional test. To be constitutional, the conduct must ``substantially affect'' interstate commerce. In addition to its constitutional problems, the Kennedy amendment has other deficiencies. The amendment provides that where the hate crime is a murder, the perpetrator ``shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.'' It does not authorize the death penalty for even the most heinous hate crimes. Accordingly, the horrific dragging death of James Byrd, Jr. on a back road in Jasper, TX, for example, under the Kennedy amendment, would provide only for a life sentence. In the Byrd case, however, State prosecutors tried the case as a capital case and obtained death sentences for the defendants. The Kennedy amendment, then, which purports to provide Federal leadership in the prosecution of hate crimes, would not even provide for the ultimate sentence permitted under duly enacted Texas law. When we asked the Justice Department what type of proof they had that the States are not doing the job, they promised to provide us evidence. I haven't seen it yet. That was quite a while ago. There may be, in the eyes of some, and in my eyes, a great reason to try to make Senator Kennedy's amendment constitutional, and that is what I tried to do in my amendment in order to do something about this if the States are not doing the job. But to this day, I have not had any information indicating that they are not doing the job. And in the Byrd case, they certainly have. In the Shepard case, they certainly have, just to mention a couple of them. I feel as deeply about hate crimes as Senator Kennedy or anybody else in this Chamber. But I want to abide by the Constitution. I recall Justice Scalia's admonition that there should be a presumption that Congress want to enact constitutional legislation, but because of some of the things we are doing, maybe that presumption is unjustified Supporters of the Kennedy amendment have claimed that it will create a partnership with State and local law enforcement. They have delicately described the legislation as being deferential to State and local authorities as to when the Justice Department will exercise jurisdiction over a particular hate crime. This is hogwash. The amendment does not defer to State or local authorities at all. It would leave the Justice Department free to insert itself in a local hate crime prosecution at the beginning, middle or end of the prosecution, even after the local prosecutor has obtained a guilty verdict. Even if the Justice Department does not formally insert itself into the particular case, it nevertheless will be empowered by the legislation to exert enormous pressure on local prosecutors regarding the manner in which they handle the case--from charging decisions the plea bargaining decisions to sentencing decisions. The Kennedy hate crimes amendment, pure and simple, would expand federal jurisdiction and federalize what currently are State crimes. By contrast, my amendment would address the issue of hate crimes in a responsible, constitutional way--by assisting States and local authorities in their efforts to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. It provides for a study of this issue to see if there really are States and local governments out there who, for whatever reason, are not investigating and prosecuting hate crimes. And, it would provide resources to State and local governments that are trying to combat hate crimes but lack the resources to do so. In summary, we must lead--but lead responsibly--recognizing that we live in a country of governments of shared and divided responsibilities. In confronting a world of prejudice greater than any of us can now imagine, President Abraham Lincoln said to Congress in 1862 that the ``dogmas of the quiet past'' were ``inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise--with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.'' In that very spirit, I encourage this body to question the dogma that federal leadership must include federal control, and I encourage this body to act anew by supporting a proposal that seeks to stem hate- motivated crime, while at the same time respecting the primacy states traditionally have enjoyed under our Constitution in prosecuting crimes committed within their boundaries. Ultimately, I believe the approach I have set forth is a principled way to accommodate our twin aims--our well-intentioned desire to investigate, prosecute, and, hopefully, end these vicious crimes; and our unequivocal duty to respect the constitutional boundaries governing any legislative action we take. My proposal should unite all of us on the one point about which we should most fervently agree--that the Senate must speak firmly and meaningfully in denouncing as wrong in all respects those actions we have increasingly come to know as hate crimes. Our continued progress in fighting to protect Americans' civil rights demands no less. Madam President, what the Hatch amendment does in comparison to the Kennedy amendment--and look, like I say, I feel as deeply about this as Senator Kennedy does, and I respect him for how he feels, and I also respect Senator Smith from Oregon and the distinguished Senator from Illinois. We are all trying to do the same thing, and that is make sure that hate crimes are prosecuted in our society today. I am very concerned about it, but I am also concerned about meeting the requisites of the Constitution as well. I believe my amendment would do that. I believe it would do it in a far more responsible way than the way the Kennedy amendment does. What the Hatch amendment does is provide for a comprehensive study so we can find out once and for all--we have the Hate Crimes Statistics Act giving us the statistics; it is something that I helped to do years ago along with Senator Kennedy. That study would help us to find out just what is happening in our society and whether or not the State and local governments are inadequate or incapable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. Two, we would provide for an intergovernmental assistance program. We provide technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or other assistance in the criminal investigation or the prosecution of crimes that, one, constitute a crime of violence; two, are a felony under relevant State law; and three, are motivated by animus against the victim by reason of the victim's membership in a particular class or group. My amendment would provide for Federal grants. We authorize the Attorney General, in cases where special circumstances exist, to make grants of up to $100,000 to States and local entities to assist in the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. We require grant recipients to certify that the State or local entity lack the resources necessary to investigate or prosecute such crimes. And, we require that the Attorney General shall approve or disapprove grant applications within 10 days of receiving the application. We provide that the Attorney General shall report to Congress on the effectiveness of the program and conduct an audit to assure that the grants awarded are used properly. What we do not do is we do not create a new Federal crime. We do not give the Justice Department jurisdiction over crimes that are motivated because of a person's membership in a particular class or group; that is, the Hatch amendment does not Federalize crimes motivated because of a person's race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. To enact such a broad federalization of hate-motivated crimes would raise serious constitutional concerns. In addition, the Kennedy amendment would federalize all rapes and sexual assaults and, in so doing, would severely burden Federal law enforcement agencies, Federal prosecutors, and Federal courts. My amendment does not authorize Federal interference with State and local investigations and prosecutions. It is not our job to second-guess the investigation and prosecution and sentencing decisions of State and local authorities in cases involving hate crimes. As such, my amendment recognizes the significant efforts of State and local law enforcement in investigating and prosecuting all violent crimes, including hate crimes. In other words, my amendment would provide the analysis, study, and data to determine whether or not the States are failing or refusing to combat these horrible crimes. It provides the Government assistance to be able to help the State and local people do their job in these areas. Of course, we provide various other kinds of assistance that could be helpful in this matter. Madam President, I have taken enough time. Parliamentary inquiry. Is it time to send the amendment to the desk?

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I don't disagree with the Senator that hate crimes are occurring, but they are being prosecuted by State and local officials. That is the point. Many of the cases --and there aren't a lot of cases that the Justice Department has provided--are cases where the Justice Department felt there should have been a greater remedy and there should have been greater sentencing. But they are not in large measure cases where State refused or failed to prosecute the perpetrators of these horrendous crimes. The fact is, there are not a lot of cases that can be produced, and the Justice Department has not been able to produce them. I don't disagree that hate crimes are occurring and we should stamp them out, but they are being prosecuted by State and local officials to the fullest extent of the law. The Federal Government may disagree on how they prosecute sometimes, but the fact is, they are being prosecuted. No one has shown, certainly not the Justice Department, that these truly horrific crimes are not being prosecuted, let alone on a large scale. The fact is, they are being prosecuted. The cases identified by the Justice Department, a handful of cases, were in large measure cases where State officials, investigators, and prosecutors got verdicts and sentences. In other words, they were brought and verdicts and sentences were obtained. The Federal Government would have tried the cases differently or might have sought a higher or more harsh sentence. But they are not cases where the State refused to prosecute a hate crime. My colleague is right: We should do everything in our power to stop hate crimes in our society. But no one to this date has been able to show that there is a widespread, endemic failure at the State level to prosecute these crimes. There is no real evidence that the States are being slovenly in their duties. That is one reason why I think it is very important that we objectively analyze these matters. We will have more time to debate this, hopefully a little more time tomorrow. Finally, when Mr. Holder, the Deputy Attorney General, appeared before the committee, he could not cite one case, not a single case. After a month of research, the Justice Department came up with a handful of cases. That was it. Not because they weren't prosecuted at the State level, they were. They just differed with the way they were prosecuted. That is not good enough. These are some of the things that bother me. I am willing to work with the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts and the distinguished Senator from Oregon and others who want to do something. If the amendment I am offering is not good enough, I am willing to work to see if we can find something that will bring us together and do a better job, certainly, to stamp out any type of hate criminal activity. But I am very loathe to federalize all crimes so that the Federal Government can second-guess State and local prosecutors every time a criminal activity occurs. I think one could say in many respects all crimes are hate crimes, even though they are not categorized as such now. They are prosecuted, and that is the important thing. Mr. President, I will ask unanimous consent, unless there is anyone else who desires to speak. Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.

Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I respect my colleagues. I think we are all here to try to get at the same problem. I respect Senator Kennedy for his sincere effort to try to do what is right with regard to civil rights matters generally, and with regard to hate crimes in particular. I feel very much the same way. This is a great country. It is the greatest in the world. We ought to set an example. We ought to do the things that really need to be done. But I think we have to have the facts before we act. I don't think we should federalize crimes. I think this amendment is too broad. We are approaching this in two different ways. I hope we can somehow or other get together to solve this matter in a way that will make sense--that respects the principles of federalism, that respects the States in their efforts to combat hate crimes. Right now, we are not sure there are any States or local jurisdictions out there that are failing or refusing to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. You can cite the James Byrd and Matthew Shepard cases as two illustrations where State authorities have done a tremendous job in prosecuting horrific, hate-motivated crimes. I don't think anybody should have to suffer from hate crime activity. I think my amendment does not go as far as Senator Kennedy's, but I think it will certainly handle the problem in a way that respects federalism, respects the Constitution, and respects the nine decisions of the Supreme Court over the last 8 years that have reinforced the principle of federalism. In the end, I think my amendment will do what all of us here on the floor would like to see done--promote the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes--in a way that is constitutionally sound. I yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH. I thank my colleague. If I could comment, I believe the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts can show that there are hate crimes in our society. I think that he will have a difficult time, however, showing that that State and local prosecutors are unwilling to investigate and prosecute hate-motivated crimes. That is why I asked the Justice Department to provide to us data and information on the specific instances where State and local authorities failed or refused to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. Years ago, under the leadership of Senator Kennedy and myself, the Senate passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act to collect data on the incidence of hate crimes. We have statistics. I am sure there are hate crimes, but I am not sure there is any evidence to show that these hate crimes are not being prosecuted in the respective States. I'm just not sure. That is one reason I think we should cautiously approach this, rather than approach it in a way that I believe would be unconstitutional. I thank my colleague.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I listened carefully to the comments of my colleague. He knows I have great respect for him in regard to civil rights matters. I have great commendation for him. I feel deeply, as he does. However, there is no use kidding about it. I think we ought to be prudent in the approach that we take. I think we ought to be constitutionally sound as well. In all of the comments of my dear friend, he still hasn't answered this basic question, which is: Can those who are pushing this very broad legislation that would federalize all hate crimes--and all crimes are hate crimes, by the way. I believe that is, if not wholly true, certainly substantially true--but can those who want to enact this broad legislation federalizing all hate-motivated crimes tell me the number of instances, if any, in which State or local authorities have refused or failed to investigate and prosecute hate crimes? If there are any cases in which State or local authorities have refused or failed to investigate and prosecute a hate crime, was it because the State or the local jurisdiction was unwilling, for whatever reason, to bring the prosecution? These questions haven't been answered. We asked them at the hearings, and the Justice Department couldn't answer them. In fact, Deputy Attorney General Holder testified that States and localities should be responsible for prosecuting the overwhelming majority of hate crimes. He said: State and local officials are on the front lines and do an enormous job in investigating and prosecuting hate crimes that occur in their communities. In fact, most hate crimes are investigated and prosecuted at the State level. That is the Deputy Attorney General of the United States of America. We have never denied that hate crimes are occurring. Nobody can deny that. I want to get rid of them as much as anybody--certainly as much as the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. But we have yet to hear of specific instances where States have failed or refused to prosecute. We have heard lots of horrific stories about hate crimes from Senators Kennedy, Reid, and Durbin. But I think they have neglected to finish the story. In each case, the Shepard case and the Byrd case, for example-- heinous crimes, no question about it--that should never have occurred; that should have been prosecuted; and were prosecuted. The State prosecutors investigated those cases. They prosecuted the defendants. In the Byrd case, the prosecutors even obtained the death penalty, something that could not be obtained if the Kennedy amendment had been passed and the Federal Government had brought the case. Think about that. I think some crimes are so heinous that the death penalty should be imposed. Certainly the Byrd case, where racists chained James Byrd to a truck and dragged him to death on a back road in Jasper, Texas, warranted the death penalty. But in all of those cases, there ought to be absolute proof of guilt. The crime ought to be so heinous that it justifies the penalty, and there should be no substantial evidence of discrimination. In the Byrd case and the Shepard case, the defendants were fully prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The question is not whether hate crimes are occurring. They are. We have them in our society--the greatest society in the world. We have some hate crimes. They are occurring. We all know it. They are occurring, and they are horrific and are to be abhorred. The question, though, is whether the States are adequately fighting these hate crimes, or whether we need to make a Federal case out of every hate- motivated crime. My amendment calls for an analysis of that question. If my amendment passes and causes an analysis of that question, and we conclude that hate crimes are not being prosecuted by the State and local prosecutors, my gosh, I think then we are justified to federalize, if we can do it constitutionally, many of these crimes. A prudent thing, in my view in light of the constitutional questions that are raised by the Kennedy amendment, would be to do the analysis first. But my amendment does more than that. My amendment provides funds to assist State and local authorities in investigating and prosecuting hate-motivated crimes. My amendment provides resources and materials to be able to help States and localities with hate crimes. We are not ignoring the problems that exist. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder conceded in his testimony before our committee, and he acknowledged that an analysis of the hate crimes statistics that have been collected needs to be conducted to determine whether State and local authorities are failing to combat hate crimes. Eric Holder testified that the statistics we have are, to use his term, ``inadequate.'' In his testimony, Deputy Attorney General Holder repeatedly argued that the Justice Department should be permitted to involve itself in local hate crime cases where local authorities are ``unable or unwilling to prosecute the case.'' Holder admitted in his testimony that there are ``not very many'' instances--later in his testimony, he said, ``rare instances''--where local jurisdictions, for whatever reason, are unwilling to proceed in cases that the Justice Department ``thinks should be prosecuted.'' At the hearing, I asked Deputy Attorney General Holder if he could identify ``any specific instances in which State law enforcement authorities have deliberately failed to enforce the law against the perpetrator of a crime.'' I asked him a specific question, to give me any specific instances in which State law enforcement authorities have deliberately failed to enforce the law against the perpetrator of a crime. I went further and I asked him, ``So the question is, can you give me specific instances where the States have failed in their duty to investigate and prosecute hate crimes.'' Deputy Attorney General Holder responded with only a handful of specific instances--and they were not instances where the State or local authorities refused to act but instances where the Justice Department felt that it would have tried the case differently or sought a harsher sentence, or where the Justice Department was not pleased with the verdict that State prosecutors obtained. The few cases Holder identified generally were not cases where State officials abdicated their responsibility to investigate and prosecute hate-motivated crimes. I have to believe there may be some such cases, but the ones Mr. Holder identified were not persuasive. They did not show any widespread pattern of State and local authorities refusing or failing to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. I am happy to receive them from my distinguished friend from Massachusetts, and I am sure he may be able to cite some. Are there so many of them that we justify federalizing all hate crimes and dipping the Federal nose into everything that is done on the State and local levels? I don't know--in my mind, the case for doing so has not yet been made. Deputy Attorney General Holder also testified that no hate crimes legislation is worthwhile if it is invalidated as unconstitutional. It would be one thing if we were talking about a Supreme Court case that was decided 100 years ago. We are talking about a case, however, the Morrison case, that was decided one month ago and invalidates exactly what Senator Kennedy is doing today. If we find out that States are refusing to prosecute hate crimes, then we would be justified under the 14th amendment in enacting legislation directed at State officials or people acting under color of law who are denying victims of hate crimes the equal protection of the laws. If that were shown, then we would be justified, especially if such conduct were pervasive, or especially if there were a considerable number of cases where State officials were denying the equal protection of the laws by refusing to prosecute crimes committed against certain groups or classes of people. The supporters of the Kennedy amendment, I have to believe, will be able to come up with one, or two, or maybe three cases where State officials denied the equal protection of the laws in this manner. But even if then can, would that justify federalizing all hate crimes? Mr. President, 95 percent of all criminal activity is prosecuted in State and local jurisdictions--95 percent. There are good reasons for that. Frankly, they do every bit as good a job as Federal prosecutors do. But if you put in ``gender,'' as Senator Kennedy does in his amendment, then every rape or assault becomes a Federal crime. I can just hear some of the very radical groups demanding that U.S. attorneys in Federal court bring cases in every rape case because every rape, in my opinion, is a hate crime. However, there is no evidence that the States are not handling those sorts of cases properly. They may be in a better position to handle them well. It may be that the federal government needs to provide enough money, so that as a backup, the DNA postconviction and even preconviction DNA testing can be conducted and we can see that justice is done. I am not unwilling to consider doing that. In fact, I am considering doing just that. I take no second seat to any Senator in this Chamber in the desire to get rid of hate crimes. But I do think you have to be wise and you can't just emotionally do it because you want to federalize things and you want to get control of them, when, in fact, the State and local governments are doing a fairly decent job. If they are not, that is another matter. I want to see the statistics. That is one reason I want a study, an analysis of these matters, so that we can know. Senator Kennedy and I fought on this very floor for the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. I have taken a lot of abuse through the years for having done so by some on the conservative side, and by some on the liberal side for not doing more. We have the statistics. We have a pretty good idea that these crimes are being committed. We just haven't got an analysis, nor do we have the facts, on whether the States are doing an adequate job of combating these crimes. And why should we go blundering ahead, federalizing all these crimes, when we are not really sure that the State and local governments are not doing a good job. In fact, the evidence I have seen appears to show that the States are taking their responsibilities in this area seriously. My amendment does a lot. It calls for a study to determine whether these hate-motivated crimes are not being prosecuted at the State level in the manner that they should be. There are those in our body who even fight against that. I am talking about the Congress as a whole. I hope there is nobody in the Senate who would fight against that. We should do an analysis and a study. We should know. We have the statistics. I do want to clear up one thing. The Department of Justice did send up a handful of cases in which the Department felt the result in hate crime litigation was inadequate. But the very few cases they identified in no way justify this type of expansive legislation. That is what I am concerned about. Now, if we find that the States are refusing to do their jobs, that is another matter. We would be justified under the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to enact remedial legislation prohibiting the States from denying our citizens the equal protection of the laws by refusing or failing to combat hate crimes. Supporters of the Kennedy amendment argue that their amendment is limited because the Justice Department could exercise jurisdiction only in four instances. Supporters of the Kennedy amendment call these instances ``exceptions''--as in the Justice Department will not exercise jurisdiction over State prosecutions of hate crimes, ``except'' when one of the four circumstances outlined in the amendment is present. But these so-called ``exceptions'' to the exercise of federal jurisdiction are exceptions that swallow the rule. The Kennedy amendment raises serious constitutional decisions or questions. The amendment is not consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, just decided last month. The amendment attempts to federalize crimes committed because of the victim's actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. Last month's Supreme Court decision in United States v. Morrison changed the legal landscape with regard to congressional power vis-a- vis the States. In light of the Morrison decision, we first should take adequate steps to ensure that legislation is constitutional. And where serious constitutional questions are raised, we should responsibly pursue less intrusive alternatives. In the case of hate crimes legislation, we should at least determine whether a broad federalization of these crimes is needed, and whether a broad federalization of these crimes would be constitutional in light of Morrison. What may have been constitutional in our minds pre-Morrison may not be constitutional today. I was the primary cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act. It may never have come up had Senator Biden and I not pushed it as hard as we did. I believed it was constitutional at the time, or I wouldn't have done it. But it clearly was stricken as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. As the father of three daughters and a great number of granddaughters, I certainly want women protected in our society. If the State and local governments are not doing that, I will find some way. I think perhaps Senator Kennedy, I, and others of good faith can find some way of making sure that these wrongs are righted. But Congress has a duty to make sure that legislation it enacts is constitutional. Justice Scalia, as I stated earlier, recently criticized Congress for failing to consider whether legislation is constitutional before enacting it. Here is what he said: My court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the court with the presumption of constitutionality. But if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with, and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution [let the Supreme Court worry] perhaps the presumption is unwarranted. He is saying that we have a constitutional obligation to live within the constraints of the Constitution. Although Morrison was a 5-4 decision, as many important decisions are, it is the supreme law of this land. And the Kennedy approach is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because under the 14th amendment it seeks to criminalize purely private conduct. In the Morrison case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that legislation enacted by Congress under the 14th Amendment may only criminalize State action, not individual action. So it really is unconstitutional from that standpoint, from the standpoint of the 14th Amendment. In addition, the Kennedy amendment is unconstitutional under the commerce clause. In Morrison, the Supreme Court emphasized that the conduct regulated by Congress under the commerce clause must be ``some sort of economic endeavor. Here, the conduct sought to be regulated-- the commission of hate crimes--is in no sense economic or commercial, but instead is non-economic and criminal in nature. Accordingly, it is just like the non-economic conduct Congress sought to regulate in the Gun Free Schools Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act--statutes held to be unconstitutional in Lopez and Morrison. In an effort to be constitutional, the Kennedy amendment provides that federal jurisdiction can only be exercised in four circumstances where there is some sort of link to interstate commerce. These circumstances, however, probably do not make the amendment constitutional. First, the interstate travel circumstance set forth in the Kennedy amendment arguably may provide an interstate nexus, but it does nothing to change the criminal, generally non-economic nature of a hate crime. The same can be said for the other circumstances set forth in the Kennedy amendment authorizing the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The second circumstance's requirement, that the crime be committed by using a ``channel, facility or instrumentality of interstate'' commerce, also may provide a interstate nexus, but it is unclear precisely what hate crimes that would encompass: hijacking a plane or blowing up a rail line in connection with a hate crime? Such occurrences, if happening at all, surely are so infrequent as to make the Kennedy amendment unnecessary. And I might add, in these cases they have been prosecuted by state and local officials who have the right and power to do so. So there seems little or no reason to want the Kennedy amendment on that basis. But without some economic activity, it still makes you wonder. The third circumstance's requirement that the defendant have used a weapon that traveled in interstate commerce would eviscerate the limits on commerce clause authority the Court stressed in Lopez and Morrison. If using a weapon that happened to have traveled in interstate commerce to commit a hate crime provides a sufficient interstate nexus authorizing congressional action federalizing hate crimes, then by the same logic Congress could federalize essentially all State crimes where a firearm or other weapon is used. And that would include most homicides had assault cases. The fourth circumstance's requirement that the victim be working and that the hate crime interfere with such working is analogous to the reasoning the Court rejected in Morrison. In Morrison, the Court rejected the argument that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce. It can only be presumed that the Court would similarly conclude that violence motivated by disability, sexual orientation or gender--again--does not substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court in Morrison and in Lopez rejected these ``costs of crime'' and ``national productivity'' arguments because they would permit Congress to regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. Finally, the Kennedy amendment's catch-all provision--that federal prosecution is permitted where the hate crime ``otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce''--not only merely restates the constitutional test, it restates it wrongly. Under Lopez and Morrison, the conduct sought to be regulated under the commerce clause must ``substantially affect'' interstate commerce. The Kennedy amendment provides for a much lower standard. With regard to the first amendment, the Kennedy amendment also has the potential to have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech. Under the amendment, the Federal Government could obtain a criminal conviction on the basis of evidence of speech that had no role in the chain of events that led to any alleged violent act proscribed by the statute. Evidence that a person holds racist or other bigoted views that are unrelated to the underlying crime cannot form the basis for a prosecution--otherwise the statute would be unconstitutional under the first amendment. The Kennedy hate crimes amendment is also bad policy. It would place significant burdens on federal law enforcement and Federal courts, undermine State sentencing regimes, and unduly interfere with State prosecution of violent crime. The Kennedy amendment prohibits hate crimes based upon the victims gender. I mentioned this earlier. Accordingly, the amendment, on its face, could effectively federalize all rapes and sexual assaults. Not only would such a statute likely be unconstitutional, it also would be bad policy. Seizing the authority to investigate and prosecute all incidents of rape and sexual assault from the States could impose a huge burden on Federal law enforcement agencies, Federal prosecutors, and the federal judiciary. I know that the Supreme Court is very concerned about the proliferation of federal crimes, as are all Federal courts in our country. They think we federalize far too many laws when, in fact, the States are doing a good job in prosecuting those crimes. And there is little or no reason for us to intrude that much on State laws when they are doing a good job. Authorities in Jasper, TX, secured a death penalty against the murderers of James Byrd, Jr., without either State or Federal hate crimes legislation. In contrast, the Kennedy amendment does not provide for the death penalty, even in the case of the most heinous hate crimes. Under the Kennedy amendment, then, a State could prosecute the same criminal acts more harshly than under the Kennedy hate crimes amendment. As a result, the Kennedy amendment would provide a lesser deterrent against hate-based criminal conduct. If there was ever a case justifying the death penalty, it certainly was the case of James Byrd, Jr. But then again it makes my point. The State and local prosecutors were fully capable of taking care of this matter. And why should we intrude the Federal Government's unwanted nose under the tent in this matter when the States are perfectly capable of taking care of these matters. The Kennedy amendment also would unduly interfere with state prosecutions of hate crimes. Contrary to claims by supporters of the Kennedy amendment, the amendment would not defer to State or local authorities at all. The amendment leaves the Justice Department free to insert itself in a local prosecution at the beginning, middle or end of the prosecution, and even after the local prosecutor has obtained a guilty verdict. Even if State or local authorities inform the federal government that they intend to prosecute the case and object to Federal interference, the Justice Department, nevertheless, is empowered by the amendment to exert enormous pressure on local prosecutors regarding the manner in which they handle the case, from charging decisions to plea bargaining decisions to sentencing decisions. In essence, the federal government can always exercise jurisdiction under the Kennedy amendment. And in so doing, the Kennedy amendment works an unwarranted expansion of federal authority to prosecute defendants--even when a competent State prosecution is available. In my view, hate crimes can be more sinister than non-hate crimes. A crime committed not only to harm an individual, but out of the motive of sending a message of hatred to an entire community--often a community that historically has been the subject of prejudice or discrimination--is appropriately punished more harshly or in a different manner than other crimes. In Wisconsin versus Mitchell, the Supreme Court essentially agreed that the motive behind the crime can make the crime more sinister and more worthy of harsher punishment. In that case, the Court upheld the State of Wisconsin's sentencing enhancement for hate crimes. There is a limited role for the federal government to play in combating hate crime. The federal government can assist State and local authorities in investigating and prosecuting hate crimes. In addition, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, which I sponsored, provides for the nationwide collection of data regarding hate crimes. Because I believe there is a federal role to play, I have introduced legislation, held hearings, and am offering this amendment today. The Federal government has a responsibility to help States and local governments solve our country's problem of hate-motivated crime. But for a federal response to be meaningful, it must abide by the limitations imposed on Congress by the constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. This is especially true today in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, which emphasized that there are limits on congressional power. The Morrison case was decided just last month and changed the legal landscape regarding congressional power in relation to the States. We should be concerned, as the Supreme Court is, about the proliferation of companion Federal crimes in areas where State criminal statutes are sufficient. The Kennedy amendment would vastly expand the power and jurisdiction of the Federal Government to intervene in local law enforcement matters. Repeatedly, supporters of the Kennedy amendment have argued the State and local authorities are either ``unable or unwilling'' to investigate the prosecute hate crimes. Let's examine this rationale closely. First, the argument that State and local authorities are unable to get serious about hate crimes: I do not dispute that in certain cases the resources of local jurisdictions may be inadequate. We can solve that. But that cannot mean that we therefore should federalize these crimes. That soft-headed logic would lead us to argue that because State and local resources are inadequate to, for example, educate our young people in some parts of the country, then the Federal Government should conduct a nationwide takeover of elementary and secondary education. That, of course, would be the wrong solution. The right solution to a problem involving inadequate resources at the local level is to try to provide some Federal assistance where requested and where needed. That is what my amendment does. If it is not enough money, then let's beef up the money. That is what my amendment does. It provides the monetary means whereby we can assist the States if they do not have the money to investigate and prosecute hate-motivated crimes. With regard to postconviction DNA evidence, it may mean we have to do more from a Federal Government standpoint. Second, I have even more difficulty stomaching the second argument put forth by supporters of the Kennedy amendment, that State and local authorities are unwilling to get serious about hate crimes. I admit that I am not certain what the supporters of the Kennedy amendment mean when they say ``unwilling.'' I assume that we all understand and appreciate that in numerous cases State and local officials are unwilling to go forward because the evidence does not warrant going forward. Supporters of the Kennedy amendment cannot possibly mean to cover all of these cases. So what do they mean? A subset of these cases? Does the Federal Government intend to review every case where local officials fail to go forward, second guess their judgments, and then pick and chose on which of those cases they want to proceed? The true answer is that no one knows what supporters of the Kennedy amendment mean when they claim that States are ``unwilling'' to deal with hate crimes. If we want to act responsibly and sensibly, we ought to do what I suggest in my amendment--(1) conduct a comprehensive analysis of whether there, in fact, is unwillingness at the local level in the handling of crimes motivates against persons because of their membership in a particular class or group and (2) provide some grant monies to States who may lack resources. The amendment I have offered does not go as far as legislation I have offered in the past, but this is not because I do not believe that hate crimes are not a problem. Rather, it is because the Supreme Court has ruled as recently as a month ago in this area, and I do not think we can ignore that. The recent decision in Morrison requires that we step back and prudently assess whether legislation like the Kennedy amendment would pass constitutional muster, and I think more than an overwhelming case can be made that it does not. Let's assume that if this amendment is ultimately adopted, and 2 or 3 years from now the Supreme Court decides the case based upon that amendment, and I am right and the Kennedy amendment is overturned, that means we are 3 more years down the line unable to do anything about hate crimes in our society when, if we do the appropriate analysis and get the information and do not walk in there emotionally, and try to give the State and local governments the monetary support and the other types of support we describe in our amendment, we could start tomorrow combating hate crimes at the federal level. The day my amendment is passed doing something about hate crimes, that will really be substantial and will work. It is a throw of the dice if we adopt the Kennedy amendment and that becomes law because I do not believe it can be possibly upheld by the Supreme Court in light of current constitutional law. My amendment is very limited and does not raise the constitutional questions raised by the Kennedy amendment. At the same time, it provides for Federal assistance to State and local authorities in combating hate crimes. With regard to both amendments, I find no fault at all--in fact, I commend my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, my friend from Oregon, and others who are pushing the Kennedy amendment because they believe something has to be done about hate crimes in our society. I find no fault with that. In fact, I admire them for doing that. I find no fault with people trying to write laws, but I do believe we can be 3 years down the line and lose all that time in making headway against hate criminal activity in our society. Where, if we do it right today and do it in a constitutionally sound way, as my amendment does, then we will have truly accomplished something. Perhaps we can get together and find some way of doing this so it brings everybody together; I would like to see all civil rights bills, all bills that involve equal protection under the laws pass unanimously, if we can. I want to work to that end. I pledge to work with my colleagues from Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, and others in this body in trying to get us there. We are all after the same thing, and that is to have a better society so that people realize there are laws by which they have to live, that there are moral laws by which they should live, and that people realize this society has been a great society and will continue to be, the more we are concerned about our fellow men and women and equality under the law. We differ on the ways to get there at this point. Maybe we can get together and find some way of resolving the differences. I find no fault with my colleagues, other than that I think Morrison is so clear, and it was decided only a month ago. I do find fault in that sense, to push an amendment probably is unconstitutional. I find no fault with the motivations behind those supporting the Kennedy amendment. In fact, I am very proud of my colleagues for wanting to do something in this area, to make a difference in our society and help our society be even better. I commend them and thank them for their efforts in that regard, but I do think we ought to do it in a constitutional way. I do think we ought to do it in a thoughtful way. I do think we ought to do it in an analytical way. I do think we ought do it in a way that will bring people together, not split them apart. And I do think we ought to do it in a way that will help State and local prosecutors, rather than Federal prosecutors, to handle these cases in manners that are proper and acceptable in our society. I do think it ought to be done in a way that does not burden our Federal courts with a plethora of cases, in addition to the drug cases burdening our courts today, when State and local governments are totally capable of taking care of it, perhaps with some monetary assistance from the Federal Government. I look forward to finding a way whereby Senator Leahy and I and others can get together to resolve these problems of postconviction DNA testing because regardless of where one stands on the death penalty, for or against it, that is not the issue. The issue is justice, and that is what the issue is here as well. Does anyone in this body think I like opposing this amendment? I don't think so. I have stood up on too many of these matters for them to think that. But defending the Constitution is more important to me than ``feeling good'' about things or just ``feeling emotional'' about things. I do feel emotionally about hate crimes. I do want to stamp them out. I do want to get rid of them. I want to start now, not 3 years from now when we have to start all over again because the Court rules that the Kennedy amendment is unconstitutional. I have taken enough time. I yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH. I don't mean to keep interrupting, but as I read that, I can see if what the Senator is after is a hate crime of keeping somebody involuntarily in servitude, but I don't know of many of those today. I am sure that may happen. We are talking about all kinds of hate crimes that certainly don't fit within the 13th amendment. If that is the way we are going to get at it, I think that is a very poor way of getting at a resolution for a hate crime problem. Reading again, section 1: Neither slavery-- And I don't know of many instances of slavery in this day and age; in fact, I don't know of any, but there may be some. But we can get them constitutionally, right now, if they do that -- nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. If there is such a thing, if there is such a hate crime today as slavery, or involuntary servitude not required because of a due conviction, then we have the absolute power today, federally, to go in and prosecute under the Constitution itself under the 13th amendment. Maybe I am missing something, or maybe I just haven't thought it through or I am too tired. I can't see how the 13th amendment provides a nexus whereby the Kennedy amendment becomes constitutional. It doesn't. In some ways, I wish the Kennedy amendment were constitutional. I worked hard back in those days to pass the Violence Against Women Act. I am working hard right now to pass it again in a form that is constitutional. We thought it was constitutional. I have to say, I had my qualms about it and my qualms proved to be accurate. Today, we know what the Court has said. It has been the principle debate in this country since the beginning. The Court has said that Congress' power in relation to the States is limited. They are 5-4 decisions that are valid and are constitutional. For us to fly in the face of those just because we want to federalize hate crime activity, is, I think, constitutionally improper. That is what worries me. These Supreme Court cases outlining the limits of congressional power under the principle of federalism are quite recent decisions. They are not old-time decisions that have been disqualified or overly criticized. They are decisions that basically advise us of the law right now. I just wanted to make that point because I am concerned: How do you make the Kennedy amendment constitutional? I don't think you can under current law. Now let's face it. If another Court comes in and reverses the nine major federalism decisions that the Supreme Court has handed down in the last few years, and ignores the principle of stare decisis and ignores the principle of federalism, I suppose that at that point you could enact the Kennedy legislation with impunity. But right now, I don't see how you do it if we, as Members of Congress, are trying to exert our influence and our obligation and our oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States. I am sorry to interrupt.

Mr. HATCH. If the Senator will yield, I am having a little bit of difficulty, so I ask how the 13th amendment applies. As I read the 13th amendment, it says, in section 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. In section 2: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. How does the Kennedy amendment qualify under the 13th amendment? As I made clear, it doesn't qualify under the 14th amendment because of the arguments I made, pure Supreme Court arguments, that are recent in decision. I missed something on the 13th amendment because that is the amendment that abolished slavery.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I want to commend the chairman, the senior Senator from Alaska, and the ranking minority, the senior Senator from Hawaii, for their long and effective leadership in evolving the Defense Health Program. The Senate bill added nearly $700 million to the President's request, funding the total Defense Health Program at $12.1 billion for FY01. And, of great importance to me and many other members of this body, the Committee has once again committed the Department of Defense's medical science capabilities to the management of a major cancer research program, extending to breast, prostate, cervical, lung, and other cancers. There is over $330 million in this bill dedicated to cancer-related research. I would like to bring to the attention of the distinguished chairman and the ranking minority member an important area of cancer research-- the investigation of genealogical and genetic databases that can uncover medical precursors to cancer in humans. My state of Utah has a history of genealogical research that is known to the millions of Americans who routinely visit the family history websites that originate from Utah. But millions of Americans are also potentially benefiting from a lesser known program. This program is currently developing a genealogical database that will help identify and predict genetic structures associated with the development and, hopefully, prevention of, cancer. Mr. President, I wish to make you aware of the Utah Population Database which if a very promising development in the area of genealogical research related to cancer. This data base is housed at the University of Utah where scientists are learning to use this unique comprehensive genealogical set of data to help predict, detect, treat, and prevent cancer. I am therefore asking the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member to support the continued development and use of the Utah Population Database by increasing the University of Utah's program for genealogical cancer research in the coming fiscal year by an additional $12.5 million.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. I join Senator Biden this afternoon. We passed the original Violence Against Women Act in 1994. He deserves a great deal of credit for that. I would like to move forward with the passage of the violence against women reauthorization this year. For almost 10 years, I have stood with my colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, on this particular issue. He and I have worked for almost a year now to try to resolve any disagreements regarding specific provisions in our respective bills on this issue, S. 245 and S. 51. What we want to do is combat violence against women. I believe we have a good product. It is the Biden-Hatch Violence Against Women Act of the year 2000. I have committed to Senator Biden that we plan to move this legislation in the Judiciary Committee. I plan to have it on the committee markup for next week. Now, any member of the committee can put it over for a week. I hope they will not. Before the Fourth of July recess, I hope we can pass the bill out of the Judiciary Committee. Hopefully, the leadership will allow us some time on the floor to debate it. It is a very important piece of legislation. Millions and millions of women, men, and children in this country will benefit by the passage of this bill. I am going to do everything in my power to help Senator Biden in getting it passed.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, first, I want to make it perfectly clear that I strongly support reforming the managed care system. I was an original cosponsor of S. 300, the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999 and voted in favor of S. 326, the Patients' Bill of Rights which was approved by the Senate last July. The House-Senate conference committee is currently working out the differences between the managed care bills passed by the House and the Senate. I believe this conference committee is making significant progress. So, not only is it premature for us to vote today on the House-passed managed care bill in the midst of these negotiations. I also do not feel that the DOD authorization debate is the appropriate time for us to be considering such important health care legislation. We are all aware of the public's frustration and the need for effective legislation to guarantee that those enrolled in managed care plans receive quality health care. Over the years, the Congress has held numerous hearings exposing story after story regarding people receiving insufficient medical treatment from their managed care plans. And let me assure you that these stories are deeply troubling to me--that's why Congress is addressing this important issue. We are listening to our constituents and we are taking action. There is one point where all of us agree--people deserve to receive the best care possible when they are sick. I believe that when the conference committee has completed its work, this important goal will become a reality. None of us think that someone should be turned away from medical treatment because his health plan won't cover it. Our legislation provides patients the ability to appeal these types of decisions, quickly, by offering both internal and external appeals processes. It is my hope that by providing these options, people will receive quality health care, in a timely fashion, when they need it the most. All of us in this chamber know very well there are numerous competing bills that have been introduced over the years that provide a variety of legislative remedies to address this issue. In many respects, these bills have common components intertwined with similar, and, in some cases, identical provisions. Approximately 47 bills were introduced in the Senate and the House last year to provide patient protections to managed care enrollees. So it is obvious that we all are concerned about this issue--we all want patients to receive the best care possible. However, for Congress to pass responsible managed care legislation, we must come together and put forth the best bill for the American people. We have done this many times before on health care legislation, and there is no reason why we cannot do this again. The Senator from Massachusetts is trying to preempt this process. He has offered an amendment that flies in the face of every effort we have made to achieve that consensus. There can be nothing more to this amendment than its public relations value, since it surely will not pass in the Senate. We have spent hours and hours and hours on the Senate floor, in conference, and in the back rooms of the Capitol on this legislation. The Senator knows well why the Dingell-Norwood approach will not pass. He knows it is likely to cause health insurance premiums to rise and, as a direct result, cause employers to drop their health plans. He knows this will lead to higher numbers of uninsured Americans. And, he knows that this is an unacceptable outcome. I remain hopeful that, in the end, we will reach consensus on this bill. I commend senator Nickles for his fine work and leadership as chairman of the House-Senate conference committee and urge my colleagues to support the conferees and let them continue their work.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as somebody who lived through the last BRAC process, and lived through it in a very intensive way, I have to say the process did not work. Everyone lost: the taxpayers, the workers in Utah, as well as those in the losing states of California and Texas, and the Air Force's state of military readiness. The process was too politicized, as I elaborate upon in my later remarks. It was a pitiful exercise, in many respects. There were some good things about it, I have to acknowledge, but most of it was not. Utah had the Air Force's highest rated air logistics command in the nation, bar none. Nobody could compare with it. It was listed No. 1. It made the top of every chart. The workforce and its achievements were models of efficiency. But, after the President finished tampering with the BRAC results, we had to fight like dogs against raging wolves to prove repeatedly what the BRAC had already determined. No sooner did we get through all that process--time after time appearing at hearings, appearing at major meetings considering BRAC, and considering what should be done, making our case over and over, and winning, winning, winning--this administration came in and immediately undertook questionable steps to sully the BRAC process. My experience gives me little confidence in this process. And it's not done yet: we won't have the process completed until late 2001, six years after the BRAC decision. I do not care who is in charge. When you politicize the base closing process, it just leads to the type of anquish I and my colleagues are expressing here today. How can we forget the major problems between San Antonio and McClellan, both of which were installations important to their respective States but did not reach the high standards of Utah's Hill Air Force Base. If Hill Air Force Base had come in last, I would not be here arguing today, nor back then, to keep it alive. Let's not forget that we need high military readiness--it is a deterrent that allows for peace through strength. But that means having a system that accentuates everything that is good about our military, like Hill Air Force Base. I would not back a base that was not doing the job. But in this particular case, McClellan had been judged by the Air Force and the BRAC commssion as deficient, as was the San Antonio Air Logistics Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. Yet, we wanted to help Kelly, if we could, because it had a high percentage of Hispanic workers. But the brutal facts showed that Kelly could not measure up. Neither did McClellan. Then came the administration's misguided and downright wrongful attempts to save some of those jobs. Mr. President, Ronald Reagan immediately comes to mind when I consider today's debate on BRAC . . . ``Here we go again.'' We're being asked to engage in the same type of taxpayer deception that characterized the 1995 BRAC. We promise savings, and deliver nothing. All BRAC produces is a politicized outcome that makes a mockery of the independent commission process. We need to remind ourselves why we sought a BRAC in the first place: It was because we did not feel Congress could be trusted. In fact, it was the President who couldn't be trusted. Let's look at some facts, facts especially painful to states which lost bases, and those that had to defend what they had won again, again and again. I refer to Utah's Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill AFB--three times we had to compete for workloads that the BRAC awarded us, but which the President delayed sending to Utah. The President intervened in the BRAC 95 process to secure California's 54 electoral votes in the 1996 election. My good friends from California--Senators Boxer and Feinstein--publicly stated that they would get relief from the White House after BRAC decided to close McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento. They succeeded, and at the cost of work that ought to have gone to Georgia and Utah, but which was delayed. The President called the BRAC decision to close McClellan an ``outrage'', in a Rose Garden statement. He actually rejected the decision of his own independent commission. In its place, the President put great pressure on the Air Force to sully an already messy situation. He called this ``privatization in place.'' He attempted to keep the jobs which were intended to be distributed to Utah, Oklahoma and Georgia in California by forcing a public-private competition that GAO rejected as unfair. It had the effect of leaving in California as many as 3,200 jobs for as long as six years after the BRAC decision, or conveniently after the year 2000 presidential election. The BRAC monies designated to move jobs and equipment to Utah and elsewhere were mismanaged. They were spent to improve the very facilities at McClellan AFB that the BRAC had intended to close! This, the President and his gang thought, would make it easier for the base to attract private contractors to perform the privatized work in place. The delay caused by this contrived competition cost the taxpayers an additional $500 million, according to GAO, to sustain the bases' workloads in place, despite the decision of BRAC to ship the workloads to the other Air Force depots. In May 1998, as many of you will remember, the Secretary of the Air Force was embarrassed by a memo written by his office urging that the Lockheed-Martin bid for the California work win the award. This behavior, to my mind, remains one of the most egregious violations of the Ethics Reform Act I have seen in my 24 years in the Senate. This act prohibits precisely the type of collusion in which the Secretary of the Air Force participated. It was so outrageous that Secretary Bill Cohen, to his everlasting credit, removed the Secretary of the Air Force from the selection team that would oversee the public-private competition for the McClellan workload. But this was not the end of the Clinton Administration's meddling: they directed the Air Force to deny the GAO, the congressional watchdog agency responsible for overseeing the expenditure of taxpayers' funds, access to the cost-data and other information used by the Air Force to put together competition for the McClellan workload. As might be expected, the long-term effect of this mischievous meddling had a cost on readiness. Delays in workload transfer were directly responsible for a severe F-16 parts shortage in 1999. Also, there is a suspicious relationship between the delayed workload transfer and the KC-135 tanker problems early this year when the fleet was grounded because of a rear stabilizer malfunction, a problem akin to the cause of the Alaskan Airline aircraft off the California coast. My personal inquiry into the KC-135 issue demonstrated that if the entire KC-135 team responsible for the repair of this part of the aircraft had been transferred to Utah in a timely way, as directed by the BRAC, the design flaw would probably never have occurred. There is an answer to BRAC: let Congress endorse the decisions of the military services, without the filter of presidential intervention, whether by a BRAC-like commission or any other procedure. The military services know better than any other body the best and the worst of their installations, the ones that pay their own way, and the ones that drain the taxpayers' pockets. After my state's experience with the BRAC process, I am more inclined to trust this body to evaluate the services' recommendations. I see that we have a very important guest. I will be happy to yield the floor at this time for Senator Helms.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation intended to start us on the path to a simpler, more rational, and fairer federal tax system. The bill I am introducing in the Senate today, the Tax Ease and Modernization Act--Part I (TEAM-I), is designed to be the first of several installments to incrementally transform the Internal Revenue Code into a revenue collection device that is more efficient, more responsive to the needs of taxpayers, more able to help this nation compete in a global marketplace, and most importantly, much easier to understand, comply with, and administer. I realize that this is a tall order. I also believe that such a transformation cannot occur overnight. This is why my plan calls for incremental action through a multi-year plan--a plan that we can start implementing this year rather than waiting for consensus to develop around a fundamental tax reform approach that centers on a flat tax, a national consumption tax, or some hybrid system. As I said on this floor on April 4, 2000, when I announced this plan, I recognize the need for a new paradigm in taxation for this country. I believe our Internal Revenue Code is fundamentally flawed and needs to be replaced with a new system. But such a new tax code will require years of presidential leadership, public education, and an intelligent transition from the current system. In the meantime, we should not wait for an elusive tax Utopia to come along and remove the immediate need for improvements to the Internal Revenue Code. We should begin to act now, and do what we can to make our current system better in the short run. This is what my plan is all about. Mr. President, the bill I introduce today begins this transformation process by repealing or repairing some of the most complex and unfair provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, it does so in a balanced way, with relief from complexity for every classification of taxpayer--low-income and high income individuals, school teachers and chief executive officers, members of neighborhood investment clubs and high rollers, small businesses and sprawling multinationals, people with IRS problems and families with foster children. The goals are to simplify the tax code and make it more fair for everyone. Because the Internal Revenue Code is so riddled with complexity at every level, attempting to eliminate it all at once would be difficult at best. Therefore, this bill focuses on solving several of the largest problems affecting millions of taxpayers, then supplements these features with a number of smaller provisions that may appear relatively minor, but as a whole add a tremendous amount of complexity, unfairness, or hassle for many taxpayers, as well as for the Internal Revenue Service. alternative minimum tax repeal Mr. President, the Tax Ease and Modernization Act--Part I starts with repealing what is likely to be the largest source of tax compliance headaches for middle- and upper-income families over the next decade-- the alternative minimum tax. The alternative minimum tax, or AMT for short, remains unknown to many Americans, and is not well understood even by those nearly 1 million taxpayers it already affects. The AMT was originally designed to ensure that taxpayers with economic income who take advantage of the tax code's many incentive deductions and credits still pay some tax. However, because of basic design flaws, the AMT's reach now goes far beyond what was intended in 1969 when it was conceived or even in 1986 when it was expanded. In fact, the Treasury Department estimates that at least 17 million taxpayers will be subject to the nightmare-like complexity of the alternative minimum tax by 2010. Even the Clinton administration, traditionally a strong supporter of the AMT, now admits it has grown out of control and advocates changes to tame it. This bill goes one better and repeals the alternative minimum tax altogether, Mr. President. It is time to rid the code of the kind of super-complexity brought by the AMT, which, in my view, has failed to achieve its objectives of bringing greater fairness to our tax system. capital gains tax simplification A second major provision of this bill would greatly simplify the taxation of capital gains. Many of my constituents were pleased in 1997 when Congress lowered the capital gains tax rates from 28 percent to 20 percent. However, many were not as excited when they found out what the new law meant come tax return filing time--a 54-line Schedule D accompanied by two worksheets and seven pages of instructions. This is compared to a 39-line form and just two pages of instructions prior to the change. TEAM-I would simplify capital gains by repealing the current maximum rate approach and instituting a 50 percent exclusion, as was the case before the 1986 Tax Reform Act repealed the capital gains preference. In other words, taxpayers would be allowed to exclude 50 percent of the long-term capital gain from gross income. The remaining 50 percent would be taxed at ordinary income rates. This would do away with the need for a special computation on the tax forms. It would also result in a lower capital gains rate for every tax bracket, with those in the lowest tax brackets getting the largest rate decreases. This bill thus both simplifies capital gains and cuts the effective capital gains tax rate for all individuals. We should not underestimate the importance of this change. Mr. President. Over the past few years the number of Americans who are invested in capital assets has skyrocketed. The Joint Economic Committee reported last month that the percentage of American families directly and indirectly holding stocks climbed from 31.6 percent in 1989 to 48.8 percent in 1998. Moreover, a recent Federal Reserve study shows that stockholdings made up a record 31.7 percent of household wealth in 1999. And this does not include other capital assets, such as bonds, real estate, and partnership interests. No longer can even the most hardened opponent of capital gains rate reductions argue that it is a tax break only for the wealthy. In addition, there is abounding evidence that lowering the capital gains tax rate has had a very salutary effect on the economy over the years, particularly since the 1997 change. A 1999 study by Standard and Poor's DRI concluded that the 1997 capital gains tax reduction from a top rate of 28 percent to 20 percent was responsible for about 25 percent of he increase in stock prices from 1997 to 1999. Also, the cost of capital for new investment fell by about 3 percent as a result of the 1997 change. Clearly, when it comes to capital gains, simplicity is needed as well as lower rates. TEAM-I delivers both. The bill I am introducing today also features a smaller but important provision relating to capital gains from the sale of a principal residence. In 1997, Congress passed a provision that allows homeowners to exclude up to $250,000 of capital gains from the sale of their principal residence. The number is $500,000 for married couples filing a joint return. This has been or will be a tremendous benefit for millions of American families. The provision was flawed in one respect, however, in that it was not indexed for inflation. My bill would index the exclusion for future inflation, in increments of $1,000. earned income tax credit simplification Mr. President, millions of lower-income taxpayers face one of the most complex tax provisions in the entire Internal Revenue Code--the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Taxpayers trying to figure out if they can claim this credit and how to compute it face a daunting challenge-- instructions and tables in the Form 1040 instructions that take up ten full pages, including a nine-step flowchart and two worksheets. Even all of this is not enough to provide all the needed information in every case. Taxpayers, many if not most of whom are surely aggravated and confused by these rules, are referred to IRS Publication 596, a 54-page booklet, to even more detailed information. Practically every professional tax group that has studied tax complexity recommends major simplification to the EITC. TEAM-I would provide major simplicity, while expanding the credit. The bill would simplify the EITC rules in two ways, Mr. President. First it modifies the definition of earned income to include only taxable employee compensation and business income readily available on Form 1040. Current law requires the consideration of non-taxable compensation, such as meals and lodging provided for the convenience of the employer and employer-provided educational assistance benefits. Many times these amounts are not readily available to the employee, who is likely to be uncertain whether such nontaxable compensation is provided or not. Second, TEAM-I simplifies the definition of a dependent child. The source of one of the greatest complexities in the EITC is the definition of a qualifying child. Current law is confusing in part because the definition of a qualifying child is very similar, but not identical, to the definition of a dependent child for purposes of the dependency exemption. In some cases, a child can qualify a taxpayer for the EITC but not for the dependency exemption. The bill simplifies both the dependency exemption and the EITC by moving the definition of a dependent child closer to that of a qualifying child for purposes of the EITC. Thus, with this new definition, taxpayers who are able to claim a dependent child for the exemption should be able to also claim the child for purposes of the earned income tax credit. This solution is based on a concept proposed by the Clinton Administration in the budget for fiscal year 2001. Mr. President, the bill also expands in three ways the earned income tax credit, which is a program that has proven vital in assisting millions of families at the margin of poverty. The first expansion provides a new category for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children, which offers a higher percentage credit. Current law provides different levels of the credit for taxpayers with no children, taxpayers with one qualifying child, and those with two or more. Secondly, the bill provides a larger maximum credit for all qualifying taxpayer with children by increasing the phaseout amount, which is the level of the taxpayer's earnings at which the credit begins to be phased out, from the current law level of $12,690 to $15,000. Perhaps even more significantly, the bill takes a major step toward relieving the onerous marriage penalty inherent in the current Earned Income Tax Credit. This is accomplished by increasing the amount at which the credit begins to be phased out by an extra $5,000 for taxpayers who are married filing a joint return. While this will not eliminate the marriage penalty problem of the EITC, which is among the largest marriage penalties in the tax code, it does take an important step toward reducing it. repeal of limitations on itemized deductions and personal exemptions Mr. President, two of the most unfair and complex provisions of the current tax law are aimed squarely at upper-middle and higher-income taxpayers. After the 1986 Tax Reform Act lowered the top tax rate to 28 percent, the Democratically led Congress decided that this was too low a tax rate for successful Americans who were considered wealthy. Rather than a straightforward increase in the top tax bracket, however, Congress decided to be sneaky about it and raised the marginal tax rates on certain taxpayers by limiting their itemized deductions and personal exemptions. The effects of these provisions are twofold. First, they obscure the true rate of tax being levied on taxpayers subject to these provisions. Second, and probably most damaging, they add a great deal of unwarranted complexity. My bill solves both problems by simply repealing these provisions. business tax simplification While the Tax Ease and Modernization Act--Part I focuses mostly on the complexity problems of individual taxpayers, it does not ignore businesses, who often face complexity in the extreme. The second and third installments of this effort will feature many more simplification provisions to help ensure that American businesses stay competitive in the global marketplace and are not forced to waste resources on unnecessary tax compliance costs. Part I features three relatively small but important provisions that will simplify taxes for practically all business taxpayers in America. The first provision would change the law to provide that corporate taxpayers no longer have to pay a higher rate of interest to the Internal Revenue Service on underpayments of tax than the rate the government pays to them for overpayments. Currently, individual taxpayers enjoy an equal interest rate for overpayments and underpayments. Corporations, however, must pay as much as a 4.5 percentage points more in interest on underpayments than they receive on overpayments. The bill would equalize these amounts at a rate of the short-term Applicable Federal Rate plus three percentage points. The second business provision would clean up a complex inequity that was only partially addressed by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. That Act established a net interest rate of zero where interest is payable and allowable on equivalent amounts of overpayment and underpayment that exist for any tax period. However, that provision fell short of providing the simplicity and fairness needed by taxpayers. Therefore, my bill would extend the concept of global interest netting to all periods and would make the change retroactive as if enacted in the 1998 Act. The final business provision included in TEAM-I would simplify the accounting for purchases of software by business taxpayers by allowing them to immediately expense the first $20,000 per year instead of capitalizing the cost and depreciating it over three years, as under current law. Having to depreciate relatively small software programs, which are often obsolete well before three years, is costly and complex. miscellaneous simplification provisions Mr. President, the bill I introduce today includes a number of smaller but very important simplification provisions designed to ease the tax lives of all taxpayers. Many of these are similar or identical to provisions recently passed by the House in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000 legislation. Other provisions are based on concepts recently suggested to Congress by Mr. Val Oveson, the National Taxpayer Advocate. One of the National Taxpayer Advocate's duties is to recommend to Congress what legislative changes are needed to improve the tax code and make it simpler and easier to administer. Last year, Mr. Oveson presented 53 separate recommendations for legislative improvement in the tax area. My bill incorporates more than a dozen of the most critical of these recommendations. Also included in the bill are several other tax simplification measures, suggested by a variety of sources. One of these is S. 1952, a bill introduced last year by Senator Abraham that would simplify the taxation of investors who participate in small investment clubs. Also included is the text of S. 670, a bill introduced last year by Senators Jeffords and Dodd that would simplify the tax rules for foster care payments. This provision was also included in last year's large tax bill that was vetoed by President Clinton. Another provision in the bill would help taxpayers who are former foster parents by providing that if those parent provide over one-half of the support of a foster child beyond the age where the state pays the expenses, they can claim the former foster child as a dependent, just as they could for their own child. Mr. President, I have also included in TEAM-I another simplification provision, suggested by the Clinton Administration in its fiscal year 2001 budget, which would both simplify the law and remove a disincentive to young people working and saving for their future. Under current law, young people who can be claimed as dependents on their parents tax returns must file a return and pay income tax if they have over $250 of income from savings if their earnings from working plus that income from savings exceeds $700. My bill would increase the allowed amount of earnings from savings from $250 to $1,000 before a return or tax is required. The bill I am introducing today also includes a provision added as a floor amendment to S. 1134, The Affordable Education Act, by Senator Collins, myself, and several others. This provision would allow elementary and secondary school teachers to deduct the cost of their professional development expenses without regard to the current-law 2- percent of adjusted gross income floor. This adds a small measure of both simplicity and fairness to the tax code. Mr. President, the bill I am introducing is far from perfect. It represents only a relatively small down payment on tax simplification in just a few areas of the Internal Revenue Code. However, I hope that its introduction will lay down a marker for tax simplification that will evoke further discussion and suggestions from interested groups and action toward simplification by my colleagues on the Finance Committee. I welcome comments on how this bill can be improved and what other tax simplification items should be considered in the future of this effort. One thing I have learned in my study about the problems of our current tax system and ways to improve it is that simplification is far from simple. Some of the most complex portions of the Internal Revenue Code can be easily and reasonably be simplified by their repeal. Others parts, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, should not be repealed but improved. Doing so, however, can be most difficult. Moreover, Mr. President, simplification often comes at a cost of lost revenue. While I have not yet received an estimate of the revenue effect of this bill from the Joint Committee on Taxation, it seems clear that the numbers will be high. However, I have concluded that one of the best ways we can spend the projected surplus is on tax simplification. I like to think of it as tax relief for all taxpayers through simplification. Additionally, I believe that simplification should not create winners and losers. To the extent possible in my bill, I have tried to leave all taxpayers at least as well off as under current law. This, however, is also costly in terms of lost revenue. While it is unclear whether Congress can pass, or whether the President will sign, major tax simplification legislation in this election year, I believe these issues are of such importance that we should not wait to embark on a major debate about them. I hope my colleagues in the Senate and House will join in the discussion, as well as taxpayer advocacy groups, businesses, and other stakeholders throughout the nation.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague, Senator Jeffords, to introduce the Alternative Fuels Tax Incentives Act. I am pleased that we are being joined by Senators Rockefeller, Robb, Chafee, and Bryan as original cosponsors. This bill is an outgrowth of S. 1003, the Alternative Fuels Promotion Act of 1999, which was sponsored by many of the same sponsors of this year's bill. And, like S. 1003, the bill we are introducing today is designed to achieve two vital goals--reduce our dependency on foreign oil and reduce air pollution from motor vehicles. While the goals of both of these bills are the same, Mr. President, the Alternative Fuels Incentive Act takes a similar, but more comprehensive approach to achieving them. There is a little dispute that our growing dependency on imported oil is dangerous, not only to our continued economic growth, but also to our national security. We are witnessing again this year just how volatile the price of gasoline and other motor fuels are and how decisions made by oil producers far from our shores affect the everyday lives of all Americans. As we increase our dependence of energy from others nations, we are literally placing our future in the hands of foreign entities. Yet, we are stymied at every turn in trying to significantly increase the discovery and development of new domestic sources of oil. At the same time, we continue to face serious air quality challenges from our almost exclusive use of conventional fuels for motor vehicles. Just in my home state of Utah, transportation vehicles account for 87 percent of carbon monoxide emissions, 52 percent of nitrogen oxide emissions, 34 percent of hydrocarbon emissions, and 22 percent of coarse particulate matter in the air. All of these emissions can be harmful to individuals suffering from chronic respiratory illnesses, heart disease, asthma, and other ailments. More than just harming our health, however, these emissions detract from the natural beauty of our country. Furthermore, as the United States grows in population and dependency on automobile transportation, these problems will only become worse unless something is done to turn the tide. Fortunately, Mr. President, answers to both problems exist. Vehicle technology using domestically plentiful and clean-burning alternative fuels have advanced to the point that, if widely adapted by Americans, we could reverse the course on both foreign dependence and clean air. The challenge is in getting over the hurdle of initial acceptance of the new technologies by the American public. In essence, there are currently three market barriers to this initial acceptance of alternative fuels vehicles by Americans--the incremental cost of the vehicles over conventionally-fueled vehicles, the cost of the fuel, and the lack of convenient fueling stations. Providing incentives--not mandates--to overcome all three of these barriers is what this bill is all about. Mr. President, the bill addresses the first barrier--the extra cost of the alternative fuels vehicles--by providing a tax credit for a portion of the difference in cost. This is key component of the bill that was lacking in S. 1003. By bringing the cost of these vehicles within the range where savings on the cost of the alternative fuel will make owning these vehicles economically viable over the life of the vehicle, public acceptance of the technology should rapidly increase. Once this occurs, production economies of scale will bring the price of the vehicles down further. The bill addresses the second and third market barriers, that of fuel cost and availability, by providing tax credits for the alternative fuels and tax benefits for suppliers who decide to sell it to the public. This is important because the ready availability of the fuel in all geographic locations where the public needs to go or to send goods is key to their acceptance of alternative fuels vehicles. These tax benefits, when combined with the market effect caused by the demand for more fueling stations created by the purchase of more vehicles, will help ensure that such stations will appear where people need them. Mr. President, the incentive approach taken by this bill is meant to provide a temporary bridge over these barriers. If this approach works, the tax incentives will not be needed in the long run. This is why we have placed a seven-year sunset on these provisions. At the end of this period, Congress should take a close look at how well these incentives worked and how the market has developed. There is little doubt that sooner or later this Nation will have to turn to alternative fuels to help solve the two problems I mentioned earlier. I believe it should be sooner and the move should be incentive-based and market-driven. The bill we are introducing today can create the momentum to get us to a cleaner and more secure America much sooner. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague, Senator Jeffords, to introduce the Alternative Fuels Tax Incentives Act. I am pleased that we are being joined by Senators Rockefeller, Robb, Chafee, and Bryan as original cosponsors. This bill is an outgrowth of S. 1003, the Alternative Fuels Promotion Act of 1999, which was sponsored by many of the same sponsors of this year's bill. And, like S. 1003, the bill we are introducing today is designed to achieve two vital goals--reduce our dependency on foreign oil and reduce air pollution from motor vehicles. While the goals of both of these bills are the same, Mr. President, the Alternative Fuels Incentive Act takes a similar, but more comprehensive approach to achieving them. There is a little dispute that our growing dependency on imported oil is dangerous, not only to our continued economic growth, but also to our national security. We are witnessing again this year just how volatile the price of gasoline and other motor fuels are and how decisions made by oil producers far from our shores affect the everyday lives of all Americans. As we increase our dependence of energy from others nations, we are literally placing our future in the hands of foreign entities. Yet, we are stymied at every turn in trying to significantly increase the discovery and development of new domestic sources of oil. At the same time, we continue to face serious air quality challenges from our almost exclusive use of conventional fuels for motor vehicles. Just in my home state of Utah, transportation vehicles account for 87 percent of carbon monoxide emissions, 52 percent of nitrogen oxide emissions, 34 percent of hydrocarbon emissions, and 22 percent of coarse particulate matter in the air. All of these emissions can be harmful to individuals suffering from chronic respiratory illnesses, heart disease, asthma, and other ailments. More than just harming our health, however, these emissions detract from the natural beauty of our country. Furthermore, as the United States grows in population and dependency on automobile transportation, these problems will only become worse unless something is done to turn the tide. Fortunately, Mr. President, answers to both problems exist. Vehicle technology using domestically plentiful and clean-burning alternative fuels have advanced to the point that, if widely adapted by Americans, we could reverse the course on both foreign dependence and clean air. The challenge is in getting over the hurdle of initial acceptance of the new technologies by the American public. In essence, there are currently three market barriers to this initial acceptance of alternative fuels vehicles by Americans--the incremental cost of the vehicles over conventionally-fueled vehicles, the cost of the fuel, and the lack of convenient fueling stations. Providing incentives--not mandates--to overcome all three of these barriers is what this bill is all about. Mr. President, the bill addresses the first barrier--the extra cost of the alternative fuels vehicles--by providing a tax credit for a portion of the difference in cost. This is key component of the bill that was lacking in S. 1003. By bringing the cost of these vehicles within the range where savings on the cost of the alternative fuel will make owning these vehicles economically viable over the life of the vehicle, public acceptance of the technology should rapidly increase. Once this occurs, production economies of scale will bring the price of the vehicles down further. The bill addresses the second and third market barriers, that of fuel cost and availability, by providing tax credits for the alternative fuels and tax benefits for suppliers who decide to sell it to the public. This is important because the ready availability of the fuel in all geographic locations where the public needs to go or to send goods is key to their acceptance of alternative fuels vehicles. These tax benefits, when combined with the market effect caused by the demand for more fueling stations created by the purchase of more vehicles, will help ensure that such stations will appear where people need them. Mr. President, the incentive approach taken by this bill is meant to provide a temporary bridge over these barriers. If this approach works, the tax incentives will not be needed in the long run. This is why we have placed a seven-year sunset on these provisions. At the end of this period, Congress should take a close look at how well these incentives worked and how the market has developed. There is little doubt that sooner or later this Nation will have to turn to alternative fuels to help solve the two problems I mentioned earlier. I believe it should be sooner and the move should be incentive-based and market-driven. The bill we are introducing today can create the momentum to get us to a cleaner and more secure America much sooner. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, as well as my distinguished colleagues Senators Wellstone, Grams, Kohl and Grassley, for their leadership and effort on behalf of the Hmong veterans and in support of this legislation. Also, I would like to make special mention of Senator Kohl's critical role in bringing all parties together and in negotiating this compromise. Senator Kohl's role truly was pivotal. With respect to Senator Grams, I would like to point out my appreciation for all that he has done to assist the Hmong veterans and their families in Minnesota. I also appreciate very much the efforts of the Lao Veterans of America with their national recognition ceremonies for the Hmong and Lao veterans of the U.S. Secret Army and the monument that they dedicated at Arlington National Cemetery. Mr. President, it is important to state that a negative inference should not be drawn from the fact that in moving this legislation through the Senate today, the Senate has amended the bill to eliminate specific mention of any one organization. In fact, the distinguished organization mentioned in the original House legislation was cited because of its role in developing, organizing and keeping records regarding the service of Hmong and Lao veterans who served with U.S. military and covert forces in Laos during the Vietnam War. It, along with other such organizations, may be helpful in providing input for the naturalization of the Hmong veterans and their families.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I will not object if that is given to our side as well.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I oppose Senator Daschle's gun control resolution on the military construction appropriations bill. Rather than move forward on this important appropriations bill, some of my colleagues are trying to breathe life into their gun control agenda. I think it needs to be made very clear that nothing this President has proposed and nothing that the million moms have proposed would have prevented Columbine; West Paducah, KY; Jonesboro; State of Washington, or Hawaii--none of those incidents. This is being done for political purposes, not because there is any real logic behind it. I was disturbed to learn that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's national instant criminal background check system malfunctioned last week, thereby preventing background checks of gun buyers. As a result of the Government's error, gun sales throughout the Nation were halted from last Thursday through Sunday. Meanwhile, existing Federal gun laws are not being enforced, and the Clinton administration appears to be allowing the national instant check system to fall into disrepair. As a matter of fact, they have never fully implemented it, even though we gave them that charge a number of years ago. During the debate on the Brady bill, the Clinton administration promised the American people an instant background check system, and we all agreed with having that system to get the real criminals in our society and to keep guns away from them. Indeed, I have worked hard to make such a system a reality. Unfortunately, as we have seen all too often, the NICS system is not instant for many Americans who wish to purchase firearms. As a result, many firearms-owning Americans are suspicious of the Federal Government's attempt to regulate firearms. Last week's collapse of the NICS system, which occurred during the Million Mom March, only increases this distrust. As the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I am announcing hearings today on the problems associated with the NICS system and how Congress can compel this administration to administer the system adequately. We will hold hearings on this. One thing is clear about last week's collapse: had the Lautenberg Amendment been enacted into law, all sales--even private sales--would have been barred at gun shows. The Clinton Administration, and many of my Democratic colleagues, call for more gun control, but they do not administer or enforce existing laws and programs. There are literally thousands of federal, state, and local firearm laws presently in existence. President Clinton spends a great deal of time at press conferences on gun control. Meanwhile, his Administration cannot even operate the NICS system adequately. Not only does the Clinton Administration fail to administer the NICS system adequately, it fails to prosecute existing gun crimes. For example, compare the following federal gun laws to the Clinton Administration's prosecution record: It is a federal crime to possess a firearm on school grounds. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted only eight cases under this law in 1998, even though more than 6,000 students brought guns to school. The Clinton Administration prosecuted only five such cases in 1997. It is a federal crime to transfer a firearm to a juvenile. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted only six cases under this law in 1998 and only five in 1997. It is a federal crime to transfer or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted only four cases under this law in 1998 and only four in 1997. It is a federal crime for a person who has been adjudicated mentally ill to possess a firearm. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted only five cases under this law in 1998 and only four in 1997. It is a federal crime for a person who has been dishonorably discharged to possess a firearm. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted only two cases under this law in 1998 and no cases in 1997. Worse yet, the Clinton Administration has failed to prosecute even the most serious gun crimes. Between 1992 and 1998, prosecutions of defendants who use a firearm in the commission of a felony dropped nearly 50 percent, from 7,045 to approximately 3,800. Mr. President, I look forward to the upcoming hearing on the NICS system. My colleagues in the Senate should work with me to encourage this Administration to administer and enforce the existing laws before we even consider additional laws. Additionally, we are talking about an enumerated right in the Constitution. And we should be very careful before we start playing around with the enumerated right. Unfortunately, some people think they can make political hay for this matter, and they are going to do everything they can to make that political hay. I have heard arguments here on the floor that are not justified under any terms. It is time for us to enforce the laws that are on the books. There are some 20,000 laws, rules, and regulations against misuse of firearms, against the criminal use of firearms, against all other things I have been talking about, and this administration has not been serious about enforcing those laws. When they get serious about that, maybe they can come in less hypocritical and talk about some changes that both sides can get together on and do something about rather than having these phony approaches toward politics rather than the consideration of the rights of American citizens to keep and bear arms. Mr. President, I yield whatever time I have remaining.

Mr. HATCH. Is my request also granted?

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I stand before the Senate today to urge my colleagues to support a bill, the Mortgage Cancellation Act of 2000, that I am introducing along with Senator Kerrey. This bill would fix a flaw in the tax code that unfairly harms homeowners who sell their home at a loss. Often, homeowners who must sell their home at a loss are able to negotiate with their mortgage lender to forgive all or part of the mortgage balance that exceeds the selling price. However, under current tax law, the amount forgiven is taxable income to the seller. For example, suppose a young family purchased their home for $150,000 with a $130,000 mortgage, $120,000 of which is still outstanding. Let us also assume that there is an economic downturn that has both decreased the value of the house to $110,000 and put this family in financial distress because the primary wage earner has lost his or her job. Because the family is no longer able to meet their mortgage payments, they are forced to sell their home for $110,000, $10,000 below the value of the mortgage, with the condition that the lender will forgive this difference. Unfortunately, under current tax law, this family will have to recognize this $10,000 difference as taxable income at a time when they can least afford it. This is true even though the family suffered a $40,000 loss on the sale. Mr. President, I find this predicament both ironic and unfair. If this same family, under much better circumstances, was able to sell their house for $200,000 instead of $110,000, then they would owe nothing in tax on the gain under current tax law because gains on a principal residence are tax exempt up to $500,000. I believe that this discrepancy creates a tax inequity that begs for relief. Finally, I want to stress that now is the time to address the inequity, while the economy is healthy, instead of waiting for the next recession, when this problem will be much more common. Luckily, the problem addressed by this bill is not widespread in our country right now. However, a few years ago, many families in my home state of Utah suffered losses on the necessary sale of their homes, and had to pay taxes on the canceled mortgage debt. Families in other areas of our nation experienced similar problems. So, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join with Senator Kerrey and me in support of this bill.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I stand before the Senate today to urge my colleagues to support a bill, the Mortgage Cancellation Act of 2000, that I am introducing along with Senator Kerrey. This bill would fix a flaw in the tax code that unfairly harms homeowners who sell their home at a loss. Often, homeowners who must sell their home at a loss are able to negotiate with their mortgage lender to forgive all or part of the mortgage balance that exceeds the selling price. However, under current tax law, the amount forgiven is taxable income to the seller. For example, suppose a young family purchased their home for $150,000 with a $130,000 mortgage, $120,000 of which is still outstanding. Let us also assume that there is an economic downturn that has both decreased the value of the house to $110,000 and put this family in financial distress because the primary wage earner has lost his or her job. Because the family is no longer able to meet their mortgage payments, they are forced to sell their home for $110,000, $10,000 below the value of the mortgage, with the condition that the lender will forgive this difference. Unfortunately, under current tax law, this family will have to recognize this $10,000 difference as taxable income at a time when they can least afford it. This is true even though the family suffered a $40,000 loss on the sale. Mr. President, I find this predicament both ironic and unfair. If this same family, under much better circumstances, was able to sell their house for $200,000 instead of $110,000, then they would owe nothing in tax on the gain under current tax law because gains on a principal residence are tax exempt up to $500,000. I believe that this discrepancy creates a tax inequity that begs for relief. Finally, I want to stress that now is the time to address the inequity, while the economy is healthy, instead of waiting for the next recession, when this problem will be much more common. Luckily, the problem addressed by this bill is not widespread in our country right now. However, a few years ago, many families in my home state of Utah suffered losses on the necessary sale of their homes, and had to pay taxes on the canceled mortgage debt. Families in other areas of our nation experienced similar problems. So, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join with Senator Kerrey and me in support of this bill.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the trade bill before us represents a milestone in U.S. trade policy. This bill, and especially the African Growth and Opportunity Act found at Title I, acknowledges the social, health, and political problems as well as the economic challenges facing a group of states, most of which are developing nations. It is not that our trade policies have not concerned themselves with developing countries before--that commitment is evident in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and many other trade initiatives. However, this bill is unique in many ways. First, we are acknowledging that the mere existence of a trade agreement does not produce immediate results. The strength of a society and its polity profoundly affect the development of the capabilities that allow for globalization. Developing countries, for example, need investment, but prudent companies do not commit their resources unless some very fundamental conditions exist, conditions that exceed those addressed in the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization. The bill before us does that. We underscore the importance of political stability; we provide opportunities for technical assistance that can create a banking and legal structure to repatriate profits and to protect the sanctity of the contract. Second, we acknowledge that there are regionally specific social and health issues that are preconditions to real economic development--what I refer to as ``trade enablement.'' Most Sub-Sahara African (SSA) states have been left behind. Their colonial and post-colonial societies have not, for the most part, melded into a modern, unified state. Nor have these societies produced the type of workforce that trade demands--educated, technically skilled, and healthy workers. The bill before us deals this reality, too, and in several ways. Like many of my colleagues, I believe we should do what we can to help restore our African partners to the world baseline standard of good health. With 20-30 percent HIV/AIDS infection among the adult populations in some states, few firms will risk hiring a workforce in which one-in-three to one-in-five workers may not be alive, let alone working in five years. I agree with President Clinton's comments that Africa, too, needs to do more to control this problem. But this bill provides incentives. Not only are these efforts to improve health in this region good economics and good politics, but they are also simply the right thing to do. We are the richest nation in the world. It has always been a part of the American character to help those who are suffering and to improve conditions where we can. Worker education also faces immense challenges. Literacy rates have risen to 59 percent, but that level lags comparable literacy rates in East Asia (84 percent), Latin America (83 percent) and the Caribbean (83 percent). Once more, the incentives provided by this bill to create an investment climate, will awaken African governments to the need for programed improvements in literacy and technical training. And, through the newly created economic forum under this bill, conditions can be put in place for technical assistance. Mr. President, it is undeniable that this bill is a hybrid. It is not a conventional trade bill, because Africa, with the exception of a few states like South Africa, Gabon, and Mauritius, is not positioned to gain immediate or even mid-term benefits unless, and I repeat, unless, trade is coupled with the forms of assistance and incentives that this bill provides. But it is no less deniable that great benefits will be potentially available to both the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa if the underlying concept in this bill materializes. For the United States, Africa is a warehouse of badly needed strategic materials which will open new sources of supply for U.S. producers. Moreover, if properly developed, this market will benefit the entire population of an African state, rather than a few, often corrupt elites. It is a fundamental axiom of every trade theory that the economic evolution of trading partners produces rolling prosperity--which is another way of saying that prosperity raises all boats. Not only does this phenomenon promise future markets for U.S. goods, services, and agricultural products, but also a more prosperous, politically stable African continent, which, in turn, produces other foreign policy and national security benefits for the U.S. It creates international partners in this region that have a stake in world peace, disease controls, as well as other initiatives to combat terrorism, international crime, labor force abuses, and environmental degradation. I believe that this Africa Trade bill will have a broad range of benefits for America, and I will support this legislation. I want to compliment Senator Roth, Senator Grassley, and other Senators who worked so diligently on this legislation.