Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I just want to point out that we tried to bring this bill up Thursday, then Friday. It was objected to. Then we brought it up Monday. We only had two amendments. Then Tuesday, Wednesday, and now today there have been logjams all the way through. Now, look, I have been as fair as anybody could be. I have tried to accommodate my colleagues on the other side, and we were not making any headway. So I thought that by calling up these 12 amendments, that would resolve it. But if not, we should proceed with the vote.

Mr. HATCH. I don't personally recall that at this time, other than that it did pass.

Mr. HATCH. If the Senator would yield--yes, we did. We supported the President's position, if I recall correctly. There is nothing that says the President can't do that. But this bill says he must at least do certain things.

Mr. HATCH. This is a 6-year bill.

Mr. HATCH. There is going to be another President in 2016, whether Republican or Democrat or otherwise. So there is nothing that says the President can't do that, but we are making sure he does do that. We have done it because of questions that have been raised by people such as the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts and you. We think we have put reasonable time constraints in there, especially since you can review the TPP as it exists-- although that may or may not be the final agreement. You can review that now, if you want, and that is well in advance of it.

Mr. HATCH. I understand the distinguished Senator. Let me say that we all have to make our own individual decisions here. I would encourage you to reconsider because I think we have a good bill that is far better than it has been in the past. Frankly, it is your administration that is putting this forward, and I am doing everything I can to help this administration get this through.

Mr. HATCH. Remember that this is the procedural mechanism that gives Congress the right to really know what is going on and to really look at these matters. That is why we put in these particular provisions, which, as far as I know, are better than they have ever been. So Members of Congress will have an opportunity to know what is in these bills. I don't know fully what is in TPP, myself, and I am going to be one of the most interested people on Earth when that comes, if not the most interested, and when we finally agree. It is still not a completed agreement, as far as I know. All I can say is I think we provide enough time in this bill for anybody who is sincere enough and dedicated enough to look at it.

Mr. HATCH. We will have the ability to take this floor, and those in the House to take the House floor, and fight against it if you disagree with it and it starts to get 51 votes. The administration knows that. They know they can't do a slovenly agreement. They have got to do a good agreement in order to get both sides up here to, in a bipartisan way, accept the agreement for our country.

Mr. HATCH. I do, and I appreciate the distinguished Senator and his efforts to represent his State. I know he does a very good job. I know the senior Senator from Massachusetts is doing a very good job. We are friends. This isn't going to change that. All I can say is that we disagree respectfully. I think I have made this as palatable as we possibly could under the circumstances. The point I have been making is that the agreement is available 60 days before it is even signed. So it isn't as if people will not have a chance to look at it or to fight against it or talk to the President-- whoever that might be. The fact of the matter is that I am not sure that it should be longer than 60 plus 60 plus, I think, another 60. So all I can say is that I have to object, as manager of this bill. I never feel good about objecting to something my colleagues want. I respect your desire to have as much information as you can. I respect the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HATCH. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire. Yes, I agree wholeheartedly. Small businesses are a vital part of promoting international trade.

Mr. HATCH. The Senator has my commitment to work with her to do so.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I want to take some time today to talk about proposals to include a currency manipulation negotiating objective in trade negotiations and the impact this issue is having on the debate over renewing trade promotion authority, or TPA. Currency manipulation has, for many, become the primary issue in the TPA debate. It has certainly gotten the focus of the media and other outside observers. Indeed, I suspect that everyone who has an interest in the outcome of the TPA debate--both for and against--is watching closely to see how the Senate will address this particular matter. Let me begin by saying that I recognize the frustrations many have regarding exchange rate policies of some of our trading partners, and I have committed to working with my colleagues to arrive at ways to improve currency surveillance and mechanisms for responding to problems. However, I want to be as plain as I can on this issue. While currency manipulation is an important issue, it is inappropriate and counterproductive to try to solve this problem solely through free-trade agreements. Nonetheless, I do not believe we should ignore currency manipulation, which is why, for the very first time, our TPA bill would elevate currency practices to a principal negotiation objective. Now, let's get that. For the first time in any trade bill, we elevate currency practices to a principal negotiation objective. We thought that would solve the problem. It means that if the administration fails to make progress in achieving this or any other objectives laid out in the bill, then the relevant trade agreement is subject to a procedural disapproval resolution and other mechanisms that would remove procedural protections. Of course, I understand that a number of my colleagues want to see more prescriptive language which would limit the range of tools available and require that trade sanctions be used to keep monetary policies in line. Most notably, we have the Portman-Stabenow amendment, which would create a negotiating objective requiring enforceable currency standards among parties to a trade agreement. The amendment goes on to say that these standards must be subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and remedies as all other elements of the trade agreement. While this approach may sound reasonable on the surface, there are a number of very serious and complex policy issues to consider. I will address those specific concerns in some detail in just a few minutes, but first I think we need to step back and take a look at the big picture. I think I can boil this very complicated issue down to a single point: The Portman-Stabenow amendment will kill TPA. I am not just saying that; it is at this point a verifiable fact. Yesterday, I received a letter from Treasury Secretary Lew outlining the Obama administration's opposition to this amendment. The letter addresses a number of issues, some of which I will discuss later, but most importantly, at the end of the letter, Secretary Lew stated very plainly that he would recommend that the President veto a TPA bill that included this amendment. That is pretty clear. It doesn't leave much room for interpretation or speculation. No TPA bill that contains the language of the Portman-Stabenow amendment stands a chance of becoming law. I want to be clear. I have great respect for the authors of this amendment. They are my friends, and I believe they are well- intentioned. They have spent a lot of time making their case on their amendment, and I respect their points of view. But at this point, it is difficult--very difficult, in fact--for anyone in this Chamber to claim they support TPA and still vote in favor of the Portman-Stabenow amendment. The two, as of yesterday, have officially become mutually exclusive. For me, this issue is pretty cut and dry. However, I do recognize that perhaps not everyone will view these developments the same way I do. But regardless of what anyone may think of Secretary Lew's letter, the Portman-Stabenow amendment raises enough substantive policy concerns to warrant opposition on its own. Offhand, I can think of four separate consequences we would run into if the Senate were to adopt this amendment, and all of them would have a negative impact on U.S. economic interests. First, the Portman-Stabenow negotiating objective would put the Trans-Pacific Partnership--or TPP--Agreement at grave risk, meaning that our farmers, ranchers, and manufacturers, not to mention the workers they employ, would not get access to these important foreign markets, resulting in fewer good, high-paying jobs for American workers, and I should say higher paying jobs at that. We know this is the case. Virtually all of our major negotiating partners--most notably Japan--have already made clear that they will not agree to an enforceable provision like the one required by the Portman-Stabenow amendment. No country I am aware of, including the United States, has ever shown the willingness to have their monetary policies subject to potential trade sanctions. Adopting this amendment will have, at best, an immediate chilling effect on the TPP negotiations, and at worst, it will stop them in their tracks. If you don't believe me, then take a look at the letter we received from 26 leading food and agricultural organizations, from the American Farm Bureau, to the National Pork Producers Council, to the Western Growers Association, urging Congress to reject the Portman- Stabenow amendment because it will, in their words, ``most likely kill the TPP negotiations.'' Put simply, not only will this amendment kill TPA, it will very likely kill TPP--the Trans-Pacific Partnership--as well. Second, the Portman-Stabenow amendment would put at risk the Federal Reserve's independence in its ability to formulate and execute monetary policies designed to protect and stabilize the U.S. economy. While some in this Chamber have made decrees that our domestic monetary policies do not constitute currency manipulation, we know that not all of our trading partners see it that way. Requiring the inclusion of enforceable rules on currency manipulation and subsequent trade sanctions in our free-trade agreements would provide other countries with a template for targeting U.S. monetary policies, subjecting our own agencies and policies to trade disputes and adjudication in international trade tribunals. We have already heard accusations in international commentaries by foreign finance ministers and central bankers that our own Fed--Federal Reserve, that is--has manipulated the value of the dollar to gain trade advantage. If the Portman-Stabenow amendment is adopted into TPA and these rules become part of our trade agreements, how long do you think it will take for our trading partners to enter disputes and seek remedies against Federal Reserve quantitative easing policies? Not long, I would imagine. If the Portman-Stabenow amendment objective becomes part of our trade agreements, we will undoubtedly see formal actions to impose sanctions on U.S. trade under the guise that the Federal Reserve has manipulated our currency for trade advantage. We will also be hearing from other countries that Fed policy is causing instability in their financial markets and economies, and unless the Fed takes a different path, those countries could argue for relief or justify their own exchange rate policies to gain some trade advantage for themselves. While we may not agree with those allegations, the point is that under the Portman-Stabenow formulation, judgments and verdicts on our policies will be taken out of our hands and, rather, can be rendered by international trade tribunals. I don't know anybody who really wants that. I am well aware that in an attempt to address this concern, the latest version of the Portman-Stabenow amendment states that their enforceable rules do not apply to ``the exercise of domestic monetary policy.'' But for those of us living here in the United States, that clarification does not provide much comfort. After all, the U.S. dollar is the global currency--that is, currently the global currency. If we fail to pass this bill--we have already seen China start to move toward having the yuan become the global currency. I will say again that the U.S. dollar is a global currency. In fact, it is the primary reserve currency in the world, and its value has an impact on markets everywhere. So for the United States, the question as to what is a domestic monetary policy and what is not is open to a lot of debate, and I don't think any of us want those debates being resolved in some international trade tribunal, which is what is going to happen. Moreover, contrary to what many of my colleagues seem to be arguing, no one in international trade--not the Treasury, not the IMF, not the G7, not the G20, not anyone in the world--has accurate tools in place to measure what is and what is not currency manipulation or what is purely domestic policy and what is intended to be international. Even if we demanded enforceable currency standards in our trade agreements, this simple fact will not change. Basing trade sanctions on existing methods which have thus far proven to be unreliable is fraught with risks--risks we should not undertake. For example, IMF models recently showed that in 2013, Japan's currency was anywhere between around 15 percent undervalued and 15 percent overvalued. Given that range, what is an international trade tribunal to do if asked to set trade sanctions based on allegations of currency manipulation? Who in the heck knows. But if we insert these standards into our trade agreements, we would not only subject our trading partners to possible trade sanctions based on indefinite standards, the United States would face similar risks. This is a recipe for trade and currency wars--a situation I think we would all like to avoid. Third, under this amendment--that is, the Portman-Stabenow amendment--the traditional role of the U.S. Treasury in setting U.S. exchange rate policies would be watered down and potentially overruled in international trade tribunals. Do we want that? Thus, adoption of the Portman-Stabenow negotiating objective cedes independence and full authority over not only monetary policy for the Federal Reserve but also exchange rate policy for the Treasury. Fourth, the Portman-Stabenow amendment would create incentives for our trading partners to evade regular reporting and transparency of exchange rate policies. If currency standards become enforceable and immediately subject to sanctions under a trade agreement, the parties on that agreement would almost certainly start withholding full participation in reporting and monitoring mechanisms that would otherwise enable us to identify exchange rate interventions and work against them. Put simply, we cannot enforce rules against unfair exchange rate practices. If we do not have information about them, we can't enforce the rules. Under the Portman-Stabenow amendment, our trading partners are far more likely to engage in interventions in the shadows, hiding from detection out of fear that they could end up being subjected to trade sanctions. I don't think anybody wants that, but that is what is going to happen. For these reasons and others, the Portman-Stabenow amendment is the wrong approach. Still, I do recognize that currency manipulation is a legitimate concern and one we need to address in a serious, thoughtful way. Toward that end, Senator Wyden and I have filed an amendment that would expand on the currency negotiating objective that is already in the TPA bill to give our country more tools to address currency manipulation without the problems and risks that would come part and parcel with the Portman-Stabenow amendment. The Portman-Stabenow amendment would provide a single tool to address currency manipulation: enforceable rules subject to sanctions. As I think I have demonstrated, this, for a variety of reasons, is a pretty blunt, unreliable, and imprecise instrument, given the realities of the global economy. By contrast, the Hatch-Wyden amendment would put a number of tools at our disposal. Specifically, the amendment calls for enhanced transparency, disclosure, reporting, monitoring, cooperative mechanisms, as well as enforceable rules. Our amendment, which would provide maximum flexibility, is a better alternative for addressing currency manipulation for a number of reasons. First, it would preserve the integrity of our current trade negotiations. Once again, if we insert an absolute requirement for enforceable currency rules and required sanctions into the ongoing TPP negotiations, many, if not all, of our negotiating partners will almost certainly walk away. The Hatch-Wyden amendment would pose no threat to the TPP negotiations or any other trade deals. Second, our amendment would not threaten the independence of the Federal Reserve or subject our own monetary and exchange rate policies to possible sanctions based on indefinite standards. Unlike the Portman-Stabenow amendment, it does not give other countries a roadmap to accuse the United States of using its policies intended for domestic growth and stability as tools for currency manipulation. Third, it would increase transparency and accountability of our trading partners' currency practices. This is absolutely crucial. Put simply, we cannot counteract practices that we cannot readily observe. The Portman-Stabenow amendment would tell our trading partners that if you engage in full reporting and transparency, you run the risk of having an international tribunal detect your actions in ways that will generate trade sanctions. The incentive, then, is for countries not to be transparent and instead to put their currency policies further in the shadows, hiding away information that could end up being used in trade disputes. Our trade agreements should provide incentives for countries to go in the opposite direction: full disclosure and accountability of currency practices. The Hatch-Wyden amendment would provide a more effective incentive structure. Finally, and in the current context, most importantly, the Hatch- Wyden amendment would not result in a veto of the TPA bill. It is, in fact, supported by the Obama administration, not to mention business and agriculture stakeholders across the country. I suppose one could say we have come full circle. After what I hope has been an interesting discussion of important policy considerations, we are back at the simple, uncomplicated truth. If nothing I have said here today about the complexities of currency and monetary policy has resonated with my colleagues, this fact remains: A vote for the Portman-Stabenow amendment is a vote to kill TPA. I am sure that sounds good to some of my colleagues who are fundamentally opposed to what we are trying to do here, but for those who support free trade, open markets, and high-paying jobs for American workers, this truth is inescapable. But, once again, this doesn't mean we should stand by and do nothing about currency manipulation. The Hatch-Wyden amendment will provide an effective path to improve transparency, measurement, and monitoring of our trading partners' currency practices, and effective and transparent ways to counteract anyone seeking to manipulate currencies for unfair trade advantage. The Hatch-Wyden amendment will allow Congress to speak forcefully on the issue of currency manipulation without putting our trade agreements and domestic policies in limbo. For Senators who are sincerely concerned about currency manipulation--and I am one of those Senators--the Hatch-Wyden amendment would address these issues in a far more productive way. So, at this point, the choice should be pretty clear. We have strong indications that the House cannot pass a TPA bill with the Portman- Stabenow language. Even if it could pass the House, Secretary Lew has made it very clear that including that provision in our bill would compel President Obama to veto it. The Hatch-Wyden amendment, on the other hand, would strengthen our hand by providing a workable set of tools to counteract currency manipulation in a way that would protect our interests and achieve real results and, most importantly, it would preserve our ability to enact TPA so we can negotiate strong trade agreements that will help grow our economy and create jobs. That is the choice we face with these two amendments. I call on my colleagues who support TPA to oppose the Portman-Stabenow currency amendment and support the Hatch-Wyden alternative. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time until 8 p.m. today be equally divided in the usual form; that upon the use or yielding back of that time, the Senate vote in relation to the amendments listed: No. 1312, Inhofe-Coons, as further modified; No. 1227, Shaheen; No. 1327, Warren; No. 1251, Brown; I further ask that no second-degree amendments be in order to these amendments and that the Inhofe amendment be subject to a 60-affirmative-vote threshold for adoption. I further ask that it be in order to offer the following first-degree amendments during today's session of the Senate: No. 1252, Brown-Portman, the level playing field amendment; No. 1385, Hatch- Wyden, the currency amendment; No. 1384, Cruz-Grassley, the immigration amendment; No. 1410, Menendez, the child labor amendment.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I call for regular order with respect to Portman amendment No. 1299.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk to the text proposed to be stricken.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I have a modification to my amendment No. 1411 at the desk.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as we resume consideration of our TPA bill, I want to delve a little deeper into the process of considering and approving trade agreements. Throughout the debate surrounding this bill, I have heard the term ``fast-track'' used quite a few times. There was, in fact, a time when trade promotion authority was commonly referred to as ``fast-track.'' Now, only TPA opponents use that term. They want the American people to believe that under TPA, trade agreements come to Congress and are passed in the blink of an eye. Sometimes they use the term ``rubberstamp'' as if under TPA Congress wielding ultimate authority over a trade agreement--the power to reject it entirely--is a mere administrative act. There is a reason the term ``fast-track'' isn't used anymore. It is because those who are being truly honest know the process is anything but fast. I think it would be helpful for me to walk through the entire process Congress must undertake before rendering a final judgment on a trade agreement, to show how thoroughly these agreements are vetted before they ever receive a vote. Before I do, though, I will note for my colleagues that this bill adds more transparency, notice, and consultation requirements than any TPA bill before it. This bill guarantees that Congress has all the information we need to render an informed up-or-down verdict on any trade agreement negotiated using the procedures in this bill. Congress's oversight of any trade agreement starts even before the negotiations on that agreement begin. Under this bill, the President must not only notify Congress that he is considering entering into negotiations with our trading partners but also what his objectives for those negotiations are. Specifically, this has to happen 3 months before the President can start negotiating. That is 3 months for Congress to consult on and shape the negotiations before they even begin. Congress's oversight continues as negotiations advance. This bill requires the U.S. Trade Representative to continuously consult with the Senate Finance Committee and any other Senate committee with jurisdiction over subject matter potentially affected by a trade agreement. Moreover, the USTR, the U.S. Trade Representative, must, upon request, meet with any Member of Congress to consult on the negotiations, including providing classified negotiating text. The bill also establishes panels to oversee the trade negotiations. These panels, the Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations and the designated congressional advisers, consult with and advise the USTR on the formulation of negotiating positions and strategies. Under the bill, members of these panels would be accredited advisers to trade negotiating sessions involving the United States. Congressional oversight intensifies as the negotiations near conclusion. At least 6 months before the President signs a trade agreement, he must submit a report to Congress detailing any potential changes to U.S. trade remedy laws. Then, 3 months before the President signs a trade agreement, he must notify Congress that he intends to do so. At the same time, the President is required to submit details of the agreement to the U.S. International Trade Commission. The ITC is tasked with preparing an extensive report for Congress on the potential costs and benefits the agreement will have on the U.S. economy, specific economic sectors, and American workers. I want to focus on the next step required by this bill because it is a new requirement never before included in TPA. Sixty days before the President can sign any trade agreement, he must publish the full text of the agreement on the USTR Web site so that the public can see it. This ensures an unprecedented level of transparency for the American people and gives our constituents the material and time they need to inform us of their views. Only after the President has met these notification and consultation requirements, only after he has provided the required trade reports, and only after he has made the agreement available to the American people, may he finally sign the agreement. The process this bill requires before an agreement is even signed is obviously quite complex, full of checks and balances, and provides unprecedented transparency for the American public. However, once the President does sign the agreement, his obligations continue. Sixty days after signing the agreement, the President must provide Congress a description of changes to U.S. law he considers necessary. This step gives Congress time to begin considering what will be included in the legislation to implement the trade agreement. This is also the time when the Finance Committee holds open hearings on the trade agreement in order to gather the views of the administration and the public. Following these hearings, one of the most important steps in this entire process occurs, the so-called informal markup. The informal markup is not always well understood, so I will take a minute to describe it. The informal markup occurs before the President formally submits the trade agreement to Congress. As with any markup of legislation, the committee reviews and discusses the agreement and implementing legislation, has the opportunity to question witnesses about the agreement, and can amend the legislation. In the event of amendments, the Senate can proceed to a mock conference with the House to unify the legislation. The practice of the informal markup produces or provides Congress an opportunity to craft the legislation implementing a trade agreement as it sees fit and to direct the President on the final package to be formally submitted to Congress. While the informal markup is well established in practice, this bill, for the first time in the history of the TPA, specifies that Congress will receive the materials it needs in time to conduct an informal markup. It requires that 30 days before the President formally submits a trade agreement to Congress, he or she must submit the final legal text of the agreement and a statement specifying any administrative action he will take to implement the agreement. The bill therefore ensures that Congress will have all the materials it needs in time to conduct a thorough markup. Only at this point may the President formally submit legislation implementing a trade agreement to Congress, and only at this point do the TPA procedures, first established in the Trade Act of 1974, kick in. Once a bill implementing a trade agreement is formally submitted to Congress, a clock for consideration of that bill starts. This clock gives Congress 90 days in session to consider and roll out a bill. As everyone here knows, 90 legislative days takes a lot longer than 90 calendar days. When I hear my colleagues talk about ``fast-track,'' I think this is where they start the clock. They are disregarding the years of oversight and consultations that occurred during trade negotiations. They are ignoring the many months of congressional consideration of trade legislation that occurs before the President ever formally submits that legislation to Congress. They are discounting that by this point in the process, Congress has held hearings on the agreement, received views from the public, and extensively reviewed the agreement and the implementing legislation through an informal markup. Calling this part of the process fast-track is like skipping to the end of a book and saying the author did not develop a plot. As I said, even here at the end of the process, the bill provides more than 3 months for hearings, committee action, floor debate, and votes. Sometimes I think that only a United States Senator could argue that more than 3 months to formally consider legislation--legislation that has already been thoroughly debated, vetted, and reviewed--is making decisions too fast. When Congress votes on an implementing bill, it is only after years of oversight and months of formal review. So I have to ask, does this process seem fast to you? If TPA is not fast, then what does TPA do? Put simply, TPA guarantees a vote. TPA says to the world that when they sign an agreement with the United States, Congress promises to say yes or no to that agreement. Most importantly, TPA guarantees that Congress will have the information in the time we need to make that decision. Without TPA, we are essentially telling the President to try to negotiate the price of a house, and then after buying that home, we are asking to renegotiate with the sellers. This would be absurd and rob Americans of financial opportunities, employment, and a fair world marketplace they can only get from free-trade agreements. Once again, I urge all my colleagues to support the bill. I yield the floor.