Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and pay tribute to James Q. Cannon, a fellow Utahn who has served as a distinguished leader in the health care quality movement for over twenty-five years. Those of us who know Jamie recognize his tireless efforts to ensure that the thousands of seniors, the underprivileged, and other vulnerable citizens receive the highest quality medical care possible. As President and Chief Executive Officer of HealthInsight, a community-based quality improvement organization in Utah and Nevada, Mr. Cannon has dedicated his life's work to fostering collaboration and continuous learning among health care providers, policy makers, consumer, and business leaders. These efforts have enabled physicians and other health care professionals to respond more effectively and humanely to the many needs of their patients and have helped the best in health care science and research to become part of the usual practice of medicine. Jamie Cannon's vision and pioneer spirit have assisted in bringing hundreds of people together annually to learn, discuss, and implement community-wide health care quality improvement strategies. His commitment to improving the delivery of health care has been a driving force behind countless successful efforts in our communities to prevent unnecessary illness, to reduce complications associated with chronic disease, to improve care delivery processes and outcomes, to simplify health care administration, and to develop sound, supportive government policies. Over the years, these successes have touched in one way or another, virtually all aspects and settings in health care--from government policy development to evaluations of program effectiveness, from pediatric care to end-of-life care, and from hospitals to physician offices. In addition to his service to the people of Utah and Nevada, Jamie has led and supported initiatives to evaluate and improve the quality of medical care delivered to all Americans. He has served as a member of the board of directors of the American Health Quality Association, an association representing a national network of organizations and individuals striving to improve the health care delivered in every state in our nation. Mr. Cannon has also chaired numerous committees and task forces at the national level, providing leadership and direction to other health business executives committed to improving the quality of clinical medicine. In addition to providing a legacy of health care quality leadership regionally and nationally, Jamie has also influenced the lives of many others in the community. He is a devoted husband, father of ten children, son and brother. Throughout his life, Jamie has also given generously of his time to those in need through lay service in his church. Jamie's genuine care and concern for others is apparent in every interaction. His boundless optimism and belief in human goodness engenders trust, rekindles hope, and nurtures vision in all those around him. Mr. Cannon's leadership and service are respected and admired by his peers, employers, business associates, friends and neighbors, and family. I am proud to know Jamie. He deserves the recognition and appreciation of Congress, the Nation, and particularly the citizens of Utah and Nevada. With honor and pride I ask my colleagues to join me today in recognizing and expressing appreciation to James Q. Cannon for his many contributions to quality health care in our country.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, this amendment will put the Senate on record in two important areas. The first is that, notwithstanding assumptions to the contrary, the Antitrust Division needs and should have adequate resources to enable it to meet its statutory requirements, including those related to reviewing and investigating increasingly numerous and complex mergers. The second, is that Congress needs to review and pursue adjustments to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. This second point, Mr. President, is an important one and one whose time is long overdue. The threshold values in this Act which trigger the requirement for businesses to file premerger notifications with government antitrust enforcers have not been changed, even for inflation, since 1976--23 years ago. The overall purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the Antitrust Division's resources are focused on matters and transactions most deserving of the Division's attention, and to remove unnecessary regulatory and financial burdens on small businesses. Mr. President, few would disagree that it is important to adequately fund the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. They are charged with the civil and criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws, including review of corporate mergers, in order to ensure that the consumer benefits from lower prices and better goods that come with vigorous competition in the marketplace. The interests of consumers must prevail over the political interests of some companies. At our oversight hearing of the Justice Department several weeks ago, I asked Attorney General Reno whether she would work with us to review the value thresholds of the Hart-Scott-Rodino. It is my belief that adjustments to the value thresholds of Hart-Scott-Rodino are needed. They are needed to ensure that the Department's merger reviews take into account inflation and the true economic impact of mergers in today's economy--not in the economy of 1976. The Attorney General, and the Federal Trade Commission have pledged to work with us, and I look forward with working with the Administration to come up with a rational proposal that is a win-win for both the Department and small business. Mr. President, let me just add that this amendment is not about one company, or one issue. It is about providing rational relief for some small businesses and supporting the enforcement of our laws.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by a diverse, bipartisan group of Senators in introducing this simple, technical bill to extend the effective date of a provision included in last year's omnibus appropriations bill. My cosponsors include Senators Nickles, Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, Sessions, Abraham, Kohl, Schumer, Lieberman, DeWine, and Helms. I urge all of my colleagues to support our bill. My colleagues will recall that last year's omnibus appropriations bill included a provision originating in the House, relating to the application of state bar rules to federal prosecutors. The so-called McDade amendment proposed the addition of a new section, Section 530B, to title 28 of the United States Code, which would effect the ethical standards required of federal prosecutors. Although I am prepared to, I do not want to address the merits of this issue today, and our bill does not do so. Suffice it to say, however, that including this provision was so controversial that a bipartisan majority of the Judiciary Committee opposed its inclusion in the omnibus bill. In fact, our strong opposition resulted in a six month delay in the provision's effective date being included as well. When we included this six month grace period, the Senate anticipated that the time might be used to address the serious concerns with the underlying measure. Due to arguably unanticipated events, we have not been able to do so. Our amendment simply maintains the status quo, extending the grace period an additional six months. A bipartisan group of 12 Senators, including myself and 3 former chairmen of the Senate Judiciary Committee signed a letter, urging the distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee to include this amendment in this supplemental appropriations bill. This letter was signed by Senators Thurmond, Kennedy, Biden, DeWine, Sessions, Abraham, Kyl, Feinstein, Kohl, Nickles, Warner, and myself. I ask unanimous consent that the letter appear in the Record following my remarks. Let me assure my colleagues, our bill will not, as some might suggest, result in looser ethical standards for federal prosecutors. The same high standards that have always applied will continue in force. Indeed, I have considerable sympathy for the values Section 530B seeks to protect. Anyone who at one time or another has been the subject of unfounded ethical or legal charges knows the frustration of clearing one's name. And no one wants more than I to ensure that all federal prosecutors are held to the highest ethical standards. As Justice Sutherland put it in 1935, the prosecutor's job is not just to win a case, but to see ``that justice shall be done. . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'' But Section 530B, as it was enacted last year, is not in my view the way to ensure these standards are met. Although well-intentioned, section 530B is not the measured and well tailored law needed to address the legitimate concerns contemplated by Congress, and will have serious unintended consequences. Indeed, if allowed to take effect in its present form, section 530B could cripple the ability of the Department of Justice to enforce federal law. The federal government has a legitimate and important role in the investigation and prosecution of complex multi-state terrorism, drug, fraud or organized crime conspiracies, in rooting out and punishing fraud against federally funded programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, in appropriate enforcement of the federal civil rights laws, in investigating and prosecuting complex corporate crime, and in punishing environmental crime. It is in these very cases that current Section 530B, if unchanged, will have its most serious adverse effects. Federal prosecutors in these cases, which frequently encompass several states, will be subject to the differing state and local rules of each of those states. Their decisions will be subject to review by the ethics review boards in each of these states at the whim of defense counsel, even if the federal prosecutor is not licensed in that state. At a minimum, the law will discourage the close prosecutorial supervision of investigations that ensure that suspect's rights are not abridged. More likely, however, in its current form, section 530B will hinder the effective investigation and prosecution of violations of federal law. Several important investigative and prosecutorial practices, perfectly legal and acceptable under federal law and in federal court, under current section 530B will be subject to state bar rules. For instance, in many states, federal attorneys will not be permitted to speak with witnesses alleged to be represented, especially witnesses to corporate misconduct. The use of undercover investigations or federal- court authorized wiretaps may be challenged as illegal in those states where these practices are barred or curtailed by state law or rule, hindering federal criminal investigations. In other states, current section 530B might be construed to require--contrary to long- established federal grand jury practice--that prosecutors present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. In short, current section 530B will likely affect adversely enforcement of our antitrust laws, our environmental laws prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste, our labor laws, our civil rights laws, and the integrity of every federal benefits program. Despite these potentially severe consequences, this legislation received no meaningful consideration in the Senate last Congress. Rather, it was included without an opportunity for Senate debate in an unamendable omnibus appropriations bill conference report. The first Senate consideration of this matter occurred just this week, with a hearing in the Judiciary Committee's Criminal Justice Oversight Subcommittee. The testimony at that hearing shed important light on many of the concerns about section 530B that I have described. Yet, our bill does not repeal section 530B, or change one letter of it. Our bill simply delays its effective date for six additional months, to provide the Senate an appropriate time in which to address these matters with our colleagues in the House. We believe that it is in the best interest of the Congress, the Department of Justice, and our state and federal courts, to resolve concerns over this issue under current law, as anticipated by the Congress when it enacted the grace period. The provisions of the McDade amendment are slated to go into effect on April 19, 1999, if no further action is taken. I urge my colleagues to support the swift enactment of our legislation, to provide the time needed to reach a reasonable resolution to this complex issue.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original co-sponsor of the legislation, the ``Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,'' which Senator Ashcroft is introducing today. This legislation's other sponsors include: Senator Dodd, Senator Sessions, Senator Lieberman, Senator Grassley, Senator Torricelli, Senator Smith, and Senator Schumer. State and federal courts are overwhelmed by up to 150,000 asbestos lawsuits today, and there are new suits being filed. Unfortunately, those who are truly sick with asbestos and various asbestos-related cancers and illnesses spend years in court before receiving any compensation, and then usually lose more than half of that compensation to attorneys' fees and other costs. One cause of this extraordinary delay in compensation is the large number of lawsuits filed by those who, without any symptoms or signs of asbestos-related illness, bring suits for future medical monitoring and fear of cancer. Mr. President, I am concerned that as juries award enormous compensation and outrageous punitive damages to non-impaired plaintiffs, others with actual illnesses receive little or no compensation. As legal and financial resources are tied up and exhausted, it is increasingly unclear whether those who are truly inflicted with asbestos-caused diseases will be able to recover anything at all in the years ahead. Courts have tried unsuccessfully to cope with this problem. The major parties involved attempted to compromise on a solution that included prompt compensation. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned one such compromise, known as the Amchem or Georgine agreement, on civil procedural rule grounds, but found the settlement to be ``arguably a brilliant partial solution.'' Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Supreme Court, upheld the Appellate decision and stated, ``[t]he argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.'' The Court accurately recognized that Congress is the most appropriate body to resolve the asbestos crisis. That is what this legislation is aimed to do. Mr. President, through the hundreds of thousands of cases that already have been litigated in the court system, the legal and scientific issues relating to asbestos litigation have been thoroughly explored. This, along with the recent court decisions demonstrate that the asbestos litigation issue is now ripe for a legislative solution. This bill we introduce today will correct the asbestos litigation crisis problems. It is crafted to reflect as closely as possible the original settlement agreed to by the involved parties in the Amchem settlement. This bill will eliminate the asbestos litigation burden in the courts, get fair compensation for those who currently are sick, and enable the businesses to manage their liabilities in order to ensure that compensation will be available for future claimants. It is important to note that no tax-payer money will fund this bill. We have carefully crafted this legislation so that it is at least as favorable--and, in many cases, more favorable--to claimants as the original Amchem settlement. As this bill makes its way through the legislative process, I look forward to working with Senator Ashcroft and my colleagues to further refine the language in order to achieve the maximum public benefit from this legislation.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my friend Senator Baucus and many more of my esteemed colleagues in the Senate in introducing legislation that would permanently extend the research and experimentation tax credit. As we enter the 21st century, we need to ensure that the United States remains the world's undisputed leader in technological and scientific innovation. The global economy is becoming increasingly competitive. We must move to ensure that our economy does not fall behind. The research and experimentation tax credit is crucial to stimulating economic growth. The President emphasized the value of this credit by asking that it be extended in his budget. Additionally, Congress has recognized the importance of this tax credit by extending it nine times since 1981. Now is the time to end the uncertainty surrounding whether or not the credit will continue to be extended or be allowed to lapse. We must guarantee to American business, our scientists, our engineers, and our citizens who depend on technological innovations every day, that we will make this tax credit permanent. Mr. President, permanence is essential to the effectiveness of this credit. Research and development projects typically take a number of years and may even last longer than a decade. As our business leaders plan these projects, they need to know whether or not they can count on this tax credit. The current uncertainty surrounding the credit has induced businesses to allocate significantly less to research than they otherwise would if they knew the tax credit would be available. This uncertainty undermines the entire purpose of the credit. For the government and the American people to maximize the return on their investment in U.S. based research and development, this credit must be made permanent. Studies have shown that the R&E tax credit significantly increases research and development expenditures. The marginal effect of one dollar of the R&E credit stimulates approximately one dollar of additional private research and development spending over the short-run and as much as two dollars of extra investment over the long-run. In the business community, the development of new products, technologies, medicines, and ideas can result in either success or failure. Investments carry a risk. The R&E tax credit helps ease the cost of incurring these risks. Whereas foreign nations heavily subsidize research with public dollars, the United States has typically relied less on direct public funds and more on private sector incentives. The R&E tax credit has potential to be an even more effective incentive if it were made permanent. I am aware that not every company that incurs research and development expenditures in the U.S. can take advantage of the R&E tax credit. As the credit matures and business cycles change, the current credit may be out of reach for some companies. To help solve this problem Congress enacted the Alternative Incremental Research Credit to help businesses that do not qualify for the R&E tax credit. To improve the effectiveness of this alternative credit, we have included a proposal to increase it by 1 percent. Mr. President, I am aware that a permanent extension of this credit will be costly. However, when you consider the value that this investment will create for our economy, it is a bargain. Making this credit permanent will encourage more companies to locate their research activities within the United States. This will lead to more jobs and higher wages for U.S. workers. We must recognize that international competition is fierce. Many other countries offer significant enticements to prompt companies to move research activities within their borders. If we fail to ensure at least a level playing field, many companies will move their research activities abroad and we will lose many precious high-paying jobs. Findings from a study conducted by Coopers & Lybrand show that workers in every state will benefit from higher wages if the R & E tax credit is made permanent. Payroll increases as a result of gains in productivity stemming from the credit have been estimated to exceed $60 billion over the next 12 years. Furthermore, greater productivity from additional R&E will increase overall economic growth in every state in the Union. Mr. President, my home state of Utah is a good example of how state economies will benefit from the R&E tax credit. Utah is home to a large number of firms who invest a high percentage of their revenue on research and development. For example, between Salt Lake City and Provo lies the world's biggest stretch of software and computer engineering firms. This area, which was named ``Software Valley'' by Business Week, is second only to California's Silicon Valley as a thriving high tech commercial area. In addition, Utah is home to about 700 biotechnology and biomedical firms that employ nearly 9,000 workers. These companies were conceived in research and development and will not survive, much less grow, without continuously conducting R&D activities. In all, Mr. President there are approximately 80,000 employees working in Utah's 1,400 plus and growing technology based companies. Research and development is the lifeblood of these firms and hundreds of thousands like them throughout the nation. If the credit is allowed to lapse, businesses will not be able to factor the credit into their long-term plans. This uncertainty causes businesses to under-invest in research. This may slow the development of the next computer chip, the next household convenience, the next generation of heart monitoring equipment, or a new drug that stops cancer. We must ensure stability so that our business leaders can count on the credit as they decide how much to invest in research and development. Research and development is essential for long-term economic growth. Innovations in science and technology have fueled the massive economic expansion we have witnessed over the course of the 20th century. These advancements have improved the standard of living for nearly every American. Simply put, the R&E tax credit is an investment in economic growth, new jobs, and important new products and processes. In conclusion Mr. President, if we decide not to make the R&E tax credit permanent, we are limiting the potential growth of our economy. How can we expect the American economy to hold the lead in the global economic race if we allow other countries to offer faster tracks than we do? Making the tax credit permanent will keep American business ahead of the pack. It will speed economic growth. Innovations resulting from American research and development will continue to improve the standard of living for every person in the U.S. and also worldwide. Mr. President, simply put, the costs of not making the R&E tax credit permanent are far greater than the costs of making it permanent. As the next millennium closes in on us, we cannot afford to let the American economy slow down. Now is the time to send a strong message to to the world that America intends to retain its position as the world's foremost innovator. I ask that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. The bill follows:

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my friend Senator Baucus and many more of my esteemed colleagues in the Senate in introducing legislation that would permanently extend the research and experimentation tax credit. As we enter the 21st century, we need to ensure that the United States remains the world's undisputed leader in technological and scientific innovation. The global economy is becoming increasingly competitive. We must move to ensure that our economy does not fall behind. The research and experimentation tax credit is crucial to stimulating economic growth. The President emphasized the value of this credit by asking that it be extended in his budget. Additionally, Congress has recognized the importance of this tax credit by extending it nine times since 1981. Now is the time to end the uncertainty surrounding whether or not the credit will continue to be extended or be allowed to lapse. We must guarantee to American business, our scientists, our engineers, and our citizens who depend on technological innovations every day, that we will make this tax credit permanent. Mr. President, permanence is essential to the effectiveness of this credit. Research and development projects typically take a number of years and may even last longer than a decade. As our business leaders plan these projects, they need to know whether or not they can count on this tax credit. The current uncertainty surrounding the credit has induced businesses to allocate significantly less to research than they otherwise would if they knew the tax credit would be available. This uncertainty undermines the entire purpose of the credit. For the government and the American people to maximize the return on their investment in U.S. based research and development, this credit must be made permanent. Studies have shown that the R&E tax credit significantly increases research and development expenditures. The marginal effect of one dollar of the R&E credit stimulates approximately one dollar of additional private research and development spending over the short-run and as much as two dollars of extra investment over the long-run. In the business community, the development of new products, technologies, medicines, and ideas can result in either success or failure. Investments carry a risk. The R&E tax credit helps ease the cost of incurring these risks. Whereas foreign nations heavily subsidize research with public dollars, the United States has typically relied less on direct public funds and more on private sector incentives. The R&E tax credit has potential to be an even more effective incentive if it were made permanent. I am aware that not every company that incurs research and development expenditures in the U.S. can take advantage of the R&E tax credit. As the credit matures and business cycles change, the current credit may be out of reach for some companies. To help solve this problem Congress enacted the Alternative Incremental Research Credit to help businesses that do not qualify for the R&E tax credit. To improve the effectiveness of this alternative credit, we have included a proposal to increase it by 1 percent. Mr. President, I am aware that a permanent extension of this credit will be costly. However, when you consider the value that this investment will create for our economy, it is a bargain. Making this credit permanent will encourage more companies to locate their research activities within the United States. This will lead to more jobs and higher wages for U.S. workers. We must recognize that international competition is fierce. Many other countries offer significant enticements to prompt companies to move research activities within their borders. If we fail to ensure at least a level playing field, many companies will move their research activities abroad and we will lose many precious high-paying jobs. Findings from a study conducted by Coopers & Lybrand show that workers in every state will benefit from higher wages if the R & E tax credit is made permanent. Payroll increases as a result of gains in productivity stemming from the credit have been estimated to exceed $60 billion over the next 12 years. Furthermore, greater productivity from additional R&E will increase overall economic growth in every state in the Union. Mr. President, my home state of Utah is a good example of how state economies will benefit from the R&E tax credit. Utah is home to a large number of firms who invest a high percentage of their revenue on research and development. For example, between Salt Lake City and Provo lies the world's biggest stretch of software and computer engineering firms. This area, which was named ``Software Valley'' by Business Week, is second only to California's Silicon Valley as a thriving high tech commercial area. In addition, Utah is home to about 700 biotechnology and biomedical firms that employ nearly 9,000 workers. These companies were conceived in research and development and will not survive, much less grow, without continuously conducting R&D activities. In all, Mr. President there are approximately 80,000 employees working in Utah's 1,400 plus and growing technology based companies. Research and development is the lifeblood of these firms and hundreds of thousands like them throughout the nation. If the credit is allowed to lapse, businesses will not be able to factor the credit into their long-term plans. This uncertainty causes businesses to under-invest in research. This may slow the development of the next computer chip, the next household convenience, the next generation of heart monitoring equipment, or a new drug that stops cancer. We must ensure stability so that our business leaders can count on the credit as they decide how much to invest in research and development. Research and development is essential for long-term economic growth. Innovations in science and technology have fueled the massive economic expansion we have witnessed over the course of the 20th century. These advancements have improved the standard of living for nearly every American. Simply put, the R&E tax credit is an investment in economic growth, new jobs, and important new products and processes. In conclusion Mr. President, if we decide not to make the R&E tax credit permanent, we are limiting the potential growth of our economy. How can we expect the American economy to hold the lead in the global economic race if we allow other countries to offer faster tracks than we do? Making the tax credit permanent will keep American business ahead of the pack. It will speed economic growth. Innovations resulting from American research and development will continue to improve the standard of living for every person in the U.S. and also worldwide. Mr. President, simply put, the costs of not making the R&E tax credit permanent are far greater than the costs of making it permanent. As the next millennium closes in on us, we cannot afford to let the American economy slow down. Now is the time to send a strong message to to the world that America intends to retain its position as the world's foremost innovator. I ask that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. The bill follows:

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, there is little doubt that the moment of truth regarding a missile defense of U.S. territory is fast approaching. The need for it was not unseen. Since 1983, there has been a steady flow of evidence that the post-cold-war era would not be the single superpower cakewalk that many expected. In place of the single adversary nuclear threat, we see a fragmented threat environment populated by mentalities more given to terrorism than the mass attack, direct confrontational strategies of the cold war. The cloudy grasp that we have of the true threat is not helped by the Clinton administration. They lack a strategic approach to a threat that they don't really know or understand. They rely on the prevention policies. Arms control and non- proliferation agreements are of questionable value. Disarmament assistance to the former Soviet Union has not kept nuclear, missile, or warhead technology from slipping abroad and has had its most adverse impact on our own U.S. steel workers and the United States rocket launch industry. United States industry has been encouraged to purchase Russian launch vehicles, technologies, and services to keep them from slipping out of the country. The administration is reluctant to squelch illegal Russian steel imports into the United States for fear of causing civil strife among Russian steel workers. Multilateral export controls are not multilaterally enforced, and the framework agreement with North Korea is neither a framework for cooperation nor an agreement. Second, there is deterrence. However, there is sufficient doubt in the world today about this administration's resolve to use force. This leaves us with the third element of administration missile defense policy: the missile defense force itself. Supposedly, that is our fall back position when prevention and deterrence fail. But when the force structure depends on a strategy that does not address a threat because the threat is unknown, one seems forced toward the very disturbing conclusion that the easiest way to avoid the messier aspects of the problem, like tampering with the ABM Treaty, is simply to politicize the threat. For too long it has appeared that this administration underestimates the threat in order to preserve the sanctity of a treaty increasingly irrelevant to the contemporary threat environment. Let me say more about this last issue. In starker terms this means denial, even wishing the real threat away. One would think that it was embarrassing enough for the Clinton threat team to make the sudden and very recent admission that there is a missile threat to U.S. territory. And, by the way, this now includes Alaska and Hawaii, which the administration had chosen to place outside of U.S. territorial boundaries to give academic weight to its anti-development and deployment arguments. If they are seriously seeking the truth, they do not demonstrate it by re-examining the ABM Treaty restraints. Here the administration has a rare opportunity for leadership on a badly understood and very divisive issue. The President acknowledged just this January that, with the long-range missile threat to U.S. territory better understood, progress on developing our defenses would be pursued by renegotiating rather than abandoning the ABM Treaty. I do not intend to await the outcome of administration negotiations on ABM modifications and amendments, which will take some time given traditional Russian Duma management of the treaty ratification process. In the meantime, I will urge the strongest possible pursuit of conceptual strategies, like the sea-based missile defense force, as well as land-force and space-based missile defense components. Inaction is eclipsing administration options. Since I join many colleagues as well as other experts outside of official circles in believing China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, and South Africa, among others, have real threat capabilities, I want something done by way of creating a viable defense of U.S. territory. For this very reason, I have joined my good friends, Senators Cochran and Inouye as a cosponsor of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, it is with great honor and reverence that I rise today with my friend and colleague, Senator Cleland, to introduce a bipartisan constitutional amendment to permit Congress to enact legislation prohibiting the physical desecration of the American flag. The American flag serves as a symbol of our great nation. The flag represents our country in a way nothing else can; it represents the common bond shared by an otherwise diverse people. Whatever our differences of party, race, religion, or socio-economic status, the flag reminds us that we are very much one people, united in a shared destiny, bonded in a common faith in our nation. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens reminded us of the significance of our unique emblem when he wrote: A country's flag is a symbol of more than nationhood and national unity. It also signifies the ideas that characterize the society that has chosen that emblem as well as the special history that has animated the growth and power of those ideas. . . . So it is with the American flag. It is more than a proud symbol of the courage, the determination, and the gifts of a nation that transformed 13 fledgling colonies into a world power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of goodwill for other peoples who share our aspirations. Throughout our history, the flag has captured the hearts and minds of school teachers, construction workers, police officers, grandmothers, and public servants. Who can forget the image of Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin planting the American flag on the moon? At that moment, the flag stood not only for the triumph of American know-how and the courage of Americans to explore the unknown, but also for freedom. It was a statement that whatever Americans do, we do to promote liberty, equality, and justice. And, what of those children who recite the ``Pledge of Allegiance'' every morning in classrooms all across America? They are pledging to be good citizens, honest and loyal and just. In pledging allegiance to the flag, they are affirming their belief in ``liberty and justice for all.'' And, throughout our history, men and women in uniform have drawn courage from our flag and gave their lives for the values it symbolizes. No matter the era, no matter the color of uniform--whether Army green, Air Force blue, or Navy white--no matter the theater of battle--whether at Gettysburg, San Juan Hill, Iwo Jima, Korea, Da Nang, or the Persian Gulf--our men and women had one common bond: the American flag. Consider the example of Army Corporal Joseph Quintero, a prisoner of the Japanese during World War II. Quintero secretly led a group of POWs in obtaining red, white, and blue material to make an American flag. The flag lifted the hearts of the Americans who were suffering from malnutrition, overwork, and physical abuse. When American planes started to attack the prison camp, Quintero waived Old Glory and the planes stopped the attack and saved numerous American lives. Even in the worst of conditions, Joseph Quintero knew the value of the American flag. From my home State of Utah, there is the courageous example of Lt. William E. Hall, whose fearless actions in the Battle of the Coral Sea earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor. Lieutenant Hall attacked a Japanese aircraft carrier and then Japanese planes in a series of highly dangerous engagements. Though seriously wounded, Lt. Hall guided his plane back to a landing strip marked by the American flag. General Schwarzkopf in a speech before Congress thanked the American people for their support of our troops in Operation Desert Storm, stating: ``The profits of doom, the naysayers, the protesters and the flag-burners all said that you wouldn't stick by us, but we knew better. We knew you'd never let us down. By golly, you didn't.'' We respect the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform because we respect what they died for. They did not give their lives for ground, prestige, wealth, or a monarch. They sacrificed their lives for freedom, opportunity, and justice--all represented by our nation's flag of 50 stars and thirteen stripes. Through the American flags at Arlington National Cemetery, on the Iwo Jima Memorial, and at every school yard, we honor those sacrifices. But there are those who do not. In 1984, Greg Johnson led a group of radicals in a protest march. He doused an American flag with kerosene and set it on fire as his fellow protestors chanted: ``America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.'' While traditional First Amendment jurisprudence would protect Johnson's ability to speak and write about the flag, it did not protect his ability to physically destroy the flag. But, in 1989, the Supreme Court abandoned the history and intent of the First Amendment by creating a new standard that made no distinction between oral and written speech about the flag and disrespectful conduct toward the flag. In Texas v. Johnson, five members of the Court, for the first time ever, overturned a conviction based solely on physical conduct toward the American flag. The majority argued that the First Amendment had somehow changed and that it now prevented a state from protecting the American flag from acts of physical desecration. When Congress responded with a federal flag protection statute, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Eichman, used its new and changed interpretation of the First Amendment to strike it down by a 5-4 vote. Under this new interpretation of the First Amendment, it is assumed that the people, their elected legislators, and the courts can no longer distinguish between speech and conduct. Because of this assumed inability to make such distinctions, there are those who argue that our freedom to express political ideas is wholly dependent on treating Greg Johnson's burning of the American flag exactly like oral and written speech. This ill-advised argument fails because its basic premise--that legislatures and courts cannot distinguish between oral and written expression and disrespectful physical conduct--is so obviously false. It is precisely this distinction that legislatures and courts did make for almost 200 years. Just as judges have distinguished which laws and actions comply with the constitutional command to provide ``equal protection of the laws'' and ``due process of law,'' so too have judges distinguished between free speech and destructive conduct, and have limited the latter. Destructive conduct, such as breaking down the doors of the State Department, may be a way of expressing one's dissatisfaction with the nation's foreign policy objectives. Laws, however, can be enacted preventing such actions in large part because there are alternatives that can be equally powerful. I should also note that right here in the United States Senate, we prohibit speeches or demonstrations of any kind, even the silent display of signs or banners, in the public galleries. Moreover, the people themselves did not elevate the act of flag desecration to a constitutionally protected status, which the Supreme Court did in Johnson and Eichman. Such an extreme view was never drafted by the Congress or ratified by the people. Indeed, such a protection is contradicted by the original and historic intent of the First Amendment. Thus, in this Senator's view, the Supreme Court erred in Johnson and in Eichman. It has also been argued that another flag protection statute could pass constitutional muster under the ``fighting words'' doctrine. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, however, the Supreme Court expanded the newly created, so-called ``right'' to burn the flag by stating that any statute that specifically targeted the American flag for protection was unconstitutional, regardless of the ``fighting words'' doctrine. Thus, a constitutional amendment is the only means left to protect the flag. It has been argued that a constitutional amendment to protect the flag should be ``content neutral'' and prohibit not only disrespectful destructions of the flag, but all destructions of the flag. Such an amendment would sweep too broadly by prohibiting the ceremonial disposal of a flag and the traditional printing of regimental names on the flag. In short, a ``content neutral'' amendment misses the point. It is the traditional constitutional protection for the dignity of the flag that must be restored, not a new broad ban on any conduct with a flag that should be created. Only a narrowly tailored amendment can accomplish this honorable purpose. The amendment that Senator Cleland and I propose affects only the most radical and disrespectful forms of conduct towards the American flag. The amendment will leave untouched the current constitutional protections for Americans to speak their sentiments at a rally, to write their sentiments to their newspaper, and to vote their sentiments at the ballot box. The amendment simply restores the traditional and historic power of the people's elected representatives to prohibit the disrespectful physical destruction of the flag. Further, it is clear that restoring legal protection to the American flag will not place us on a slippery slope to limit other freedoms. No other symbol of our bipartisan national ideals has flown over so many of our battlefields, cemeteries, school yards, and homes. No other symbol has been paid for with so much of our countrymen's blood. No other symbol has encouraged so many ordinary men and women to seek liberty and justice for all. In recent months, my colleagues on both sides of the political aisle have called for a new bipartisan spirit in Congress. This amendment fits the bill. Restoring legal protection to the American flag is not, nor should it be, a partisan issue. Including Senator Cleland and myself, 57 senators, both Republicans and Democrats, have joined as original cosponsors of this amendment. Over 70 percent of the American people want the opportunity to vote to protect their flag. Numerous organizations, including the Medal of Honor Recipients for the Flag, the American Legion, the American War Mothers, the American G.I. Forum, and the African-American Women's Clergy Association all support the flag protection amendment. Forty- nine state legislatures have passed resolutions calling for constitutional protection for the flag. Last Congress, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed this amendment by a vote of 310- 114, and will pass it again this year. Mr. President, I am very honored to be a cosponsor with my dear friend from Georgia, Senator Cleland. I appreciate the efforts he has put forth in this battle. Having served in the military as he has done with such distinction and with courage, he has earned the right to speak for the protection of the flag. I am, therefore, proud to rise today and introduce a constitutional amendment that will restore to the people's elected representatives the right to protect one unique national symbol, the American flag, from acts of physical desecration. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the proposed amendment be included in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise to speak for a few moments on the Justice Department's ongoing case against Microsoft, and to discuss the Judiciary Committee's upcoming agenda in examining competition in the digital markets. As my colleagues know, the Department of Justice and 19 states have sued Microsoft for violating federal antitrust laws. In the case brought by the Department of Justice, the Government has completed its case in chief, and Microsoft rested its case on Friday, February 26. While the trial is proceeding in the courts, I have not held hearings on Microsoft's apparent monopolistic activities and their impact on competition within the software and related technology markets. However, as I noted last November, the Judiciary Committee will continue to examine the important role proper and timely enforcement of federal antitrust laws can have on fostering both competition and innovation for emerging technologies, while minimizing the need for government regulation of the Internet. I believe an important area of inquiry is evaluating the significant public policy concerns posed by the question of what remedies should be imposed in cases where, notwithstanding the generally dynamic and competitive nature of Internet-related industries, high technology companies have been found to have violated the antitrust laws. As I have maintained in the past, these dynamic high-technology industries are different from other traditional industries of the past, and antitrust remedies must take these differences and the special characteristics of the respective high-tech industries into account. Mr. President, if, at the close of the trial, Microsoft is found to have violated the law, the remedies that the court would apply will implicate many policy concerns with respect to how business in the high-technology industry is transacted. Any resolution of the matter-- including any settlement, I believe, should aim to restore competition and ensure that neither Microsoft, nor any other monopolist similarly situated, is allowed to continue to benefit from the market advantages it gained unfairly. Promoting real and vigorous competition, which respects intellectual property rights, will not only ensure better prices for the consumers, but will also ensure that innovation is not hampered due to the market stranglehold of a monopolist. Ensuring that true competition exists in the market is also the best way to keep the government out of the business of regulating the Internet. Government should not exert unwarranted control over the Internet-- even if Vice President Gore still thinks he created it. Nor should any one company. Indeed, I share Senator Gorton's interest in knowing where the Vice President stands with respect to the Microsoft case. After all, doesn't the father of the Internet have a view on who should be able to control his creation? In the trial, we saw the government put forth a powerful case against Microsoft. And, we saw Microsoft put forth a not so stellar defense. Many experts, even those who were skeptical at first, now believe that the government may well prevail. I ask unanimous consent that several illustrative articles related to this case be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to read them if they have not already done so. These articles set forth but a few examples of Microsoft's unfortunate actions that have manifested in what has been several months of missteps and embarrassments for the company. The trial is not over. The case is just suspended until the week of April 12, when the court will reconvene for probably several weeks of testimony from rebuttal witnesses. But Microsoft and its defenders have again begun their public relations efforts here in the Senate. Just last Friday, my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Washington, Senator Gorton, took the floor to again defend Microsoft, and attack the Antitrust enforcers and me for questioning Microsoft's actions. I have said before and will say it again: Microsoft is not above the law. The facts and the law should and will prevail regardless of Microsoft's public relations campaign, its ill-advised lobbying efforts, and its muddled defenses. I had been surprised to read several weeks ago that Senator Gorton, in a February 9 press conference, ``vowed to use his influence as a member of the Appropriations Committee to cut funding for the Justice Department's antitrust division.'' I and several concerned Senators wrote to Senators Gregg and Hollings and argued that a move to cut the Division's funding without justification could be perceived by many as interfering with an ongoing litigation. I was pleased to hear that my colleague has apparently conceded that trying to cut DOJ's funding would be unwise. However, he has now properly downsized his ambition and is now advocating not increasing the Antitrust Division's budget by the amount the Administration has requested. I am not yet convinced that the Antitrust Division has fully justified its request for a substantial budget increase. In fact, I believe the Congress should work with the Administration to examine whether we should adjust the Hart-Scott-Rodino value thresholds in order to ensure that the Department's merger reviews take into account inflation and the true economic impact of mergers in today's economy. Attorney General Reno has pledged to work with me on this, and I look forward to working with any of my colleagues who may have an interest in this issue. In this age of precious resources, we will be looking closely at the Antitrust Division's budget and operations, and making sure that any reasonable budget increase is justified. A final point. My friend and Senator from Microsoft's home state has publicly stated that a number of companies across the nation, including some in my state of Utah, work with Microsoft and would be hurt by the current antitrust litigation against Microsoft. I don't know if they will be hurt, but what I do know is that there are many high technology companies and millions of consumers in the States of Washington, Utah and across the nation that would be harmed by any anticompetitive act of Microsoft. In fact, we heard testimony before the Judiciary Committee from one Seattle, Washington-based company, Real Networks, describing how Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct crippled their technology and hurt the company, although I have to say Real Networks has been doing very well ever since because of their fascinating innovations and the tremendous abilities that they have in this field. However, if violations of the antitrust laws are not pursued against powerful companies like the Microsofts of the world, as the Senator from Washington suggests, many of the technology companies, not to mention the consumers, in the states of Washington, Utah and all across the nation, will suffer. Mr. President, the survival of these companies means jobs, it means innovation, it means competition in the digital market, and it means the availability of consumer choice. I just hope that Microsoft can learn from its mistakes in court and its earlier mistakes here in Congress. Frankly, some of their efforts here have reminded me of those who would tie themselves to railroad tracks and wait for a train to come just to make a point. Microsoft's misguided legal and legislative advice has not helped its case to date, and I would hope, for Microsoft's case, that they would not initiate a foolish political protest which could leave them even more damaged than they are now. Frankly, I don't think this train is going to stop. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and turn the floor over for my dear friend from South Carolina. Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. I thank the Chair.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak for 15 minutes and that immediately following my remarks Senator Hollings be recognized.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as this decade nears a close, and as our Nation has enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic growth, there remains an issue that affects many American families. I am referring to child care. It has been nearly 9 years since the passage of the bipartisan Child Care and Development Block Grant Act. I was proud to have been a sponsor of this legislation, and I remain committed to its goals, structure, and principles. Though the CCDBG has led to great improvements in the child care situation facing low-income families in every State, it has become clear that more needs to be done to help the family. In my home State of Utah, an extraordinary 57 percent of mothers with children under the age of 6 are in the labor force, and 134,000 children under the age of 6 in Utah will be cared for by someone other than their parents. I am pleased to again join my colleagues--Senators Chafee, Snowe, Roberts, Specter, Collins, and Cochran--each of whom has a long record of concern and involvement in child care issues--in sponsoring this measure. The Caring for Children Act is a comprehensive, realistic child care proposal, which we believe will benefit middle- and lower- income American families who struggle to get ahead or struggle to keep up. First, the Caring for Children Act will, by expanding the Dependent Care Tax Credit, cut taxes for many middle- and lower-income families. Under the current system, the maximum credit of 30 percent is available only to families with incomes of $10,000 or less. Our proposal increases the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) from 30 percent to 50 percent. The maximum income is also increased to $30,000. The maximum allowable expenses of $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or more children will remain the same. For example, a working family in Vernal, UT, earning $30,000 with two children, could receive a tax credit of $2,400 (50 percent of $4,800), instead of $960 under the current law. Our bill also lowers the maximum credit more gradually than current law. This provides a form of tax relief for DCTC-eligible families earning between $30,000 and $75,000. This change is intended to benefit an often forgotten group--taxpayers who earn too much for Federal breaks but not enough for child care expenses not to be a big bite out of their budget. This proposal also breaks new ground. It recognizes, for the first time, as a matter of Federal child care policy, that many families elect to have one parent remain at home to serve as the primary are giver. We understand the value of a parent at home to care for a child, both in terms of quality of care and monetary sacrifice. Such families pay for their child care by forfeiting a second income. The Caring for Children Act would expand eligibility for the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) to families with young children in which one parent remained at home. Our bill assumes child care expenses for such a family of $150 per month. Thus, a family earning $30,000 with two children, ages 3 and 1, in Farmington, UT, in which one parent remains at home, would receive a tax credit of $900 (50 percent of $15012 months). Some have criticized our bill for not giving the same tax benefits to families with a stay-at-home parent. Frankly, I support such parity in the DCTC. I would like our bill to be able to provide a larger credit. But, expanding eligibility for this credit is an expensive proposition. While we may not be able to propose DCTC parity in one fell swoop, we should establish the concept in this bill and increase the level of benefit as quickly as we can. But, we should not fail to do something just because we cannot do it all. Many families across America elect to forego a second income in order to have a parent remain at home with children. Federal policy has so far failed to recognize parental care as child care, even if many people, myself included, consider it the best possible care. I happen to believe that parental care is the best care there is. And, let me offer a word of praise and gratitude for my wife, Elaine. Elaine could have had a successful career as a professional educator. Instead, she chose to stay home with our children--all of whom are now married with children of their own. Of course, my daughters and daughters-in-law will make their own choices about balancing career and family. Different families make different choices and face different circumstances that drive their choices. Our bill asserts that the Dependent Care Tax Credit should be available to families regardless of their choice. The DCTC should be a tax credit to help families care for children, not just a credit for employment expenses. We should not minimize the significance of this change in the federal child care paradigm. Yet, many working but low-income families have no tax liability and will not benefit from our proposed changes to the DCTC. These families, many of which may be headed by single parents or headed by individuals moving from welfare to work, are struggling to make ends meet. One of the family's biggest expenses is child care. The cost of child care, like almost everything else, has increase in the 9 years since the implementation of the Child Care and Development Block Grant. When the CCDBG was enacted, the average cost of care per child was $3,000. Today, it is estimated to be more than $4,000 per child. I invite senators to do the math: If a parent is making $10 an hour ($20,800 per year before taxes) and has just one child, child care expenses claim almost one-fifth of the family budget. It is no wonder that the Utah Child Protective Services told me some years ago about a mother who was forced to choose between groceries and child care. The Caring for Children Act proposes to increase the authorization of appropriations for the Child Care and Development Block grant Act (CCDBG), which states use to subsidize child care for low-income parents and to develop new capacity in areas--both geographic and functional--where there are shortages. In Utah, as in other states as well, smaller and more rural communities often have shortages of child care. And, nearly every community suffers shortages of infant care, after school care, and care for special needs children. The CCDBG is the only federal program we have for assisting low- income working families with child care expenses. We are not proposing to create another one. We are not expanding the statutory eligibility or entitlement for this program. The Caring for Children Act merely makes it possible for states to serve more eligible people and to address more of the problem of shortages under the provisions of the CCDBG. I have said many times in this body that I do not support federal assistance for those who are able but do not help themselves. But, I likewise believe that some help is warranted when people are working and doing all they can to provide for their families. This is why I joined as a sponsor of the Child Care and Development Block Grant 10 years ago. I do not want Utah families to have to choose between child care and food. We still face issues of quality of care. Our bill affirms state prerogatives to set their own standards for child care. My colleagues are well aware of my strong opposition to any federal effort to set or imply federal standards. States must be allowed discretion in this. But, our bill also recognizes that standards are worthless if they are not enforced. To encourage states to make a stronger commitment to enforce their own standards for child care, the Caring for Children Act provides a system of bonuses for states who exceed a threshold of inspections or, conversely, penalties for those who fail to conduct a minimum number of inspections. In my view, the most stringent standards in the world do not provide any assurance of quality care if providers do not believe standards will be enforced. I also believe that the best assurance of quality is a parent's own good judgment. The Caring for Children Act takes the very inexpensive, but potentially very productive step of providing funds for beefed up consumer information to parents. There are other important provisions in our bill that are designed to encourage private sector initiatives in child care as well as to enhance training opportunities for child care providers. All together, the Caring for Children Act attempts to address all three of the major issues in child care: affordability, availability, and quality. I believe the bill we are introducing today is measured and responsible. In no way is this a government knows best model of social problem solving; rather, it builds on what we already know works and what we already know that parents want. They want resources and information to make their own decisions and to care for their own children. They want input into the plans developed by states. They want control over child care. The bill we are introducing today endeavors to put government on the side of parents by returning resources to them through tax credits, by enabling states to do more under the CCDBG, by increasing available child care information, and, finally by respecting the choices they make. I am again pleased to join my colleagues in this legislation and hope other Senators will support this measure as well.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as this decade nears a close, and as our Nation has enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic growth, there remains an issue that affects many American families. I am referring to child care. It has been nearly 9 years since the passage of the bipartisan Child Care and Development Block Grant Act. I was proud to have been a sponsor of this legislation, and I remain committed to its goals, structure, and principles. Though the CCDBG has led to great improvements in the child care situation facing low-income families in every State, it has become clear that more needs to be done to help the family. In my home State of Utah, an extraordinary 57 percent of mothers with children under the age of 6 are in the labor force, and 134,000 children under the age of 6 in Utah will be cared for by someone other than their parents. I am pleased to again join my colleagues--Senators Chafee, Snowe, Roberts, Specter, Collins, and Cochran--each of whom has a long record of concern and involvement in child care issues--in sponsoring this measure. The Caring for Children Act is a comprehensive, realistic child care proposal, which we believe will benefit middle- and lower- income American families who struggle to get ahead or struggle to keep up. First, the Caring for Children Act will, by expanding the Dependent Care Tax Credit, cut taxes for many middle- and lower-income families. Under the current system, the maximum credit of 30 percent is available only to families with incomes of $10,000 or less. Our proposal increases the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) from 30 percent to 50 percent. The maximum income is also increased to $30,000. The maximum allowable expenses of $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or more children will remain the same. For example, a working family in Vernal, UT, earning $30,000 with two children, could receive a tax credit of $2,400 (50 percent of $4,800), instead of $960 under the current law. Our bill also lowers the maximum credit more gradually than current law. This provides a form of tax relief for DCTC-eligible families earning between $30,000 and $75,000. This change is intended to benefit an often forgotten group--taxpayers who earn too much for Federal breaks but not enough for child care expenses not to be a big bite out of their budget. This proposal also breaks new ground. It recognizes, for the first time, as a matter of Federal child care policy, that many families elect to have one parent remain at home to serve as the primary are giver. We understand the value of a parent at home to care for a child, both in terms of quality of care and monetary sacrifice. Such families pay for their child care by forfeiting a second income. The Caring for Children Act would expand eligibility for the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) to families with young children in which one parent remained at home. Our bill assumes child care expenses for such a family of $150 per month. Thus, a family earning $30,000 with two children, ages 3 and 1, in Farmington, UT, in which one parent remains at home, would receive a tax credit of $900 (50 percent of $15012 months). Some have criticized our bill for not giving the same tax benefits to families with a stay-at-home parent. Frankly, I support such parity in the DCTC. I would like our bill to be able to provide a larger credit. But, expanding eligibility for this credit is an expensive proposition. While we may not be able to propose DCTC parity in one fell swoop, we should establish the concept in this bill and increase the level of benefit as quickly as we can. But, we should not fail to do something just because we cannot do it all. Many families across America elect to forego a second income in order to have a parent remain at home with children. Federal policy has so far failed to recognize parental care as child care, even if many people, myself included, consider it the best possible care. I happen to believe that parental care is the best care there is. And, let me offer a word of praise and gratitude for my wife, Elaine. Elaine could have had a successful career as a professional educator. Instead, she chose to stay home with our children--all of whom are now married with children of their own. Of course, my daughters and daughters-in-law will make their own choices about balancing career and family. Different families make different choices and face different circumstances that drive their choices. Our bill asserts that the Dependent Care Tax Credit should be available to families regardless of their choice. The DCTC should be a tax credit to help families care for children, not just a credit for employment expenses. We should not minimize the significance of this change in the federal child care paradigm. Yet, many working but low-income families have no tax liability and will not benefit from our proposed changes to the DCTC. These families, many of which may be headed by single parents or headed by individuals moving from welfare to work, are struggling to make ends meet. One of the family's biggest expenses is child care. The cost of child care, like almost everything else, has increase in the 9 years since the implementation of the Child Care and Development Block Grant. When the CCDBG was enacted, the average cost of care per child was $3,000. Today, it is estimated to be more than $4,000 per child. I invite senators to do the math: If a parent is making $10 an hour ($20,800 per year before taxes) and has just one child, child care expenses claim almost one-fifth of the family budget. It is no wonder that the Utah Child Protective Services told me some years ago about a mother who was forced to choose between groceries and child care. The Caring for Children Act proposes to increase the authorization of appropriations for the Child Care and Development Block grant Act (CCDBG), which states use to subsidize child care for low-income parents and to develop new capacity in areas--both geographic and functional--where there are shortages. In Utah, as in other states as well, smaller and more rural communities often have shortages of child care. And, nearly every community suffers shortages of infant care, after school care, and care for special needs children. The CCDBG is the only federal program we have for assisting low- income working families with child care expenses. We are not proposing to create another one. We are not expanding the statutory eligibility or entitlement for this program. The Caring for Children Act merely makes it possible for states to serve more eligible people and to address more of the problem of shortages under the provisions of the CCDBG. I have said many times in this body that I do not support federal assistance for those who are able but do not help themselves. But, I likewise believe that some help is warranted when people are working and doing all they can to provide for their families. This is why I joined as a sponsor of the Child Care and Development Block Grant 10 years ago. I do not want Utah families to have to choose between child care and food. We still face issues of quality of care. Our bill affirms state prerogatives to set their own standards for child care. My colleagues are well aware of my strong opposition to any federal effort to set or imply federal standards. States must be allowed discretion in this. But, our bill also recognizes that standards are worthless if they are not enforced. To encourage states to make a stronger commitment to enforce their own standards for child care, the Caring for Children Act provides a system of bonuses for states who exceed a threshold of inspections or, conversely, penalties for those who fail to conduct a minimum number of inspections. In my view, the most stringent standards in the world do not provide any assurance of quality care if providers do not believe standards will be enforced. I also believe that the best assurance of quality is a parent's own good judgment. The Caring for Children Act takes the very inexpensive, but potentially very productive step of providing funds for beefed up consumer information to parents. There are other important provisions in our bill that are designed to encourage private sector initiatives in child care as well as to enhance training opportunities for child care providers. All together, the Caring for Children Act attempts to address all three of the major issues in child care: affordability, availability, and quality. I believe the bill we are introducing today is measured and responsible. In no way is this a government knows best model of social problem solving; rather, it builds on what we already know works and what we already know that parents want. They want resources and information to make their own decisions and to care for their own children. They want input into the plans developed by states. They want control over child care. The bill we are introducing today endeavors to put government on the side of parents by returning resources to them through tax credits, by enabling states to do more under the CCDBG, by increasing available child care information, and, finally by respecting the choices they make. I am again pleased to join my colleagues in this legislation and hope other Senators will support this measure as well.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 61

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I am proud to introduce the Twenty- First Amendment Enforcement Act. This legislation will provide a mechanism enabling States to more effectively enforce their laws regulating the interstate shipment of alcoholic beverages. Interstate shipments of alcohol directly to consumers are increasing exponentially. Unfortunately, along with that growing commerce, problems associated with that trade are also growing. While I certainly believe that interstate commerce should be encouraged, and while I do not want small businesses stifled by unnecessary or overly burdensome and complex regulations, I do not subscribe to the notion that purveyors of alcohol are free to avoid State laws which are consistent with the power bestowed upon them by the Twenty-First Amendment. All States, including the State of Utah, need to be sure that the liquor that is brought into their State is labelled properly and subject to certain quality control standards. States need to protect their citizens from consumer fraud and have a claim to the tax revenue generated by the sale of such goods. And of the utmost importance, States need to ensure that minors are not provided with unfettered access to alcohol. Unfortunately, indiscriminate direct sales of alcohol have opened a sophisticated generation of minors to the perils of alcohol abuse. I can tell you that my home State of Utah, which has some of the strictest controls in the nation on the distribution of alcohol, is not immune from the dangers of direct sales. A recent story which ran on KUTV in Salt Lake City showed how a thirteen year old was able to purchase beer over the internet and have it shipped directly to her home--no questions asked. If a thirteen year old is capable of ordering beer and having it delivered by merely borrowing her brother's credit card and making a few clicks with her mouse, there is something very wrong with the level of control that is being exercised over these sales. Of course the Utah case is not an isolated example. Stings set up by authorities in New York and Maryland have also shown how easy it is for minors to obtain alcohol. Debate over the control of alcoholic beverages has been raging for as long as this country has existed. Prior to 1933, every time individuals or legislative bodies engaged in efforts to control the flow and consumption of alcohol, whether by moral persuasion, legislation or Constitutional Prohibition, others were equally determined to repeal, circumvent or ignore those barriers. However, the Twenty-First Amendment did, for a time, create an ordered system for the distribution of alcohol. The Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933. That amendment ceded to the States the right to regulate the importation and transportation of alcoholic beverages across their borders. By virtue of that grant of authority, each State created its own unique regulatory scheme to control the flow of alcohol. Some set up State stores to effectuate control of the shipment into, and dissemination of alcohol within, their State. Others refrained from direct control of the product, but set up other systems designed to monitor the shipments and ensure compliance with its laws. But whatever the type of State system enacted, the purpose was much the same: to protect its citizens and ensure that its laws were obeyed. Although not perfect, the systems set up by the States worked reasonably well for many years. However, modern technology has opened the door for abuse and created the need for further governmental action to address those abuses. No longer must a State prosecute just an errant neighborhood retailer for selling to a minor--now, the ones selling to minors and others in violation of a State's regulatory laws are a continent away. A small winery can create its own web page and accept orders over the internet; a large retailer can advertise nationally in the New York Times and accept orders over the phone; an ad can be placed in a magazine with a national circulation offering sales through an 800 number. Let me emphasize that there are many companies engaged in the direct interstate shipment of alcohol who do not violate State laws. In fact, many of these concerns look beyond their own interests and make diligent efforts to disseminate information to others to ensure that State laws are understood and complied with by all within the interstate industry. I should also note that I am certainly sympathetic to the small wineries and specialty micro-breweries who feel that the requirement that they operate through a three tier system (producer-wholesaler- retailer) which does not embrace them may, in effect, shut them out of the marketplace. They make the argument that if wholesalers do not carry their product, they have no other avenue to the consumer other than through direct sales. However, if there is a problem with the system, we need to fix the system, not break the laws. Federal law already prohibits the interstate shipment of alcohol in violation of State law. Unfortunately that general prohibition lacks any enforcement mechanism. The legislation I am introducing simply provides that mechanism by permitting the Attorney General of a State, who has reasonable cause to believe that his or her State laws regulating the importation and transportation of alcohol are being violated, to be permitted to file an action in federal court for an injunction to stop those illegal shipments. This bill is balanced to ensure due process and fairness to both the State bringing the action and the company or individual alleged to have violated the State's laws. The bill: 1. Permits the chief law enforcement officer of a State to seek an injunction in federal court to prevent the violation of its laws regulating the importation or transportation of alcohol; 2. Allows for venue for the suit where the defendant resides and where the violations occur; 3. Does not require the posting of a bond by the requesting party; 4. Does not permit an injunction without notice to the opposing party; 5. Requires that any injunction be specific as to the parties, the conduct and the rationale underlying that injunction; 6. Allows for quick consideration of the application for an injunction and conserves court resources by avoiding redundant proceedings; 7. Mandates a bench trial; and 8. Does not preclude other remedies allowed by law. Some will argue that State courts are capable of handling this issue. Unfortunately, States have had mixed success in enforcing their laws through State court actions. Companies and individuals have raised jurisdictional, procedural and legal defenses that have stalled those efforts, and that continue to hamper effective enforcement. It is, in part, because of those inconsistent rulings, that federal leadership is needed in this area. Moreover, the scope and limitations of a State's ability to effectively enact laws under the Twenty-First Amendment are essentially federal questions that need to be decided by a federal court, and perhaps ultimately, by the Supreme Court. Only through such rulings can both the States and companies seeking to conduct interstate shipments be assured of consistency in interpretation and enforcement of the laws. The introduction of a bill is just the beginning of the legislative process. It is my hope that, working together, we can reach an agreement on how best to balance legitimate commercial interests with the Constitutional rights of the States as ceded to them by the Twenty- First Amendment. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I am proud to introduce the Twenty- First Amendment Enforcement Act. This legislation will provide a mechanism enabling States to more effectively enforce their laws regulating the interstate shipment of alcoholic beverages. Interstate shipments of alcohol directly to consumers are increasing exponentially. Unfortunately, along with that growing commerce, problems associated with that trade are also growing. While I certainly believe that interstate commerce should be encouraged, and while I do not want small businesses stifled by unnecessary or overly burdensome and complex regulations, I do not subscribe to the notion that purveyors of alcohol are free to avoid State laws which are consistent with the power bestowed upon them by the Twenty-First Amendment. All States, including the State of Utah, need to be sure that the liquor that is brought into their State is labelled properly and subject to certain quality control standards. States need to protect their citizens from consumer fraud and have a claim to the tax revenue generated by the sale of such goods. And of the utmost importance, States need to ensure that minors are not provided with unfettered access to alcohol. Unfortunately, indiscriminate direct sales of alcohol have opened a sophisticated generation of minors to the perils of alcohol abuse. I can tell you that my home State of Utah, which has some of the strictest controls in the nation on the distribution of alcohol, is not immune from the dangers of direct sales. A recent story which ran on KUTV in Salt Lake City showed how a thirteen year old was able to purchase beer over the internet and have it shipped directly to her home--no questions asked. If a thirteen year old is capable of ordering beer and having it delivered by merely borrowing her brother's credit card and making a few clicks with her mouse, there is something very wrong with the level of control that is being exercised over these sales. Of course the Utah case is not an isolated example. Stings set up by authorities in New York and Maryland have also shown how easy it is for minors to obtain alcohol. Debate over the control of alcoholic beverages has been raging for as long as this country has existed. Prior to 1933, every time individuals or legislative bodies engaged in efforts to control the flow and consumption of alcohol, whether by moral persuasion, legislation or Constitutional Prohibition, others were equally determined to repeal, circumvent or ignore those barriers. However, the Twenty-First Amendment did, for a time, create an ordered system for the distribution of alcohol. The Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933. That amendment ceded to the States the right to regulate the importation and transportation of alcoholic beverages across their borders. By virtue of that grant of authority, each State created its own unique regulatory scheme to control the flow of alcohol. Some set up State stores to effectuate control of the shipment into, and dissemination of alcohol within, their State. Others refrained from direct control of the product, but set up other systems designed to monitor the shipments and ensure compliance with its laws. But whatever the type of State system enacted, the purpose was much the same: to protect its citizens and ensure that its laws were obeyed. Although not perfect, the systems set up by the States worked reasonably well for many years. However, modern technology has opened the door for abuse and created the need for further governmental action to address those abuses. No longer must a State prosecute just an errant neighborhood retailer for selling to a minor--now, the ones selling to minors and others in violation of a State's regulatory laws are a continent away. A small winery can create its own web page and accept orders over the internet; a large retailer can advertise nationally in the New York Times and accept orders over the phone; an ad can be placed in a magazine with a national circulation offering sales through an 800 number. Let me emphasize that there are many companies engaged in the direct interstate shipment of alcohol who do not violate State laws. In fact, many of these concerns look beyond their own interests and make diligent efforts to disseminate information to others to ensure that State laws are understood and complied with by all within the interstate industry. I should also note that I am certainly sympathetic to the small wineries and specialty micro-breweries who feel that the requirement that they operate through a three tier system (producer-wholesaler- retailer) which does not embrace them may, in effect, shut them out of the marketplace. They make the argument that if wholesalers do not carry their product, they have no other avenue to the consumer other than through direct sales. However, if there is a problem with the system, we need to fix the system, not break the laws. Federal law already prohibits the interstate shipment of alcohol in violation of State law. Unfortunately that general prohibition lacks any enforcement mechanism. The legislation I am introducing simply provides that mechanism by permitting the Attorney General of a State, who has reasonable cause to believe that his or her State laws regulating the importation and transportation of alcohol are being violated, to be permitted to file an action in federal court for an injunction to stop those illegal shipments. This bill is balanced to ensure due process and fairness to both the State bringing the action and the company or individual alleged to have violated the State's laws. The bill: 1. Permits the chief law enforcement officer of a State to seek an injunction in federal court to prevent the violation of its laws regulating the importation or transportation of alcohol; 2. Allows for venue for the suit where the defendant resides and where the violations occur; 3. Does not require the posting of a bond by the requesting party; 4. Does not permit an injunction without notice to the opposing party; 5. Requires that any injunction be specific as to the parties, the conduct and the rationale underlying that injunction; 6. Allows for quick consideration of the application for an injunction and conserves court resources by avoiding redundant proceedings; 7. Mandates a bench trial; and 8. Does not preclude other remedies allowed by law. Some will argue that State courts are capable of handling this issue. Unfortunately, States have had mixed success in enforcing their laws through State court actions. Companies and individuals have raised jurisdictional, procedural and legal defenses that have stalled those efforts, and that continue to hamper effective enforcement. It is, in part, because of those inconsistent rulings, that federal leadership is needed in this area. Moreover, the scope and limitations of a State's ability to effectively enact laws under the Twenty-First Amendment are essentially federal questions that need to be decided by a federal court, and perhaps ultimately, by the Supreme Court. Only through such rulings can both the States and companies seeking to conduct interstate shipments be assured of consistency in interpretation and enforcement of the laws. The introduction of a bill is just the beginning of the legislative process. It is my hope that, working together, we can reach an agreement on how best to balance legitimate commercial interests with the Constitutional rights of the States as ceded to them by the Twenty- First Amendment. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I join today with my colleagues Senators Abraham and Wyden to introduce the New Millennium Classrooms Act. Technology is a wonderful thing. It increases our productivity, enhances the way we communicate with each other, and opens up access to whole new worlds at the click of a finger. It is becoming an integral part of the way America does business. Our economy has become more and more globalized. Our jobs, our cars, and our toys are more and more high-tech. Computers have become such a big part of American business that it has been projected that 60 percent of American jobs will require high-tech computer skills by 2000--just next year. Unfortunately, there is an important part of our society that has not kept pace with this technology craze--our schools. We are falling dismally short of meeting the Department of Education's recommendation of 1 computer per 5 students. American schools had an average of just 1 computer per 24 students in 1997. Not only are there too few computers in the classrooms, but those that are there are old and outdated, unable to run today's software and applications. In fact, the most popular model of computer in our schools is the Apple IIc. For those of you who are unfamiliar with this computer, you can see one just down the street in the Smithsonian. Too many of today's schoolchildren are missing out on one of the greatest advancements in computer applications--the Internet. Thirty- two percent of our public schools have only one classroom with access to the Internet. This is not right. Our kids deserve the cutting edge of technology, not the 21st century equivalent of chalk and slates. In 1997, Congress recognized the need for more and better computers in our schools enacting a corporate charitable tax deduction for school computer donations. Unfortunately, the deduction was crafted narrowly with various restrictions and limitations so that we have not seen a significant increase in computer donations to our schools. The New Millennium Classrooms Act is designed to address the shortcomings of the current deduction by expanding limits on the deduction and adding a tax credit equal to thirty percent of the fair market value of the donated computer equipment. This provides greater incentives for corporations to donate computer technology and equipment to our schools. Allowing computer manufacturers to donate computers and other equipment returned to them through trade-ins or leasing programs will expand both the number of eligible donors and the qualified equipment to be donated. An enhanced 50 percent tax credit for donations to schools located in empowerment zones, enterprise communities, and Indian reservations will help to address the growing technology gap between our urban and rural, rich and poor schools. This will help focus the donations to those kids who need the technology the most, to those kids who are less likely to have a computer at home. A good education for our children is the key to the future of our country. Without current computers and equipment in our schools, we cannot keep our kids on the cutting edge of technology where they belong. This bill contains real incentives for private organizations to get involved and donate computers and equipment to schools in order to help educate our children. This is important to our kids, our schools, and our future. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am introducing today an amendment to subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. My amendment would allow athletes participating in world events, such as the Salt Lake 2002 Winter Olympic Games, to bring into the United States, duty free, such personal effects as equipment expressly used in the sporting events, and then re-exported with departing athletes at the termination of the events. This bill is needed to relieve both Customs officials and event participants of immense amounts of documentation required in the past for such exceptions to Customs laws and practices. However, this amendment does not exempt such items from inspection by Customs officials, inspections which can be made entirely on their discretion, nor does it allow the entry of items barred under current law. This same bill, which I introduced in the prior, 105th Congress was favorably reported out by both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, and incorporated in the Omnibus Trade Bill which failed passage.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, in accordance with rule XXVI, section 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby submit for publication in the Congressional Record, the Rules of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Rules follow: Committee on the Judiciary i. meetings of the committee 1. Meetings may be called by the Chairman as he may deem necessary on three days notice or in the alternative with the consent of the Ranking Minority Member or pursuant to the provision of the Standing Rules of the Senate, as amended. 2. Each witness who is to appear before the Committee or any Subcommittee shall file with the Committee, at least 48 hours in advance of the hearing, a written statement of his testimony in as many copies as the Chairman of the Committee or Subcommittee prescribes. 3. On the request of any Member, a nomination or bill on the agenda of the Committee will be held over until the next meeting of the Committee or for one week, whichever occurs later. ii. quorums 1. Ten Members shall constitute a quorum of the Committee when reporting a bill or nomination; provided that proxies shall not be counted in making a quorum. 2. For the purpose of taking sworn testimony, a quorum of the Committee and each Subcommittee thereof, now or hereafter appointed, shall consist of one Senator. iii. proxies When a record vote is taken in the Committee on any bill, resolution, amendment, or any other question, a quorum being present, a Member who is unable to attend the meeting may submit his vote by proxy, in writing or by telephone, or through personal instructions. A proxy must be specific with respect to the matters it addresses. iv. bringing a matter to a vote The Chairman shall entertain a non-debatable motion to bring a matter before the Committee to a vote. If there is objection to bring the matter to a vote without further debate, a rollcall vote of the Committee shall be taken, and debate shall be terminated if the motion to bring the matter to a vote without further debate passes with ten votes in the affirmative, one of which must be cast by the minority. v. subcommittees 1. Any Member of the Committee may sit with any Subcommittee during its hearings or any other meeting, but shall not have the authority to vote on any matter before the Subcommittee unless he is a Member of such Subcommittee. 2. Subcommittees shall be considered de novo whenever there is a change in the Subcommittee chairmanship and seniority on the particular Subcommittee shall not necessarily apply. 3. Except for matters retained at the full Committee, matters shall be referred to the appropriate Subcommittee or Subcommittees by the chairman, except as agreed by a majority vote of the Committee or by the agreement of the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member. vi. attendance rules 1. Official attendance at all Committee markups and executive sessions of the Committee shall be kept by the Committee Clerk. Official attendance at all Subcommittee markups and executive sessions shall be kept by the Subcommittee Clerk. 2. Official attendance at all hearings shall be kept, provided that Senators are notified by the Committee Chairman and ranking Member, in the case of Committee hearings, and by the Subcommittee Chairman and ranking Member, in the case of Subcommittee hearings, 48 hours in advance of the hearing that attendance will be taken; otherwise, no attendance will be taken. Attendance at all hearings is encouraged.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am today introducing a private relief bill on behalf of Belinda McGregor, the beloved sister of one of my constituents, Rosalinda Burton. Mistakes are made every day, Mr. President, and when innocent people suffer severe consequences as a result of these mistakes, something ought to be done to remedy the situation. In the particular case of Ms. Belinda McGregor, the federal bureaucracy made a mistake--a mistake which cost Ms. McGregor dearly and it is now time to correct this mistake. Unfortunately, the only way to provide relief is through Congressional action. Belinda McGregor, a citizen of the United Kingdom, filed an application for the 1995 Diversity Visa program. Her husband, a citizen of Ireland, filed a separate application at the same time. Ms. McGregor's application was among those selected to receive a diversity visa. When the handling clerk at the National Visa Center received the application, however, the clerk erroneously replaced Ms. McGregor's name in the computer with that of her husband. As a result, Ms. McGregor was never informed that she had been selected and never provided the requisite information. The mistake with respect to Ms. McGregor's husband was caught, but not in time for Ms. McGregor to meet the September, 1995 deadline. Her visa number was given to another applicant. In short, Ms. McGregor was unfairly denied the 1995 diversity visa that was rightfully hers due to a series of errors by the National Visa Center. As far as I know, these facts are not disputed. Unfortunately, the Center does not have the legal authority to rectify its own mistake by simply granting Ms. McGregor a visa out of a subsequent year's allotment. Thus, a private relief bill is needed in order to see that Ms. McGregor gets the visa to which she was clearly entitled to in 1995. Mr. President, I have received a very compelling letter from Rosalinda Burton of Cedar Hills, UT which I am placing in the Record. Ms. Burton is Ms. McGregor's sister and she described to me the strong relationship that she and her sister have and the care that her sister provided when Ms. Burton was seriously injured in a 1993 car accident. I hope that the Senate can move forward on this bill expeditiously. Ms. McGregor was the victim of a simple and admitted bureaucratic snafu. The Senate ought to move swiftly to correct this injustice. Mr. President, I am also including in the Record additional relevant correspondence which documents the background of this case. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce private relief legislation on behalf of my constituents, Mr. Saeed Rezai, and his wife, Mrs. Julie Rezai. As my colleagues are aware, those immigration cases that warrant private legislation are extremely rare, but are warranted in some cases. I am introducing a bill for the relief of Saeed Rezai. I had hoped that this case would not require congressional intervention. Unfortunately, it is clear that private legislation is the only means remaining to ensure that the equities of Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's case are heard and that a number of unresolved questions are answered without imposing a terrible hardship on Mr. and Mrs. Rezai and on their marriage. I wish to take a moment, Mr. President, to provide something by way of background to this somewhat complicated case and to explain the urgency of this legislation. Mr. Rezai first came to the United States in 1986. On June 15, 1991, he married his current wife, Julie, who is a U.S. citizen. Shortly thereafter, she filed an immigrant visa petition on his behalf. Approval of this petition has been blocked, however, by the application of 204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 204(c) precludes the approval of a visa petition for anyone who entered, or conspired to enter, into a fraudulent marriage. The Immigration and Nationalization Service [INS] applied this provision in Mr. Rezai's case because his previous marriage ended in divorce before his 2-year period of conditional residence had expired. In immigration proceedings following the divorce, the judge heard testimony from witness on behalf of Mr. Rezai and his former wife. After considering that testimony, he found there was insufficient evidence to warrant lifting the conditions on Mr. Rezai's permanent residency and, in the absence of a qualifying marriage, granted Mr. Rezai voluntary departure from the United States. The judge was very careful to mention, however, that there was no proof of false testimony by Mr. Rezai, and he granted voluntary departure rather than ordering deportation because, in his words, Mr. Rezai `may be eligible for a visa in the future.' Despite these comments by the immigration judge, who clearly did not anticipate the future application of the 204(c) exclusion to Mr. Rezai's case, the INS has refused to approve Mrs. Rezai's petition for permanent residence on behalf of her husband based on that very exclusion. In the meantime, Mr. Rezai appealed the initial termination of his lawful permanent resident status in 1990. In August 1995, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals denied this appeal and reinstated the voluntary departure order. Under current law, there is no provision to stay Mr. Rezai's deportation pending the BIA's consideration of Mrs. Rezai's current immigrant visa petition. Mr. President, there is no question that Mr. Rezai deportation will create extraordinary hardship for both Mr. and Mrs. Rezai. Throughout all the proceedings of the past 6 years, not a single person that I know of--including the INS--has questioned the validity of Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's marriage. In fact, many that I have heard from have emphatically told me that Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's marriage is as strong as any they have seen. Given the prevailing political and cultural climate in Iran, I would not expect that Mrs. Rezia will choose to make her home there. Thus, Mrs. Rezai's deportation will result in either the breakup of a legitimate family or the forced removal of a U.S. citizen and her husband to a third country foreign to both of them. It should also be noted that Mr. Rezai has been present in the United States for more than a decade. During this time he has assimilated to America culture and has become a contributing member of his community. He has been placed in a responsible position of employment as the security field supervisor at Westiminster College where he has gained the respect and admiration of both his peers and his supervisors. In fact, I received a letter from the interim president of Westminister College, signed by close to 150 of Mr. Rezai's associates, attesting to his many contributions to the college and the community. This is just one of the many, many letters and phone calls I have received from members of our community. Mr. Rezai's forced departure in light of these considerations would both unduly limit his own opportunities and deprive the community of his continued contributions.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Year 2000 Fairness and Responsibility Act.'' This bill addresses what is popularly known as the ``Y2K Problem'' or the ``Millennium Bug.'' It is supported by over 85 industry organizations and is important to the state of Utah, our nation's fastest growing high-tech state. Due to a simple decision years ago to save space on computer punch cards, many computers and electronic devices around the world still express years in only two digits. As a result, these computers will be incapable of making a smooth transition to the next millennium. Technicians and economists have predicted that this problem, if not corrected in time, could result in either a recession or at least serious economic dislocation. Over the last several years, the U.S. government and the private sector have made great strides in aggressively targeting the technology side of the Y2K problem. Although there remains much to do, many critical areas have already been addressed. Last year, a unanimous Congress passed a bipartisan Senate Judiciary Committee-reported bill that unleashed the genius of the American private sector by fostering the sharing of remedial information on the Y2K problem. Prior to the bill's passage, various businesses were fearful of being sued if they shared corrective and other information concerning the Y2K problem. In essence, the bill insulates statements about Y2K information and solutions from being used as admissions in a court of law. This legislation has spurred solutions to the Y2K problem by increasing the amount of information available to address the Y2K challenge. But while this first step was important, additional reforms are needed to aid innocent users and manufacturers and to nurture an environment where solutions to the Y2K problem will be forged. Last year's advances are threatened by frivolous Y2K lawsuits--which will disrupt and perhaps even cripple our courts, our high-tech industry, and thousands of businesses, large and small, around our nation. Indeed, one respected analyst recently estimated that the world-wide cost of Y2K-related litigation would be a staggering one trillion dollars. The anticipated flood of lawsuits from those affected by the Y2K crisis may very well impede the progress we have been making in solving the problem. Companies of every variety will be forced to devote precious resources to litigation rather than to repairing and preventing computer problems, and many of these companies may even go bankrupt as a result. Our courts could very well be deluged with lawsuits, clogging the arteries of justice. These consequences must be addressed. The legislation introduced today will ameliorate the Y2K dilemma in a fair and reasonable manner. One of the main features of this new Y2K bill is that it provides for a problem-solving, cooling off period before Y2K-related litigation may commence. The problem-solving period is designed to allow prospective plaintiffs an opportunity to describe the nature of the problem of which they seek legal remedy and give the prospective defendants an opportunity to respond and, if necessary, correct any material Y2K defect. The parties may be able to resolve their disputes during the mediation period, thus forestalling the need for costly and time- consuming litigation. Correspondingly, the bill establishes an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve private disputes and avoid litigation. Of particular significance is the bill's limitations on damages. The bill limits punitive damages in Y2K-related suits to three times economic damages or $250,000, whichever is greater, or, if a small business is a defendant, whichever is lesser. This and other provisions will prevent frivolous lawsuits while preserving the ability of the truly injured to recover damages and to deter future abuses. The bill also remediates potential problems arising out of Y2K- related class suits. Class action cases are currently a source of abuse, and this bill seeks to limit such abuses by allowing class actions to proceed only if a majority of class members' claims involve material defects relating to Y2K problems. Thus, as a practical matter, specious class action suits are barred. The purpose of our bill is clear--to promote and increase the chances that innocent users and businesses gain access to solutions to the Y2K problem. And while the purpose is clear, we recognize that the solution is not simple, We have worked to produce a fair, reasoned bill that preserves the rights of all parties to settle disputes, but will help avert the potential disasters awaiting us if we choose not to act. This bill reflects the high levels of cooperation and broad consensus that large manufactures, small businesses, the telecommunications industry, the information technology industry, electric utilities, and professional associations have been able to achieve. They are all to be commended for their efforts in supporting this vitally important legislation. Let me explain the bill in more detail. I. purpose of the bill The bill's main purpose is to promote Y2K readiness and problem- solving by discouraging a wasteful diversion of resources that would otherwise support readiness and problem-solving toward Y2K-related litigation. Such a costly diversion of resources could exacerbate the risk of nationwide economic dislocation that the Y2K problem poses. Accordingly, the bill aims to prohibit Y2K-related litigation but to impose a slight delay in its commencement so as to promote resolution of Y2K problems and disputes without resort to litigation. I believe this will benefit plaintiffs, defendants, consumers, businesses, and innocent users. We want to create an environment when people think, ``Let's try to solve it'' before they say, ``Let's sue them.'' ii. summary of the bill's provisions Pre-litigation Remediation Period (Sec. 101): If a person aggrieved by a year-2000-related (Y2K-related) problem wants to file a lawsuit based on that problem, he must first provide the prospective defendant, at least 90 days before filing suit, with notice regarding how the Y2K defect manifests itself, what injury he suffered or risk he bore as a result, and what relief he seeks. The only exception to this mandatory 90-day remediation period is if the prospective plaintiff is party to a contract that provides for a period of delay before suit for breach of contract may commence. In that case, the contract's waiting period prevails over the bill's. If the prospective plaintiff fails to give notice to the prospective defendant, as outlined above, and sues anyway, the defendant can treat the plaintiff's lawsuit itself as a substitute notice, thus triggering the 90-day remediation period. If the 90-day remediation period is triggered by an actual lawsuit (instead of the notice) all discovery will be stayed and pleading deadlines will be tolled for the duration of the period. The bill imposes responsibilities on prospective defendants as well as plaintiffs. If a defendant has been given notice, as outlined above, he must respond to this notice within 30 days of receiving it. In this response, the prospective defendant must state in writing his acknowledgement of receipt of the notice and what actions he will take or has taken to address the Y2K problem identified in the plaintiff's notice. Even if the plaintiff has not given notice and the defendant treats his actual lawsuit as substitute notice, the defendant must still respond to that notice within 30 days with all required particulars. If the defendant fails to respond to the plaintiff's notice, then the remediation period terminates at the expiration of the defendant's 30- day response deadline; the lawsuit can then proceed. Also of particular significance, the 90-day remediation period may be extended as part of mutual agreement of the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution. See Sec. 102(a). Pleading Requirements (Sec. 103): The bill requires all Y2K plaintiffs seeking money damages to make a detailed statement in their lawsuits of the nature and amount of the damages they seek to recover, specific facts that form the basis for calculating those damages, and how material Y2K defects manifest themselves. In addition, if the claim being pursued requires proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the plaintiff must ``state in detail the facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.'' The bill allows the court to dismiss a Y2K lawsuit that fails to meet the above pleading requirements. However, the plaintiff can re-file his lawsuit with the required detailed statements and still get a chance to pursue his claim. Duty to Mitigate (Sec. 104): This provision codifies the common-law rule that bars recovery of damages for injuries that the plaintiff could reasonably have been avoided. Evidence of Reasonable Efforts and Contract Defenses (Sec. 202(a)): This provision allows a defendant, ``for the purpose of limiting or eliminating the defendant's liability,'' for breach of contract to offer evidence that his performance was ``reasonable in light of the circumstances.'' This would overcome any objection, based on Federal or State rules of evidence, that evidence of such reasonable-efforts performance is irrelevant to the issue of breach. Also, this provision expressly preserves the common-law and Uniform Commercial Code defenses of impossibility and impracticability. Contract Damages Limit (Sec. 203): Contract damages are limited either to those provided for in a liquidated damages clause or by operation of law that governed the contract's interpretation at the time of contract formation. This does not alter present-day contract law. Rather, it is designed to preempt any State's attempt to change its contract law relating to Y2K problems after the contract that is the subject of the lawsuit was entered into. Proportionate Liability in Tort Cases (Sec. 301(b)): This provision essentially codifies the tort doctrine of pure comparative negligence in that it requires the court to assign a percent share of liability to each person determined to have caused or contributed to the plaintiff's loss in proportion to the relative fault of each. Personal injury cases are exempt from this provision. State of Mind and Foreseeability Requirements in Tort Cases (Sec. 302): This provision establishes a heightened state-of-mind element for three types of lawsuits: For fraud and negligent misrepresentation cases, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``actually knew, or recklessly disregarded a known and substantial risk, that [a Y2K] failure would occur.'' For cases that require proof of gross negligence or recklessness, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``actually knew, or recklessly disregarded a known and substantial risk, that plaintiff would suffer [actual or potential] harm. For ordinary negligence cases, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``knew or reasonably should have known that its actions would cause harm to the plaintiff.'' Reasonable Efforts Defense in Tort Cases (Sec. 303): Under this provision, a plaintiff may not recover simply by showing that a Y2K failure occurred in something that was under the control of the defendant. This is intended to avoid a defendant being held strictly liable for harm caused by a Y2K failure. Also, the bill provides the defendant with a complete defense to liability if he can show that he took reasonable efforts under the circumstances to prevent the Y2K failure or its attendant damages. Breach of contract cases are exempt from this provision. Tort Punitive Damages Limit (Sec. 304): This provision limits punitive damages to either: (1) lesser of three times actual damages or $250,000 for individuals whose net worth is $500,000 or less and for small businesses; or (2) the greater of three times actual damages or $250,000 for all other defendants. Limit on Economic Loss Recovery in Tort Cases (Sec. 305): This provision essentially codifies the common-law economic loss doctrine found in section 766C of the Restatement of Torts. Accordingly, the provision allows recovery of economic losses only when permitted by statute or judicial decision and (1) where permitted under a contract to which the plaintiff is a party; (2) where permitted under applicable law that governed interpretation of the contract at the time of contract formation; (3) when they are incidental to a Y2K-related personal injury claim; or (4) when they are incidental to a Y2K-related property damage claim. Liability of Officers and Directors (Sec. 306): This provision limits the personal liability of corporate officers and directors to the greater of $100,000 or the amount of cash compensation such officer or director received in the year preceding the act or omission for which he was found liable. This limitation on personal liability does not apply where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the officer or director specifically intended to harm the plaintiff by (1) intentionally making materially misleading statements on which the plaintiff relied or (2) intentionally withholding material information regarding a Y2K failure that he had a duty to disclose. This provision expressly does not pre-empt State law on liability of officers and directors. Class Action Requirements: Regarding Y2K-related class suits, the bill allows these actions to proceed only if a majority of class members' claims involve material Y2K defects. Also, only those individuals who have actual notice, as certified by the court, of the suit are entitled to join the class, unless they inform the court in writing prior to commencement of trial or entry of judgment of their desire to join the class. Finally, the bill changes the requirements of Federal jurisdiction for Y2K-related actions in three respects: (1) there is no amount in controversy requirement for Federal diversity jurisdiction; (2) diversity of citizenship can be established as to any member of the class, not just the named members; and (3) plaintiffs as well as defendants can remove Y2K-related actions from state court to Federal court. In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to emphasize that the Y2K problem is not a partisan issue. This is a bipartisan, fair bill. We must all work together--now--to ensure that a rush to the courts does not cripple the ability of American businesses to solve the Y2K problem swiftly, efficiently and without unnecessary distractions. The real beneficiaries of this bill will be individual consumers and businesses, the engine of the American economy. I ask my colleagues to support this worthwhile legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the bill in its entirety be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce with my good friend Senator Breaux the ``State and Local Investment Opportunity Act of 1999.'' This legislation would first, raise the annual limit on States' authority to issue their own tax-exempt ``Private Activity'' Bonds to the greater of $75 times population or $225 million and, second, index the limit to inflation. Tax-exempt Private Activity Bonds finance much needed municipal services, student loans, affordable housing, and economic development. In my home State, the Utah Housing Finance Agency has financed first- time homes for nearly 41,000 working families with Mortgage Revenue Bonds. In addition, multifamily housing bonds have financed almost 3,300 affordable apartments. Both of these bonds are subject to the cap. However, many more Utah families still need the housing help that these bonds provide. According to the National Council of State Housing Agencies, demand in Utah for these bonds and other Private Activity Bonds more than doubled supply. Nationwide, demand for bond authority exceeded supply by almost 50 percent in 1997. The current bond limit is the greater of $50 times population or $150 million. Cap growth is restricted by State population growth, which has been less than 5 percent nationwide over the past decade. During the same period, inflation has sliced bond purchasing power nearly in half, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Last year's Omnibus Appropriations Act included a partial, phased-in bond restoration among its limited tax provisions. However, the increase will not become effective until 2007. By then, nearly one- third of the purchasing power of Private Activity Bonds will have been lost even with the phase-in. Bond restoration has strong bipartisan support. A majority of the Senate, and nearly three quarters of the House, cosponsored full restoration and indexation in the 105th Congress. Furthermore, three- quarters of the House, including nearly three-quarters of the Ways and Means Committee, cosponsored identical House legislation. The Nation's governors and mayors, along with other State and local groups, and the public finance community strongly support full bond cap restoration. I encourage my colleagues to cosponsor the ``State and Local Investment Opportunity Act of 1999,'' so that their States can continue to make vital investments in their citizens and communities.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Year 2000 Fairness and Responsibility Act.'' This bill addresses what is popularly known as the ``Y2K Problem'' or the ``Millennium Bug.'' It is supported by over 85 industry organizations and is important to the state of Utah, our nation's fastest growing high-tech state. Due to a simple decision years ago to save space on computer punch cards, many computers and electronic devices around the world still express years in only two digits. As a result, these computers will be incapable of making a smooth transition to the next millennium. Technicians and economists have predicted that this problem, if not corrected in time, could result in either a recession or at least serious economic dislocation. Over the last several years, the U.S. government and the private sector have made great strides in aggressively targeting the technology side of the Y2K problem. Although there remains much to do, many critical areas have already been addressed. Last year, a unanimous Congress passed a bipartisan Senate Judiciary Committee-reported bill that unleashed the genius of the American private sector by fostering the sharing of remedial information on the Y2K problem. Prior to the bill's passage, various businesses were fearful of being sued if they shared corrective and other information concerning the Y2K problem. In essence, the bill insulates statements about Y2K information and solutions from being used as admissions in a court of law. This legislation has spurred solutions to the Y2K problem by increasing the amount of information available to address the Y2K challenge. But while this first step was important, additional reforms are needed to aid innocent users and manufacturers and to nurture an environment where solutions to the Y2K problem will be forged. Last year's advances are threatened by frivolous Y2K lawsuits--which will disrupt and perhaps even cripple our courts, our high-tech industry, and thousands of businesses, large and small, around our nation. Indeed, one respected analyst recently estimated that the world-wide cost of Y2K-related litigation would be a staggering one trillion dollars. The anticipated flood of lawsuits from those affected by the Y2K crisis may very well impede the progress we have been making in solving the problem. Companies of every variety will be forced to devote precious resources to litigation rather than to repairing and preventing computer problems, and many of these companies may even go bankrupt as a result. Our courts could very well be deluged with lawsuits, clogging the arteries of justice. These consequences must be addressed. The legislation introduced today will ameliorate the Y2K dilemma in a fair and reasonable manner. One of the main features of this new Y2K bill is that it provides for a problem-solving, cooling off period before Y2K-related litigation may commence. The problem-solving period is designed to allow prospective plaintiffs an opportunity to describe the nature of the problem of which they seek legal remedy and give the prospective defendants an opportunity to respond and, if necessary, correct any material Y2K defect. The parties may be able to resolve their disputes during the mediation period, thus forestalling the need for costly and time- consuming litigation. Correspondingly, the bill establishes an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve private disputes and avoid litigation. Of particular significance is the bill's limitations on damages. The bill limits punitive damages in Y2K-related suits to three times economic damages or $250,000, whichever is greater, or, if a small business is a defendant, whichever is lesser. This and other provisions will prevent frivolous lawsuits while preserving the ability of the truly injured to recover damages and to deter future abuses. The bill also remediates potential problems arising out of Y2K- related class suits. Class action cases are currently a source of abuse, and this bill seeks to limit such abuses by allowing class actions to proceed only if a majority of class members' claims involve material defects relating to Y2K problems. Thus, as a practical matter, specious class action suits are barred. The purpose of our bill is clear--to promote and increase the chances that innocent users and businesses gain access to solutions to the Y2K problem. And while the purpose is clear, we recognize that the solution is not simple, We have worked to produce a fair, reasoned bill that preserves the rights of all parties to settle disputes, but will help avert the potential disasters awaiting us if we choose not to act. This bill reflects the high levels of cooperation and broad consensus that large manufactures, small businesses, the telecommunications industry, the information technology industry, electric utilities, and professional associations have been able to achieve. They are all to be commended for their efforts in supporting this vitally important legislation. Let me explain the bill in more detail. I. purpose of the bill The bill's main purpose is to promote Y2K readiness and problem- solving by discouraging a wasteful diversion of resources that would otherwise support readiness and problem-solving toward Y2K-related litigation. Such a costly diversion of resources could exacerbate the risk of nationwide economic dislocation that the Y2K problem poses. Accordingly, the bill aims to prohibit Y2K-related litigation but to impose a slight delay in its commencement so as to promote resolution of Y2K problems and disputes without resort to litigation. I believe this will benefit plaintiffs, defendants, consumers, businesses, and innocent users. We want to create an environment when people think, ``Let's try to solve it'' before they say, ``Let's sue them.'' ii. summary of the bill's provisions Pre-litigation Remediation Period (Sec. 101): If a person aggrieved by a year-2000-related (Y2K-related) problem wants to file a lawsuit based on that problem, he must first provide the prospective defendant, at least 90 days before filing suit, with notice regarding how the Y2K defect manifests itself, what injury he suffered or risk he bore as a result, and what relief he seeks. The only exception to this mandatory 90-day remediation period is if the prospective plaintiff is party to a contract that provides for a period of delay before suit for breach of contract may commence. In that case, the contract's waiting period prevails over the bill's. If the prospective plaintiff fails to give notice to the prospective defendant, as outlined above, and sues anyway, the defendant can treat the plaintiff's lawsuit itself as a substitute notice, thus triggering the 90-day remediation period. If the 90-day remediation period is triggered by an actual lawsuit (instead of the notice) all discovery will be stayed and pleading deadlines will be tolled for the duration of the period. The bill imposes responsibilities on prospective defendants as well as plaintiffs. If a defendant has been given notice, as outlined above, he must respond to this notice within 30 days of receiving it. In this response, the prospective defendant must state in writing his acknowledgement of receipt of the notice and what actions he will take or has taken to address the Y2K problem identified in the plaintiff's notice. Even if the plaintiff has not given notice and the defendant treats his actual lawsuit as substitute notice, the defendant must still respond to that notice within 30 days with all required particulars. If the defendant fails to respond to the plaintiff's notice, then the remediation period terminates at the expiration of the defendant's 30- day response deadline; the lawsuit can then proceed. Also of particular significance, the 90-day remediation period may be extended as part of mutual agreement of the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution. See Sec. 102(a). Pleading Requirements (Sec. 103): The bill requires all Y2K plaintiffs seeking money damages to make a detailed statement in their lawsuits of the nature and amount of the damages they seek to recover, specific facts that form the basis for calculating those damages, and how material Y2K defects manifest themselves. In addition, if the claim being pursued requires proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the plaintiff must ``state in detail the facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.'' The bill allows the court to dismiss a Y2K lawsuit that fails to meet the above pleading requirements. However, the plaintiff can re-file his lawsuit with the required detailed statements and still get a chance to pursue his claim. Duty to Mitigate (Sec. 104): This provision codifies the common-law rule that bars recovery of damages for injuries that the plaintiff could reasonably have been avoided. Evidence of Reasonable Efforts and Contract Defenses (Sec. 202(a)): This provision allows a defendant, ``for the purpose of limiting or eliminating the defendant's liability,'' for breach of contract to offer evidence that his performance was ``reasonable in light of the circumstances.'' This would overcome any objection, based on Federal or State rules of evidence, that evidence of such reasonable-efforts performance is irrelevant to the issue of breach. Also, this provision expressly preserves the common-law and Uniform Commercial Code defenses of impossibility and impracticability. Contract Damages Limit (Sec. 203): Contract damages are limited either to those provided for in a liquidated damages clause or by operation of law that governed the contract's interpretation at the time of contract formation. This does not alter present-day contract law. Rather, it is designed to preempt any State's attempt to change its contract law relating to Y2K problems after the contract that is the subject of the lawsuit was entered into. Proportionate Liability in Tort Cases (Sec. 301(b)): This provision essentially codifies the tort doctrine of pure comparative negligence in that it requires the court to assign a percent share of liability to each person determined to have caused or contributed to the plaintiff's loss in proportion to the relative fault of each. Personal injury cases are exempt from this provision. State of Mind and Foreseeability Requirements in Tort Cases (Sec. 302): This provision establishes a heightened state-of-mind element for three types of lawsuits: For fraud and negligent misrepresentation cases, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``actually knew, or recklessly disregarded a known and substantial risk, that [a Y2K] failure would occur.'' For cases that require proof of gross negligence or recklessness, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``actually knew, or recklessly disregarded a known and substantial risk, that plaintiff would suffer [actual or potential] harm. For ordinary negligence cases, the plaintiff must, in addition to proving all other elements of the claim, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ``knew or reasonably should have known that its actions would cause harm to the plaintiff.'' Reasonable Efforts Defense in Tort Cases (Sec. 303): Under this provision, a plaintiff may not recover simply by showing that a Y2K failure occurred in something that was under the control of the defendant. This is intended to avoid a defendant being held strictly liable for harm caused by a Y2K failure. Also, the bill provides the defendant with a complete defense to liability if he can show that he took reasonable efforts under the circumstances to prevent the Y2K failure or its attendant damages. Breach of contract cases are exempt from this provision. Tort Punitive Damages Limit (Sec. 304): This provision limits punitive damages to either: (1) lesser of three times actual damages or $250,000 for individuals whose net worth is $500,000 or less and for small businesses; or (2) the greater of three times actual damages or $250,000 for all other defendants. Limit on Economic Loss Recovery in Tort Cases (Sec. 305): This provision essentially codifies the common-law economic loss doctrine found in section 766C of the Restatement of Torts. Accordingly, the provision allows recovery of economic losses only when permitted by statute or judicial decision and (1) where permitted under a contract to which the plaintiff is a party; (2) where permitted under applicable law that governed interpretation of the contract at the time of contract formation; (3) when they are incidental to a Y2K-related personal injury claim; or (4) when they are incidental to a Y2K-related property damage claim. Liability of Officers and Directors (Sec. 306): This provision limits the personal liability of corporate officers and directors to the greater of $100,000 or the amount of cash compensation such officer or director received in the year preceding the act or omission for which he was found liable. This limitation on personal liability does not apply where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the officer or director specifically intended to harm the plaintiff by (1) intentionally making materially misleading statements on which the plaintiff relied or (2) intentionally withholding material information regarding a Y2K failure that he had a duty to disclose. This provision expressly does not pre-empt State law on liability of officers and directors. Class Action Requirements: Regarding Y2K-related class suits, the bill allows these actions to proceed only if a majority of class members' claims involve material Y2K defects. Also, only those individuals who have actual notice, as certified by the court, of the suit are entitled to join the class, unless they inform the court in writing prior to commencement of trial or entry of judgment of their desire to join the class. Finally, the bill changes the requirements of Federal jurisdiction for Y2K-related actions in three respects: (1) there is no amount in controversy requirement for Federal diversity jurisdiction; (2) diversity of citizenship can be established as to any member of the class, not just the named members; and (3) plaintiffs as well as defendants can remove Y2K-related actions from state court to Federal court. In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to emphasize that the Y2K problem is not a partisan issue. This is a bipartisan, fair bill. We must all work together--now--to ensure that a rush to the courts does not cripple the ability of American businesses to solve the Y2K problem swiftly, efficiently and without unnecessary distractions. The real beneficiaries of this bill will be individual consumers and businesses, the engine of the American economy. I ask my colleagues to support this worthwhile legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the bill in its entirety be printed in the Record.