Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce with my good friend Senator Breaux the ``State and Local Investment Opportunity Act of 1999.'' This legislation would first, raise the annual limit on States' authority to issue their own tax-exempt ``Private Activity'' Bonds to the greater of $75 times population or $225 million and, second, index the limit to inflation. Tax-exempt Private Activity Bonds finance much needed municipal services, student loans, affordable housing, and economic development. In my home State, the Utah Housing Finance Agency has financed first- time homes for nearly 41,000 working families with Mortgage Revenue Bonds. In addition, multifamily housing bonds have financed almost 3,300 affordable apartments. Both of these bonds are subject to the cap. However, many more Utah families still need the housing help that these bonds provide. According to the National Council of State Housing Agencies, demand in Utah for these bonds and other Private Activity Bonds more than doubled supply. Nationwide, demand for bond authority exceeded supply by almost 50 percent in 1997. The current bond limit is the greater of $50 times population or $150 million. Cap growth is restricted by State population growth, which has been less than 5 percent nationwide over the past decade. During the same period, inflation has sliced bond purchasing power nearly in half, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Last year's Omnibus Appropriations Act included a partial, phased-in bond restoration among its limited tax provisions. However, the increase will not become effective until 2007. By then, nearly one- third of the purchasing power of Private Activity Bonds will have been lost even with the phase-in. Bond restoration has strong bipartisan support. A majority of the Senate, and nearly three quarters of the House, cosponsored full restoration and indexation in the 105th Congress. Furthermore, three- quarters of the House, including nearly three-quarters of the Ways and Means Committee, cosponsored identical House legislation. The Nation's governors and mayors, along with other State and local groups, and the public finance community strongly support full bond cap restoration. I encourage my colleagues to cosponsor the ``State and Local Investment Opportunity Act of 1999,'' so that their States can continue to make vital investments in their citizens and communities.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce private relief legislation on behalf of my constituents, Mr. Saeed Rezai, and his wife, Mrs. Julie Rezai. As my colleagues are aware, those immigration cases that warrant private legislation are extremely rare, but are warranted in some cases. I am introducing a bill for the relief of Saeed Rezai. I had hoped that this case would not require congressional intervention. Unfortunately, it is clear that private legislation is the only means remaining to ensure that the equities of Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's case are heard and that a number of unresolved questions are answered without imposing a terrible hardship on Mr. and Mrs. Rezai and on their marriage. I wish to take a moment, Mr. President, to provide something by way of background to this somewhat complicated case and to explain the urgency of this legislation. Mr. Rezai first came to the United States in 1986. On June 15, 1991, he married his current wife, Julie, who is a U.S. citizen. Shortly thereafter, she filed an immigrant visa petition on his behalf. Approval of this petition has been blocked, however, by the application of 204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 204(c) precludes the approval of a visa petition for anyone who entered, or conspired to enter, into a fraudulent marriage. The Immigration and Nationalization Service [INS] applied this provision in Mr. Rezai's case because his previous marriage ended in divorce before his 2-year period of conditional residence had expired. In immigration proceedings following the divorce, the judge heard testimony from witness on behalf of Mr. Rezai and his former wife. After considering that testimony, he found there was insufficient evidence to warrant lifting the conditions on Mr. Rezai's permanent residency and, in the absence of a qualifying marriage, granted Mr. Rezai voluntary departure from the United States. The judge was very careful to mention, however, that there was no proof of false testimony by Mr. Rezai, and he granted voluntary departure rather than ordering deportation because, in his words, Mr. Rezai `may be eligible for a visa in the future.' Despite these comments by the immigration judge, who clearly did not anticipate the future application of the 204(c) exclusion to Mr. Rezai's case, the INS has refused to approve Mrs. Rezai's petition for permanent residence on behalf of her husband based on that very exclusion. In the meantime, Mr. Rezai appealed the initial termination of his lawful permanent resident status in 1990. In August 1995, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals denied this appeal and reinstated the voluntary departure order. Under current law, there is no provision to stay Mr. Rezai's deportation pending the BIA's consideration of Mrs. Rezai's current immigrant visa petition. Mr. President, there is no question that Mr. Rezai deportation will create extraordinary hardship for both Mr. and Mrs. Rezai. Throughout all the proceedings of the past 6 years, not a single person that I know of--including the INS--has questioned the validity of Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's marriage. In fact, many that I have heard from have emphatically told me that Mr. and Mrs. Rezai's marriage is as strong as any they have seen. Given the prevailing political and cultural climate in Iran, I would not expect that Mrs. Rezia will choose to make her home there. Thus, Mrs. Rezai's deportation will result in either the breakup of a legitimate family or the forced removal of a U.S. citizen and her husband to a third country foreign to both of them. It should also be noted that Mr. Rezai has been present in the United States for more than a decade. During this time he has assimilated to America culture and has become a contributing member of his community. He has been placed in a responsible position of employment as the security field supervisor at Westiminster College where he has gained the respect and admiration of both his peers and his supervisors. In fact, I received a letter from the interim president of Westminister College, signed by close to 150 of Mr. Rezai's associates, attesting to his many contributions to the college and the community. This is just one of the many, many letters and phone calls I have received from members of our community. Mr. Rezai's forced departure in light of these considerations would both unduly limit his own opportunities and deprive the community of his continued contributions.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am today introducing a private relief bill on behalf of Belinda McGregor, the beloved sister of one of my constituents, Rosalinda Burton. Mistakes are made every day, Mr. President, and when innocent people suffer severe consequences as a result of these mistakes, something ought to be done to remedy the situation. In the particular case of Ms. Belinda McGregor, the federal bureaucracy made a mistake--a mistake which cost Ms. McGregor dearly and it is now time to correct this mistake. Unfortunately, the only way to provide relief is through Congressional action. Belinda McGregor, a citizen of the United Kingdom, filed an application for the 1995 Diversity Visa program. Her husband, a citizen of Ireland, filed a separate application at the same time. Ms. McGregor's application was among those selected to receive a diversity visa. When the handling clerk at the National Visa Center received the application, however, the clerk erroneously replaced Ms. McGregor's name in the computer with that of her husband. As a result, Ms. McGregor was never informed that she had been selected and never provided the requisite information. The mistake with respect to Ms. McGregor's husband was caught, but not in time for Ms. McGregor to meet the September, 1995 deadline. Her visa number was given to another applicant. In short, Ms. McGregor was unfairly denied the 1995 diversity visa that was rightfully hers due to a series of errors by the National Visa Center. As far as I know, these facts are not disputed. Unfortunately, the Center does not have the legal authority to rectify its own mistake by simply granting Ms. McGregor a visa out of a subsequent year's allotment. Thus, a private relief bill is needed in order to see that Ms. McGregor gets the visa to which she was clearly entitled to in 1995. Mr. President, I have received a very compelling letter from Rosalinda Burton of Cedar Hills, UT which I am placing in the Record. Ms. Burton is Ms. McGregor's sister and she described to me the strong relationship that she and her sister have and the care that her sister provided when Ms. Burton was seriously injured in a 1993 car accident. I hope that the Senate can move forward on this bill expeditiously. Ms. McGregor was the victim of a simple and admitted bureaucratic snafu. The Senate ought to move swiftly to correct this injustice. Mr. President, I am also including in the Record additional relevant correspondence which documents the background of this case. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, Daniel Webster once observed that a ``sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or duty violated is still with us. . . .'' The duty which has faced each United States Senator is the obligation to do impartial justice in a matter of significant historical import with lasting consequences for our constitutional order--the consideration of the impeachment articles against President William Jefferson Clinton. Our duty calls on us to answer a serious question--whether the President's actions warrant his removal from office. Fundamentally, in arriving at our individual decisions, we must consider what is in the best interests of the American people. The President engaged in conduct, that even his defenders recognize, was reprehensible and wrong. A bipartisan majority of the House also found that he committed serious, impeachable crimes. So, the test for the Senate must be to do what's in the best interest of our nation. It is not a matter of what is easiest or cleanest. It is a matter of what is in the immediate and long term national interest. This has been, and it will continue to be, a subjective and difficult standard and one which I will discuss in greater detail later in my remarks. First, however, I wish to speak on the Senate's procedural responsibility when sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the constitutional law concerning impeachable offenses, and the Articles of Impeachment at issue in the present case; finally, I will conclude with a discussion of whether--assuming the facts alleged have been proven-- the best interests of the country would be served by removing President Clinton from office. I. The Senate's Role Let me begin by explaining what the role of the Senate is in the impeachment process. Simply put, the Senate's role in the impeachment process is to try all impeachments. As Joseph Story wrote: The power [to try impeachments] has been wisely deposited with the Senate. . . . That of all the departments of the government, `none will be found more suitable to exercise this peculiar jurisdiction than the Senate.' . . . Precluded from ever becoming accusers themselves, it is their duty not to lend themselves to the animosities of party, or the prejudices against individuals, which may sometimes unconsciously induce'' the other body. In serving as the tribunal for impeachments, we must strive to attain and demonstrate impartiality, integrity, intelligence and independence. If we fail to do so, the trial and our judgment will be flawed.--Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Section 386. In short, impeachment trials require Senators to act, wherever possible, with principled political neutrality. One question I have repeatedly asked myself during this scandal--when faced with questions concerning the interpretation of the relevant law, the process, the calls for resignation, or forgiveness--has been whether I would have taken the same position were this a Republican President. I have done this throughout the past year I and expect many of my colleagues have done the same. In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of United States versus Nixon that the process by which the Senate tries impeachments was nonjusticiable. As a result of the Nixon decision, the Senate has a heightened constitutional obligation in impeachment cases. As constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt notes in his 1996 book, The Federal Impeachment process, ``Congress may make constitutional law-- that is, make judgments about the scope and meaning of its constitutionally authorized impeachment function--subject to change only if Congress later changes its mind or by constitutional amendment. Thus, Nixon raised an issue about Congress's ability, in the absence of judicial review, to make reasonably principled constitutional decisions.'' I believe the Senate has conducted this trial in a fair manner and that we have made principled constitutional decisions. I want to commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--in particular the Majority Leader, Trent Lott--for the impartial and proficient manner in which we have conducted our constitutional obligation. At the core of our deliberations was the tension between, on the one hand, our shared interest in putting this matter behind us and getting on with the Nation's business, and, on the other hand, our interest in affording the President, and the weighty matter of impeachment, that process which is due and fair. While there are decisions the Senate reached with which I differed, I want to make clear my view that the Senate has ably balanced these competing interests. A fair and full trial that we were once told would take one year has been completed in less than six weeks. The credit for this process rests with every Member of the Senate, with the House Managers, counsel for the President, and the Chief Justice. ii. the impeachment standard Of great concern to me is what the standard should be for impeachment in this and future trials. The President's Counsel has argued that the President can only be removed for constituting, what Oliver Wendell Holmes termed in free speech cases, a ``clear and present danger.'' It was contended that a President can only be removed if he is a danger to the Constitution. As such, according to the President's Counsel, removable conduct must relate to egregious conduct related to performance in office. Even if the House's allegation--that President Clinton committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice is proven true--it was argued--than such behavior does not rise to impeachable offenses because it was private, not public, conduct. In this case an inappropriate sexual relation with a subordinate employee--was the predicate of the charged offenses. But such a standard establishes an impossibly high bar as to render impotent the impeachment clauses of the Constitution. I hope that no matter the outcome of this trial, President Clinton's view of what constitutes an impeachable offense does not become precedent. If it does, I fear the moral framework of our Republic will be frayed. If it does, the legitimacy of our institutions may very well become tattered. It would create the paradox of being able to convict and jail an official for committing, let's say, homicide, but not to be able to remove that official from holding positions of public trust. Committing crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury and obstruction of justice, go to the very heart of qualification for public office. The overwhelming consensus of both legal and historical scholars is that the Constitution mandates the removal of the ``President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States''--which includes federal judges--``upon impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate of ``treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' (U.S. Const. Art. II. Sec. 4). The precise meaning of this latter clause is critical to the outcome of the impeachment trial. The President's advocates agree with their critics that this standard is the sole standard for presidential impeachment, but contend that the ``or other'' phrase indicates that grounds for impeachment must be criminal in nature because treason and bribery are crimes or acts committed against the state. Such crimes or acts must be heinous, they contend, because the term ``crimes and misdemeanors'' is preceded by the descriptive adjective ``high'' in the impeachment clause. These advocates also claim that there exists no proof of criminal wrongdoing, that we have evidence of only a private affair unrelated to performance in public office, and that abuse of power related to official conduct--not present here--is a prerequisite for impeachment. Many learned scholars oppose this view. Looking at the debates in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, they note that the Convention originally chose treason and bribery as the sole standard for impeachment. George Mason argued that this standard was too stringent and advocated that ``maladministration'' be added to the list. James Madison objected, believing that no coherent definition of ``maladministration'' existed and that such a lenient standard would make the President a pawn of the Senate. The Convention, as a result, settled on the phrase ``treason, bribery or other high crime or misdemeanor.'' It is clear that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' was considered by the Framers to have a more narrow and specific meaning and, indeed, it is a term taken from English precedent. Accordingly, many scholars, including Raoul Berger, the dean of impeachment scholars (Impeachment: the Constitutional Problems (1973)), contend that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is a common law term of art that reaches both private and public behavior. Treason and bribery are acts that harm society in that they constitute a corruption on the body politic. Consequently, ``other high crimes and misdemeanors'' encompasses similar acts of corruption or betrayals of trust, and need not constitute formal crimes. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 65 makes clear that impeachment is political, not criminal, in nature and reaches conduct that goes to reputation and character. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries the term ``misdemeanor'' refers not to a petty crime, but to bad demeanor. History thus demonstrates that acts or conduct that demeans the integrity of the office, or harms an individual's reputation in such a way as to engender a lack of public confidence in the office holder or the political system is an impeachable offense. Justice Joseph Story, in his celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States Sec. 762 (1835), made this abundantly clear when he wrote that impeachment lies for private behavior that harms the society or demeans its institutions: In the first place, the nature of the functions to be performed: The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a political character. Not but that crimes of a strictly legal character fall within the scope of the power, (for, as we shall presently see, treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors are expressly within it;) but that it has a more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political office. Even though the Framers rejected the English model of impeachment as a form of punishment and promulgated removal as the remedy for conviction, most scholars contend that the Framers looked to English precedent to define ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' There is a wealth of evidence that a betrayal of public trust or reckless conduct that places a high office in disrepute constitutes ``high misdemeanors.'' The modifier ``high'' refers to acts against the state or commonwealth. In the eighteenth century, the term ``political'' also encompassed our modern term of ``social.'' So conduct that harmed society as a whole, or denigrated the public respect and confidence in governmental institutions, constituted ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' As such, both English and American officials have been impeached for drunkenness, for frequenting prostitutes, even for insanity, in other words private conduct that is unrelated to official acts. Such behavior is seen as defaming the office that the accused held and diminishing the people's faith in government. Impeachment is thus seen by many scholars as a means of removing unqualified office holders. Thus, impeachment and removal does not have to be predicated upon commission of a crime. Consequently, impeachment and removal is not in essentially a criminal punishment, a conclusion that is also textually demonstrated by the fact that the Framers expressly provided for later indictment and criminal conviction of an impeached and removed President. A high crime and misdeameanor--according to this view--does not have to amount to a crime or be related to official conduct. Even if President Clinton's acts of perjury were predicated upon lying about a private sexual relation, they still must be considered high crimes and misdemeanors. The fact that the underlying behavior was private in its genesis is irrelevant. Such private acts demean the Office of the President, and betray public trust. Those acts therefore are impeachable. But I must emphasize that even if the President's Counsel is correct in that private acts unrelated to performance in office are not impeachable offenses, I believe the gravamen of what President Clinton committed are public, not private, acts that are unambiguous breaches of public trust. Perjury and particularly obstruction of justice are conduct that attack the very veracity of our justice system. (Furthermore, I vehemently disagree that the underlying conduct was a purely private concern because the conduct involved a federal employee in a work environment). Lying under oath, hiding evidence, and tampering with witnesses destroy the truth-finding function of our investigatory and trial system. Perjury and obstruction of justice are particularly pernicious if committed by a President of the United States, who has sworn pursuant to the oath of office to protect the Constitution and laws of the United States. Whether perjury and obstruction of justice can be considered private or public acts is of no moment. They are twin ``high crimes'' harming the political order and requiring impeachment and removal from office. A related argument made by the President's Counsel is that a President should be held to a less stringent standard than federal judges in impeachment trials. Because many judges have been removed for conduct unrelated to performance in office, such as Judges Clairborne and Nixon, who were convicted and removed for perjurious statements unrelated to their performance in office, the President is almost compelled to make this argument. In essence, The President's Counsel contend that Article III's requirement that judges hold office for ``good behavior'' is not simply a description of the term of office, but a grounds for impeachment if violated. Presidents--and other civil officers--are subject to the more stringent high crimes and misdemeanor standard. Most scholars reject this view. For instance, Michael J. Gerhardt (The Federal Impeachment Process (1996)) testified in the House Constitutional Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in November that the impeachment standard of high crimes and misdemeanors applies to all civil officers, including judges as well as the President. This is the sole constitutional ground for impeachment. Article III's good behavior provision for judges simply sets the duration for judicial office (lifetime unless impeached). There are simply no differing standards for judges and the President. iii. article one--perjury Let me now turn to the facts of this case. The House alleges in Article I that the President should be removed because he committed acts of perjury. The House alleges in Article II that the President should be removed because he obstructed and interfered with the mechanisms and duly constituted processes of the justice system. To demonstrate why I believe it is so, it is necessary to discuss both the legal standards and how the facts meet the requirements of those standards. I will first discuss perjury, and, next, turn to obstruction of justice. Article I of the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that: On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal Grand Jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury. I. Statements before the Grand Jury that constitute perjury Overview ``Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury knowingly makes any false material declaration . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'' See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a). In a prosecution for perjury under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a), the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the declarant was under oath, (ii) the testimony was given in a proceeding before a court of the United States, (iii) the witness knowingly made, (iv) a false statement, and (v) the testimony was material. United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768 (1976). The first two elements are not at issue here because it is undisputed that President Clinton testified under oath before a Grand Jury of the United States. As the discussion below reveals, the House Managers proved the remaining elements of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt for key aspects of President Clinton's Grand Jury testimony. A. Statements to Betty Currie on January 18, 1998 President Clinton committed perjury before the Grand Jury when he testified falsely concerning his motivation for making five statement to Betty Currie. Hours after his deposition in the Jones case, President Clinton called his secretary Betty Currie and asked her to come to the White House the next day, January 18. See Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 65-66. On that Sunday afternoon, the President made the following five statements to Ms. Currie about Monica Lewinsky: (1) ``You were always there when she was there, right?''; (2) ``We were never really alone.''; (3) ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''; (4) ``You can see and hear everything, right?''; and (5) ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.'' Id. at 71-74. President Clinton repeated these same questions and statements to Betty Currie a few days later. See BC 1/27/98 GJ at 80-81. When he discussed his deposition testimony regarding Ms. Lewinsky with Betty Currie on these two occasions, President Clinton violated Judge Wright's strict order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition. falsity President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified about his motivation for making these statements. When asked before the Grand Jury about these statements to Betty Currie, the President testified that he asked these ``series of questions'' in order to ``refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 131. He further testified that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was about what she heard, what she could hear'' and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly as I could * * * [a]nd I was trying to figure [it] out * * * in a hurry because I knew something was up.'' See WJC 8/17/98 at 56. Immediately following extensive questioning on this issue, a different prosecutor from the Office of Independent Counsel asked the President that ``[i]f I understand your current line of testimony, you are saying that your only interest in speaking with Ms. Currie in the days after your deposition was to refresh your own recollection.'' (Emphasis added.) See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 141-142. President Clinton answered: ``Yes.'' Id. President Clinton's testimony that he was ``only'' trying to ``refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' is perjury because a person cannot ``refresh'' his memory with statements and questions that he knows are false. Each of President Clinton's five statements to Currie is either an outright lie or extremely misleading. President Clinton knew the facts of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he knew his statements to Betty Currie were false. By definition, these false questions and statements could not have helped President Clinton accurately refresh his memory. In addition, Betty Currie could not possibly have known the answers to some of these questions. For example, how could Betty Currie have known whether the President ever ``touched'' Ms. Lewinsky or whether Ms. Currie was ``always there when [Ms. Lewinsky] was there?'' Common sense defies the President' explanation: if one is trying to refresh his memory or gather information quickly, he does not ask questions of a person to which the person could not know the answers. The fact that Betty Currie could not have known the answers to these questions further undermines President Clinton's testimony that he was trying to refresh his memory or gather information quickly. If the President was merely trying to refresh his recollection or gather information quickly why did he repeat these questions and statements to Currie a few days later? As the House Managers noted during the trial, instead of asking a series of specific leading questions, why didn't President Clinton ask Currie a general question about what she recalled about Ms. Lewinsky's activity at the White House? Moreover, President Clinton's blatant violation of Judge Wright's order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition casts further doubt on his testimony on this issue. The President's testimony regarding his motivation for these statements is false. He did not make these statements to refresh his recollection. Rather, as the following section explains, the President made these statements to Ms. Currie in order to influence her potential testimony in the Jones suit and to influence her possible responses to the media. Knowingly In a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the prosecution must prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the false statement. Under this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that the defendant made the false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, (7th Cir. 1980). The President knowingly made these false statements about his motivation for speaking to Betty Currie after his deposition. He did not make these statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' Rather, President Clinton lied about his motivation to conceal his true purpose in making these statements to Currie. In reality, President Clinton was attempting to corroborate his deceitful testimony in the Jones deposition with a prospective witness. When he made these statements to Currie, the President knew that she was a likely witness in the Jones case because he repeatedly referred to Currie when asked about Ms. Lewinsky by the Jones lawyers. See Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 58. President Clinton actually told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' in response to one question in the deposition. Id. at 64-66. In fact, Betty Currie was subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers only days after the President's deposition. Moreover, in addition to influencing a prospective witness in the Jones suit, the President had another motivation for coaching Ms. Currie: She was a probable target of press inquiries about this controversy. In fact, a prominent reporter from Newsweek had already called Currie on January 15, 1998 and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky. See Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 120-121. The President had a motive to influence information Currie might give to the media--in addition to testimony she might give as a witness in Jones versus Clinton. The President knowingly made these statements to Ms. Currie in order to influence both her potential testimony and her possible responses to the media. Materiality ``Because the Grand Jury's function is investigative, materiality in that context is broadly construed.'' United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have consistently held that in a Grand Jury, ``a false declaration is `material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 1623 when it has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994). President Clinton's false statements to the Grand Jury regarding his January conversations with Betty Currie are material to the Grand Jury's investigation of obstruction of Justice. To determine whether the President obstructed justice in the Jones case, it was critical for the Grand Jury to ascertain whether President Clinton attempted to influence the testimony of Currie, a potential witness in that case. President Clinton's statements to Currie the day after his deposition strongly indicate that he was seeking to influence her testimony. The President's false statements about his motivation for making these statements to Currie had the ``natural effect or tendency'' to ``impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of obstruction of justice in the Jones case. The President's Defense In his trial brief, the President offers only a brief defense to this perjury allegation. First, the President argues that ``Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he was looking for information as a result of his deposition'' when he made these statements to Currie. See President's Trial Brief at 53. As discussed earlier, however, this is implausible. A person cannot accurately gather information by making false or misleading statements to another person. Second, in his brief, the President refers to Currie's Grand Jury testimony in which she testified that she felt no pressure to agree with the President when he made these questions and statements. See President's Trial Brief at 51-53. However, the fact that Ms. Currie testified that she did not feel pressured is completely irrelevant to whether the President committed perjury concerning these statements. President Clinton's state of mind--not Ms. Currie's--is at issue here because he is the one accused of perjury. In sum, the House Managers proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton (1) knowingly (2) lied about his motivation for making these deceitful statements to Betty Currie (3) concerning a material matter under investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under oath before a federal Grand Jury. B. The nature and extent of the physical relationship with Lewinsky Another example of perjury before the Grand Jury concerns President Clinton's testimony that he did not engage in ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky even under his alleged understanding of the definition used in the Jones case. Even under his purported interpretation of the term, however, Clinton admitted to the Grand Jury that if the person being deposed touched certain enumerated body parts of another person, then that would constitute ``sexual relations.'' See WJC 8/17/98 at 95- 96. When asked if he denied engaging in such specific conduct, Clinton answered ``[t]hat's correct.'' Id. Falsity President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified concerning the nature and extent of the sexual relationship. First, human nature and common sense strongly undermine President Clinton's testimony. It is undisputed that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual activity on at least ten occasions over the course of 16 months. President Clinton's testimony to the Grand Jury that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain areas with the intent to arouse is simply not believable given the nature and extent of their contact. In addition, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony directly contradicts the President. She testified in detail repeatedly before the grand jury about each of their sexual encounters. According to Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, she and President Clinton engaged in conduct that constituted ``sexual relations'' even under the President's purported understanding of the term during 10 encounters. It is important to note that Ms. Lewinsky's testimonty about the extent of their sexual conduct occurred before the President's Grand Jury testimony made these precise sexual details important. Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky's friends, family members, and medical therapists corroborated her account by testifying to the Grand Jury that Lewinsky made near-contemporaneous statements to them that President Clinton fondled her in a variety of ways during their encounters. Finally, the fact that President Clinton lied to the American people about this tawdry affair badly undermines his implausible testimony on this issue. Knowingly As mentioned earlier, in a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the prosecution must prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the false statement. Under this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that the defendant made the false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998), United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980). President Clinton knowingly made these false statements about the nature and extent of his sexual relationship. He did not make these statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' Instead, the President had a strong motive to lie about the extent of the sexual contact in order to avoid being accused of perjury in the Jones deposition. After Ms. Lewinsky's dress was discovered, President Clinton could no longer deny a sexual affair. However, because he repeatedly denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones deposition, the President was trapped. As mentioned earlier, the President was forced to admit that fondling Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways would constitute ``sexual relations'' even under his purported interpretation of the term. Consequently, President Clinton had to deny such fondling before the Grand Jury to prevent an admission that he committed perjury in his civil deposition, despite how implausible this denial is. In summary, President Clinton committed perjury before the Grand jury by insisting that his testimony in the Jones deposition on this key matter was true. Perhaps due to fear of being charged with perjury in the Jones deposition, President Clinton committed the more serious offense of perjury before a Grand Jury. Materiality As mentioned earlier, ``because the Grand Jury's function is investigative, materiality in that context is broadly construed.'' United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have consistently held that in a Grand Jury, ``a false declaration is `material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 1623 when it has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994). The President's false statements about the extent of his sexual conduct with Ms. Lewinsky are material to the Grand Jury's investigation of whether the President committed perjury in the Jones deposition. In an effort to determine whether President Clinton testified truthfully in his deposition, the Office of Independent Counsel questioned the President at length before the Grand Jury about the nature and extent of his sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's tortured definition of sexual relations makes these details material to whether he committed perjury in the Jones deposition. Simply put, if the President touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways, he is guilty of perjury in the Jones deposition. Obviously, President Clinton's false statements on this matter had the ``natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of perjury in the Jones deposition. The President's Defense In President Clinton's trial brief, the only rebuttal to his allegation of perjury is that ``[t]his claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial details concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship.'' See Clinton Trial Brief at 44. Even this one pithy sentence, however, is inaccurate. First, as the earlier discussion reveals, there is more evidence than an oath against an oath. Human nature and common sense badly undermine the President's testimony. In addition, Ms. Lewinsky testified in detail repeatedly before the Grand Jury about the extent of the sexual relationship, while the President reverted to his prepared statement 19 times to avoid answering specific sexual questions. Moreover, the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky's family, friends, and medical therapists provide additional evidence of the President's perjury. Finally, the fact that President Clinton lied to the entire nation about this sordid affair-- and only acknowledged the affair when confronted with evidence of Ms. Lewinsky's dress--devastates his credibility on this issue. In sum, the House Managers provide beyond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton (1) knowing (2) lied about the extent of his sexual activity with Ms. Lewinsky (3) concerning a material matter under investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under oath before a federal Grand Jury. Other Lies before the Grand Jury In addition, I have concluded that President Clinton lied in other instances before the Grand Jury. While these lies might not sustain a conviction for perjury in a court of law, they are profoundly troubling nonetheless. For instance, it strongly appears that President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified that he did not believe certain acts that he and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in were covered by any of the terms and definitions used in the Jones suite. The following definition of ``Sexual Relations'' was used at the Jones deposition: For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes contact with . . . [certain enumerated body parts] of any person with the intent to arouse . . .'' (Emphasis added.) Amazingly, President Clinton testified to the Grand Jury that he does not believe and did not believe at the Jones deposition that this definition includes certain acts which I will not specify. Without addressing these lurid details, Clinton interprets ``any person'' to mean ``any other person'' under the definition. There is no legal basis for him to interpret the definition in this manner. I do not believe that President Clinton can reasonably claim this interpretation. First, under the President's interpretation, one person can engage in sexual relations, while his or her partner in the same activity is not engaged in sexual relations. Obviously, this is an implausible and absurd conclusion. Second, no reasonable person would have understood the definition in the Jones suit not to encompass the particular activity that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in. It is important to remember that the underlying allegation in the Jones suit concerned the same particular acts involved in the Lewinsky affair. Why would the Jones' lawyers use a definition that did not include the very conduct alleged by their client? Given this context, the President's testimony that he did not believe the definition included certain conduct is not believable. Finally, the President had a clear motive to lie about his understanding of the definition of sexual relations. After Ms. Lewinsky's dress was discovered, the President could no longer deny his sexual affair. However, the President repeatedly denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones deposition. President Clinton's absurd interpretation of the definition of sexual relations allowed him to admit to a sexual relationship--which he had to do given the dress--without simultaneously admitting to perjury in the Jones deposition. Because perjury is such a difficult crime to prove, I have concluded that the President might not be convicted in a court of law for perjury concerning his testimony on this issue. I am convinced, however, that President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury about this matter. While this testimony might not generate a conviction in a court of law, it was clearly contrived and is profoundly troubling. IV. Article Two--Obstruction of Justice Let me now turn to the facts of the second article of impeachment alleging obstruction of justice. Article Two alleges that: In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding. In order to determine whether the President has engaged in the type of acts charged, it is important that the law be first addressed in order to guide us in understanding how the facts relate to the violations alleged. A. The Law of Obstruction of Justice: 1. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503: The Federal obstruction of justice statute punishes ``[w]hoever . . . corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.'' 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1503(a). Known as the ``omnibus clause,'' Sec. 1503(a) ``clearly forbids all corrupt endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice,'' United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989), which is defined as ``the performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.'' United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977). The statute has alternatively been interpreted as forbidding ``interferences with . . . judicial procedure'' and aiming ``to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'' United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 1984). ``There are three core elements that the government must establish to prove a violation of the omnibus clause of section 1503: (1) there must be a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant must have knowledge or notice of the pending proceeding; and (3) the defendant must have acted corruptly with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the proceeding in its due administration of justice.'' United States v. Williams, 874 F2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993) (adding the word ``influence'' to the terms ``obstruct or impede'' in the intent element). The purpose of the statute, according to the Supreme Court is not directed at the success of the corruptive effort, ``but at the `endeavor' to do so.'' United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921) (opining that the word ``endeavor'' was used instead of ``attempt'' in order to avoid the technical distinctions between attempts, which are punishable, and preparation for attempts, which are not). See also United States v. Aguilar 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (holding that while the endeavor must have the `natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice, the defendant's actions need not be successful, citing Russell). 2. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512. The statute criminalizing witness tampering prohibits, inter alia, the use or attempted use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct with the intent of influencing delaying, or preventing testimony in an official proceeding, causing a person to withhold testimony or documentary evidence, alter or destroy physical evidence, evade legal process, or be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been legally summoned. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b). ``To sustain its burden of proof for the crime of tampering with a witness . . . the Government must prove . . . that the [d]efendant knowingly, corruptly persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade . . . a witness; and second, that the [d]efendant . . . did so intending to influence the testimony of [that witness] at the [g]rand [j]ury proceeding.'' United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-453 (2d Cir. 1996). The witness tampering statute's prohibition of corruptly persuading someone with intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding,'' has been interpreted to mean exhorting a person to violate his legal duty to testify truthfully in court. United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that a simple request to testify falsely was outside the scope of Sec. 1512(b)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1279 (1997). As the Second Circuit explained: ``Section 1512(b) does not prohibit all persuasion but only that which is `corrupt.' The inclusion of the qualifying term `corrupt' means that the government must prove that the defendant's attempts to persuade were motivated by an improper purpose to . . . . A prohibition against corrupt acts `is clearly limited to . . . constitutionally unprotected and purportedly illicit activity.' United States v. Thompson 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Jeter, 775 F2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985)). Apart from corrupt persuasion with intent to influence a person's testimony, Sec. 1512(b) proscribes engaging in misleading conduct with intent to influence such testimony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b)(1). As one court described it, ``[t]he most obvious example of a section 1512 violation may be the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury. United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986). Some courts have interpreted conduct that was not misleading to the person at whom it was directed, even if it was intended to misled the government, as outside the scope of Sec. 1512. See e.g. United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237-238 (2d Cir. 1985). However, the Rodolitz court distinguished the facts in King, where there was insufficient evidence that the witness was actually misled, from the situation where the declarant makes false statements to a witness who is ignorant of their falsity. See Rodolitz, 786 F2d at 81-82 (``In giving the statutory language its fair meaning, the court must find that making false statements to convince another to lie falls squarely within the definition of `engaging in misleading conduct toward another person' under section 1512.''). The witness tampering statute explicitly states that ``an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(e)(1). However, courts have implied some state of mind element. E.g. United States v. Kelly, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (``It therefore follows that Sec. 1512 does not require explicit proof of [defendant's] knowledge . . . that such proceedings were pending or were about to be instituted. . . . The statute only requires that the jury be able reasonably to infer from the circumstances that [defendant], fearing that a grand jury proceeding had been or might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons with the intent to influcence their possible testimony in such a proceeding.'') B. The Facts Related to Obstruction of Justice. 1. Subparts (1) and (2) of Article II: In Subpart (1) of Article II, it is averred that: On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a federal civil action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading. Subpart (2) alleges that: On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that proceeding. Subparts (1) and (2) are flip sides of the same coin. In essence, the two subparts charge that the President's 2:30 a.m. phone call to Ms. Lewinsky on December 17, 1997, informing her of her presence on a witness list in the Jones case was designed to encourage her to provide a false affidavit in the case to avoid testifying, or failing that, that she give false testimony hiding the true nature of their relationship. What does the evidence show? It should be recalled that the presence of Ms. Lewinsky's name on the Jones witness list first came to the attention of the President no later than December 17, 1997. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84. He was certainly aware of the true nature of their relationship, and it can be inferred that he knew that knowledge of the existence of that relationship would be detrimental to his case. It is also known that a cover story had been developed earlier to hide the relationship from others that included the false representation that Ms. Lewinsky's visits to the oval office were for the purpose of bringing the President papers or to visit Ms. Currie. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84. Ms. Lewinsky testified that in the same 2:30 a.m. conversation in which he informed her of the presence of her name on the witness list, the President told her that she could always say she was bringing him papers or visiting Ms. Currie, consistent with their previous cover series. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1219. Ms. Lewinsky and the attorneys for the President have argued that since Ms. Lewinsky did in fact ``see'' Ms. Currie on those visits to the President and since she was ``carrying'' papers, that story was not untruthful and therefore could not have been designed to obstruct justice. However, that rationale defies logic and common sense. In the first place, the purpose of the visits was not to see Ms. Currie. Secondly, the papers she carried were just props, not to be handed over to the President, but to falsely characterized as papers for the President if questioned. Therefore, were she to testify in a deposition that the purpose of her trips to the Oval Office to visit the President were actually to deliver papers or visit Ms. Currie, those would be false representations. The creation of a cover story followed by actions consistent with that cover story do not make the story any more truthful. Therefore, the President's instruction to her to rely on the cover story is in fact an instruction to her to lie. Other evidence supports this conclusion, not the least of which is the affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in the case after those discussions with the President took place, an affidavit she herself later testified as being false. How else could she have characterized it? In that affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she ``never had a sexual relationship with the President.'' This was false. She swore that ``[t]he occasions I saw the President after I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996, were official receiptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were other people present on those occasions.'' This statement too was false. She also averred that ``I do not possess any information that could possibly be relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible evidence in this case.'' Once again, this statement was false, as the President was aware, since he knew of the gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. See WJC 8/17/98 at 32-35. The President repeatedly said that he thought that Ms. Lewinsky ``could,'' and he emphasizes the word ``could,'' have been able to draft a narrow truthful affidavit. See WJC 8/17/98 at 69, 116-17. The problem is that although she ``could'' have been able to draft such an affidavit, the end product was not a truthful affidavit. Thus the President's intentional failure to prevent his attorney from using that false affidavit at his deposition provides further evidence of his corrupt intention during the December 17, 1997, phone call to Ms. Lewinsky. Given these facts, the House has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the President endeavored to corruptly influence the affidavit and potential testimony of Ms. Lewinsky in his December 17, 1997, 2:30 a.m. call to her. 2. Subpart (3) of Article II: In Subpart (3), it is alleged that: On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against him. This allegation relates to the obstruction of justice by Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie in hiding gifts provided to Ms. Lewinsky by the President under the bed of Ms. Currie. The only question that needs to be answered here in whether the President participated in that effort. What does the evidence show? By December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the Jones case. In addition to demanding her appearance to testify, the subpoena also required that Ms. Lewinsky turn over any gifts given to her by the President. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1221. Under the pretense of meeting with Ms. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House on Sunday, December 28, 1997, to discuss her subpoena with the President. Now at the time of that visit, there is no indication that the President was aware that particular items had been subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers from Ms. Lewinsky. Without the benefit of that information, the President freely gave Ms. Lewinsky a number of additional gifts. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224. So when Ms. Lewinsky informed the President of that fact, one can infer that he must have been at the very least, surprised, and probably, somewhat troubled. When asked by Ms. Lewinsky at that meeting whether she should hide the gifts or give them to someone else like Ms. Currie for safekeeping, the President either failed to respond or said he needed to think about it. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she left the White House and later received a phone call from Ms. Currie stating that she understood Ms. Lewinsky had something for her, or, the President said you have something for me. Ms. Lewinsky immediately understood that statement by Ms. Currie to refer to the gifts from the President she had discussed with him earlier in the day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1225. She then proceeded to gather up all those gifts. However, according to Ms. Lewinsky, she unilaterally withheld some of those gifts from Ms. Currie which were of sentimental value to her. The President's first defense to this allegation is based upon a minor discrepancy in Ms. Lewinsky's testimony concerning the time that the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie. The argument is that if Ms. Lewinsky was mistaken by one and one half hours in her recollection of when the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie, then her recollection of who initiated the retrieval is also suspect. See Statement of Cheryl Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S826-27. This is a red herring. The timing itself is unimportant. What is important is the fact that the call came from Ms. Currie. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1225. Ms. Currie's cell phone records tend to support the notion that Ms. Lewinsky's memory is accurate as to who called whom about the gifts. After all, the only way that Ms. Currie would have known about the gifts and made the call is if the other party to those discussions, the President, apprised her of that conversation and asked her to pick up the gifts. The fall-back defense of the President is based upon the fact that he had given her more gifts that same day, the idea being that his giving other gifts to Ms. Lewinsky is inconsistent with a plan to hide those gifts. See Statement of Cheryl Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S827. This, however, is belied by the fact that the President provided her with those gifts before the issue of the gifts being subpoenaed came up in their conversation that day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224. It is reasonable to infer that the President's understanding of the gift pickup was unrestricted. He expected Ms. Lewinsky to give all the gifts to Ms. Currie for safekeeping, even the ones she had received that day. The fact that Ms. Lewinsky kept some of the gifts does not change the nature of the intended scheme. The evidence adduced as to Subpart (3) shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged or supported a scheme to conceal evidence in the Jones case. 3. Subpart (4) of Article II: Subpart (4) makes the accusation that: Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to him. It is uncontroverted that Vernon Jordan did not actively seek to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky until she was on the witness list in the Jones case. Once she was on the witness list, she engaged in a high level job search under the guidance of the President and reported his progress in that regard directly to the President. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong. Rec. S1231-36. Moreover, he knew at the time of his job search that Ms. Lewinsky was a potential witness in the Jones case and, according to Ms. Lewinsky, was apprised by her of the sexual nature of her relationship with the President. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 138-39. And of course, in that very same time frame, he procured for her an attorney to help her file a false affidavit freeing her from testifying in the case and to prepare that false affidavit in time for it to be used in the President's deposition in the Jones case. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong. Rec. S1240-41. One could speculate that the President's use of one of the most powerful attorneys in Washington, and a close friend of the President, to find a lowly Defense Department employee and former intern a lucrative and prestigious job by contacting some of the most powerful executives in the country was just an act of kindness unrelated to her pending testimony in the Jones case. One could conclude that the numerous calls made by Mr. Jordan to the President and Ms. Currie, the calls made by the President to Mr. Jordan, and the calls made by Mr. Carter to Mr. Jordan, calls which coincided with the effort to get Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and secure her a job, were simply coincidental. One could surmise that Mr. Jordan's call to Ronald Perelman after Ms. Lewinsky felt she had a bad interview, which call led to a second successful interview, was unrelated to her cooperation in signing the affidavit only a day earlier. One could believe that Mr. Jordan had a great interest in assisting Ms. Lewinsky to find a job prior to her name showing up on the witness list in the Jones case and only failed to do so because he had no time, but was somehow able to find and devote substantial time to that effort, coincidentally, after her name showed up on the witness list. One could undertake such speculation. But that would defy common sense and reason. The President became personally engaged in the effort to find Ms. Lewinsky a job only after her name appeared on the Jones witness list. He then used his powerful friend to find Ms. Lewinsky a job because he believed out of gratitude for his help in obtaining a job, she would continue to hide their relationship. He kept in constant direct contact with Mr. Jordan up until the time that the affidavit was completed and she had received and accepted a job offer from Revlon. Indeed, the President actually spoke to Mr. Jordan during a meeting between her and Mr. Jordan on December 19, 1997. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 131. Mr. Jordan immediately called the President to report his fears the moment he thought Ms. Lewinsky may have turned government witness when he learned Mr. Carter had been relieved of his representation by her. See VJ 6/9/98 GJ at 45- 46. One need only look at the contrary actions by the President once he believed Ms. Lewinsky may have decided to cooperate with the Independent Counsel investigation. Once he believed that she may have been cooperating with the Office of the Independent Counsel, he began to disparage her to aides like Sidney Blumenthal. See SB 2/3/99 at Cong. Rec. S1248. After that date, the President discussed the wisdom of destroying her credibility and reputation with Dick Morris. See DM 8/18/98 GJ at 35. Can anyone doubt that her favorable testimony was tied into the President's efforts to conceal his relationship with her and that the intensified job search was the President's endeavor to keep her from telling the truth? Put another way, does anyone believe that the President would have used Vernon Jordan to help get her a job after she agreed to tell the truth to the Jones attorneys or to the Independent Counsel? Of course not. It was not in the President's interest to reward her for the truth--she was only rewarded for her failure to tell the truth. Her reward for telling the truth was to be smeared by the President and his spin machine. The President's attorneys repeat the mantra that Ms. Lewinsky believes that she was not promised a job for her false testimony in the Jones case. But that really isn't the issue. The law requires an endeavor to corruptly influence her testimony. Regardless of how Ms. Lewinsky perceived or misperceived the reasons for the high level assistance she received, there was no such misconception on the part of the President and Mr. Jordan. The corrupt endeavor by the President was confirmed by two powerful and compelling words that cannot be parsed or stripped of meaning. Those two words summed up the month long effort to protect the President: ``Mission Accomplished.'' There can be no other meaning of those words in the context used by Mr. Jordan other than the completion of a crucial and time sensitive task by him on behalf of the President. The proof as to subpart (4) is sustained beyond a reasonable doubt that the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to him. 4. Subpart (5) of Article II: Subpart (5) alleges that: On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that judge. There is no question that during the deposition of the President by the Jones attorneys, the President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, made the following statement. . . . Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton . . . Mr. BENNETT made this statement in an effort to cut off any questioning of the President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. That statement was false, as was later admitted by Mr. Bennett, even given the contorted reading of the definition of sexual relations as purportedly understood by the President. It is equally clear that the President did not correct this assertion by his attorney. The President's primary defense to this allegation is that he wasn't paying attention to what was said by his attorney. This statement can not be believed. The videotape of that deposition clearly shows the eyes of the President shifting from person to person as each spoke or argued their perspective on the issue. As each spoke, the President focused on the speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that when the name Monica Lewinsky was brought up, the President was not keenly aware of the significance of that line of questioning. The President's primary defense to this allegation is that he wasn't paying attention to what was said by his attorney. This statement can not be believed. The videotape of that deposition clearly shows the eyes of the President shifting from person to person as each spoke or argued their perspective on the issue. As each spoke, the President focused on the speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that when the name Monica Lewinsky was brought up. the President was not keenly aware of the significance of that line of questioning. He knew the work that had been done to get her affidavit completed before the deposition. He understood the disclosure of that relationship could do irreparable damage to his case and to his Presidency. There is nothing to indicate he was anything less than completely aware of what was said and of his failure to correct that record to his detriment. I choose to believe my own eyes and common sense, not the implausible explanation put forward by the attorneys for the President. The secondary defense offered by the President, that Mr. Bennett's use of the word ``is'' precluded the necessity to reveal any sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky not occurring, essentially, in that room during the deposition, is not worthy of a detailed refutation or response. The evidence demonstrates that the President allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge, thus obstructing the administration of justice. 5. Subpart (6) of Article II: In Subpart (6), the House makes the contention that: On or about January 18, 1998, and January 20-21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness. This allegation relates to the statements made to Ms. Currie by the President in his unusual Sunday meeting with her after the Jones deposition, and in his repetition of those statements the following Tuesday or Wednesday after the Starr investigation had become public. The President has not contested the fact that the statements made to Ms. Currie were false and misleading. Nor has he provided any answer as to why the statements, if designed to help refresh his recollection, were false and had to be repeated to her again several days later. After being confronted with the subpoena issued to Ms. Currie by the Jones attorneys in the days after his deposition, and the revised witness list containing her name, the President's attorneys have now backed off the notion that no one could have thought Ms. Currie would be a witness at the time of these statements. Despite this, the President still asserts that those false and misleading statements were designed to refresh his recollection and that he personally did not believe that she would become a witness. Once again, this defense defies credulity. When these statements were made, the President was defying a court order not to discuss his testimony. See WJC 1/17/98 DT at 212-13. He knew it was essential to do so regardless of that order because he had blatantly inserted Ms. Currie into the case as a fact witness. He mentioned her name during his deposition no less than six times, on one occasion even stating that the Jones attorneys would have to ``ask Betty.'' See generally WJC 1/17/98 DT. Clearly, the Jones attorneys got the message; they added Ms. Currie to the witness list and subpoenaed her the following week. So did the President. Having ``brought'' her into the case, the President realized the absolute need to make sure her testimony would dovetail with his assertions that he had no improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. It is apparent that the Sunday meeting was designed to corruptly mislead Ms. Currie when she would be called as a witness in the Jones case. What was left unanswered by the President, but for which there can be but one answer, was why the President repeated the false statements to Ms. Currie on Tuesday or Wednesday. The answer lies in the record. By Tuesday, the president had learned that Judge Starr was investigating the case. See VJ 6/9/98 GJ at 55-74. He knew that the evidence in the Jones case would lead Judge Starr to Ms. Currie, just as surely as he knew it would lead the Jones attorneys to her. So he had to reinforce the false statements he had told Ms. Currie the previous Sunday because the stakes had just risen substantially. The President needed to be sure he was covered by Ms. Currie for both the Jones case and for the Independent Counsel investigation to come. Once again the evidence shows that the President related a false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness. 6. Subpart (7) of Article II: The House asserts in Subpart (7) that: On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. This subpart relates to the President's discussions with Erskine Bowles, John Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal concerning the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Now the President does not deny the testimony of Mr. Podesta where he related that the President said that he had no sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, including oral sex. Nor does he deny the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal that he characterized Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker who had threatened him, and whose seduction he had declined. The President also admits that he knew it was likely they would be grand jury witnesses when he made those statements to them. Their client having conceded the basic facts of this allegation, the President's attorneys first try to make the argument that the President could not have been intending to influence the grand jury since he did not tell his aides anything different than he had told any other person publicly. However, the evidence is unrefuted that his denials to his aides were fundamentally different from his public pronunciations in that they departed from even his tortured definition of sexual relations. Moreover, he created a false impression of Ms. Lewinsky in order to besmirch her character and credibility in a blatant attempt to both misguide the grand jurors, and it can be inferred by the fact such information was provided to his communications aide, to publicly disparage her character. The second defense offered is that the President's attempts to keep his aides our of the grand jury show he was not trying to corruptly influence that body. However, this argument loses force in light of the fact that only specious arguments were made to prevent their testimony. Knowing they would fail, they were arguably designed to serve his private interest in delaying the investigation and creating an impression of Judge Starr as overreaching and out of control. Moreover, the President had months to correct his misstatements to Mr. Blumenthal prior to his grand jury testimony, but failed to do so even when he knew he would be called before the grand jury to repeat the earlier lies told to him by the President. See SB 2/3/99 at Cong. Rec. S1249. In effect, the President killed two birds with one stone. His chimeric fight to prevent his aides from testifying was used effectively in a public relations campaign to impugn the Independent Counsel investigation. And when he lost the ``battle'' that he knew would inevitably fail, he was aware the false and slanderous testimony preordained to be given by his aides would be of assistance to him in misleading the grand jury. There is substantial proof as to Subpart (7) that the President made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. For the reasons I have just outlined, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of Article II. v. why removal? This impeachment trial is of momentous constitutional consequence. A removal of the President--a coequal branch of government--must not be taken lightly. But that--now that we have decided to end the trial by a final vote--does not negate the duty that each Senator has, as individual conscience dictates, to vote to acquit or convict based upon the evidence. Posterity demands that each of us justify the votes Senators render in the impeachment trial of the President. Future generations of Americans will look to what we do as precedents for impeachments. This is particularly true since our Nation has faced only one impeachment trial of a President--that of Andrew Johnson in 1868. But it is also true for judges and other federal officials as well. Let me thus explain in some detail why I shall vote for conviction. The Constitution vests great discretion in the Senate in determining whether to remove an impeached official. The Framers intentionally followed the English model where the House of Commons possessed the power to impeach or indict officials and the House of Lords the authority to try the impeached official. As such, the House of Representatives was delegated the authority to impeach and the Senate the power to try, convict, and remove. The Senate was chosen as the repository of this awesome power because it was considered the more mature chamber of Congress. Serving six year terms instead of the two years for the House, the Senate was seen as a bulwark against the shifting tides of public opinion. The age qualification differences--30 for the Senate and 25 for the House-- demonstrates that maturity in the Senate would dominate over youthful passion. And most important, while the House was prone to passionate factional rifts, because Representatives are elected from small sometimes single-issue districts, Senators are elected state-wide where, it was hoped, factions would counteract factions. Thus, the Senate was designed to be more attuned to the public interest than to the special interest. Consequently, when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, it does not have to rubber-stamp the House's view as to what is an impeachable offense. As recognized by the Supreme Court in the Nixon case, the Senate was vested by the Framers with the sole power to try impeachments. The Senate is thus vested with independent judgment as to what process to employ in the trial. It also follows that the Senate was granted the discretion to determine whether the factual allegations made by the House are true and whether such findings by the Senate rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors. Furthermore, the Senate, as the Upper Chamber insulated against popular passions and the factions of special interests, could make a subjective determination of the public good in defining high crimes and misdemeanors and in removing an official. In the words of my esteemed colleague, Robert Byrd, the answer of whether a person is fit to remain in office requires both detached objectivity and subjective judgment rising above temporary popular passions of whether continuation in office ``brings the political (or judicial) system into disrepute and undermines the people's trust and confidence in government.'' Supportive of this discretionary authority to remove officials--an authority that must be divorced from the fleeting and flaming emotions of the times--is the constitutional supermajority safeguard of a \2/3\ vote of the Senate needed to remove officials. This requirement is a further guarantee against the tide of popular passion and tilts the impeachment process towards acquittal. Accordingly, a Senator in impeachment trials must consider two factors: (1) whether the allegations are true; and (2) whether the facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors-- impeachable offenses. In determining the second prong--whether the facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors--the subjective intent of Senators of what is in the public interest is a factor to consider. I have already discussed the facts and the standard for impeachable offenses. Now I will discuss whether the public interest--in other words what is best for the country--requires that the acts committed by President Clinton rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors requiring his removal. I believe that it has. Some of my colleagues, particularly those on the other side of the aisle, contend that it is not in the public interest to remove President Clinton, because the economy is doing well, or because of his foreign policy successes, or because he is extremely popular in the polls. But these factors--no matter how important--do not justify ignoring the constitutional mandate of removal upon proving that impeachable acts were committed. Polls should not be a factor in this trial. Our system of government is not a pollocracy. It is a representative republic where the people, as a constitutional matter, speak only through elections of their representatives. America is thus a constitutional republic, and will remain so ``if''--in the words of Benjamin Franklin--``you can keep it.'' The only way to ``keep it'' is to respect the processes established by the Constitution itself. Simply put, the Constitution mandates the conviction and removal of civil officers, including the President, upon proving ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I believe that the House Managers have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton has committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice. I believe that Senators should come to the same subjective determination, as I have, that these acts of perjury and obstruction of justice so erodes our civil and criminal justice system as to conclude that the public good is served by removal. A President of the United States is not simply a political leader. A President is a head of state and a role model for Americans, particularly our children. What kind of message will we send to our posterity if President Clinton's conduct is not considered worthy of removal? What amount of cynicism and disrespect for our governmental institutions will we engender if we impose one set of rules for the common man--imprisonment for acts of perjury and obstruction of justice--and another for the President of the United States--who receives a pass from removal because he is powerful or has done a ``good job'' in some eyes? Our children are extremely vulnerable to the growing cynicism surrounding this trial. We have all heard stories that some children justify their deceits by claiming that the President of the United States lied as well. Many wise philosophers have exclaimed that a republic can survive only if its citizens are moral. I am afraid that our children may not learn that lesson. Not to remove here is to diminish the rule of law. As Manager Rogan warned in his closing argument, ``[u]p until now, the idea that no person is above the law has been unquestioned. And yet this standard is not our inheritance automatically. Each generation of Americans ultimately has to make the choice for themselves. Once again, it is time for choosing. How will we respond?'' We should respond by safeguarding the rule of law by voting to remove the President. Whether President Clinton has done a ``good job'' is a matter of partisan debate. In fact, adopting a ``god job'' exception--a term that is so flexible and vague as to be meaningless as a constitutional standard--merely exasperates the partisan tensions ever present in impeachment trials. The same analysis applies for the ``good economy means no removal'' theory. It is intuitive that economic growth can never justify crime or acts rising to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors warranting removal. If President Clinton is removed, our economy will not suffer. The world will still spin on its axis. Our Constitution provides for orderly succession and stable government. Removal will not overturn an election, as some have argued. The constitutional impeachment procedures were designed simply to remove unqualified or corrupt officials. Vice President Gore, pursuant to the Constitution, will become President and life will go on. Let me emphasize that by requiring removal upon proving the commission of impeachable offenses, the Framers believed that it is in the public good to remove the official. President Clinton is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and his poll numbers, no matter how lofty, cannot insulate him from the dictates of the Constitution. The President believes that a rule of polls should govern the Senate's decision. But as Manager Rogan correctly observed, ``the personal popularity of any President pales when weighed against the fundamental concept that forever distinguishes us from every nation on the planet. No person is above the law. There is no escaping the Senate's duty enshrined in the impeachment oath that we do ``impartial justice'' and remove the President if we believe that his actions amounted to high crimes and misdemeanors. vi. conclusion I do not take pleasure or gain any sense of gratification for the decision I must make today. For literally months, night and day, I have anguished over the serious accusations against President Clinton and what they mean for our country, our society, and our children. I know none of us enjoys sitting in judgment of the President, our fellow human-being, but that is our job and we cannot ignore our responsibility. I believe most of us will do a sincere job of trying to fulfill our oath to do impartial justice. I have diligently strived to extend my deepest respect to the President--indeed, to the Presidency--throughout this process. I wanted to be able to support President Clinton. I believe that I have been more than fair. I have tried not to rush to judgment. All of my life I've been taught to forgive and forget. I've always tried to live up to that belief. As a leader in my church, I have dealt with a great number of human frailties, people with a wide variety of problems, and I've always believed that good people can repent of their sins and be forgiven. Indeed, to the dismay of some, I had expressed a hope and a desire early on in this constitutional drama that the President would acknowledge his untruthful statements. He chose to do otherwise and perpetuated his untruthfulness. Although some believe this is solely a private matter, I feel this is really about the President's fidelity to the oath of office and the rule of law. I have always been prepared to vote my conscience. Indeed, my concerns regarding the bad precedent a likely acquittal would set have been somewhat calmed by something the great constitutional scholar, Joseph Story, once wrote about acquittal in impeachment cases. Mr. Story noted that in cases in which two-thirds of the Senate is not satisfied that a conviction is warranted, ``it would be far more consonant to the notions of justice in a republic, that a guilty person should escape than that an innocent person should become the victim of injustice from popular odium * * * '' Nonetheless, I am reminded of a quote by President Theodore Roosevelt, a statement that applies to the matter before the Senate: Honesty is not so much a credit as an absolute prerequisite to efficient service to the public. Unless a man is honest, we have no right to keep him in public life; it matters not how brilliant his capacity * * *. `Liar' is just as ugly a word as `thief,' because it implies the presence of just as ugly a sin in one case as in the other. If a man lies under oath or procures the lie of another under oath, if he perjures himself or suborns perjury, he is guilty under the statute law. Under the higher law, under the great law of morality and righteousness, he is precisely as guilty if, instead of lying in a court, he lies in a newspaper or on the stump; and in all probability the evil effects of his conduct are infinitely more widespread and more pernicious. President Theodore Roosevelt's words cannot be ignored--nor can the Constitution. After weighing all of the evidence, listening to witnesses, and asking questions, I have concluded that President Clinton's actions warrant removal from office. Committing crimes of moral turpitude such as perjury and obstruction of justice go to the heart of qualification for public office. These offenses were committed by the chief executive of our country, the individual who swore to faithfully execute the laws of the United States. This great nation can tolerate a President who makes mistakes. But it cannot tolerate one who makes a mistake and then breaks the law to cover it up. Any other citizen would be prosecuted for these crimes. But, President Clinton did more than just break the law. He broke his oath of office and broke faith with the American people. Americans should be able to rely on him to honor those values that have built and sustained our country, the values we try to teach our children-- honesty, integrity, being forthright. For 13 miserable months, we have struggled with the question of what to do about President Clinton's actions. The struggle has divided the nation. To those of us who have ourselves taken an oath to uphold the Constitution--which represents the rule of law and not of men--it should not matter how brilliant or popular we feel the President is. The Constitution is why we goven based on the principle of equality and not emotion. The Constitution is what guides us as a nation of laws and not personalities. The Constitution is what enables us to live in freedom. I will vote for conviction on both articles of impeachment--not because I want to--but because I must. Upholding our Constitution--a sacred document that Americans have fought and died for--is more important than any one person, including the President of the United States. When all is said and done, I must fulfill my oath and do my duty. I will vote ``Guilty'' on both Article One and Article Two.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, even as the Senate has been weighing historic matters, the important work of the Judiciary Committee has gone forward as well. I am pleased to report that the Judiciary Committee is working to develop an agenda that will continue the Senate's commitment to the American people to make our streets safe from crime, to ensure that the benefits of this great technological and communications age reach all our people unencumbered by artificial legal barriers, and to ensure that we preserve and protect the rule of law. I will have more to say in the coming days about this agenda. Today, however, I would like to focus my comments on what I believe are highly irresponsible cuts to administration of justice programs in the President's budget proposal. This year, criminal justice issues should and will once again require the attention of the Senate. Many of our communities are not sharing equally in the decline in crime rates. For instance, according to FBI data, while the rate of violent crimes decreased nationally by four percent in 1997, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports demonstrate that in the Mountain West, the decline was only 2.4 percent, and my state of Utah posted a slight increase. Similarly, property crimes decreased nationally 3.1 percent, but only decreased one-half of one percent in the Mountain West. Again, my state of Utah actually had an increase in property crime. Compared to rates in the Northeast, the violent crime rate is 46.4 percent higher in the West and 52.1 percent higher in the South. And it is not just crime rates that need further improvement. The youth drug epidemic continues to plague us. According to the National Institute of Drug Abuse's Monitoring the Future surveys, drug use among our youth has grown substantially, and recent marginal improvement cannot hide the fact that more of our young people than ever are ensnared by drugs. From 1991 to 1998, the lifetime use of marijuana-- the gateway to harder drugs--has increased among school-age youth. The number of 8th graders reporting to have ever used marijuana has increased by 55 percent from 1991 to 1998, and the number of 8th graders who have used marijuana within the past year has increased by 173 percent in that same time. Not surprisingly, then, use of harder drugs has also increased. The number of 8th graders who have used cocaine within the past year has increased by 181 percent from 1991 to 1998, and the number these students who have used heroin within the past year has increased by 86 percent in the same time period. And significantly, 1997 to 1998, lifetime heroin use by 8th and 10th graders has increased by 0.2 percent, meaning that the use of this deadly drug is still on the rise among our youth. Because we have so far to go in our fight against crime and drugs, I am particularly disturbed by the President's proposed budget for the Department of Justice. The Clinton budget provides only a marginal 1.6 percent increase in DOJ funding for FY 2000. But even this slight increase pales compared to the massive cuts President Clinton is proposing in assistance to state and local law enforcement. Let me alert my colleagues to what the President is proposing. Undisclosed by the Administration's spin machine and most media reports, President Clinton is proposing more than $1.5 billion in cuts to state and local crime fighting efforts. Among the programs on the President's chopping block is the entire Violent Offender and Truth in Sentencing Incentive Grant program. This program has, by any measure, been a tremendous success, providing critical seed money to states for bricks and mortar prison construction and thus making our streets safer. Incarceration deters crime. Dramatic and historic reductions in sentence lengths and the expectation of punishment from the 1950s onward fueled steep increases in crime in the Sixties, Seventies, and Eighties. Only after these incarceration trends began to be reversed in this decade, did crime rates start to fall also. The Violent Offender and Truth in Sentencing Incentive Grant program has been an important component of this effort. In response to federal assistance, states have changed their sentencing laws. As the President's own Justice Department reported just last month, because of this program, 70 percent of prison admissions in 1997 were in states requiring criminals to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. The average time served by violent criminals has increased 12.2 percent since 1993. With such success, why would the President want to eliminate this program? And he doesn't stop there. Also eliminated in the President's budget is the highly successful Local Law Enforcement Block Grant program, which since 1995 has provided more than $2 billion in funding for equipment and technology directly to state and local law enforcement. The President wants to cut 20 percent from the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act, which he signed into law just last year, to provide vests to protect officers whose departments otherwise could not afford this life-saving equipment. The President wants to cut $50 million from the successful and popular Byrne Grant program, which provides funding for numerous state crime-fighting initiatives, and he proposes funding changes that put this program at further risk in future budgets. The President wants to cut by $85 million funding that reimburses states for the costs of incarcerating criminal aliens. He wants to cut $4 million from the Violence Against Women program, and $12.5 million from COPS grants targeting violence against women. And the Clinton budget slashes the entire juvenile accountability block grant, which over the past two years has provided $500 million for states and local government to address the single most ominous crime threat we face--serious and violent juvenile crime. Mr. President, the recent gains of state and local law enforcement in the fight against violent crime are fragile, and have been based largely on the Congress's endless push to place the interests of the law abiding over the establishment of new social spending programs. Time and again, Congress has had to remind President Clinton that government's first domestic responsibility is to keep our streets and communities free from crime. From the earliest days of the Clinton Administration, the President proposed severe cuts in law enforcement. For example, in March 1993, the President took the unprecedented step of firing every incumbent United States Attorney, a move the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts later said contributed to significant declines in federal prosecutions. In 1994, the President proposed cutting 1,523 Department of Justice law enforcement positions, including 847 in the FBI, 355 in the DEA, and 143 in U.S. Attorney's offices. Congress said no. In 1996, 1997, and 1998, the President has proposed cuts to state and local law enforcement assistance. Congress has said no. And ever since 1995, the President has wanted to use badly needed prison construction grants intended for bricks and mortar to fund drug treatment and other social programs not shown to have the same crime deterrent effect. Congress has said no. Now the President wants to cut the program entirely, and make further cuts in assistance to state and local law enforcement. Let me summarize these cuts: $50 million in Byrne grants for state and local law enforcement--Cut. $523 million in Local Law Enforcement Block Grants--Cut. $645 million in Truth in Sentencing Grants--Cut. $85 million for criminal alien incarceration--Cut. $250 million for juvenile crime and accountability grants--Cut. $4 million in Violence Against Women Grants--Cut. $12.5 million in COPS grants targeting domestic violence--Cut. Even the President's own COPS program--$125 million Cut. And what does the President want to fund? $200 million for a program to turn prosecutors into social workers, who ``focus on the offender, rather than the specific offense,'' and provide punishments such as recreational programs for criminals up to age 22 who commit violent offenses, including weapons offenses, drug distribution, hate crimes, and civil rights violations. It appears that Congress will have to say no again, and once again remind President Clinton that our government's first domestic duty is to protect the people from crime and violence. I will have more to say in the coming days about the President's budget and the Judiciary Committee's agenda, but suffice it to say, however, that I find President Clinton's budget for Administration of Justice spending is in need of significant attention. I intend to see that this budget and administration of justice programs get that attention. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I would like to advise my colleagues that a priority of the Committee this year will be the reauthorization of the Department of Justice. Included in this will be efforts to address expiring authorizations from the 1994 crime law, a number of which have been vital to assisting state and local government in reducing crime. I hope and expect that we will consider, on a bipartisan basis, the important funding and policy questions inherent in this effort, so to ensure that the Department can continue into the next century its important mission of upholding the rule of law. We will hold a series of hearings, both in the newly established Criminal Justice Oversight Subcommittee and at Full Committee, with the goal being to ensure that the Department of Justice is making the most of the precious law enforcement dollars appropriated and that essential law enforcement priorities are being met for the American people. Mr. President, I appreciate my colleagues' attention. I look forward to working with them on these important matters. I thank the Chair, and yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to introduce S. 324, the ``Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 1999''--the DATA Act. The goal in this bill is simple but it is important: S. 324 attempts to help make drug treatment more available and more effective. In developing this legislation I have worked closely with Representative Thomas Bliley of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce who plans to introduce shortly the House counterpart of this bill. I am very pleased to report that in sponsoring this bi-partisan bill I am joined by two colleagues from across the aisle--Senator Levin from Michigan and Senator Moynihan from New York. Senators Levin and Moynihan and I have long shared an interest in speeding the development of anti-addiction medications. One of the most troublesome problems that our Nation faces today is drug abuse. The spectrum of deleterious by-products of drug abuse include rampant and often violent crime, breakdown in family life and other fundamental social structures, and the inability of addicted individuals to reach their full potential as contributing members of American society. For example, a 1997 report by the Utah State Division of Substance Abuse, ``Substance Abuse and Need for Treatment Among Juvenile Arrestees in Utah'' cites literature reporting that heroin- using offenders committed 15 times more robberies, 20 times more burglaries, and 10 times more thefts than offenders who do not use drugs. In my own state of Utah--I am sorry to report--a 1997 survey by the State Division of Substance Abuse reported that 9.6% of Utahns--one in ten of our citizens--used illicit drugs in the past month. That is simply too high. Unfortunately, no state or city in our great Nation is immune from the dangers of illicit drugs. I want the children of Utah to grow up drug free so that they may realize their enormous potential. And I want to help my neighbors in Salt Lake and fellow citizens across Utah and throughout the country who are addicted to break the grip of this deadly epidemic. The wide variety of negative behaviors associated with drug abuse require policymakers to employ a wide variety of techniques to cut down both the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. We must do all we can do to stop the criminal behavior involved in supplying the contraband products as well as taking steps to stop all Americans from starting or continuing to use drugs. This legislation I am introducing today focuses on increasing the availability and effectiveness of drug treatment. The purpose of the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 1999 is to allow qualified physicians, as determined by experts at the Department of Health and Human Services, to prescribe schedule IV and V anti-addiction medications in physicians' offices without an additional Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration if certain conditions are met. These conditions include certification by participating physicians that: they are licensed under state law and have the training and experience to treat opium addicts; they have the capacity to refer patients to counseling and other ancillary services; and they will not treat more than 20 in an office setting unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services adjusts this number. The DATA provisions allow the Secretary, as appropriate, to add to these conditions and allow the Attorney General to terminate a physician's DEA registration if these conditions are violated. This program will continue after three years only if the Secretary and Attorney General determine that this new type of decentralized treatment should not continue based on a number of determinations. These determinations include whether the availability of drug treatment has significantly increased without adverse consequences to the public health and the extent to which covered drugs have been diverted or dispensed in violation of the law such as exceeding the initial 20- patient per doctor limitation. This bill would allow the Secretary and Attorney General to discontinue the program earlier than three years if, upon consideration of the specified factors, they determine that early termination is advisable. Nothing in the waiver policy undertaken in the new bill is intended to change the rules pertaining to methadone clinics or other facilities or practitioners that conduct drug treatment services under the dual registration system imposed by current law. In drafting the waiver provisions of the bill, the co-sponsors have consulted with the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse. As well, this initiative is consistent with the recent announcement of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, of the Administration's intent to work to decentralize methadone treatment. In 1995, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences issued a report, ``Development of Medications for Opiate and Cocaine Addictions: Issues for the Government and Private Sector.'' The study called for ``(d)eveloping flexible, alternative means of controlling the dispensing of anti-addiction narcotic medications that would avoid the `methadone model' of individually approved treatment centers.'' The Drug Addiction Treatment Act--DATA--is exactly the kind of policy initiative that experts have called for in America's multifaceted response to the drug abuse epidemic. I recognize that the DATA legislation is just one mechanism to attack this problem and I plan to work with my colleagues to devise additional strategies to reduce both the supply and demand for drugs. I urge all my colleagues to support S. 324 because it promises to get more patients into treatment and back on the road to honest, productive lives. I ask unanimous consent that the text of S. 324 be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chief Justice: Does the majority leader's resolution, does that also keep open the right of Senators to file----

Mr. HATCH. Does the majority leader's resolution allow for the filing and consideration of motions that may not be mentioned in the resolution itself?

Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to ask one question.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to introduce S. 324, the ``Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 1999''--the DATA Act. The goal in this bill is simple but it is important: S. 324 attempts to help make drug treatment more available and more effective. In developing this legislation I have worked closely with Representative Thomas Bliley of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce who plans to introduce shortly the House counterpart of this bill. I am very pleased to report that in sponsoring this bi-partisan bill I am joined by two colleagues from across the aisle--Senator Levin from Michigan and Senator Moynihan from New York. Senators Levin and Moynihan and I have long shared an interest in speeding the development of anti-addiction medications. One of the most troublesome problems that our Nation faces today is drug abuse. The spectrum of deleterious by-products of drug abuse include rampant and often violent crime, breakdown in family life and other fundamental social structures, and the inability of addicted individuals to reach their full potential as contributing members of American society. For example, a 1997 report by the Utah State Division of Substance Abuse, ``Substance Abuse and Need for Treatment Among Juvenile Arrestees in Utah'' cites literature reporting that heroin- using offenders committed 15 times more robberies, 20 times more burglaries, and 10 times more thefts than offenders who do not use drugs. In my own state of Utah--I am sorry to report--a 1997 survey by the State Division of Substance Abuse reported that 9.6% of Utahns--one in ten of our citizens--used illicit drugs in the past month. That is simply too high. Unfortunately, no state or city in our great Nation is immune from the dangers of illicit drugs. I want the children of Utah to grow up drug free so that they may realize their enormous potential. And I want to help my neighbors in Salt Lake and fellow citizens across Utah and throughout the country who are addicted to break the grip of this deadly epidemic. The wide variety of negative behaviors associated with drug abuse require policymakers to employ a wide variety of techniques to cut down both the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. We must do all we can do to stop the criminal behavior involved in supplying the contraband products as well as taking steps to stop all Americans from starting or continuing to use drugs. This legislation I am introducing today focuses on increasing the availability and effectiveness of drug treatment. The purpose of the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 1999 is to allow qualified physicians, as determined by experts at the Department of Health and Human Services, to prescribe schedule IV and V anti-addiction medications in physicians' offices without an additional Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration if certain conditions are met. These conditions include certification by participating physicians that: they are licensed under state law and have the training and experience to treat opium addicts; they have the capacity to refer patients to counseling and other ancillary services; and they will not treat more than 20 in an office setting unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services adjusts this number. The DATA provisions allow the Secretary, as appropriate, to add to these conditions and allow the Attorney General to terminate a physician's DEA registration if these conditions are violated. This program will continue after three years only if the Secretary and Attorney General determine that this new type of decentralized treatment should not continue based on a number of determinations. These determinations include whether the availability of drug treatment has significantly increased without adverse consequences to the public health and the extent to which covered drugs have been diverted or dispensed in violation of the law such as exceeding the initial 20- patient per doctor limitation. This bill would allow the Secretary and Attorney General to discontinue the program earlier than three years if, upon consideration of the specified factors, they determine that early termination is advisable. Nothing in the waiver policy undertaken in the new bill is intended to change the rules pertaining to methadone clinics or other facilities or practitioners that conduct drug treatment services under the dual registration system imposed by current law. In drafting the waiver provisions of the bill, the co-sponsors have consulted with the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse. As well, this initiative is consistent with the recent announcement of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, of the Administration's intent to work to decentralize methadone treatment. In 1995, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences issued a report, ``Development of Medications for Opiate and Cocaine Addictions: Issues for the Government and Private Sector.'' The study called for ``(d)eveloping flexible, alternative means of controlling the dispensing of anti-addiction narcotic medications that would avoid the `methadone model' of individually approved treatment centers.'' The Drug Addiction Treatment Act--DATA--is exactly the kind of policy initiative that experts have called for in America's multifaceted response to the drug abuse epidemic. I recognize that the DATA legislation is just one mechanism to attack this problem and I plan to work with my colleagues to devise additional strategies to reduce both the supply and demand for drugs. I urge all my colleagues to support S. 324 because it promises to get more patients into treatment and back on the road to honest, productive lives. I ask unanimous consent that the text of S. 324 be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am proud today to introduce the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999. I am pleased to be joined by Senator Sessions, the distinguished chairman of the Youth Violence Subcommittee, as well as Senator DeWine. There are few issues that will come before the Senate this year that touch the lives of more of our fellow Americans than our national response to juvenile crime. Crime and delinquency among juveniles is a problem that troubles us in our neighborhoods, schools and parks. It is the subject across the dinner table, and in those late night, worried conversations all parents have had at one time or another. The subject is familiar--how can we prevent our children from falling victim-- either to crime committed by another juvenile, or to the lure of drugs, crime, and gangs. Their concerns should be our concerns. The sad reality is that we can no longer sit silently by as children kill children, as teenagers commit truly heinous offenses, as our juvenile drug abuse rate continues to climb. In 1997, juveniles accounted for nearly one fifth-- 18.7 percent--of all criminal arrests in the United States. Persons under 18 committed 13.5 percent of all murders, over 17 percent of all rapes, nearly 30 percent of all robberies, and 50 percent of all arsons. In 1997, 183 juveniles under 15 were arrested for murder. Juveniles under 15 were responsible for 6.5 percent of all rapes, 14 percent of all burglaries, and one third of all arsons. And, unbelievably, juveniles under 15--who are not old enough to legally drive in any state--in 1997 were responsible for 10.3 percent of all auto thefts. To put this in some context, consider this: in 1997, youngsters age 15 to 19, who are only 7 percent of the population, committed 22.2 percent of all crimes, 21.4 percent of violent crimes, and 32 percent of property crimes. And although there are endless statistics on our growing juvenile crime problem, one particularly sobering fact is that, between 1985 and 1993, the number of murder cases involving 15-year olds increased 207 percent. We have kids involved in murder before they can even drive. Even my state of Utah has not been immune from these trends. Indeed, a 1997 study by Brigham Young University Professor Richard Johnson found that Utah's juvenile arrest rate is the highest in the nation. Additionally, as an indication of the increasingly serious nature of juvenile offenses in Utah, between 1990 and 1996 the number of juveniles sentenced to youth corrections increased 142 percent, and the number of juveniles requiring detention in a secure facility more than doubled. And in 1995, the average Utah juvenile offender had accumulated an astonishing average of 23 misdemeanors, 8 felony convictions, and 2.4 status offense convictions before being sentenced to a secure youth facility. In short, our juvenile crime problem has taken a new and sinister direction. But cold statistics alone cannot tell the whole story. Crime has real effects on the lives of real people. Last fall, I read an article in the Richmond Times-Dispatch by my good friend, crime novelist Patricia Cornwell. It is one of the finest pieces I have read on the effects of and solutions to our juvenile crime problem. Let me share with my colleagues some of what Ms. Cornwell, who has spent the better part of her adult life studying and observing crime and its effects, has to say. She says ``when a person is touched by violence, the fabric of civility is forever rent, or ripped, or breached . . .'' This is a graphic but accurate description. Countless lives can be ruined by a single violent crime. There is, of course, the victim, who may be dead, or scarred for life. There are the family and friends of the victim, who are traumatized as well, and who must live with the loss of a loved one. Society itself is harmed, when each of us is a little more frightened to walk on our streets at night, to use an ATM, or to jog or bike in our parks. And, yes, there is the offender who has chosen to throw his or her life away. Particularly when the offender is a juvenile, family, friends, and society are made poorer for the waste of potential in every human being. One crime, but permanent effects when ``the fabric of civility is rent.'' This is the reality that has driven me to work for the last three years to address this issue. In this effort, I have been joined by a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which last Congress reported comprehensive legislation on a bipartisan, two to one vote. Indeed, among members of the Youth Violence Subcommittee, the vote was seven to two in favor of the bill. The Judiciary Committee's legislation last Congress would have fundamentally reformed the role played by the federal government in addressing juvenile crime in our Nation. It was supported by law enforcement organizations such as the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, and the National Troopers Coalition, as well as the support of juvenile justice practitioners such as the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and victim's groups including the National Victims Center and the National Organization for Victims Assistance. The bill we introduce today builds on those efforts. Our reform proposal includes the best of what we know works. It combines tough measures to protect the public from the worst juvenile criminals, smart measures to provide intervention and correction at the earliest acts of delinquency, and compassionate measures to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and to supplement and enhance extensive existing prevention programs to keep juveniles out of the cycle of crime, violence, drugs, and gangs. Mr. President, let me spell out in great detail the provisions of this bill, and how it will help reform the juvenile justice system that is failing the victims of juvenile crime, failing too many of our young people, and ultimately, failing to protect the public. First, this bill reforms and streamlines the federal juvenile code, to responsibly address the handful of cases each year involving juveniles who commit crimes under federal jurisdiction. Our bill sets a uniform age of 14 for the permissive transfer of juvenile defendants to adult court, permits prosecutors and the Attorney General to make the decision whether to charge a juvenile offender as an adult, and permits in certain circumstances juveniles charged as an adult to petition the court to be returned to juvenile status. It also provides that when prosecuted as adults, juveniles in Federal criminal cases will be subject to the same procedures and penalties as adults, except for the application of mandatory minimums in most cases. Of course, the death penalty would not be available as punishment for any offense committed before the juvenile was 18. The bill similarly provides that juveniles tried as adults and sentenced to prison must serve their entire sentences, and may not be released on the basis of attaining their majority, and applies to juveniles convicted as adults the same provisions of victim restitution, including mandatory restitution, that apply to adults. Finally, in reforming the federal system, I believe that we must lead by example. So our bill provides that the federal criminal records of juveniles tried as adults, and the federal delinquency records of juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain serious offenses such as murder, rape, armed robbery, and sexual abuse or assault, will be treated for all purposes in the same manner as the records of adults for the same offenses. Other federal felony juvenile criminal or delinquency records would be treated the same as adult records for criminal justice or national security background check purposes. The bill also permits juvenile federal felony criminal and delinquency records to be provided to schools and colleges under rules issued by the Attorney General, provided that recipients of the records are held to privacy standards and that the records not be used to determine admission. Let me assure any who may be concerned that it is not our intent in reforming the federal juvenile code to federalize juvenile crime-- indeed, no conduct that is not a federal crime now will be if this reform is enacted. I do not intend or expect a substantial increase in the number of juvenile cases adjudicated or prosecuted in federal court. It is our intent, rather, to ensure that when there is a federal crime warranting the federal prosecution of a juvenile, the federal government assumes its responsibility to deal with it, rather than saddling the states with that burden. Second, at the heart of this bill is an historic reform and reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the most comprehensive review of that legislation in 25 years. The States for several years have been far ahead of the Federal Government in implementing innovative reforms of their juvenile justice systems. For example, between 1992 and 1996, of the 50 States and the District of Columbia, 48 made substantive changes to their juvenile justice systems. Among the trends in State law changes are the removal of more serious and violent offenders from the juvenile justice system, in favor of criminal court prosecution; new and innovative disposition/ sentencing options for juveniles; and the revision, in favor of openness, of traditional confidentiality provisions relating to juvenile proceedings and records. While the States have been making fundamental changes in their approaches to juvenile justice, however, the Federal Government has made no significant change to its approach and has done little to encourage State and local reform. Thus, the juvenile justice terrain has shifted beneath the Federal Government, leaving its programs and policies out of step and largely irrelevant to the needs of State and local governments. This bill corrects this imbalance between State and Federal juvenile justice policy, and will help ensure that federal programs support the needs of State and local governments. First, our bill reforms and strengthens the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the Department of Justice. The effectiveness of the OJJDP will be enhanced by requiring its Administrator to present to Congress annual plans, with measurable goals, to control and prevent youth crime, coordinate all Federal programs relating to controlling and preventing youth crime, and disseminate to States and local governments data on the prevention, correction and control of juvenile crime and delinquency, and report on successful programs and methods. And, most important to state and local governments, in the future, OJJDP will serve as a single point of contact for States, localities, and private entities to apply for and coordinate all federal assistance and programs related to juvenile crime control and delinquency prevention. This one-stop-shopping for federal programs and assistance will help state and local governments focus on the problem, instead of on how to navigate the federal bureaucracy. Second, our reform bill consolidates numerous JJDPA programs, including Part C Special Emphasis grants, State challenge grants, boot camps, and JJDPA Title V incentive grants, under an enhanced $200 million per year prevention challenge block grant to the States. The bill also reauthorizes the JJDPA Title II Part B State formula grants. In doing so, it also reforms the current core mandates on the States relating to the incarceration of juveniles to ensure the protection of juveniles in custody while providing state and local governments with needed flexibility. This flexibility is particularly important to rural states, where immediate access to a juvenile detention facility might be difficult. Since many communities cannot afford separate juvenile and adult facilities, law enforcement officers must drive hours to transport juvenile offenders to the nearest facility, instead of patrolling the streets. Another unintended consequence of JJDPA is the release of juvenile offenders because no beds are available in juvenile facilities or because law enforcement officials cannot afford to transport youths to juvenile facilities. Juvenile criminals are released even though space is available to detain them in adult facilities. Our reform will provide the states with a degree of flexibility which currently does not exist. However, this flexibility is not provided at the expense of juvenile inmate safety. The bill strictly prohibits placing juvenile offenders in jail cells with adults. No one supports the placing of children in cells with adult offenders. To be clear--nothing in the bill will expose juveniles to any physical contact by adult offenders. Indeed, the legislation is explicit that, if states are to qualify for federal funds, they may not place juvenile delinquents in detention under conditions in which the juvenile can have physical contact, much less be physically harmed by, an adult inmate. These provisions are largely based on H.R. 1818 from the 105th Congress, but are improved to ensure that abuse of juvenile delinquent inmates is not permitted by incorporating definitions of what constitutes unacceptable contact between juvenile delinquents and adult inmates. Third, and finally, our reform of the JJDPA reauthorizes and strengthens those other parts of the JJDPA that have proven effective. For example, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act are reauthorized and funded. Gang prevention programs are reauthorized. And important, successful programs to provide mentoring for young people in trouble with the law or at risk of getting into trouble with the law are reauthorized and expanded. Operating through the Cooperative Extension Service program sponsored by the Department of Agriculture, the University of Utah has developed a ground-breaking and highly successful program that mentors to entire families--pairing college age mentors with juveniles in trouble or at risk of getting in trouble with the law, and pairing senior citizen couples with the juvenile's parents and siblings. This program gets great bang for the buck. So our bill provides demonstration funds to expand this program and replicate its success in other states. Finally, our bill provides an important new program to encourage state programs that provide accountability in their juvenile justice systems. All or nearly all of our states have taken great strides in reforming their systems, and it is time for the federal government's programs to catch up and provide needed assistance. Despite reforms in recent years, all too often, the juvenile justice system ignores the minor crimes that lead to the increasingly frequent serious and tragic juvenile crimes capturing headlines. Unfortunately, many of these crimes might have been prevented had the warning signs of early acts of delinquency or antisocial behavior been heeded. A delinquent juvenile's critical first brush with the law is a vital aspect of preventing future crimes, because it teaches an important lesson--what behavior will be tolerated. Accountability is not just about punishment--although punishment is frequently needed. It is about teaching consequences and providing rehabilitation to youth offenders. According to a recent Department of Justice study, juveniles adjudicated for so-called index crimes--such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and auto theft--began their criminal careers at an early age. The average age for a juvenile committing an index offense is 14.5 years, and typically, by age 7, the future criminal is already showing minor behavior problems. If we can intervene early enough, however, we might avert future tragedies. Our bill provides a new Juvenile Accountability Block Grant to reform federal policy that has been complicit in the system's failure, and provide states with much needed funding for a system of graduated sanctions, including community service for minor crimes, electronically monitored home detention, boot camps, and traditional detention for more serious offenses. And let there be no mistake--detention is needed as well. Our first priority should be to keep our communities safe. We simply have to ensure that violent people are removed from our midst, no matter their age. When a juvenile commits an act as heinous as the worst adult crime, he or she is not a kid anymore, and we shouldn't treat them as kids. State receipt of the incentive grants would be conditioned on the adoption of three core accountability policies: the establishment of graduated sanctions to ensure appropriate correction of juvenile offenders, drug testing juvenile offenders upon arrest in appropriate cases; and recognition of victims rights and needs in the juvenile justice system. Meaningful reform also requires that a juvenile's criminal record ought to be accessible to police, courts, and prosecution, so that we can know who is a repeat or serious offender. Right now, these records simply are not generally available in NCIC, the national system that tracks adult criminal records. Thus, if a juvenile commits a string of felony offenses, and no record is kept, the police, prosecutors, judges or juries will never know what he did. Maybe for his next offense, he'll get a light sentence or even probation, since it appears he's committed only one felony in his life instead 10 or 15. Such a system makes no sense, and it doesn't protect the public. So the reform we offer in this bill also provides the first federal incentives for the integration of serious juvenile criminal records into the national criminal history database, together with federal funding for the system. Finally, we all recognize the value of education in preventing juvenile crime and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. When trouble- causing juveniles remain in regular classrooms, they frequently make it difficult for all other students to learn. Yet, removing such juveniles from the classroom without addressing their educational needs virtually guarantees that they will fall further into the vortex of crime and delinquency. The costs are high--to the juvenile, but also to victims and to society. These juveniles too frequently become crime committing adults, with all the costs that implies--costs to victims, and the cost of incarcerating the offenders to protect the public. So our bill tries to break this cycle, by providing a three-year $45 million demonstration project to provide alternative education to juveniles in trouble with or at risk of getting in trouble with the law. The bill we introduce today authorizes significant funding for the programs I have described. In all, our bill authorizes $1 billion per year for 5 years, in the following categories: $450 million per year for Juvenile Accountability Block Grants; $435 million per year for prevention programs under the JJDPA, including $200 million for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Block Grants, $200 million for Part B Formula grant prevention programs, and $35 million for Gangs, Mentoring and Discretionary grant programs; $75 million per year for grants to states to upgrade and enhance juvenile felony criminal record histories and to make such records available within NCIC, the national criminal history database used by law enforcement, the courts, and prosecutors; and $40 million per year for NIJ research and evaluation of the effectiveness of juvenile delinquency prevention programs. Additionally, the bill authorizes $100 million per year for joint Federal-State-local law enforcement task forces to address gang crime in areas with high concentrations of gang activity. $75 million per year of this funding is authorized for establishment and operation of High Intensity Interstate Gang Activity Areas, and the remaining $25 million per year is authorized for community-based prevention and intervention for gang members and at-risk youth in gang areas. And, finally, as I have already noted, the bill authorizes $45 million over 3 years for innovative alternative education programs to make our schools safer places of learning while helping ensure that the youth most at risk do not get left behind. Lastly, Mr. President, let me address a provision in the bill which will prohibit firearms possession by violent juvenile offenders. This section extends the ban in current law on firearm ownership by certain felons to certain juvenile offenders. Juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for an offense which would be a serious violent felony as defined in 18 U.S.C. 3559(C)(2)(f)(i)--the federal three strikes statute--were the offense committed by an adult will no longer be able to legally own firearms. This is common sense. If tried and convicted as adults, these criminals would automatically forfeit their right to own a gun. However, we should learn our lesson as well from the so-called domestic violence gun ban enacted several years ago. If the offense records that allow us to know who is covered by the ban are not available, the law is hollow, or worse--it will be enforced only in arbitrary cases. For this reason, the ban we propose is prospective only, applying only to delinquent acts committed after records of such offenses are routinely available within the National Instant Check System instituted pursuant to the Brady Law. We should also resist seeing this provision as any sort of panacea. Laws banning criminals from owning firearms have not stopped them from doing so, for a simple reason--criminals do not respect or obey the law. So while this provision is an appropriate step, we should be under no illusion that it is the answer to our juvenile crime problem. Mr. President, I believe that we all agree that it is far better to prevent the fabric of civility from being rent than to deal with the aftermath of juvenile crime. In the face of a confounding problem like juvenile crime, it is tempting to look for easy answers. I do not believe that we should succumb to this temptation. We are faced, I believe, with a problem which cannot be solved solely by the enactment of new criminal prohibitions. It is at its core a moral problem. Somehow, too frequently we have failed as a society to pass along to the next generation the moral compass that differentiates right from wrong. This cannot be legislated. It will not be restored by the enactment of a new law or the implementation of a new program. But it can be achieved by communities working together to teach accountability by example and by early intervention when the signs clearly point to violent and antisocial behavior. Mr. President, that is what the bill we introduce is all about. It is a comprehensive approach to this national problem. I believe that it now is time for the Senate to act. I urge my colleagues to review this legislation, to support it, and to support its early debate and passage by the Senate. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a bill summary prepared by the Judiciary Committee staff and an article by Patricia Cornwell be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am proud today to introduce the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999. I am pleased to be joined by Senator Sessions, the distinguished chairman of the Youth Violence Subcommittee, as well as Senator DeWine. There are few issues that will come before the Senate this year that touch the lives of more of our fellow Americans than our national response to juvenile crime. Crime and delinquency among juveniles is a problem that troubles us in our neighborhoods, schools and parks. It is the subject across the dinner table, and in those late night, worried conversations all parents have had at one time or another. The subject is familiar--how can we prevent our children from falling victim-- either to crime committed by another juvenile, or to the lure of drugs, crime, and gangs. Their concerns should be our concerns. The sad reality is that we can no longer sit silently by as children kill children, as teenagers commit truly heinous offenses, as our juvenile drug abuse rate continues to climb. In 1997, juveniles accounted for nearly one fifth-- 18.7 percent--of all criminal arrests in the United States. Persons under 18 committed 13.5 percent of all murders, over 17 percent of all rapes, nearly 30 percent of all robberies, and 50 percent of all arsons. In 1997, 183 juveniles under 15 were arrested for murder. Juveniles under 15 were responsible for 6.5 percent of all rapes, 14 percent of all burglaries, and one third of all arsons. And, unbelievably, juveniles under 15--who are not old enough to legally drive in any state--in 1997 were responsible for 10.3 percent of all auto thefts. To put this in some context, consider this: in 1997, youngsters age 15 to 19, who are only 7 percent of the population, committed 22.2 percent of all crimes, 21.4 percent of violent crimes, and 32 percent of property crimes. And although there are endless statistics on our growing juvenile crime problem, one particularly sobering fact is that, between 1985 and 1993, the number of murder cases involving 15-year olds increased 207 percent. We have kids involved in murder before they can even drive. Even my state of Utah has not been immune from these trends. Indeed, a 1997 study by Brigham Young University Professor Richard Johnson found that Utah's juvenile arrest rate is the highest in the nation. Additionally, as an indication of the increasingly serious nature of juvenile offenses in Utah, between 1990 and 1996 the number of juveniles sentenced to youth corrections increased 142 percent, and the number of juveniles requiring detention in a secure facility more than doubled. And in 1995, the average Utah juvenile offender had accumulated an astonishing average of 23 misdemeanors, 8 felony convictions, and 2.4 status offense convictions before being sentenced to a secure youth facility. In short, our juvenile crime problem has taken a new and sinister direction. But cold statistics alone cannot tell the whole story. Crime has real effects on the lives of real people. Last fall, I read an article in the Richmond Times-Dispatch by my good friend, crime novelist Patricia Cornwell. It is one of the finest pieces I have read on the effects of and solutions to our juvenile crime problem. Let me share with my colleagues some of what Ms. Cornwell, who has spent the better part of her adult life studying and observing crime and its effects, has to say. She says ``when a person is touched by violence, the fabric of civility is forever rent, or ripped, or breached . . .'' This is a graphic but accurate description. Countless lives can be ruined by a single violent crime. There is, of course, the victim, who may be dead, or scarred for life. There are the family and friends of the victim, who are traumatized as well, and who must live with the loss of a loved one. Society itself is harmed, when each of us is a little more frightened to walk on our streets at night, to use an ATM, or to jog or bike in our parks. And, yes, there is the offender who has chosen to throw his or her life away. Particularly when the offender is a juvenile, family, friends, and society are made poorer for the waste of potential in every human being. One crime, but permanent effects when ``the fabric of civility is rent.'' This is the reality that has driven me to work for the last three years to address this issue. In this effort, I have been joined by a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which last Congress reported comprehensive legislation on a bipartisan, two to one vote. Indeed, among members of the Youth Violence Subcommittee, the vote was seven to two in favor of the bill. The Judiciary Committee's legislation last Congress would have fundamentally reformed the role played by the federal government in addressing juvenile crime in our Nation. It was supported by law enforcement organizations such as the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, and the National Troopers Coalition, as well as the support of juvenile justice practitioners such as the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and victim's groups including the National Victims Center and the National Organization for Victims Assistance. The bill we introduce today builds on those efforts. Our reform proposal includes the best of what we know works. It combines tough measures to protect the public from the worst juvenile criminals, smart measures to provide intervention and correction at the earliest acts of delinquency, and compassionate measures to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and to supplement and enhance extensive existing prevention programs to keep juveniles out of the cycle of crime, violence, drugs, and gangs. Mr. President, let me spell out in great detail the provisions of this bill, and how it will help reform the juvenile justice system that is failing the victims of juvenile crime, failing too many of our young people, and ultimately, failing to protect the public. First, this bill reforms and streamlines the federal juvenile code, to responsibly address the handful of cases each year involving juveniles who commit crimes under federal jurisdiction. Our bill sets a uniform age of 14 for the permissive transfer of juvenile defendants to adult court, permits prosecutors and the Attorney General to make the decision whether to charge a juvenile offender as an adult, and permits in certain circumstances juveniles charged as an adult to petition the court to be returned to juvenile status. It also provides that when prosecuted as adults, juveniles in Federal criminal cases will be subject to the same procedures and penalties as adults, except for the application of mandatory minimums in most cases. Of course, the death penalty would not be available as punishment for any offense committed before the juvenile was 18. The bill similarly provides that juveniles tried as adults and sentenced to prison must serve their entire sentences, and may not be released on the basis of attaining their majority, and applies to juveniles convicted as adults the same provisions of victim restitution, including mandatory restitution, that apply to adults. Finally, in reforming the federal system, I believe that we must lead by example. So our bill provides that the federal criminal records of juveniles tried as adults, and the federal delinquency records of juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain serious offenses such as murder, rape, armed robbery, and sexual abuse or assault, will be treated for all purposes in the same manner as the records of adults for the same offenses. Other federal felony juvenile criminal or delinquency records would be treated the same as adult records for criminal justice or national security background check purposes. The bill also permits juvenile federal felony criminal and delinquency records to be provided to schools and colleges under rules issued by the Attorney General, provided that recipients of the records are held to privacy standards and that the records not be used to determine admission. Let me assure any who may be concerned that it is not our intent in reforming the federal juvenile code to federalize juvenile crime-- indeed, no conduct that is not a federal crime now will be if this reform is enacted. I do not intend or expect a substantial increase in the number of juvenile cases adjudicated or prosecuted in federal court. It is our intent, rather, to ensure that when there is a federal crime warranting the federal prosecution of a juvenile, the federal government assumes its responsibility to deal with it, rather than saddling the states with that burden. Second, at the heart of this bill is an historic reform and reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the most comprehensive review of that legislation in 25 years. The States for several years have been far ahead of the Federal Government in implementing innovative reforms of their juvenile justice systems. For example, between 1992 and 1996, of the 50 States and the District of Columbia, 48 made substantive changes to their juvenile justice systems. Among the trends in State law changes are the removal of more serious and violent offenders from the juvenile justice system, in favor of criminal court prosecution; new and innovative disposition/ sentencing options for juveniles; and the revision, in favor of openness, of traditional confidentiality provisions relating to juvenile proceedings and records. While the States have been making fundamental changes in their approaches to juvenile justice, however, the Federal Government has made no significant change to its approach and has done little to encourage State and local reform. Thus, the juvenile justice terrain has shifted beneath the Federal Government, leaving its programs and policies out of step and largely irrelevant to the needs of State and local governments. This bill corrects this imbalance between State and Federal juvenile justice policy, and will help ensure that federal programs support the needs of State and local governments. First, our bill reforms and strengthens the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the Department of Justice. The effectiveness of the OJJDP will be enhanced by requiring its Administrator to present to Congress annual plans, with measurable goals, to control and prevent youth crime, coordinate all Federal programs relating to controlling and preventing youth crime, and disseminate to States and local governments data on the prevention, correction and control of juvenile crime and delinquency, and report on successful programs and methods. And, most important to state and local governments, in the future, OJJDP will serve as a single point of contact for States, localities, and private entities to apply for and coordinate all federal assistance and programs related to juvenile crime control and delinquency prevention. This one-stop-shopping for federal programs and assistance will help state and local governments focus on the problem, instead of on how to navigate the federal bureaucracy. Second, our reform bill consolidates numerous JJDPA programs, including Part C Special Emphasis grants, State challenge grants, boot camps, and JJDPA Title V incentive grants, under an enhanced $200 million per year prevention challenge block grant to the States. The bill also reauthorizes the JJDPA Title II Part B State formula grants. In doing so, it also reforms the current core mandates on the States relating to the incarceration of juveniles to ensure the protection of juveniles in custody while providing state and local governments with needed flexibility. This flexibility is particularly important to rural states, where immediate access to a juvenile detention facility might be difficult. Since many communities cannot afford separate juvenile and adult facilities, law enforcement officers must drive hours to transport juvenile offenders to the nearest facility, instead of patrolling the streets. Another unintended consequence of JJDPA is the release of juvenile offenders because no beds are available in juvenile facilities or because law enforcement officials cannot afford to transport youths to juvenile facilities. Juvenile criminals are released even though space is available to detain them in adult facilities. Our reform will provide the states with a degree of flexibility which currently does not exist. However, this flexibility is not provided at the expense of juvenile inmate safety. The bill strictly prohibits placing juvenile offenders in jail cells with adults. No one supports the placing of children in cells with adult offenders. To be clear--nothing in the bill will expose juveniles to any physical contact by adult offenders. Indeed, the legislation is explicit that, if states are to qualify for federal funds, they may not place juvenile delinquents in detention under conditions in which the juvenile can have physical contact, much less be physically harmed by, an adult inmate. These provisions are largely based on H.R. 1818 from the 105th Congress, but are improved to ensure that abuse of juvenile delinquent inmates is not permitted by incorporating definitions of what constitutes unacceptable contact between juvenile delinquents and adult inmates. Third, and finally, our reform of the JJDPA reauthorizes and strengthens those other parts of the JJDPA that have proven effective. For example, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act are reauthorized and funded. Gang prevention programs are reauthorized. And important, successful programs to provide mentoring for young people in trouble with the law or at risk of getting into trouble with the law are reauthorized and expanded. Operating through the Cooperative Extension Service program sponsored by the Department of Agriculture, the University of Utah has developed a ground-breaking and highly successful program that mentors to entire families--pairing college age mentors with juveniles in trouble or at risk of getting in trouble with the law, and pairing senior citizen couples with the juvenile's parents and siblings. This program gets great bang for the buck. So our bill provides demonstration funds to expand this program and replicate its success in other states. Finally, our bill provides an important new program to encourage state programs that provide accountability in their juvenile justice systems. All or nearly all of our states have taken great strides in reforming their systems, and it is time for the federal government's programs to catch up and provide needed assistance. Despite reforms in recent years, all too often, the juvenile justice system ignores the minor crimes that lead to the increasingly frequent serious and tragic juvenile crimes capturing headlines. Unfortunately, many of these crimes might have been prevented had the warning signs of early acts of delinquency or antisocial behavior been heeded. A delinquent juvenile's critical first brush with the law is a vital aspect of preventing future crimes, because it teaches an important lesson--what behavior will be tolerated. Accountability is not just about punishment--although punishment is frequently needed. It is about teaching consequences and providing rehabilitation to youth offenders. According to a recent Department of Justice study, juveniles adjudicated for so-called index crimes--such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and auto theft--began their criminal careers at an early age. The average age for a juvenile committing an index offense is 14.5 years, and typically, by age 7, the future criminal is already showing minor behavior problems. If we can intervene early enough, however, we might avert future tragedies. Our bill provides a new Juvenile Accountability Block Grant to reform federal policy that has been complicit in the system's failure, and provide states with much needed funding for a system of graduated sanctions, including community service for minor crimes, electronically monitored home detention, boot camps, and traditional detention for more serious offenses. And let there be no mistake--detention is needed as well. Our first priority should be to keep our communities safe. We simply have to ensure that violent people are removed from our midst, no matter their age. When a juvenile commits an act as heinous as the worst adult crime, he or she is not a kid anymore, and we shouldn't treat them as kids. State receipt of the incentive grants would be conditioned on the adoption of three core accountability policies: the establishment of graduated sanctions to ensure appropriate correction of juvenile offenders, drug testing juvenile offenders upon arrest in appropriate cases; and recognition of victims rights and needs in the juvenile justice system. Meaningful reform also requires that a juvenile's criminal record ought to be accessible to police, courts, and prosecution, so that we can know who is a repeat or serious offender. Right now, these records simply are not generally available in NCIC, the national system that tracks adult criminal records. Thus, if a juvenile commits a string of felony offenses, and no record is kept, the police, prosecutors, judges or juries will never know what he did. Maybe for his next offense, he'll get a light sentence or even probation, since it appears he's committed only one felony in his life instead 10 or 15. Such a system makes no sense, and it doesn't protect the public. So the reform we offer in this bill also provides the first federal incentives for the integration of serious juvenile criminal records into the national criminal history database, together with federal funding for the system. Finally, we all recognize the value of education in preventing juvenile crime and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. When trouble- causing juveniles remain in regular classrooms, they frequently make it difficult for all other students to learn. Yet, removing such juveniles from the classroom without addressing their educational needs virtually guarantees that they will fall further into the vortex of crime and delinquency. The costs are high--to the juvenile, but also to victims and to society. These juveniles too frequently become crime committing adults, with all the costs that implies--costs to victims, and the cost of incarcerating the offenders to protect the public. So our bill tries to break this cycle, by providing a three-year $45 million demonstration project to provide alternative education to juveniles in trouble with or at risk of getting in trouble with the law. The bill we introduce today authorizes significant funding for the programs I have described. In all, our bill authorizes $1 billion per year for 5 years, in the following categories: $450 million per year for Juvenile Accountability Block Grants; $435 million per year for prevention programs under the JJDPA, including $200 million for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Block Grants, $200 million for Part B Formula grant prevention programs, and $35 million for Gangs, Mentoring and Discretionary grant programs; $75 million per year for grants to states to upgrade and enhance juvenile felony criminal record histories and to make such records available within NCIC, the national criminal history database used by law enforcement, the courts, and prosecutors; and $40 million per year for NIJ research and evaluation of the effectiveness of juvenile delinquency prevention programs. Additionally, the bill authorizes $100 million per year for joint Federal-State-local law enforcement task forces to address gang crime in areas with high concentrations of gang activity. $75 million per year of this funding is authorized for establishment and operation of High Intensity Interstate Gang Activity Areas, and the remaining $25 million per year is authorized for community-based prevention and intervention for gang members and at-risk youth in gang areas. And, finally, as I have already noted, the bill authorizes $45 million over 3 years for innovative alternative education programs to make our schools safer places of learning while helping ensure that the youth most at risk do not get left behind. Lastly, Mr. President, let me address a provision in the bill which will prohibit firearms possession by violent juvenile offenders. This section extends the ban in current law on firearm ownership by certain felons to certain juvenile offenders. Juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for an offense which would be a serious violent felony as defined in 18 U.S.C. 3559(C)(2)(f)(i)--the federal three strikes statute--were the offense committed by an adult will no longer be able to legally own firearms. This is common sense. If tried and convicted as adults, these criminals would automatically forfeit their right to own a gun. However, we should learn our lesson as well from the so-called domestic violence gun ban enacted several years ago. If the offense records that allow us to know who is covered by the ban are not available, the law is hollow, or worse--it will be enforced only in arbitrary cases. For this reason, the ban we propose is prospective only, applying only to delinquent acts committed after records of such offenses are routinely available within the National Instant Check System instituted pursuant to the Brady Law. We should also resist seeing this provision as any sort of panacea. Laws banning criminals from owning firearms have not stopped them from doing so, for a simple reason--criminals do not respect or obey the law. So while this provision is an appropriate step, we should be under no illusion that it is the answer to our juvenile crime problem. Mr. President, I believe that we all agree that it is far better to prevent the fabric of civility from being rent than to deal with the aftermath of juvenile crime. In the face of a confounding problem like juvenile crime, it is tempting to look for easy answers. I do not believe that we should succumb to this temptation. We are faced, I believe, with a problem which cannot be solved solely by the enactment of new criminal prohibitions. It is at its core a moral problem. Somehow, too frequently we have failed as a society to pass along to the next generation the moral compass that differentiates right from wrong. This cannot be legislated. It will not be restored by the enactment of a new law or the implementation of a new program. But it can be achieved by communities working together to teach accountability by example and by early intervention when the signs clearly point to violent and antisocial behavior. Mr. President, that is what the bill we introduce is all about. It is a comprehensive approach to this national problem. I believe that it now is time for the Senate to act. I urge my colleagues to review this legislation, to support it, and to support its early debate and passage by the Senate. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a bill summary prepared by the Judiciary Committee staff and an article by Patricia Cornwell be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce an important piece of corrective legislation--the Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act. This bill will address in a responsible manner the critical issue of ethical standards for federal prosecutors, while ensuring that the public servants are permitted to perform their important function of upholding federal law. The bill I am introducing today is a careful solution to a troubling problem--the application of state ethics rules in federal court, and particularly to federal prosecutors. In short, my bill will subject federal prosecutors to the bar rules of each state in which they are licensed unless such rules are inconsistent with federal law or the effectuation of federal policy or investigations. It also sets specific standards for federal prosecutorial conduct, to be enforced by the Attorney General. Finally, it establishes a commission of federal judges, appointed by the Chief Justice, to review and report on the interrelationship between the duties of federal prosecutors and regulation of their conduct by state bars and the disciplinary procedures utilized by the Attorney General. No one condones prosecutorial excesses. There have been instances where law enforcement, and even some federal prosecutors, have gone overboard. Unethical conduct by any attorney is a matter for concern. But when engaged in by a federal prosecutor, unethical conduct cannot be tolerated. For as Justice Sutherland noted in 1935, the prosecutor is not just to win a case, ``but that justice shall be done. . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'' We must, however, ensure that the rules we adopt to ensure proper prosecutorial conduct are measured and well-tailored to that purpose. As my colleagues may recall, last year's omnibus appropriations act included a very controversial provision known to most of my colleagues simply as the ``McDade provision,'' after its House sponsor, former Representative Joe McDade. This well-intentioned but ill-advised provision was adopted to set ethical standards for federal prosecutors and other attorneys for the government. In my view, it was not the measured and well-tailored law needed to address the legitimate concerns its sponsors sought to redress. Nor was I alone in this view. So great was the concern over its impact, in fact, that its effective date was delayed until six months after enactment. That deadline is approaching. In my view, if allowed to take effect in its present form, the McDade provision would cripple the ability of the Department of Justice to enforce federal law and cede authority to regulate the conduct of federal criminal investigations and prosecutions to more than 50 state bar associations. As enacted last fall, the McDade provision adds a new section 530B to title 28 of the U.S. Code. In its most relevant part, it states that an ``attorney for the government shall be subject to State laws and rules . . . governing attorneys in each state where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that state.'' There are important practical considerations which persuasively counsel against allowing 28 U.S.C. 530B to take effect unchanged. I have been a frequent critic of the trend toward the over-federalization of crime. Yet the federal government has a most legitimate role in the investigation and prosecution of complex multistate terrorism, drug, fraud or organized crime conspiracies, in rooting out and punishing fraud against federally funded programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, in vindicating the federal civil rights laws, in investigating and prosecuting complex corporate crime, and in punishing environmental crime. It is in these very cases that Section 530B will have its most pernicious effect. Federal attorneys investigating and prosecuting these cases, which frequently encompass three, four, or five states, will be subject to the differing state and local rules of each of those states, plus the District of Columbia, if they are based here. Their decisions will be subject to review by the bar and ethics review boards in each of each of these states at the whim of defense counsel, even if the federal attorney is not licensed in that state. Practices concerning contact with unrepresented persons or the conduct of matters before a grant jury, perfectly legal and acceptable in federal court, will be subject to state bar rules. For instance, in many states, federal attorneys will not be permitted to speak with represented witnesses, especially witnesses to corporate misconduct, and the use of undercover investigations will at a minimum be hindered. In other states, section 530B might require--contrary to long- established federal grand jury practice--that prosecutors present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Moreover, these rules won't have to be in effect in the district where the subject is being investigated, or where the grand jury is sitting to have these effects. No, these rules only have to be in effect somewhere the investigation leads, or the federal attorney works, to handcuff federal law enforcement. In short, Section 530B will affect every attorney in every department and agency of the federal government. It will effect enforcement of our antitrust laws, our environmental laws prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste, our labor laws, our civil rights laws, and as I said before, the integrity of every federal funding program. Section 530B is also an open invitation to clever defense attorneys to stymie federal criminal or civil investigations by raising bogus defenses or bringing frivolous state bar claims. Indeed, this is happening even without Section 530B as the law of the land. The most recent example is the use of a State rule against testimony buying to brand as ``unethical'' the long accepted, and essential, federal practice of moving for sentence reductions for co-conspirators who cooperate with prosecutors by testifying truthfully for the government. How much worse will it be when this provision declares it open season of federal lawyers? What will the costs of this provision be? At a minimum, the inevitable result will be that violations of federal laws will not be punished, and justice will not be done. But there will be financial costs to the federal government as well, as a result of defending these frivolous challenges and from higher costs associated with investigating and prosecuting violations of federal law. All of this, however, is not to say that nothing needs to be done on the issue of attorney ethics in federal court. Indeed, I have considerable sympathy for the objectives values Section 530B seeks to protect. All of us who at one time or another have been the subject of unfounded ethical or legal charges, as I have been as well, know the frustration of clearing one's name. All no one wants more than I to ensure that all federal prosecutors are held to the highest ethical standards. But Section 530B, as it was enacted last year, is not in my view the way to do it. The bill I am introducing today addresses the narrow matter of federal prosecutorial conduct in a responsible way, and I might add, in a manner that is respectful of both federal and state sovereignty. As all of my colleagues know, each of our states has at least one federal judicial district. But the federal courts that sit in these districts are not courts of the state. They are, of course instrumentalities of federal sovereignty, created by Congress pursuant to its power under Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United States in ``one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'' As enacted, Section 530B is in my view a serious dereliction of our Constitutional duty to establish inferior federal courts. Should this provision take effect, Congress will have ceded the right to control conduct in the federal courts to more than fifty state bar associations, at a devastating cost to federal sovereignty and the independence of the federal judiciary. Simply put, the federal government, like each of our states, must retain for itself the authority to regulate the practice of law in its own courts and by its own lawyers. Indeed, the principle of federal sovereignty in its own sphere has been well established since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland [17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 1819]. However, it may only be a first step. For the problem of rules for the conduct of attorneys in federal court affects more than just prosecutors. It affects all litigants in each of our federal courts, who have a right to know what the rules are in the administration of justice. This is a problem that has been percolating in the federal bar for over a decade--the diversity of ethical rules governing attorney conduct in federal court. Presently, there is no uniform rule that applies in all federal courts. Rather, applicable ethics rules have been left up to the discretion of local rules in each federal judicial district. Various districts have taken different approaches, including adopting state standards based on either the ABA Model Rules or the ABA Code, adopting one of the ABA models directly, and in some cases, adopting both an ABA model and the state rules. This variety of rules has led to confusion, especially in multiforum federal practice. As a 1997 report prepared for the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure put it, ``Multiforum federal practice, challenging under ideal conditions, has been made increasingly complex, wasteful, and problematic by the disarray among federal local rules and state ethical standards.'' Moreover, the problem may well be made worse if Section 530B takes effect in its present form. First, as enacted, Section 530B contains an internal conflict that will add to the confusion. Section 530B provides that federal attorneys are governed by both the state laws and bar rules and the federal court's local rules. These, of course, are frequently different, setting up the obvious quandary--which take precedence? Finally, Section 530B might further add to the confusion, by raising the possibility of different standards in the same court for opposing litigants--private parties governed by the federal local rules and prosecutors governed by Section 530B. The U.S. Judicial Conference's Rules Committee has been studying this matter, and is considering whether to issue ethics rules pursuant to its authority under the federal Rules Enabling Act. I believe that this is an appropriate debate to have, and that it may be time for the federal bar to mature. The days are past when federal practice was a small side line of an attorney's practice. Practice in federal court is now ubiquitous to any attorney's practice of law. It is important, then, that there be consistent rules. Indeed, for that very reason, we have federal rules of evidence, criminal procedure, and civil procedure. Perhaps it is time to consider the development of federal rules of ethics, as well. This is not to suggest, of course, a challenge to the traditional state regulation of the practice of law, or the proper control by state Supreme Courts of the conduct of attorneys in state court. The assertion of federal sovereignty over the conduct of attorneys in federal courts will neither impugn nor diminish the sovereign right of states to continue to do the same in state courts. However, the administration of justice in the federal courts requires the consideration of uniform rules to apply in federal courts and thus, I will be evaluating proposals to set uniform rules governing the conduct of attorneys in federal court. Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today is of vital importance to the continued enforcement of federal law. Its importance is compounded by the deadline imposed by the effective date of Section 530B. I urge my colleagues to join me in this effort, and support the Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill titled ``Violence Against Women Act of 1999.'' I expect that this will be one of several bills introduced this week in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, reflecting an array of ideas and views on the reauthorization of existing programs and the creation of new ones. Let me say at the outset, that one of my proudest accomplishments in this body was my work with Senator Joe Biden earlier this decade culminating in the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994. I have great hopes that Senator Biden and I can duplicate that strong bipartisan effort in the 106th Congress. Five years after the passage of VAWA I, I think it is fair to say that this Act has significantly enhanced the efforts of law enforcement in combating violence against women and improved the services available to victims of domestic violence in my home state of Utah and across the nation. But five years later, it is time to advance the process in three major respects: (1) it is time to review and evaluate the effectiveness of programs created by the 1994 Act and to reexamine the adequacy of the funding levels for these programs; (2) it is time to review law enforcement's efforts and successes as a result of the 1994 Act; and (3) it is time to survey and consider the need for new programs and further changes in the law. Thus, while I am today introducing a bill that reauthorizes the majority of current programs, many at increased funding levels, I think that these programs need first to be evaluated as to whether available funds are being used in the most effective way possible. Further, I know that Senator Biden has a number of ideas for new programs and changes in the law, and I look forward to working with him on some of those ideas. Finally, let me just note that my bill also contains some new proposals regarding campus violence, battered immigrant women, and the victims of domestic violence on military bases around the country. Like many Americans, I watched with some horror on Sunday night as ``60 Minutes'' detailed the degree of domestic violence on and around our military bases and the apparent lack of serious responsiveness by persons in charge. This situation, if accurately portrayed, is not acceptable, and this Administration needs to act swiftly and effectively to change what is reportedly happening. To that end, my bill includes a provision requiring a prompt review and report by the Secretary of Defense on the incidence of and response to domestic violence on our military bases. In sum, Mr. President, I hope that enacting effective legislation to combat violence against women will be a priority in the 106th Congress. I intend to do my best, working in a bipartisan fashion, to ensure that it is.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that will help provide for greater consumer choice and competition in television services, the ``Satellite Home Viewer Improvements Act of 1999.'' Joining me in introducing this bill are the Majority Leader, Senator Lott, the distinguished Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain, and my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, Senators DeWine and Kohl. The options consumers have for viewing television entertainment have vastly increased since that fateful day in September 1927 when television inventor and Utah native Philo T. Farnsworth, together with his wife and colleagues, viewed the first television transmission in the Farnsworth's home workshop: a single black line rotated from vertical to horizontal. Both the forms of entertainment and the technologies for delivering that entertainment have proliferated over the 70 years since that day. In the 1940's and 1950's, televisions began arriving in an increasing number of homes to pick up entertainment being broadcast into a growing number of cities and towns. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, cable television began offering communities more television choices by initially providing community antenna systems for receiving broadcast television signals, and later by offering new created-for-cable entertainment. The development of cable television made dramatic strides with the enactment of the cable compulsory license in 1976, providing an efficient way of clearing copyright rights for the retransmission of broadcast signals over cable systems. In the 1980's, television viewers began to be able to receive television entertainment with their own home satellite equipment, and the enactment of the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1988 helped develop a system of providing options for television service to Americans who lived in areas too remote to receive television signals over the air or via cable. Much has changed since the original Satellite Home Viewer Act was adopted in 1988. The Satellite Home Viewer Act was originally intended to ensure that households that could not get television in any other way, traditionally provided through broadcast or cable, would be able to get television signals via satellite. The market and satellite industry has changed substantially since 1988. Many of the difficulties and controversies associated with the satellite license have been at least partly a product of the satellite business attempting to move from a predominately need-based rural niche service to a full service video delivery competitor in all markets, urban and rural. Now, many market advocates both in and out of Congress are looking to satellite carriers to compete directly with cable companies for viewership, because we believe that an increasingly competitive market is better for consumers both in terms of cost and the diversity of programming available. The bill I introduce today will move us toward that kind of robust competition. In short, this bill is focused on changes that we can make this year to move the satellite television industry to the next level, making it a full competitor in the multi-channel video delivery market. It has been said time and again that a major, and perhaps the biggest, impediment to satellite's ability to be a strong competitor to cable is its current inability to provide local broadcast signals. (See, e.g., Business week (22 Dec. 1997) p. 84.) This problem has been partly technological and partly legal. Even as we speak, the technological hurdles to local retransmission of broadcast signals are being lowered substantially. Emerging technology is now enabling the satellite industry to begin to offer television viewers their own local programming of news, weather, sports, and entertainment, with digital quality picture and sound. This will mean that viewers in the remoter areas of my large home state of Utah will be able to watch television programming originating in Salt Lake City, rather than New York or California. Utahns in remote areas will have access to local weather and other locally and regionally relevant information. In fact, one satellite carrier is already providing such a service in Utah. Today, with this bill, we hope to begin removing the legal impediments to use of this emerging technology to make local retransmission of broadcast signals a reality for all subscribers. The most important result will be that the constituents of all my colleagues will finally have a choice for full service multi-channel video programming. They will be able to choose cable or one of a number of satellite carriers. This should foster an environment of proliferating choice and lowered prices, all to the benefit of consumers, our constituents. To that end, the ``Satellite Home Viewer Improvements Act'' makes the following changes in the copyright governing satellite television transmissions: It creates a new copyright license which allows satellite carriers to retransmit a local television station to households and businesses throughout that station's local market, just like cable does, and sets a zero copyright rate for providing this service. It extends the satellite compulsory licenses for both local and distant signals, which are now set to expire at the end of the year, until 2004. It cuts the copyright rates paid for distant signals by 30 or 45 percent, depending on the type of signal. It allows consumers to switch from cable to satellite service for network signals without waiting a 90-day period now required in the law. It allows for a national Public Broadcasting Service satellite feed. Many of my colleagues in this chamber will recognize this legislation as substantively identical to a bill reported unanimously by the Judiciary Committee last year. I am pleased with the degree of cooperation and consensus we were able to forge with respect to this legislation last year, and I hope that we can pick up where we left off to bring this bill before the Senate for swift consideration and approval. As I indicated late in the last Congress, the bill I am introducing is intended to be a piece of a larger joint work product to be crafted in conjunction with our colleagues on the Commerce Committee. Once again in the 106th Congress, it is our intention that the Judiciary Committee will move forward with consideration of the copyright legislation I am introducing today, which, as I indicated, is cosponsored by the Chairman of the Commerce Committee. The Commerce Committee will proceed simultaneously to consider separate legislation to be introduced by Chairman McCain to address related communications amendments regarding such important areas as the must-carry and retransmission consent requirements for satellite carriers upon which the copyright licenses will be conditioned, and the FCC's distant signal eligibility process. It is our joint intention to combine our respective work product as two titles of the same bill in a way that will clearly delineate the work product of each committee, but combine them into the seamless whole necessary to make the licenses work for consumers and the affected industries. We need to act quickly on this legislation. The Satellite Home Viewer Act sunsets at the end of this year, placing at risk the service of many of the 11 million satellite subscribers nationwide. Many of our constituents are confused about the status of satellite service because of a court order requiring the cessation of distant-signal satellite service in February and April to as many as 2.5 million subscribers nationally who have been adjudged ineligible for distant signal service under current law. The granting of the local license, together with some resolution of the eligibility rules for distant signals and a more consumer-friendly process can help bring clarity to these consumers. Let me again thank the Majority Leader for his interest in and leadership with respect to these issues, and the Chairman of the Commerce Committee for his collegiality and cooperation in this process. I also want to thank my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee who have worked on this legislation. This bill is a product of a bipartisan effort with Senators Leahy, DeWine, and Kohl. I look forward to continued collaboration with them and with our other colleagues to help hasten more vigorous competition in the television delivery market and the ever-widening consumer choice that will follow it. I ask unanimous consent that an explanatory section-by-section analysis of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with Senators Ashcroft, Thurmond, Kyl, and Sessions, the ``Judicial Improvement Act of 1999.'' This legislation is designed to preserve the democratic process by strengthening the constitutional division of powers between the Federal Government and the States and between Congress and the Courts. I introduced this legislation last session, but, to my regret, the Senate did not have an opportunity to act upon it. I am re-introducing it because the same ills that were plaguing our judicial system continue to exist, and I believe this legislation can remedy these ills. I have every expectation that this legislation will be acted upon and favorably passed this session. I have always given credit where credit is due. So let me state that on the whole, our federal judges respect their constitutional roles and the Senate is aware of these judges' dedication to administering their oaths of office. Yet, unfortunately, this dedication is not universal and a degree of overreaching by some judges dictates that Congress move to more clearly delineate the proper role of federal judges. In our constitutional system, judges can not conveniently forget or blatantly ignore that the Constitution has exclusively reserved to Congress the power to legislate and limited their power to the interpretation of the law. This careful, but deliberate, separation of legislative and judicial functions is a cornerstone of our constitutional system. Regardless of the temptation to embrace a certain judge's decision that some may find socially or politically expedient, we must remember that no interest is more compelling than preserving our Constitution. Now, attempts by certain federal judges to infringe upon Congress's legislative authority deeply concern me. I have taken the floor in this chamber on numerous occasions to recite some of the more troubling examples of judicial overreaching. I will not revisit them today. Suffice it to say that activism, and by that I mean a judge who ignores the written text of the law, whether from the right or the left, threatens our constitutional structure. An an elected official, my votes for legislation are subject to voter approval. Federal judges, however, are unelected, hence they are, as a practical matter, unaccountable to the public. While tenure during good behavior, which amounts to life tenure, is important in that it frees judges to make unpopular but constitutionally sound decisions, it can become a threat to liberty when placed in the wrong hands. And substituting the will of life-tenured federal judges for the democratically elected representatives is not what our Constitution's framers had in mind. In an effort to avoid this long-contemplated problem, the proposed reform legislation we are introducing today will assist in ensuring that all three branches of the Federal Government work together in a fashion contemplated by, and consistent with, the Constitution. In addition, this legislation will ensure that federal judges are more respectful of the States and their respective sovereignty. I want to be clear in stating that this bill does not, as some may claim, challenge the independence of federal judges. However, there are currently some activist federal judges improperly expanding their roles in an effort to substitute their own ideas and interests for the will of the people. Judges, however, are simply not entitled to deviate from their roles as interpreters of the law in order to create new law from the bench. If they believe otherwise, they are derelict in their duties and should leave the federal bench to run for public office--at least then they would be accountable for their actions. It is time that we pass legislation that precludes any federal judge from blurring the lines separating the legislative and judicial functions. It is important to note that the effort to reign in judicial activism should not be limited simply to opposing potential activist nominees. While the careful scrutiny of judicial nominees is one important step in the confirmation process, a step reserved to the Senate alone, Congress itself has an obligation to the public to ensure that judges fulfill their constitutionally prescribed roles and do not encroach upon those powers delegated to the legislature. Hence, the Congress performs an important role in bringing activist decisions to light and, where appropriate, publicly criticizing those decisions. Some view this as an assault upon judicial independence. That is untrue. It is merely a means of engaging in debate about a decision's merits or the process by which the decision was reached. Such criticism is a healthy part of our democratic system. While life tenure insulates judges from the political process, it should not, and must not, isolate them from the people. In addition, the Constitution grants Congress the authority, with a few notable limitations, to set federal courts' jurisdiction. This is an important tool that, while seldom used, sets forth the circumstances in which the judicial power may be exercised. A good example of this is the 104th Congress' effort to reform the statutory writ of habeas corpus in an attempt to curb the seemingly endless series of petitions filed by convicted criminals bent on thwarting the demands of justice. Legislation of this nature is an important means of curbing activism. In an effort to accomplish these goals, I have chosen to re- introduce, along with my colleagues, the Judicial Improvement Act. It is a small, albeit meaningful, step in the right direction. Notably, this legislation will change the way federal courts review constitutional challenges to state and federal laws. The existing process allows a single federal judge to hear and grant applications regarding the constitutionality of state and federal laws as well as state ballot initiatives. In other words, a single federal judge can impede the will of a majority of the voters merely by issuing an order halting the implementation of a state referendum. This proposed reform will accomplish the twin goals of fighting judicial activism and preserving the democratic process. In essence, this bill modestly proposes to respond to the problem of judicial activism in part by: (1) Requiring a three judge district court panel to hear appeals and grant interlocutory or permanent injunctions based on the constitutionality of a state law or referendum; (2) placing time limitations on remedial authority in any civil action in which prospective relief or a consent judgment binds State or local officials; (3) prohibiting a federal court from having the authority to order state or local governments to increase taxes as part of a judicial remedy; (4) preventing a federal court from prohibiting state or local officials from reprosecuting a defendant; and (5) preventing a federal court from ordering the release of violent offenders under unwarranted circumstances. As I said last session and still believe to be true, this reform bill is a long overdue effort to minimize the potential for judicial activism in the federal court system. Americans are understandably frustrated when they exercise their right to vote and the will of their elected representatives is frustrated by judges who enjoy life tenure. It is no wonder that millions of Americans do not think their vote matters when they enact a referendum only to have it enjoined by a single district court judge. By improving the way federal courts analyze constitutional challenges to laws and initiatives, Congress will protect the rights of parties to challenge unconstitutional laws while at the same time reduce the ability of activist judges to abuse their power and circumvent the will of the people. I want to take a few moments to again describe how this legislation will curb the ability of federal judges to engage in judicial activism. The first reform would require a three judge panel to hear and issue interlocutory and permanent injunctions regarding challenged laws at the district court level. The current system allows a single federal judge to restrain the enforcement, operation and execution of challenged federal or state laws, including initiatives. There have been many instances where an activist judge has used this power to overturn a ballot initiative only to have his or her order overturned by a higher court years later. One need only remember how Proposition 209, a ballot initiative passed by the voters which prohibited affirmative action in California, was held in abeyance after a district court judge issued an injunction barring its enforcement to understand how the three judge panel provision may in fact play a role in ensuring that the will of the people is not wrongfully thwarted. The injunction was subsequently overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which ruled that the law was constitutional. A three judge panel perhaps may have ruled correctly initially, allowing the democratic process to work properly while also saving taxpayer dollars. Obviously, I have no problem with a court declaring a law unconstitutional when it violates the written text of the Constitution. It is, however, inappropriate when a judge attempts to act like a legislator and imposes his own policy preference on the citizens of a state. Such an action weakens respect for the federal judiciary, creates cynicism in the voting public, and costs governments millions of dollars in legal fees. By requiring a ruling by a three judge panel to overturn the validity of a State law, the proposed law would eliminate the ability of one activist judge to unilaterally bar enforcement of a law or ballot initiative through an interlocutory or permanent injunction. In addition, new time limits on injunctive relief would be imposed. A temporary restraining order would remain in force no more than 10 days, and an interlocutory injunction no more than 60 days. After the expiration of an interlocutory injunction, federal courts would lack the authority to grant any additional interlocutory relief but would still have the power to issue a permanent injunction. These limitations are designed to prevent the federal judiciary from indefinitely barring implementation of challenged laws by issuing endless injunctions, and facilitate the appeals process by motivating courts to speedily handle constitutional challenges. What this reform essentially does is encourage the federal judiciary to rule on the merits of a case, and not use injunctions to keep a challenged law from going into effect or being heard by an appeals court through the use of delaying tactics. The bill also proposes to require that a notice of appeal must be filed not more than fourteen days after the date of an order granting an interlocutory injunction and the appeals court would lack jurisdiction over an untimely appeal of such an order. The court of appeals would apply a de novo standard of review before reconsidering the merits of granting relief, but not less than 100 days after the issuance of the original order granting interlocutory relief. If the interlocutory order is upheld on appeal, the order would remain in force no longer than 60 days after the date of the appellate decision or until replaced by a permanent injunction. The bill also proposes limitations on the remedial authority of federal courts. In any civil action where prospective relief or a consent judgment binds state and local officials, relief would be terminated upon the motion of any party or intervener: (a) Five years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief; (b) two years after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief; or (c) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of this act, two years after the date of enactment. Parties could agree to terminate or modify an injunction before relief is available if it otherwise would be legally permissible. Courts would promptly rule on motions to modify or terminate this relief and in the event that a motion is not ruled on within 60 days, the order or consent judgment binding state and local officials would automatically terminate. However, prospective relief would not terminate if the federal court makes written findings based on the record that relief remains necessary to correct an ongoing violation of a federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation and is the least intrusive means available to correct the violation of a federal right. Moreover, this measure would also prohibit a federal court from having the authority to order a unit of state or local government to increase taxes as part of a judicial remedy. When an unelected federal judge has the power to order tax increases, this results in taxation without representation. Americans have fought against unfair taxation since the Revolutionary War, and this bill would prevent unfair judicial taxation and leave the power to tax to elected representatives of the people. The bill would not limit the authority of a federal court to order a remedy which may lead a unit of local or state government to decide to increase taxes. A federal court would still have the power to issue a money judgment against a State because the court would not be attempting to restructure local government entities or mandating a particular method or structure of State or local financing. This bill also doesn't limit the remedial authority of State courts in any case, including cases raising issues of federal law. All the bill does is prevent federal courts from having the power to order elected representatives to raise taxes. This is moderate reform which prevents judicial activism and unfair taxation while preserving the federal courts power to order remedial measures. Another important provision of the bill would prevent a federal court from prohibiting State or local officials from re-prosecuting a defendant. This legislation is designed to clarify that federal habeas courts lack the authority to bar retrial as a remedy. This part of the legislation was co-sponsored by Congressman Pitts and Senator Specter in response to a highly-publicized murder case in the Congressman's district. Sixteen year old Laurie Show was harrassed, stalked and assaulted for six months by the defendant, who had a vendetta against Show for briefly dating the defendant's boyfriend. After luring Show's mother from their residence, the defendant and an accomplice forcefully entered the Show home, held the victim down, and slit her throat with a butcher knife, killing her. After the defendant was convicted in state court, she filed a habeas petition in which she alleged prosecutorial misconduct and averred her actual innocence. A federal district court judge not only accepted this argument and released the defendant, but he also took the extraordinary step of barring state and local officials from reprosecuting the woman. This judge even went so far as to state that the defendant was the ``first and foremost victim of this affair.'' Congress has long supported the ability of a federal court to fashion creative remedies to preserve constitutional protections, but the additional step of barring state or local officials from reprosecution is without precedent and an unacceptable intrusion on the rights of States. This bill, if enacted, will prevent this type of judicial activism from ever occurring again. This bill also contains provisions for the termination of prospective relief when it is no longer warranted to cure a violation of a federal right. Once a violation that was the subject of a consent decree has been corrected, a consent decree must be terminated unless the court finds that an ongoing violation of a federal right exists, the specific relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right. The party opposing the termination of relief has the burden of demonstrating why the relief should not be terminated, and the court is required to grant the motion to terminate if the opposing party fails to meet its burden. These provisions prevent consent decrees from remaining in effect once a proper remedy has been implemented, thereby preventing judges from imposing consent decrees that go beyond the requirements of law. The proposed reform law also includes provisions designed to dissuade prisoners from filing frivolous and malicious motions by requiring that the complainant prisoner pay for the costs of the filings. These provisions will undoubtedly curb the number of frivolous motions filed by prisoners and thus, relieve the courts of the obligation to hear these vacuous motions designed to mock and frustrate the judicial system. Finally, the bill proposes to prevent federal judges from entering or carrying out any prisoner release order that would result in the release from or nonadmission to a prison on the basis of prison conditions. This provision effectively will preclude activist judges from circumventing mandatory minimum sentencing laws by stripping federal judges of jurisdiction to enter such orders. This will ensure that the tough sentencing laws approved by voters to keep murderers, rapists, and drug dealers behind bars for lengthy terms will not be ignored by activist judges who improperly use complaints of prison conditions filed by convicts as a vehicle to release violent offenders back on to our streets. It will also prevent any federal judge from ever endangering families and children in our communities by preventing these judges from releasing prisoners based on prison conditions. Congress repeatedly has tried to ensure that convicted prisoners stay where they belong: in prison for the term to which they were sentenced. This effort has been ongoing for over 10 years. Consider the following examples: (1) In 1987, Congress passed the Sentencing Guidelines which effectively limited the probation of prisoners; (2) the 1994 Crime Bill contained incentives for States to pass Truth in Sentencing Laws which kept convicted prisoners incarcerated for longer periods; and (3) the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996 allowed for the revocation of good time credit if prisoners filed malicious, repetitive and frivolous law suits while in prison. The reform bill being introduced today will further Congress' ongoing efforts to provide safer streets for all Americans by ensuring that convicted prisoners who pose a danger to our communities are not released prior to the expiration of their mandated sentences. This timely legislation is a measured effort to improve the way the federal judiciary works. It is not an attempt to infringe upon judicial independence. To the contrary, this reform bill is a sensible, balanced attempt to promote judicial efficiency and to prevent egregious judicial activism. I encourage all of my colleagues to act swiftly on and support this truly needed legislation.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am today, once again, introducing a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. In so doing, I continue the effort that I and many of my colleagues have long pursued to provide a permanent and strong mandate for a fiscally responsible path for our Nation. It is a political reality, of course, that Congress' success in decreasing our deficit levels and achieving a balanced budget in the 105th Congress to a certain extent mitigated the urgency of passing this Constitutional Amendment. In my view, however, this is the ideal time to move forward on a constitutional amendment. The fact that we have reached a balanced budget has shown that it can be done. Significantly, it has refuted the arguments and scare tactics of opponents that a balanced budget would mean the end of Social Security and Medicare. Rather, we now have a record to demonstrate the strong benefits of a balanced budget to our economy in general and to each segment of our society in particular. I am as proud as any Member of this body of our recent success in restraining the deficit. But that success does not mean that this amendment is no longer necessary. Our history, unfortunately, demonstrates that the fiscal discipline of recent years is the exception, not the rule. The political incentives in this town to spend now and pay later remain. Thus, it is as true now as it always been that only a structural change in our basic charter can ensure long term fiscal responsibility and a secure future for our children and grandchildren. This is a matter that remains vital to the economic health of the State of Utah and the Nation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to the introduce the Four Corners Monument Interpretive Center Act. The Four Corners is the only location in our nation where the boundaries of four states meet at one point. Each year more than a quarter of a million visitors from around the world brave heat and discomfort to visit the Four Corners. This legislation will provide basic amenities to these travelers and provide an important economic opportunity for the Indian Nations who share the Four Corners area. The Four Corners area is unique for reasons other than the makeup of its political boundaries. This location was home to some of the earliest Americans, the Anasazi people. Little known about this ancient people, but the Four Corners area contains many of the clues left behind to help us learn about their society. This heritage has created an area of rich historical, archeological, and cultural significance as well as natural beauty. In more recent history, in 1949, the Governors of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah met at the Four Corners Monument for a historic meeting. Each Governor sat in his state's corner and ate a picnic lunch together. The governors pledged to meet every so often to reaffirm their commitment to working together for the good of the four states and for the Four Corners region. This year marks the 50th anniversary of that historic meeting. I think we should reaffirm their commitment to cooperation by establishing this center that will promote opportunity in this region. This legislation is important for the Navajo Nation and the Mountain Utes who share control of the existing Four Corners Monument. And, we must be clear what we mean by ``monument.'' In contrast to the 1.7 million acre Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument recently declared by President Clinton, the ``monument'' that marks the spot at Four Corners is a simple concrete disk containing the four states' seals. Native Americans have set up small open air stalls around the monument to exhibit and sell their native crafts. But, there is no electricity, no running water, no permanent restroom facilities, and no phone service in the area. The interpretive center provided by this legislation would not only assist these Native Americans economically, but it would provide a valuable resource to visitors who would like to learn more about the culture, history, and environment of the Four Corners region. Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that this bill reflects the initiative of the local tribes and elected officials. This is not a federal imposition, but federal support of sustainable economic development in an area that is in desperate need of it. The Four Corners Heritage Council, which is comprised of tribal leaders, local government and private sectors leaders, has been instrumental in developing this bill. Not only will the interpretive center benefit the local tribes, but it will help to create more interest among tourists of other attractions and sites in the entire Four Corners region. Within a 100 mile radius of the monument there are multiple sites and parks for the enjoyment of tourists, such as Zion National Park, Arches National Park, the Grand Canyon, Rainbow Bridge, Hovenweep, Mesa Verde, and much, much, more. Because of its central location, the center would act as a staging ground for the entire Colorado Plateau. That this proposal reflects the needs of so many in the area, is reflected by the strong support among all the region's tribal and local governments, and the San Juan Forum, which represents federal state and local interests in the four states. The Albuquerque Tribune editorialized last year that ``the project merits New Mexico's strong support.'' The state of Arizona has already set aside $250,000 for their share of the project. In addition, the Arizona Department of Transportation has produced draft plans for the new center and for the road changes that would be required. The other states have also shown interest as well, which is important as they will be required to match the $2 million authorized by this bill for the project. Mr. President, this bill represents cooperation of federal, state, local, and tribal governments in an effort to reaffirm our ties to our past while building for our future. I urge my colleagues to give this proposal their full support.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to the introduce the Four Corners Monument Interpretive Center Act. The Four Corners is the only location in our nation where the boundaries of four states meet at one point. Each year more than a quarter of a million visitors from around the world brave heat and discomfort to visit the Four Corners. This legislation will provide basic amenities to these travelers and provide an important economic opportunity for the Indian Nations who share the Four Corners area. The Four Corners area is unique for reasons other than the makeup of its political boundaries. This location was home to some of the earliest Americans, the Anasazi people. Little known about this ancient people, but the Four Corners area contains many of the clues left behind to help us learn about their society. This heritage has created an area of rich historical, archeological, and cultural significance as well as natural beauty. In more recent history, in 1949, the Governors of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah met at the Four Corners Monument for a historic meeting. Each Governor sat in his state's corner and ate a picnic lunch together. The governors pledged to meet every so often to reaffirm their commitment to working together for the good of the four states and for the Four Corners region. This year marks the 50th anniversary of that historic meeting. I think we should reaffirm their commitment to cooperation by establishing this center that will promote opportunity in this region. This legislation is important for the Navajo Nation and the Mountain Utes who share control of the existing Four Corners Monument. And, we must be clear what we mean by ``monument.'' In contrast to the 1.7 million acre Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument recently declared by President Clinton, the ``monument'' that marks the spot at Four Corners is a simple concrete disk containing the four states' seals. Native Americans have set up small open air stalls around the monument to exhibit and sell their native crafts. But, there is no electricity, no running water, no permanent restroom facilities, and no phone service in the area. The interpretive center provided by this legislation would not only assist these Native Americans economically, but it would provide a valuable resource to visitors who would like to learn more about the culture, history, and environment of the Four Corners region. Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that this bill reflects the initiative of the local tribes and elected officials. This is not a federal imposition, but federal support of sustainable economic development in an area that is in desperate need of it. The Four Corners Heritage Council, which is comprised of tribal leaders, local government and private sectors leaders, has been instrumental in developing this bill. Not only will the interpretive center benefit the local tribes, but it will help to create more interest among tourists of other attractions and sites in the entire Four Corners region. Within a 100 mile radius of the monument there are multiple sites and parks for the enjoyment of tourists, such as Zion National Park, Arches National Park, the Grand Canyon, Rainbow Bridge, Hovenweep, Mesa Verde, and much, much, more. Because of its central location, the center would act as a staging ground for the entire Colorado Plateau. That this proposal reflects the needs of so many in the area, is reflected by the strong support among all the region's tribal and local governments, and the San Juan Forum, which represents federal state and local interests in the four states. The Albuquerque Tribune editorialized last year that ``the project merits New Mexico's strong support.'' The state of Arizona has already set aside $250,000 for their share of the project. In addition, the Arizona Department of Transportation has produced draft plans for the new center and for the road changes that would be required. The other states have also shown interest as well, which is important as they will be required to match the $2 million authorized by this bill for the project. Mr. President, this bill represents cooperation of federal, state, local, and tribal governments in an effort to reaffirm our ties to our past while building for our future. I urge my colleagues to give this proposal their full support.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on an issue of great and escalating importance: database piracy. While perhaps not an issue on the tips of most Americans' tongues, it is nevertheless an issue that has garnered considerable attention in recent years both in the United States and in international forums. The 106th Congress is now the third consecutive Congress in which database legislation will be considered. This is an appropriate reflection of the fact that while intellectual property has become the heart of our Nation's economy, information is its lifeblood. Utahns are interested in an appropriate balance of interest here. Utah is a leader in the hi-tech and information industries, and is home to both producers and users of information and database collections. Utah is blessed with world class scientists and scholars, genealogists, and computer and hi-tech companies that create new information, organize information, and use information--often using information created by others in innovative ways to create new information or to make it more easily or inexpensively accessible. I would guess that most of my colleagues would find that similarly in their own home states that many of their constituents are interested in this issue at some level because so many are producers or users of information, and often both. American database providers render an invaluable service by collecting, organizing, and disseminating billions of bits of information from myriad sources of every possible sector of our economy. They give us such widely-used tools as phone books, directories, catalogs, almanacs, encyclopedias, and other reference guides. They provide specialized products like statistical abstracts, medical and pharmaceutical reference tools, stock quotes, pricing guides, genealogical data and countless other sources of information for businesses, researchers, scientists, educators, and consumers. Indeed, it is the information they collect that allows us to predict the weather, to treat disease, to preserve our national security, to use computers to communicate over global networks, like the Internet, to travel, to buy a home, and even to watch the evening news. It is not surprising that the cost of creating and maintaining accurate, reliable, and user-friendly databases is significant. Yet, the commercial viability of these products has, for many years, served as an incentive to investment and spawned a thriving information industry in the United States. Nevertheless, events in the past several years have caused some to question the continued viability of these products, raising the question of whether current law is sufficient to maintain the same sort of incentives that have served to keep the United States on the cutting edge of the information age. The most debated among these is perhaps the 1991 decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, in which the Supreme Court rejected the so-called ``sweat of the brow'' theory as a basis for copyright protection for databases. Under Feist, the degree of labor and investment associated with producing a database is irrelevant to the question of copyrightability. Rather, a database may be protected by copyright only where it exhibits a minimum level of originality in the selection and arrangement of its contents. And, even then, the copyright in the database is said to be ``thin'' in that it extends only to the original selection and arrangement of the material but does not protect against the wholesale appropriation of the facts themselves. Thus, Feist made clear that a database owner who spends several years and a substantial amount of money to respond to an unmet market for data cannot look to copyright law for protection against a competitor who seeks ``to reap where he has not sown'' by reproducing and commercializing the same information in a different format, so long as the competing product does not copy the original selection or arrangement of the underlying information, if any. For example, in Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. v. Dunhill Int'l List Co., No. 88-6767-CIV- ROETTGER (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1994), the court held that wholesale copying of attorney's names, addresses, and other information from the Martindale-Hubbell directory for inclusion in a competing directly was not infringing. Having no recourse to copyright law, such database producers must rely on state law regimes of contract and unfair competition to protect their investment. While there has been an ongoing and healthy debate as to whether such protections are sufficient, it is clear that the varying nature of the patchwork of state laws has led, at the very least, to some uncertainty among database producers regarding the degree of protection they may expect. Also of growing importance is the effect of technology on the database industry as a whole. To a large extent, technology has been the fire that has fueled the growth of the database industry. Many also look to emerging technology as the solution to many of the problems sought to be addressed in the current debate. But while technological measures for protecting databases are still emerging, current technology has greatly contributed to the uncertainty that surrounds existing database protections. As databases move from hard-bound printed text versions to fully searchable electronic information-bases, selection and arrangement of the material becomes less important, and copyright protection is further removed. Thus, a database that in print form might be protected by copyright based on its arrangement of facts would likely no be protected by copyright when the same information is placed in a searchable electronic database where the arrangement of the facts is unimportant. And the digital networked environment has made piracy of databases much easier, both in terms of the facility of reproduction and in terms of the ease of unauthorized access to the contents of the database itself. Finally, recent international proposals for database legislation and have heightened awareness of database piracy and prompted a greater sense of urgency among some to elevate the level of protection for databases in the United States. Most significant among these is the 1996 directive of the European Union requiring its member states to adopt certain protections for both copyrightable and noncopyrightable databases by January 1, 1998. Of particular relevance is a provision withholding protection for those databases produced in countries that do not afford a similar level of protection for European databases. Thus, failure by the United States to exact legislation extending federal protection to noncopyrightable databases will likely result in the withholding of protection for American databases in Europe--a significant market for U.S. database providers. Mr. President, I have long been on record as supporting some form of federal protection to fill the gap of protection created by Feist for those databases that are the result of significant effort and investment. Nearly 2 years ago I initiated a process that I hoped would enable Congress to balance the varied interests at stake in order to preserve appropriate incentives for investment in information while promoting the widest possible dissemination of information, as well as the greatest innovation in making information inexpensive and easy to use. I began this process by asking the Copyright Office to conduct a comprehensive study of the issues involved and to make recommendations to the Judiciary Committee. The Register of Copyrights and her staff did an outstanding job in responding to my request, and the Copyright Office issued a formal report in August 1997, shortly before the 104th Congress adjourned. Congressman Coble, chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in the House of Representatives, spearheaded the effort to report database legislation in the 105th Congress. His subcommittee reported legislation, which was ultimately passed twice by the House of Representatives in the 105th Congress--once under suspension of the rules an then again as title V of the H.R. 2281, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. I commend him for the hard work that he has done and for his work in bringing the various parties together on this particular issue. As my Senate colleagues will recall, while the Coble bill encountered very limited opposition on the House floor, it proved to be more controversial in the Senate. In order to address the outstanding concerns of various information users, I requested that the parties sit down under the auspices of the Judiciary Committee to discuss their differences and seek a resolution that was favorable to all. These discussions went on almost daily for approximately three weeks, and considerable progress was made. Based on these meetings, I put forward a series of discussion drafts that sought to narrow the gaps and arrive at an acceptable solution. While ultimately a solution could not be reached before the Congress adjourned, we did make considerable progress. Each of these discussion drafts represented an additional step toward a resolution, and I believe that in the end we were close to a workable compromise. As we begin the 106th Congress, I want to stand before my colleagues to reiterate my commitment to the timely enactment of database legislation. There are many people that stand to be affected by such legislation, and many points of view about what the proper approach should be. While I am not wedded to a specific proposal or a particular approach, I do believe that any bill should keep in mind the dual priorities of providing the protections necessary to ensure the continued proliferation of databases in the United States and of protecting widespread access to and dissemination of information. In an effort to build upon the progress we made in the Senate last year, I am sharing with my colleagues a discussion draft that is identical to the last of the discussion drafts I offered last year. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this draft be included in the Record immediately after my statement.

Mr. HATCH. By putting forward this particular draft I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily the appropriate starting point for debate in the 106th Congress. Provisions of this draft must be read in light of the circumstances in which they were written, mainly the consideration of the conference report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It does, however, represent a number of significant advances toward consensus as well as ideas and principles that I expect will prove useful in crafting a database bill that meets the above- stated objectives. For these reasons I commend it to my colleagues for their consideration. But there are other approaches we should be cognizant of as we work toward the best possible solution. First, there is a broad unfair competition model that approaches in some ways a property rights model. The foremost example of this approach has been the House's bills over the past few years. I understand that Chairman Coble has introduced a bill in the House that largely reflects the bill that passed by the House last year and that he will be seeking to forge a consensus in the House based on that proposal. I am pleased that he has made this a priority again this year, and I look forward to working with him as I have been privileged to do on so many prior occasions. For the reference of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Coble's bill be printed in the Record as an exemple of the broad model of database protection.

Mr. HATCH. Second, there are many who believe a narrower unfair competition model is preferable to the model set forth in the Coble bill. One such proposal has been proposed by certain commercial database users, with the support of the scientific, education, and library communities. I ask unanimous consent that this proposal also be printed in the Record.

Mr. HATCH. I include this proposal in the Record hoping that it will also help our deliberations be more fully informed and spur discussion of the merits of each approach. The existence of, and my dissemination of, these various approaches, however, should not be used to delay prompt action on this important issue. In short, Mr. President, as we rapidly approach the new millennium, it is time for Congress to act to ensure adequate federal protection for American investment in information. I intend this to be a high priority in the Judiciary Committee this year and intend to move forward with hearings and timely consideration of appropriate legislation. I look forward to working with the interested parties in an effort to build consensus in this area, and I encourage my colleagues to join with me in support of this process. Exhibit 1

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to discuss for the benefit of my colleagues a matter of great importance--consideration this Congress of legislation to reauthorize the Department of Justice. It has been nearly two decades since Congress has passed a general authorization bill for the Department of Justice. It is in my view a matter of significant concern when any major cabinet department goes for such a long period of time without congressional reauthorization. Such lack of reauthorization encourages administrative drift, and permits important policy decisions to be made ad hoc through the adoption appropriations bills or special purpose legislation. However, these concerns are amplified when the department in question is of such central importance to our national life as is the Department of Justice. The Department is entrusted critical duty of primary responsibility for the enforcement of our Nation's laws. Through its divisions and agencies including the FBI and DEA, it investigates and prosecutes violations of federal criminal laws protects the civil rights of our citizens, enforces the antitrust laws, and represents every department and agency of the United States Government in litigation. Increasingly, its mission is international as well, protecting the interests of the United States and its people from growing threats of trans-national crime and international terrorism. And, among the Department's key duties is providing assistance and advice to state and local law enforcement. The growing importance of the Department's role is demonstrated by the growth of its budget in the last two decades. In fiscal year 1979, the Department of Justice's budget was just $2.538 billion, and represented one half of one percent of the federal government's $559 billion budget. In fiscal year 1999, the Department of Justice's budget is more than seven times greater--an estimated $18.2 billion, representing about 1 percent of the $1.75 trillion federal budget. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I would like to advise my colleagues that a major priority of the committee this year will be the reauthorization of the Department of Justice. Last Congress, the Judiciary Committee reported a bipartisan, 3-year Justice Department reauthorization bill which was sponsored by myself and the distinguished ranking member, Senator Leahy. Unfortunately, this legislation, which was similar to a bill passed by the House of Representatives, never received consideration by the full Senate. In the next several weeks, I will reintroduce legislation to reauthorize the Department of justice. The Judiciary Committee will redouble its efforts to address this important issue. I look forward to continuing reports to my colleagues on the important issue of Department of Justice reauthorization, and to working with each of my colleagues on this matter.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, 14 years ago, when I served as Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, I teamed up with Representative Henry Waxman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, to lead passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. The bottom line of this law was to improve the health of the American people. The statute accomplishes this in two primary ways: First, it essentially created the market for more moderately priced generic drugs by allowing generic manufacturers to demonstrate their equivalence to pioneer products without duplicating all of the original safety and efficacy data. Relieved of this costly burden, generic drug firms can provide their products at competitive prices which are attractive to many consumers. Second, pioneer drug firms became eligible for restoration of some of the patent term lost due to the extensive FDA review of safety and efficacy that all new drugs must undergo. This partial restoration of patent term--up to five years in certain circumstances when such restoration would not result in a greater than 14 year effective patent life--allowed pioneer drug firms additional time to recoup the enormous investments required to bring a new drug to market. This helped attract the investment capital that pioneer firms need to develop the next generation of life-saving drugs. Consumers benefit from this win-win dynamic because the American public gets both new drugs and competitively priced off-patent medications. As we start the 15th year since the enactment of this important health and consumer law, we have a generic pharmaceutical sector that has developed into an integral part of the health care system, which together with innovator pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies lead the world in the development and marketing of new health care products. While I think that the track record of the Hatch-Waxman Act is enviable, I hope that we can even do better for the American public in the future. Accordingly, I intend to devote time during the next Congress to begin the necessary examination into how we can make changes in the law that will increase our ability to produce both the innovative products that we have come to expect and the lower priced generic products that are so attractive to the family budget. I intend for this examination to include a serious study of how well the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Extension Act has functioned over the past 14 years, whether the Act has fulfilled its initial promise, how the courts have interpreted the Act, and indeed, how it has been implemented. I hope to work closely in this endeavor with my good friend and colleague Senator Jim Jeffords, Chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, which shares jurisdiction over the Act with the Judiciary Committee. A major test of such a review will be to assemble a package of initiatives that will retain the delicate but essential balance between the innovator and generic sectors of the industry. This will be a difficult task but it is a worthwhile endeavor for the American people. Even during this session of Congress, some have proposed changes to our nation's drug discovery laws. There has, for example, been some discussion about changing one of the most controversial provisions of the 1984 law--the so-called Bolar Amendment. Section 271(e) of the Title 35, contains language to overturn a 1984 Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in the case of Roche v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which held that conducting the tests required to secure approval of generic copies of pioneer drugs constituted patent infringement. Section 271(e)(1) establishes an exception to patent infringement laws to authorize generic pharmaceutical companies to conduct testing on patent approved pharmaceutical products for purpose of filing an abbreviated new drug application. Recently, the application of section 271(e)(1) has been a matter of some controversy in an on-going legal battle between two pioneer drug firms, one company holding existing patent protection and FDA product approval and the other company asserting its own patent rights and seeking pioneer rather than generic approval from FDA. While ultimately the courts must decide whether this is a case of patent infringement, it is clear that this is not merely a simple, garden variety patent infringement case because it also raises the question of precisely what type activities that section 271(e)(1) should allow, and should not allow, in the context of developing not only generic drugs but new drugs and biologicals that they potentially compete directly with. While I do not take a position on the merits of the actual patent rights in dispute in the current Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel litigation, I must say this case is of some concern to me, especially with regard to court's initial findings which are not consistent with, and broaden, Congress' intent in enacting 271(e). I do believe Congress would be wise to reassess the breadth of section 271(e)(1) in light of this and a number of court decisions since 1984 that have tended to expand the scope of this provision. One case in particular is the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Lilly v. Medtronic. My position on these questionable decisions has been clear for some time. I was, in fact, a signatory to an amicus brief in the Lilly case that argued for a somewhat narrower interpretation of 271(e)(1) than has evolved in the courts. One proposal worthy of serious consideration is to more clearly limit the applicability of 271(e)(1) to exclude testing and other activities necessary for approval of NDAs and BLAs from the patent infringement exemption. Of course, the 271(e)(1) question is only one of many issues that will undoubtedly be proper for further discussion in the next Congress. Some are concerned about whether drugs that were already in FDA review at the time of enactment of Hatch-Waxman (the ``pipeline drugs'') have received adequate and fair patent protections in view of subsequent delays that were encountered. Congress should undertake complete review of this proposal during our study of Waxman-Hatch next year, as I believe the evidence will show that there are inequalities we should take steps to remediate. Others are concerned about the application of the 180 day generic drug exclusivity rule in the aftermath of the Mova decision. Indeed, some are advocating report language that will give FDA new leeway to adopt a ``first-to-succeed'' in patent litigation approach rather than the ``first-to-file'' an ANDA that the courts have found. Frankly, I have concerns about the current outcome whereby some ANDA applicants appear to be handsomely rewarded by pioneer firms for not selling generic competitors. Still others advocate in the spirit of international harmonization adopting the European rule of a 10 year marketing exclusivity period for all new drugs. And others point out that the advent of the new GATT-required 20 year from filing patent term may change the traditional incentives in coordinating PTO and FDA approvals. It is time, some argue, to do away completely with current rule by which only 5 years of patent life may be restored to compensate time lost at FDA and only if the effective patent term does not exceed 14 years. Some would also like to revise the rule that limits patent restoration for time lost during the IND phase in a for each 2-days lost, 1-day restored ratio. On the generic side of the industry, there is concern that as NDA approvals speed up due to user fees, generic approvals continue to lag and take much longer than NDAs. There is also great frustration about what some describe as challenges to the bioequivalence of generic products that are more a delaying and harassing tactic than a bona fide scientific dispute. And then, there are those in the generic industry who believe that FDA's Orange Book, which records the patents in effect for FDA approved drugs, should be renamed as the ``Evergreen Book''! So there are many issues that merit consideration as we reassess the adequacy of the laws pertaining to the generic and pioneer sectors of the pharmaceutical industry. Our focus should be on ascertaining what steps we can take that will most benefit the American people in terms of providing incentives both for the development of new drugs and the production of competitively priced generic products. This has and will continue to require a delicate balance. There is an inherent tension between the twin goals discovering the next generation of drugs while at the same time providing generic versions of today's medications. My goal is to reconcile these somewhat conflicting but wholly meritorious goals in the interest of the American people, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in the House and Senate on this complex issue next year.