Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. I was saying, if it was up to the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from Utah, I believe we would have the will to do what is right.

Mr. HATCH. Let me just finish. But the problem is, it is not up to just the two of us. It has been up to everybody in Congress for 28 years of unbalanced budgets. I know that people do not like these two stacks because they are embarrassing. It is embarrassing to me to have to point to these and say for the 21 years I have been here, these have been unbalanced. For all of those 21 years I fought for a balanced budget amendment. But I have to say, we do not have the will. It is apparent and we are not going to have the will unless we do something about it constitutionally, where everybody will have to face the music. Right now they do not. And where some on our side love more defense spending and some of the Democrat side love more social spending in ways that may be irresponsible, under the balanced budget amendment I think we are going to all have to be more responsible. I just wish--this is an erstwhile wish, I understand--but I wish my colleague from West Virginia were on our side on this, because I think it would be a much easier amendment to pass. But I understand why he is not, and I know how sincere he is. But, like Paul of old--

Mr. HATCH. Like Paul of old, who held the coats--

Mr. HATCH. The man who held the coats of the men who stoned the first Christian martyr, he is sincerely wrong.

Mr. HATCH. Paul was, yes, for holding the coats of those who stoned the first Christian martyr, Stephen. Paul was sincere. He meant what he said. He really was sincere. But he was wrong.

Mr. HATCH. I don't think so. Sometimes going back in history is a very good thing to do.

Mr. HATCH. I do. I would feel much better.

Mr. HATCH. So am I.

Mr. HATCH. No, I didn't say that. I said the amendment does not mandate a balanced budget. I think this amendment will lead us to a balanced budget.

Mr. HATCH. I will not go into that very much right now, but I think the Senator makes a very good point. One reason is the States do not print the money. No. 2 is some States cannot do much in the capital way because they do not have the money and they do not balance their budgets the way they should. No. 3 is that there are rating systems that make it possible for States to borrow on bonds, and they discipline the use of bonds by the States. There would be no similar system for the Federal Government. No. 4 is that, frankly, the Federal Government can create surpluses that should work. No. 5 is that the States, at least 44 of them, have balanced budget amendments. If they did not have their balanced budget amendments, many of them would not be balancing their budgets either, even with the capital budget. And they have done better than the Federal Government at restraining their borrowing. So there is no real comparison between the Federal Government and the States. There is nobody to keep the Federal Government in line without a balanced budget amendment. I think that is what this balanced budget amendment is all about. I appreciate my colleague. We have had a good debate. He certainly always raises very interesting issues and very pertinent issues and I think adds to the quality of the debate around here every time he comes on the floor. So I personally appreciate it. With regard to capital budgets, let me say OMB, CBO and GAO, among others, have opined that debt-financed capital budgets are not a good idea for the Federal Government. All of them have said that. See, for example, President Clinton's fiscal 1998 proposed budget. The Analytical Perspectives volume, I think on page 136, there are some remarks on this. The Clinton administration said, ``The rationale for borrowing to finance investment is not persuasive'' and that a ``capital budget is not a justification to relax current and proposed budget constraints.'' I agree. Besides the fact that the U.S. Government does not need to borrow to finance its investment, it is not subject to the constraints that families, business and States face. Families and businesses are disciplined by markets. States are disciplined by bond ratings. A Federal capital budget is bound to be abused. Future Congresses could redefine many kinds of spending as capital. It would be a monstrous loophole in the balanced budget amendment. Let me just say that I do agree with OMB, CBO, the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, that a Federal capital budget is not a good idea. Especially, I think, in the context of a constitutional amendment. So that is all I will say about it today. But I hope that is enough because a capital budget is really not the way to go constitutionally. But this amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, is the right way to go. It will help us to make some dents in what has been going on for the last 28 years at least, or should I say 58 of the last 66 years where we have had unbalanced budgets. Could I ask the Chair, how much time remains on both sides?

Mr. HATCH. Go ahead.

Mr. HATCH. Could I yield to the budget----

Mr. HATCH. I yield such time as he needs.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. HATCH. That is right.

Mr. HATCH. Right.

Mr. HATCH. Yes. In every vote in the House of Representatives.

Mr. HATCH. Let me finish. I cannot cite a single example in the Senate, but that is irrelevant. The fact is the reason we are writing the constitutional amendment is to provide a means whereby you have to have a constitutional majority, without worrying about the Vice President, who is not a Member of this body other than to preside, if he wants to, and break majority vote ties. We are saying that we need a constitutional majority of at least 51 Senators to resolve this problem, and at least 218 Members of the House. And since it is a constitutional amendment, we would be changing the current method of budgeting to require higher majority votes in order to waive the balanced budget amendment requirements. That is what we are doing.

Mr. HATCH. Sure.

Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HATCH. Because I do think I just need to make a couple more comments on the Vice President.

Mr. HATCH. Just to make the record. The question does arise, as the Senator phrased, as to how Senate Joint Resolution 1 affects the obligations of the Vice President, as President of the Senate, to vote in case of a tie vote in the Senate. The answer is that a balanced budget amendment does not change the Constitution's basic reliance on simple majority votes or the Vice President's role in casting a vote in those cases where Senators are equally divided. Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.'' By the plain meaning of this provision, the Vice President is not a member of the Senate. He is merely the Presiding Officer, the President of the Senate, a neutral empire, and thus cannot vote or take part in the deliberations of the Senate. And even though our current Vice President is a former member of the Senate, he is no longer a member of the Senate. He is a member of the executive branch. But he does have that function. The only exception to this is where there exists a tie vote. In that case to ``secure at all times the possibility of a definitive resolution of the body, it is necessary that the Vice President should have only a casting vote.'' That was taken from Federalist Paper No. 68 written by Hamilton. But the situation where the Vice President can break a tie vote only applies to a simple majority vote, the run-of-the-mill ordinary vote of the Senate. It very seldom happens but it can happen under those circumstances. Where the Constitution, however, provides for a supermajority vote, in situations where the Framers of the Constitution feared the passions of the majority rule would retard reasoned deliberation, there really is no occasion for a tie vote, and therefore the Vice President may not vote. These include the two-thirds requirement of each House to override a veto. When the President formally rejects legislation passed by both Houses of Congress, the drafters of the Constitution contemplated the simple democratic majoritarian rule does not serve the best interests of this country. A constitutional majority will not even do in that instance. Congress may override the President's veto only by a supermajority vote. The two-thirds vote requirement of the Senate to give its advice and consent to treaties and the two-thirds vote requirement of the Senate to convict on impeachment are other examples where the Vice President has absolutely no vote whatsoever. I add the votes on cloture. You are going to have at least 60 votes in order to invoke cloture. You could go on I think. In each of these cases the Vice President has no role in casting a deciding vote. The balanced budget amendment supermajority provisions, whether the three-fifths number of the whole number of each House of Congress--that section 1 waiver to allow outlays to exceed receipts; section 2 waiver to increase the limit on the debt, or the constitutional majority provisions--a majority of the whole number of each House--section 4 requirement to raise revenue, section 5 requirement to waive amendment when the United States is involved in military action that is a threat to national security--would work the same way as the Constitution's other supermajority provisions. Because these supermajority provisions require a majority vote of the whole number of each House of Congress, and it is clear that the Vice President is not a Member of either House, these provisions, like the two-thirds vote in the Senate for treaties, is an exception to the simple majority vote general rule that the Vice President may vote in cases of a tie in the Senate. Moreover, with a supermajority requirement, a tie vote is meaningless. For instance, 60 votes in the Senate would be required to raise the debt ceiling, where a three-fifths vote is required under section 2 of this amendment, and 51 votes would be needed to raise taxes as required by section 4. A 40 to 40 vote or even a 50 to 50 vote does not meet that requirement. Therefore, the Vice President would have no role in casting a deciding vote. But that does not in any way diminish his constitutional authority. Madam President, what we are debating here is very important. What the balanced budget amendment does is establish a constitutional requirement that Congress live within its means, that we quit doing this to America, as represented by these 28 years in a row of unbalanced budgets since 1969. All the supermajority requirements are saying is that if Congress wants to waive the Constitution, a simple majority will not do. You have to have a true majority--in the case of the section 4 requirement to raise revenue and section 5 requirement to waive the amendment when the United States is involved in a military action that is a threat to national security--or a supermajority in the case of the section 1 waiver of the balanced budget requirement or the section 2 waiver of the debt limit. And every Senator and every Congressman must be on record and thereby accountable to his or her constituency. Now, I have at least 3 or 4 hours more that I could go on on this subject.

Mr. HATCH. All right.

Mr. HATCH. Right.

Orrin Hatch

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