Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Yes.

Mr. HATCH. The Vice President would not have a right to vote here, but he doesn't have a right to vote for this amendment either.

Mr. HATCH. That is correct, just like a vote for this constitutional amendment excludes the Vice President, and countless other votes exclude the Vice President.

Mr. HATCH. We are saying precisely the opposite. We are saying to keep this country secure, to have this country remain the greatest country in the world, quit spending it into bankruptcy and put some fiscal mechanism in the Constitution that requires us to quit spending it into bankruptcy. If we want to have a strong military, then, by gosh, let us be willing to stand up and vote for it. I have to tell you, this Senator for 21 years has been a strong supporter of a strong national security. I voted for virtually everything that would help this country and protect our young men and women. I think, in a time of imminent threat to this country, I have never seen a case since I have been here where liberals, moderates and conservatives alike would reject protecting our young men and women. We are not going to see it in that case. But I will tell you this, there is no justification whatsoever to put into this amendment the changes that the distinguished Senator from Connecticut wants, which would allow the amendment to be waived for almost any circumstances and, frankly, waived for what? Because they are going to spend more money on the military? Give me a break. It is going to be so they can continue spending the way they always have, so they can continue to build this mountain of paper, of national debt that we have had for 28 straight years, and out of the last 66 years, 58 years of debt. That is what we are trying to stop. If we want a strong military, if we want strong national security, if we want to protect ourselves from imminent threats, if we want to protect ourselves from war, if we want to protect ourselves from being invaded, if we want to protect ourselves and our allies, then by gosh we better get spending under control. And this balanced budget amendment is about the only thing the vast majority of us in Congress right now can think of that will help us to do it.

Mr. HATCH. What the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut would do is it would just plain make it so anybody could waive the balanced budget amendment for any reason at any time. And I guarantee it will not be waived to increase military spending.

Mr. HATCH. I am not getting emotional.

Mr. HATCH. I read that.

Mr. HATCH. I don't think so.

Mr. HATCH. No, I don't think it would.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, my colleague, as I can see, feels very deeply about his position. I am not casting aspersions on him. I know he is very sincere in what he is doing here today, but all we are saying is unless the President declares a war, which he has in his amendment, that this article can't be waived for a fiscal year, for any fiscal year unless the United States is ``engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, which becomes law.'' If we take what the distinguished Senator from Connecticut wants, then it would be a tremendous loophole. It would allow people who are not as sincere as he is to come in here and waive, on simple majority vote, the whole balanced budget amendment for almost any reason at all it will ruin our chance for fiscal responsibility. The Senator from Connecticut is confusing the question of congressional authorization of military action with spending measures. The balanced budget amendment has no effect on the ability of Congress to approve actions like Panama. It has no effect at all. What the balanced budget amendment does require is that when it comes to paying for those actions, that we act responsibly and only waive the amendment in the case of a declaration of war or if we have a three-fifths vote of both bodies to do so. It is just that simple. Or, if we actually are ``engaged in a military conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House,'' in other words, by a constitutional majority, that is all this amendment does. I think to a degree, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is mixing the President's Commander in Chief authority to act with congressional authority to provide resources. The Commander in Chief can act. There is nothing that stops the Commander in Chief from acting, and if the moneys are there, he can act in ways that utilize more money. But the fact of the matter is, if the moneys are not there, he or she is going to have to come up here and make a case, and I can't imagine where there is an imminent and serious military threat to national security that the Congress will not provide the necessary votes. We do not challenge the President's authority. Rather, the balanced budget amendment opponents resist congressional control over all spending, including defense, and that is really what is the thrust of this amendment, in the eyes of many. I respect my colleague from Connecticut. Yes, I get a little excited about these kind of amendments, too. The whole purpose of a balanced budget amendment is to give us some mechanism to try and stop this charade, and, frankly, I think most people in America, if they really look at it, become very cynical about Congress, because they see this charade that's been caused over 28 straight years now. They see us trying to find every way we can to spend more and more. Some are so cynical that they believe people around here spend so they can keep themselves in office and go home, beat their breasts, and say, ``Look what I have done for you.'' They never say ``with your own money, your own borrowed money.'' We are trying to stop this charade. We are trying to at least put some dents in it, and the balanced budget amendment might do that.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I think maybe we spent enough time on this. I would like to spend a few minutes replying to Senator Byrd, who I respect deeply and who is one of the people I most admire in this body. He spoke for about an hour and a half, an hour and 40 minutes this morning in a very intelligent and eloquent way, but I think there are a number of things about his remarks that do need to be clarified. Like I say, the text of section 1 of this amendment before the body is modest in length. It is very significant. It is language that has been worked out over many years in a bipartisan, bicameral way. Constitutional amendments are of great importance, and I would like to just take a few minutes to walk through the provisions of the balanced budget amendment and discuss how they would cure our so-called addiction to debt. The core provision of Senate Joint Resolution 1 is contained in section 1, which establishes, as a fiscal norm, the concept of a balanced budget amendment. That section mandates that: Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that year, unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House of Congress shall provide by law for a specific excess of outlays over receipts by a rollcall vote. This section does not require a particular process the Congress must follow in order to achieve a balanced budget. There are many equitable means of reaching that goal. Each program will have to compete on its own for the resources available. Thus, the balanced budget amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, does not dictate any particular fiscal strategy upon Congress. Section 1 also provides reasonable flexibility by providing for a waiver of the balanced budget amendment. In order to invoke this waiver, both Houses of Congress must provide by law for a specific default which must pass by a three-fifths rollcall vote. This careful balancing of incentives creates enough flexibility for Congress to deal with economic or other emergencies. However, the waiver will not be easy when a future Congress is simply trying to avoid the tough choices necessary to balance the budget. Many supporters of the balanced budget amendment have suggested that in the future it might be in the Nation's interest to plan to run a reasonable surplus to ensure easier compliance with its terms and to be able to begin to pay down the debt with any surplus funds. Another important aspect of this section is that in a year that the Congress chooses to waive the balanced budget rule, it must do so ``for a specific excess of outlays over receipts . . .'' That means that the maximum amount of deficit spending to be allowed must be clearly identified. By forcing Congress to identify and confront a particular deficit, this clause will prevent a waiver for a specific purpose, such as an economic downturn, from opening the door to a whole range of deficit-funded spending. Another key feature of section 1 is that it requires any waiver to be by rollcall vote. A rollcall vote will be required to ensure the required three-fifths vote has been recorded so that the American people will be able to see who stood for fiscal responsibility and who for adding more debt on our children's and grandchildren's heads. The balanced budget amendment will increase accountability in Government. Gone will be the days of late-night unrecorded voice votes to spend away America's future. If there is to be a deficit, the American people will know who wanted it and why they wanted it. They can make their own judgment as to who has the right priorities. Section 2 provides that: The limit on the debt of the United States held by the public shall not be increased, unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House shall provide by law for such an increase by a rollcall vote. So that is pretty clear. Section 2 works in tandem with section 1 to enforce the balanced budget amendment. Section 2 focuses public attention on the magnitude of Government indebtedness. To run a deficit, the Federal Government must borrow funds to cover its obligations. If borrowing will go beyond a previously enacted statutory limit, the balanced budget amendment will require a three- fifths vote in order to raise that limit. This section acts as an incentive to not only balance the budget in good times, but to start paying down the existing debt that is so high now that it is mind-boggling. By doing so, Congress will provide more flexibility for itself by opening more breathing room between the actual debt and the debt limit. This is, in truth, what we should have been doing for years. We hear so much about the recent and temporary decline in the annual deficit. It is amazing to me that some people consider a smaller increase in the debt a reason to celebrate. I do not think it is. The debt is still increasing. We must balance the budget. It is over $100 billion this year, that deficit. We must balance the budget and stop increasing the debt at all. Indeed, our goal should be to run a surplus during prosperous times so that we can start paying down the debt and meet threats to our national security. I wonder how a credit card company would respond if I told them that although my debt was more than three times my annual income, I overspent by less this year than I did last year. They would sure as heck cut me off, as they would any of us. Section 3 provides: Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to the Congress a proposed budget for the United States Government for that fiscal year, in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts. That is important. While this may not seem important to some people, consider how long it has been since we had a balanced budget--28 solid years now. These are all unbalanced budgets for 28 years. That is why this stack of books next to me is so high. The President's budget does not balance this year either. He claims it will get us to balance by 2002. I hope we can work with him to do that. But without a balanced budget amendment, I fear it is not going to happen. If you look at his budget, 75 percent of the cuts are in the last 2 years, when he is out of office. So it is pretty clear to me that it is not as sincere an attempt as I would like to see it. The President understands this game. His budget, like I say, saved 75 percent of the cuts for only after he leaves office--another plan to leave it to the future and let the next guy pay the bill. It is time for us to break our habit of deficit by default. People propose deficit spending in Washington without a second thought. I believe that by the simple action of having the President propose a budget that balances in that fiscal year, we will go a long way towards changing the debt-happy attitudes in this town and that, in turn, will help us stay in balance after we reach it. Section 4 requires approval by a majority of the whole number of each House by a rollcall vote for any bill to increase revenue. This will provide a responsible and balanced amount of tax limitation and improve congressional accountability for revenue measures. It is important to stop borrowing, but to unduly borrow burdens hard-working Americans and would also be deleterious to the Nation and to its citizens. Section 4 will help us to curb spending and taxing by requiring a majority of the whole Congress, not just those voting at a given time, and by forcing Members of Congress to go on record with a rollcall vote. These reforms are a crucial part of putting our fiscal house in order. Section 5 guarantees--and I will not read it; we have been reading that--but it guarantees that Congress will retain maximum flexibility in responding to clear national security crises such as a declared war or imminent military threat to national security. This section provides a balance between the need for flexibility to react to a military threat to the Nation and the need to keep the balanced budget amendment strong. Clearly, if the United States is involved in a declared war, the situation is serious and the waiver of the balanced budget rule should not be overly difficult. Unless clear situations, but still in instances of military conflict, the threshold is slightly higher. In order to waive the balanced budget rule Congress must pass the waiver by a majority of the whole number of both Houses and it must become law, must be signed by the President. This prevents the balanced budget amendment from being too easily waived. Thus, taken together, section 5 allows the country to defend itself but also protects against a waiver that is borne more of a desire to avoid the tough choices needed to balance the budget than of military need. Section 6 states: The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts. This section makes explicit what is implicit. The Congress has a positive obligation to fashion legislation to enforce this article. Section 6 underscores Congress' continuing role in implementing the balanced budget requirement. This provision precludes any interpretation of the amendment that would result in a shift in the balance of powers among branches of Government. We have heard from time to time claims by opponents of the balanced budget constitutional amendment that the President or the courts will become unduly involved in enforcing the amendment. This section, together with the plethora of legal precedent and documents, shows that such claims are misplaced. This provision also gives Congress appropriate flexibility with which to fashion the implementing legislation by permitting reliance on estimates. Since obviously no one can predict the future with absolute certainty, we must rely on estimates when we plan budgets. This provision recognizes that we must rely on estimates to make the constitutional amendment workable. Section 7 defines ``receipts,'' ``outlays.'' Section 7 defines receipts and outlays. Receipts do not include money from borrowing--it is high time we stopped thinking of borrowing as a normal source of income. Outlays do not include money used to repay debt principle. This will further encourage future Congresses to start to pay down our mammoth debt. Perhaps more than any other section, opponents try to change this one most often. By altering the definitions of receipts and outlays they know they could tear a giant loophole in the balanced budget amendment. So they come forth with a parade of exemptions, for every interest under the sun, and each would provide those who are addicted to debt a way to get their fiscal fix. We must not allow it. The supporters of honest, fiscal responsibility should not be distracted from their goal of balancing the budget in spite of the desires to respond to all manner of sympathetic political causes. Finally, section 8 states that the amendment will take effect in 2002 or 2 years after it is adopted, whichever is later. This will allow Congress a period to consider and adopt the necessary procedures to implement the amendment, and to begin the process of balancing the budget. In conclusion, Mr. President, let me reiterate that the balanced budget amendment is the only way we are going to be able to balance the budget. We have tried statutes, they don't work. We have tried mustering the political will, it hasn't worked. And we have tried just letting the debt grow, that can't work. We need to end our cycle of debt with a hard and fast rule, that cannot be easily discarded when it becomes inconvenient. We need the balanced budget amendment. Mr. President, let me respond to a few charges which have been leveled against the amendment. Some suggest a conflict between the general requirement of balance and the allowance for a waiver. Allowing for a waiver by vote is not inconsistent with the purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 1, which is to make it harder to borrow as a general matter, yet provide flexibility to borrow in case of need demonstrated by the appropriate consensus. Section 6 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 provides that ``Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.'' To be sure, reliance on good faith estimates is necessary to make the balanced budget amendment workable. No budget cannot be balanced to the penny; particularly the $1.6 trillion Federal budget. Opponents of the balanced budget amendment contend that this reliance on estimates is improper because CBO budgetary estimates are not always precisely accurate, specifically if you compare the estimates for the beginning of the fiscal year with what the actual numbers are at the end of the fiscal year. It seems to me that by definition an estimate is not necessarily going to match up to the exact figures at the end of the year. But that is no reason to stop using estimates. They are a reasonable and logical way to approach the uncertainty inherent in trying to predict the future. The balanced budget amendment will still function smoothly even given this lack of absolute certainty at the beginning of the year. If, over the course of the fiscal year outlays exceed receipts in a way not previously anticipated, we have two choices. We can either pass a reconciliation bill to bring the budget back into balance, or, if necessary, we can waive the balanced budget rule for that year as provided for in the text of the amendment. Further, under the Budget Act, both OMB--for the President's budget estimate--and CBO by law must provide for three budgetary estimates: one at the beginning of the fiscal year, the second as a mid-course correction, and the last before the end of the fiscal year. Thus, there exists a statutory fine-tuning process that assures a degree of accuracy--not perfect accuracy--but one that provides for workable budgetary estimates. If we see during the course of the year that our estimates are going to be off, we have time to make the necessary corrections. I believe that reliance on estimates is both reasonable and sound. If we did not permit a reliance on estimates, I have little doubt that someone on the other side would be on the Senate floor arguing that the balanced budget amendment would be unworkable because it does not let us rely on estimates. The bottom line is that at the beginning of the year, we have no crystal ball, only reasonable estimates to work from. The balanced budget amendment accepts that plain truth and accordingly provides for the use of estimates. We use budget estimates in Congress every day. The President just sent a budget that he claims will balance by 2002. That is an estimate. We will pass a budget resolution here in the Senate, and that will rely on estimates. The balanced budget amendment merely continues this time-honored, logical, and reasonable practice. If the opponents of the balanced budget amendment succeed, we will be condemning our children to even higher debt, even higher taxes, and even lower wages, by any estimate. I hope that everyone in the Senate will keep that in mind as this debate continues. The Senator raises two points that were discussed in the committee report that accompanied Senate Joint Resolution 1. While I understand the concerns, I believe that they are based on a misreading of the report. The report allows that, ``Congress could decide that a deficit caused by a temporary, self-correcting drop in receipts or increase in outlays during the fiscal year would not violate the article.'' This does not mean that the budget will be out of balance at the end of the year. It simply states that the budget need not be in perfect balance every second of the year. And there is nothing in the text of the balanced budget amendment to indicate that it should. However, the temporary condition described in the committee report must be self-correcting by the conclusion of the fiscal year, in order to avoid a three-fifths vote. I see no harm in allowing this flexibility during the course of the year. Additionally, the report states that Congress could permit negligible deviations be made up in the next year. Again, this is not nearly as remarkable as some have made it out to be. We all know that sometimes the very last few outlays and receipts of the year are not known until after the fiscal year is over. The balanced budget amendment neither requires nor envisions that this logistical truth become a problem. In such an event, the Congress could provide itself with the flexibility to make up any negligible deficits to be made up the next year. What is crucial is that the funds must be made up, thus keeping us in balance. It simply would not make any sense to bring the Government to a halt over a 4-cent deficit. And the balanced budget amendment does not require that we do. That is all that this statement in the committee report is saying. Some opponents claim that the BBA is too inflexible. It has been repeatedly referred to as a ``straightjacket.'' On the other hand, we also hear that the BBA is not stringent enough. In fact, the balanced budget amendment strikes just the right balance between strict provisions to counter the strong incentives in Congress to deficit spend and the reasonable flexibility necessary for the amendment to function in the real world. What we need to do is focus on the problem--our national debt is over $5.3 trillion and climbing. Only the balanced budget amendment will put us in a position to end that climb. Meeting the requirements of the balanced budget will require a heightened vigilance of Congress; it will require that the Federal Government be more aware of and concerned about our borrowing and spending habits. No, it will not be as easy as simply spending and then borrowing if we did not plan well. It will require that we plan better and be better stewards over that plan. I think that is appropriate, given the importance of the problem, and of our duty. The point has also been raised that Congress will not know precisely if we are in balance of the size of the deficit to the dollar before the end of the year. That is why we have the workable flexibility of relying on estimates, yet we will need to plan and administer the process with care. Congress may and should shoot for a small surplus to avoid a last minute unforseen deficit, and if the estimates near the end of the year suggest we will run a deficit, we can approve a deficit at the high end of the estimates. If we approve an estimate that is slightly larger than we needed, it is not like we actually spent the money. While some may say that relying on estimates creates a loophole, I submit that the risks of this provision are substantially less than our current process of simply spending and borrowing as a matter of course. debt ceiling super majority Concerns have also been raised that under section 2 it will be too hard to get the three-fifths currently required and that a minority in Congress will be able to hold us hostage with the threat of forcing a default. For one thing, threatening default is not likely. This Nation has never defaulted on its debt. And let me tell you, if this country ever reached a point where there were 41 Senators, nearly the entire current Democratic membership of the Senate, who were so militantly disillusioned with this Nation that they were truly willing to let us default on our debt, the 60-vote requirement to raise the debt ceiling would be the least of our problems. Now, the opponents of the three-fifths requirement cite the budget battles of last Congress as evidence that it is sometimes difficult to raise the debt limit. But Mr. David Malpass, an expert on financial markets who testified at the Judiciary Committee's hearings, showed that those very budget battles--where the word ``default'' was being bandied about with regularity--were seen by the markets as a very positive step. Indeed, he noted that ``The U.S. bond market had a very strong rally from August 1995 through January 1996, with yields falling from 6.9 percent to 6.0 percent.'' He termed this as a very significant positive development for the economy. Through all the tumult and uncertainty of those budget battles, American investors were excited and encouraged that Congress was finally moving towards a balanced budget. That encouragement manifested itself in lower interest rates, which in turn is the kind of market conditions that can help us balance the budget and strengthen the economy. Mr. Malpass was prescient enough to foresee this very objection to the balanced budget amendment when he wrote: Financial markets are practical. [T]he threat of a default would not be taken seriously as long as both the Administration and Congress expressed the intention not to default. The requirement of a super-majority would not affect this calculation. A step toward fiscal discipline like passing a solid balanced budget amendment would similarly be viewed positively by the markets. Enacting a weakened one, one like the proposal before us contemplates, with no real debt limit restraint, would undermine the amendment's credibility and its effectiveness. We have a choice--we can either continue on the downward spiral of more debt, higher interest rates, higher taxes, and lower incomes, or we can move ahead with the balanced budget amendment and lower interest rates, lower taxes, with greater job growth and a stronger overall economy. Mr. President, we already have several supermajority requirements in the Constitution. Some were in the original text, some have been added by amendment. The one thing they have in common is that they were all meant to come into play in unusual circumstances. That is what we expect of the balanced budget amendment, that the vote to raise the debt of this Nation be an unusual circumstance. Those who believe the supermajority vote will be the rule rather than the exception betray their mental habit of thinking in terms of deficit spending. We must break this habit and make deficit spending the exception instead of the rule. The balanced budget amendment does not require a supermajority to pass a budget--only a budget that is out of balance. The balanced budget amendment creates a positive incentive for current majorities to avoid borrowing to avoid supermajority votes and risking the kind of intrigue opponents say could happen when supermajorities are required. This is wholly appropriate and reasonable to break Congress of its borrowing habit. The debt ceiling has sometimes been raised by supermajorities and often it has been raised by simple majorities. What is important is that we have never defaulted. When we have had to have the votes, the necessary votes have always been there. When votes are tallied, it is easy for Members to vote against raising the debt ceiling, knowing that the ceiling will be raised. I expect when we are living under the balanced budget amendment, once again, the necessary votes will be there, but not many more than necessary, because Members may wish to vote against it knowing the necessary votes are there. Let me conclude with some comments on the objections to supermajorities in Senate Joint Resolution 1. According to Prof. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. of Harvard, in his scholarly book ``The Taming of the Prince,'' the real genius of our Constitution is that having placed all power in the hands of its citizenry, the American people consented to restraints on that power. Understanding that direct or pure democracies in history were inherently unstable and fickle, the Framers placed restraints on popular rule and congressional power--what we now call supermajority requirements. Let me mention some of them: Article I, section 3, the Senate may convict on an impeachment with a two-thirds vote; article I, section 5, each House may expel a Member with a two-thirds vote; article I, section 7, a Presidential veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote of each House; article II, section 2, the Senate advises and consents to treaties with a two-thirds vote; article V, a constitutional amendment requires two-thirds of each House or a constitutional convention can be called by two-thirds of the State legislatures, and three-quarters of the State legislatures must ratify; article VII, the Constitution itself required ratification of 9 of the 13 States; the 12th amendment requires a quorum of two-thirds of the States in the House to choose a President and a majority of States is required to elect the President, the same requirements exist for the Senate choosing the Vice-President; the 25th amendment, dealing with the President's competency and removal, requires that if Congress is not in session within 21 days after Congress is required to assemble, it must determine by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the duties of his office. The Constitution requires that a supermajority approve a constitutional amendment. To pass the balanced budget amendment, we must have 67 Senators vote for it. Is this inappropriate? Or should we allow some number between 26 and 51, or 50 with the Vice- President casting the tie-breaking vote to approve the balanced budget amendment? The Constitution requires that three fourths of the States ratify the balanced budget amendment. Perhaps our majoritarian friends would prefer that some number of States between 26 and 51 ratify the amendment, with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or Guam casting a tie-breaking vote if the States are evenly divided. Mr. President, if majority rule were the fundamental principle of our Government, as I have heard some in this debate say, we would not have the Government we do. We would have a unicameral parliamentary system without judicial review, and indeed without the Bill of Rights or a written Constitution, because each of those features of our Government is an intrusion into the principle of majority rule. And they are certainly not the only examples. The first amendment does not say Congress shall not abridge free speech unless a fletting majority wants to. It does not say that Congress shall not interfere with the free exercise of religion or establish a religion, unless a majority of those present and voting want to. The first amendment takes those options away from even supermajorities of Congress, except through constitutional amendment. Shall we tear up the Bill of Rights and the Constitution because they contain checks on the power of transient majorities? I do not think so. As I have said, as Thomas Jefferson said, as even Professor Tribe has said, the power of transient majorities to saddle minorities or future majorities with debt is the kind of infringement on fundamental rights that deserves constitutional protection. The Framers wished to protect life, liberty, and property; they reacted harshly against taxation without representation. As I have pointed out throughout this debate, our deficit spending taxes generations which are not now represented; it takes their property and their economic liberty. It is wholly appropriate that we at least increase the consensus of those currently represented to allow them to shackle those who are not--future generations--with the debt, the taxes, and the economic servitude that go with citizenship in a country with high national debt. Mr. President, opponents of the balanced budget amendment charge that supermajority requirements will create some new kind of sinister bargaining among factions to gain advantage in return for supporting the necessary consensus. This objection strikes me as strange because that kind of negotiation is as old as the legislative process. It happens now in the search for a majority. Mr. President, under the balanced budget amendment, majorities will continue to set budget priorities from year to year. Only if the majority attempts to borrow money from future generations to pay for its priorities would there have to be a supermajority vote. This allows a minority to play the conscience of the Nation and protect future generations from the type of borrowing sprees we have seen in recent decades. I would note, Mr. President, that those who believe the supermajority vote will be the rule rather than the exception betray their mental habit of thinking in terms of deficit spending. We must break this habit and make deficit spending the exception instead of the rule. The balanced budget amendment does not require a supermajority to pass a budget--only a budget that is out of balance. The balanced budget amendment creates a positive incentive for current majorities to avoid borrowing to avoid supermajority votes and risking the kind of intrigue opponents say could happen when supermajorities are required. This is wholly appropriate and reasonable to break Congress of its borrowing habit. Mr. President, it is absolutely clear that to restore the constitutional concept of limited government and its protection of liberty--as well as to restore fiscal and economic sanity--we must pass this balanced budget amendment. We need the supermajority provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1--a modern day ``auxiliary precaution'' in Madison's words--to put teeth into the balanced budget amendment--to be a force to end business as usual here in Congress--and most important, to foster the liberty of limited government that the Framers believed to be essential.

Mr. HATCH. Let me answer that question. You have raised a point that Congress will not know precisely if we are in balance or a deficit to the exact dollar before the end of each year. That is why we have the workable flexibility of relying on estimates. Yet we will need a plan to administer that process with care. Now, Congress may, and I think this would become the norm, instead of now just planning on deficits, Congress may and should plan for a small surplus to avoid a last-minute, unforeseen deficit. If the estimates near the end of the year suggest we will run a deficit, we can approve a deficit at the high end of the estimates. If we approve an estimate that is slightly larger than is needed, it is not like actually spending the money. While some may say relying on estimates creates a loophole, I submit that the risks are substantially less than our current process of spending and borrowing, and that is exhibited by these 28 years of unbalanced budgets. That has been the matter of course. I think we have to change course, and I think the normalcy--I think the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, if I know him as well as I think I do, would be leading the fight to have at least small surpluses each year to take care of any fluctuations that might occur. I don't think he would permit us to get into this mess, which neither he nor I have been able to prevent under the current statutory scheme. But under a balanced budget amendment, we are going to have to be real.

Mr. HATCH. This amendment does not mandate a balanced budget as the only option. This amendment requires us to move toward a balanced budgets, because it requires a balanced budget or supermajority votes if we are going to run deficits. So the pressures----

Mr. HATCH. If I could be allowed to finish. So the pressures will be on us to try to have surpluses rather than continue to spend, because sooner or later we have to face the music. Let me make this point. The accuracy of estimates is self-correcting, because OMB and CBO must, by law, correct their estimates twice a year, under current practices. Usually, the original estimates are always off by OMB and CBO. Under the current system, there is not nearly as much pressure to be accurate as there will be under the constitutional amendment system, if we pass this by the requisite two-thirds vote of both Houses and it is ratified by three-quarters of the States. So what if CBO and OMB correct it? The balanced budget amendment does nothing to correct that procedure. It puts pressure on them to, maybe, do more than twice a year corrections. The balanced budget amendment actually will further budgetary discipline. Congress is the one that must always enforce the system. Every one of us take an oath to uphold the Constitution. If this becomes part of the Constitution, we will have to live up to that oath. We will have to devise a system that really does it. We will still operate under a statutory system of implementing the constitutional rule. We can't order perfection; not even we can order perfection. But the balanced budget amendment will put the appropriate amount of pressure on Congress, which is not there now, as easily can be seen by the Senator's very important chart. It will put the pressure on Congress to ensure truthfulness. Public reactions will punish those who act cowardly. Everybody will know because we will always have to vote. We can't do it on voice votes anymore, or hide it in the dead of the night, which I know Senator Byrd understands well and does not approve of, as I don't. We would all have to stand up and vote, and the public will know who has voted which way. They are going to expect us to do a far better job than that which has done and than these 28 years of unbalanced budgets. Let us be honest. There is no way anybody can absolutely, accurately tell what the outlays and receipts are going to be in advance. When we say ``total outlays of any fiscal year shall not exceed,'' it has to be written that way because that is the force that says, Congress, your estimates better be good, a lot better than these statutory estimates we have had in the past, because then we will be under a constraint to balance the budget, or vote by a supermajority vote not to balance it. That is the difference.

Mr. HATCH. And vice versa.

Mr. HATCH. It doesn't--it's not the only option.

Mr. HATCH. It doesn't. We can do whatever we want to. We just have to vote to have an unbalanced budget by the required supermajority or margin.

Mr. HATCH. If I could just finish this one sentence, but I have to say that his chart makes my case better than I have made it. I congratulate him for it, and I am grateful that he has put the chart up, because I don't know how anybody can argue for the current system when you look at that chart.

Mr. HATCH. I think the Senator is very logical. But he also has to allow the logic to take into account that Congress may, as I said before, and should shoot for a small surplus--the incentives will be to have surpluses to avoid a last-minute unforeseen deficit. And if the estimates near the end of the year suggest that we are going to run a deficit, then it would be a simple matter for us to approve a deficit at the high end of the estimates. If we approve an estimated deficit that is slightly larger than we need, it is not like we actually spent the money. Again, I will say some may say that relying on estimates creates a loophole. But there is no other workable way to do it. I submit that the risks that might arise from those provisions in the constitutional amendment are substantially less than our current process, which is clearly not working, of simply spending and borrowing with no restraints whatsoever. I go back to my point. The distinguished Senator may be right in this regard. Perhaps Senators should not come out here and say, ``This is going to always make us balance the budget.'' I think, more accurately, it should be said that the incentives will be toward balancing the budget, because you will have supermajority votes of three-fifths in order to run deficits, or you will have to have constitutional majorities to increase taxes, which means at least 51 Senators would have to vote for it, and at least 218 Members of the House. That puts pressure on Members of both parties to be accurate, and it puts pressure on them to try to get surpluses rather than deficits. It puts pressure on them in writing implementing legislation to make sure you have legislation that really does work rather than the five failed plans that we have had since 1978, none of which have worked. My friend and colleague knows that. I don't know of anybody more intelligent and more concerned about these matters than the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. HATCH. Frankly, I think if you have the incentives to produce more accurate estimates of receipts and outlays, there will be an incentive to have the top line have the bars going up every time, where right now we do not have that incentive. We have every incentive to just spend today. There is no restraint on spending whatsoever. The balanced budget amendment would not mandate that you balance the budget if a supermajority is willing to vote not to, but it does change the incentive so that literally you will not want to go into deficit because sooner or later you are going to have to pay the piper under that amendment. Again, I think the Senator's chart makes my case.

Mr. HATCH. I do not think I need the Senator's chart to make the case that our country is in trouble, that we are not doing what is right, that we are continuing to spend us into bankruptcy. And even though there are arguments made that we are only going to have a $107 billion deficit in 1997, that is still a deficit of over $100 billion.

Mr. HATCH. Because I believe Senators will live up to the constitutional mandate and the oath of office that they take to do what is right, where at this particular point there is no constitutional mandate to live within budgetary constraints, and it is apparent.

Mr. HATCH. Well, there was not----

Mr. HATCH. Would not agree that it should be a three-fifths majority to increase taxes. I happen to believe that this has to be a bipartisan amendment. It is even though there are, as a percentage, less Democrats supporting it than Republicans. But Democrats have helped to formulate this amendment, and I have to give credit to those who are standing here with us. I think they have guts to stand up under the circumstances and vote for this amendment, as they should. Now, that does not mean that those who vote against it do not have guts, too, because there is a price that will be paid for voting against this amendment. We all understand that. And let me just say this. I happen to believe that the distinguished Senator from West Virginia has never lacked intestinal fortitude. In fact, I have been through a lot of experiences here that prove that as a matter of fact to me. I could not have more respect for anybody than I do for him as a U.S. Senator. But again, I think he makes our case. I think these 28 unbalanced budget volumes make our case. I think it is apparent our system is not working. I think if we keep going this way, our children and grandchildren's futures are gone. I know the distinguished Senator is a great family man. I know that he loves his children and grandchildren, as I do mine. We are expecting our 16th and 17th grandchildren within 2 weeks, Elaine and I. I want them to have a future as we have had. But right now with what is happening in accordance with the chart of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, it is pretty apparent their future is being bartered away because we are unwilling to make the tough choices. I would lots rather have the balanced budget amendment helping us to estimate receipts and outlays than to have this system estimate them, I will tell you that right now. And it is a better system to have a balanced budget amendment.

Mr. HATCH. You do.