Orrin Hatch

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. I understand.

Mr. HATCH. We understand.

Mr. HATCH. If the Senator will yield, I do not think Kentucky could have better advocates than the two Senators that currently represent Kentucky. I understand the issue. All I can say is, in good faith, we will try to work with the Senator and try to resolve it. But I would like to not have to go to a vote on this amendment, because I would have to oppose it under these circumstances and I would prefer not to do that if we can somehow or other find our way clear to working out this problem. As far as I am concerned, the Senator is a leader in this body. I have every desire to try to accommodate him if we can.

Mr. HATCH. Yes, we do.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for that.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as far as I am concerned the bill is ready for a vote.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, could we do that after I----

Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield for just a second?

Mr. HATCH. I suggest that the Senator from Pennsylvania withdraw his amendment and that will solve that problem, and then, of course, whatever remarks the distinguished Senator would like to make; is that OK?

Mr. HATCH. I know this is an important debate, and I do not want to interject myself, but I want to move this bill.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full Committee on Environment and Public Works be granted permission to meet Tuesday, October 24, at 2:30 p.m., to consider S. 1316, the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1995, and other pending business.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, October 24, 1995, at 2 p.m., in room 226 Senate Dirksen Office Building to consider nominations.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, October 24, 1995, at 2:30 p.m. to hold a member briefing on intelligence matters.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Possessions and Territories Criminal Law Clarification Act. This law, which is purely technical in nature, is needed to clarify an ambiguity in a number of Federal statutes as to their coverage of crimes occurring in the territories, possessions, and commonwealths of the United States. This ambiguity arises because these statutes contain references to State law, without any indication of whether they are to be applied to territories or other entities which are not States. My bill would clarify that these ambiguous Federal criminal statutes apply to the territories, possessions, and commonwealths of the United States, as well as to the 50 States. I ask my colleagues to support this legislation, and urge its swift approval.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Title 18 Uniformity Act of 1995 and urge my colleagues' support for this bill. This bill makes technical adjustments to make uniform the dollar amounts used in title 18 to distinguish between grades of offenses. This bill raises the dollar threshold that triggers more severe punishment of certain unlawful acts. This change allows the punishment to better fit the crime by raising the threshold to a reasonable level before the extended imprisonment option becomes effective. This bill furthers our interest in applying equal justice and better utilization of incarceration space. I urge its passage.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Substantial Assistance Clarification Amendment Act of 1995. This amendment to Federal sentencing procedures clarifies the procedures by which the Government may move that the court sentence a defendant below a statutory minimum sentence based on the defendant's cooperation with the Government. My bill removes the requirement that a substantial assistance reduction be based on information relating to a particular person being investigated or prosecuted. Instead, under my bill, such a reduction could be given in exchange for substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any offense, even if the defendant is unaware of the specific person or persons involved. My bill will assist Federal prosecutors in their task of bringing criminals to justice by giving them additional leverage with which to uncover needed evidence. It will also provide incentives to defendants to come clean, and mitigate their crimes by cooperating with the prosecution. This bill does nothing to lessen the punishment for truly culpable defendants who deserve the full measure of punishment the law provides. It simply strengthens a tool in the prosecution's toolbox. It furthers the interests of justice, and I urge its passage.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Substantial Assistance Clarification Amendment Act of 1995. This amendment to Federal sentencing procedures clarifies the procedures by which the Government may move that the court sentence a defendant below a statutory minimum sentence based on the defendant's cooperation with the Government. My bill removes the requirement that a substantial assistance reduction be based on information relating to a particular person being investigated or prosecuted. Instead, under my bill, such a reduction could be given in exchange for substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any offense, even if the defendant is unaware of the specific person or persons involved. My bill will assist Federal prosecutors in their task of bringing criminals to justice by giving them additional leverage with which to uncover needed evidence. It will also provide incentives to defendants to come clean, and mitigate their crimes by cooperating with the prosecution. This bill does nothing to lessen the punishment for truly culpable defendants who deserve the full measure of punishment the law provides. It simply strengthens a tool in the prosecution's toolbox. It furthers the interests of justice, and I urge its passage.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Title 18 Uniformity Act of 1995 and urge my colleagues' support for this bill. This bill makes technical adjustments to make uniform the dollar amounts used in title 18 to distinguish between grades of offenses. This bill raises the dollar threshold that triggers more severe punishment of certain unlawful acts. This change allows the punishment to better fit the crime by raising the threshold to a reasonable level before the extended imprisonment option becomes effective. This bill furthers our interest in applying equal justice and better utilization of incarceration space. I urge its passage.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Possessions and Territories Criminal Law Clarification Act. This law, which is purely technical in nature, is needed to clarify an ambiguity in a number of Federal statutes as to their coverage of crimes occurring in the territories, possessions, and commonwealths of the United States. This ambiguity arises because these statutes contain references to State law, without any indication of whether they are to be applied to territories or other entities which are not States. My bill would clarify that these ambiguous Federal criminal statutes apply to the territories, possessions, and commonwealths of the United States, as well as to the 50 States. I ask my colleagues to support this legislation, and urge its swift approval.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, this afternoon, the House gave final approval to S. 1111, a bill Senator Kennedy and I have authored to remove barriers to the patenting of biotechnology processes by establishing a modified examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office [PTO] of those patent applications. Passage of this legislation is a tremendous testament to the foresight and capabilities of our House colleague, Representative Carlos Moorhead, chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. Chairman Moorhead drafted the original legislation this session, H.R. 587, which was approved in committee on June 7, 1995. The bill now goes to the President for signature. Mr. President, under the provisions of S. 1111, if a claimed biotechnology process uses or produces a patentable composition of matter, the process will be presumed nonobvious for the purpose of examining the process. This modified examination will resolve delays and inconsistent determinations faced by biotechnology patentees under present PTO practices, and thereby increase innovation and stimulate the development of new products and processes. For the edification of my colleagues, I want to take this historic opportunity to explain the purpose of the bill and the need for the legislation. Biotechnology: The Office of Technology Assessment defines biotechnology as ``any technique that uses living organisms--or substances from those organisms--to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.'' Biotechnology, in the sense of genetic manipulation, has been practiced by man for many hundreds of years. It has been used successfully by plant breeders in developing schemes for crossing plants to introduce and maintain desirable traits in various crops such as wheat or maize. Bakers and beverage producers have used yeast, a fungus, for leavening dough and for fermentation. Today, the practice of biotechnology is far more powerful, with promising applications in diverse industries ranging from pharmaceuticals, agriculture and nutrition to environmental cleanup, new energy resources and law enforcement. Some examples of widely known products made with the use of biotechnology include insulin, human growth hormone, home pregnancy tests, tests for diagnosing human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), vaccine against the Hepatitis B virus, and high-protein yielding corn. The dramatic breakthroughs and future promises of biotechnology became possible in the 1950's when scientists James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid. Ironically, neither scientist seemed aware that their discovery would give birth to an entire new generation of technology. In a March 12, 1953, letter to Max Delbruck, Watson wrote: In the next day or so Crick and I shall send a note to Nature proposing our structure (of DNA) as a possible model, at the same time emphasizing its provisional nature and the lack of proof in its favor. Even if wrong, I believe it to be interesting since it provides a concrete example of a structure composed of complementary chains. If, by chance, it is right, then I suspect we may be making a slight dent into the manner in which DNA can reproduce itself. The discovery of DNA put more than a slight dent in our knowledge of basic biology: it became the basis of a new, promising industry that has led to significant breakthroughs in the ability to improve human life. DNA, known as the ultimate molecule of life, contains the codes that instruct cells to grow, to differentiate into specialized structures, to duplicate, and to respond to environmental changes. DNA guides the special functions of cells by directing the synthesis of proteins. A gene, which is comprised of a specific section of DNA, contains the special instructions the cell needs to synthesize proteins. Proteins give living organisms their unique characteristics. Some proteins give the organism its structure; others mediate the many biochemical reactions that occur within the body and are necessary for organisms to function. The DNA code for certain genes is sometimes defective. The defect may have been present at birth or later developed due to other factors such as infection, age, or exposure to ultraviolet light. When a defect occurs, the code for the synthesis of proteins is scrambled and causes the cell to produce either a defective protein or no protein at all. If the function of this defective protein is important, this can have serious consequences for the health of the organism. For human beings, the deficiency in the protein may lead to tragic disabilities like cancer and arthritis, or even lead to death. For corn and other agricultural crops, the incorrect protein may lead to limited resistance to insects or extinguishment of the crop all together. Once scientists determine which specific protein performs which function in an organism, they, with the aid of biotechnology, are able to effectively fight disease and other abnormalities. For example, when the absence of a certain regulatory protein leads to cancer, it is possible to stop the growth of cancerous cells by replacing the defective gene with a normal one that would produce the necessary protein in the body. It is also possible to reproduce the normal protein in another organism and then supply it in the human body. The technology enabling this method is known as recombinant DNA technology. A well-known example of such a method is the process used to produce insulin. Insulin is produced in mass quantities in microorganisms and then [[Page S 15221]] injected into human beings to treat diabetes. Proteins produced through recombinant DNA technology are used not only to treat numerous diseases, such as cancer, allergies, blood disorders, and infections, but also for more prosaic tasks, such as use in laundry detergents and food production. All of the tools that currently allow scientists to perform such marvels are the product of innovative research utilizing biotechnology. Given the complexities of developing such treatments, the underlying research is often expensive and takes many years before it yields practical results. The biotechnology industry estimates that the average cost of discovery and bringing a single drug to market exceeds $230 million. It is also estimates that bringing a drug from initial discovery to final FDA approval takes an average of 12 years. Certain incentives are necessary to encourage biotechnology researchers to invest in the much needed, but often expensive, research endeavors. To date, the patent laws have been the source of such incentives. The biotechnology industry relies heavily on patent protection in recouping the costs of bringing new drugs to the market. Furthermore, adequate patent protection is vital in persuading investors to provide the necessary capital to the industry. The biotechnology industry has been one of the success stories in U.S. industry, creating new jobs and pioneering exciting breakthroughs that improve our way of life. However, the biotechnology industry now faces formidable challenges in continuing its ground-breaking research. Japan and Europe have invested heavily in biotech research and Japan has targeted pharmaceutical development as an industry of vital economic importance. In facing this competition, it is vital that the United States provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection for the biotechnology industry. General patent protection: A patent on an invention gives the patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, or seling that invention. Under 35 U.S.C., section 101, an inventor may obtain a patent on ``any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . .'' Once an invention is determined to be of the kind that may be patentable under section 101, it must also satisfy other requirements before a patent is granted on that particular invention. The two other major requirements are that the invention be ``novel'' and be ``nonobvious.'' If a U.S. patent is granted on a particular product, the owner of the patent can prevent others from manufacturing, selling, or importing the product in the United States. However, because patents are national rights, the owner of the U.S. patent cannot prevent others from manufacturing or selling the patented product in another country. In order to prevent others from exploiting his patented product in another country, the inventor must obtain a patent in that country. A patent may be granted for a new method of using or a new method of making a product. Such patents are referred to as ``process patents.'' It is not uncommon for an inventor to seek both product and process patent protection relating to the same invention. A process patent must meet the same basic requirements for patentability as a product patent, that is, that the claimed invention be new, useful, and nonobvious. The owner of a process patent may prevent the sale or manufacture of a product made using that process. The courts have described the difference between a process patent and a product patent as one relating to scope: A product patent gives the patentee the right to restrict the use and sale of the product regardless of how and by whom it was manufactured. A process patentee's power extends only to those products made by the patented process. A process patent thus ``leaves the field open to ingenious men to invent and to employ other processes. . . .'' A sale of a product made by a patented process does not itself infringe the patent; it is the unauthorized use of the process that infringes the patent. The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 provided additional protection for process patent owners. Under this act, the process patent owner may not only prevent unauthorized domestic use of the process, but also the importation of foreign-manufactured products if a U.S. patented process was used in making the products. This amendment provides protection to domestic U.S. process patent holders against foreign companies using the U.S. patented process overseas and importing the resulting product into the United States without any recourse by the process patent owner for infringement. Therefore, a patent on the final product, or at least a patent on the process for making that product, is necessary in order to effectively protect innovators from the unfair competition of imported ``knock-offs'' of their creations. Although a product patent is generally considered to provide better protection for innovators than process patents, they are often not available for products of biotechnology. Biotechnology products are difficult to patent because they are usually the recombinant version of a naturally occurring protein. In many cases, the naturally occurring version of the protein has been identified and described in the literature to some extent. Even if this protein has not been completely characterized, the patent application on the recombinant version of the protein may be denied because, in the eyes of the PTO, it is not novel, or it is obvious in light of the previous disclosure. In patent law parlance, that product has already been discovered and does not warrant a patent under the U.S. patent code. A good example of this problem is human insulin. Human insulin was discovered in 1921 when scientists first extracted the protein from a dog's pancreas. In 1951, Frederick Sanger identified the chemical structure of human insulin and won the Nobel Prize for this discovery. He would not have been able to obtain a patent on insulin despite the fact that his discovery earned him the Nobel Prize. Then in 1979, David Goeddel synthesized human insulin using biotechnology methods, enabling patients to gain access to the product they needed to control their diabetes. Even Goeddel would not have been able to receive a product patent on insulin. The difficulties in obtaining patents on products of biotechnology, therefore, make the availability of effective process patent protection vital in providing a reward for the achievements of biotechnology pioneers. Moreover, adequate protection is necessary to encourage the continued investment in biotechnology research and development. Biotechnology process patenting: The ability of the biotechnology industry to obtain process patent protection has been undermined by the lack of clarity in the rules for the patentability of such process patents. Not only does the lack of adequate and effective process patent protection affect the industry's ability to fend off unfair competition of foreign-made products using U.S. patented starting products, but it also inhibits venture capital investment in biotechnology research. The uncertainty in the rules of process patent protection has been the result of the Patent and Trademark Office's [PTO] inconsistent and erroneous application of In re Durden, and other related and conflicting decisions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [CAFC]. Although In re Durden did not involve a biotechnology invention, the principles espoused by the court in that case have had a significant effect on the patentability of biotechnology processes. In re Durden involved an appeal of the PTO's denial of a patent for a process to make certain new chemical compounds. The process used was similar to one already familiar to those in the industry, however, it used a novel and nonobvious starting material and produced a novel and nonobvious chemical product. As stated by the court, the issue in the case was ``whether a chemical process, otherwise obvious, is patentable because either or both the specific starting material employed and the product obtained are novel and nonobvious.'' The court concluded that the process was not patentable. Given the particular facts of In re Durden, it held that a process using a new starting material to make a new product will not automatically be presumed nonobviousness for patentability purposes. It noted [[Page S 15222]] that the patentability of each process claim must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Since the In re Durden decision, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain process patent protection in the United States for genetic engineering inventions. It is reported that the PTO frequently cites this case in automatically rejecting applications for biotechnology processes. The reasoning used in rejecting biotechnology process patent applications is as follows: The basic process of genetic engineering, recombinant DNA technology, is known. It consists of inserting a DNA molecule into a living cell so that the cellular machinery produces the specific protein encoded by the inserted DNA molecule. Therefore, when a new DNA molecule has been invented, it is assumed ``obvious'' that it can be used in a recombinant DNA process to produce the protein it encodes. Since nonobviousness is a condition for patentability, the process for producing the protein is rejected by the PTO as obvious. Under In re Durden, the process is rejected even if the starting materials used in the process in producing the final product are new and patentable. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit revisited the issue in the subsequent case of In re Pleuddemann. As with In re Durden, this case involved a challenge of the PTO's denial of a patent to a process. The challenger had a patent on a starting material that he used in the process at issue to make a patentable final product. Except for the use of the patented starting material, the process for making the final product was already known in the industry. The court held that the process in this particular case was patentable. In its opinion, the court emphasized that In re Durden was not to be read as a ``per se'' rule against patenting old processes that use new starting materials or produce new products. The court distinguished In re Durden in this case on the ground that the process at issue in In re Pleuddemann involved a process of ``using'' rather than a process of ``making,'' which was the claimed process at issue in In re Durden. This distinction between the two types of processes was lost on many and has caused further confusion on the status of the law on patenting processes. It is not clear why a method of ``using'' a starting material should be treated differently, for purposes of determining nonobviousness, from a method of ``making'' the end product. Relying on In re Pleuddemann, some applicants have manipulated phrasing in crafting patent applications to explain processes in terms of ``using'' rather than ``making.'' However, the PTO continues to reject such claims citing In re Durden and arguing that such claims are really a process of making claim in disguise Although biotechnology innovators have difficulties obtaining patents on products and processes of biotechnology, they can receive patents on new starting materials they discover. However, unlike patents on products or the process by which those products are developed, U.S. patents on the starting materials fail to provide adequate protection from unfair foreign competition. The U.S. patent on the starting materials--typically a new DNA molecule, a genetically altered host cell or a vector--can prevent others from using them in the United States in any way, including using them to produce a final product. However, without process patent protection, the patent owner of the starting materials cannot prevent another from taking the patented materials to another country, use it to produce a product based on such material, and import the product back into this country for commercial sale. Under the patent laws, there is no infringement of the patent on the starting materials because there is no ``use'' of the materials in the United States. Without process patent protection, the inventor can not challenge the unfair importation of the product and is forced to watch helplessly as foreign copy-cats reap the harvest to which he, as a pioneer, is entitled. The uncertainty in the examination of biotechnology process patents under current U.S. law has become a serious impediment to the development of new technologies in this industry. The confusion in the case has led to inconsistent results by patent examiners. The inconsistent application of the case law, in turn, has led to severe delays or denials of issuance of process patent protection to deserving patent applicants. The resolution of this problem will provide both certainty for patent applications in this field and adequate protection against unfair foreign competition. It is not clear if or when the CAFC will resolve the confusion in the case law relating to process patents. Currently, there are two cases pending in the CAFC relating to this issue. These two cases have been pending before the CAFC for over 3 years, and there is no indication when the court might issue a decision on them. Even if the court issues a decision on these cases, it is by no means certain that they will resolve the confusion caused by In re Durden and related cases. The PTO, in congressional hearings, testified that it does not believe it can resolve the problem administratively because of the seemingly conflicting court opinions. S. 1111 resolves the In re Durden problem in our patent law by providing that a biotechnological process of making or using a product may be considered nonobvious if the starting material or resulting product is patentable. This change will provide a degree of certainty to the protection of biotechnology inventions and will simplify the PTO's examination of biotechnology process patent applications. This bill will also allow U.S. researchers to enforce their patents claiming a certain starting material against the unfair importation of products made overseas using such material. As my colleagues are aware, the Senate has gone on record in support of this change in the law many times, most recently in 1994 when we approved the Deconcini-Hatch legislation. I am proud that the Congress has now given final approval to the bill, and I am hopeful the President will sign the measure as soon as it reaches his desk. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of S. 1111 and a section-by-section summary be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I introduce a bill to amend the commencement dates of certain temporary judgeships that were created under section 203(c) of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Public Law 101-650, 104 Stat. 5101. The minor adjustment embodied in this bill should improve the efficiency of the courts involved, and is not expected to be controversial. I am pleased to have Senators Biden, Grassley, Heflin, Specter, Simon, DeWine, Feinstein, and Abraham as original cosponsors. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 created the temporary judgeships by providing that a new district judge would be appointed to each of 13 specified districts, and by providing that the first vacancy in the office of a district judge in those districts occurring after December 1, 1995 would not be filled. The districts are as follows: the northern district of Alabama, the eastern district of California, the district of Hawaii, the central district of Illinois, the southern district of Illinois, the district of Kansas, the western district of Michigan, the eastern district of Missouri, the district of Nebraska, the northern district of New York, the northern district of Ohio, the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and the eastern district of Virginia. In a given district, the new judgeship is temporary but the individual judge appointed serves on a permanent basis in the same manner as any other article III judge. The overlap in judgeships-- between the appointment of a judge to a temporary judgeship and the point at which a vacant permanent judgeship is left unfilled--is what effectively adds another judge to the district for a temporary period of time. Due to delays in nomination and confirmation, however, many districts have had only a relatively brief period of time in which to take advantage of their temporary judgeship. In the district of Hawaii and the southern district of Illinois, for example, new judges were not confirmed until October 1994. Other districts have faced similar delays. Those delays mean that many of the temporary judgeships will be unable to fulfill congressional intent to alleviate the backlog of cases in those districts. Many of the districts [[Page S 15237]] faced a particularly heavy load of drug enforcement matters. This bill changes the second part of the temporary judgeship calculus by providing that the first district judge vacancy occurring 5 years or more after the confirmation date of the judge appointed to fill the temporary judgeship would not be filled. In that way, each district would benefit from an extra active judge for at least 5 years, regardless of how long the appointment process takes. This will help alleviate the extra burden faced in those districts. The only district excluded from this treatment is the western district of Michigan. That district requested to be excluded because its needs will be met under the current scheme. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has requested that the Senate pass this bill before December 1, 1995. After that date, some vacant judgeships will be unable to be filled under current law. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I will do my part to expedite this bill's passage.

Mr. HATCH

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I introduce a bill to amend the commencement dates of certain temporary judgeships that were created under section 203(c) of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Public Law 101-650, 104 Stat. 5101. The minor adjustment embodied in this bill should improve the efficiency of the courts involved, and is not expected to be controversial. I am pleased to have Senators Biden, Grassley, Heflin, Specter, Simon, DeWine, Feinstein, and Abraham as original cosponsors. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 created the temporary judgeships by providing that a new district judge would be appointed to each of 13 specified districts, and by providing that the first vacancy in the office of a district judge in those districts occurring after December 1, 1995 would not be filled. The districts are as follows: the northern district of Alabama, the eastern district of California, the district of Hawaii, the central district of Illinois, the southern district of Illinois, the district of Kansas, the western district of Michigan, the eastern district of Missouri, the district of Nebraska, the northern district of New York, the northern district of Ohio, the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and the eastern district of Virginia. In a given district, the new judgeship is temporary but the individual judge appointed serves on a permanent basis in the same manner as any other article III judge. The overlap in judgeships-- between the appointment of a judge to a temporary judgeship and the point at which a vacant permanent judgeship is left unfilled--is what effectively adds another judge to the district for a temporary period of time. Due to delays in nomination and confirmation, however, many districts have had only a relatively brief period of time in which to take advantage of their temporary judgeship. In the district of Hawaii and the southern district of Illinois, for example, new judges were not confirmed until October 1994. Other districts have faced similar delays. Those delays mean that many of the temporary judgeships will be unable to fulfill congressional intent to alleviate the backlog of cases in those districts. Many of the districts [[Page S 15237]] faced a particularly heavy load of drug enforcement matters. This bill changes the second part of the temporary judgeship calculus by providing that the first district judge vacancy occurring 5 years or more after the confirmation date of the judge appointed to fill the temporary judgeship would not be filled. In that way, each district would benefit from an extra active judge for at least 5 years, regardless of how long the appointment process takes. This will help alleviate the extra burden faced in those districts. The only district excluded from this treatment is the western district of Michigan. That district requested to be excluded because its needs will be met under the current scheme. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has requested that the Senate pass this bill before December 1, 1995. After that date, some vacant judgeships will be unable to be filled under current law. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I will do my part to expedite this bill's passage.