Howell Heflin

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. I just wanted to ask if the Senator will yield and respond to a couple questions.

Mr. HEFLIN. Let me ask the Senator this. Is the Shelby amendment included?

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, a substitute has been offered and I want to go into some of the aspects of the substitute, and I will later. First, I think I stated in the beginning of the debate that I considered this to be an extremely unfair bill. While it was titled the ``Product Liability Fairness'' bill, there were numerous provisions that were one-sided and which attempted to take away rather basic rights of a claimant in a lawsuit, and I thought it was extremely unfair. Also this bill was unfair because of the fact that it exempted all commercial loss and made commercial loss come under the category of commercial or contract law, primarily the Uniform Commercial Code. Commercial loss is a business loss, not a personal injury loss. Some of the most egregious punitive damage suits--practically all of the large ones--have been against business. Penzoil versus Texaco, $11 billion, is the one that stands out primarily in the minds of most people. But commercial loss would be in most all instances restricted to corporate America suing corporate America. Manufacturers do not want to come under the provisions of this bill because they do not want to be put under the same laws as the people who receive personal injuries. For example, under the statute of limitations on implied warranties in contract law, it is substantially longer. My State of Alabama has a contract statute of limitations of 6 years. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, under warranties, it is 4 years. Yet, under this bill, it would come to apply to personal injury which is 2 years. There are several types of implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, there is an implied warranty that the product is suited for the purpose for which it is sold. However, under this bill implied warranties are not recognized. Therefore, if a person remains silent, there is no implied warranty. The rules with respect to implied warranties have been developed over the years and have been recognized as being an essential element in sales that a product ought to be fit for the purposes for which it is sold. There are other aspects of this that have emerged relating to its unfair provisions, and I will touch on some of these provisions at this time. First, I want to address my remarks initially to the Snowe amendment. The Snowe amendment has been touted as eliminating the unfairness of the original cap on punitive damages in this product liability case. Under the original bill, it was set at being three times the economic loss, or $250,000. There were those that said that noneconomic loss, such as scarring or disfigurement, the infertility or loss of childbearing ability of a woman, or other noneconomic factors such as loss of consortium, was discriminatory because of the fact that they would be limited to $250,000, whereas a person's economic loss could be up into the millions. In a speech I made last week, I cited a 55-year-old CEO of a corporation who is making $5 million annually who has an anticipated work expectancy of 10 years. We would have a situation where his loss of earnings, his economic loss, would be $5 million a year times 10 years, or $50 million, and then multiply it by three. He would have a cap of $150 million, as opposed to the housewife [[Page S6246]] who has no economic loss, or the elderly who have no economic loss. Their cap would be $250,000--$150 million versus $250,000. That is quite a disparity in regard to caps, and I believe my point caused some Senators to reflect on the unfairness of the original punitive damage provision in the Gorton-Rockefeller substitute. As a result, there have been some changes made. The Snowe amendment now has a formula with regard to punitive damages which provides for twice the amount of total economic loss and the noneconomic loss--or twice times compensatory damages. Yet, there are still examples in which this would cause an even worse situation. In the case where death occurs instantaneously, there is no noneconomic--that is ``pain and suffering''--loss under the laws of most States. We would have a situation defined as meaning noneconomic loss means subjective nonmonetary loss resulting from harm, including pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, and humiliation--all of this is in the definition of noneconomic loss that is in the substitute that we have now before the Senate. Now, on that scenario where a person died as a result of injury, what would be the situation? That same 55-year-old CEO who was making $5 million a year, his economic loss would be $50 million on a work expectancy of 10 years times two under the Snowe amendment--or $100 million. Well, that is less of a cap than the $150 million we have. But what do we have on the housewife? She also dies immediately. She did not suffer any pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, and so forth, so she would really be in a situation where her noneconomic loss would be zero. Then we revert back to what the situation was under the original bill. She had no economic loss because she did not work outside the home, and therefore her total economic loss and her total noneconomic loss would be zero. We double zero, and we still have zero. Now, some might say, well, she would at least have an economic loss in funeral expenses. Well, there are some States--and I do not know whether this is the majority or not--that say that death is inevitable, like taxes. Therefore, we have a situation in which we are going to have to be buried, and that cannot be counted as an economic loss. Let's say, for purposes of discussion and debate, that all of the States were to allow it. Instead of the death case with the elderly or the housewife, it would be an economic loss of maybe $5,000 for funeral expenses, and we double that under the Snowe amendment and we have $10,000. So we still have the difference between the 55-year-old CEO who is killed, at $100 million; and we have, for the elderly or the housewife, maybe zero, and maybe $10,000 for funeral expenses. That shows, to me, the disparity of the Snowe amendment, and a situation in which it would not operate fairly. At least, under the original bill, we would have had a cap of $250,000. Now the cap, under the death case that I recited, would either be zero for the elderly and zero for the housewife, or perhaps maybe $10,000, or possibly $15,000, at the most, in regard to burial expenses. So this Snowe fix supposedly did come up under a situation in which death occurs, and as a result, if there were personal injuries, the personal injuries would have a different cap. But, therefore, it would be for the benefit of the wrongdoer who is going to be sued. A tortfeasor would much rather see the person dead than that he would be alive and incurring some pain and suffering and giving the jury some leeway in the determination of noneconomic loss, particularly if it is a person like a housewife, and elderly person, or a child or student, who has yet to begin making a living for herself. Under the Snowe amendment, a high-income victim will continue to be able to receive a high punitive award, whereas a homemaker, retiree, low-income victim will be limited to a very low punitive damage award in regards to these instances. Punitive damages are designed to punish and deter egregious conduct. They are not necessarily designed to have caps. You have to deal with it on an individual basis. As to the McDonald's hot coffee case, the situation was that the jury determined that punitive damages were in order to send a message to McDonald's, after 700 instances of burn cases. The jury in that situation decided on a punitive damage award of 2 days of the gross sales of coffee by the McDonald's Corp. which amounted to approximately $2.5 million, and then the judge reduced that down to $460,000. Later it was settled for an undisclosed sum that was protected by a secrecy order. There were third-degree burns in this case and McDonald's had repeated warnings that its coffee was being served way too hot. This bill takes away from the ability of juries to determine just what type of egregious conduct warrants an appropriate amount of punishment as to damages. Other language that appears in the Dole-Coverdell substitute has been changed. There was put into the substitute an amendment by Senator DeWine which appeared as a special rule. It says, The amount of punitive damages that may be awarded in any products liability action against an individual whose net worth does not exceed $500,000 or against an owner of an incorporated business or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government or organization that has fewer than 25 employees, shall not exceed $250,000. Now it appears in the substitute that the Dewine exemption applies in all civil cases--not just product liability cases--against an individual whose net worth does not exceed $500,000 or a partnership, corporation, so on--but it has as its cap, two times the sum of the economic damages and the noneconomic damages--still Snowe--or $250,000, but then it has the language which says, ``which amount is lesser.'' So a suit against a small corporation, partnership or an individual where the net worth does not exceed $500,000--and of course a small business has fewer than 25 employees--that has as its caps Snowe, which is double the compensatory damages or $250,000, but which amount is lesser. This exemption applies to all civil cases. I believe the President called a similar provision the drunk drivers' protection act. It is still a drunk drivers' protection act against a limited number of people. It just says that if you are drinking while driving you better not be worth more than $500,000 or you must not be an owner of an unincorporated business or be involved in a partnership or corporation. But it still is a drunk drivers' protection act, as it would apply to the limits that are placed in the bill, because it applies to any civil action, not just product liability. But let us also look at these caps and see how they apply. That 55- year-old CEO who is, we will say, killed, he has a situation in which he had a work expectancy of 10 years; with a $5 million annual salary he would have had a $50 million loss as his economic loss; multiply that times two and that would be $100 million. But under this, he would be limited to $250,000. Because that is the lesser of his $250,000 or two times his compensatory damages. So if he gets killed by a drunk driver, then the drunk driver is limited under the now substituted proposal to $250,000. Let us take the housewife, the elderly person, or the child in some instances. You would think they would still be under the $250,000, but that amount is greater. It is not lesser. And the language here says ``is the lesser.'' So the housewife who has no economic loss, and no noneconomic loss, it is still zero. For the elderly person who has no economic loss, the cap is zero because it is the lesser. Because the compensatory damages that they would suffer, in a death case, would be less than the $250,000, therefore the lesser amount, zero, would apply. This amendment also, as it is written now affects automobile accidents almost every type of conceivable accident, not just products liability incidents. It fails to take into account how much insurance an individual carries on his automobile or how much liability insurance he carries in his business. An individual may have $1 million or $5 million in liability insurance. But he still could have a net worth of less than $500,000. So he is protected under this special rule. He is protected by this small business exemption and the individual net worth figure, and his insurance goes home free. Certainly, if he [[Page S6247]] had $1 million worth of insurance, as a lot of people carry on their various businesses or automobiles--many individuals carry umbrella policies to try to protect them against that sort of thing--then that cap applies to him. But as to the housewife, the cap is zero or to the elderly the cap is zero. So I just point these out to show how these caps would apply and what inequities would come about and would occur. These also would apply to any civil action. I wonder in regard to the Oklahoma City explosion if there were attempts to bring suits against those that are eventually determined to be responsible for that bombing. So I just want to point out that there are many problems with the way this amendment is written. Certainly, if somebody carries insurance, the amount of the insurance ought to be counted in calculating whether or not a cap goes into effect. The idea is to protect the small business or the individual not worth more than $500,000. He might have a total net worth of $50,000 or $100,000 or $150,000 and carry $100,000 worth of insurance or carry $1 million worth of insurance. But these do not take into account his insurance that he carries on his car in the way it is written. I mentioned one time in a previous speech about the situation of the homeowner policy. Homeowner policies have for years and years now carried comprehensive liability coverage. Comprehensive liability coverage is very comprehensive, and basically it is written in a manner in which it has to exclude those things that are not covered. But practically all homeowners carry some type of comprehensive liability insurance. Again, that insurance does not come into effect as the way this substitute--the change of the language--took place from the DeWine amendment. To me, that is another example of how this is being written for the advantage of insurance companies. Therefore, I think that ought to be given very careful consideration. There are numerous aspects of this bill that are unfair as they apply to real life situations. I think it is very unfair to local government. There are some units of local government that are included under the DeWine amendment, if they have fewer than 25 full-time employees. But the way the bill is written, a claimant is defined to include a governmental entity. This affects most local governments, anywhere from a city that has about 25 employees. They usually define that as a city of anywhere from 10,000 and up with various types of departments: street department, fire department, police department and so on. I do not know the exact number. But it includes in the claimant. So, therefore, a city or county, State government or Federal Government which has a claim arising out of this, or property damage, may have some claim in regard to subrogation rights under certain circumstances and would also include the Federal Government. Therefore, they come within the purview of this relative to all of the provisions that are in this substitute, including the misuse and alteration of a product by any person, not the claimant himself. He might not have anything to do with it. But they are entitled to a reduction in regard to the percentage of fault in regard to misuse or alteration. With regard to the statute of repose, many, many products are bought by these governmental entities. Then the bill, or substitute, includes the Federal Government, the Army, the services. Most of our armed services utilize, helicopter, trucks, automobiles, Jeeps, and other vehicles all of which are built for the test of time. Many of them today are far in excess in age of over 20 years. For example, many of the types of helicopters that were used in the Vietnam war are still in use today. But the statute of repose in effect applies to them. The purpose of this bill is obviously to save money for business, corporate America, and insurance companies. In this instance, who are they going to save money from in regard to their defective product-- governmental entities? There are provisions relating to several liability which concern me. You do not even have to be a party. You can prove it against a nondefendant in a suit. You prove several liability on that, and that includes coemployees, which in most States you cannot sue the employer. It has a provision that, if there is any fault to be allocated against the coemployee and the employer, then that is the last item that you are to bring up in the priority of how you present your case before a jury. There are many other aspects of this that continue to be of concern, and I may mention some of these later as I go along. But there are numerous provisions in this bill that are written in such a manner which are directed toward taking away rights of the injured party and benefiting the wrongdoer. The provision that says you cannot introduce gross negligence or any punitive damage elements in your main trial relative to compensation if you have demanded punitive damages and there is a call for a bifurcated or separated trial is further evidence of the bill's basic unfairness. To me that is a real serious situation. A claimant, for example, could not show if a person was guilty of drunkenness. That would be a punitive damage element, and you could not show that in the trial in chief. Mr. President, for the time being, I am going to yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HEFLIN. To answer my question, is the Shelby amendment included or not?

Mr. HEFLIN. Let me ask the Senator this. In regard to the DeWine amendment, is it still the lesser of $250,000 or two times compensatory plus noncompensatory? Is it still the lesser?

Mr. HEFLIN. What I have written out to me is the lesser of it. This was handed out as some sort of brief statement.

Mr. HEFLIN. I think the distinguished Senator from Washington wishes to speak. I yield the floor. Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.

Mr. HEFLIN. Yes.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, this bill ought to be determined kill them, not injure them. Certainly in regard to the DeWine small business amendment, where it is the lesser of $250,000 or two times noneconomic and economic damages, you can have instances in death cases where the limit would be zero because there are no economic damages and because death occurs immediately, without pain and suffering, or with a minimum amount of time in which one goes through that. But the whole issue comes down to the role of the Senate. To me, the role of the Senate in regards to this is extremely important. Some of my colleagues, I am afraid, do not realize there will be a conference and the House of Representatives bill, which was passed, which has a 15-year statute of repose, which does not even have the Snowe amendment, which I consider not to be--an improvement--does not have it in it. And when you go to conference what is going to happen? I do not see the Speaker of the House of Representatives is going to be outdone by my good friend, Senator Rockefeller. I think he will come out with a House version of the bill. So, regardless of what substitute to a substitute might be offered here, if cloture were to be agreed to then what do you do? You go to conference and what do you come out with? You come out with the Gingrich bill. The role of the Senate is to be a deliberative body. We are not a body that votes aye and nay, and the majority rules in the event a person desires to take advantage of the rules. You have the cloture situation. So what is really at stake here is an issue in regards to the role of the Senate and the rules of the Senate. Do not be under any illusion to the effect that what you might adopt as a substitute to a substitute is going to be the final bill that goes to the President. It goes to conference. I think we ought to realize very clearly what the situation will be. There are just so many bugs in this. One of the lawyers on Senator Hollings staff mentioned to me you can organize subsidiary corporations or you can keep down the major corporations to fewer than 25 employees. There are so many maneuvers and various activities that can occur relative to that, that opens the market wide open pertaining to this. So I have already spoken. Senator Hollings is here, and others that will probably want to speak. I am not going to speak long on this, but this is basically saying that life in the United States, if a wrongdoer kills you, it is worth no more than $250,000, particularly in the event that you fall under the small business protection. I say this is flawed with great unfairness throughout. I have outlined it before. But the main issue to be considered in this cloture vote that is upcoming is the role of the Senate. Do not forget there is going to be a conference. Do not forget who is going to control the conference. I hope my colleagues bear that in mind as they consider their cloture vote.

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, again, I want to emphasize what this vote is about. It is, of course, about product liability, but it is also the role of the Senate in the legislative process. The House has passed a bill that contains vast differences from what is proposed in the substitute and what is proposed in the substitute to the substitute. If we do not take advantage of our rules and do not exercise the role that is intended for the Senate to be a deliberative body, and if we vote cloture, there is no question what will happen is it will go back to the House and I do not think there is much question as to what will happen. The Speaker of the House will control the conference, and this is going to be a bill regardless of what fixes may have been attempted in the Senate, the version that is going to come out of the conference is going to be the version of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It comes back here and people say, ``Well, you can exercise your rules and you can have extended debate at that time.'' But we all know what happens on conferences. Their reports come back, people are anxious to get away, and they are arranged at a time to come up where you are in a situation, and we end up, with very rare exceptions, approving conference reports. So I say to my colleagues, this is a vote not only on product liability but is a vote on the role of the Senate on this bill and other bills that may be coming down in the future. So I urge my colleagues to vote against cloture. It is very important that they bear in mind the fact that whatever is being proposed here does not mean that that is going to be the final version. The final version, I think, in the judgment of anybody who can see beyond the immediate scene and can see around the corner will be that it will be in conference and it will come out as a Gingrich version of this bill. I yield the floor. Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. I have come to somewhat agree with the Senator in regards to this. I have always been sort of puzzled as why that was put in there. Of course, in original ideas on alternate dispute resolution methods, some of the States have had what they call court-annexed arbitration, and they put a penalty relative to the failure to bind on the claimant, plaintiff, when this occurs, which raises an issue that it could be a violation of the seventh amendment, of the right to a trial by jury, by saying anything is mandatory under the concept of court-annexed provisions. Previous bills, as I recall, said if the judgment that occurred was less than what the award had been in an arbitration proceeding which is a part of the alternate dispute resolution, that then plaintiff would have to pay the reasonable attorney's fees and court costs and so on. And that raised the question of whether that was causing a claimant to be deprived of the right of trial by jury. This language here has, in section 103(a)(1), that they can have an offer to proceed to voluntary, nonbinding alternate dispute resolution. If it is voluntary and nonbinding, I do not understand why you would, in effect--unless it is sort of an effort to have an encouragement for defendants, realizing that claimants would be the ones who would probably want a nonbinding, voluntary alternate dispute procedure to start in order to more rapidly dispose of their claims. In particular, in the States that have had procedure, they usually have a dollar amount limitation. Actually, this is already authorized under existing law which we voted on several years ago, the Biden Civil Justice Act. I do not remember the specific title and name of it, but it authorized nonbinding alternate dispute resolutions in the Federal courts. You could have such a proceeding under this existing statute. So, I have been puzzled why proponents attempted to have the provision for a possible defendants' penalty. The only reason I see is I thought they were probably doing it for window dressing, purely for the purpose of trying to say we are giving something to the claimant; while we are taking away 100 different things, we are going to give you 1 with the alternative dispute resolution provision. Of course they use the word ``unreasonable'' in this section which allows for some leeway on behalf of a defendant. But overall, in fairness, I sort of tend to support the Senator's amendment here to strike the provision from the underlying Gorton substitute. I do not know what the others will do but as it is right now, unless I am convinced otherwise, I may well vote with you.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I am delighted to hear Senator Rockefeller state that the way the bill stands now, it is deformed and disfigured. That reminds me that this bill, as it stands right now, is pretty much similar to what the House passed. I do not think whatever we pass here in the Senate, when it goes to conference, is going to come out much different from the House bill. I think we know that the Speaker over there has great influence. I just feel that, basically, whatever we do here which passes the Senate and goes to conference will reflect the Speaker's position on this overall issue. I think the key battle is the battle here in the Senate and the Senate's legislation. Now, if there is a disfigurement and a deformity by extending the language pertaining to punitive damages, by extending the language eliminating joint and several liability to cover all civil actions, then that is a recognition that there is a fault with that extension, there is a fault with the overall underlying principle that is being brought forth here in regard to punitive damages and also to eliminating joint and several liability.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to proceed for 3 more minutes.

Mr. HEFLIN. I send to the desk and will ask to have printed in the Record a letter, dated May 25, 1990, to the Honorable Richard H. Bryan, then chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, pertaining to the GAO study. One of the questions that he asked was: In your research of the current product liability system, have you found any evidence that would support the argument that the current tort system has led to an increase in transaction costs? And they ended up saying: ``We believe that S. 1400''--which was a predecessor bill--``is unlikely to reduce transaction costs in product liability suits.'' I send that letter to the desk and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. HEFLIN. I wonder if the Senator can respond to a question or two?

Mr. HEFLIN. I was interested in what the Senator had to say about whether the Senator really does anticipate that the passage of this bill would reduce insurance costs. The Senator has given a couple of reasons why certain things are outside. But as I understand it, one of the main ideas has been that this would cut transaction costs, which I question, because it bifurcates a trial requiring additional hearings. But basically, will the Senator agree that where companies have liability insurance that there is in practically all policies no limit on transactional costs? The defense that occurs to the company as a result of liability insurance is borne by the insurance companies. Therefore, I raise the issue. One of the arguments is the cost. I have heard the Senator talk about it--defense fees, the deposition fees, and those things from the defense side which really would be borne by the insurance companies. Therefore, it would have some relationship to the overall cost of insurance, would it not?

Mr. HEFLIN. I might inquire of the Senator if there was testimony--I do not know whether it was this year or last year--from the American Insurance Association, one of their officers, which basically said that passage of the bill would not, I repeat, not, bring about any reduction in liability insurance premiums? Some words are that there would be insurance cost savings. I do not remember right offhand the person who said it, but I remember seeing that in a previous report of the Commerce Committee. Does the Senator remember that testimony?

Mr. HEFLIN. In regard to the alternate dispute resolution, if I recall right--I do not have it before me right now--there was a GAO study which indicated that they thought the bill would increase the transaction costs and that one of the reasons for it was the way the alternate dispute resolution provision was contained in the bill. Does the Senator recall that testimony?

Mr. HEFLIN. I was speaking of the GAO report. I do not have it before me. But as I recall the GAO report indicated that the provisions of the bill--maybe it was a predecessor of it--in their judgment would not reduce transactions costs, and that one of the reasons was they felt it could possibly increase it was because of the alternate dispute resolution methods that were there--increasing it another hearing as well as the provisions dealing with bifurcation, separate hearings that you would have to go through--thereby bringing about additional lawyer's fees in regards to those proceedings, particularly on the defendant's side where there is an hour billable approach. Does the Senator recall that?

Mr. HEFLIN. Senator Hollings is unable to be here. He was called down to the White House on a budget matter. In regard to his amendment, he has asked that I point out that his same amendment was accepted by unanimous consent last year. The proponents of the bill, Senator Gorton unanimous consent in the last Congress. So I am just repeating that at the request of Senator Hollings relative to this matter. But overall, this bill is a very unfair bill. It has added to it to make it much more encompassing, to make this matter of punitive damages now extend to other suits far into what it does. There are other provisions, such as the Abraham amendment, that, in effect, extends the elimination joint and several liability to all sorts of suits. Now, in our courts, you either have criminal cases or you have civil cases. Under this, it extends it to all civil suits brought under any theory whatsoever. So it is very broad and comprehensive, and very much covering almost every conceivable type of civil lawsuit that you might have, including such things as State antitrust laws. Sexual harassment in State laws would be covered; disability protections in State laws; Americans with disabilities would be covered, as it would apply, by State laws relative to this; automobile accident cases, all sorts of things in regard to it. It is an extremely broad and encompassing bill. I think it ought to be defeated. abraham amendment no. 600 on joint and several liability

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I would like to add my voice to those which have already lamented the passing of our dear former colleague from Mississippi, John Stennis. About 25 of us went down to Mississippi last week to his funeral to say goodbye to one of the true giants in the history of this institution. I recall about 10 years ago, some Senators, including myself, went to Senator Stennis' hometown of De Kalb, MS, where the people of De Kalb and surrounding areas had gathered to help celebrate his birthday. There was a great outpouring of love and genuine affection from friends and neighbors who had known him, his father, and others before him. No one really knows an individual in the same way that the people of his hometown do, and you could see that as they came together that day. There was an authentic feeling of closeness and friendship. De Kalb is a small community, probably smaller than the one I come from. The people there--the salt of the earth--knew their favorite son, John Stennis, for his character and integrity. The great outpouring of affection which was on display that day was the best evidence anyone ever needed of his graciousness, honesty, decency, and dedication to principle. All of us there could see that he stood very tall with those who knew him best. John Stennis and I had much in common, both of us from southern families that go back for many generations. I used to enjoy the stories he would tell about his early years and how his father would raise cotton, transport it over to Alabama, and ship it down the river to Mobile. We were both judges at one time, which gave us a unique perspective on government, individuals, and human nature in general. John Cornelius Stennis was born on August 3, 1901, in Kemper County, in the red clay hills of eastern Mississippi. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from what is now Mississippi State University in 1923 and 4 years later, received his law degree from the University of Virginia. Just 1 year later, he was elected to the Mississippi Legislature. He later went on to serve as a district prosecuting attorney and circuit judge. After 10 years on the bench, he ran in 1947 for the Senate seat held by the flamboyant Senator Theodore G. Bilbo and was elected over five opponents in November. His campaign theme was ``I want to plow a straight furrow right down to the end of my row,'' and that philosophy guided the rest of his career in public service. Until his last campaign, in 1982, he was never seriously challenged for reelection. Even then, facing future Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour, then only 34, he won by a 2-to-1 margin. In his early days in the Senate, John would work 16 hours a day, staying in the Senate until it adjourned and then studying in the Library of Congress. He was meticulous in his work, someone who would go over something again and again until he finally mastered its complexities. He was a commanding such resonance. Even after we had microphones, he would often speak without one. John Stennis served in the Senate longer than all but one other person in its history. When he retired on January 3, 1989, he had served for 41 years, 1 month, and 29 days. During the 1960's and 1970's, he was the most influential voice in Congress on military affairs. He was chairman of the appropriations Committee, and was instrumental in the development of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, which was extremely important to both our States economically. He changed with the times, and began to support civil rights measures. Due to his integrity, diligence, and judgment, he was often called upon to investigate controversial political matters. It became routine to refer to him as the conscience of the Senate. He was a patriarch and teacher to younger Members. It his later years, while his voice remained clear and his mind sharp, he experienced serious physical problems. He was shot and seriously wounded by a burglar at his home in 1973, and had a leg amputated in 1984 due to cancer, but each time, he returned to his beloved Senate much sooner than had been expected. After he retired, Senator Stennis moved to the Mississippi State University campus, home of the John C. Stennis Institute of Government and the John C. Stennis Center for Public Service, created by Congress to train young leaders. In one of his last interviews, he said, ``I do believe the most important thing I can do now is to help young people understand the past and prepare for the future.'' At that birthday celebration for John Stennis a decade ago, I had the honor and pleasure of speaking. I ended my speech with an old Irish prayer, which goes: May the road rise to meet you. May the wind always be at your back. May the Sun shine warm on your face And the rains fall soft on your shoulders, And may the Good Lord hold you in the hollow of his hand during the remainder of your days. He was a deeply religious man, and he told me he was particularly glad I used the prayer as a closing on that occasion. John Stennis' days are now over, and his passing gives us reason to pause, reflect, and remember that this body is a decidedly better institution, and the United States a better nation, for having had the benefit of this statesman's service for so many years.

Mr. HEFLIN

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.