Jesse Helms

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici.

Mr. HELMS. The Chair says 48 minutes.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, how much time do we have left on this side?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what is the existing time now--post the minority leader's request?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what is the time the minority leader has under his proposal?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, my friend, Senator Biden, began with an allusion to the young people listening by television about how we call each other distinguish Senators and various other good things, and that is called courtesy. I call him a distinguished Senator, and I admire Joe Biden. He knows I do. I cannot outshout him. He has far more volume than I. I have used my windpipes a little bit longer than he has. Let me tell you about Joe. He is a good guy. He is a good family man. He goes home to Delaware every night. He comes back in the morning. Sometimes he is not on time for committee meetings and other things, but we take account of that. But you can bank on Joe Biden in terms of his vote. He is going to vote liberal every time. I have never known him--and I say this with respect--to cast a conservative vote. And that is the real difference. I believe it is essential that the Senate withhold its consent and vote to defeat the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Mr. President, in the post-cold-war world, many of us have assumed that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is less relevant than before. I contend that it is more important than ever. The level of threat posed by another nation has two parts--the nation's capabilities to inflict damage upon us, and the intent to do so. Since the end of the cold war, Russia's intent, clearly, is peaceful. This has not changed Russian nuclear capabilities, however. If Russia's government were to change to a hostile one tomorrow, the level of threat posed by Moscow would be even greater than it was during the cold war. Unlike the United States, Russia has not stopped improving on its nuclear arsenal. The Russians have continued to modernize their nuclear arsenal with new warheads and new delivery systems, despite the end of the cold war. This modernization has been at tremendous economic expense and has probably entailed continued nuclear testing. I might also add that Russian nuclear doctrine has continued to evolve since the end of the cold war, and now Moscow relies even more on its nuclear deterrent for defense than it did before. But, Russian is not the only potential threat. The greater danger may come, ultimately, from China. As you know, Chinese espionage has yielded great fruit, including United States nuclear weapons designs and codes, as well as intelligence on our strategic nuclear submarine force. China continued nuclear testing long after the United States undertook a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium in 1992. And, undoubtedly, it can continue secret nuclear testing without our being able to detect it. Other threats also abound. One of the most serious is from North Korea, which remains in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is continuing to build missiles that can be used for nuclear weapons delivery. In this uncertain world, it is not enough to simply retain a nuclear arsenal. We need a true nuclear deterrent. A nuclear arsenal becomes a nuclear deterrent only when we have convinced potential enemies that we will use that arsenal against them if they attack us or our allies with weapons of mass destruction. This means we must do two things. First, we must maintain the arsenal in workable, reliable condition. Second, we must clearly communicate our willingness to use the arsenal. We must not forget: a weapon does not deter if your enemy knows that you won't use the weapon. Nuclear testing, historically, has performed both the maintenance and communications functions. Testing kept the arsenal reliable and modern. Very importantly, it also signaled to potential enemies that we were serious about nuclear deterrence. Some people might argue that our nuclear arsenal is as modern as it will ever need to be. I am not willing to make that argument because I know I can't predict the future. I have no way of knowing what technological advances our potential enemies may make. Perhaps they will make discoveries of countermeasures that make our delivery systems outmoded. Or, perhaps they will acquire ever more potent offenses, just as Iraq, Russia, and North Korea have acquired highly virulent biological weapons. If the future does bring new challenges to our existing arsenal, I think we ought to be in a position to modernize our stockpile to meet those challenges. The directors of our nuclear weapons design laboratories have told us that we cannot modernize our weapons, for example, to take on the threat of biological weapons unless we can test. It therefore seems reasonable that we not deny ourselves the ability to test. Again, some people may argue that we should join the CTBT and then pull out if we need to test. That would be terribly foolish. We all know how politically difficult it is to pull out of a treaty, no matter how strong the arguments are for doing so. It is better to not join in the first place. In conclusion, let me reiterate my support for keeping our nuclear deterrent strong. The nuclear arsenal protects us against attacks from other nations that might use weapons of mass destruction against us. It tells them silently that the cost of any aggression is too high. We need to keep sending that signal to them, and nuclear testing will help us do that. Mr. President nuclear deterrence was crucial to U.S. and allied security throughout the cold war, and it will be no less important in the future. The enormous benefit of America's nuclear deterrent is that it protects U.S. interests and safeguards the peace without the use of force. It is clear that on several occasions, notably during the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear deterrence kept the cold war from becoming a shooting war. Now that the cold war is over, has nuclear deterrence become less important? The answer is no. During the first conflict of the post-cold-war period, the 1991 gulf war with Saddam Hussein, nuclear deterrence undoubtedly saved thousands, possibly tens of thousands of lives. How? Saddam Hussein was deterred from using his chemical and biological weapons because he feared the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons. That is not my interpretation of the gulf war; it is what senior Iraqi leaders have said. The gulf war experience illustrates that as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons continue to proliferate, the U.S. nuclear deterrent will become even more vital to our security. While Washington must be prepared for the possibility that nuclear deterrence will not always safeguard the peace, we must safeguard our capability to deter. President Clinton recognized this continuing value of nuclear deterrence in the White House's most recent presentation of U.S. national security strategy. A National Security Strategy for A New Century, I quote: ``Our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion . . .'' And, quote ``The United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership . . .'' The strategy of nuclear deterrence that for decades has played such a crucial role in preserving peace without resort to war would be damaged, perhaps beyond repair, in the absence of nuclear testing. Make no mistake, the CTBT would harm U.S. security by undermining the U.S. nuclear deterrent. For the nuclear stockpile to underwrite deterrence it must be credible to foes. That credibility requires testing. To deter hardened aggressors who are seemingly impervious to reason, there is no substitute for nuclear testing to provide the most convincing demonstration of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and U.S. will to maintain nuclear deterrence. The strategy of nuclear deterrence also requires that U.S. leaders have confidence that the nuclear stockpile will work as intended, is safe and reliable. Only testing can provide that confidence to U.S. leaders, and to our European and Asian allies who depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. In the past, nuclear testing has uncovered problems in given types of weapons, and also assured that those problems were corrected, permitting confidence in the reliability of the stockpile. The absence of testing would undermine both the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the eyes of would-be aggressors and the confidence of U.S. leaders in the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In addition, an effective strategy of nuclear deterrence requires that the nuclear stockpile be capable of deterring a variety of aggressors and challenges. New and unprecedented threats to United States security are emerging as a variety of hostile nations, including North Korea and Iran, develop mass destruction weapons and their delivery means. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must be capable against a wide spectrum of potential foes, including those who are desperate and willing to take grave risks. The nuclear stockpile inherited from the cold war is unlikely to be suited to effective deterrence across this growing spectrum of potential challengers. America's strategy of nuclear deterrence will become increasingly unreliable if the U.S. nuclear arsenal is limited to that developed for a very different time and challenger. Nuclear weapons of new designs inevitably will be necessary; and as the directors of both nuclear weapons design laboratories have affirmed, nuclear testing is necessary to provide confidence in the workability of any new design. In short, nuclear testing is the key to confidence in the new weapons design that inevitably will be necessary to adapt our nuclear deterrent to a variety of new challengers and circumstances. Finally, the U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence cannot be sustained without a cadre of highly trained scientists and engineers. That generation of scientists and engineers that served successfully during the cold war is passing rapidly from the scene. Nuclear testing is critical to recruit, train, and validate the competence of a new generation of expert to maintain America's nuclear deterrent in the future. Mr. President, there is no credible evidence that the CTBT will reduce nuclear proliferation. None of the so-called ``unrecognized'' nuclear states--India, Pakistan and Israel--will be convinced by this Treaty to give up their weapons programs. Most important, those states that are currently seeking nuclear weapons--including Iran, Iraq and North Korea a state that probably already has one of two nuclear weapons--will either not sign the Treaty or, equally likely, will sign and cheat. These countries have demonstrated the value they ascribe to all types of weapons of mass destruction and are not going to give them up because others pledge not to test. They also know that they do not need to test in order to have confidence in first generation weapons. The United States did not test the gun-assembly design of the ``little boy'' weapon in 1945; and the South Africans and other more recent proliferators did not test their early warhead designs. Contrary to its advertised purpose, and in a more perverse and bizarre way, the CTBT could actually lead to greater proliferation not only by our adversaries but also by several key allies and friends who have long relied on the American nuclear umbrella as a cornerstone of their own security policy. In other words, if the CTBT were to lead to uncertainties that called into question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which it certainly will, the result could well be more rather than less proliferation. The United States has for many years relied on nuclear weapons to protect and defend our core security interests. In the past, our nuclear weapons were the central element of our deterrent strategy. In today's world--with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles increasingly available to rogue states--they remain an indispensable component of our national security strategy. While serving as a hedge against an uncertain future with Russia and China, United States nuclear weapons are also essential in meeting the new threat of regional states armed with weapons of mass destruction. In fact, in the only contemporary experience we have with an enemy armed with chemical and biological weapons, there is strong evidence that our nuclear weapons played a vital role in deterring Saddam from using these weapons in a way that would have changed the face of the gulf war, and perhaps its outcome. While the U.S. nuclear deterrent today inspires fear in the minds of rogue-type adversaries, U.S. nuclear capabilities will erode in the context of a CTBT. Inevitably, as both we and they watch this erosion, the result will be to encourage these states to challenge our commitment and resolve to respond to aggression. Much less concerned by the U.S. ability--and therefore its willingness--to carry out an overwhelming response, they will likely pursue even more vigorously aggression in their own neighborhoods and beyond. To support their goals, these states will almost certainly seek additional and ever more capable weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological and nuclear-- to deter American intervention with our conventional superiority. They may also be more willing to employ weapons of mass destruction on the battlefield in an effort to disrupt, impede, or deny the United States the ability to successfully undertake military operations. By calling into question the credibility of the ``extended deterrent'' that our nuclear weapons provided for key allies in Europe and Asia, the CTBT could also spur proliferation of nuclear weapons by those states who have long relied on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. For over half a century, the United States has successfully promoted non- proliferation through the reassurance of allies that their security and ours were inseparable. U.S. nuclear weapons have always been a unique part of this bond. Formal allies such as Germany, Japan and South Korea continue to benefit from this protection. Should the U.S. nuclear deterrent become unreliable, and should U.S. allies begin to fear for their security having lost faith in the U.S. guarantee, it is likely that these states--especially those located in conflict-laden regions-- would revisit the question of whether they need their own national deterrent capability. Maintaining a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent has also contributed to the reassurance of other important friends in regions of vital interest. For instance, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia have to date shown considerable restraint in light of the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation in their region, in large part because they see the United States as committed and capable of coming to their defense. While strong security relations have encouraged Taipei and Riyadh to abstain from their own nuclear programs, an unreliable or questionable U.S. nuclear deterrent might actually encourage nuclear weapons development by these states. In summary, by prohibiting further nuclear testing--the very ``proof'' of our arsenal's viability--the CTBT would call into question the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as their credibility and operational utility. Consequently, should the United States move forward with ratification of the Treaty, it is likely to have the profound adverse effect of encouraging further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This would be in the most fundamental way detrimental to U.S. national security objectives. Mr. President, a cornerstone of arms control is the ability of the U.S. government to verify compliance. In U.S. bilateral agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Senate has insisted on provisions in the treaty that would provide for a combination of cooperative measures including on- site inspection, as well as independent national technical means of verification to monitor compliance. Such provisions have been almost entirely absent in multinational arms control agreements. It is not surprising that international agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Chemical Weapons Convention are ignored by nations whose security calculation drives them to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The CTBT is likely to sustain the tradition of non-compliance we have so widely observed with other multilateral arms control agreements. The problem with the CTBT is particularly acute because national technical means of verification do not exist to verify compliance. There is some relevant arms control history on this point. In the 1980's, the United States negotiated a threshold test ban treaty with the former Soviet Union, FSU. This agreement limited nuclear tests to a specific yield measured in equivalent explosive energy in tons of TNT. Compliance with this agreement could not be verified by national technical means of verification. Very specific cooperative measures were required to render the agreement vulnerable to verification of compliance. Specifically, underground nuclear tests were limited to designated sites, and each side was required to permit the deployment of sensors in the region where tests were permitted to monitor such testing. These extraordinary measures emphasize the limitations of underground nuclear test monitoring. Tests that were not conducted at designated sites could not be reliably monitored. Moreover, even when we are confident we know where a test will be conducted, unless we have detailed knowledge of the local geological conditions and are able to deploy our own sensors near the site, the limits of modern science--despite the billions of dollars invested in various technologies for nearly half a century--cannot verify compliance with national undertakings concerning underground nuclear testing. Since the early 1990's, Russian nuclear weapons scientists and engineers have been conducting experiments at a test site on the Novaya Zemlya Island in the Russian Arctic. Because these tests are conducted in underground cavities, it is beyond the limits of modern scientists to be certain that a nuclear test has not been conducted. Two such tests were carried out in September according to the Washington Post in its report on Sunday, October 3, 1999. No one in the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the CIA, or the White House knows what those tests were. Nor can they know. These could have been nuclear tests using a technique for emplacing the nuclear device in circumstances that will deny us the ability to know whether or not a nuclear test has been carried out. A technique known as ``decoupling'' is a well understood approach to concealing underground nuclear tests. By suspending a nuclear device in a large underground cavity such as a salt dome or hard rock, the seismic ``signal'' produced by the detonation is sharply reduced as the energy from the detonation is absorbed by the rock or salt. The resulting ``signal'' produced by the blast of the detonation becomes difficult to distinguish from natural phenomena. Because decoupling is a simple, cheap, and reliable means of concealing nuclear tests, the United States insisted on a provision in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that underground nuclear tests could only be undertaken in specific agreed-upon sites. The unfeasibility of monitoring compliance with a CTBT if a nation decides to use decoupling techniques to conceal nuclear tests. This has been acknowledged by the Intelligence Community. The Community's chief scientist for the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Dr. Larry Turnbull stated last year. The decoupling scenario is credible for many countries for at least two reasons: First, the worldwide mining and petroleum literature indicates that construction of large cavities in both hard rock and sale is feasible with costs that would be relatively small compared to those required for the production of materials for a nuclear device; second, literature and symposia indicate that containment of particulate and gaseous debris is feasible in both sale and had rock. The reduction in the seismic ``signal'' can diminish the apparent yield of a nuclear device by as much as a factor of 70. The effectiveness of concealment measures means that potential proliferators can develop the critical primary stage of a thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapon. It can do so with the knowledge that science does not permit detection of a decoupled nuclear test in a manner that will permit verification of compliance with a CTBT or any other bilateral or multilateral arms control agreement intended to restrain nuclear testing. How much risk must the United States continued to be exposed by these ill-thought out multilateral arms control agreements? We have been reminded of this problem recently. The Biological Weapons Convention has been advertised by the same people now advocating the CTBT to be a successful example of a universally subscribed codification of the rejection of biological weapons by the international community. What has happened in the three decades since its ratification? The treaty has in fact, been widely violated. Two dozen nations have covert biological weapons programs. The arms control community--recognizing the treaty's fundamentally flawed character--is now seeking to ``put toothpaste back in the tube'' by attempting to negotiate verification provisions 30 years after the fact. We know from the report of the Rumsfeld Commission last year that the technology of nuclear weapons has been widely disseminated--abetted by the declassification policies of the Department of Energy. The problem of nuclear proliferation is now beyond the grasp of arms control. Other measures to protect American security and the security of its allies from its consequences now must be identified, considered, and implemented. We simply have to face the fact that compliance with the CTBT cannot be verified and no ``fix'' is possible to save it. The scope and pace of the consequences of nuclear proliferation will be magnified if the CTBT is verified. Mr. President, when Ronald Reagan said ``trust but verify'' he expressed what most Americans feel about arms control treaties that limit the tools of U.S. national security. They know we will abide scrupulously by our legal obligations and would like to live in a world where others do the same. But since we do not live in such a world, they expect us to avoid treaties whose verification standards are less demanding than our own compliance standards. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now before us for advice and consent would be a radical departure from traditional U.S. approaches to the cessation of nuclear testing. Despite its superficial attractiveness there are two enduring reasons why no previous administration has ever advocated a permanent, zero-yield test ban. The first is that we've never apologized for relying on low yield underground tests to assure the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. Others and I will have more to say about that issue, but right now I will focus on the second reason we've never catered to the anti-nuclear sentiments behind a zero-yield test ban. In the 1950's--when international nuclear disarmament really was a stated objective of U.S. policy--President Eisenhower's ``comprehensive'' test ban applied to tests above four or five kilotons. But after studying it for a few years he turned instead to nonproliferation and limited test ban proposals because he realized he could not assure verification of a test ban even at that threshold. We understood back then that cheating would allow an adversary to modernize new weapons and confirm the reliability of existing ones. We knew we would never exploit verification loopholes for military advantage but were less sanguine about the forbearance of others. We knew that monitoring, detecting, and identifying noncompliance, let alone verifying it under international legal standards, was beyond our technical, diplomatic, and legal limits, and we were honest enough to say so. And yet today we are told verification methods are good enough to enforce compliance by others with a permanent zero-yield test ban while we pursue unconstrained nuclear weapons modernization by other means ourselves. Mr. President, I know that science has not stood still over the past 40-plus years. Our monitoring methods have no doubt improved. But does that mean that from now until forever we can verify any nuclear test of any magnitude, conducted by anyone, anywhere? And--if we could--that we would be equipped to do something about it? The administration wisely stops short of such absolute claims, but asserts nevertheless that international verification methods are adequate for this treaty. So I have to ask is it our means of detection and verification or our standards of foreign compliance that have ``evolved'' over the past 44 years? I realize that perfect verification is unachievable. The U.S. is party to many treaties--some good, some bad--that are less than 100% verifiable. But the administration's belief--that this CTBT is so important that we should bind ourselves forever to its terms anyway-- does not flow logically from that premise. Previous administration have proposed bans on nuclear tests above certain yields despite sub-optimal means of monitoring compliance by appealing to their ``effective'' rather than ``foolproof'' verification provisions. The Carter administration employed that standard to promote a ten-year ban on tests above two kilotons. They knew a lower threshold would stretch credulity despite the seemingly infinite elasticity of ``effective verification.'' Mr. President, ``effective verification'' is an intentionally vague political term-of-art, but as the old saying goes, we all ``know it when we see it.'' for the CTBT, it should mean we have high confidence that we can detect within hours or days any clandestine nuclear test that would provide a cheater with militarily significant weapons information. If the administration attaches a different meaning to the term, we are entitled to know that. If not, we are entitled to know precisely what nuclear tests yields do provide militarily significant information, and whether the CTBT's verification system can detect them down to that level. As they are pondering those questions, permit me to offer some assistance. Those who test new weapons and track the deterioration of old ones will tell you that Carter's two-kiloton threshold would have permitted scientifically valuable U.S. nuclear tests (which Clinton's CTBT would disallow) bearing directly on the reliability of our nuclear deterrent. So, let me rephrase the question. Let's say evidence suggests a foreign test in, say, Novaya Zemlya, North Korea, Iran's territorial waters, or somewhere near the Tibetan mountains. Let's say it indicates an explosion of five kilotons--250 percent of what Carter would have allowed. Let's say the test did not take place in a ``decoupled'' cavity and, unlike the Pakistani test of May 1998, that the suspect state did not disable in-country seismic stations. Now, will the IMS reliably detect that test within hours or days with high confidence? Will is promptly identify the test and its precise location? Will it quickly differentiate it from mining excavations and plant disasters? And if it does: Will the requisite 30 members of the 51-member CTBT Executive Council immediately support an on-site inspection on the basis of that IMS input? Will the Executive Council issue an inspection request even if the state in question was the last one inspected and cannot be challenged consecutively? With the alleged cheater welcome a team of top caliber experts and escort them to the suspected location promptly on the basis of that input? Will inspectors be allowed to use state-of-the-art inspection equipment in and around all suspect facilities on the basis of that input? Let's say the IMS and Executive Council overcome all of those impediments and call for an on site inspection of the suspected state. Now, do you suppose a state that conducted a clandestine nuclear test might be prepared to exercise any of the following rights explicitly granted under the CTBT's ``managed access'' principle: Deny entry to the inspection team [88(c)]? Refuse to allow representatives of the United States (as the challenging state) to accompany the inspectors [61(a)]? Delay inspectors' entry for up to 72 hours after arrival [57]? Permanently exclude a given individual from any inspections [22]? Veto the inspection team's use of particular equipment [51]? Declare buildings off-limits to inspectors [88(a); 89(d)]? Declare several four-square-kilometer sites off-limits to inspectors? [89(e); 92; 96]? Shroud sensitive displays, stores, or equipment [89(a)]? Disallow collection/analysis of samples to determine the presence or absence of radioactive products [89(c)]? Mr. President, even if we truly believe that in certain cases, working diligently under CTBT rules, each of these impediments can be surmounted, I must ask: Would it really be worth it for 5 kilotons? What if comparable events arise days, weeks, or months apart? What if new information bearing on the event arises after the elaborate inspection process has run its course? What if we develop comparable suspicions of the same state frequently? How many of these would it take before the United States is branded as a ``pest'' by the anti-nuclear crowd that is pushing this treaty? What if only our friends agree with our judgments? Or, perish the thought, if even our ``friends'' don't? How many pointless, frustrating, inconclusive OSI exercises would have to proceed our exercise of ``Safeguard F'' withdrawal rights? In short, Mr. President, the CTBT is long on President Reagan's ``trust'' requirement, but fatally short on his ``verify'' requirement. I don't see how a single Senator can vote in favor of its ratification. Mr. President, I want to clarify a point in regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to set the record straight concerning the heritage of the treaty that the Senate is now considering. The treaty before the Senate is not, as some have led us to believe, the product of nine administrations. Certainly Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Dwight D. Eisenhower have no ties to this treaty. And, the administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter's never proposed this treaty. The fact is, no other administration has any tie whatsoever to the treaty that is being considered by the Senate. The administration would like you to think that the treaty has had decades of support. Not so. This treaty is all Bill Clinton's. No other administration has ever supported a zero yield, unlimited duration nuclear test ban treaty barring all tests. Well, they'll say, the idea of limiting nuclear testing has been endorsed since the Eisenhower administration. Well, that may be, but supporting an idea and endorsing the specifics of a concrete proposal are two different things. President Clinton and I both support tax cuts. We both support missile defense. We even both say we're for maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. It's in examining the specific tax cuts, missile defense proposals, and methods of maintaining our nuclear security that we differ. President Eisenhower's name has been invoked here a number of times by Members supportive of the treaty. The implication is that Eisenhower is somehow the father of the CTBT. A review of the historical record reveals that President Eisenhower's administration proposed a test ban only of limited duration. Eisenhower only supported the test moratorium that began in 1958 because he was assured that the moratorium would retain American nuclear superiority and freeze the Soviets in an inferior position. He was very clear that the United States had to maintain a nuclear edge both in quality and quantity. I believe President Eisenhower would not have supported a treaty that gave others an advantage, as this treaty clearly does. President Kennedy's views of a nuclear test ban were much the same as Eisenhower's. He did not support a zero yield test ban. In fact, hydronuclear tests were conducted secretly in the Nevada desert during President Kennedy's administration. He also did not support a ban of unlimited duration. Kennedy broke out of the testing moratorium after the Soviet Union tested on September 1, 1961. At that time the world was shocked that the Soviets were able to begin an aggressive series of 60 tests within 30 days. Equally shocking was the realization that the Soviets had been planning for the tests for at least six months, while at the same time negotiating with the United States to extend the test moratorium. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations did agree to the Limited Test Ban Treaty which banned nuclear blasts in the atmosphere, space, or under water, but not underground as the CTBT does. President Nixon did not seek to ban nuclear tests, although he agreed to limit tests above 150 kilotons. James Schlesinger, President Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Energy tell us that President Carter only sought a 10-year treaty and sought to allow tests of up to two kilotons. Presidents Reagan and Bush did not pursue a comprehensive test ban of any kind or duration. Some point to President Bush's signing of the Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell legislation limiting the United States to a series of 15 underground tests before entering a ban on testing as evidence that President Bush supported this comprehensive test ban treaty. This is not correct. On the day he left office, President Bush repudiated the Hatfield legislation and called for continuation of underground nuclear testing. He said, I quote, The administration strongly urges Congress to modify this legislation urgently in order to permit the minimum number and kind of underground nuclear tests that the United States requires, regardless of the action of other states, to retain safe, reliable, although dramatically reduced deterrent forces. That brings us to the Clinton administration. Only President Clinton has sought a zero yield, unlimited duration treaty, and he has not even held that position for the entirety of his administration. For the first 2\1/2\ years, this administration pursued a treaty that would allow some level of low yield testing. As recently as 1995, the Department of Defense position was that it could support a CTBT only if tests of up to 500 tons were permitted. As a concession to the non- nuclear states, the Clinton administration dropped that proviso and agreed to a zero yield test ban. This treaty has no historical lineage. It is from start to finish President Clinton's treaty. Mr. President, proponents of the CTBT are fond of pointing out that public opinion is strongly in favor of the treaty. This is not particularly a surprise because, in general, Americans support treaties that have been signed by their President. They assume that the U.S. Government would not participate in a treaty that is not in the nation's interest. In this regard, I would like to make two points. First, the American public overwhelmingly supports maintenance of a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent. If people are given the facts about the importance of nuclear testing to that deterrent, I believe that their view of the CTBT would change dramatically. Second, the CTBT indeed is not in the nation's interests and it is up to us, as leaders, to explain to the people why. Let me first address Americans' attitudes toward their nuclear deterrent. In June, 1998, the Public Policy Institute of the University of New Mexico truly non-partisan and professional groups conducted a nationwide poll on public views on security issues. Let me give you a few results of that poll: Seventy-three percent view it as important or extremely important for the U.S. to retain nuclear weapons today. Sixty-six percent view U.S. nuclear weapons as integral to maintaining U.S. status as a world leader. Seventy percent say that our nuclear weapons are important for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against our country. More than 70 percent say that it is important for the U.S. to remain a military superpower, with 45 percent saying that it is extremely important that we remain so. Now, we all know that the measure of commitment to a given aim can sometimes best be gauged by willingness to spend money to achieve it. The poll asked, ``Should Government increase spending to maintain existing nuclear weapons in reliable condition?'' Fifty-seven percent support increased spending and 15 percent support present spending levels. I will return to the subject of public opinion in a moment, but let me turn briefly to the issue of whether this treaty is in the nation's interest. If there were a test ban, we would not be able to know with certainty whether our nuclear weapons are as safe and reliable as they can be. On the other hand, Russia, China, and others might be able to continue nuclear testing without being detected. This is because the CTBT is simply not verifiable. What do you think the American people would think about that? Well, we have some data to tell us. The University of New Mexico's poll asked: ``If a problem develops with U.S. nuclear weapons, is it important for the United States to be able to conduct nuclear test explosions to fix the problem?'' Fifty- four percent of the people said yes. Only 15.5 percent said no. The rest were undecided. The poll also asked, ``How important do you think it is for the United States to be able to detect cheating by other countries on arms control treaties such as the comprehensive nuclear test ban? Over 80 percent said that it was important, with 40 percent saying that it is extremely important. The bottom line here is that the American people want us to retain a strong nuclear deterrent. While they will also support good arms control measures, they expect the American leadership to do whatever is necessary to keep the deterrent strong. Let's not be fooled by simplistic yes-or-no answers to questions about the CTBT. This issue is more complex than that. We must simply give people the facts about this treaty. The CTBT would imperil our security. I urge a vote against this treaty. I yield back the remainder of my time. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens.

Mr. HELMS. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith.

Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the Old Dominion State, Mr. Warner.

Mr. HELMS. We have a 3-minute difference; is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the Senate is moving toward the end of an historic confrontation against the most egregious arms control treaty ever presented to this body for its advice and consent. The CTBT is a dangerous treaty which, if ratified, would do enormous harm to our national security. It will not and cannot accomplish its highly exaggerated stated goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, because as the CIA has repeatedly made clear the CTBT cannot be verified. Moreover, at the same time, it would undermine America's security by undermining confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. It is for these reasons that the Senate is prepared to vote down this treaty. Unable--indeed unwilling even to try to respond to these facts, the White House has spitefully argued that Republicans are ``playing politics'' with the national security of the United States--a spurious charge, which is one of many reasons why the administration has failed to convince Senators who have raised substantive concerns. Mr. President, the Senate Republicans' purpose in opposing this treaty is not because we seek to score political points against a lame- duck administration. We are opposed because the CTBT is unverifiable, and because it will endanger the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Those who support the CTBT have failed to make a compelling case, and that, Mr. President, is precisely why the CTBT is headed for defeat. The President and his Senate allies have mouthed the charge that the process has been ``unfair''--that Republicans are ramming this vote through the Senate in what the White House has falsely asserted as a ``blind rush to judgment.'' Let's examine the record: The Senate has held seven separate hearings exclusively on the CTBT--three in the Government Affairs Committee, three in the Armed Services Committee and one final, day-long marathon hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee with 11 different witnesses. It is instructive that, after demanding for months that the Foreign Relations Committee hold hearings, only a handful of Democrat Senators even bothered to show up. As for floor debate, we scheduled 22 hours of debate on the CTBT-- more than any other arms control treaty in recent history. By contrast, the Senate held just 6 hours of debate on Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; 9\1/2\ hours on the START Treaty; 6 hours on the START II treaty; 18 hours on the Chemical Weapons Convention; and just 2 hours on the Conventional Forces in Europe Flank Agreement. Well, then, some of them have falsely charged, Republicans pushed their unanimous-consent request through an unsuspecting Senate, on a Friday when few Senators were in town to discuss and consider it--a demonstrably false allegation. The majority leader shared our draft unanimous-consent request with the minority leader on Wednesday, September 29. He offered it on the Senate floor the next day, Thursday, September 30. The minority objected, and asked for more time to consider it. After consulting with the White House, with the State Department, and with the Democrat Caucus, they came back with a request for more time for the debate. We agreed to give them an additional week before the vote, and 12 additional hours of floor debate. Then on Friday October 1--after 3 days of internal discussion--they finally agreed to a unanimous consent for a vote they had vociferously demanded for two full years. And they are complaining that we are rushing to judgment? As my friend, Senator Biden has often pleaded during this debate; Give me a break! So the ``politics'' argument failed, and the ``process'' argument failed. Now they are turning in desperation to the ``Chicken Little'' argument, warning us of the ``disastrous'' consequences should the Senate reject the CTBT. If we vote the CTBT down, they warn, India and Pakistan may well proceed with nuclear test. Well, as Senator Biden may plead: Give me a break! That horse has already left the barn. India and Pakistan have already tested. Why did they test in the first place? Because of the Clinton administration's failed nuclear nonproliferation policies. For years, India watched as Red China transferred M-11 missiles to their adversary, Pakistan. They watched as this administration stood by--despite incontrovertible evidence from our intelligence community that such transfers were taking place--and refused to impose sanctions on China that are required by law. As a result, they made an unfortunate but understandable calculation that the President of the United States is not serious about non-proliferation, and that this White House is unwilling to impose a real cost on proliferating nations. The fact of the matter is that no matter how the Senate votes on the CTBT, nations with nuclear ambitions will continue to develop those weapons. Russia and China will continue their clandestine nuclear testing programs. North Korea will not sign or ratify the CTBT, and will continue to blackmail the West with its nuclear program. And India and Pakistan will probably test again--no matter what we do today. Because these nations know that this administration is unwilling to impose any real costs on such violations. By defeating this treaty, the Senate will not change this calculus one iota. We will not be giving a ``green light'' for nuclear testing. Such tests by non-nuclear states are already a violation of the international norm established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The proliferation we have witnessed in recent years has been a result of the administration's failure to enforce that existing norm, and place a real costs on violations of that norm. Mr. President, only a willingness to impose real penalties on such violations will prevent the expansion of the nuclear club. Papering over the problem with a worthless piece of paper like the CTBT will accomplish nothing. Let me suggest something that will happen when we defeat this treaty. This administration, and future administrations, will henceforth think twice before signing more bad treaties which cannot pass muster in the United States Senate. This administration clearly wants the Senate's ``consent'' on treaties, but they are not interested in the Senate's ``advice.'' If they had asked our ``advice'' on the CTBT before they signed it, they would have known well in advance that an unvertifiable, permanent, zero-yield ban on all nuclear tests would be defeated. They would have negotiated a treaty that could be ratified. Mr. President, when the debate ends today, there must be no ambiguity about the status of the CTBT. The Senate must make clear that this treaty is dead. Unless we vote today to explicitly reject the CTBT, under customary international law the U.S. will be bound by the terms of this treaty. The CTBT will be effectively in force. That is an unacceptable outcome. Why must the Senate defeat the CTBT? The answer is clear: Because the next administration must be left free to establish its own nuclear testing and nuclear nonproliferation policies, unencumbered by the failed policies of the current, outgoing administration. We must have a clean break, so that the new President can re-establish American credibility in the world on non-proliferation. A credibility not based on scraps of paper, but on clear American resolve. Mr. President, we must vote on this treaty and we must reject it. It is our duty and solemn responsibility under the Constitution. I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of our time.

Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

Mr. HELMS. I object.

Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison.

Mr. HELMS. If they want to object to that, let them try.

Mr. HELMS. I yield back all time under the control with the exception of 45 minutes. This action, again, makes the time remaining equal on both sides.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Alabama.

Mr. HELMS. May we have order in the Senate.

Mr. HELMS. I am going to ask speakers on both sides to have no conversation because we have very little time. I say to the Senators on my side, we are limiting ourselves as far as it will go to 5 minutes per Senator. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from the distinguished former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

Mr. HELMS. The proposal I make is that I yield back all time under our control with the exception of 45 minutes. This action again makes the time remaining exactly equal on both sides, or at least I hope it does.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the yeas and nays have been ordered; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

Jesse Helms

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