Jesse Helms

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. I ask the Parliamentarian for his views on it now, to get that settled.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Maine is here. I yield 15 minutes to the gracious Senator.

Mr. HELMS. I did not think it would be four questions.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. I feel obliged to observe that the United States has already flirted with an end to nuclear testing--from 1958 to 1961. It bears remembering that the nuclear moratorium ultimately was judged to constitute an unacceptable risk to the nation's security, and was terminated after just three years. On the day that President Kennedy ended the ban--March 2, 1962--he addressed the American people and said: We know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient--we have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it impossible of execution. This statement is very interesting. It makes clear that the fundamental problems posed by a test ban remain unchanged over the past 27 years. The United States certainly faces a Russian Federation that is engaging in ``secret preparations'' and likely is engaging in clandestine nuclear tests relating to the development of brand-new, low-yield nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, cannot engage in such nuclear modernization while adhering to the CTBT. Likewise, the Senate is faced with the same verification problem that it encountered in 1962. As both of President Clinton's former intelligence chiefs have warned, low-yield testing is undetectable by seismic sensors. Nor does the United States have any reasonable chance of mobilizing the ludicrously high number of votes needed under the treaty to conduct an on-site inspection. In other words, the treaty is unverifiable and there is no chance that cheaters will ever be caught. This is not my opinion. This is a reality, given that 30 of 51 countries on the treaty's governing board must approve any on-site inspection. Even the President's own senior arms controller--John Holum--complained in 1996 that ``treaty does not contain . . . our position that on-site inspections should proceed automatically unless two-thirds of the Executive Council vote ``no.'' Instead of an automatic green light for inspections, the U.S. got exactly the opposite of what it requested. But most importantly, in 1962 President Kennedy correctly noted that the inability to test has a pernicious and corrosive effect--not just upon the weapons themselves (which cannot be fully remanufactured under such circumstances)--but upon the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Our confidence in the nuclear stockpile is eroding even as we speak. Again, this is not my opinion. It is a fact which has been made over and over again by the nation's senior weapons experts. In 1995, the laboratory directors compiled the following two charts which depict two simple facts: (1) that even with a successful science- based program, confidence will not be as high as it could be with nuclear testing; and (2) even if the stockpile stewardship program is completely successful by 2010, the United States will not be able to design new weapons, and will not be able to make certain types of nuclear safety assessments and stockpile replacements. Senators will notice that, on both charts, there is mention of ``HN'' (e.g. hydronuclear) and 500 ton tests. The laboratory directors, in a joint statement to the administration in 1995, said: ``A strong Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is necessary to underwrite confidence. A program of 500-ton experiments would significantly reduce the technical risks.'' This judgment has not changed over the past several years. Both weapons laboratory directors stated in 1997 that nuclear testing would give the United States greater confidence in the stockpile. So as I listen to these claims that the United States is ``out of the testing business,'' I make two basic observations. First, we are only out of the testing business because President Clinton has taken us out. There is no legal barrier today to conducting stockpile experiments. The reason is purely political. Indeed, the White House is using circular logic. The United States is not testing because the White House supports the test ban treaty; but the White House is claiming that because we are not testing, we should support the treaty. Second, I remind all that the United States thought it was out of the testing business in 1958, only to discover how badly we had miscalculated. President Kennedy not only ended the 3-year moratorium, but embarked upon the most aggressive test series in the history of the weapons program. If Senators use history as their guide, they will realize that the CTBT is a serious threat to the national security of the United States.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I assure my friend from Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I enjoy hearing him and hearing him and hearing him. I guess it is sort of similar to what the President said in one of his strong moments not long ago: I guess it depends on what the definition of ``is'' is. This afternoon in Canada, President Clinton held a press conference in which he explicitly rejected the offer I made along with a number of other Republican Senators that the Senate would put off a vote on the CTBT if the President requested in writing (a) that the treaty be withdrawn and (b) that it not be considered for the duration of his presidency. Considering that the President acknowledged he does not have the votes to ratify the treaty, this seemed to many of us a generous offer which the President rejected with a strange rhetorical outburst. When asked about our offer today, he said: They want me to give them a letter to cover the political decision they have made that does severe damage to the interest of the United States and the interest of nonproliferation in the world? I don't think so. The Mr. President further suggested, strangely and absurdly, that the reason we made the offer in the first place was because, as he put it, Republicans are afraid to go though with a vote. He said: . . . they want to [kill the treaty] and don't want to get up and defend it before the American people in an election year. . . . [They think] that some letter from me will somehow obscure [that fact] . . . Mr. President, among those who are urging that the Senate kill this dangerous treaty are: six former Secretaries of Defense, four former National Security Advisors, four former Directors of Central Intelligence, and two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, Mr. Clinton suggests that Republicans are afraid to vote? The fact is, the President and his advisors have done everything possible to discourage a solution. Let's make it clear so the President can get his confusing rhetoric straightened out: Since he has rejected our offer, I will object, along with many of my Republican colleagues, to any effort to put off next week's vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a dangerous treaty, contrary to the national security interests of the American people. The Senate should go on record as planned: The Senate should vote this treaty down. Mr. President, may I make an inquiry how much time has expired on each side since this morning when the Senate convened?

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for me to suggest the absence of a quorum and the time be divided equally from both sides.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement by the Senate, consideration has begun regarding an arms control treaty that has been the longest-sought, hardest-fought item on the unilateral nuclear disarmament agenda. Strangely, the Clinton administration has used every fanciful reasoning in its attempt to portray the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an agreement long pursued by every administration since President Eisenhower, a claim that is bewilderingly untrue. Even the administration's own negotiator acknowledged that the administration's claims are ``hyperbole.'' You see, Mr. President, the truth of the matter is that not one administration (prior to the current one) ever proposed a zero-yield, unverifiable, permanent duration test ban. Indeed, as Ambassador Ledogar admitted, even the Clinton administration itself did not want such a treaty initially. Someone has commented that the CTBT now before the Senate is the clearest case of ``parchment worship'' ever seen. It was neither carefully negotiated nor well-thought through. It does not even define exactly what it bans. Instead, the CTBT is the product of a mad scramble to: (1) Create an arms control ``legacy'' for the Clinton-Gore administration; or (2) provide an excuse for this administration's lack of any nonproliferation policy; or (3) obscure the fact that this administration presided over the collapse of the single-most significant reduction in nuclear weapons with Russia ever negotiated-- the START II Treaty--which would have eliminated all MIRVed ICBMs and the SS-18 missile. (The likelihood is that all three played a major role in the administration's decision to try to ram through this Senate this unwise and dangerous treaty.) Unfortunately, in the race to fashion a last-minute rickety ``legacy'', the Clinton administration abandoned longstanding United States policy on nuclear testing and signed up to a ``zero yield,'' unverifiable, permanent duration test ban. As several of us have noted, for a number of reasons relating to verification and U.S. nuclear weapons requirements, this is something to which no other administration ever agreed. For instance, President Eisenhower--who has been repeatedly and mistakenly blamed with authorship of the CTBT-- insisted that nuclear tests with a seismic magnitude of less than 4.75 be permitted. The reason that the United States historically has refused to sign on to a zero yield test ban is that five problems are created by such a prohibition. First, confidence in the safety and the reliability of the weapons stockpile will erode. Second, warheads cannot be ``remanufactured'' to capitalize upon modern technologies. Third, no further designs or capabilities can be added to the nuclear stockpile. Fourth, critical infrastructure and hardware cannot be thoroughly ``hardened'' against nuclear weapons effects. Fifth, the U.S. can have no confidence that other countries are abiding by the CTBT because a zero yield ban cannot be verified. By preventing the United States from testing, the CTBT will erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements. Confidence that the weapons will perform as needed will erode. Already, leaders of our own nuclear weapons design laboratories have stated that problems with the stockpile have arisen that formerly would have prompted nuclear tests. Further, several of the weapons are not as safe as they could be. As this chart demonstrates, only one warhead of the nine in the stockpile is equipped with all of the modern surety features available. One weapon--the W62--does not have any safety features at all, and three of the weapons--the W76, W78, and W88--are only equipped with ``enhanced detonator safety'' measures. Mr. President, several important safety improvements cannot be made to these weapons unless subsequent nuclear testing is allowed to ensure that modified devices will function properly with these changes. I will underscore that for Senators. The CTBT will prevent the United States from making critical safety improvements to its warheads. I, for one, agree with the Governor of North Dakota who wrote to me opposing the CTBT stating: As a governor of a state that hosts a sizable percentage of our nation's nuclear weapons, I have an obligation to the people of North Dakota to ensure that these warheads are as safe and reliable as they can be made. It troubles me that several U.S. warheads do not contain the most modern safety features available, such as fire-resistant pits and insensitive high explosives. Yet these warheads cannot capitalize upon such improvements without nuclear testing. I hope Senators will understand that the CTBT will gradually undermine the safety of the U.S. deterrent by precluding the incorporation of modern safety features. Moreover, nuclear testing is essential if the United States is to discover and fix problems with the stockpile. These problems usually are associated with aging. The materials and components of weapons can degrade in unpredictable ways and can cause the weapon to fail. Many weapons believed to be reliable and thoroughly tested nevertheless developed problems which were only discovered, and could only be fixed, through nuclear testing. In fact, one-third of all the weapon designs placed in the stockpile since 1958 have required and received post- deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems. In three quarters of these cases, the problems were identified and assessed only as a result of nuclear testing, and only could be fixed through testing. The United States has chosen to remanufacture aging weapons in the enduring stockpile rather than designing and building new ones. This presents problems because many of the materials and processes used in producing the original weapon are no longer available. New materials and processes need to be substituted, but they can only be validated to assure that the remanufactured weapon works as intended through nuclear testing. Exact replication, especially of older systems, is impossible without testing. In part, this is because documentation has never been sufficiently exact to ensure replication. Nuclear testing is the most important step in product certification; it provides the data for valid certification. As a case in point, the United States attempted to remanufacture both the W52 and W68 warheads on the basis of simulations. However, when actually tested, both weapons had a measured yield well short of what test-experienced weapons designers predicted. This is a lesson that the administration, in supporting the CTBT, seems willing to forget. The CTBT also will prevent the United States from developing new weapons to counter new technological advances by adversaries. Nuclear testing is essential to such modernization. Without it, the nuclear triad will become obsolete. I fail to see the logic behind the argument that the United States has no need to modernize its deterrent if Russia, China, and others are similarly constrained. Such a claim just won't fly; in fact, given the demonstrable inability to verify a total test ban, I am persuaded that such assertions are founded upon the mistaken presumption that nuclear weapons modernization is driven by the evolution of other nuclear deterrents. Historically, this simply has not been the case. Indeed, nuclear weapons modernization is generally driven either by new mission requirements, or by non-nuclear technological evolution in defensive systems. For instance, during the cold war, advances in air defense and anti-submarine warfare created needs for new weapons. Nuclear testing was needed to create the B83 bomb, a gravity bomb--a ``laydown weapon'' because it enabled the B-1B to drop its payload, at low altitude and high speed, and thereby escape the resulting explosion. This weapon was needed in response to advances in air defense capability. For the same reason, the U.S. developed the nuclear air- launched cruise missile, which allows U.S. bombers to fulfill their mission outside of air defense ranges. Nuclear testing was needed for the Trident II missile's warheads, W76 and W88. Testing was essential to optimize the system, giving the missile, and thus the submarine as well, increased striking range. This was needed in response to advances in anti-submarine warfare. Without the ability to test and modernize, the airmen and sailors aboard our bombers and submarines will be put at increased risk as they try to perform their duties with obsolete technology. Senators should think carefully about the implications of the CTBT, and the risk it poses-- not just to the nuclear weapons themselves--but to our servicemen. Our clear, future need facing the United States is the requirement to develop new or modified warheads to respond to developments in missile defense--particularly in the area of directed energy. It would be impossible to adapt to such developments under a complete test ban. Further, without the ability to design new weapons, such as a warhead optimized to kill biological plagues or to destroy deeply-buried targets, the U.S. will be unable to respond to serious emerging threats to our security. I could not agree more with one of the former Directors of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dr. Roger Batzel, who warned that; ``A nuclear arsenal which is unable to keep pace with a changing security environment is unlikely, in the long run, to prove much of a deterrent.'' Fourth, the CTBT would make the United States increasingly vulnerable to foreign nuclear programs. Critical systems such as satellites cannot be hardened and thoroughly protected against electro-magnetic pulse attack without nuclear testing. Computers cannot simulate a nuclear environment. Neither can controlled radiation sources. It takes a nuclear explosion to create the heat and complex interplay of radiation needed to evaluate the resistance of systems to these nuclear effects. Historically, the United States often has been surprised by how systems which seemingly performed as needed during non-nuclear simulations then failed to function properly in an actual nuclear environment. Indeed, surprises have been found in the vulnerability to nuclear effects of all U.S. strategic nuclear systems except the Minuteman II. The CTBT will allow counties to exploit a growing U.S. vulnerability brought about by an increasing reliance on high-tech weaponry and a decision not to test in order to harden systems. Finally, a ``zero yield'' test ban is not verifiable. While the exact thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood that the United States cannot detect nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. Countries are able to resort to a number of techniques, ranging from ``unattended detonations'' to seismic decoupling, that will enable them to conduct significant nuclear explosions with little chance of being detected. The proposed verification regime under the CTBT offers scant reassurance in this matter. The seismic detection thresholds of the International Monitoring System are sufficiently high that a large amount of clandestine testing could occur without fear of seismic detection. Moreover, the on-site inspection regime is riddled with loopholes and deficiencies. The bottom line is that if the Senate were to make the mistake of approving this treaty, the United States would scrupulously adhere to the CTBT, thereby losing confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Other nations, however, most likely would violate the treaty and escape detection, building new weapons to capitalize upon the U.S. deficiencies and vulnerabilities created by the CTBT. For these reasons, I oppose the CTBT and I am gratified that more and more Senators are making clear their opposition to ratification of an unwise, even dangerous, proposal to deprive the American people of the protection they need and deserve. Mr. President, for just a moment I suggest the absence of a quorum and then I will resume.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I do thank my friend from New York--our friend from New York--whom we will sorely miss before very long. I thank the Senator and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the inspiring prayer which Senators just heard was delivered by the remarkable Dr. John C. Compton, whose church is the home church for Dot Helms and me when the Senate is in session. The congregation at First Baptist Alexandria includes many good folks from North Carolina, with relatives in our State. Dr. Compton has been senior pastor at First Baptist Alexandria since June 1997, and what an enormous impact he has had. His powerful sermons are always meaningful and helpful. Young adults are flocking to the various services and other events at his church. Dr. Compton's messages to all who hear him are straight from the Bible. He dares to address with candor the moral and spiritual breakdown so evident in America today. That is because his message, without exception, emphasizes the hope available to all who will follow and embrace the precepts and faith of our Founding Fathers. John and Teresa Compton have two daughters, Sarah and Rachel. Dr. Compton's father, deceased, and his mother served as missionaries in Brazil for a quarter of a century beginning in 1950. Numerous staff members from Capitol Hill attend First Baptist Alexandria, including several from my own office. A warm welcome is extended to the Senate's guest Chaplain for today, Dr. John C. Compton. And for my part, Mr. President, I am genuinely grateful for what this remarkable minister has meant to Dot Helms and me and countless others. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, October 6, 1999, the Federal debt stood at $5,654,882,997,504.81 (Five trillion, six hundred fifty-four billion, eight hundred eighty-two million, nine hundred ninety-seven thousand, five hundred four dollars and eighty-one cents). One year ago, October 6, 1998, the Federal debt stood at $5,536,217,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-six billion, two hundred seventeen million). Five years ago, October 6, 1994, the Federal debt stood at $4,690,449,000,000 (Four trillion, six hundred ninety billion, four hundred forty-nine million). Ten years ago, October 6, 1989, the Federal debt stood at $2,877,626,000,000 (Two trillion, eight hundred seventy-seven billion, six hundred twenty-six million) which reflects a doubling of the debt-- an increase of almost $3 trillion--$2,777,256,997,504.81 (Two trillion, seven hundred seventy-seven billion, two hundred fifty-six million, nine hundred ninety-seven thousand, five hundred four dollars and eighty-one cents) during the past 10 years.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the Senate proceeds toward its still- scheduled debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I am confident that the record will show most former senior U.S. government officials remain strongly opposed to Senate ratification of the CTBT. The Senate--and the American people--will hear from many distinguished officials in the coming days, as they speak out against the CTBT. Of course, the Clinton Administration will try to counter that other well-known people support the CTBT, but those who support ratification of this proposed total nuclear test ban are a distinct minority. In looking over the record, however, I found that many of the very people the Clinton Administration claims now support such a permanent and total nuclear test ban treaty in fact explicitly rejected it when they served in the U.S. Senate and in uniform. They argued at that time (a) that such a test ban was unverifiable, and (b) that the U.S. needs to preserve the ability to conduct nuclear tests if the American people are to be assured of the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. Make no mistake: These are all great Americans, whom I admire and respect, who served their country with distinction. In calling attention to their statements of the past for the record today, I certainly imply no disrespect. To the contrary, I hope the record will reflect their judgements at that time because I believe that those judgements on a zero-yield test ban were right back then--and those judgements are still right today. For example, as a U.S. Senator, our distinguished former colleague, Bill Cohen of Maine, was a leading light on defense issues in the U.S. Senate. Indeed, he vigorously objected to the termination of nuclear testing when he served here as a U.S. Senator. He objected, he said, because the termination of nuclear testing would undermine efforts to make U.S. weapons safer. Throughout the months of August and September 1992, Senator Cohen vigorously fought efforts by Senators Mitchell, Exon, and Hatfield to kill the United States nuclear test program. Here is a sample of Senator Cohen's 1992 views as expressed on the Senate floor on September 18 of that year seven years ago: We have made, in fact, remarkable progress in negotiating substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. While we have made substantial reductions, we are not yet on the verge of eliminating nuclear weapons from our inventories. We are going to have to live with nuclear weapons for some time to come, so we have to ask ourselves the question: Exactly what kinds of nuclear weapons do we want to have during that time? Senator Bill Cohen declared further seven years ago: . . . [W]hat remains relevant is the fact that many of these nuclear weapons which we intend to keep in our stockpile for the indefinite future are dangerously unsafe. Equally relevant is the fact that we can make these weapons much safer if limited testing is allowed to be conducted. So, when crafting our policy regarding nuclear testing, this should be our principal objective: To make the weapons we retain safe. . . . The amendment that was adopted last week . . . does not meet this test . . . [because] it would not permit the Department of Energy to conduct the necessary testing to make our weapons safe. Similarly, Vice President Al Gore likewise adamantly opposed a ``zero-yield'' test ban--i.e., one that would ban all nuclear tests--as a United States Senator, on the grounds that such a ban was unverifiable. Indeed, on May 12, 1988, Senator Gore objected to an amendment (offered to the 1989 defense bill) because it called for a test ban treaty and restricted all nuclear tests above 1 kiloton. A 1 kiloton limit ban, Senator Gore said at that time, was unverifiable. At Senator Gore's insistence, the proposed amendment was modified to raise the limit for nuclear testing from a 1 kiloton limit to a 5 kiloton limit. For the Record, here's what Senator Gore's position as taken on the Senate floor in 1988: Mr. President, I want to express a lingering concern about the threshold contained in the amendment. Without regard to the military usefulness of lack of usefulness of a 1 kiloton versus the 5 kiloton test, purely with regard to verification, I am concerned that a 1 kiloton test really pushes verification to the limit, even with extensive cooperative measures. . . . I express the desire that this threshold be changed from 1 to 5. If Senator Gore argued on the Senate floor that a 1 kiloton test ban was unverifiable, surely the zero-yield--ban--i.e. a ban on all nuclear tests would be equally unverifiable. President Clinton has argued that several former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly back his call for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning any and all nuclear tests. It's interesting that their statements, when they were still in uniform, however, raise doubts about Administration's claims that they vigorously support the CTBT. Consider, for example, what General Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said on December 1, 1992: With respect to a comprehensive test ban, that has always been a fundamental policy goal of ours, but as long as we have nuclear weapons, we have a responsibility for making sure that our stockpile remains safe. And to keep that stockpile safe, we have to conduct a limited number of nuclear tests to make sure that we know what a nuclear weapon will actually do and how it is aging and to find out a lot of other physical characteristics with respect to nuclear phenomenon. . . . As long as we have nuclear weapons, I think as good stewards of them, we have to conduct testing. General Powell previously had made much the same declaration during a Senate hearing on September 20, 1991: We need nuclear testing to ensure the safety, surety of our nuclear stockpile. As long as one has nuclear weapons, you have to know what it is they will do, and so I would recommend nuclear testing. What General Powell said was as true back then as it is today. Similarly, Admiral William Crowe also opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 1986, he stated: [A comprehensive test ban] would introduce elements of uncertainty that would be dangerous for all concerned. He further declared: I frankly do not understand why Congress would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent--namely the warhead. General David Jones likewise stated, during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee: I would have difficulty recommending a zero test ban for an extended period. Among the General's reasons for opposition were, according to a May 29, 1978 press account, that the CTBT is not verifiable, and that U.S. stockpile reliability could not be assured. Numerous press accounts from 1994 and 1995 indicated that General John Shalikashvili maintained strong reservations regarding a zero yield test ban, and made clear that he favored maintenance of the ability to conduct low-yield testing under any negotiated treaty. Indeed, these comments by these former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs-- while in uniform--strongly echo the current views of other former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, such as Admiral Tom Moorer and General John Vessey, Jr., both of whom today strongly oppose the CTBT. Again, I must emphasize that all of these men are distinguished Americans whom I greatly respect and admire. Indeed, my point today is simply to show that the arguments of Senators Cohen and Gore, and Chairmen Powell, Crowe, Jones and Shalikashvili were right then--and they are still right today: Nuclear testing is vital to maintaining the safety of our nuclear weapons and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent. A ``zero-yield''--i.e., a total and complete--nuclear test ban is unverifiable. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that bars any and all nuclear testing is dangerous for the American people, and I am confident that the United States Senate will not ratify such a dangerous treaty.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Tuesday, October 5, 1999, the Federal debt stood at $5,657,493,668,389.71 (Five trillion, six hundred fifty-seven billion, four hundred ninety-three million, six hundred sixty-eight thousand, three hundred eighty-nine dollars and seventy-one cents). One year ago, October 5, 1998, the Federal debt stood at $5,527,218,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred twenty-seven billion, two hundred eighteen million). Five years ago, October 5, 1994, the Federal debt stood at $4,692,973,000,000 (Four trillion, six hundred ninety-two billion, nine hundred seventy-three million). Ten years ago, October 5, 1989, the Federal debt stood at $2,878,570,000,000 (Two trillion, eight hundred seventy-eight billion, five hundred seventy million). Fifteen years ago, October 5, 1984, the Federal debt stood at $1,572,268,000,000 (One trillion, five hundred seventy-two billion, two hundred sixty-eight million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $4 trillion--$4,085,225,668,389.71 (Four trillion, eighty-five billion, two hundred twenty-five million, six hundred sixty-eight thousand, three hundred eighty-nine dollars and seventy-one cents) during the past 15 years.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Monday, October 4, 1999, the Federal debt stood at $5,654,411,268,306.82 (Five trillion, six hundred fifty-four billion, four hundred eleven million, two hundred sixty-eight thousand, three hundred six dollars and eighty- two cents). Five years ago, October 4, 1994, the Federal debt stood at $4,692,027,000,000 (Four trillion, six hundred ninety-two billion, twenty-seven million). Ten years ago, October 4, 1989, the Federal debt stood at $2,878,049,000,000 (Two trillion, eight hundred seventy-eight billion, forty-nine million). Fifteen years ago, October 4, 1984, the Federal debt stood at $1,572,268,000,000 (One trillion, five hundred seventy-two billion, two hundred sixty-eight million). Twenty-five years ago, October 4, 1974, the Federal debt stood at $476,919,000,000 (Four hundred seventy-six billion, nine hundred nineteen million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion--$5,177,492,268,306.82 (Five trillion, one hundred seventy- seven billion, four hundred ninety-two million, two hundred sixty-eight thousand, three hundred six dollars and eighty-two cents) during the past 25 years.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, October 1, 1999, the Federal debt stood at $5,652,679,330,611.02 (Five trillion, six hundred fifty-two billion, six hundred seventy-nine million, three hundred thirty thousand, six hundred eleven dollars and two cents). One year ago, October 1, 1998, the Federal debt stood at $5,540,570,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred forty billion, five hundred seventy million). Fifteen years ago, October 1, 1984, the Federal debt stood at $1,572,266,000,000 (One trillion, five hundred seventy-two billion, two hundred sixty-six million). Twenty-five years ago, October 1, 1974, the Federal debt stood at $481,059,000,000 (Four hundred eighty-one billion, fifty-nine million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion-- $5,171,620,330,611.02 (Five trillion, one hundred seventy-one billion, six hundred twenty million, three hundred thirty thousand, six hundred eleven dollars and two cents) during the past 25 years.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I was fascinated when I saw in the Washington Post this Sunday the front-page headline reading: ``CIA Unable to Precisely Track Testing: Analysis of Russian Compliance with Nuclear Treaty Hampered.'' The first paragraph of the story below that headline said it all: In a new assessment of its capabilities, the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that it cannot monitor low- level nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. . . . Twice last month the Russians carried out what might have been nuclear explosions at its . . . testing site in the Arctic. But the CIA found that data from its seismic sensors and other monitoring equipment were insufficient to allow analysts to reach a firm conclusion about the nature of events, officials said. . . . This surely was devastating news for a lot of people at the White House. Our nation's Central Intelligence Agency had come to the conclusion that it cannot verify compliance with the CTBT. Mercy. I can just see them scurrying around. But more amazing than this was the response of the White House spin machine. I've seen a lot of strange things during my nearly 27 years in the Senate, but this is the first time I have ever seen an administration argue that America's inability to verify compliance with a treaty was precisely the reason for the Senate to ratify the treaty. Back home that doesn't even make good nonsense. Yet this is what the White House has been arguing all day today. This revelation is good news for the CTBT's proponents, they say, because the CTBT will now institute an entirely new verification system with 300 monitoring stations around the world. Madam President, I am not making this up. This is what the White House said. I say to the President: What excuse will the White House give if and when they spend billions of dollars on a ``new verification system with 300 monitoring stations around the world''--and the CTBT still can't be verified? Talk about a pig in a poke. Or a hundred excuse-makers still on the spot! If the Administration spokesman contends that the CTBT's proposed ``International Monitoring System,'' or IMS, will be able to do what all the assets of the entire existing U.S. intelligence community cannot--i.e., verify compliance with this treaty--isn't it really just a matter of their having been caught with their hands in the cookie jar? Let's examine their claim. The CTBT's International Monitoring System was designed only to detect what are called ``fully-coupled'' nuclear tests. That is to say tests that are not shielded from the surrounding geology. But the proposed multibillion-dollar IMS cannot detect hidden tests-- known as ``de-coupled'' tests--in which a country tries to hide the nuclear explosion by conducting the test in an underground cavern or some other structure that muffles the explosion. ``Decoupling'' can reduce the detectable magnitude of a test by a factor of 70. In other words, countries can conduct a 60-kiloton nuclear test without being detected by this fanciful IMS apparatus, a last-minute cover up for the administration's having exaggerated a treaty that should never have been sent to the U.S. Senate for approval in the first place. Every country of concern to the U.S.--every one of them--is capable of decoupling its nuclear explosions. North Korea, China, and Russia will all be able to conduct significant testing without detection by our country. What about these 300 ``additional'' monitoring sites that the White House has brought for as a illusory argument in favor of the CTBT? They are fiction. The vast majority of those 300 sites already exist. They have been United States monitoring stations all along--and the CIA nonetheless confesses that it cannot verify. The additional sites called for under the treaty are in places like the Cook Islands, the Central African Republic, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Niger, Paraguay, Bolivia, Botswana, Costa Rica, Samoa, etc. The majority of these will add zero, not one benefit to the U.S. ability to monitor countries of concern. The fact is if U.S. intelligence cannot verify compliance with this treaty, no International Monitoring System set up under the CTBT will. This treaty is unverifiable, and dangerous to U.S. national security. If this is the best the administration can do, they haven't much of a case to make to the Senate--or anywhere else--in favor of the CTBT. The administration is grasping at straws, looking for any argument--however incredible--to support an insupportable treaty. We will let them try to make their case. As I demonstrated on the floor last week, the Foreign Relations Committee has held 14 separate hearings in which the committee heard extensive testimony from both sides on the CTBT--113 pages of testimony, from a plethora of current and former officials. This is in addition to the extensive hearings that have already been held by the Armed Services Committee and three hearings exclusively on the CTBT held by the Government Affairs Committee. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold its final hearings this Thursday to complete our examination of this treaty. We will invite Secretary Albright to make her case for the treaty, and will hear testimony from a variety of former senior administration officials and arms control experts to present the case against the treaty. I have also invited the chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, Senator Warner, to present the findings of his distinguished panel's review of this fatally flawed treaty. Finally, the facts are not on the administration's side. This is a ill-conceived treaty which our own Central Intelligence Agency acknowledges that it cannot verify. Approving the CTBT would leave the American people unsure of the safety and reliability of America's nuclear deterrent, while at the same time completely unprotected from ballistic missile attack. That is a dangerous proposal, and I am confident that the U.S. Senate will vote to reject this dangerous arms control pact called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, it was on September 16 that Hurricane Floyd crashed into the North Carolina coast dumping 20 inches of rain that resulted in devastating floods. The region of Eastern North Carolina most affected was visited by another 4-6 inches of rain just a week later, making an already catastrophic situation even worse. So I noted with great interest when President Clinton paid a visit to a group of elite international financiers at the annual World Bank and IMF meeting 13 days later (September 29) to make an important announcement. It was there that he disclosed with great fanfare his proposal to forgive 100 percent of the debt owed by some 40 foreign countries to the United States--and much of their debt owed indirectly to the U.S. through the World Bank and the IMF. Thirteen days after Hurricane Floyd arrived, and when many communities in my state were still literally under water, President Clinton decided it was appropriate to make the following plea on behalf of debt relief to foreign governments--he said: ``. . . I call on our Congress to respond to the moral and economic urgency of this issue, and see to it that America does its part. I have asked for the money and shown how it would be paid for, and I ask the Congress to keep our country shouldering its fair share of the responsibility.'' No wonder my constituents are puzzled as to why, in the words of John Austin of Tryon, North Carolina, ``we can help everyone else--but not our own people.'' North Carolinians understand instinctively that there is something odd about our national priorities when we have spent more--$27.9 billion--on foreign aid in the past two years than the $27.7 billion FEMA has expended in the past ten years. That's right: government aid through FEMA for such wide-ranging disasters as the Northridge earthquakes in California, Hurricane Andrew in South Florida and the catastrophic Midwestern floods doesn't even measure up to the past two years of foreign aid. Now, I have been in constant communication with the Majority Leader, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, members on the other side of the aisle, and countless federal agencies seeking relief for thousands of North Carolinians who have been ruined by Hurricane Floyd. Helping these victims is the number one priority for those with whom I have spoken. And for the record, I am gratified by their cooperation and their determination to help. With respect to the President's plan to forgive the debts of foreign governments, I remind Senators that every one of the governments whose debt the President proposes to forgive has no one to blame but themselves for pursuing socialist and statist policies, and often outright theft, that drove them in a hole in the first place. Just how much is being taken away from victims in my state to fund the President's proposal? The Administration calculates that it will cost $320 million to forgive the $5.7 billion in mostly uncollectible debts owed to the U.S. Additionally, Uncle Sam is being asked to underwrite debt forgiveness to the World Bank and the IMF to the tune of $650 million. That's a total of $970 million which North Carolina and other devastated regions desperately need, but will not get because money used to forgive the debts of foreigners is money that cannot and will not be used to assist hurricane victims. Bear in mind, Mr. President, that the United States has already provided approximately $32.3 billion in foreign aid to just these countries since the end of World War II. And the U.S. Government has already provided $3.47 billion in debt forgiveness to these countries in the past several years alone. If Senators study the list of countries, it turns out that the President seeks to reward governments who keep their people in economic and political bondage, and he proposes to do it at the expense of suffering Americans. The human rights organization Freedom House determined that only eight of the 36 proposed beneficiaries are ``free'' in terms of political expression. At least one on the World Bank's list of countries eligible to receive debt forgiveness is a terrorist state, and that's Sudan. Also included are the communist dictatorships in Angola, Vietnam and the military dictatorship Burma. The Heritage Foundation determined that none of the countries in question are ``free'' economically. (The economies of the vast majority of the countries judged are either ``repressed'' or ``mostly unfree'' according to the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom.) Some countries on the World Bank's list do not even have functioning governments, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Only one of 36 countries voted with the United States more than half of the time at the United Nations in 1998 (that is Honduras, which supported the U.S. only 55 percent of the time). Make no mistake about it: this proposal diverts assistance from Hurricane Floyd victims to corrupt, economically and politically repressed foreign countries--many of whom are not even friendly to the United States. Mr. President, my office has received a steady stream of visitors and mail urging Congress to support the ``Jubilee 2000'' debt forgiveness plan, which now includes the President's proposal. It has been a well- orchestrated lobbying campaign. But since the day Hurricane Floyd slammed into the North Carolina coast and dumped 20 inches of rain on the eastern third of my state, the phone calls and mail from North Carolina in support of debt forgiveness to foreign governments has dried up. The reason is clear: we have a natural disaster unlike any seen in 500 years here at home, and our duty is to help suffering Americans first. Mr. President, I'm putting the Administration on notice here and now that the first priority shall be helping victims of Hurricane Floyd. Not until sufficient resources are dedicated to this effort by the federal government will I agree to Senate consideration of President Clinton's debt forgiveness to foreign governments proposal.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Thursday, September 30, 1999, the federal debt stood at $5,656,270,901,615.43 (Five trillion, six hundred fifty-six billion, two hundred seventy million, nine hundred one thousand, six hundred fifteen dollars and forty-three cents). Five years ago, September 30, 1994, the federal debt stood at $4,692,750,000,000 (Four trillion, six hundred ninety-two billion, seven hundred fifty million). Twenty-five years ago, September 30, 1974, the federal debt stood at $481,743,000,000 (Four hundred eighty-one billion, seven hundred forty- three million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion--$5,174,527,901,615.43 (Five trillion, one hundred seventy- four billion, five hundred twenty-seven million, nine hundred one thousand, six hundred fifteen dollars and forty-three cents) during the past 25 years.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am getting a little weary of this business of saying this is true and that is true when it is not true. We have held at least nine hearings on this matter. We have invited Senators to come. They didn't want to come. I have done the best I can to have hearings. But if the Senators won't come, and if the news media won't report what we have had, I believe I have discharged my responsibility. Let's hear no more about ``no hearings.'' There have been hearings; the Senators from the other side just didn't participate.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum so I can get my records over here.

Mr. HELMS. I object.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, my dear friends from the other side of the aisle are refusing to agree to a unanimous consent agreement to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate floor for debate and a vote on October 7, 1999. Having said that, I ask unanimous consent it be in order for me to request Senator Cleland be recognized for whatever time he needs and at the conclusion of his remarks I be recognized again.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I think the Record will show I already recommended Senator Cleland be recognized at the conclusion of which I shall have the floor; is that not the case?

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at least 17 respected witnesses have discussed their views on both sides of the CTBT question in the past 2 years. The administration itself has included this treaty in testimony on five occasions. More than 113 pages of committee transcript text are devoted to this subject. I have a stack of papers here that are CTBT testimony and debate within the committee. A record can be made of how this has been delayed and by whom. Mr. President, I find it puzzling that some in the Senate are objecting to the unanimous-consent request of the majority leader. The Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We have heard from experts on this very treaty. Let me share this with the Senate, the people listening, and the news media--that have not covered hearings on this matter but whose editors have said it is a disgrace that a vote has not been allowed on the CTBT treaty. Here are the people who have discussed the CTBT before the Foreign Relations Committee. Let me point out, we have hearings fairly early in the morning, maybe too early for some to come. But I look on both sides of the aisle, and I have seen, sometimes, nobody on one side. Anyway, here is a list of the people I recall having discussed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with the Committee on Foreign Relations: The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State; The Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs; Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Fred Ikle, Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Former U.S. Representative from New York; The Honorable William J. Schneider, Former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology; Dr. Richard Haass, Former Senior Director, Near East and South Asia, National Security Council; The Honorable Stanely O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense; The Honorable Eric D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs; The Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Parenthetically, I might say, not one word, as I recall, has been published by the same newspapers that have been piously declaring there must be action on the CTBT. To continue the list: General Eugene Habiger, Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command; The Honorable Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, American International Group; Dr. Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution; The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of State; and The Honorable Richard Butler, Former Executive Chairman United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). I think this record will show--it should--that the Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We have pleaded for members of the committee, several of them, to come to a meeting once in a while. I have done everything I could to get this thing orderly presented to the Senate. All I have received are communications from Senators with a veiled threat if I did not proceed in some other way. We have certainly talked about this treaty in more depth than many other treaties, to my knowledge. Those who are objecting, and objected to the majority leader's proposition this morning, don't want more hearings; what they want is more delay. You see, until a few minutes ago, until the majority leader offered his unanimous consent request, the same people who are now demanding more hearings were ready to dispense with further debate and go to a vote. Let me tell you what I mean. The American people may recall, if they were watching C-SPAN, that President Clinton, in his State of the Union Address on January 27, 1998, declared: ``I ask the Senate to approve it" --the CTBT--and he said ``this year'' in mournful tones. In other words, the President was ready for a vote in 1998. Then a year later, the President said: I ask the Senate to take this vital step: Approve the Treaty now. ``Approve it now,'' he said. He did not say approve the CTBT after more hearings. On July 23, 1998, the Vice President, Mr. Gore, asked the Senate to ``act now'' on the CTBT, and all the while the New York Times and the Washington Post, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, have been saying that Helms is holding up this treaty. In February, Secretary Albright asked for approval of the CTBT ``this session.'' And in April she said: . . . the time has come to ratify the CTBT this year, this session, now. On January 12, 1999, the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, declared: . . . it would be a terrible tragedy if our Senate failed to ratify the CTBT this year. The point I am making is that the list goes on and on. Mr. President, 45 Democratic Senators wrote to me asking me to allow a vote: . . . with sufficient time to allow the United States to actively participate [sic] in the Treaty's inaugural Conference of Ratifying States. . . . That conference begins next week. At a recent press conference for the cameras, Senator Specter, my friend, declared: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was submitted to the Senate months ago, and it is high time the Senate acted on it. Senator Murray called for: . . . immediate consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Senator Dorgan said that: . . . we must get this done at least by the first of October. I must observe that the distinguished Democratic leader, Senator Daschle, also had very strong words on this matter. Just 6 days ago, he proclaimed: Senate Republicans have permitted a small number of Members from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules-- I wonder how we did that when I was not looking. No rules have been manipulated, and I resent the inference. But to continue his quote-- from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules and procedures to prevent the Senate from acting on the CTBT. . . . I would hope we would soon see some leadership on the Republican side of the aisle to break the current impasse and allow the full Senate to act on the CTBT . . . That effort must begin today. Mr. President, I hope when we get to the debate, however long it lasts, that we will not have the spectacle of Senator Kennedy again and again offering his minimum wage amendment. He keeps it in his hip pocket all the time and pulls it out anytime he can stick it up, and he will debate it for an hour or 2. We have to have some understanding about what we are going to debate, when we do debate, and I hope we will debate on the terms the Senator from Mississippi, the majority leader, offered. I think all this speaks well of the majority leader, and I congratulate him. I congratulate him for having the will to do this because this has been insulting on many occasions as a political issue, which it is not. I hope the Senate Democrats will reconsider their refusal to agree to a CTBT vote after having demanded it so often. Let me go back in time a little bit. I have been waiting for the President of the United States to follow up on his written commitment to me that he will send up the ABM Treaty, and I have been hoping to see a treaty on two or three other things. I am not in the mood to leave the American people naked against a very possible missile attack, and that has been my problem. The President of the United States has insisted on keeping the ABM Treaty alive when that would forbid anything happening in terms of defending the security of the American people. I was unwilling to do that until he followed through on his written guarantee to me that he would send the ABM Treaty to me and to the Senate. I trust in the future that the media will, for once, acknowledge some of their statements regarding the CTBT for what they have really said because it is inaccurate and misleading to the American people. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.