Jesse Helms

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are all aware of how the administration has refused, refused to provide the Senate, despite my repeated requests, my repeated entreaties to them, to give us an updated assessment of the Russian position regarding the BDA and the CWC. Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President Gore on July 8, 1996 stating that both the BDA and the 1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding have outlived their usefulness to Russia, don't you see. Moreover, the Prime Minister, one, tied Russian ratification of this treaty, the CWC, to United States agreement to a joint statement linking ratification by the United States to Russian ratification; two, stated that the American taxpayers--get this--the American taxpayers must pay the cost of the Russian destruction program; and three, he linked ratification to United States acquiescence to Russia's position on conversion of its chemical weapons facilities. The shift in Russian arms control policy, you see, will have important ramifications. First, the minimalist approaches taken by Russia in its data declaration on the Wyoming memorandum of understanding will go unresolved. Russia has stated that the total size of its stockpiled chemical weapons is equivalent to 40,000 tons of agent. This declaration is absolutely untrue. The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on June 23, 1994, that the United States had ``serious concerns over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency and contradictory aspects of the data'' submitted by Russia under the Wyoming MOU. On August 27, 1993, Adm. William Studeman, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn stating: We cannot confirm that the Russian declaration of 40,000 mt is accurate. In addition, we cannot confirm that the total stockpile is stored only at the seven sites declared by the Soviets... Articles in both the Washington Post and the Washington Times alleged that the Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated the Soviet stockpile could be as large as 75,000 metric tons. Omissions in Russia's MOU data declarations have clear implications for how Russia will interpret the various provisions of the CWC. Because the BDA mandates annual updates to the Wyoming MOU, Russian withdrawal from the BDA may also signal that Russia will henceforth refuse to entertain any additional United States questions about the size of its chemical weapons stockpile or its binary weapons program. Senators should be concerned that Russia may intend to provide to the OPCW data which mirrors that provided under the Wyoming MOU. This would, in this Senator's view, serve as a clear indicator that Russia intends to violate the CWC. Second, Russia has consistently refused to provide information on the status of its binary chemical weapons program. On June 23, 1994, then- Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey declared that ``the data we have received from Russia makes no reference to binary chemical weapons or agents. That is contrary to our understanding of the program that was initiated by the former Soviet Union.'' Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, has stated that the Russian Federation may continue work on novel nerve agents far more lethal than any other known chemical agents--substance A-230, substance 33, and substance A-232. In an article in the Wall Street Journal on May 25, 1994, Dr. Mirzayanov wrote: It is very easy to produce binary weapons without detection under the guise of agricultural petrochemicals. The products easily pass all safety tests and become registered with the government as legitimate commercial products. The plant receives a license for production and goes into operation. Neither the firm's leaders, its staff, nor international inspectors know that the chemicals are a component of a new binary weapon. As the public talks toward banning chemical weapons progressed, the more intense became Russia's secret development and testing of binary weapons... our laboratories created Substance A-230, a weapon about which I can only say that its killing efficiency surpassed any known military toxin by a factor of five to eight. ...Two more major achievements took place in 1990 and 1991. First, a binary weapon based on a compound code-named Substance 33 passed site tests and was put into production for the Soviet army. ...The second development was the synthesis of a binary weapon based on Substance A-232, a toxin similar to A-230. This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal ``Novichok'' class, provides an opportunity for the military establishment to disguise production of components of binary weapons as common agricultural chemicals; because the West does not know the formula, and its inspectors cannot identify the compounds. ...Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 have been produced in the city of Novocheborksarsk... But our generals have told the U.S. that Novocheborksarsk is turning out another substance known as VX. Dr. Mirzayanov and other dissident Russian scientists have claimed that Russia's binary weapons program has been specifically crafted to evade detection under the verification regime of the CWC. They allege that components for the binary agents have been given legitimate commercial applications, that they are not covered under the CWC's schedules, and that OPCW inspectors will not know what they are examining when they come across such chemicals. The United States should not ratify the CWC until Russia agrees to forgo this abhorrent program. Third, the BDA provides for United States on-site inspections of Russian storage, destruction and production facilities, combined with data declarations. The United States can expect to gain real monitoring benefits from the CWC only if the Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA] is implemented. This agreement provides for United States on-site inspections of Russian storage, destruction and production facilities. Without the BDA, the United States will be forced to verify Russian CWC compliance based upon a smaller number of inspections than anticipated under the bilateral arrangement, with inspections of Russian sites by the OPCW rather than by United States personnel, and with no guaranteed United States access to detailed inspection data. In other words, the intelligence community's already poor confidence level in its ability to monitor Russian treaty compliance will fall even lower. Fourth, Russian insistence on excluding several of its chemical weapons-related facilities from the BDA's definition of ``chemical weapons production facility,'' and hence from the CWC's definition, relates directly to its desire to maintain a clandestine chemical weapons production capability. The United States refusal to accede to the Russian position, which would have--in turn--strengthened the Russian case for facility conversions under the CWC, may be a primary reason that Russia has refused to implement the BDA. We should not, under any circumstance, allow Russia to exclude its chemical weapons facilities from inspection. Moreover, without the bilateral agreement the OPCW will increase the size of its international inspectorate and purchase of additional equipment. This will drive up vastly the expected costs of the regime. Further, the CWC requires States Parties to pay for monitoring of their chemical weapons production, storage, and disposal facilities. Mr. President, I guess we ought to respond once more--it is an exercise in futility, but we ought to keep responding to that old litany that we have heard this day about making the United States ratification of the CWC contingent upon Russia's acting first. Let us look at a little bit of history. This Senate approved the START II treaty amidst a clamor of claims by the administration that a failure to act was preventing Russian approval of that treaty. Does anybody hear anything familiar about that? More than 15 months have passed and the Russian Duma still has not approved START II. Instead, the Russian leadership rendered ratification of the START II treaty contingent upon United States acquiescence to Russian interpretation of, get this, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and now the Chemical Weapons Convention is being tied to NATO enlargement and other issues. Mr. President, surely, surely, Senators will not fail to refuse such linkages, and the best way to do it is to require, to stipulate unmistakably that Russia must act in good faith and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention first. Indeed, in his letter to Vice President Gore, the Prime Minister of Russia stated that the United States should wait for Russia. I urge Senators to reject that motion to strike. I yield the floor. I do not know who has been waiting the longest.

Mr. HELMS. I did not see anybody over here.

Mr. HELMS. The yeas and nays have been ordered?

Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suppose, at this point, it would be an exercise in futility to go into great detail about why the Senate should reject this chemical weapons treaty. But let me touch on it. I ask the Chair to notify me when I have talked for 8 minutes. Mr. President, this treaty won't touch--won't touch--terrorist states like Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea. The administration admits this itself. The administration also admits that this treaty is unverifiable. The fact that Russia is already cheating, even before this treaty goes into effect, and the rather incredible refusal by the administration to bar inspectors from hostile nations, such as Iran and China, to come and ``inspect'' the businesses of the United States of America. It seems to me that each of these defects, in and of themselves, are reason enough to oppose the treaty. But one in the Senate often has to face reality. Let me say this. There is one issue that has raised the greatest concern among Senators, I believe--the issue on which the ratification vote should hinge--and that is the administration's refusal to modify Articles X and XI of this treaty. Now, these controversial provisions require the transfer of dangerous chemical agents, defensive gear and know-how to any nation that joins the CWC, including--get this--terrorist states like Iran and Cuba, and known proliferators, such as Russia and China. Now, think of the implications of that. If anybody is out there in televisionland, I hope you will contemplate what is going on here on the Senate floor and watch who votes how when the roll is called up yonder in just a little while. Former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, during the previous public administration, the Bush administration, by the way, told the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month that Articles X and XI amount to what he said are ``a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities around the world.'' Now, this condition is an essential protection in the Senate's resolution of ratification. It would make approval of this treaty absolutely contingent upon the administration's agreement to seek modifications of Articles X and XI. You have heard me say that over and over again for the past several weeks and months. Now, I have urged Senators to oppose efforts to strip out that key protection. But here we go again. If this motion to strike prevails, it will be an invitation to the Senate to reject the treaty entirely. But I don't think the Senate is going to accept that invitation. In any case, why should we modify Articles X and XI? The administration argues that, in spite of all its flaws, the CWC is better than nothing. Well, to the contrary. With Articles X and XI unmodified, this treaty is far worse than nothing. Instead of halting the spread of poison gas, this treaty will be aiding in its proliferation by helping countries like Iran modernize their chemical arsenals, giving them access to our secrets for defending against poison gas attack, and giving a United States imprimatur to third country transfers of dangerous chemicals and defensive technology to rogue states. Anybody who needs a road map or wants one for how this will work doesn't have to go to a lot of trouble. Just examine how Russia has taken advantage of similar provisions in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Russia is, at this very moment, using that treaty to justify its sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, under a provision known as ``Atoms for Peace,'' if you can believe that. Under this CWC treaty's Articles X and XI--again, I have to chuckle when I say it--dubbed ``Poisons for Peace''--if Russia or China decide, for example, to build a chemical manufacturing facility in Iran, giving that terrorist regime the chemical agents and high technology it needs to modernize its chemical weapons program, Russia and China not only could argue that they are allowed to give Iran this technology, but that they are obliged to do so under a treaty, mind you, ratified by the Senate of the United States. In short, ratifying the chemical weapons treaty sends a signal to the world that something has been done about the proliferation of chemical weapons when, in fact, we would not have done anything at all except make bad matters worse, because Articles X and XI of this treaty--this dangerous, dangerous treaty--assure that the Chemical Weapons Convention will increase the spread of chemical weapons rather than stop it. So in this next to the last vote of the evening, Senators have a choice. In making that choice, I for one cannot imagine that the U.S. Senate would reject the advice of four former distinguished Secretaries of Defense, who testified that unless Articles X and XI are modified, the Senate should refuse to ratify this treaty. Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as I may have to Senator Kyl.

Mr. HELMS. From my general debate time I yield 10 minutes to the assistant majority leader.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on this amendment?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me state the order of distinguished speakers on this side of the aisle. I am going to start with the most distinguished of all. The President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator Thurmond, will have 5 minutes; followed by Senator Hutchison of Texas, for 5 minutes; Senator Hutchinson of Arkansas to follow with 2 minutes; Senator Brownback, for 1 minute; Senator Kyl, for 1 minute; Senator Ashcroft, for 2 minutes. They will be recognized in that order.

Mr. HELMS. Please. Yes.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senators will be glad to hear this. I ask for the yeas and nays on the final vote in the Senate.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I, on behalf of the leader's time and any other time that may be assigned to me, yield the remainder of time.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, of course I am disappointed by today's vote on the CWC. But I find some solace in the fact that, thanks to our efforts, this treaty is much less harmful than it would have been. I am enormously proud of Senators Kyl, Inhofe, and other Senators who stood with us despite enormous pressure against this treaty. I believe history will vindicate their efforts. Make no mistake, this is a dangerous treaty. But it is a little less dangerous thanks to the efforts we made to amend it, and to deliver the truth to the American people. Last September, treaty proponents were pressing the Senate to vote on a treaty that had none of the key protections that some of us succeeded in inserting in this treaty. Had we not been a phalanx of common sense standing in their way, the exact same treaty would have been before the Senate for ratification today, and that would have been a disaster. The treaty approved by the Senate tonight was toned down with 28 conditions, most of which the administration was until recently calling ``killer amendments.'' Those include, among many others, conditions that limit the cost of the treaty to the American taxpayer, place safeguards on intelligence sharing, enhance our chemical defenses, and protect confidential business information. Further, concessions on what I consider some of the most important issues--such as protecting the right of American commanders in the field to use tear gas, and requiring criminal search warrants for foreign inspectors--came only the final days before I agreed to allow the treaty to go to the Senate floor for a vote. If we had not held out so long--in spite of all the criticism and derision lobbed in our direction--none of those protections would be in the treaty today. I hope I may be forgiven for taking some satisfaction in the knowledge that, thanks to what our critics called our stubbornness, our soldiers in the field will be a little safer, and the constitutional rights of American citizens will be a little better protected. Final judgment of our efforts will be left to future generations. I do know this: those great Senators with whom I was honored to stand fought the good fight, we won some battles, and lost others. But we fought with honor, and integrity, and for the cause of right. Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we all know full well that this administration has already testified that the CWC is ``effectively verifiable.'' The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, testified on March 22, 1994, that ``the treaty is effectively verifiable'' and that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe, made similar claims on May 13, 1994. However, just because administration officials have declared the CWC to be ``effectively verifiable'' does not make it so. Indeed, by making such claims the Clinton administration has done great violence to the standard of ``effective verification'' developed and refined by the Reagan and Bush administrations as a key criteria for arms control treaties. The definition of ``effective verification'' was first offered to the Foreign Relations Committee by Ambassador Paul Nitze during hearings on the INF Treaty in 1988 and subsequently further refined on January 24, 1989, by ACDA's Director, Maj. Gen. William Burns, and again in January 1992 by Secretary of State James Baker. The components of effective verification, as defined during testimony, are: (1) a ``high level of assurance'' in the intelligence community's ability to detect (2) a ``militarily significant'' violation in (3) a ``timely fashion.'' That definition is the one used in this condition. This yardstick of ``effective verification'' has been the standard against which every arms control treaty for the last decade has been measured. It should be the standard against which the CWC is measured as well. For any arms control treaty to be effective it must be verifiable. When Vice President George Bush put forward the first U.S.-sponsored text for the CWC, he told negotiators in Geneva on April 18, 1984, that: For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. . . . No sensible government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain--or verify--that it is getting what it contracted for. I could not agree more. In my view, this standard cannot be met by the CWC. On March 1, 1989, then-Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] William Webster stated that monitoring the CWC ``is going to be costly and difficult, and, presently, the level of confidence is quite low.'' On January 24, 1989, Director Burns noted that ``verification of any chemical ban is going to be extremely difficult.'' ACDA's section 37 report on the CWC, submitted on March 18, 1994, states that the CWC's verification provisions, together with National Technical Means [NTM], ``are insufficient to detect, with a high degree of confidence, all activities prohibited under the Convention.'' Then-DCI Woolsey testified on June 23, 1994 that ``I cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small scale.'' Most significantly, declassified portions from the August 1993 NIE note: The capability of the intelligence community to monitor compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. They key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation determined to preserve a small, secret program using the delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention. With respect to military significance, General Shalikashvilli testified on August 11, 1994 that: In certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical agent may have a military impact . . . With such variables in scale of target and impact of chemical weapons, the United States should be resolute that the 1 ton limit set by the Convention will be our guide. The bottom line is that a stockpile of 1 ton of chemical agent can prove of military significance. Unclassified portions of the NIE on U.S. monitoring capabilities indicate that it is unlikely that the United States will be able to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all, when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single ton. Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to today's Washington Times, Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a pilot plant in quantities of only 55 to 110 tons annually. In other words, the intelligence community has low confidence in its ability to detect in a timely fashion the covert production of chemical weapons which could produce militarily significant quantities. We should not cheapen the norm of effective verifiability by claiming that the CWC meets this standard--for it patently does not. In conclusion, verification of the CWC is plagued by the fact that too many chemicals are dual-use in nature. Chemicals used to make pen ink can be used to make deadly agent. It is impossible to monitor every soap, detergent, cosmetic, electronics, varnish, paint, pharmaceutical, and chemical plant around the world to ensure that they are not producing chemical weapons, or that toxic chemicals are not being diverted to the production of weapons elsewhere. Countries such as Russia are well aware that if they ratify the CWC, they can cheat with impunity. Indeed, on May 6, 1996 the Defense Intelligence Agency informed the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Russia intends to maintain the capability to produce chemical weapons, regardless of whether or not it ratifies the CWC. The Senate, therefore, should not agree to this treaty until U.S. intelligence capabilities have caught up with President Clinton's Wilsonian idealism. Finally, I will say a word or two about the counter-arguments we have heard on this condition. Patently ignoring the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs, the administration has claimed that the right standard for detecting violations is not 1 metric ton, but a ``large-scale, systematic effort by a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a militarily significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' It is absurd to say that if the intelligence community has high confidence in its ability to detect ``any large-scale, systematic effort by a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a military significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' the CWC is effectively verifiable. I have no doubt that it would be difficult to conceal the existence of a program the scope and size of the former Soviet Union's for example. But not one of the countries that currently envisions a need for chemical weapons intends to wage World War III and conquer Western Europe. Not one. Again, let me reiterate just how ridiculous this argument is. Nobody--not Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan, Egypt, or North Korea--is engaged in a large scale effort. Indeed, such a certification is inherently contradictory since a country desirous of developing a militarily significant stockpile of chemical agent need not engage in a large-scale, systematic effort. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, testified before the Armed Services Committee on August 11, 1994, that: Even one ton of chemical agent may have a military impact . . . With such variables in scale of target and impact of chemical weapons, the United States should be resolute that the 1 ton limit set by the Convention will be our guide. In other words, the production of 1 militarily significant ton of agent does not require a large-scale program. To knock-out every key logistical node in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein needs only a handful of SCUD's with chemical warheads. He does not need an elite force of infantry trained in chemical-environment combat. Accordingly, the intelligence community's confidence in its ability to detect the annual production of 1 metric ton in a timely fashion is the benchmark question by which the Senate should assess the verifiability of the CWC. I urge the Senate to reject this motion to strike and to uphold President Reagan's standard of effective verifiability. Mr. President, I ask that Senator Shelby of Alabama be recognized next for 10 minutes. Does the Senator have somebody?

Mr. HELMS. I understand that. I have 5 minutes. Then he would like 2 minutes. So take it out of the other pot.

Mr. HELMS. That will be fine, from this point. I will consume a few minutes.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, April 24, 1997 at 2:00 p.m. to hold a closed hearing on intelligence matters.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety be granted permission to conduct a hearing Thursday, April 24, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., on ozone and particulate matter standards proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2 p.m. on Thursday, April 24, 1997, in executive session to mark up S. 7, the National Missile Defense Act of 1997.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on April 24, 1997, at 10 a.m. on ISTEA Reauthorization/Truck Safety.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent on behalf of the Governmental Affairs Committee to meet on Thursday, April 24, 1997, at 12:30 p.m. for a hearing on opportunities for management reforms at the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Human Resources be authorized to meet for a hearing on Overview of Vocational Education, during the session of the Senate on Thursday, April 24, 1997, at 10 a.m.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, April 23, 1997, the federal debt stood at $5,345,088,835,181.58. (Five trillion, three hundred forty-five billion, eighty-eight million, eight hundred thirty-five thousand, one hundred eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight cents) One year ago, April 23, 1996, the federal debt stood at $5,106,372,000,000. (Five trillion, one hundred six billion, three hundred seventy-two million) Five years ago, April 23, 1992, the federal debt stood at $3,877,376,000,000. (Three trillion, eight hundred seventy-seven billion, three hundred seventy-six million) Ten years ago, April 23, 1987, the federal debt stood at $2,264,001,000,000. (Two trillion, two hundred sixty-four billion, one million) Fifteen years ago, April 23, 1982, the federal debt stood at $1,058,822,000,000 (One trillion, fifty-eight billion, eight hundred twenty-two million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $4 trillion--$4,286,266,835,181.58 (Four trillion, two hundred eighty-six billion, two hundred sixty-six million, eight hundred thirty-five thousand, one hundred eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight cents) during the past 15 years.