Jesse Helms

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, just a moment. I must leave the Chamber for a few minutes. After the Senator from Rhode Island has concluded, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Alabama be recognized to consume our 10 minutes.

Mr. HELMS. A bum deal, just like this treaty.

Mr. HELMS. I am profoundly disappointed in the five votes of the Senate on the important, vital amendments. After all the debate, all the gallons of newspaper ink spilled, all of the negotiations-- ultimately, I had hoped for better. But so be it. There isn't a person in this room, rhetoric aside, who can believe that the amendments that we have just considered are ``killer amendments.'' The nature of international relations, and of treaties is that what is negotiated can be renegotiated, and if necessary, negotiated anew. If our aim is a better future, what are a hundred more meetings in Geneva, or Vienna or the Hague? These amendments would have ensured that this treaty did no harm, even if it did no good. Now, we must vote on a treaty that, stripped of these key protections, four former Defense Secretaries have told us is contrary to the national security interests of the United States. The truth is that I cannot abide the pretense of action on a matter as weighty as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we ratify this treaty today, the Senate, with the President, will announce to the world that we have done something about the scourge of chemical weapons. We will pat ourselves on the back and go home. But, Mr. President, we will have done nothing. And, worse than nothing, we will have done harm. In the name of curbing the proliferation of these chemicals, we will allow rogue states to gain access to our most precious defense secrets. We will guarantee that rogue nations of the World--both those who have signed this treaty and those who have not--have the ability to manufacture chemical weapons and penetrate our Nation's most advanced chemical defenses. Article X and XI--``Poisons for Peace''--will foster the proliferation of those very poisons. Anyone who doubts that need only look to how Russia has abused similar provisions in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. The N.P.T.'s ``Atoms for Peace'' provisions allows Russia to transfer to Iran, a terrorist state, a nuclear reactor. Russia has argued that the sale is perfectly legal, and Russia is right. Iran, despite its nuclear weapons program and its chemical weapons program, is a nation in full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And so it will get one nuclear reactor from Russia, maybe more. And perhaps China will throw in a reactor or two as well. And we can do nothing to stop it. The administration says that we will not sell Iran chemical technology or defensive gear under the similar provisions of the CWC. We are not selling them nuclear reactors either. Russia is. And it will not be the United States which provides Iran the chemical technology. They will get it from Russia and China under ``Poisons for Peace.'' And Iran will give it to its terrorist allies Syria and Libya, who have not signed up to the treaty. And we will be powerless to protest--because if we ratify this treaty, here, today, in this body, we will have endorsed those transfers. Now this morning the President has offered us some sweeteners for the hemlock he is asking us to swallow. He promises to keep an eye on any problems Articles X and XI may cause. I appreciate his willingness to recognize the legitimacy of the concerns my colleagues and I have expressed. However, I can't help but feel that this last ditch attempt to buy off opponents to this dangerous treaty is nothing more than empty promises. I am a veteran of the counter-proliferation wars. Every week, I see more and more classified information about proliferation activities that should require the President, under existing law, to levy sanctions against Russia, China, or both. We never do, and we won't under the terms of the CWC with or without the assurances under Article X and XI. The President doesn't want to fight with those 800-pound gorillas. In much the same way as we will turn a blind eye while Russia helps Iran get a nuclear weapon, we will allow others to develop chemical weapons. And there won't be a darn thing we'll be able to do. Should Articles 10 and 11 of the CWC be renegotiated? Yes. Did the Senate err by stripping out the protections we inserted that would have required the administration to do so? Yes. And I am deeply disappointed that I was unable to convince my colleagues of the danger to the people of the United States and our allies. We have made a terrible, potentially cataclysmic, mistake today in ignoring the desperate need to revise the terms of this treaty. Without revision of Articles 10 and 11, this treaty is bad for America, and bad for the world. It must be voted down. For it we ratify this treaty, our children and our grandchildren will hold us accountable. They will hold us accountable when Iran or Syria or Libya or North Korea finally uses a chemical weapon--and they will do so-- built with technology they acquired thanks to Articles 10 and 11 of the CWC. They will look back on this debate, look back on where each us of stood, and--mark my words--they will hold us accountable. Mr. President, let us listen to the wisdom of the four former Secretaries of Defense, who have urged us to oppose this treaty. Let us listen to the mountain of evidence--classified and unclassified--that has been presented over the past two days as to the dangers posed by this treaty. And most important, let us listen to our consciences. Let us vote to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention. Amendment No. 52

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HELMS. How many minutes?

Mr. HELMS. Ten minutes.

Mr. HELMS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma. Privilege of the Floor

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, there is a lot of misunderstanding about this treaty. It has been advertised implicitly--not explicitly, of course--as a cure-all; as an end to the perils of chemical warfare. And a lot of people think it will all be over, and we will not have any more danger. The truth of the matter is that they will not do a thing in the world to help the situation because the Chemical Weapons treaty--Convention, as it has been called--is not a comprehensive ban. This treaty contributes to the national security of the United States and the American people, and that is what I am primarily interested in. This treaty, it seems to me, must at a minimum affect those countries possessing chemical weapons which pose a threat to the United States. Accordingly, the United States should not become a party to this treaty--many Senators feel--until those countries are also participants. And no effort has been made to encourage them to come in. We are standing alone, and they are going to go about their little deviltry unmolested. Rogue states--like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea--clearly represent a threat to United States security and the security of key United States allies. And not one of these countries has ratified the CWC, and not one of them is likely to ratify. First, the intelligence people in our own country--we call it the intelligence community--reported that all of these governments have active aggressive programs to develop and produce chemical weapons. In March 1995, I believe it was, regarding the nonproliferation treaty, the Central Intelligence Agency released an unclassified estimate that gave a troubling assessment of the likely impact that the CWC would have upon the proliferation of chemical weapons. This report said: A number of states continue to pursue the development or enhancement of a chemical weapons capability. Some states have chosen to pursue a chemical weapons capability because of relatively low cost, and the low technology required for chemical weapons production. Moreover, they believe that a CWC ability can serve as both a deterrent to enemy attack and as an enhancement of their offensive military capability. I am quoting. The report says: Currently, at least 15 countries have an offensive CWC program in some level of development, and the most aggressive chemical weapons programs are in Iran, Libya, and Syria. The CWC will continue to be a serious threat for at least the remainder of this decade despite a number of armaments control efforts, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. Several countries have expressed concern, excluding Libya, Syria and Iraq, which have so far refused to sign the CWC, and some CW-capable countries that have signed the treaty show no signs of ending their programs. That was our intelligence community's assessment of the situation as of 1995. Mr. President, while the intent of the CWC is good, what it proposes is to create a global chemical weapons ban, and it will not do any such thing. It simply will not achieve any other of the goals. Thirty percent of the countries with chemical weapons programs, including all of those with what is called aggressive programs, have not yet signed the treaty, let alone ratified it. Yet, these countries have been and will continue to be the paramount chemical weapons threat to the United States. About 6 years ago, during Operation Desert Storm, the United States was so concerned about Iraq's chemical weapons program that we focused a huge percentage of long allied air attacks upon Saddam Hussein's chemical weaponry. A facility 65 miles north of Baghdad was the nucleus of Iraq's chemical weapons program, and a priority target during the early days of the gulf war. I was amazed then that no one seemed to pay much attention. And I am amazed now that no one seems to remember General Schwarzkopf's remarks during a press briefing at that time in Saudi Arabia. It was on February 27, 1991. Here is what he said: The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go through the Iraqi tank barrier, get hung up in this breach right here and then have the enemy artillery rain chemical weapons on the troops that were in the gaggle, in the breach right here. Pointing to specific points. Well, the point is this. That nightmare scenario exists today since Iraq has neither signed nor ratified this treaty. Let us look at another rogue regime, North Korea. On March 18, 1996, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, forwarded to me a DIA assessment of North Korea's military capabilities which underscored United States concern with the war- fighting uses to which chemical weapons can be put. Now, according to that study, and I am quoting, ``In any attack on the South, P'yongyang could use chemical weapons to attack forces deployed near the DMZ, suppress allied air power and isolate the peninsula from strategic reinforcements.'' Now, in boasting that this treaty will make American soldiers free from the threat of chemical weapons, the administration either has forgotten or deliberately ignored the fact that North Korea has neither signed nor ratified the CWC and the threat posed by North Korea and Iraq and others here. Now over 30,000 United States troops face North Korean troops armed and extensively trained with chemical weapons. Key airfields and ports are within striking distance of North Korean missiles, and with just a handful of chemical weapons North Korea could force United States aircraft to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula to Japan, and in fact in the near future North Korea may be even able to strike air bases in Japan with chemical munitions. Without air support and reinforcement, our ground forces and our South Korean allies would be overwhelmed within days. The threat to the United States forces in the Persian Gulf being rotated from Iran and Iraq is no less troubling, Mr. President. The bottom line, I guess, is that rogue states--if you will look at the chart--see chemical weapons as the best means to offset the superior conventional forces of the United States and its allies. These countries continue to develop plans to use chemical weapons in the event of war, and we must remember I think, Mr. President, that each of these countries are state sponsors, Government sponsors, of terrorism and may supply chemical weapons to terrorist groups. So when the CWC enters into force, our troops will be no safer from chemical attacks than they are today because the countries of greatest concern have not acceded to this treaty. For the CWC to offer any improvement, however modest, to the national security of the United States, it must at a minimum, I think, affect those countries with aggressive chemical weapons programs, those countries which have hostile intentions toward the United States and the American people. I urge Senators, please, to oppose this motion to strike this key provision. Have the yeas and nays been ordered on the motion?

Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for that explanation. I think it was very timely. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe], following which I suggest we vote.

Mr. HELMS. In that case, I misunderstood the statement of the Parliamentarian.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe time has expired. Parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. HELMS. If the Chair will refresh my memory, a motion to table is not in order, is that correct?

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Science, Technology and Space Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on April 24, 1997, at 2 p.m. on reauthorization of the FY98 NASA budget.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules and Administration be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, April 24, 1997, beginning at 9:30 a.m. until business is completed, to hold a hearing to consider revisions to Title 44.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. I see. So the Senator from North Carolina feels that maybe they have had ample opportunity thus far into the debate. Now, I ask that the distinguished Senator from Minnesota be recognized for 7 minutes, after which time we will stand in recess for the policy luncheon.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before you rule, I would like to be heard.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask to be recognized for at least 10 minutes so that the distinguished occupant of the chair can be recognized to make a statement. While we get a replacement for him in the chair, let me say this before the matter gets too cold. The distinguished Senator from Indiana, in good faith, I know, raised a number of concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention in terms of this. Senator Dole, in a letter dated September 11, 1996, contrary to what the distinguished Senator from Indiana said, said the following: To achieve this goal, a treaty must be effectively verifiable and genuinely global--encompassing all countries that possess, or could possess, chemical weapons. If the Chemical Weapons Convention now before you achieves this goal, I will support it. Now, of course, Senator Dole wrote that letter in good faith, and I suppose that the administration has assured him, incorrectly, that all of his concerns have been taken care of. In any case, I ask unanimous consent that the letter written by Bob Dole on September 11, 1996, be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.