Pete Hoekstra

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield an additional minute to my colleague.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh from New York.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time I would like to continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers) who was successful in the committee in passing two important amendments to improve this bill.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I am probably the only speaker left. I will close at the appropriate time.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, as the designee of Mr. Blunt, call forward the second amendment.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I object.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to take the 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment, although I will not oppose the amendment.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. If the amendment were forthwith, there would be another avenue to deal with it. Reclaiming my time. The amendment is promptly, so that the committee can do the work that it is required to do and that the committee is required to do. This says we will have the committee do its work, and that the DNI will report back by January with this information that is critical to the House of Representatives. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I believe that the way the amendment is written, the committee can do the work, do it very, very quickly and get this bill and get this amendment back.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. At the current time and in the current form, I am opposed to the bill.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield for a question.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit sends the bill back to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions for an amendment requesting a national intelligence assessment on the strategic implications of high oil and energy prices for America. I would like to remind my colleagues in the House today that last year, when we did the Intelligence Authorization Bill, over 230 of my colleagues voted for an amendment that would require a national assessment on global climate change and asked the intelligence community to investigate that. This is a much more pressing and a much more serious issue and a much more immediate issue. This assessment would constitute the best analytical judgment of our intelligence community as to the outlook for supply, demand and prices for a variety of strategic energy sources. This assessment would also examine the plans and intentions of key energy-producing and exporting states. But most importantly, this assessment explores the national security implications of America's sworn enemies, such as Iran and Venezuela, using increased energy prices as leverage against us and our foreign policy goals. This assessment is timely and directly relevant to America's national security interests. This amendment stands in sharp contrast to the repeated attempts to divert precious time and scarce intelligence resources to discuss topics such as global warming, topics that merely advance an ideological agenda, rather than keeping this country and the American safe. Take a look at specifically what this motion to recommit asks the intelligence community to do. It asks the intelligence community to look at the plans, the intentions of key energy-producing and exporting nations with respect to energy production and supply. Energy-producing nations are changing their behavior. Why? For them it is less about increasing supply today because they are now flush with cash. Their behavior is changing. It also asks the intelligence community to look at the national security implications of potential use of energy resources as leverage against the United States by Venezuela, Iran, or other potential adversaries of the United States as a result of increased energy prices. Some call this the ``Iran premium.'' 80 percent of the world's oil reserves are controlled by government or national oil companies, many of them unfriendly to the United States. This assessment also would ask for the national security implications of increases in funding to current or potential adversaries of the United States as a result of increased energy prices. This year there will be a transfer of over $2.3 trillion from energy-consuming nations to energy-producing nations. The intelligence community should assess what the impact of that wealth transfer should be. In addition, the community would do an assessment of the likelihood that increased energy prices will directly or indirectly increase financial support for terrorist organizations. In an environment where America receives 60 percent of its energy overseas, where we are dependent on foreign supplies of energy, and where there are no indications that there will be decisions made to increase U.S. production, it is absolutely essential and vital that our national intelligence community does this assessment so that we, as policymakers, can understand the implications of the decisions that we make. We need this assessment. We need to understand how vulnerable we are and the tools that our adversaries may use against us in the future. For that reason, I urge my colleagues to support this motion to recommit. Send this bill to committee, where, on the Intelligence Committee, this can be done in a very expeditious way. To make sure that we get this information, this assessment will be required to be brought back to the House of Representatives by January of 2009. With that, I ask for my colleagues' support, and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. This motion to recommit is promptly.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I demand that these words be taken down.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I would also like to clarify a number of aspects of this legislation on behalf of myself and the distinguished Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Smith. We have faced substantial challenges in reconciling fundamentally different philosophies on how to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The text of H.R. 6304 was carefully, deliberately crafted on a bipartisan basis to reconcile these differences. Other statements by media reports, or the reports or work product of any of outside groups reflect their own views and should not be construed as determinative guidance with respect to legislative intent. While the text of the bill ultimately controls interpretation of the bill, we would like to note our understanding of H.R. 6304 as the Ranking Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary respectively on three matters within this legislation. role of the foreign intelligence surveillance court The authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or any court in approving foreign intelligence collection generally, and specifically the surveillance of foreigners located in other countries, was an issue of great debate during negotiations and the resulting text was delicately constructed. For the first time ever, this bill will statutorily insert the FISA court in a limited way into the Executive's Constitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence information targeting foreign persons in foreign countries. This unprecedented move was an accommodation to those who believed that the court could provide some sort of additional check to ensure that the IC is properly using its procedures to target a foreigner abroad and to minimize U.S. person information that may be incidentally obtained. There is no mechanism included in the text that would provide for a probable cause or similar type of review that the FISC has done in the past with respect to traditional FISA applications, but rather a method for the FISC to verify that the Intelligence Community is following the law and its own procedures when it targets foreigners abroad for surveillance under this law. The FISC is also required to approve procedures developed and used by the Intelligence Community. It is important for the FISC to adhere to the limited role set forth in the text of this bill, and to recognize that it is a different role from that which it has traditionally held with regard to traditional, individual FISA applications. This should not be construed as an opening to insert the courts further into foreign intelligence matters that properly lie within the Executive's purview. It is also important to note the flexibility that remains with the Executive Branch to prevent gaps from forming in the future that are similar to those we saw last August before the Protect America Act was passed. This bill permits the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to immediately authorize intelligence collection, as provided for under the law, upon a determination that ``exigent circumstances'' exist. While the text of the bill uses the term ``exigent circumstances,'' the use of this term is not intended to implicate in any way the use of that term in criminal procedure jurisprudence as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See, e.g., U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Rather, section 702 specifically defines its use of the term ``exigent circumstances'' for purposes of targeting a foreign person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States as those circumstances that will result in the loss or failure to timely acquire intelligence important to the national security of the United States. The compromise text was delicately drafted and reaching compromise on the bill was premised, in part, on maintaining flexibility for the Intelligence Community to immediately initiate surveillance in situations where intelligence may be lost, or not gathered in time to act on in a way that best protects the United States. This section is designed to prevent the type of intelligence gaps that put us in a critical situation during the summer of 2007. exclusive means Section 102 of the bill provides that the procedures in FISA and in the relevant provisions of the federal criminal code are the exclusive means for electronic surveillance. It is important to note that section 102 of H.R. 6304 denotes the statutory exclusive means for acquiring foreign surveillance. In enacting this section, Congress did not intend legislatively abrogate any inherent Article II powers of the Executive Branch. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001 (FISCR 2002) (citing the holding in U.S. v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) that the President has inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information). protections for electronic communications service providers The provisions in Title II set forth a process under which the Federal district courts would have jurisdiction to review both prospective and retroactive claims relating to alleged assistance to the intelligence community. The standard and type of review by the courts with respect to the retroactive liability protections were issues of great and delicate debate while this bill was being drafted. Careful and lengthy discussions took place about which court would review the Attorney General certifications, what the certifications would contain, and what the standard of review would be, and all of these considerations culminated in the text of H.R. 6304 as it passed the House on June 20, 2008. With respect to retroactive liability protection, the Attorney General must certify to the district court that one of two situations is present. Either the assistance alleged to have been provided by the carrier was authorized by the President, designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack against the U.S. after the September 11th attacks, and was the subject of a written request or series of requests to the carrier, or the carrier did not provide the alleged assistance. The aforementioned written request or series of requests must have informed the communications provider that the activity requested was authorized by the President, and was determined to be lawful. The statute expressly requires the Attorney General's certification to be given effect unless the court finds that the Attorney General's certification is not supported by substantial evidence that the statutorily required elements of the certification have been fulfilled. The provision also allows the court to review only certain specified supplemental materials (any relevant court order, certification, written request or directive) when considering the certification, and permits plaintiffs or defendants in civil actions to participate in briefing or argument of legal issues to the extent that such participation does not require the disclosure of classified information to such parties. Careful consideration went into the drafting of this provision, and the final text is very clear about what the federal district court may consider in its review under this section. The bill is intended to require and authorize the district courts to review exactly what the text of H.R. 6304 specifies, which does not include a review of the underlying legal basis for any representations that may have been made in a written request or series of requests for assistance to a company during the life of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Rather, these provisions were intended to ensure that any companies that may have provided assistance to the government did so based on their good faith reliance on specified representations made to it by the Government.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished minority whip, who played such a critical role in ensuring that this bill made it to the floor today.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to a member of the committee, Mrs. Wilson from New Mexico. (Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield 3 minutes to another distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).

Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time I would like to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa). (Mr. ISSA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I would like to yield myself the balance of my time. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the President, the leaders of Congress, faced a very difficult situation: to learn more and to better understand the threat that America now faced. They recognized that we needed to move from a mentality of being law enforcement to a mentality of prevention, that we needed to confront, contain, and ultimately defeat radical jihadists if America was going to stay safe. The President, the leaders of Congress, many of whom spoke today, huddled together and talked about the various strategies that they could implement to get a better understanding of this organization called al Qaeda, its leaders, its intentions, and its capabilities. Overarching in their discussions were making sure that the Constitution and the rule of law would guide their behaviors. As they considered various alternatives and discussed these, they implemented a terrorist surveillance program using the capabilities that in many cases are unique to America that could give us insights into al Qaeda, its leadership, and its intentions. It's not the President's program. This program was put together by the President in consultation, sure, with members of his cabinet, but also, very importantly, with consultation on a bipartisan basis with the leaders of Congress. These leaders in Congress were consistently briefed about how the program would work, the kinds of information that was being obtained, and how it was being used to keep America safe, all the while placing a responsibility on yes, the President, but also the leaders of Congress to make sure that the intel community was doing the things it was being asked and was being asked to do things that would be legal. The intel community has performed very well. They have gotten us information that has enabled us to keep America safe. The intel community, this administration, and Congress asked other parts of our economy to participate, private sector companies. They stood up and they did the job to keep America safe. Congress did the necessary job of doing oversight, and in 2004, we reformed the intelligence community. So since 9/11, many things have been done properly. The end result, as we've gone through this process, is that we have kept America safe. I congratulate the Speaker, I congratulate the majority leader, I congratulate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, Mr. Smith, for working in a bipartisan basis to recognize what needed to be done in allowing this bill to come to the floor and continue to move forward in a slightly different way than how we've been moving forward over the last 6 years. But the most important thing is in a bipartisan basis, we have come together on a national security issue to give our intelligence community the tools that they need to keep America safe.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank my colleague. One of the jobs that I have here in the Congress is to serve as the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, also having served as the chairman on the Intelligence Committee. Today I rise in support of Congressman Wolf's privileged resolution on cyber security to salute him for his efforts to educate this House and the American public about the growing threat to U.S. commerce, our national security, and the privacy of the American people. Unfortunately, some on the other side have attempted to scare the American people into thinking that the gravest threat to their privacy comes from our Nation's hardworking intelligence professionals. That's absolutely not true. Mr. Wolf, in this resolution today, reminds us that the real threat to America's privacy and the safety of Americans comes not from within, but from those who would do us harm from overseas. Mr. Wolf had the misfortune to personally experience this fact when computers in his office were compromised by hackers from China, the Chinese, in 2006. I agree with my friend from Virginia that his office computers probably were targeted because of his long record of speaking out against human rights violations in China. While I can't discuss the specifics of what we know, I can tell you that the leadership of this Congress, Republicans and Democrats, are well aware of the cyber espionage threat that exists. But what has this Congress done? Instead of working to modernize and strengthen our Nation's surveillance capabilities, the Democratic leadership of this Congress has sought to tie the process down in bureaucracy, in red tape. Some have sought to vilify the intelligence professionals we ask to form the first line of our Nation's defense. And in some cases, instead of talking about the threat to America's privacy posed by foreign cyber espionage and hackers, they instead point the finger of accusation at our intelligence professionals and innocent patriotic businesses that may at this point be helping to protect the Nation, the very same intelligence professionals and businesses we may turn to to help protect our Nation from the cyber threat. The threats we face are real. These are not just simple viruses, these are sophisticated attacks on a new electronic battlefield. They jeopardize America's security--politically, economically, and militarily. It's a global problem with multiple threats. Some of my colleagues have talked about earlier, there has been reports about what Russia did in Estonia. We know what countries have done against the United States. So Congress does need to face this and face this issue very seriously. Congress needs to ask tough questions about trade and technology deals involving Chinese finance and businesses. One of the things that we know, while my colleague brings up China in this instance, and the Chinese, we know that it is a global threat. But specifically about China the message is very, very clear, consistently over and over the Chinese cheat. We also need to focus on the real threats our Nation faces, not those imagined for partisan gain. And most importantly, and most urgently, again, to make sure that our intelligence professionals on the front lines have the tools that they need to keep us safe and to attack this cyber threat, this Congress needs to pass the Senate FISA bill now. Because this law not only affects how we track the radical jihadists who threaten us, it will also impact how we confront the cyber threat as well. This is a very sophisticated problem, it is a very serious problem. I congratulate my colleague for bringing it forward. This is an issue that I believe we can work on a bipartisan basis. We need to work on a bipartisan basis. But we need to do first things first, and the first thing we need to do now is get FISA passed, and do it soon.