Pete Hoekstra

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. There is an interesting article I would like to reference that talks a little bit about what the previous administration did during the 1990s. The article is ``Show Stoppers,'' and it is out of the Weekly Standard, January 26, 2004. It is written by Richard Shultz, who is director of International Security Studies at the Fletcher school, Tufts University, and director of research at the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in Washington, D.C. He brings up an interesting point. America has the best trained military in the world, regular Army; but then we also have some very special folks, Special Operations folks. Remember, the policy as he lays out here was that we were prepared to preemptively and offensively attack those individuals who we thought might be a threat to the United States. We knew who they were. The Clinton administration identified al Qaeda; they identified bin Laden as being threats. We heard that in our quotes tonight. But what Richard Shultz goes on to point out, he says not once during the 1990s, even though we on occasion might have known where bin Laden was, we knew where his terrorist camps were, not once did we take and use our Special Operations forces to neutralize the capability of these folks who we were relatively confident and who the Clinton administration were selling the American people on that these were a threat to the American public and to our military and to our allies around the world. We never used our Delta Force, we never used our Seals, we never used our Rangers to kill or capture bin Laden or attack al Qaeda training bases.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Taking back my time, Mr. Shultz goes on to talk about the Clinton administration's desire for preemptive and offensive actions. But they never took the step. Terrorism is a crime, they said. They said we will prosecute it afterwards. We will not use our forces for minimizing the capability of these people to wage war against us. It does not meet the Pentagon's definition of war. We are risk-averse. That sent a very clear message to terrorist organizations and rogue regimes like Iran, Iraq, Syria and a number of other countries that said the United States is not going to do anything. They may respond, but even if we attack their battle ships, even if we attack their embassies or their barracks, they will not respond or they will respond in a very minimal way, and they will allow us to keep moving forward and to prepare other attacks. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, candidate Governor Bush in 1999, he echoed the understanding of the threat that President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and others laid out. He called to mind an earlier time when free people were confronted with what he called rapid change and momentous choices. In was the 1930s, Nazi Germany is rearming, the British are reluctant to respond. Winston Churchill outlines to the people, the United Kingdom, what they are facing. Winston Churchill: ``The era of procrastination, of half measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, of delays is coming to a close. In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.'' For the United States, that day of consequences, the day where we suffered the consequences of half measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, of delays through the 1990s, we suffered that day of consequence on 9-11, 2001. We want to move on a little bit and talk a little bit about what Dr. Kay has found relative to what the National Intelligence Estimate indicated we might find, and this is the backdrop of what President Clinton outlined during the 1990s and the Clinton administration outlined during the 1990s about the dangers of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. It is in the backdrop of what happened on 9-11, 2001; and the National Intelligence Estimate indicated that since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical and biological weapons effort. What has Dr. Kay found? This is from a statement by Dr. Kay on the ``Interim Progress Report.'' He talks about discovering dozens of WMD-related program activities. Concealment efforts. So it is very, very public that Dr. Kay has recognized and found that the National Intelligence Estimate said Iraq has maintained its chemical and biological weapons effort programs. I did not say weapons; I said programs. It is exactly what Dr. Kay found when he got to Iraq.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, here we go on and we go back to President Clinton on February 17, 1998, talking about the kind of environment that we see in Iraq and the kind of folks that we are trying to work on and taking a look at denial and deception. But how did Iraq work? This is President Clinton's description in 1998: ``Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM,'' that is, the UN inspectors, ``would then uncover evidence that gave lie to those declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports. ``Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect facilities as inspectors walked through the front door. And our people were there observing it and had the pictures to prove it. ``If he refuses or continues to evade his obligations through more tactics of delay and deception, he and he alone will be to blame for the consequences.'' September 9: ``We've pushed and pushed some more to help UNSCOM,'' this is Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, ``break through the smokescreen of lies and diction put out by the Iraqi regime . . . '' `` . . . UNSCOM was able for the first time to conduct inspections of sensitive sites where it found new evidence that Iraq had lied about the size of its chemical weapons stock.'' These are really interesting quotes, considering the debate. We have gone into this war situation with a number of allies, but the President has been critiqued because there were not enough partners in the process. Here is what President Clinton said in a debate with Robert Dole on October 6, 1996: ``Sometimes the U.S. has to act alone, or at least has to act first. Sometimes we cannot let other countries have a veto on our foreign policy.'' Madeleine Albright's quote in 1998: ``I am going to explain our position. And while we always prefer to act multilaterally, we are prepared to go unilaterally.'' President Clinton, Time Magazine, 1998: ``Would the Iraqi people be better off if there was a change in leadership? I certainly think they would be.'' Remember, by the year 2000, the official policy of the United States was regime change in Iraq. 1998, President Clinton: ``If we fail to respond today, Hussein, and all those who would follow in his footsteps,'' and I think the President was referencing terrorist organizations that would attack America and other freedom-loving people around the world, ``and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity.'' This is President Clinton. And ``what if he fails to comply and we fail to act? . . . Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal.'' President Clinton, August 31, 1998. What we are seeing throughout the 1990s, whether it is President Clinton, whether it is the Vice President, whether it is the Secretary of State, or whether it is the Secretary of Defense, there is a clear pattern that the Clinton administration, rightfully so, identified terrorist threats, Saddam Hussein, and Iraq as a threat to the people of Iraq, as a threat to Israel, as a threat to the stability of the Middle East, and as a threat to the United States and the rest of the world. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I am joined tonight by my colleague from Georgia. What we would like to talk about tonight is the issue of whether America is at war. Were we at war in the 1990s? What was the reaction of the administration in the 1990s? What do we see in the year 2000 and beyond? And what have we found about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? First, were we a country at war during the 1990s? We have all the examples of the attacks on the United States. In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed. In 1996, our military barracks were bombed in Saudi Arabia. Our embassies were attacked in Africa. The USS Cole was attacked in 2000. In 1995, two unidentified gunmen killed two U.S. diplomats and wounded a third in Karachi. A Palestinian sniper opened fire on tourists atop the Empire State Building. In 2000, a bomb exploded across the street from the U.S. embassy in Manila. It is not only the high-profile attacks that we should be concerned about, but what we saw during the 1990s was a pattern of attacks against the U.S., against our embassies, against our economic interests, against our military personnel, and against American civilians. If we take a look at the quotes and the things that folks said about the 1990s and what was going on specifically, and maybe focused more on Iraq than anywhere else, you kind of get a feeling as to whether in the 1990s people in the administration understood the threat that terrorist groups and that Saddam Hussein posed to the United States. The question that some ask today, or the facts that they state today is that, well, you know, this all came up after 2001, that the data was fabricated. What did Bill Clinton say during his administration? February 17, 1998: ``Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut U.N. inspectors. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors. And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen.'' Again continuing, President Clinton in 1998: ``There should be no doubt Saddam's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that region and the security of the world. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us. In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction ready to use them or provide them to terrorists who travel the world. If we fail to respond today, Saddam will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity. I have no doubt he would use them again if permitted to develop them.'' A clear case that on February 17, 1998, President Clinton was not only aware of the threats that Saddam Hussein and Iraq posed but that the threat extended to people like Saddam and to different terrorist organizations. I do not know if my colleague from Georgia has any other quotes from President Clinton or not. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, there are those who say that this administration was the first to try to create a link between al Qaeda and Iraq. That is absolutely wrong. In 1998, again with the attack on the plant in Sudan: ``U.S. officials who declined to be identified told reporters that there were contacts as the Sudanese company was being developed between Al Shifa officials and Iraqis working on their country's VX program. `Iraq is the only country we are aware of that had planned to use WMD,' the officials said. The officials also said there is evidence linking Osama bin Laden. Defense Secretary Cohen has publicly stated that bin Laden had some financial interest in contributing to this particular facility in Khartoum.'' Where is that? How do we know if Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that? ``We know that he, bin Laden, had contributed to this particular facility,'' Secretary of Defense William Cohen, New York Times, August 29, 1998. Another quote: ``And indeed we have information that Iraq has assisted in the chemical weapons activity in Sudan.'' That is an op-ed by Samuel Berger, the national security advisor, the Washington Times, October 16, 1998. He goes on in that activity: ``And, indeed, we have information that Iraq has assisted in the chemical weapons activity in Sudan . . . We had information linking bin Laden to the Sudanese regime and the Al Shifa plant.'' National security advisor, Samuel Berger, op-ed, October 16 in the Washington Times. It is interesting. This link between Saddam Hussein, Iraq, terrorist organizations, and the threat that they combine to depose the United States and the rest of the world is not new. It has been outlined through the 1990s. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. It is a consistent message through all levels of their policy chain.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. We go on through the administration. Remarks by Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State: ``In this struggle our adversaries are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because there American dominance is well established. We must be concerned instead by weapons of mass destruction and by the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden bombs. These unconventional threats endanger not only our Armed Forces but all Americans and America's friends everywhere.'' Madeleine Albright in the Clinton administration got much of this right in perceiving the threat, as was so brutally proved on September 11.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Referring to Bush I, and, what, accusing him of inaction?

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, we are going to talk a little bit more about some of these quotes, and then we will talk about exactly what the Clinton administration did in the 1990s as they laid out the threat from terrorist organizations, as they laid out the threat from Saddam and Iraq. Madeleine Albright, subject: Tonight's air strikes against strategic targets in Iraq. ``This is a moment of grave determination. We have decided to use force because other means simply have not worked. Saddam's capacity to develop and brandish such armaments poses a threat to international security and peace that cannot be ignored. Month after month we have given Iraq chance after chance to move from confrontation to cooperation. We have explored and exhausted every diplomatic action. We will see whether force can persuade Iraq's misguided leaders to reverse course and to accept at long last the need to abide by the rule of law and the will of the world.'' It took 3 years before inspectors on a limited basis were ever allowed back. I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. There is no doubt that in the 1990s the Clinton administration, or at least the President, voiced the concerns about terrorist organizations, Iraq and specifically Saddam Hussein; but it was not only the President. The Vice President, May 23, 2000, during a conference breakfast with the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee: ``Despite our swift victory and our efforts since, there is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein still seeks to amass weapons of mass destruction. You know as well as I do that as long as Saddam Hussein stays in power, there can be no comprehensive peace for the people of Israel or the people of the Middle East. We have made it clear that it is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone.'' Al Gore, May 23, 2000: ``We have made it clear that it is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone.''

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time, in comments by President Bill Clinton at the meeting of the National Security Council, comments on the bombing of strategic interests in Iraq: ``I am convinced the decision I made to order this military action, though difficult, was absolutely the right thing to do. It is in our interest and in the interest of people around the world. Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles before. I have no doubt he would use them again if permitted to develop them.'' I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. If the gentleman will yield, this is the Vice President, or at that point in time the Senator?

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, he goes on in another talk with an interview with Katie Couric on December 18. ``One of reasons we are taking this action,'' and this is the Secretary of Defense, ``is we don't want to see it taken with chemical or biological agents, but we do know,'' not we estimate, we think, ``but we do know that Iraq has been in process of building that kind of capability. But we're looking at the intelligence very closely. We anticipate there will be terrorist attacks in a variety of areas of the globe, and we are taking whatever precautions we can against it.'' Remember those words, because we will get back to it in a few minutes. ``We are taking whatever precautions we can against it.'' And what is against it? The variety of terrorist attacks in all areas of the globe. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. If I now take a look at the report on global terrorism in 2001, what does it say? In addition, the regime continued to provide training and political encouragement to numerous terrorist groups, although its main focus was on dissident Iraqi activity overseas. But Iraq provided bases to several terrorist groups, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the MEK, the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal Organization. In 2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP, raised its profile in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by carrying out successful terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. In recognition of the PFLP's growing role, an Iraqi vice president met with the former PFLP secretary, General Habbash, in Baghdad. In January 2001, there was continued Iraqi support for the intifadah. Also in mid-September, a senior delegation from the PFLP met with an Iraqi deputy prime minister. Baghdad also continued to host other Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Arab Liberation Front and the 15 May Organization. There is no doubt that Iraq continued its connection with terrorist organizations. What happened in 2002? I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, what my colleague is talking about is that in 1995 and 1996 the Clinton administration implemented what was called the Deutsch Doctrine. John Deutsch was the director of the CIA. And, after some things happened in 1995, the Deutsch Doctrine becomes the official policy of the CIA. What does the Deutsch Doctrine say? It does what my colleague said, although maybe not quite as strict as what my colleague said; but it said, we are not going to recruit as human assets those individuals who have human rights records or who have criminal records; we are not going to recruit those kinds of people to spy for the United States. As a matter of fact, we are not only going to not recruit those people in the future, we are going to go and do what is called the ``Deutsch scrub.'' We are going to go back and take a look at those people who are working for us today. They have made that choice, they have left the dark side, they are spying for the United States, they are giving us the information that we need to be safe, but the Clinton administration says, thanks, but no thanks. You have a dark record in your background, you are out of here, leaving these people in no man's land and saying, well, let me see. I was a bad guy, I came over to the good side, and now you are cutting me loose. It was a chilling effect for the work of the CIA and the people that were doing the work in the CIA. It was a chilling effect, obviously, for those spies who were spying for us and now were cut off; and the basic message was, you are not good people to do business with. They think, one day you are going to use us, and the next day we are out in the cold. We get to 2000. And I wonder how many people in Saddam's cabinet room, when we watch him sitting at the table, I wonder how many of them had clean human rights records. I mean, remember, they hung thousands of people in their jails. There is evidence they might have used chemical or biological testing on some of their prisoners. They killed over 300,000 of their own people. They gassed the Kurds, they gassed the Iranians. Sitting in that room, I do not think there were a lot of Eagle Scouts. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the National Intelligence Estimate said, if left unchecked, Iraq probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Here is what Dr. Kay had to say, George Stephanopoulos, October 5, 2003: ``I think if they had, if someone had given them the enriched material or the plutonium, I think that it would have taken them a year or less to fabricate a weapon from that material. They had the capability, they had the knowledge, once given the proper material to very quickly develop a nuclear weapon.'' I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, let us not go there yet, all right? Because every year there is something that is put out. It is called the Report on Global Terrorism. And if my colleague will take a look, he has got the 1999 review of Iraq. I have got the 1998. Here is what it says in 1998. The global terrorism overview of state- sponsored terrorism. Iraq continues to provide safe haven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the former head of the now defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of U.S. aircraft. In December, press reports indicated that Abu Nidal had relocated to Iraq and may be receiving medical treatment. Abu Nidal's move to Baghdad would increase the prospect that Saddam may call on the ANO to conduct anti-U.S. attacks. Iraq also provides bases, weapons and protection to the MEK, a terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. Back in 1998, through much of the 1990s, it was clear, at least in the global terrorism overview of state-sponsored terrorism, Iraq has consistently been identified as a state sponsor of terrorism on a global basis. What did the report say in 1999? I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I think the record is relatively clear. In many ways, the Clinton administration in the 1990s got the message. After the World Trade Center bombing, after the U.S. barracks bombings, after our embassy bombings, after the USS Cole and as American civilians were attacked around the world, the rhetoric was very, very good. The rhetoric that came out of the Clinton administration said we are at war. We are prepared to punish and hold those accountable who have attacked us. We are willing to go in and preemptively attack and be on the offense against those who may attack us in the future; and we may even go it alone, because we will not allow another country to hold veto over American national security. They defined the war. They said we are at risk at home and abroad. Civilian, military individuals would be at risk; our allies would be at risk. Madeleine Albright identified that it would be an unconventional war. Parts of it would be conventional; parts of it would be unconventional. Some battles would be in the open; some would be in secret. We would use both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It is a violent and a dangerous world. Truck bombs, improvised explosive devices, small labs for chemical and biological weapons, weapons that could be delivered by plane, ships, missiles, or backpacks. You go back to the one quote I think you had from, I am not sure if it was the President or Al Gore, but I got the quotes here again. From William Cohen: ``We anticipate there will be terrorist attacks in a variety of areas of the globe and we are taking whatever precautions we can against it.'' Al Gore in 2000: ``We have made it clear that it is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone.'' I am not sure what quote my colleague has over there, but we ought to take a look at what the Clinton administration did in the 1990s.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, a couple of other things. We never used our Special Operations forces. But with all of this discussion about what capabilities do we have in intelligence, it is helpful to have a discussion as to what the Clinton administration did during the 1990s with intelligence. From 1992 to 1999, the intelligence agency, we decreased the number of agents we had in the field by 27 percent, we decreased the number of stations or locations that we had around the world by 30 percent, and we decreased the number of assets. What is an asset? An asset is a spy. We reduced the number of assets we had by 40 percent. We gutted our human intelligence capability. We have phenomenal satellites and different things that can do wonderful things in trying to help us figure out what is going on, but unless we have the human intelligence to determine intent and planning or to go inside of a building and see what is going on inside of a building and to hear and be part of the discussions, we cannot figure out exactly what is going on; and even if we have those people in certain places, it is still difficult to pull together the entire practice. But the reason we were kind of blind in Iraq in 2000 is that Bill Clinton's administration, President Clinton's administration, gutted our human intelligence. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 361) and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HOEKSTRA

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the order of the House of February 3, 2004, and as the designee of the majority leader, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 498) congratulating the Grand Valley State University Lakers football team for winning the 2003 National Collegiate Athletic Association Division II Football National Championship, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Res. 498.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the Grand Valley State University Lakers football team who, on December 3, 2003, defended their NCAA Division II national football championship by defeating the University of North Dakota Fighting Sioux 10 to 3. The 2003 national champions fought through the playoffs with a tight defense that limited its final three playoff opponents to a field goal each. The title match-up was a close, dramatic contest that pitted the 14 and 1 GVSU Lakers against the 12 and 2 Fighting Sioux. Ultimately, the Lakers emerged victorious after intercepting North Dakota in the shadow of their own end zone with 20 seconds remaining in the fourth quarter, spoiling a last-minute, come-from-behind attempt. Grand Valley State picked up its 240th win in school history with a victory over the Fighting Sioux. Before a national audience, Grand Valley State University avenged its heartbreaking 17-14 loss to the same Fighting Sioux in the 2001 title match-up. Finally, I would like to congratulate the students, alumni, faculty, and nearly 5,000 fans of Grand Valley State who trekked to Braly Municipal Stadium in Florence, Alabama, to cheer on their Lakers during a cold and rain-soaked afternoon. Mr. Speaker, I will include for the Record the full roster of this national championship team and their coaching staff. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers).

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.